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AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
 AGAM-P (M) (28 Jun 67) FOR OT

6 July 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

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1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by COMARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
 Major General, USA
 The Adjutant General

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(Continued on page 2)

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Dept. of Army
Wash DC 20310
attn: OT-RD

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HEADQUARTERS
8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96238

AVCA QN-TG-SIG

15 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

THRU: Commanding Officer
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
ATTN: AVCA QN-GO
APO 96238

Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA GO-O
APO 96307

Deputy Commanding General
US Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DH
APO 96307

Commander in Chief
US Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, DC 20310

enc (1)
Attached are ~~six~~ (6) copies of the 8th Transportation Group's Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: PT 749

1-6 Incl
as

Wilfred M. Leatherwood, Jr.
WILFRED M. LEATHERWOOD, JR.
Major, TC
Adjutant

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3

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HEADQUARTERS
8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96238

AVCA QN-TG

14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

THRU: Commanding Officer
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
ATTN: AVCA QN-GO
APO San Francisco 96238

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, DC 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A. COMMAND:

1. On 1 June 1966, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport), was activated at Fort Lewis, Washington, per General Order Number 95, Sixth United States Army, dated 6 May 1966, and under TOE 55-12B, with an authorized strength of 13 Officers, 2 Warrant Officers and 44 Enlisted Men. LTC Marlin W. Ramsey, TC, 0704979, was the commander. All personnel were on station by 15 June. On 15 June, Colonel Joseph P. O'Connor Jr., TC, 040648, arrived and assumed command.

2. Training began on 20 June for the Headquarters Detachment and the following units, all of which were assigned to the 8th Transportation Group and activated 1 June:

- a. Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 54th Transportation Battalion (Truck).
- b. Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 506th Transportation Battalion (Truck).
- c. 297th Transportation Company (Car).
- d. 506th Transportation Detachment (Trailer Transfer Point).

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1

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AVCA QN-TG

14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RGS CSFOR-65)

- e. 509th Transportation Detachment (Highway Regulating Point).
 - f. 520th Transportation Detachment (Trailer Transfer Point).
 - g. 521st Transportation Detachment (Highway Regulating Point).
 - h. 522nd Transportation Detachment (Highway Regulating Point).
 - i. 534th Transportation Detachment (Highway Regulating Point).
 - j. 535th Transportation Detachment (Highway Regulating Point).
 - k. 536th Transportation Detachment (Highway Regulating Point).
 - l. 563rd Transportation Company (Medium Truck).
 - m. 585th Transportation Company (Medium Truck).
3. On 4 and 5 August the Group Headquarters passed its ATT and was determined to be combat ready.
4. 8th Group Headquarters supervised the embarkation of all subordinate units, and then departed from the port of Oakland on 24 September, aboard the USNS General Leroy Eltinge, arriving in Qui Nhon, Republic of Vietnam, on 19 October. The advance party, which left McChord AFB on 2 October arrived in country on 6 October. A base camp was established in Valle, "C" approximately ten miles southwest of Qui Nhon and on 20 October 1966, Group Headquarters assumed operational control of the 27th Transportation Battalion (Truck) and the 54th Transportation Battalion (Truck), at the same time conducting a vigorous self-help area-improvement program. See Incl 1.
5. On 20 November 1966, Col O'Connor was medically evacuated as a result of a detached retina and LTC Ramsey assumed command of the Group.
6. During the period of the report (1Jun66 - 31Jan67) the unit engaged in training for 47 days, spent 12 days preparing for movement, was intransit for 28 days, and was engaged in operations for 104 days. Those days unaccounted for were spent in organization of the unit, POR leaves, and awaiting port call.

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5

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AVCA QN-TG

14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

B. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE:

1. Enlisted personnel started to arrive during April and May 1966 prior to activation of the units at Fort Lewis and were assigned to various units throughout the post, pending activation of this headquarters. Officers arrived 1 June 1966, and NCO's arrived 13, 14, and 15 June. An accelerated unit training program was conducted during the period 15 June through 8 August, culminating in an Army Training Test and Field Training Exercise the first week in August. Preparation for overseas movement and packing of equipment was completed by 18 September. Personnel were given fifteen (15) days POM leave and all had returned by 10 September 1966.

