CAN NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS ATTAIN AND MAINTAIN A READINESS POSTURE TO PERMIT EARLY DEPLOYMENT

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CAN NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS ATTAIN AND MAINTAIN A READINESS POSTURE TO PERMIT EARLY DEPLOYMENT?

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Can National Guard Divisions Attain and Maintain a Readiness Posture to Permit Early Deployment?

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In the conduct of its national security policy, every nation employs some form of mobilization. With the ever-decreasing size of the world due to the technological advances in weapons delivery systems, the time for mobilization grows less and less. Couple this to a national philosophy that depends greatly on deployment of Reserve Component elements to meet the nation's contingency requirements, the necessity for reduced mobilization time for, and early deployment of, Reserve Component elements rises dramatically in importance.
This essay addresses the difficulties associated with reduced mobilization training time and early deployment of Reserve Component elements, specifically the Army National Guard of the United States. It concludes that postmobilization time can be reduced if innovative methods that exploit the One Army Concept, even though expensive in terms of resources required, are implemented.
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CAN NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS ATTAIN AND MAINTAIN A READINESS POSTURE TO PERMIT EARLY DEPLOYMENT?

Historically, the United States has maintained a relatively small standing Army during periods of so-called peace. The country has relied primarily on her "citizen-soldiers" during times of national emergency.

The National Defense Act of 3 June 1916 specified that the Army of the United States (AUS) was to consist of the Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officer Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the National Guard while in national service. Pursuant to that act, the US Army developed its two Reserve Components—the Army Reserves and the Army National Guard of the United States, and this general organization has persisted. Today, the Army consists of the Regular (or Active) Army and the Reserve Components. However, despite the fact that the Reserve Components have been a preponderant part of the Army of the United States, security affairs studies frequently do not consider them as meaningful forces if, indeed, they consider them at all in their analyses of the situation.

With the advent of the One Army Concept and with the draw down in the size of the Active Army following the withdrawal from Vietnam, "... there has been a demand for attainment of even higher levels of mobilization readiness of Guard organizations." Secretary Laird in his Annual Defense Department Report stated unequivocally that the National Guard, under the Total Forces Concept, would take on "... ever
increasing combat readiness responsibilities.\textsuperscript{6} The necessity for this demand is clearly evident when one considers that during each of the last four mobilizations and deployments of Reserve Components, virtually all units had to undergo a complete unit training cycle to achieve deployable status. Moreover, during World War II and the Korean Conflict, oftentimes the individual training cycle as well, either totally or in part, had to be conducted\textsuperscript{7} before the unit training cycle could be started.

In order to determine how the Reserve Component elements could attain and maintain higher levels of readiness to permit early deployment, an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) study group headed by Major General Ellis W. Williamson proposed 33 concepts dealing with this vital subject. The Army accepted 21 of these proposals for further study and evaluation, of which 11 either have been, or are being, field tested.

To answer the title question of this paper, namely, "Can National Guard Divisions Attain and Maintain a Readiness Posture to Permit Early Deployment?" findings and conclusions from four of the field tests are used. These four tests focused on those concepts concerned with the feasibility of reducing:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Postmobilization training time from 10 to six weeks by consolidating brigade and division level training after battalions reach proficiency (Test 2).
  \item Postmobilization training time by establishing higher training level requirements for
\end{itemize}
Reserve Component units which are associated with and supported by Active Army units (Test 3).

Postmobilization training time to produce combat ready units by rounding out an Active Army division with three Reserve Component battalions (Test 6).

Deployment time for Reserve Component units by utilizing one Maneuver Area Command (MAC) to assist other Reserve Component units during pre and postmobilization training (Test 10).

More detail on the purposes, objectives, and scopes of Tests 2, 3, 6, and 10 are at Annexes A through D.

