FUTURE OF THE ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS: IN-THE-FIGHT OR STAY-AT-HOMERS

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
30 December 1971
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December 1971

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BY

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NONRESIDENT COURSE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

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The basic question is whether or not the Army Reserve Components will probably be mobilized in a future national emergency or war. Experience since WWII up through Vietnam was examined. The present status of the reserves and the problem areas of personnel, training, equipment, facilities, and technicians are discussed. Current authorization and doctrine were explored and the author reviews a selective survey of views of professionals on possible future mobilization—all of which points to a policy of mobilization of reserves first, then a build-up by draft in future emergencies. A summary of specific recommendations for a more effective Army Reserve urges increased pay, educational benefits, and rotation of key positions for personnel; variations in Annual Training time, duration and movement; more home field training sites; and additional technician support.
FUTURE OF THE ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS: IN THE FIGHT OR STAY-AT-HOMERS

Our professional soldiers must still wonder why the Reserves were not called up during the large build-up for the Vietnam War. The Army Reserve Components wonder why, also. Maintaining a Ready Reserve involves substantial expenditure by the United States Government and a significant commitment by the individual Reservists. Whether or not the President or Congress will mobilize the Reserves the next time that a National emergency or war exists or threatens, is a timely and major consideration in our military strategy planning.

This essay on this aspect of strategy will touch on the role of Army Reserve Components beginning with World War II and will review briefly the present composition, strengths and weaknesses of the Army Reserve Components, the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (USAR). It will try to analyze some of the reasons for the very limited use of Reserves during the Vietnam War build-up. Lastly, it will explore the expectations and future roles of the Army Reserve Components under present policy. Entering into the discussion will be the role of the Army Reserve Com-
ponents in domestic crises and disasters, and the effect of the commitment of the Department of Army to an all-volunteer Army concept with zero draft calls.

**ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS: WWII TO DATE**

A war of the scope of WWII demanded every ready Reserve resource that we had. As war threatened, nearly all ARNG units were called by the President prior to Pearl Harbor, during 1940 and early 1941. In addition, many Army Reserve officers were called as fillers for both ARNG and active Army units. The total call-up of National Guard personnel during World War II numbered 297,000 and the Army Reservists ordered to active duty numbered 136,000.¹

This was the last real total U. S. commitment to a war effort. Hopefully future threats can be deterred rather than require war. This has not been the case since World War II. During the Korean War 138,000 National Guardsmen and 241,000 Army Reservists, in

¹ I. Heymont and E. W. McGregor, *Review and Analysis of Resident Mobilizations and Deployments of U. S. Army Reserve Compo...* (1971), Table 1, p. 2.
Units and as individuals, were ordered to active duty. Of the eight (8) ARNG divisions called, two (2) were deployed to combat duty in Korea, and two (2) divisions were deployed to Germany as part of our NATO forces.

In 1961 the Soviets turned the heat on Berlin. Additional active Army forces were deployed to Europe, and the President called two ARNG divisions, plus other units for active duty in Federal Service. National Guardsmen called numbered 44,000. Also ordered to active duty were 68,000 Army Reservists. Major George Fielding Elliott, well-known military analyst, suggests that Chairman Krushchev, of the U.S.S.R., read our intentions seriously, significant of which was the call-up of Reserve components. Mr. Krushchev himself, in his own memoirs, takes no note of this, and treats the whole Berlin crisis of 1961 very lightly. Notwithstanding world

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5 Heymont and McGregor, Table 1, p. 2.
divergence of opinion, we obtained the desired results.

A year later Krushchev tried to employ missiles in Cuba, but backed down upon deployment of our standing forces. No Army Reserve Components were called at that time.

Another very major role for Army Reserve components since World War II has been in natural disasters and civil disturbances. Since World War II up through September 1970, the Army National Guard has been called 379 times under State control, much more frequently during the last 10 years. The National Guard under Federal call has been activated 12 times since 1945 for civil disturbances, normally after State National Guard efforts have been applied and where additional reinforcement was necessary.  

In the Vietnam War very little use was made of Army Reserve Components. It is worthy of more study because it was a very recent consideration. Our involvement in the Vietnam War started with military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam in repelling an externally

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8 Jack D. Kaufman, LTC, The Effects of an All-Volunteer Army on the Reserve Components. Essay (Carlisle Barracks, 5 November 1970) p. 8
directed guerrilla war. As the war developed, American special forces groups, helicopter aviation units, tactical Air Force, and combat service support units were committed. It wasn’t until 1965 after the Gulf of Tonkin events that President Johnson committed any American ground combat forces and then it was for the main purpose of protecting and providing security for our own installations. Later, in June 1965, as the war was escalated by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, President Johnson authorized the commitment of Army ground combat forces to independent military action in Vietnam.  

