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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

(1)

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (6 Dec 66) FOR OT RD

9 December 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 507th Transportation Group

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned from Headquarters, 507th Transportation Group for Period Jan-July 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
a/s

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FOR OT RD
660241

Jan 13

HEADQUARTERS
507th TRANSPORTATION GROUP
APO SF 96309

MACTM-AG

15 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Period Jan-July
1966. (RCS-CSFOR-65)

THRU: Headquarters
U.S. Army, Vietnam
APO 96307
ATTN: AVC-DH

TO: Headquarters
Department of the Army
ATTN: ACSFOR DA
Washington D.C. 20310

Section I

1. Significant Organization Activities.

The provisional Movement Control Group, Headquarters, Vietnam was activated on 15 September 1965 with the mission of supporting the Traffic Management Agency (TMA), Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). To further support TMA-MACV, the 507th Transportation Group was completely reorganized and alerted for duty in Vietnam. The advance party arrived in Vietnam on 13 November 1965. On 7 February 1966 the last element of the 507th closed in Vietnam and is presently performing a vital mission in support of the Traffic Management Agency, MACV along with Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel.

2. Mission: TMA performs assigned missions under the operational control of COMUSMACV with staff supervision exercised by J-4, MACV. The 507th Transportation Group, assigned to USARV furnishes the ARMY personnel to staff TMA. The following specific missions are assigned TMA:

a. Direct, control, and supervise all functions incident to the efficient and economical use of freight and passenger transportation service required for movement of all DOD sponsored personnel and cargo.

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b. Serve as a point of contact for all users of military highway, railway, inland and coastal waterways, troop carrier, and cargo airlift capability as made available by the component commanders; arrange for movement; advise and assist shippers and receivers to insure that such transport capability is effectively utilized.

c. Prepare and maintain in a current status, plans in support of war and emergency plans and such other MACV plans as specifically directed.

d. Operate MACV Traffic Coordinating Offices.

e. Control the movement into terminals in coordination with terminal operators.

f. Maintain liaison with transport agencies of host nations, host nation military organizations, and appropriate US Forces Headquarters as required to accomplish assigned missions.

g. Establish, manage, and control a MACV Connex Control Activity.

3. Organisation.

TMA-MACV is organized with a Directorate Staff and three Traffic Regions. TMA furnishes officers to the Combat Operations Center, MACV as the TMA representation to the J-4 complement. There are two liaison officers; one in Oakland, California, the other remaining in Headquarters TMA.

The Headquarters is composed of Directorates for Administration and Services, Plans, Systems, and Movements. Operations are contained in the Movements Directorate; organized with a Tri-Service ATCO, Land Movement Center, Airlift Center, and Sealift Center.

The three Traffic Regions and their District Traffic Offices (DTO) are located in Major areas throughout V.N. The 1st Traffic Region is located in Da Nang in support of the I Corps units. The 2nd Traffic Region is located in Nha Trang with DTO's at Pleiku, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Cam Ranh Bay. The 3rd Traffic Region is in Saigon with DTO's at Bien Hoa, Vung Tau, and Saigon.

4. Communications.

Communications linking the headquarters to the regions are telephone, sole user teletype and AN/GRC-26 Radio/Teletype. Both radio and teletype circuits cover all nine of our stations in RVN. TMA has crypto capability direct to MACV COC.

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Section II

COMMANDERS' REPORT

5. Operations.

The increase in U.S. and Free World Forces had already begun when the decision was made to have a Traffic Management Agency in RVN. The arrival of the first increment of the advance party in Nov 1965 was 4-6 months after the build-up began. The advance party began operations immediately, and attempted to introduce traffic management principles to replace the existing "Experience" methods. This necessitated a complete review and arrangement of all transportation resources. The second increment of the advance party arrived in December 1965. Complete organization of TMA in February 1966 enabled TMA to staff its various Directorates and begin operations in earnest. The development of the Traffic Regions provided decentralized operations with centralized control in meeting the transportation demands of the military forces. Cargo and passenger ATCO's have been established in major areas to insure efficient flow and reporting of passengers and cargo by the theater transportation resources. In addition coordination was established between TMA and major component commands providing transport capability in support of MACV. Representatives of Chief, Western Traffic Office, Japan, Military Airlift Command, RVN Transportation and ROK Transportation are physically located within the Headquarters for instantaneous coordination.

The introduction of Traffic Management principles in a rapidly expanding theater of operations was a difficult process.

The process was slowed considerably by the unavailability of two of the prime transportation capabilities, rail and highway. New operating techniques for the movement of increasing amounts of logistical supplies had to be examined in air and intracoastal shipping resources.