2. Morale and discipline have been exceptionally high throughout the nascent period of activation and up to the present. Personnel were billeted in the standard Army wooden barracks and many long hours, seven days per week was the order of the day. The enthusiasm shown by young and inexperienced soldiers in pitching in and doing a job was especially gratifying. This enthusiasm has yet to wane.

C. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

In late January the Group was assigned the additional mission of installation security for this sector of the Qui Nhon area. This includes forty units with a combined troop strength of 5,500. Major depot activities in this sector include the Ammunition Supply Point, two separate storage sites for Class I, II and IV, Engineer IV, and the 5,000 gallon tanker parks of two POL Transportation Companies. This area of responsibility covers approximately fourteen square miles. Utilizing major tenant units, this sector is divided into subsectors, each with its commander and plans developed for mutual support against hostile activity.

D. PLANS, OPERATIONS, TRAINING:

1. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 8th Transportation Group began an accelerated training cycle on 13 June 1966 which terminated upon successful completion of the Army Training Test administered during the period 3-5 August 1966. During this training cycle the Group was also responsible for supervision and support of the training activities of all attached transportation units.

2. The Group Headquarters was scheduled for deployment after all other units had trained and deployed, but due to late changes in shipping availability two units deployed shortly after the Group deployed.

6

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14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

3. 8th Group Headquarters assumed operational control of the 27th Transportation Battalion and its seven truck companies within 24 hours after arrival of main body personnel on 19 October 1966. The 54th Transportation Battalion with four truck companies arrived 23 October 1966 and was attached to the Group. As the task vehicles for the newly arrived truck companies arrived in port, they were placed in operation within 72 hours.

4. The continuing mission of the Group is: line haul movement of all classes of supply, including bulk POL to An Khe, Pleiku, Phu Cat, and to task forces supporting combat operations; local haul to include water and aerial port clearance; and other support missions as required.

5. During the period covered by this report, 8th Transportation Group units transported a total of 265,699 short tons of dry cargo and 20,870,000 gallons of bulk POL. Total accumulated mileage during this period was 3,961,760 miles.

6. Although the TOE does not provide for sufficient personnel to operate on a 24 hour basis, operating conditions have required continuous manning for highway operations.

E. LOGISTICS:

Requisitions for much of the TOE equipment were submitted by the Group's sponsoring unit at Fort Lewis prior to the activation date. Material arrived slowly, leaving major shortages during the training cycle and AIT. Many items of TOE equipment have still not been received at this date.

F. MAINTENANCE:

Two medium truck companies (the 563rd Transportation Company and the 585th Transportation Company) formed on 1 June 1966 and were assigned to the 8th Transportation Group. These units did not receive any task vehicles until approximately 25 July 1966. The vehicles received on that date were 5 ton tractors (M52) that were hand receipted from the PDO yard at Fort Lewis. Each unit received ten tractors. Stake and Platform semitrailers, as authorized by TOE, were not received until approximately 1 August 1966, and then only ten were received by each unit. Later additional trailers were received and at the termination of the training cycle sixty trailers were on hand per unit. The 5 ton tractors, however, were not received during the entire training cycle and both units deployed without a single task vehicle.

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(RCS CSFCR-65)

14 February 1967

SECTION II. PART I

OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

A. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE:

1. Item: Unqualified Personnel Assigned to Deploying Unit

Discussion: Thirteen percent (13%) of enlisted personnel assigned were not POR qualified and had to be subsequently reassigned to units which were not deploying. Some of the disqualifying factors were:

- a. Underage.
- b. Medically unfit.
- c. Insufficient time remaining to complete tour.
- d. Board cases.

Observation: Agencies responsible for personnel assignments to deploying units should carefully screen records for obviously POR unqualified personnel. Granted, medical disqualifications are often latent. One to four weeks additional utilization could be had by US Army if POR unqualified personnel are assigned to non-deploying units.

2. Item: Department of the Army Controlled Assignments.

Discussion: Department of the Army directed the assignment of all enlisted men by TOE line item and OPO control number. However, eighty percent (80%) of EM actually arriving did not have the DA directed control number reflected in their orders. Personnel without the control number were therefore assigned to a TOE line number position compatible with their MOS. When requisitions were submitted by this headquarters to fill TOE position vacancies, DA cancelled the requisitions in many cases because records at OFO reflected those positions as having been already filled by the OPO line item control number assignment. Inquiries to commands losing EM with regards to non-arrivals were met with a lack of response. It was only after direct contact with Enlisted Requisitions at Hq DA that an agreement was established to accept the word from the headquarters on TOE positions actually vacant.