From there the build-up of the Army and the deployment to Vietnam continued through '65, '66, '67 and '68. This build-up in Vietnam was beyond the capability of the active Army to sustain, along with its other missions in support of NATO land forces, and also maintaining a strategic reserve in the continental United States (CONUS). The alternative courses of action were whether to build up the active Army with draftees or to call up Army Reserve components, or both. Missions for the Reserves could be either strategic reserve in CONUS, a training mission in preparation for deployment overseas, and/or the mis-

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sion of fillers or replacements for existing units and for activation of new active Army units. A military journal stated, "Three times the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a Reserve Forces call-up to meet Vietnam war requirements . . . Three times they were told 'no'..."

President Johnson, in his memoirs, has explained for the first time in greater detail publicly, his reluctance to alarm the world through mobilization of Reserve components in significant numbers for possible combat deployment or else to release other forces for combat deployment. He felt reserve mobilization would additionally alarm the world community more than our other combat activity on the ground in Vietnam or in the air. To the Reservist who is ready to go, this is hard then, as now, to fully comprehend.

Draft calls were greatly increased and new units were activated in the active Army. Not until 1968 were any Reserve components ordered or called to active duty. Eventually some 12,000 men of the ARNG were called and 5,000 from the USAR were ordered to active duty, mostly small units. In addition, from early in the war, R.O.T.C.

11 Johnson, pp. 143-146.
graduates were called as individuals to serve a two-year obligatory tour of extended active duty.\textsuperscript{12} Realizing that our forces in Vietnam totalled approximately 540,000 at the peak in 1968, the number from the ARNG and USAR that were eventually deployed to Vietnam were small in quantity, but the types of the units and their missions were vital to the overall forces in the theater.

At this point we can only speculate whether a posture presented to the world of extensive mobilization would have changed world opinion one bit. Particularly would it have had any reaction whatsoever by our enemy in North Vietnam, or by the U.S.S.R., or Red China? However, reserve mobilization as compared to the use of draftees might possibly have had a lesser dividing effect on American public opinion.

Perhaps at this point we should re-analyze the mission and status of the Army Reserve components in light of recent events and current doctrine. Will they be "In-The-Fight" or "Stay-at-Homers"?

\textbf{MISSION AND STATUS OF ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS}

In the U. S. Code, Title 10, Section 262, the mission or purpose of

all reserve components is simply spelled out:

The purpose of each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the Armed Forces in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the National security requires, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, during and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components. 13

The objective of the Army Reserve Components is best spelled out in Army Regulations 135-1:

"The principal objective of the Reserve Component Units of the Army is to attain and sustain a degree of readiness which will support requirements of approved Army plans and programs as outlined in AR135-10." 14

Starting in 1964, the Congress established an annual manpower level for each of the Reserve components. The Department of Defense budget for fiscal year '72 calls for strengths of 308,000 in the USAR and 400,000 in the ARNG. These figures, together, represent level trends over the last four (4) years. Reserve Component Strength (in paid status) in recent fiscal years is as follows: (End of fiscal

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13 U. S. Code, Title 10, Section 262.
years in thousands )

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<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>312</td>
<td>308</td>
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<td>308</td>
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<td>728</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>717</td>
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In addition there are over a million men in a non-paid status in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

Major types of units under current organization are as follows: 8 divisions and 18 separate combat brigades in the ARNG; 3 combat brigades in the USAR; 13 training divisions in the USAR; numerous combat support and combat service support units of all types in both; 50 State ARNG headquarters; 18 USAR regional headquarters; and 99 USAR Schools.

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19 Ibid, p. 12.
Some of the chief problem areas for the Army Reserve Components which we should spotlight as being present and future problems fall under five headings: (1) personnel procurement and retention, (2) individual and unit training, (3) equipment, (4) training areas, and (5) technicians (full-time civilian employees assigned to handle administrative and technical support duties with Reserve Component units).

