AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF ENLISTMENT INCENTIVES AMONG JUNIOR COLLEGE STUDENTS

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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM No. 1
Navy Career Motivation Programs in an All-Volunteer Condition

Principal Investigator: Albert S. Glickman

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHOD</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANALYSES AND RESULTS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OBJECTIVES

In order to develop an administrative strategy to insure that the Navy has available a sufficient complement of competent and career-motivated personnel, we have suggested (Glickman, Goodstadt, Korman & Romanczuk, 1973), that a number of approaches might be both feasible and worthwhile. For example, one approach entails the operation of a series of small-scale administrative experiments which would yield understanding regarding the potential impact of incentives and organizational changes on Navy personnel. Following evaluation of such experimental programs and demonstrations of their effectiveness, changes might then be introduced on a Navy-wide basis to enhance recruiting and retention efforts. Of particular importance is that such organizational changes and incentives have appeal for those who are qualified to meet the Navy's technical requirements.

A general conceptual model of the career motivation process has been developed (Glickman, et al., 1973) as an aid in identifying those parameters of change that might have the greatest influence upon career motivation in the Navy. This model points out different types of organizational and incentive changes that appear most promising to introduce and evaluate in the form of limited-scale administrative experiments.

The research described in the present report is a step in the direction of developing and evaluating organizational and incentive changes for enhancing career motivation. Our focus in undertaking the work involved stems from the following considerations:

1. We seek to supplement interview data gathered during the first phase of the project (as documented in our initial report) by the use of a questionnaire procedure. Our content goal is to obtain additional information regarding possible incentives that might influence Naval career motivation and the shape and intrinsic characteristics of these incentives. It is felt that this additional information should come from different methodological procedures in order to complement dimensions that came out of our interview data. In cases where the incentive dimensions uncovered by interviews and by the questionnaires are similar, additional analysis enables us to specify more precisely the specific attributes comprising those dimensions.
In turn, such specifics are then useful for developing experiments with administrative innovations and new policies aiming to enhance career motivation.

2. A second aim of this research is to broaden our data base to insure adequate representation of specific and concrete administrative policies which might be employed in an incentive manipulation approach to influencing the enlistment process. We want to examine the adequacy of the range of incentives we have surveyed in our previous research and in our reviews of other research (cf. Gilbert Youth Survey Report, 1972) and to enable us to identify the major incentives available. Out of this pool of incentives, we wish to identify those incentives which seem to have considerable promise for influencing individuals to enlist in the Navy.

3. As a third consideration, we are also interested in exploring the generalizability and adequacy of our incentives for a specific population of interest, the junior college student, because, as indicated previously, (Glickman, et al., 1973), junior colleges tend to attract individuals who have: (a) the ability, motivation and self-discipline to successfully compete in achievement settings; as well as (b) a high degree of vocational and, often technical, work interest. Given the increasingly technical orientation of the Navy, there may be considerable untapped resources in junior colleges from which the Navy might recruit interested individuals.
METHOD

Questionnaire

The basic instrument used in this research was a 38-item questionnaire which reflected a variety of incentives that might be employed by the Navy for recruiting in an all-volunteer setting. These incentives reflected the types of concerns and motivational variables found in our interviews (Glickman, et. al., 1973), and in the existing research literature (Gilbert Report, 1971).

A preliminary revision of the 38-item questionnaire was pre-tested on civilian personnel to assure comprehensibility and relevance. Following pre-testing, a final form of the questionnaire was developed (see Appendix A). The responses to Navy recruiting incentives were made along a five-point scale ranging from thinking "less favorably of the Navy" to thinking "more favorably of the Navy and would seriously consider enlisting."

Sample

A total of 100 male community college students constituted the sample of this research. These students were contacted at two campuses of a suburban community college outside of Washington, D.C. and an inner-city community college in New York City. None of the respondents had ever been in the service and none had any current commitment to a military service. The demographic makeup of this sample (as determined by self-report items on the questionnaire) is shown in Table 1.

Administration

The questionnaire was administered to students in classes by their regular college instructors. All respondents were told the basic nature of the project and were assured of anonymity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Father's Occupation</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-19 yr.</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Lower-middle class</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-21 yr.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Middle-middle class</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-over</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Upper-middle class</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deceased</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nonrespondents</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Grade Completed</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consideration of Other Armed Service(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Yes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonrespondents</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nonrespondents</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interest in the Navy**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Am not interested in the Navy</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have not given much thought to joining</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am thinking about joining</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am thinking about joining and would like more information</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am definitely going to join the Navy</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonrespondents</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. The Descriptive Analysis

The method used to determine the incentive dimensions encompassed by the questionnaire was a principle-components factor analysis with an orthogonal varimax rotation to simple structure.