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14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

Observation: While it is recognized that controlled assignments are effective tools of personnel management in an ideal situation, adverse influences should be taken into account which inhibit the smooth functioning of this system. Losing commands should make greater efforts toward the inclusion of D. line item and control numbers in orders reassigning personnel to deploying units. Additionally, higher headquarters should receive weekly reports from the field to verify assignments as they are actually filled. Adverse influences include medically disqualified personnel, retirees, and diversion of personnel enroute to priority units.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

None.

C. PLANS, OPERATIONS, TRAINING:

1. Item: Poor road and bridge conditions seriously affect transport capability and vehicle maintenance.

Discussion: Maintenance of roads and bridges is an Engineer responsibility and performed on an area basis. The deteriorated condition of the road bed and bridges on highways 1 and 19 can only be alleviated by constant effort if the resupply mission is to continue satisfactorily. Although the Qui Nhon Support Command has responsibility for the intersectional transportation service, no Engineer elements are subordinate to the support command for immediate response when Engineer effort is needed. In a major portion of the Group operational area road and bridge maintenance responsibility is split between US and ARVN units. Response by ARVN units is slow and generally inadequate.

Observation: More effort should be expended for road and bridge maintenance and consideration be given to providing major command with control over units which have the mission and capability to respond to the commander's needs.

2. Item: Time/distance data is necessary for highway transportation planning and operations.

Discussion: Road conditions and security problems cause highway nets to vary from extremely poor to good and to be subject to complete closing with little notice. Road reconnaissance information is often untimely and unreliable. It is always necessary to test run a portion of the road before satisfactory planning can be accomplished. Map reconnaissance as an only means of planning is unreliable and should be used alone only when absolutely necessary. Even though the distance between two points in ~~the area of operations~~ is only 20 - 30 miles, it is generally

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6

9

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14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

necessary to allow up to 3 times the normal travel time for convoys to traverse that portion of the road.

Observation: Road and bridge reconnaissance information should be provided periodically to transportation motor transport units just as intelligence summaries are disseminated.

3. Item: The existing telephone system in the Qui Nhon area is inadequate to meet operational requirements.

Discussion: When a Truck Battalion with its companies arrived in country and moved into a relatively unsettled area, communications facilities were inadequate to support them. To telephone a commitment from Group Operations to the Battalion Operations (located only ten miles away) involved going through three switchboards. Insufficient trunk circuits existed and switchboards were undermanned, so that it was usually impossible to get through, and frequently when one got through, the circuit was of too low quality to permit conversation. Although authorized only $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles of field wire, this headquarters had to install a ten mile wire line, and spend an average of over six manhours per day maintaining that line for a two month period, in order to have communications with its subordinate Battalion. After two months a direct system was installed by the Area Signal Battalion between the first and third switchboards, and one AN/MTC-7 switchboard was replaced with an AN/MTC-1, greatly improving area communications.

Observation: The communications system in the Republic of Vietnam has been unable to keep up with the rapid expansion required by newly arrived units. Units must be prepared to help themselves until the area communications system can be expanded to fill their needs.

4. Item: Communications, both telephone and radio, are vital to control of convoy operations.

Discussion: Long distance telephone communications are unreliable in this area causing considerable lag time in operations. FM radio communications are good to a point, but FM radios do not have the necessary range for command and control of operations at the distant Trailer Transfer Points. Lack of information on status of convoys affects planning for future operations which often depend on close availability of vehicles.

Observation: Radios with increased range (AM radios) and FM radios at TTP's would provide necessary communications link between convoys and TTP's and back to Group Operations.

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10

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14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

5. Item: Radio frequencies are assigned on an area basis to avoid interference between stations using the same frequency.

Discussion: Too many units in this area operate on the same or close frequencies causing units to share a frequency or receive unintentional jamming. Transportation units operate routinely out of their base camp and frequently encounter other units on the same frequency.

Observation: Assignment of frequencies with a wider area spread will improve radio transmission.

6. Item: The 12 ton Stake and Platform Semitrailer has side, head, and end boards that are difficult to remove for cargo space access during loading and are difficult to replace.