Procurement of new personnel has not been a problem during the Vietnam War buildup because of pressure of the draft; most units have had waiting lists of men trying to get in. However, as we aim towards the zero draft this pressure will be non-existent, unless it is decided to draft young men for tours of duty in the Reserve Components to take up anticipated shortages of personnel.\(^2^1\)

More reliance on reserves and more call-up of reserves will further reduce recruitments as our future strategy indicates heavier reliance on the Reserve forces. Hand-in-hand with the recruiting problem is the retention of company grade officers, non-commissioned officers (NCO's)

\(^2^1\) "Draft Being Considered to Fill National Guard, Reserve Rolls," The Burlington Free Press (Burlington, Vt.) 7 October 1971, p. 18.
and key specialists in the Reserve Components beyond their term of obligated service. The Gates Commission Report explored this and dismissed the matter of retention as not being a problem, with extensive calculations and estimates to show that by increasing the pay that all will be well. 22

Individual and unit training is the primary task in any Reserve Component unit. Under Army Regulations (AR) 135-8 standards of unit readiness condition (REDCON) can be determined based on unit strength, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) qualification, training status, equipment on hand, equipment deployability, and technician support. 23

The required REDCON is specified under Army Regulation 135-10. 24 Turnover and lack of retention of personnel, lack of equipment during the last several years, and lack of sufficient technician support, are some of the leading causes for REDCON deficiencies. Adding to the training bur-

den are the number of skills or MOS qualifications that are required in each unit and which require school training in Army Service Schools during active duty for training, attendance at MOS courses at USAR Schools or resident attendance at service schools for the period of MOS training.

LTG Peers, recent Chief, Office of Reserve Components of the Army, recently reported:

"Annual Training 1971 was the best I have observed to date.

... Our training objective is to attain and sustain company-level readiness ... Several of the early deployment units have already attained this level and in some cases have initiated training at the battalion level. By the end of AT72, approximately 75 percent of the Reserve Component units will have achieved their training objective."

Equipment shortages are being relieved with the Vietnam wind-down. Defense Secretary Laird describes the situation as follows:

"It is estimated that at the end of 1970 Army Reserve Components had on hand about $1.6 billion worth of combat serviceable equipment, as against mobilization requirements of about $6.1 billion, and within that amount training requirements of $3.8 billion in equipment. ... FY 1970 ... $300 million of serviceable equipment was issued to Reserve Com-

ponent units in that year... between $450 and $600 million in equipment were provided in FY 1971, and at least $500 million more in FY 1972."

"One specific indication of progress in equipping levels is that 10 brigades are earmarked in our plans for early deployment in the event of a major contingency, and they are expected to have 80% of their full equipment allowances by the end of 1971. The 80% level is the amount authorized for training purposes prior to mobilization (the balance of their equipment allowance would be maintained in depot stocks earmarked for their use in event of mobilization.)"26

Facilities for regular drill training and summer training are another serious problem. Most units drill in urban Armory and Reserve Center locations and some are fortunate enough to have nearby outdoor training sites or access to an Army Post where firing and maneuver can take place. However, home training sites are not available to all units. Annual training is usually accomplished at some distant facility, mainly set aside for this purpose only, and this provides a place where, under summer weather conditions, most units can go into the field to "move, shoot, and communicate," the most basic ingredients of training for any functioning unit.

Last of the problem areas is the lack of technicians, not only for ad-

ministrative work, but also for knowledge of equipment and for performance of maintenance on it. It appears even now as the equipment levels and units are very substantially moving upward, together with DOD funding for same, storage or parking areas for placing equipment at home station and knowledgeable mechanics to supervise and give maintenance training, either as full-time technicians or part-time Reservists, is sadly lacking.

**AUTHORIZATION**

As we talk about the present state of readiness, and some of the problem areas, we then should move into the statutory authorization for the use of Reserve components, a prime factor that our military planner must consider as they develop their strategic plans.

First of all, the Constitution states in "Powers Vested in Congress": Article I, Section 8, para. 15 and 16: "To provide for calling forth the militia . . . ." and also it states: "To provide for organizing, arming, disciplining, the militia"27 . . .

There certainly is Congressional legislation on the books with quite specific authorization for the President to declare a National emergency

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and call-up Reserve components of the Armed Forces in strengths up to one million men for up to 24 months of service.\textsuperscript{28} Although the President can only declare a National emergency, Congress can either declare a National emergency or declare a state of war.

