ALL THIS AND OPM S II (OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM II): A NEW APPROACH TO LOGISTICAL OFFICER CAREER MANAGEMENT

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20 March 1972
This paper begins with a review of logistical problems during the buildup in Vietnam, singling out the shortage of qualified logistics managers as the major factor involved. Logistical career management, before and after the Army Reorganization of 1962, is discussed briefly. The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) Study and the approved follow-on, the Officer Personnel Management System II (OPMS II), are covered in detail, highlighting the logistical career implications. The author then presents his concept of how a vigorous, effective logistical career management system can be built under the aegis of OPMS II. He proposes the grouping of materiel and logistics services into development channels or fields, under Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation branches.
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INTRODUCTION

When an "old" logistics officer wakes up screaming, it is a safe bet that the subject of the nightmare was Vietnam--not Count Dracula! Now, some will say that my phrasing is unduly restrictive, that you needn't be an oldtimer, and certainly not a log-type, to have frightening dreams about Vietnam. I must agree, but, at the same time, ask you to consider the special blue devils that trigger the hallucinations of the VN logistics veteran, circa 1965-1967.

The buildup started in 1965 with the introduction of thousands of troops, and where there are troops, there are logistical requirements--unsurprising logistical requirements! Even our dear old mothers know that soldiers need food, clothing, shelter, weapons, and ammunition; but that isn't even a frigid sliver on the icicle hanging from the tip of the iceberg. The logistics folks back home in the commodity commands had some notion of the problem though, and they developed and shipped over their own form of Care Packages, hundreds of thousands of tons of "push" shipments, to meet the anticipated requirements. Unfortunately, they derived the anticipated requirements from the Korean War and, in some cases, World War II consumption data (and some say from their own excess lists).¹

However, the essentiality of the contents of the "push-packs" didn't matter so much at that particular point in time because the more immediate dilemma involved unloading, moving, receiving, documenting, and storing the materiel. More formally, as the
Besson Board put it, there was a "failure to limit the introduction of supplies to the throughput capacity of the ports, depots, and bases."² In any language, it was sheer chaos. By late 1965, port congestion had reached the unbelievable stage, and the year ended with 122 ships awaiting discharge off Vietnam and a substantial number of other inbound vessels at anchor in the Philippines, Okinawa, and elsewhere.³ When the ships were docked, other problems became evident: the top cargo was frequently destined for the next port of call, containers were crushed or broken, documentation was sketchy or missing, port clearance capability was limited at best, and the cargo was susceptible to further loss, damage, and theft.⁴

As the buildup continued through 1966 and into 1967, the sea of materiel became a mountain of materiel at in-country depots. There were masses of undocumented, unidentified, and, too often, unneeded materiel in every available space—mostly open and unimproved ground. Supply "expeditors" from the divisions and other organizations roamed the receiving and storage areas trying to spot something they could use. Vietnam had a blank check and open materiel catalogs; and the bottleneck intensified as supply personnel fell prey to over-desiring ("goldplating" requirements), over-ordering, and over-building. A vicious cycle began: the bottleneck meant increased time to requisition and receive materiel; which led to repetitive requisitions carrying ever-higher priorities; which resulted in a further inundation of the logistics system, with increasing range and depth of in-country stockage and further degradation of inventory management.⁵
A massive construction effort was undertaken to improve port and depot facilities, and new materiel-handling, transport, and data processing equipment was rushed over. Logistics personnel and units were drawn from every theater. Crash training programs, reduction of CONUS tours, and volunteer programs were also initiated. Civil servants were recruited, contracts were let, and indigenous personnel and third-country nationals were hired. The problem eased, but at great cost, and then another monumental task was begun: the identification of excesses and the reduction of inventories.

Is there a central theme to this horror story? The Besson Board thought so, and again I quote:

To meet the increased logistics requirements, the Army did not have the capability to provide the required numbers of skilled logistics personnel at the lower and middle levels of its logistic management operations in Vietnam. This shortage of resources and skills accentuates the need for the best possible top-level management.

If we can agree with General Besson, et al., and I certainly do, the Army didn't have enough lower- and middle-level managers, and the top-level left something to be desired also. How do we account for this dismal circumstance?

THE LOGISTICAL CAREER MANAGEMENT ABYSS

BACKGROUND

To understand the dearth of skilled managers, we need only look at the state of career development and management for logistics officers. Prior to the Army Reorganization of 1962, there were
seven technical services functioning under the direction and control of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG). Each tech service was materiel oriented, and each had a chief who commanded the supply, maintenance, and other activities necessary to support his particular materiel category. Not only that, but each chief had branch organizations and units to perform support right down the line, and he had identifiable staff counterparts going down to Division level. There was no question as to who had responsibility for any item of equipment, to include the training of specialists to support it.\textsuperscript{9}