Discussion: When sideboards must be removed and replaced as many as 4 times in a 24 hour period, the wear and tear caused by mechanical removal results in excessive deterioration of the equipment and slows down loading and unloading operations. Since the sideboards are held into place by friction, the heavily pitted roads caused them to jar loose and fall by the roadside. Sideboard maintenance and replacement is a major problem in this command.

Observation: A semitrailer with dropsides would be faster to load and prove to be less of a maintenance problem. Tie down chains with quick release binders would also be advantageous for many loads that would not require use of sideboards.

7. Item: Most dry cargo received in this command and transported on Group vehicles is palletized.

Discussion: Much usable cargo space and cargo capacity is lost due to palletization of cargo. Pallets are not standard for all classes of supply and rarely do they fit the cargo space of a vehicle to make best utilization of the available cubic cargo space.

Observation: More efficient utilization of transportation capability could be achieved by standardization of pallet size compatible with the size of the beds of cargo vehicles. With better utilization of cargo space less damage would be caused by cargo shifting in a loosely filled vehicles.

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14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

8. Item: This headquarters and 13 subordinate units were activated simultaneously for overseas deployment.

Discussion: Insufficient time was allotted for this headquarters to organize and train prior to assuming command of subordinate units. Too much time had to be spent in organizing the headquarters when this time should have been spent in assisting the newly activated subordinate units. Too often the same problem was encountered simultaneously by all units and each would attempt to solve it within their own capability.

Observation: Headquarters elements should be activated, organized and trained prior to attachment of subordinate units undergoing similar cycles.

9. Item: Units deploy to Southeast Asia still requiring additional training time.

Discussion: With the exception of headquarters detachments, all units were considered deployable but commanders recommended additional training time in-country. This was especially true of the truck companies who received minimal training on vehicle operations in CONUS because the vehicles were not available.

Observation: Sufficient time should be permitted to train units in vehicle operations after arrival in-country.

D. LOGISTICS:

1. Item: Immersion Heater 37 $\frac{1}{2}$ " is not authorized.

Discussion: Heater is for utilization in 400 gallon water trailer which is on hand. Item is not authorized in the command and it has to be turned in prior to departure from CONUS. Availability of item would enable unit to supply sufficient hot water to troops for personal hygiene.

Observation: Item is required by newly arrived units to furnish hot water for washing.

2. Item: Only one field jacket is issued to personnel.

Discussion: For approximately four months of the year weather is cold enough to require wearing of field jackets. Currently only one field jacket is authorized for each individual. Due to time required for laundry service, personnel are without a field jacket for a period of up to seven days. Evenings are cool and personnel are without adequate clothing when field jacket is being laundered.

12

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12 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

Observation: Personnel require two field jackets.

3. Item: Rifles receive an excessive amount of damage when they are bounced around loose in the vehicle.

Discussion: Rifle Mounts (MWO 9-2320-218-20/13) are available for use on vehicles to prevent damage to weapons.

Observation: Vehicle rifle mounts are required on all vehicles.

4. Item: Lack of administrative vehicles increase time required for newly arrived units to become operational.

Discussion: Upon arrival in country units must set up a base camp, including associated housekeeping functions. Lack of transportation seriously hinders coordination and availability of necessary supplies and equipment.

Observation: Administrative vehicles are required immediately upon arrival of unit in-country.

E. MAINTENANCE:

1. Item: Nonavailability of 5 ton tractors during training cycle.

Discussion: Organizing units must have available from the onset of the training cycle sufficient TOE vehicles to familiarize and train both operators and mechanics on the particular vehicle. In this case units received only ten (10) M52 tractors halfway through their training cycle and these were salvaged vehicles. When the unit arrived in country they received M52A2 (multifuel) tractors and the drivers were completely inexperienced as to the proper operation of this vehicle. As a result an excessive deadline rate, primarily due to the operator's fault, was experienced.

Observation: Units must receive sufficient TOE vehicles early in their training phase to fully train vehicle operators and unit mechanics on equipment they will deploy with.

2. Item: Nonavailability of Number One Common and Supplemental Tool Sets during training cycle.

Discussion: Units newly organized did not receive the Number One Common and Supplemental Tool Sets until a few days prior to packing. There was no opportunity to familiarize and train inexperienced mechanics on the proper utilization of these tools and test equipment.