In addition to the U. S. Code, the Department of Defense has published directives and these in turn are reflected in Army Regulations, all of which provide for mobilization of units and individuals of the Army Reserve Components of the Ready Reserve.\textsuperscript{29} Further action by Congress would be required to authorize mobilization of the Standby or Retired Reserve. Although in the recent Vietnam conflict the President was reluctant to use his authority for a Reserve call-up, in recent years there has not been an incident, even in the absence of hostilities, where a President has failed to obtain Congressional support for mobilization when requested in the face of a National emergency. However, it is understandable that any President feels a tremendous mantle of responsibility when he commits members of our Armed Forces, either Reserves or active forces, to open

\textsuperscript{28} U. S. Code, Title 10, Section 673.

hostility, and that he will use a great amount of consideration in coming to such a decision. He will be judged by U. S. public opinion, by the U. S. electorate, by the world, by history, by his conscience and by his Deity. In the case of the Berlin Crisis, President Kennedy felt the call-up of Reserves would retard the aggressive actions of the Soviet Union, and history appears to confirm this. On the other hand, President Johnson was reluctant to stir up adverse and reactionary world opinion which he felt might come about as a result of the ordering up of Reserve units; his thought being to do it more gradually with the use of the active Army and the draft, and to keep the level of war below even the Partial Mobilization level.

Lastly, of course, with regard to authorization for ordering up units, we should note that the Governors of each state, normally through their respective Adjutant Generals, can call members of their own State National Guard into State service in instances of natural or manmade disasters, civil disturbances, insurrection, mutiny, or any other situation where regular police and local authorities are unable to control or prevent the situation from getting out of hand. This is well-known and amply demonstrated in recent years, but it is one more element of authority for the use of Army Reserve Components. Further, in event of a Federal call
of ARNG units from selected states or from all states, there are Federal and state statutory provisions for reconstituting State Defense Forces, as needed, until mobilized units are demobilized and returned to State control.

NIXON ADMINISTRATION DOCTRINE

This essay should review briefly the present doctrine as promulgated by the President and the Secretary of Defense, with particular emphasis on our military strategy and its effect on future roles for the Army Reserve Components. In President Nixon's report to the Congress in February of 1970 outlining U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, he established the three basic principles for our Foreign Policy:

"Peace Requires Partnership (The Nixon Doctrine) . . . .

"Peace Requires Strength . . . .

"Peace Requires a Willingness to Negotiate" 31

Further in his report to Congress, he develops the shaping of our Military posture:

"In the effort to harmonize doctrine and capability, we chose what is best described as the '1-1/2 war' strategy.

30 Eliot, p. 75
Under it we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia and contending with a contingency elsewhere.

"To meet the requirements of strategy we adopted, we will maintain the required ground and supporting tactical Air Forces in Europe and Asia, together with naval and air forces. At the same time, we will retain adequate active forces in addition to a full complement of Reserve Forces based in the United States . . ." 32

Next, we should refer to the Secretary of Defense's report to the Congress on the five-year program for Fiscal Years 1972-76 entitled, "Toward A National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence."

"The strategy of realistic deterrence is new. Those who would dismiss it as a mere continuation of past practices in new packaging would be quite mistaken. Past policy was responsive and reactive. Our new strategy is positive and active. Past policy focused on containment and accommodation. The new Strategy emphasizes measured, meaningful involvement and vigorous negotiation from a position of strength. 33

Quoting from the Secretary's report on some of "the major interim goals," we note these that are pertinent:

"In reordering national priorities: By shifting the Defense portion of the Federal Budget and the Gross National Product (GNP) to its lowest level in 20 years . . .

32 Ibid, pp. 129-130.
"In moving toward zero-draft: ... by cutting draft calls almost in half from 1968 to 1970 in pursuing our goal of zero draft by July 1, 1973." 34

In the section on new initiatives on U.S. Force Planning the Secretary spells out the likelihood of future Reserve call-ups, loud and clear, removing all doubt about there being "Stay-at-Homers" in the strategy plans of this Administration:

"One major step we have taken is our new policy with respect to Reserve Forces. Members of the National Guard and Reserve, instead of Draftees, will be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces." 35

This specifically reflects the President's planning, because he refers to the Secretary of Defense's Report where it "will be spelled out in greater detail..." Secretary Laird further states:

"To improve Reserve readiness we must recognize the importance of two inter-related factors, manning levels and the availability of equipment. Manning levels will represent a continuing problem as we move toward an all-volunteer force. . . . Our efforts in FY 1972 will be primarily oriented toward enhancing participation in the Reserve and Guard. . . Recent general pay raises for active duty military personnel also accrues to Reserve and Guard personnel, which will provide some

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid, p. 36
help in maintaining Reserve Component strengths. . . as we
draw closer to FY 1973 there will be a need for real and vis-
able incentives to encourage young men and women to join or
remain in the Reserve components.