In addition, the Logistics Officer Program (LOP) was established in 1956, primarily to guide the development of logistics generalists (logisticians) for the vital broad-scope assignments involving multiple materiel categories, functions, and support services. Officers from all branches (except Medical, Judge Advocate, and Chaplains Corps) were attracted. The acceptance standards were high—experience, education, and proven ability in logistics management—but the pay-off, in terms of a rewarding career, was high also. The DCSLOG exercised firm, positive career development and management over LOP members. Basic branches proposed assignments, but the DCSLOG had to concur that they meshed with development objectives. A policy of alternating branch material and logistical assignments was established, and enforced, and it proved to be vital to the development of other than "pure" logistical officers.\textsuperscript{10}
CHANGE AND DILUTION

In 1962, the technical services were abolished and the Army Materiel Command was created, generally along functional lines. However, the branch-materiel relationship was lost and, for all practical purposes, the materiel specialist headed for extinction. Responsibility for the procurement, assignment, and career development of all officers was vested in the Officer Personnel Directorate (OPD), reporting through the Chief of Personnel Operations to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). The DCSLOG was relegated to an advisory role, providing "technical advice and assistance" to the DCSPER.

Within OPD, the Officers Specialty Branch (now under the Deputy for Army Aviation), administers the LOP but, in practice, this is rather perfunctory. The LOP administrator, currently a capable Major, processes applications for membership in the program, maintains lists of the most important logistics positions (designated by the DCSLOG), and coordinates assignments for members. The latter function appears to be more in the nature of a formality than anything else because assignments are determined, and vigorously defended, by branch management officers in the Colonels Division or Career Branches of OPD. The management officers seem to be under constant pressure to satisfy branch position requirements, to the detriment of logistical career management; and, in keeping with the orientation of selection and promotion boards, are certainly more concerned about command than technical expertise.
Despite the obvious management problems, the LOP is still growing in membership. At the start of 1972, there were 1,929 members including 235 from the combat arms and 1,674 from the old technical services (77% of the total are Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation officers). While the participation figures are impressive, the Army still has only about half as many certified logistician generalists as it needs to fill recognized requirements. The fact of the matter is that there is no deliberate and systematic process for developing generalists. While there are career patterns, training programs, and assignment policies to chart branch development, there are no such guidelines to produce professional logistics officers.

Even if clear development guidance was produced, and all of the OPD elements were dedicated to its accomplishment, the battle would have just begun. Before any development plan could be carried out, the DCSPER would need rather detailed information about the logistics positions throughout the Army--information that is not available today. Authorization documents could be researched, but they would reveal almost nothing about the actual qualifications required, functions to be performed, and experience to be gained on the job. If a position survey was conducted, it would show that an astounding number of the military billets which existed in the CONUS logistical base in 1962, have long since been converted to civilian staffing. As a result, a satisfactory training, experience, and rotation base for logistical officers does not now exist. In addition, under existing policy, the
DCSPER has no real control over assignments in the field commands. Therefore, even though logistical officers might be assigned, in response to field command requisitions, to fill specific development positions, there is no assurance that they would actually go into those positions. Sadly, this is even true for some of our most important logistics positions, such as Division Support Commands, where the tendency seems to be to assign unqualified combat arms officers.16

STUDIES AND PROPOSALS

The serious deficiencies in logistical career management and the sizeable obstacles in the way of improvement drew considerable attention even before the Vietnam conflict. I have identified more than 20 study and review projects conducted over the last seven or eight years, and there have undoubtedly been many more. Among others, the situation has been investigated by the Quartermaster Center, Ordnance Center, Army Materiel Command, Comptroller of the Army, DCSPER, DCSLOG, and a myriad of Department of the Army (DA) special boards and panels.

Starting with the Baker Board (DA Board of Inquiry on Materiel Readiness) in 1964, the shortage of skilled logistical specialists was officially acknowledged. In 1965, Project TECSTAR documented the need for reexamination and clarification of the functions assigned to the logistical officers of the various branches. The Brown Board (DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System),
SOQ (Signal, Ordnance, and Quartermaster) Study and the STOCQ (Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical, and Quartermaster) Study, during the period 1966-67, recognized the necessity for improvements in logistical personnel structure, training, and career development. They also recommended the consolidation of the Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation Corps, and the elimination of the LOP. In 1970, the DA Board for Review of Responsibilities for Logistics Doctrine, Personnel and Training Functions supported the concept of one Logistics Corps, and urged that the DCSLOG's role in personnel management and training be strengthened.

Looking over this long and busy progression of review, analysis, evaluation, study, and restudy, I can understand the wags who maintain that a logistical officer could develop a fine career just studying the career development of logistical officers. For while there is no denying the sincerity of the activists involved, the simple fact is that nothing concrete has come of all this effort. Logisticians are still coming from whatever rises to the top of the tech service milk buckets—the curd as well as the cream.

THE OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

REVOLUTIONARY CONCEPT

At this point in the impasse, the DCSPER distributed the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) study for review and
comment, and the shockwave was felt around the world. This revolu-
tionary personnel concept grew out of General Westmoreland's desire
to improve Army professionalism. One of his major targets was
"the philosophy and mechanics of officer career management." In
response, the DCSPER formed the in-house task force which produced
OPMS in June of 1971. While most of its notoriety came from the
proposal to formally designate officers as either commanders or
staff and technical specialists, and to develop each career group
separately, OPMS took an equally innovative approach to a great
many of the other "well-established" policies and procedures in
the officer personnel area.