It is interesting to note that for the purpose of conducting the OSD tests, Continental Army Command (CONARC) developed a series of objective tests to replace the more subjective Army Training Tests (ATT) and Operational Readiness Tests (ORT) normally administered to determine the level of training achieved by a unit. These new tests are based on the five functions of land combat (Command, Control, and Communications; Firepower; Mobility; Intelligence; and Combat Service Support) each of which has been subdivided into objectives, subobjectives, parameters and dataform questions. The dataform questions are for the most part, totally objective and can be answered by a simple Yes or No, or by recording a simple fact, e.g., a date/time group. To pass the tests, all functions must be passed. Passing a function is achieved by passing a prescribed minimum number of objectives; passing an objective, by a minimum number of subobjectives and so on down the chain. The prescribed minimum numbers or criteria were validated by an independent testing means. This objective style of
testing is new and offers many interesting possibilities. To explore it in depth is outside the scope of this essay, but would lend itself well to future SRPs for resident students at the College.

An analysis of the various OSD tests shows that the concepts for reducing post-mobilization training time deal, primarily, with how to improve the readiness posture of National Guard units during premobilization training. Even OSD Test 2, which considers: "Can postmobilization training time be reduced from 10 to six weeks by combining brigade and division level training?" is predicated upon the hypothesis that the battalions, and particularly the maneuver battalions, can reach battalion level proficiency in the first three weeks of postmobilization training. For the battalions to do this, obviously, they must have attained and maintained a readiness level during premobilization training from which it is possible for them to complete the Advance Unit Training (AUT) program during those first three weeks of postmobilization training. Implicit in this is the requirement that there be a high degree of confidence in the unit's premobilization readiness level. Planners must be assured that the unit cannot only complete the prescribed Army Training Program (ATP) in the three weeks allotted, but also do it in such a manner as to assure that its performance during the last three weeks of postmobilization training, will not degrade (or impact adversely upon) the performance of the brigades and the division.

As a general rule, the units of the National Guard attempt to
maintain company level proficiency, i.e., completion of Basic Unit Training (BUT). A close study of past training and performance records indicates they have not always successfully achieved this end. But, assuming that they had, reduction of postmobilization training time would still be difficult, if not impossible, based solely on a review of weeks of training required in the various ATPs to go from BUT to deployment status. Some ATPs call for more than three weeks time for AUT.

During Training Year (TY) 72, a concerted effort was made by the Active Army and the Reserve Components themselves to raise the readiness levels of the test troops involved in OSD Tests 2, 3, 6, and 10. Some of the means employed were:

Utilization of multiple unit training assemblies in order to reduce lost training time due to travel time,

Increased assistance by the Active Army, to include: lending of equipment; providing Instruction and Demonstration (I&D) teams; providing evaluators at weekend drills,

Increased quotas for the Reserve Component elements for both officers and enlisted men to various service and MOS producing schools,

Special courses developed for and presented to the commanders and staffs of National Guard units by the service schools, and

Special Command Post Exercises (CPX) and Field Training Exercises (FTX) developed, controlled and evaluated by a Maneuver Area Command (MAC) to train National Guard units in specific areas of
staff planning and operations. Yet, the results of Phase I, Test 2, indicated no battalion achieved combat proficiency. Test 3 concluded that "... all participating battalions failed to achieve the required level of proficiency...." The round out battalions, which are Reserve Component battalions, participating in Phase I, Test 6, were considered to require several hundred hours of training before they could achieve battalion level combat readiness. Test 10 found that "... significant readiness gains were not indicated as a result of utilizing a MAC to assist other Reserve Component units during pre and postmobilization type training...." On balance, the ten National Guard battalions participating in Phase I, Test 2, can be considered as representative of the training levels normally achievable by the Reserve Component units. Test 2 revealed that the infantry battalions were at an average of 6.6 weeks of a 13 week ATP; the armor battalions at an average of 7.1 weeks of a 13 week ATP; and the artillery battalions at an average of 4.4 weeks of a 13 week ATP, see Annex E.

The previous discussion has focused on the results of tests conducted during AT 72. Those tests dealt primarily with developing a data base by objectively measuring the training level of certain Reserve Component battalions. This was a necessary first step in the logic structure for coping with the problems of Reserve readiness and early deployment. However, the final answer to the question
of the feasibility of reducing postmobilization training time will come from the tests conducted during AT 73, particularly Phase II, Test 2.