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14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

Observation: Authorized tool sets should be on hand early in the training cycle to allow proper training of unit mechanics.

3. Item: Lack of required technical publications.

Discussion: Upon arrival and organization all units established pin point distribution accounts with AG Publications Center, St Louis, Mo. Required publications did not arrive in many cases until the training cycle was terminated and unit operators, mechanics, TERS clerks, and PLL clerks did not have the required publications to be properly trained. This shortage of technical manuals was especially difficult when formulating the unit PLL, as essential 20P series manuals were not available and thus units deployed with incomplete PLL's.

Observation: High priorities are required for deploying units at all AG publications centers. Based on TOE, sponsor units should establish pin point accounts and requisition basic regulations and technical manuals prior to actual organization of the unit.

4. Item: Misuse of Red Ball Express.

Discussion: During the terminal phase of unit's training cycle the requirement was established that all deploying units would receive certain Red Ball catalogs and requisition anticipated repair parts in accordance with unit TOE. The result was numerous repair parts requisitioned which were unauthorized and not required. No guidance was given on the proper operation of the Red Ball Express program and units arrived in country and experienced equipment deadlined for parts without any prior orientation on this expedited operation.

Observation: Units should be properly oriented on the operation of the Red Ball Express program in Vietnam prior to deployment.

5. Item: Insufficient training of multifuel vehicle operators.

Discussion: Insufficient time for the proper training of operators of multifuel trucks resulted in excessive downtime in organizational and support maintenance.

Observation: Insure intensive training is conducted to fully orient operators of multifuel vehicles in the following areas:

- a. Proper starting technique (change 2, TM 9-2320-211-10).

11

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AVCA QN-TG

14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

- b. Maximum RPM's to be utilized in operation.
 - c. Requirement to drain daily fuel filters.
 - d. Proper warm-up and shut-off operation.
 - e. Proper clutching technique (instruct drivers on proper method of double clutching).
 - f. Characteristics of the LD-465-1 (A) engine.
6. Item: Insufficient training time for organizational Maintenance personnel.

Discussion: With the requirement for mandatory training and POR qualifications, unit maintenance personnel spend the majority of their time attending classes on subjects of general interest. Little or no time was programmed or available for the proper training - formal or informal - of inexperienced mechanics assigned to deploying units.

Observation: Sufficient time must be allocated for the proper training of unit maintenance personnel. A considerable portion of time should be set aside to train unit mechanics on the maintenance of TOE vehicles, assigned tools and test equipment, and maintenance records. PLL clerks as well as TAMRS clerks require intensive training to be fully effective after arrival in country.

7. Item: Deploying units with incomplete PLL's.

Discussion: All units of this command deployed with insufficient and incomplete PLL's. Repair parts were not received in sufficient quantities to qualify as a condition indicator four (4) in block 65, DA Form 2715, AR 220-10. Units averaged between 40 and 60 percent of fill on computed PLL items. In addition, as previously mentioned, the nonavailability of required 20P manuals precluded units from requisitioning repair parts for certain items of equipment. Furthermore, certain items of equipment requiring repair parts (ie. generators, lube and service units, and compressors) were not received until the packing was initiated and repair parts for these items could not be requisitioned until model types were known.

Observation: Equipment requiring repair parts must be on hand early in the organizational phase. Fill on PLL items should rate a condition indicator (1) in block 65, DA Form 2715, AR 220-10 prior to deployment.

12

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14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

SECTION II PART II

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE:

1. That holding detachments be established to administer to troops arriving on station prior to activation of unit and that officers and NCO's be required to report to duty station prior to arrival of troops to insure that proper arrangements are made for administration and billets.
2. That losing units be directed to set up POR processing teams to insure that personnel assigned to deploying units are fully POR qualified.
3. That orders issuing agencies insure that all required data appear in orders as directed.
4. That personnel being levied for reassignment to priority units be briefed as thoroughly as possible if new unit of assignment is known to be deploying.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

None.