Traffic Management Operations in RVN are hampered by the situation in V.N. itself. It is difficult to provide transportation management to a rapidly expanding military effort. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that no major existing deep draft ports or airfields are controlled by US Forces. Similarly, a good part of the cargo entering the system is non-military in nature and disposition. The operating principles previously found adequate had to be altered to meet the often disruptive demands of the host nation.

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Sub-Section II

LESSONS LEARNED

6. General Observation.

Item: When a troop build-up is anticipated, a Movement Control unit should be among the first deployed.

Discussion: Prior to the arrival of the 507th Transportation Group (Mov Con) and the establishment of the TMA-MACV, Traffic Management and control of the movement of personnel and cargo was virtually non-existent. There were isolated transportation detachments operating on experience factors independent of each other. Little or no coordination could be made between operating elements in the field and management agencies in the rear areas.

Observation: An earlier deployment of a traffic management organization would have eased the movement of forces into a combat zone and would also have eliminated the need to break down the trial and error techniques that emerged everywhere.

7. Personnel.

Item: After the arrival of the 507th Trans Group, the TMA was required to operate with many personnel who were unfamiliar with traffic management and related procedures.

Discussion: Traffic Management type organizations scheduled for deployment should be staffed to the greatest extent possible with personnel thoroughly familiar with all aspects of transportation, particularly in the operations field. Trained personnel are immediately required in water, air, and communications. The traffic region offices spend a vast amount of time and effort educating shippers and receivers in Milstamp documentation. Although many of the small detachments were incorporated into TMA, these personnel did not bring proper documentation principles with them. Similarly, the bulk of the personnel making up the newly organized 507th were not adequately trained in Milstamp and other DOD documentation procedures.

Observation: TMA established extensive and accelerated on-the-job training programs to insure standard compliance with Milstamp procedures. This had to be accomplished rapidly to offset the already disorganized transportation documentation system.

Item: To adequately staff a TMA, personnel from other services are required.

Discussion: The nature of the missions assigned to TMA in RVN necessitates assignment of other service personnel. In a theater relying most heavily upon air and intracoastal sealift resources,

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experienced personnel from the Navy and Air Force are needed.

Observation: A cross service agreement for other service personnel has been submitted and some sister service personnel are presently assigned. This agreement calls for a senior Air Force officer as Deputy Commanding Officer and other senior Air Force officers in each Staff Directorate. ATCO personnel will be partly Air Force. The first traffic region commander is a Marine Corps officer in support of III MAF. Several Naval personnel have operated in Sealift center, Headquarters TMA. This arrangement is providing more professional knowledge and smoother liaison with the 7th Air Force and MSTS personnel.

8. Communications.

Item: To efficiently operate a Traffic Management Agency on a theater basis, effective communications is needed.

Discussion: Until the arrival of unit equipment in mid February, communications linking Headquarters TMA with its subordinate elements in the field was extremely hampered due to inadequate telephone and teletype circuits. Matters requiring urgent attention were often delayed for extended periods of time when telephone contact could not be made. Local communications also was severely hampered by lack of organic transportation. By early March, however, sole-user and radio teletype nets were established and have proven to be highly effective, even with the lack of sufficient trained operating personnel.

Observation: The advance party must have communications equipment to operate effectively. Sufficient amounts should either accompany the advance party or be made available in the area. (This applies to motor transportation as well as to electrical communications.) Generators must also be made available to provide emergency power when main power sources go out, as it frequently does in RVN.

9. Operations.

a. Sealift

Item: RVN Port Congestion

Discussion: The first major problem confronting the Traffic Management Agency was the backlog of ships in RVN waters due to port congestion. Lack of adequate berthing facilities, vessel control and sound management principles had resulted in, at one time, an excess of 100 ships waiting in RVN waters. Badly needed supplies and equipment were aboard

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some of the vessels and, in many cases, combat effectiveness of units was being affected by the lack of material to accomplish their mission. A vessel priority meeting was established by TMA for representatives from all the major commands and interested agencies. This meeting was used to discuss the needs and requirements of the receiving agencies and establish priorities for calling forward vessels for unloading.

Observation: As port congestion decreased the frequency of the meetings was reduced to its present status of 3 times weekly. Port congestion, although always a problem, has not reoccurred to the degree that it was at TMA's activation.

Item: Forecasting Vessel Arrivals

Discussion: Due to the overcommitment of cargo discharge capabilities at RVN ports, it was necessary to establish a forecast system to control vessels coming from CONUS and PACOM ports. Previously, it was extremely difficult to know which vessels were enroute, what cargo was aboard, and when the vessel would arrive.