To gain an appreciation of the breadth, depth, and sheer
audacity of the concept, you need only consider a few of its mind-
boggling proposals:

-- A single component officer corps to replace the Regular
Army and Reserve components.

-- A system of managed, rather than guaranteed tenure, with an
on-going program to eliminate sub-standard performers at all grade
levels.

-- One promotion system to replace temporary and permanent
promotions.

-- Subdivision of the officer corps into functional branch
groups (Combat Arms, Combat Support, Materiel and Movement Services,
and "Other Branches") for management, and for promotion and school
selection competition.
-- Proponency for Military Occupational Specialties (MOS's) with a single branch or branch group responsible for each MOS. 24

-- Complete functionalization of staff positions with specialists serving at all levels (for example: a Military Intelligence Corps officer as the S-2, and a Materiel and Movement (M & M) officer as the S-4 of each Infantry Battalion). 25

-- Restriction of command prerogatives through the exercise of greater centralized control over officer assignments. 26

-- Abolishment of the Chemical Corps with the creation of a chemical engineering career field in the Corps of Engineers. 27

LOGISTICAL CAREER IMPLICATIONS

While, obviously, those proposals affected logistical officers as members of the officer corps, OFMS also narrowed its focus to zero in on the management and development of logisticians specifically. It began with what almost amounted to a lamentation for the loss of the materiel oriented technical services in 1962, and the functionalization of combat service support under COSTAR II and TASTA-70. There was clear recognition that branch identity with both commodities and functions is vague, if not indiscernible now. The weaknesses in the LOP were acknowledged also.

OFMS proposed a profusion of remedies designed to meet the Army's requirements for commodity and functional specialists, as well as for generalists. In keeping with the major theme of grouping branches with like functions, logistical support was to be vested in the M & M Group, composed of the Ordnance, Quartermaster and
Transportation Corps. As conceived, the three M & M branches would perform the full range of logistical functions for all commodities, which meant taking on support now performed by other branches; for example: the support of avionics equipment from the Signal Corps. The LOP was to be abolished, and the Procurement Officers Program was to be absorbed by the M & M Group.

Two alternatives were offered for the internal structure of the Group. The present branches were to be retained under the first alternative, with the branches developing both specialists and generalists. The Group was to keep a watchful eye on branch management and assume the management of generalists at the field grade level. The second alternative was to merge the three branches into a Logistical Corps with management by MOS grouping. The final selection of alternatives was held in abeyance pending review of MOS structure and logistics organizations, but both alternatives were considered acceptable by the DCSPER. Under either, the desired career development progression could be achieved: (1) all officers initially trained and utilized in a single commodity, mode of transportation, or support service; (2) most officers then trained and utilized in multiple commodities, modes, and services; and (3) a few potential logisticians given assignments in a broad range of Group functions.

Although certainly not stated as such, the concept for school selection, promotion, and commander designation amounted basically to an allocation or quota system. The allocations to M & M Group
were to be based on its own validated requirements, i.e., the logistical positions requiring higher level civilian and military education, the anticipated logistical vacancies at the next higher grade, and the number of logistical command positions authorized. M & M Group officers were to compete only with the other officers within the Group, with selection on a best qualified basis. One disturbing facet of the military education proposal which, incidentally, meshed with the recent Norris Board recommendations, was that Command and General Staff College (CGSC) level education for M & M Group officers was to come primarily from equivalent courses established at the Army Logististics Management Center at Ft. Lee and the Defense Systems Management School at Ft. Belvoir.

OPMS - II

AFTER EFFECTS

Obviously, OPMS constituted a decidedly different approach to overall officer development and management, as well as to logistical career management. The howls of anguish it raised throughout the Army should be equally obvious. Many of the objections could be classed, predictably, as reflex reaction against something new and "not invented here," but a number of the comments indicated legitimate concern about the magnitude and speed of the proposed changes.

As a result, the decision was made to concentrate, initially, on those actions considered most vital to the improvement of Army professionalism and to the development of satisfying career patterns.
for all officers. Many of the other, "peripheral" proposals are still alive, and the DCSPER will develop and staff them as individual actions later. In fact, the only certain casualties are the single component officer corps, the single promotion system, and the separate promotion boards for the four functional branch groups. Implementation of those proposals could only have been accomplished through changes in the Army's legislative authority, and one doesn't have to be in Legislative Liaison to realize that this is not the ideal time to beard the Congressional lion.31

MARCHING ORDERS

On 5 January 1972, General Westmoreland approved OPMS II, the highly distilled management system, for implementation during the 1972-1973 timeframe.32 The basic tenet is a return to specialization, based on the premise that certain selected officers make the best commanders, others the best functional staff officers, and still others the best technical specialists. Clearly, the success of such a system depends on the identification of individual abilities and desires, and the provision of equal opportunity for development and advancement in each career field.