"Also, . . . we are also trying to improve the readiness
with various types of associations between Reserve Compo-
nent Units and Active Army Forces. . . to enable a Reserve
Component Unit to train with the Active Unit and to become
familiar with the latter's equipment and methods of operation.

"One approach is actually to integrate the Reserve Compo-
nent Unit with the Active Unit. In the program now being eval-
uated, a number of Guard and Reserve Battalions are assigned
to round out two NATO oriented divisions and would deploy as
units of those divisions. We are also examining the possibil-
ity of integrating an entire Reserve brigade with the training
exercises and deployment plans of an active division.

". . . Units which have achieved company level readiness
in Army training tests (i.e., their training and equipment is
up to the level needed to function as a unit in combat) may
then participate in active Army exercises in order to measure
the capabilities of active units. "36

Extracting from another table in the report we find the following DOD

"Financial Summary" for expenditures "by program" in recent years as

follows:37

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<tr>
<td>Guard and Reserve Forces (All DOD Departments)</td>
<td>1,764</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,570</td>
<td>2,686</td>
<td>3,141</td>
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36 Ibid, pp. 102-103.
37 Ibid, Table 1, p. 163.
FUTURE ROLES FOR ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS

Possible future roles for Army Reserve Components should briefly be tabulated based on past experience and current military strategic guidance. Then we can analyze what we really expect.

In a general war we can anticipate a need to call up every Reserve Component unit and individual that is physically fit to render service in the Armed Forces and is not in a civilian critical status. We could envision any combination of the following different missions for the Army Reserve Components:

A. Filling out combined active Army-Reserve divisions for immediate overseas deployment.

B. Strategic Reserve in CONUS.

C. Deployment overseas immediately following deployment of active Army units as soon as the transportation bottleneck is cleared.

D. Taking over of all or part of training centers and service schools by Training Divisions and Reserve Schools.

E. Individual pool of fillers for understrength and newly-activated units, and combat theater replacements from Immediate Ready Reserve (IRR) pool.

F. Control or suppression of civil disturbances, and control and relief in event of natural and man-made disasters or nuclear attack.
Following a reserve mobilization there would be a reliance on the Selective Service to provide manpower through the draft. It must be assumed that a standby Selective Service System will be maintained as was recommended by both the Gates Report\textsuperscript{38} and the Report of the National Advisory Committee on Selective Service.\textsuperscript{39}

In the event of a limited war, such as Korea or Vietnam, where active Army combat divisions were deployed overseas, combat divisions from the ARNG and combat service support units from the USAR, could be mobilized to maintain the size of our Strategic Reserve in CONUS, and perhaps even enlarge it against new threats. In the event of crises or emergencies short of hostilities, such as the Berlin crisis, the Reserve Components might again be mobilized for our Strategic Reserve in CONUS, or even deployed overseas.

Our planners and leaders have to weigh the current degree of credibility of our intentions and actions, in the eyes of our enemies. We were credible in Korea, Lebanon, Berlin, Cuba, and Vietnam, but this credibility may be dangerously diminished by the demonstrated and publicized

\textsuperscript{38}President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. 10.
divided public reaction in the U.S. over Vietnam. Our "lovish" element has undoubtedly given confidence to the strategic analysts and planners in Moscow, Peking and Hanoi, that the next time we might be a "paper tiger."

SURVEY

A small survey was made of selected officers of the Armed Forces past and present, active Army, USAR, and ARNG, on what we really expect as a future role for Army Reserve Components. Response to the survey was 88%, 23 out of 26 questionnaires being returned. A sample of the questionnaire and the list of the respondents is attached as an appendix to this paper with the tabulation of responses indicated in each space on the sample questionnaire.

The first question asked was:

1. Do you visualize call-up of Army Reserve Components, either Army Reserve (USAR) or Army National Guard (ARNG) in event of: a) A general war situation? b) A limited war situation similar to Korea? c) A limited unconventional war situation similar to Vietnam? d) A domestic crisis, riots or natural or manmade disasters, units being under Federal control?

All respondents expected that Army Reserve Components would be called up in the event of a general war situation; about 85% expected a call-up in a limited war similar to Korea; about 75% expected a call-up in a limited unconventional war similar to Vietnam; and about two-thirds
of respondents expected Federal call-up in the event of domestic crisis, riots or natural or man-made disasters.