Observation: In March 1966 a forecast system was initiated. Information provided to TMA Sealift Center from MSTs, cargo reports of shipments from CONUS and PAMPA, vessel stow plans, and manifests which were incorporated into forecast charts providing invaluable assistance in determining the arrivals of vessels.

Item: Providing Component Commands with Information on Vessel Arrivals.

Discussion: There was no established system to provide component commands with information on vessel arrivals so that necessary planning and preparation could be accomplished.

Observation: TMA initiated the Weekly Vessel Forecast Report to include comments on the port status of each RVN port.

Item: Sealift operations must be constantly examined to insure unnecessary intracoastal shipments of transient cargo.

Discussion: In December 1965, vessels arriving in RVN waters were destined to discharge at as many as six ports. At the same time, intracoastal shipping rose to a high in May 1966, as intracoastal capabilities increased along with total tonnage arriving from CONUS and PACOM.

Observation: Through coordination between TMA, the intracoastal operator, and MTMTS and MSTs, agencies controlling influx from CONUS, continuous emphasis was placed on single port discharge. Subsequently the

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average number of tons per vessel discharged at a single port has more than doubled between January and June 1966. This has reduced the turnaround time considerably between CONUS and RVN and reduced the requirement to tranship intra-coastally.

b. Land Movements

Item: Common service military highway capability should be available to TMA.

Discussion: At present, TMA has no control over military truck units in RVN. At times difficulty is experienced in moving cargo for components who do not supply their own trucks because truck units are controlled by a single component command. The problem is most acute in areas where limited commercial trucking is available.

Observation: Until military truck units are available in sufficient numbers to permit several units to perform common user transportation service, little can be done.

Item: The VN Railroad system needs connecting links to depots to be of more value.

Discussion: The two hundred (200) plus miles of operational track in VN offer only a 5000 S/T capability a month. This capability will be increased as more tracked areas become secure. However, spurs are needed in secure areas where major supply depots exist, i.e., Cam Ranh Bay and Long Binh.

Observation: Efforts to increase the tonnage moved on the railroad and the railroad system itself are made difficult because US Forces have only a customer relationship with the railroad. TMA does have Rail Operating teams in the rail system but their functions are limited to booking and supervising only the US cargo being moved.

c. Air

Item: Early development of scheduled airlift.

Discussion: Initially, all cargo and passengers were moved on special mission request only. Recurring requirements were also moved on a special mission basis. This produced an unnecessary workload and resulted in priority cargo undergoing lengthy delays at times.

Observation: The Traffic Management Agency Airlift Center developed a series of routine flight schedules for cargo delivery. This system has been refined to the point where, at present, approximately 75

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to 80% of all cargo offerings move by scheduled airlift.

Item: Encouragement of decentralized operations and establishment of firm agreements with the host nation on use of the transportation systems is required.

Discussion: Request for airlift from RVN forces are submitted through their Joint General staff. With the exception of cargo moved from Tan Son Nhut, ARVN requirements move through the airlift system as special mission rather than through the arial ports as routine airlift.

Observation: In order to increase the amount of cargo moved by routine scheduled aircraft, all shippers must be included. A continuous effort is being made to authorize RVN logistical centers to offer routine cargo to respective TMA agencies in their immediate area.

Item: Airfield Construction

Discussion: Expeditionary airfields in RVN are not constructed to stand up under sustained high sortie operation of C-123 and C-130 aircraft. In addition, rapid deterioration is common during the monsoon season.

Observation: During sustained airlift operations into an expeditionary field, the air-strips should be maintained by adequate engineer support. This would facilitate arial resupply of units and prevent a force from being partially isolated without air support.

10. Plans

Item: Continued increase in US Armed Forces units into RVN necessitates continuous transportation planning.

Discussion: Attempts to keep (current) transportation requirements are complicated by frequent deletions, additions, and changes in arrival schedules of units to RVN. Plans to project air support requirements for support of tactical operations are often disrupted by an extremely fluid tactical situation.

Observation: Frequent contact with JCS, CINCSTRIKE, CINCPAC, MACV,

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
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and USARV, enables planners to obtain current information to project
phased deployments into RVN.

11. Recommendations

None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



RICHARD P. JANESE
MAJ, ARTY
Adjutant

AVHQC-IH

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Period Jan - July
1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: @P00-MH
APO 96558

1. One copy of the Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the 507th Transportation Group for the period ending 31 July 1966 is forwarded herewith.
2. This headquarters considers the report adequate in content and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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