Three career phases are described: a company grade development phase (first 10 years), a field grade development phase (11-20 years), and a senior officer utilization phase. Career development will evolve around what is labeled a "dual-track" concept in which each officer acquires and maintains expertise in two separate and distinct skill areas. In the first phase of his development, the young
officer concentrates on branch qualification through basic officer and MOS training, and assignments at platoon and company level. Basically, this is the first track or primary skill development.

As envisioned, the officer then branches out onto his second track with training and work in one or more functional staff areas (for example: personnel, operations, plans, and training). This is essential because prior to promotion to Major, he must formally designate his secondary skill in either a functional staff area or a technical specialty. Current special career programs, to include the LOP, will be retained as the bases for technical specialization. Interestingly, even at this early stage of career development, the officer is permitted to request redesignation of his skills. If approved, presumably on the basis of Army requirements, his functional or technical specialty would then be his primary skill, with branch qualification retained as his secondary skill.

During the field grade phase, officers will increase proficiency in their primary skill areas (greater branch qualification in the main) with additional schooling and broader assignments. However, prior to promotion to Lieutenant Colonel (LTC), they must also complete their qualification in the secondary skill. Qualification consists of either two successful assignments in the designated specialty, or one successful assignment and an advanced degree in a related discipline. At this point, officers may also redesignate their skills. Otherwise, after selection for promotion to LTC, all officers will be evaluated and programed for future development as
commanders or specialists. However, even after passing that milestone, a full career in the command field is not assured because a second evaluation will take place following selection to Colonel (COL). Due to the reduction in command positions at the higher grade, a number of officers will be rerouted to functional or technical specialties at that time.33

DIFFERENT, NOT GREATER POTENTIAL

Understandably, the procedures planned for the selection and designation of commanders are of major interest. The OPD career branches will study the records of their officers and nominate those considered fully qualified for command. Separate branch group selection boards, made up of former brigade-level commanders, will meet annually to make the selections. As now proposed, only Table of Organization and Army Training Center positions will be used to determine the command requirements and, hence, the number of command designated officers. Of importance also is the fact that, based on OPD recommendations, field commanders will continue to select specific commanders for their organizations.

Each officer will be in the zone of consideration for four years following selection for promotion to ITC, but there will be a progressively diminishing chance of selection after the first year. Officers will be informed, individually, of the results of the career evaluation. Officers not selected for the command field, and those who decline the command designation, will have a voice in the planning of their future specialty development programs.
Every LTC will then be following a command, a functional, or a technical career pattern, with schooling and assignments specifically tailored to each career field; and, conceptually at least, each will have an equal opportunity to reach the stars.\textsuperscript{34}

**EMPHASIS ON MOS SYSTEM**

In the areas of staff functionalization and MOS proponency, OPMS II has retreated somewhat from the original "all-the-way" proposals. An effort will be made to establish single branch responsibility for MOS's and, if at all successful, this should reduce the range of MOS's for each branch and result in more specialists being assigned at every echelon. However, the effect will be dampened considerably by the decision to designate principal staff positions for joint proponency, for example: the Infantry Battalion S-4 will be either a logistical or an Infantry officer.

Career patterns will be built on the MOS structure with progression from a basic MOS to ever-broader MOS's in each skill area. Some DA directed assignments are planned when necessary to achieve the desired career development. There will also be a greater degree of centralized control over the MOS's awarded individual officers. The "Primary MOS" must be in the officer's primary skill area, and a single "Secondary MOS" will be awarded by DA when the officer qualifies in his secondary skill. Other training and experience will be reflected by the awarding of "Additional MOS's."\textsuperscript{35}
While apparently subject to further refinement, the following functional grouping of branches for personnel management purposes is planned:

- **Combat Arms** - Infantry, Armor, Air Defense, and Field Artillery.
- **Combat Support Arms** - Chemical, Engineers, Military Intelligence, Military Police, and Signal Corps.
- **Logistics Services** - Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation Corps.
- **Administrative Services** - Adjutant General and Finance Corps.

Inasmuch as the Army will not seek changes to existing legislative authority, the current promotion system will continue in effect. Certain administrative modifications are planned, however. Membership on the single promotion board will be increased to obtain proportionate representation from each branch group, and the instructions will project branch group requirements at the next higher grade, and stress the essentiality and equality of the different career fields.  

**APPLICATION TO LOGISTICS AREA**

That, in essence, is OPMS II. In a very real sense, it is merely the bare skeleton of a career management structure. Now comes the tedious task of adding floors, walls, and ceilings. In
the logistics area, the DCSPER and the DCSLOG must build together. Without stretching the analogy, the DCSPER is both architect and future manager and, as such, is vitally interested in the functionality of the system; but, like any tenant-owner, it is the DCSLOG who must live with the results.