During AT 73, a National Guard division for the first time was administered a so-called Division Postmobilization Special Training Program and Test (DPSTPT). This DPSTPT required the division and all of its supporting elements to be in the field operating in a tactical environment for 13 consecutive days. The purpose of the DPSTPT was to determine if postmobilization training time could be reduced from 10 to six weeks by combining brigade/division level training. The theory was that battalion and lower levels require three weeks and the higher echelons, if they consolidated their training, could get by with just three weeks more. Phase II, Test 2, thus sought to learn if brigades and division could reach deployable status in three weeks. Although the results of Phase II, Test 2, are not yet fully audited and analyzed, they tend to support part of the theory, namely that given combat proficient battalions, the higher echelons of the division, i.e., the division (headquarters and staff), the brigades, the division artillery and the division support command (DISCOM), could achieve a deployable status in three to four weeks. The "soft underbelly" of the whole theory is the idea that the battalions can achieve a combat level proficiency in the first three weeks of the six weeks period. During AT 73, the battalions were again objectively tested concurrently with the division special test. The battalion tests were similar to those which they received during
AT 72. The results, which although not yet fully analyzed, none-theless reveal no great improvement in their levels of readiness even after a year of dedicated training to raise their readiness conditions. The infantry battalions appear to be at an average of 8.7 weeks of the ATP (an increase of 2.1 weeks); the armor battalions at an average of 6.7 weeks of the ATP (a regression of .4 weeks); and the artillery battalions at an average of 4.7 weeks of the ATP (an increase of .3 weeks), see Annex F.

The results of these tests should be neither surprising nor cause for those in the active service to look down on their Reserve Component brothers as second class soldiers. The Reserves are not second class soldiers. They are first class people who are dedicated to the security of their Nation and who devote many long hours to this end after they have completed their normal, full time civilian pursuits.

There are many factors that bear on these test results, not the least of which is the general neglect of the National Guard in recent times due to the Active Army's heavy involvement and commitment in Southeast Asia. But more directly, the facts show that only a few of the division's officers have had extended active duty experience as officers. Additionally, many of the organic units have experienced an annual turnover rate of up to 30% of their key personnel. Another factor is the reorganization of the National Guard that has occurred from time to time and which thereby has required the officers and men not only to have to reorient their thinking, but to learn new and
different skills and techniques. In some cases, a unit has been changed from a line unit to a combat support unit to a combat service support unit and back to a line unit of a type different from what it was to start with. Yet another factor is the shortage of home station equipment and facilities. Still another handicap is the distance that must be traveled to an adequate training site (normally an Active Army installation), and the concomitant loss in training time, for company and higher level training.

The National Guard necessarily employs the Unit Training Assembly (UTA) system for training during Inactive Duty Training (IDT). Each UTA is four hours in duration. Thus, the 48 UTAs normally authorized per year for training are the equivalent of only 24 eight hour training days. Insofar as combat readiness is concerned, one must discount the time invested in travel, and in other requirements such as preparation for civil disturbance, riot control, and disaster assistance. While the latter is training, it contributes very little to combat readiness. Certainly, additional UTAs could be authorized, but the experience has been that this adversely impacts on the recruiting/retention program and employee/employer relationships.

But, irrespective of the foregoing and despite all the roadblocks in front of improved Reserve readiness, the constant threat, the steadily decreasing effective size of the world, and the declining strength of the standing Army combine to make the question of Reserve readiness more important than ever before. The Reserves must be ready for early deployment. Vital contingency plans are
based on fixed deployment schedules. The decrease in the size of the Active Army has created voids in that schedule. There's no choice but to fill the voids with National Guard divisions.

The mission of the National Guard is to provide trained units and personnel in time of war or national emergency. Now, due to the draw down of the active forces, this mission is more important than ever before.

In view of the above, it can be seen that it is critically important that the US Army find a sensible and practicable avenue to a higher, much higher, readiness posture for its Reserve Components prior to mobilization. In short, the higher the peacetime readiness level, the shorter the training time after mobilization, and the shorter the training time after mobilization, the faster the deployment schedule. All this means that commitments can be met and, thus, US security can be preserved. As General Harold K. Johnson said, "The basic concern of the military planner is the time gap; that is, the time between the outbreak of a conflict and the time at which a force of sufficient size is on the ground to control the course that conflict will take."16