C. PLANS, OPERATIONS, TRAINING:

1. That road and bridge conditions be improved along Main Supply Routes.
2. That consideration be given to issuing AM radios with increased range to transportation units operating convoys beyond FM radio range.
3. That military design cargo vehicles be equipped with drop sides to facilitate palletized cargo loading.
4. That general cargo pallets be standardized and compatible with the dimension of standard cargo vehicles for better utilization of available cube space.
5. That Chain Load Binding (FSN 2010-803-8858) and Binder, Chain (FSN 3990-274-6746) be authorized in transportation light and medium truck (Cargo) units.

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16

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14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

D. LOGISTICS:

1. That immersion Heater 37 $\frac{1}{2}$ " be issued to units prior to departure from CONUS.
2. That two field jackets be authorized and issued to each individual.
3. That vehicle rifle mounts be installed on vehicles prior to shipment from CONUS.
4. That administrative vehicles be included in Red Circle T.M.

E. MAINTENANCE:

1. That task vehicles authorized by TOE be provided a deploying unit from the onset of its training cycle to properly train operators and unit mechanics in the operation and maintenance of vehicles they will have in country.
2. That organizational tools and test equipment as authorized by TOE be provided deploying units from the onset of their training cycle to permit inexperienced maintenance personnel to be familiarized and qualified in the proper use of this equipment.
3. That sponsor units establish pin point publication accounts for deploying units prior to arrival of such units. Basic regulations and technical manuals should be requisitioned by the sponsor unit in accordance with the unit TOE.
4. That publication requests for units deploying to Vietnam should receive high priorities. Publication kits, containing basic publications required in accordance with TOE should be prepared at AG Publications Center and be sent to units upon DA notification of activation.
5. That deploying units receive detailed instructions (and perhaps pertinent USARV regulations) on the operation of the Red Ball Express program in Vietnam.
6. That intensive training be conducted for operators of multifuel vehicles. Assigned drivers must be fully aware of the characteristics of this vehicle. Special emphasis should be placed on preventive maintenance and the importance of such maintenance to minimize downtime of the vehicle.

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14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

7. That intensive training be allocated and conducted for organizational maintenance personnel to insure unit mechanics and PLL clerks are fully qualified and familiar with unit equipment and maintenance procedures.

8. That unit prescribed load lists be reviewed for completeness and accuracy. Fill on P11 items should rate a condition indicator (1) in block 65, DA Form 2715, AR 220-10 prior to deployment. Equipment requiring PLL should be available as soon as possible so that repair parts may be requisitioned in accordance with the model actually on hand.

Martin W Ramsey
MARTIN W. RAMSEY
LTC, TC
Commanding

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19
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1967 RCS CSFOR-65

6 MAR 1967

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON, APO SAN FRANCISCO 96238

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O,
APO 96307
Deputy Commanding General, US Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH,
APO 96307
Commander-in-Chief, US Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 20310

Attached report has been reviewed and is considered adequate with the following comments:

a. Road and Bridge Conditions:

(1) An engineer construction program to upgrade classification of bridges and roads is in progress, scheduled for completion prior to the monsoon.

b. Telephone System:

(1) A 2,000 line dial central office exchange in Qui Nhon is expected to be completed by 1 March 1967.


(2) A 1,000 line dial central office exchange in Phu Thanh Valley area is planned but no completion date has been established.

c. Radio Frequencies: Radio frequencies (FM only) are controlled in the entire II Corps area by IFVV. Due to the limited number of FM frequencies available, it is necessary and encouraged that joint usage be coordinated at the lowest possible level.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

QNL 167

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JERRY F. HIXON
CPT, AGC
Adjutant General

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16

21

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AVCA GC-0(14 Feb 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967.
(RCS CSFOR - 65)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND, APO 96307

8 APR 1967

TO: Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96307

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by the 8th Transportation Group for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1967 is forwarded herewith.

2. Reference paragraph d6, page 4:

a. If sufficient justification exists unit strength may be augmented through MTOE action. A temporary moratorium on MTOE requests has been imposed by Department of the Army, but should be lifted in very near future.

b. Operating on a 24 hour basis is the norm in RVN for most units even though TOE's do not provide sufficient personnel for continuous manning.

3. Reference paragraph c1, page 6: Engineer resources available in Vietnam are limited and are insufficient to accomplish all work requiring engineer effort. Since there are competing demands for this limited available engineer effort, i.e., combat support, logistical facilities, line of communication requirements, etc.; it is essential that these resources be under central control at that level of command that is capable of determining the relative priorities to be afforded each of these demands. This centralization of control provides flexibility in application of effort, assures the availability of sufficient effort to meet the most critical requirements, and makes optimal use of the limited resources available.