We might just consider some of the comments from various people on the subject of a Vietnam-type of war:

"Yes. I do not believe we would again make the mistake of piecemeal commitment for ill-defined objectives--at least in the near future."

"No. Until domestic conditions change, the U.S. will not become physically engaged in this type of war. Assistance may be provided to countries faced with this type of crisis, but not troops."

"Yes. Failure to do so has been a major factor arousing adverse public sentiments."

"No. The scar of Vietnam is still fresh; in fact, has not healed--on the American conscience. Careful as I was, cautiousness would mark the approach to any call-up. A problem would be to define in the early stages what is "conventional" or "unconventional."

"Yes. It is inconceivable that reliance would be placed entirely on the draft again."

"No. While I personally advocate mobilizing these forces necessary to effect a decisive victory, I do not visualize such a call-up with the present political climate."

"Yes. Due to a contemplated reduction in the regular Army, I believe that it will be necessary to call up the Reserve/N.G. in any situation except a small operation like the Dominical Republic situation."

The second question asked the respondents to select between probable missions for the reserves among, (1) "Immediate deployment," (2)
"Train, then deploy," and/or (3) "Strategic Reserve in CONUS" in each of the three types of war:

a. General War

b. Korean-Type Limited War

c. Vietnam-Type Limited War

Several respondents expected that in a general war situation the Reserves would be assigned "Immediate deployment" or else "Train, then Deploy" for all types of units. In the limited type war there was no significant response to the mission of "Immediate deployment," but a fairly evenly divided response between the mission of "Train, then deploy," and the other mission of "Strategic Reserve in CONUS." In the case of a Vietnam-type limited war, there was a slightly less expectation of deployment. Asked to select between missions visualized for the USAR and for the ARNG, there was no significant difference in selection.

Our questions about the expected future size of Army Reserve Components, considering the effect of an all-volunteer Army, the majority of respondents felt it would be larger as a portion of the entire Army, but they were divided in opinion on its numerical size compared with the present -- larger, smaller, or about the same.
CONCLUSIONS

We can arrive at some conclusions here about future call-ups of Army Reserve Components that are contrary to what actually occurred in the Vietnam War. It would certainly appear from the statements of the President and his Secretary of Defense that there is going to be a heavy reliance on Reserve Components in the future in our new approach to National Security, the "1-1/2 War Strategy" of "realistic deterrence," concurrent with the movement towards the all-volunteer army. Further, we must conclude that under the present Administration and Congress, that the defense budget will be smaller in dollars and smaller as a percent of both the Federal Budget and the Gross National Product. Our Army will be "leaner and meaner," that is to say smaller in number, more professionally trained, more relative combat power, and longer tenure of its key officers and non-commissioned officers. Primarily because of size reductions, budget reductions, and declaration by the present Administration there will be a stronger reliance placed on the Reserves. The select individuals responding to the author's questionnaire expect reserve call-ups during any war situation.

We must further conclude that the Reserves are going to be better. They must be better because our military strategy is going to depend on
a higher state of peacetime readiness than we have experienced before. This has been the trend ever since World War II and there has been improvement with each Reserve call-up. Moreover, it is the government's and the public's intent that we spend less for a standing professional Army composed solely of volunteers, so we must offset some of this reduction by diverting additional financial resources for readiness of reserve components.

There are going to be problem areas which the Army Reserve Components will always face; personnel recruitment and retention, equipment, training, facilities, and technicians. Our military strategy must take cognizance of these and our military leaders must pursue courses of action to minimize or correct them.

Reserve Components will occasionally be called for civil disturbances, but hopefully with improvements in social conditions and local police force improvements, this will be a less frequent contingent diversion of reserve forces in preparedness planning.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This leads us into some recommendations in six areas that pertain to the Army Reserve Components; recommendations that the author feels
will sustain and increase the mobilization potential of these reserve elements in our strategic military planning:

A) Organization

1. Constant review of organization with less turmoil and fanfare; primary consideration to Army plans for force structure needs in a partial or full mobilization of Reserve Components, but with consideration of minimal re-organization and to include consultations down to and with State Adjutant General and Regional U.S. Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) Commanding Generals.

B) Personnel

1. Pay levels continue to increase so that pay, plus allowances or an equivalent salary is attractive for the time expended and the pay received per hour by enlisted reserves in comparison with the opportunities to earn additional or moonlight pay in comparable civilian jobs.