The first job is to determine the actual requirements for logistical specialists and generalists throughout the Army. Next, based on those requirements, distinct career fields and development patterns must be established. The third task is to construct a solid framework for logistical career development and management, and to do this, functions, and perhaps even branches, will have to be realigned and consolidated.37

A CONCEPT FOR LOGISTICAL CAREER MANAGEMENT

THE BASIS

Army philosophy, organizational structure, policies, and procedures have been shaped over many years, under every conceivable condition and circumstance, by a veritable procession of perceptive military thinkers. One doesn't have to be a traditionalist who views every proposed change with suspicion, to feel that our concepts are basically sound and, consequently, to be apprehensive over the prospect of radical sweeping changes. In fact, most logistical officers number themselves in that conservative group. I certainly favor a pragmatic approach to change: identifying weaknesses and problems, isolating causes, and directing corrective action at the specific trouble spots.
The explanation probably lies in the nature of the career field itself. Logistics is an extremely arduous, ulcer-producing business, and there is always a Lorelei tempting us off our rough, but well-charted course with "the solution" to all of our problems. Many contend that the elimination of the technical services in 1962 was the result of just such a Siren song. Be that as it may, I do not view OPMS II as a mandate for radical change. Rather, I see it as an opportunity to correct many of the problems and weaknesses we have long recognized in the management and development of logistical officers.

I have based my concept on OPMS II which omits the Army Medical Department and its support; places the Engineer, Signal, and Chemical Corps in the Combat Support Arms Group; and tasks the Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation Corps with the full range of materiel support, plus movement and support services. Without those "fences," it would be logical to fashion a management system covering a much wider spectrum of logistics. Medical materiel support, and engineer facilities and grounds support would certainly be included; and, because I believe that operator-supporters have much to comment them, I would seek some means of including materiel support elements from the Engineer, Signal, and Chemical Corps.

**ONE CORPS OR THREE BRANCHES**

The issue of retaining the Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation Corps, or merging them into a Logistics Corps is
most controversial, and highly emotional. It is difficult to separate cause and effect when appraising today's ineffective management system, and observing the duplication, parochialism, and unproductive competition which characterize the individual branches. I was tempted to simply emphasize the value of branch traditions and esprit, and to caution against discarding them without first assuring that it was necessary. Obviously, that would not do because it is almost a classic in begging the question.

So, despite my conservative bent, my approach was to assume one consolidated corps, and to concentrate on devising a career management system which would produce both logistical generalists and specialists. For the latter, three types of specialization were visualized:

-- Materiel - the support of specific materiel-commodity categories (the present eight AMC categories plus a general, DSA/GSA, category).

-- Functional - all aspects of the common logistics functions, such as procurement, supply, and maintenance.

-- Services - The performance of logistics services, such as movement (transportation management and operations) and support (subsistence, memorial, and petroleum services).

It was immediately apparent that some career grouping, along either functional or materiel-service lines, was essential for effective management. My first effort was to establish functional development channels, which was relatively simple until I faced up
to the necessity of relating those channels to the materiel categories. At this point, the options were either a spaghetti-like convolution or a multi-dimensional matrix, neither a very suitable management tool. As an alternative, I structured materiel-service development channels. My initial groupings were rather narrow, each consisting of a few related materiel categories or a single logistics service. While there was no question that this served the development of specialists, generalists could only be developed by crossing officers between channels. This is feasible, certainly, but it would complicate the career management process considerably.

My final approach was to attempt to restructure the groupings so that officers could be developed as generalists within each separate channel. The groupings had to be narrow enough to confine the typical officer's expertise to a limited number of categories or service operations, but broad enough to provide experience for a designated few in a range of functions and services. Generally, a composite of materiel categories and logistics services seemed the most practical way to meet the narrow-broad, specialist-generalist requirement. Then, in arranging specific groups, it was only logical to take full advantage of the natural relationship between the operators and supporters of the same materiel. You are undoubtedly ahead of me at this point for, in effect, I found myself recreating the branches!

You may counter that there are other ways to develop specialists and generalists than by using materiel-service groupings; or you may accept that approach, but point out that other, new groupings
are possible and, perhaps, more desirable. I will not argue either point because almost any approach will work if the management hierarchy is powerful enough, wise enough, and determined enough to make it work. My conclusion is simply that a management system could be established over the framework of the three branches which would be at least as effective as one built on a consolidated Logistics Corps.

**DCSLOG'S FUNCTIONS**

Some serious thought is undoubtedly being given to the precise role that the DCSLOG should play in the logistics personnel management system. Considering the formidable tasks already confronting him, it would seem that he would be content to spell out the qualitative and quantitative requirements for generalists and the various specialists, and then sit back in the kibitzer's seat, and shout advice and encouragement to the DCSPER as he labors to produce them. However, because personnel development and management are so vital to Army logistics, there is almost a compulsive urge to get in on the action.