4. Reference paragraph c2, page 6: Concur. The 517th Engineer Technical Intelligence Detachment 1, a subordinate unit of the USRV Engineer Command, prepares Line of Communication Reports which provide both narrative and graphical (annotated maps) descriptions of road and bridge classifications and conditions. These reports do not provide information concerning day to day interruptions that may occur. It appears that the best source for timely highway intelligence would be the major users of the roads, the transportation units themselves.

5. Reference paragraph c4, page 7: At this time, this headquarters does not concur with the recommendations to supply motor transport units with AM radios on a TOE basis. Continuous contact by a convoy with its headquarters is not required. Periodic contact may be necessary. The same is true for trailer transfer points which also have tactical units nearby which could supplement their available long distance telephone communications. It is suggested that communications by motor transport units be studied. Possible convoys could have access to LD systems by FM radio. Units will be informed of these comments.

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AVCA GO-O

SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOI - 65)

6. Reference paragraph c5, page 8: Nonconcur. This headquarters does not concur that frequency sharing is unavoidable in RVN due to the number of units. Transportation units operating routinely outside their base camp area should so specify in frequency requests. The unit will be informed of these comments.

7. Reference paragraph d1, page 9: The standard immersion heater can be used and is available for issue.

8. Reference paragraph d2, page 9: Field jackets are not presently authorized for RVN. DA is studying the possibility of equipping personnel deploying to RVN with a field jacket.

9. Reference paragraph d4, page 10: Units alerted for shipment to RVN are advised of requirement for advance party to bring administrative vehicles by message from this command thru HQ, USAFV. In addition, this command has forwarded this observation in after action reports to HQ, USAFV. The time frame for arriving equipment is from 5 days before to 2 days after the unit arrival time.

10. Reference paragraph 5e, page 11: The transmission used in subject vehicle is a synchromesh type and does not require the double clutch technique. Also, double clutching will cause undue wear on the clutch components.

11. Reference paragraph c3, page 13: Concur. Semitrailers with dropsides would greatly speed cargo loading and unloading.

12. Reference paragraph c4, page 13: Nonconcur. Pallets cannot be standardized for just one type of transportation. Many modes must move cargo therefore pallets must conform to the needs of the majority of shippers and forwarders.

13. Concur with the basic report as modified by the comments contained in the preceding indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

T.L.: LYNX 782/430

1 Incl
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Timothy S. O'Hara III
for
J. C. FINCHER, III
Copy to A/C
Asst Adjutant General

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18

23

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AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 67) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 20 MAY 67

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-OT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference paragraphs A1 and 2, pages 5 and 6; paragraph 8, page 9; and paragraphs A1 - 4, page 13, concerning problems of unit activation and personnel administration: Recommend that the comments of the reporting unit be forwarded to appropriate CONUS agencies for consideration.

b. Reference paragraphs C1, 3, 4, and 5, pages 6 - 8; paragraphs C1 and 2, page 13; paragraphs a, b, and c, 1st Indorsement; and paragraphs 3, 5, and 6, 2d Indorsement, concerning communications and road and bridge construction: Concur with comments of the indorsing headquarters.

c. Reference paragraph 6, page 8; paragraph C3, page 13; and paragraph 11, 2d Indorsement, concerning the requirement for drop sideboards: A requirement for 320 trucks with drop side cargo bodies and tiedown kits was established under ENSURE procedures. Initially, ten of these trucks will be evaluated in RVN by the 48th Transportation Group. Further action is dependent upon the results of field evaluation.

d. Reference paragraph 7, page 8; paragraph C4, page 13; and paragraph 12, 2d Indorsement, concerning pallet standardization: Concur with the comments of 1st Logistical Command in 2d Indorsement. Pallets are stocked in various sizes to accommodate many users. Palletized loads can be effectively transported on standard cargo trucks by building a platform over the cargo bed. This practice is used extensively in Vietnam.

e. Reference paragraph 9, page 9; paragraphs E1, 2, 5, and 6, pages 10 - 12; and paragraphs E1, 2, 6, and 7, pages 14 and 15, concerning insufficient training time in CONUS prior to unit deployment: DA recommends deployment of units based upon the unit's readiness report and the recommendations of CG, USCONARC. In several cases, on-schedule