2. In service, off-duty, non-service related educational programs now available to members of the active forces be also available to members of the reserves. 40

3. Equal standards of acceptance into the Reserves, the same as the active Army. 41

4. Use of the active Army recruiting system and offices for Reserve Component recruitment.

5. Stand-by draft under the Selective Service System for drafting of qualified men into the Reserve Components, as needed, to fill

41 Ibid, pp. 103-104.
the authorized force levels.\textsuperscript{42}

6. Rotation of officers in key staff and command positions every three years in order to gain experience.\textsuperscript{43}

C) Equipment

Continue the level of the present program of the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{44}

D) Training

1. Three weeks annual active duty for training, but only every 3 years for combat support units and field-type combat service support units, to include the maximum of large unit field exercises and with a reduction in home station drills by an equivalent amount during the subsequent six months.

2. Two-week annual active duty for training in locations and climate other than normal summer climate every third year to vary training environment.\textsuperscript{45}

3. Occasional airlift to distant station or training facility for annual training to obtain air movement experience.

4. Additional emphasis and training on tactical vehicular movement to or at the training facility, including night movement under blackout conditions.

E) Facilities

1. Additional programming of new and improved drill facilities, such as Army Reserve Centers and State Armories.

\textsuperscript{42} National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, pp. 4, 7.
\textsuperscript{43} Milnor J. Roberts, Jr., MG., Remarks to Army Reserve Officers (Carlisle Barracks) (30 June 1971).
\textsuperscript{44} Melvin R. Laird, Statement of Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee. (15 March 1971), p. 102.
\textsuperscript{45} Eliot, pg. 67.
2. Acquisition or rental with damage compensation, of additional home station field training sites, where units can get into the field to move, shoot, and communicate.

3. Greater use of permanent military installations for weekend field training of Reserve Component units.

F. Technicians

1. Increase in the ratio of technicians upwards from 1 per company to at least the minimum of 3 per company for administration and recruiting.

2. Additional technicians as required for key operating personnel on equipment, and adequate personnel for year-round maintenance of equipment required for home station training.

3. Uniform ratio of technicians for all services based on requirements relative to personnel and equipment.

Many of these recommendations are under way or programmed. Some have specifically been attributed and most have been considered or recommended by others interested in the future use of Army Reserve Components in our military strategy.

Strength in Reserve is part of our foundation for peace.

Robert W. Moore

ROBERT W. MOORE
LTC, IN (USAR)
APPENDIX

Questionnaire Prepared by Author with Tabulation of Responses to Each Question (List of respondents attached. Responses received during October and November 1971)
TABULATION OF RESPONSES

LTC Robert W. Moore
248 Laurel Hill Drive
South Burlington, Vermont 05401

July 1971

TO: SEE ATTACHED LIST OF RESPONDENTS

SUBJECT: The role of US Army reserve component forces in US military strategy.

In the preparation of a student research paper for the nonresident course of the US Army War College on the above subject, your opinions and expectations are sought. The paper will be unclassified. The scope of the paper as approved by the DNRI at the USAWC is appended to this questionnaire. Your assistance in providing background and input to this study is sincerely appreciated.

1. Do you visualize call-up of Army reserve components units, either Army Reserve (USAR) or Army National Guard (ARNG) in event of

a. a general war situation? 23 - Yes 0 - No
Comment:__________________________________________________________

b. a limited conventional war situation similar to Korea? 19 - Yes 3 - No 1 - Undecided
Comment:__________________________________________________________

c. a limited unconventional war situation similar to Vietnam? 17 - Yes 6 - No
Comment:__________________________________________________________

d. a domestic crisis, riots, or natural or man-made disaster, units being under federal control? 15 - Yes 8 - No
Comment:__________________________________________________________
II. What missions do you visualize for various types of Army reserve components units in event of federal call-up under each of the three suggested types of war situations. (Please check as appropriate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of War Situation</th>
<th>a. USAR</th>
<th></th>
<th>b. ARNG</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combat and Combat Support Type Units</td>
<td></td>
<td>Combat and Combat Support Type Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immed. Deployment</td>
<td>Train, then Deploy</td>
<td>Strat. Res. in Conus</td>
<td>Immed. Deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. General War</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Conventional</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. War (Korean Type)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Unconventional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. War (Vietnam Type)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