Inasmuch as sound staff and resource management dictums, alone, make transfer of the logistics personnel function to the DCSLOG inconceivable, the only question, in my view, is how to assist the DCSPER without interfering with his positive direction of the system. Surely, the DCSLOG should provide advice and counsel on the technical aspects of logistics personnel management, and he should
monitor the operation of the system and provide a continuing evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses. Other than giving technical advice on qualifications, I do not feel that the DCSLOG, or even a logistics advisory council, should participate in the individual assignment process—tempting though it may be. If logistics operators assist in the formulation of selection policies and procedures, and assure themselves that the guidelines are right and proper, then they should have faith that the correct assignments will be made. Almost to a man, logistics officers would be willing to stand on their records and take their chances, if a fair and impartial assignment process was assured.

There is another, more critical area which requires a massive and immediate effort by the DCSLOG. Every organizational structure in the Army must be reviewed, and all logistical positions (civil service, military, and contractor) must be identified and evaluated. This is mandatory if position stairess are to be laid out which will give officers basic technical skills, and then increasingly broader experience and greater management responsibility. This may entail the conversion of some positions; and the Army, and the Congress, must be willing to accept a little less of the "continuity" afforded by DA and contract civilians for the sake of building a solid logistics development, training, and rotation base. At the same time, to aid in establishing development patterns and managing careers, greater Army-wide standardization must be achieved in the titles, MOS's, grades, and functions assigned to logistical positions.
In evaluating logistical positions, it is essential that a determination be made of, and possibly even a code devised to show, the breadth and depth of expertise required of officers assigned to them, and the experience they will gain in the positions. For example: While the title and MOS indicates a supply position, what aspects of supply (storage, distribution, requirements computation, etc.) and what categories of materiel are involved? Does it require more technical knowledge and experience, or more administrative and planning skill, or more managerial and leadership ability? There is also a requirement to stratify positions on the basis of knowledge and experience needed, but if the positions are standardized throughout the Army, grade levels should equate directly to knowledge and experience levels.

THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

I envision a two-level management structure with four branches (Ordnance, Quartermaster, Transportation, and an LOP branch for "outside" logistical officers) serving as the foundation; and an ecumenical staff of policy, program, and career management specialists forming the upper level. This activity should operate under a Deputy for Logistics Career Management (DLCM) within OPD. During the formative years, at least, the Deputy position should be filled by a Brigadier General with broad experience in logistics management.

Under our current system, for all practical purposes, one officer in either the Career Branch or Colonels Division performs both the career management and assignment functions. While,
unquestionably, this career manager-assignment officer is development oriented; unfortunately, even development along branch lines is lost when specific personnel requirements must be satisfied. The dual-level structure is seen as an effective means of divorcing the two functions to give each the specialized attention it deserves, and, in the process, to diffuse the pressure of requirements. Although there would be certain exceptions, in general, career management would be performed at the higher level by the DLCM staff, while the branches would accomplish the assignment function.

The staff echelon would develop overall policies, procedures, and personnel objectives based on the required balance of generalists and materiel, functional, and service specialists; and establish development patterns for each career field. During the company grade development phase, the branches would make assignments and schedule training within the established guidelines. The career management staff would coordinate selections of company command positions, but other than that, the branches would operate independently.

When an officer entered the field grade development phase, his career field manager would review his personnel file and tailor a development pattern to guide his career progression—balancing the officer's desires with his demonstrated potential, and the needs of the Army. To be effective, the branches must have the capability to match the individual development pattern to a reasonably long projection of logistical vacancies. Most assuredly, the assignment
officer cannot achieve career goals if he deals in day-to-day and week-to-week requirements. The career manager should coordinate each proposed assignment, and it should then be passed to the designated approval point within the hierarchy.

Based on the requirements and development patterns established by career management, some Majors would be directed towards command and logistical generalist development. This pairing is intentional because I feel that commanders need a broad-gauge knowledge of logistics, as well as specialized expertise. Later, after formal selection, LTC command-designees and generalists, and all COL's, would be managed and assigned by separate elements of the staff.

CAREER DEVELOPMENT

My concept, outlined earlier, is to group materiel and logistics services into development channels or fields, under a branch banner. In addition to affording materiel, functional, or service specialization, the branch channels are intended to be broad enough so that a selected few can be developed for assignment to generalist and command positions. While there may well be objections to the particulars of the groupings given below, they will serve to illustrate the career development concept:

-- Ordnance
  Weapons - Ammunition -
  Weapons - Fire Control Materiel
  Missile - Safeguard Materiel
  Munitions
  Mobility - Communications -
  Tank - Automotive Materiel
  Mobility Equipment Materiel
  Communication - Electronic Materiel
-- Quartermaster

General Materiel (Food, POL, Individual Clothing and Equipment, plus all Army-Use DSA/GSA Items)
Support Services -
  Subsistence - Food Service
  Petroleum Operations
  Memorial Services (Mortuary and Graves Registration)
  Retail Operations (Commissary, Exchange and Clothing Sales)

-- Transportation

Aviation Materiel
Movement Services -
  Highway Operations
  Water - Terminal Operations
  Aviation Operations
  Rail Operations
  Movement Control