Obviously, there are only two courses of action for filling this worrisome time gap. One way is to increase the size of the Active Army. The other is to upgrade Reserve readiness and rely on the Reserve Components for early deployment. It can be easily seen that now is not the time to opt for a larger Active Army. Neither the
Congress nor the people will stand for more men in uniform. Even if they would, the Army would be hard pressed to recruit the required qualified personnel. Thus, under today's conditions, only the second course of action is feasible. The US Army must plan on early deployment of the Reserve Components. The difficulty is how to get the Reserves to appropriate readiness levels. Considering the results of Test 2, a pure pragmatist might conclude that the Guard is at one of those places from which it cannot get to where it needs to go. This, simply, isn't true! But to achieve the appropriate readiness levels, the Guard and other Reserve forces will require the dedicated support of the Active Army. In short, the One Army Concept must be fully and totally implemented, rather than remaining a catch phrase to which we pay lip service.

Phase I of Test 2 generated an idea about how to overcome the above difficulty which seems feasible. The idea is largely the brain-child of Brigadier General Eugene M. Lynch, the Deputy Test Director. The Lynch Plan is founded on the premise that the main problem of training any division to a combat ready status evolves around the difficult tasks of achieving proficient combat battalions. According to General Lynch, this is ninety percent of the problem. The other ten percent is the job of professionalizing the headquarters of the division, of the brigades, and of division artillery and of obtaining an effective division support command. The importance of professionalism in these elements is recognized; however, it is altogether obvious that no matter how good this professionalism may be,
a combat division can never be effective if its "fighting" elements are not combat ready. Get the battalions ready and division deployment status will follow in a natural way in a relatively short time.

If the battalions are to be brought to a high state of premobilization readiness, the time available during Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT) must be devoted to those things and those subject areas that require repeated practice, drill and more drill. For example, all can agree that mortar crews must be able to place accurate fire, in great volume, any place on the battlefield within range. Their goal should be to get the first round on the way with the proper elevation, deflection and charge in one minute, or less, if in position, and within three minutes if on the move. As any mortar expert can attest, the achievement of this goal takes practice—much, much practice. The firing part is vital, but simple compared to the task of devising and developing the procedures, the teamwork, the esprit-de-corps, the pride, and the will to succeed in the crew. Overcome these type problems in premobilization training and postmobilization training can be significantly reduced.

The Lynch Plan called for a "battalion training center" to be established at the Active Army installation which is the primary AT training site for the Reserve Component division, and, hopefully, which is also the mobilization station for that division. The Center would be staffed with Active Army assets. Specifically, a small headquarters would be required for the necessary planning and coordinating effort. This element, perhaps, could be part of the
normal station complement and be absorbed in the G3 (or Directorate for Plans and Training) section. However, the main requirement would be an Active Army mechanized infantry, or armor, battalion reinforced with a company or two of the opposite arm. Obviously, this example is directed at a mechanized or armored division. The logic is that this reinforced battalion would be brought to a very high level of competence in order that it could demonstrate (as near perfectly as possible) every facet of a battalion operation in a combat environment. Thereafter the battalion would, during IDT, enter into three successive 10-week cycles as follows: In the first cycle, ten Reserve Component battalions (one per weekend for 10 weeks) would come to the Active Army installation (the AT training site) and the demonstration battalion would execute a "show-and-tell" FTX. The Guardsman or Reservist would marry-up with his counterpart and learn by observing. In the second cycle, the demonstration battalion, or selected elements thereof, would visit the Reserve Component battalions at their home armories, or Weekend Training (WET) site, and continue the learning process with their counterparts, using hands-on training supervised by specialized I&D teams. In the third cycle, which could be reduced to five weeks by bringing in two Reserve Component battalions simultaneously, the Reserve Component battalions would execute an opposing forces FTX under the close supervision of the demonstration battalion. This would be not a test, but a training vehicle which could be slowed or even stopped as necessary to correct mistakes. During AT, the opposing forces concept would again be used, but now the main thrust of this FTX would be as a training
The primary purpose of this test would be to evaluate Reserve readiness either to assure the Army that appropriate levels had been achieved or to reveal the scope and type of corrective action needed. This also, of course, would permit the determination of the amount of postmobilization training time required. A peripheral benefit of such a plan would be the extremely high level of combat proficiency attained and maintained by the demonstration battalion.