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31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

deployment has been recommended for units reporting training deficiencies. Late arrival of equipment at CONUS station prior to departure is a common cause of training deficiencies. The time factor involved in obtaining the equipment and integrating it into the unit's training program would prohibit deferral unless the deficiency would significantly reduce the unit's capability to perform its mission. Concur with the observation that sufficient time for in-country on-the-job training should be provided; however, of necessity most training in-country must be conducted concurrently with operations and the performance of the unit's assigned mission.

f. Reference paragraph D1, page 9; paragraph D1, page 14; and paragraph 7, 2d Indorsement, concerning immersion heaters: Concur with the comment of 1st Logistical Command in 2d Indorsement that the standard immersion heater is adequate for unit's requirement for heating bath water. The 37 $\frac{1}{4}$ inch immersion heater, designed for use with the 400-gallon water trailer, is a WABTOC item for temperate zones V and VI, and for the Arctic zone. Unit can obtain additional 32-gallon cans for use with the standard immersion heater, and should ensure that immersion heaters are not used in water trailers lined with fiberglass.

g. Reference paragraph D2, pages 9 and 10; paragraph D2, page 14; and paragraph 8, 2d Indorsement, concerning the requirement for field jackets: A recent survey has revealed that a substantial number of field jackets are presently in the hands of troops, and units are deploying to RVN with field jackets on hand as organizational clothing. As stated in 2d Indorsement, DA is developing a plan for issue of one field jacket to each individual deploying to RVN. A solution to the problem of excessive laundry time will be provided by the receipt of 155 new laundry units and the establishment of 13 semi-permanent laundry facilities in RVN. The new laundry equipment is scheduled to arrive in-country and become operational prior to the end of FY 67.

h. Reference paragraph D3, page 10, and paragraph D3, page 14, concerning vehicle rifle mounts: Units can requisition and install the rifle mount as required.

i. Reference paragraph D4, page 10; paragraph D4, page 14; and paragraph 9, 2d Indorsement, concerning administrative vehicles: Concur with comments of 1st Logistical Command in 2d Indorsement. Arrangements with Transportation Corps representatives for shipping

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

administrative vehicles is the responsibility of the deploying unit. It is the responsibility of the host unit to provide administrative vehicles and assist advance party personnel in establishing supply accounts and obtaining in-country items.

j. Reference paragraph E3, page 11, and paragraphs E3 and 4, page 14, concerning technical publications:

(1) The requirement to furnish publications to newly activated TOE and TD units is a responsibility of the commander of the installation where the unit is to be activated. Provisions are made to submit pinpoint distribution forms and requisitions on DA Form 17 to obtain an initial library of essential maintenance and supply publications appropriate to the unit's type, size, and mission. This is accomplished by submission of DA Form 17 to the publications center with a notation "HOLD FOR ACTIVATION OF (enter unit designation)".

(2) Publications packets are furnished each separate battalion and larger size unit for information and guidance prior to deployment to RVN. Records reflect that a requisition for all USARV regulations was filled and mailed to reporting unit on 28 December 1966.

k. Reference paragraph E4, page 11, and paragraph E5, page 14, concerning instructions on Red Ball Express: Concur. Appropriate USARV directives are included in the publications packet mailed to deploying units. Recommend that the comments of the reporting unit be forwarded to appropriate CONUS agencies for consideration.

l. Reference paragraph E7, page 12, and paragraph E8, page 15, concerning prescribed load lists (PLL): This headquarters is aware that units are deploying with PLL's which are not in a category 1 condition. Based on deployment priorities, some units must leave CONUS with PLL shortages. The USARV Readiness Assistance Team makes periodic visits and is available on call to assist units in the preparation of PLL files.

21

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3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

m. Reference paragraph C5, page 13, concerning chain load binding: The appropriate procedures for requesting equipment in excess of authorized allowances are described in USARV message (U) AVHGC-OT 19073, DTG 251132Z March 1967, subject: Changes in Equipment Authorizations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



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E. L. KENNEDY
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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GPOP-OT (15 Feb 67) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 8th Trans Gp (Motor Transport)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 20 JUN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs with the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

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H. SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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