Ordnance is a materiel-functional branch with two separate materiel channels for development and management purposes. Quartermaster and Transportation are materiel-service branches, and each has a materiel and a logistics service channel. Second Lieutenants begin with basic branch schooling followed by MOS training in a hard skill associated with either a materiel or service channel. Each materiel channel officer "majors" in either supply or maintenance with appropriate emphasis on his designated materiel category or group of materiel categories. Each service channel officer "majors" in a single mode of transportation or a single support service. Of course, selected Transportation officers must attend flight school before moving into their aviation materiel or service "major." Initial assignments are at platoon, company, or comparable levels. A combat arms detail would be quite valuable, but career development will suffer unless assignments are restricted to logistical positions. Then, while still a Lieutenant, the
officer receives a second assignment in his "major," one designed to expand his first-track knowledge and experience.

As Captains, most supply "majors" receive second-track training and experience in maintenance, while the majority of maintenance-types "minor" in supply. Logistics service officers "minor" in different modes or different support services. Some officers are given the opportunity to participate in those special career programs which have logistics application, i.e., Procurement, Research and Development, Military Assistance, Comptroller, and Operations Research/Systems Analysis. At this same time, LOP officers enter the field from other branches. Although a few could be used to advantage as platoon leaders and staff officers in service organizations, their greatest potential lies in supply and maintenance assignments related to their basic branch equipment, for example: Signal, Engineer, and Armor officers to Mobility-Communications; and Infantry, Air Defense, and Field Artillery officers to Weapons-Ammunition.

The branch advance course comes towards the end of the company grade development phase, and it presents a fine opportunity to broaden selected officers. Since every branch course should have a hard-core curriculum covering all aspects of logistics, much can be gained--by "host" and "visitor" alike--from assigning a number of officers to schools outside of their basic branch. During this phase, also, those officers who have demonstrated the greatest command potential will be assigned as company commanders.
The field grade development phase features further qualification in both first and second-track skills with additional training and more responsible assignments, covering a wider range of functions to include logistics systems, plans, policies, and procedures. If selected for development as generalists, materiel officers get training and experience in a logistics service channel. Of course, some "elective" assignments are available in each materiel channel, certainly every commodity command has transportation elements. While potential generalists among the services officers can get their materiel experience in-house, it would be mutually beneficial to assign highway, rail, and water operators to Mobility-Communications positions.

Short, specialized courses, both correspondence and resident, would be valuable in broadening officers, and the Logistics Executive Development Course at the Army Logistics Management Center is a career must. In addition, when the potential generalist is assigned to another branch, he should be rotated to several positions to gain exposure to the most important aspects of the field. Hopefully, his own expertise will also be of value. For example, both the basic and detail branch should benefit from the exchange of transportation and supply "majors," with each not only gaining an appreciation of another logistics field, but also triggering new supply procedures to capitalize on transport capabilities, and revised transportation techniques to better meet supply requirements.

After promotion to LTC, command designees, and those selected for further managerial and generalist development, will receive
increasingly responsible assignments encompassing the multiple facets of logistical management and support. The specialists will serve in important functional and service staff positions throughout the world. As COL's, logistics officers reach the professional pinnacle. At this point there are four broad specialists: maintenance, supply, transportation, and support services; and a host of narrow specialists in individual materiel categories, modes of transportation, and support services. They will serve as specialty chiefs and directors at commodity commands, the Army Materiel Command, DA, and at all major field commands. With their "majors," "minors," and "electives" completed, the generalists have their logistician PhD's and are ready to assume key logistical assignments anywhere. (And, possibly, even some of those positions will indicate a preferred specialty, e.g., "generalist-supply" and "generalist-support services.")

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

All functional branch groups should send the same percentage of officers to CGSC, and the course should be revised to cover the separate career fields in reasonable detail. This is essential for mutual understanding, appreciation, and respect—all vital to Army teamwork and coordination!

In the event there is a significant deficiency between the number of logistical officers who require CGSC-level schooling and those who can be accepted at Ft. Leavenworth, then it is only logical to establish CGSC-equivalent courses at the Army Logistics
Management Center and the Defense Systems Management School. However, even with equivalent courses, some logistical officers should still be schooled at Ft. Leavenworth. In fact, "cross-pollination" is so extremely important to a meaningful military education that combat arms and other functional branch group officers should also attend the equivalent courses in goodly numbers.

If logistical officers are truly considered as equals by selection boards, then Senior Service College should take care of itself. However, the importance of graduate level schooling must be stressed. Such schooling is simply necessary preparation for many logistics positions, and healthy allocations to the USAF Institute of Technology and civilian educational institutions are essential.

**CONTROL OF ASSIGNMENTS**

Even if every logistical position is identified and evaluated, and development patterns are charted to perfection, the logistical career management system will surely fail unless there is a high degree of control over assignments. When the field commander submits a requisition to fill a specific position, and DLCM provides an officer for that position, it only follows that the officer should, in fact, be assigned to that position. Field commanders could be permitted to select from a list of position candidates if that is necessary to get the system accepted; however, it would complicate the career management task considerably. Further, once an officer is
assigned, he should remain in the position for an established period unless relieved for cause. If reassignment is deemed necessary, after a specified minimum period, the field commander should coordinate with DLCM to assure that the proposed new assignment is compatible with the officer's career pattern.