Alternatives to the Lynch Plan might be:

a. To designate Active Army units to sponsor like Reserve Component units and assist them with their training and training management problems. Such a plan would certainly add credence and emphasis to the One Army Concept. Further, the Reservist (or Guardsman) would be exposed to the more modern equipment normally assigned to the Active Army unit and receive the benefit of the latest technology, expertise, and experience of his Active Army counterpart.

b. To reorganize the National Guard to ensure that no units would transcend state boundaries; perhaps, this would mean separate brigades for most states. National Guard divisions should only be assigned to states (such as California and Texas) that can support the division entirely within its own borders. Organizing a division that cuts across state boundaries subjects that division to too many factors that affect combat readiness but over which the division commander has no control, e.g., policies and guidance of several Governors and State Adjutants General; multi-funding procedures; differing supply procedures responsive to the Adjutant General and
not the division commander; state loyalties versus loyalty to the division (afterall, except when federalized, the state, not the division, controls selection and promotion).

However, it is not at all certain that postmobilization training time could be significantly or measurably reduced by either of these alternatives. The first alternative would be subject to the variable of the proficiency level of the Active Army unit that was not dedicated to the National Guard training mission, as would be the demonstration battalion of the Lynch Plan. In the second alternative, though many problems would be resolved, many other problems that now exist in the National Guard units would still persist, i.e., obsolescent equipment, limited training facilities, and low officer/noncommissioned officer experience levels.

Though an in-depth study of these alternatives, and many more, would certainly be within the scope of this paper, the restrictions as to number of words permitted precludes further examination of the trade offs inherent in, and cost effectiveness of, these alternatives. Such cost effectiveness analyses, however, lend themselves to future SRPs.

Some fear that implementation of the above plans would degrade the readiness posture of the Active Army unit. This is not a serious risk. In fact, the readiness posture of the Active Army unit probably would be improved. Teachers usually learn more than their students.
It is concluded that postmobilization training time can be reduced sufficiently to permit early deployment of Reserve Component elements, particularly the National Guard. However, to do so will require the Army to break away from its old, traditional training methods and adopt an innovative system that makes a truism of the One Army Concept. Some may say that such systems are too costly. Those that say this will really be saying national security is not very important. The truth, of course, is that we cannot afford not to pay the costs, whatever they are, "... in order to ... provide for the common defense..." and, thereby, assure that Article IV of the Constitution remains valid--"The United States shall guarantee in this Union a Republican form of Government, and shall protect each of them (the states) against invasion...." For in the words of the late President John F. Kennedy, "... only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed." 

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FOOTNOTES

1. William F. Levantrosser, Congress and the Citizen-Soldier, p. 5.

2. Ibid., p. 13.


4. Levantrosser, p. 10.


18. Ibid., p. 144.

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   (A selection from President Kennedy's public statements from his election through the 1961 adjournment of Congress, setting forth the goals of his first legislative year.)


   (A review and analysis of the historical experiences of the four most recent mobilizations and deployment of the US Army Reserve Components--World War II, the Korean Conflict, the Berlin Crisis of 1961, and Vietnam in 1968.)


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(A synopsis of the Final Report, OSD Reserve Component Study, Test 2, PHASE I.)


(A detailed report of Test 2 and answer to: Can postmobilization training time be reduced from 10 to six weeks and if
so, can a National Guard division fully accomplish all TOE tasks? If not, what is the training time required?)


(A concise summarization of the purpose, objective, concept, scope and evaluation logic for the conduct of OSD Test 3 and the results achieved by each participating unit.)


(A report of the test results of three Reserve Component battalions (8th Bn, 40th Armor; 1st Bn, 123d Armor; 3d Bn, 117th Inf (M)) tested under the revised and validated Army Training Test (ATT) during June 1972. Additionally, OSD Test 6 Directorate developed training recommendations for each battalion to attain and maintain combat readiness prior to AT 73.)


(An in-depth study by an ad hoc committee headed by MG Williamson in which 33 concepts were proposed for evaluation/test. These concepts were aimed at improving the readiness status of the Reserve Components; reducing the postmobilization training time required for the Reserve Components; providing for early deployment of Reserve Component elements.)
PURPOSE, OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE: TEST 2

1. **PURPOSE:** To test the feasibility of reducing the postmobilization training time required to produce combat ready divisions by consolidating brigade and division level training.