__________________________________________________________________________________

-33-
111. Do you visualize call-up of individuals from either the USAR or ARNG in event of federal call-up under each of the three suggested types of war situations. (Please check as appropriate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of War Situation</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From Units</td>
<td>MOBDES</td>
<td>Unassigned Indiv. Ready Res. (IRP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. General War</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Conventional</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. War (Korean type)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Unconventional</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Ranking NCO's & Spec's  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From Units</th>
<th>Unassd. IRR</th>
<th>From Units</th>
<th>Unassd. IRR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. General War</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Conventional</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. War (Korean type)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Unconventional</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
IV. If the U. S. Army evolves toward an all-volunteer army in the next decade, how do you think the reserve components will be affected? (Please check as appropriate)

a. Relative size of reserve components as portion of the entire army. Larger_15_, Smaller_4_, About the Same_4_, No Opinion_0_

Comment:__________________________________________________________

b. Numerical size of reserve components. Larger_10_, Smaller_5_, About the Same_7_, No Opinion_1_

Comment:__________________________________________________________

c. Mix of reserve component units compared with present mix. More combat and combat support units_7_, About the Same_14_, No Opinion_2_

Comment:__________________________________________________________

It is the author's intent to tabulate the checked responses; however no checked responses will be attributed to any one individual. Only a list of the names of individuals who respond will be included in the bibliography. Your comments on the other hand may assist in developing the body of the paper.

You (may), (may not) quote the comments of the undersigned in the text or in the footnotes and bibliography.

__________________________________________________________
(Signature)

__________________________________________________________
(Printed name and grade)

If you would like to receive a copy of the finished paper as finally submitted, would you please so indicate here. __________________

Thank you again for your time and assistance.

Robert W. Moore
LTC   INF
LIST OF RESPONDENTS

23 Questionnaires Received
26 Questionnaires Sent = 88% Response

Hon. Robert T. Stafford, (VT)
United States Senate (formerly House of Representatives)

MG Leonard W. Cronkhite, CG
94th U.S. Army Reserve Command

MG Reginald M. Cram
Adjutant General, State of Vermont

BG Robert D. Upp, USAR
Army Vice President, Reserve Officers Assn. of the U.S., Los Angeles, Calif.

BG Sherman J. Gage, ADC
50th Armored Div. ARNG

COL Everett C. Bailey, USAR (Ret.)
(Formerly) Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army for Vermont

COL Norman J. Boyden, Jr., Commandant
U.S. Army Reserve School (1035), Burlington, Vermont

COL William J. Burke
Vermont State Director, Selective Service System

COL Joseph L. Chabot, (Ret.) Director, Army Affairs
Reserve Officers Association of the United States, Washington, D. C.

COL Steven S. Crowell
Director of Technical Support, Edgewood Arsenal, MD.

COL Donald J. Haibach, USAR
Mbr. 5851st Con Gp (Reinf), EUSA/USARJ, Japan

COL Thomas A. Lowe, Study Director
Institute for Advance Studies, USA Cbt Dev Cmd, Carlisle Brks, Pa.

COL Robert O. Lynch
Dir., Strat Mil Studies - The Americas, USAWC, Carlisle Brks, Pa.

LTC Noel L. Bergeron
J5 Plans Off, USSTRICOM, MacDill AFB, Fla.

LTC Grover C. Ethington, Jr., USAR
X0 100th Regt (CST) 4th Bde., 100th Div. (Tng) USAR, Ky.
LTC John F. Hannan, USAR
Instr, C&GS Dept., USAR School (2076), Wilmington, Del.

LTC William C. Haponski
Prof. of Military Science & Tactics, University of Vermont, Burlington

LTC James H. Kovach
Resident Student, USAWC, Carlisle Brks, Pa.

LTC Richard V. Krogh
HQ, KMAG, G3 Sec, Korea

LTC Craig S. Kuhns, USAR
HHC 351st CA Area "A", Mountain View, Calif.

LTC Clarence A. Miller
Resident Student, USAWC, Carlisle Brks, Pa.

LTC William P. Snyder
Dir, Economics of National Securities Studies, USAWC, Carlisle Brks

LTC Harry Wolff
CO, 89th Med Det (DS) US Army, Europe
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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71. Roberts, J. Milnor, Jr., MG. Chief of Army Reserve, U. S. Army, Carlisle Barracks Interview with Committee from Directorate of Strategic Studies, Institute of Advanced Studies, Combat Developments Command., 30 June 1971. (Background only; not cited).