Less control is required over company grade assignments; field commanders need greater flexibility to meet changing requirements, and young officers will benefit from varied assignments. DLCM would provide field commands with career development recommendations when each company grade officer is assigned, however; and this aspect of field command personnel management-assignment practices would be checked by Inspectors General, and others, routinely.

Related to assignments, the Officer Efficiency Report (OER) will serve as a vital link between the field commands and DLCM. The OER's must document the manner of performance; both strengths and weaknesses must be spelled out if the system is to have validity. Not only that, but while officers are now rated on overall performance (encompassing such important things as appearance, conduct, drive, personality, and administrative skills), a way must be found to pinpoint professional development. Perhaps the solution lies in having raters and indorsers answer specific questions in the narrative portion of the OER. The questions could be quite simple, such as these: "Has this officer demonstrated the requisite technical skills during this period?"; "What additional training and/or experience do you feel he needs at this stage of his development?";
and, "Is he fully qualified to serve at a higher professional echelon with additional responsibilities, and requiring greater technical expertise?"

DESIGNATION OF COMMANDERS

Whether we admit it to ourselves or not, career managers have always identified the "comers" in their branches and routed them to the right jobs and the right schools. They would be derelict in their duty if they didn't assign their top men, with the best possible preparation, to their most important positions. So, in my view, all OPMS II does is formalize this old, reliable personnel management technique. When viewed in conjunction with the identification and evaluation of logistical positions, the establishment of development patterns, and the control of assignments, DLCM should be able to test potential logistics commanders and managers in demanding, challenging jobs at appropriate stages of their development. The result must certainly be better commanders and managers!

I pair logistics command and managerial positions because I am convinced that both demand the same basic knowledge, experience, and proven ability. Not only would it be unfair to logistical officers, but also highly unrealistic—if not impossible—to attempt to differentiate between potential commanders and potential high-level managers. Further, a logical career pattern would probably be from battalion command to project management, and then on to higher command.
The idea of designating only logistics\textit{ troop} commanders is even less realistic. In that unfortunate circumstance, management positions would be down-graded and the selection process for some of the most difficult and critical commands in the Army would be unstructured. Taken on balance, there are no greater challenges than the command of logistics centers, transportation terminals, arsenals, and depots. Those positions demand the utmost in professional military and technical skill both to accomplish the command mission and to respond to the different, and at times, conflicting, leadership demands of a mixed civilian-military-contract workforce.

\textbf{DENOUEMENT}

My purpose has been to show, in some detail, how OPMS II can be used to construct a vigorous, effective logistics career management system. The concept may have glossed over some sticky details, it may have some flaws, and it may well raise some hackles; however, I trust that it also generates some positive thoughts about making OPMS II work to the benefit of Army logistics.

We logistical officers are a proud lot, and rightly so. In many respects we relish the awesome challenges and frustrating problems we face: not merely keeping abreast of technological change but pushing the state of the art, so as to have the best possible weapons and equipment available at any moment in time, for any conceivable contingency; buying and stocking just the right
items, in the right amounts, at the right places (often in support of equipment and tactics that have never been employed before, in climates and over terrain where we have never operated before); moving anything and everything rapidly, safely, and economically; routinely feeding and clothing troops better than their families ever did; performing instantaneous maintenance with minimum facilities and equipment, minimum people, and minimum repair parts; and accomplishing much of this wizardry with young men who couldn't even spell "logistics" a few short weeks before.

There certainly are no magic solutions, but we, and those who follow us, must be professionals in every respect. Ten years have passed since the demise of the technical services, ten years without a firm hand to guide our development and help us to become professionals. Something must be done--and done quickly!

William A. Rathbone
LTC
TC
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 22.

3. Ibid., p. 10.


5. Summary Assessment, pp. 18-19.

6. Ibid., p. 7.

7. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

8. Ibid., p. 31.


10. Ibid.

Interviews with Action Officers, Officer Personnel Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, January - March 1972 (hereafter referred to as "OPD Interviews").

11. Ibid.


12. OPD Interviews.


14. Ibid.

15. OPD Interviews.

16. Ibid.

17. Review of Responsibilities, Chap. 5, App. D.


24. Ibid., p. C-4-2.

25. Ibid., p. C-3-1.


27. Ibid., p. C-10-5.


29. OPMS, p. C-14-2.

30. OPD Interviews.

31. US Department of the Army, "OPMS II Briefing for the Chief of Staff," Unpublished Briefing Notes (5 January 1972) (hereafter referred to as "OPMS II").

32. US Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel memorandum to Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Subject: "Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS)," 25 February 1972 (hereafter referred to as "DCSPER Memo, 25 Feb 1972").

33. OPMS II.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

38. **OPMS II.**

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