2. **OBJECTIVE:** To determine if Reserve Component divisions will be fully capable of performing TOE missions if postmobilization training time is reduced from 10 to six weeks.

3. **SCOPE:** The maneuver battalions of one Reserve Component division will be brought to battalion level proficiency during CY 72, including successful completion of an ATT. This proficiency level will account for three of the six weeks consolidated postmobilization training. Subsequently (CY 73), the Reserve Component division will conduct the remaining three weeks of its training at a single mobilization station concentrating on several brigade level exercises plus exercising the division headquarters in a field environment. Simultaneous brigade exercises are conducted wherein the division headquarters directs and monitors movements and relays information as appropriate. The entire division will be administered appropriate tests during the latter part of the three weeks training to determine brigade and division proficiency. The validity of the special training program and tests for the three weeks of consolidated postmobilization training will be determined by administering the program and tests to an Active Army division during CY 73.

ANNEX A
PURPOSE, OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE: TEST 3

1. **PURPOSE:** To test the feasibility of reducing the time required for postmobilization training by establishing higher training levels for Reserve Component units.

2. **OBJECTIVE:** To determine if battalion level proficiency is an attainable and maintainable goal for selected Reserve Component units when such units are closely associated with and supported by Active Army units; and if not, what level of training can be achieved in terms of completion of weeks of the applicable Army Training Program.

3. **SCOPE:** Three battalions of the 40th Armor Brigade, California ARNG; one infantry (M), one armor, and one artillery, conduct IDT and AT in CY 72 with the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) providing support and training assistance. These test battalions are tested during AT 72 to determine the training proficiency achieved. Three like ARNG control battalions of comparable quality are tested also during AT 72 to determine the training proficiency achieved without the Active Army support provided the test battalions. The test will be continued during CY 73 to determine if the degree of training proficiency attained by the end of AT 72 can be maintained.

ANNEX B
1. PURPOSE: To test the feasibility of reducing unit postmobili-
ization training time required to produce combat ready units.

2. OBJECTIVE: To determine if an Active Army division (eight man-
euver battalions) rounded out with three Reserve Component battalions
(battalion level proficiency) will be fully capable of performing
TOE missions after about two weeks of postmobilization brigade and
division shakedown training.

3. SCOPE: Three Reserve Component maneuver battalions are used to
round out an Active Army division with eight Active Army maneuver
battalions. If necessary, the Active Army test division is tailored
to eight maneuver battalions for the purposes of the test. Prior to
AT 72 the Reserve Component test battalions are brought to battalion
training proficiency under the supervision and with the assistance
of the Active Army test unit. The attainment of battalion training
proficiency will be tested in AT 72 using refined battalions ATTs.
During CY 73, the brigade/division exercise and test phase of the
test is conducted.
PURPOSE, OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE: TEST 10

1. PURPOSE: To test the feasibility of reducing time required for unit deployment by providing alternative missions and force structures within the Army Reserve Components.

2. OBJECTIVE: To determine if Reserve Component units can achieve significant readiness gains by utilizing a Maneuver Area Command to assist other Reserve Component units during pre and postmobilization training.

3. SCOPE: The resources of one Maneuver Area Command (MAC) will be utilized to assist selected Reserve Component combat support and combat service support units in attaining higher levels of unit training proficiency by preparing, conducting, and evaluating CPXs and FTXs for test units during IDT and AT 72. Control units of like type and quality will be used for purposes of comparing progress achieved between the test units who receive MAC assistance and the control units who do not receive MAC assistance. Both test and control units will be given appropriate ATTs by Active Army teams during AT 72 to determine training proficiency achieved. Other tests, inspections, and reports will be used as available to assist in comparing the progress of test and control units.
LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY ATTAINED
BY
INFANTRY, ARMOR AND ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

PHASE I, TEST 2

-O- Basic Unit Training
-X- Advanced Unit Training

Source: Phase I, Test 2, Executive Summary

ANNEX E
LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY ATTAINED
BY
INFANTRY, ARMOR AND ARTILLERY BATTALIONS
PHASE II, TEST 2

-0- Basic Unit Training
-X- Advanced Unit Training

Source: Appendix 4, Annex F, Test 2 Final Report
ANNEX F 28