This analysis resulted in a total of six factors that could be given meaningful interpretation and which accounted for 68.8 percent of the common variance. The item loadings on each factor are shown in Tables 2 through 7. A cut-off point of .40 was used to indicate a "significant" loading. The interpretation of these findings and their relationship to our research goals is as follows:

Factor One: Opportunity for self-determination (Table 2). This factor, accounting for 48.0 percent of the common variance, was concerned with self-determination; that is, having control over one's own fate. Thus, incentive items 18, 26, 28, 29 and 31 (see Appendix A for questions) all seem to have the common thread of encouraging the potential enlistee to believe that he would not be completely under the control of the Navy and that he would be able to retain personal control over important aspects of his life. Since this motivational theme was also a common element in the interviews previously reported (Glickman, et al., 1973), this outcome is consistent in showing that the desire for self-determination and fate control are important influences on career motivation. In addition, the present finding provides some explicit details regarding those incentives that may impinge on self-perceived powerlessness and fate control. These specific incentives will therefore be useful for application in later research.

Factor Two: Opportunity for vocational and financial satisfactions (Table 3). This second factor accounted for 6.0 percent of the common variance and is also quite similar to some of the motivational themes described in previous work. As we have indicated earlier, it would seem that the increasing value that young men assign to self-actualization and meaningful control over their vocational and personal life has not been
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item #</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Educational leave at full pay for 2 months a year.</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Periodic visits by dependents while at sea, which would be paid for by the Navy.</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>A policy of guaranteed location assignments after your initial tour.</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>The right to leave the Navy at any time after 2 years, with no strings attached.</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>The right to live off the base after boot camp, if you prefer.</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Assurance that you will be able to change your job after 1 year if you don't like it.</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>30 days paid vacation each year.</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>An opportunity to get out of the Navy after 6 months, if you are not satisfied, with no strings attached.</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Free long distance phone calls to dependents when separated for more than 2 weeks (one free call every 2 weeks).</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>An opportunity to work in jobs that have clear civilian transferability.</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Eliminate drilling and reduce physical training aspects of Navy boot camp.</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>An opportunity to accumulate unused leave time up to 180 days.</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Redesigning military quarters on shore bases in order to provide for one and two-man rooms with bath.</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>A chance to enroll in an officer training program immediately after completing 2 years of college (or junior college).</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item #</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Loading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>More pay for sea duty than for shore duty.</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Guarantee of the Navy vocational school of your choice at enlistment.</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>A $1000 bonus at the time of enlistment</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>The opportunity to retire at half pay, with medical benefits after 15 years of service.</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 3
Factor Two: Opportunity for Vocational and Financial Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item #</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>A $3000 bonus at the time of enlistment with no strings attached.</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>An enlistment of 2 years instead of 3 or 4 years.</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Navy would help you get started in a civilian job after finishing your active duty, by providing training in a civilian skill.</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>As an enlisted man, you would be paid by the government for up to four years of college, including living expenses, at the school of your choice, in return for four years of active duty.</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>A $1000 bonus at the time of enlistment.</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>People who have been to college for one or two years would enter at higher pay grades than persons who have not had any college.</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>An opportunity to work in the home port area of your choice for the first 2 years of your enlistment.</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>The Navy would pay up to two years of technical/vocational school training, including living expenses, at the school of your choice, in return for four years of active duty.</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>A 9 month leave of absence at full pay for educational and/or other personal growth activities every 6 years.</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>A $5000 bonus at the time of enlistment with no strings attached.</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>An opportunity to accumulate unused leave time up to 180 days.</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
accompanied by a devaluation of vocational and financial satisfactions. These traditional concerns continue to be important as shown by our interviews and as documented here.

**Factor Three: Opportunity for retirement benefits (Table 4).** This factor accounted for 5.5 percent of the common variance, and is rather specific in nature. Two major item loadings reflect the extent to which individuals value currently existing Navy retirement benefits. A third significant loading (Item 34) is not consistent with this interpretation. However, it also loads significantly on Factor One and is consistent with the "Opportunity for Self-Determination" interpretation of that grouping.

It may be noted that the "opportunity for retirement benefits" is not a frequently cited factor in our interviews. Its occurrence here, therefore, constitutes an addition to the findings of that earlier study.

**Factor Four: Opportunity for integration of military and civilian life (Table 5).** In Factor Four, which accounts for 3.5 percent of the common variance, we seem to be dealing with a view of the Navy in the same career framework with civilian employers. The Navy, as an organization offering employment, is viewed here as part of a whole set of employers that exist in an individual's perceptual field, all of whom are interrelated in terms of degree of skill and occupational transferability. This factor emerges as consistent with our earlier interview research. In addition, it adds information as to specific incentives underlying this dimension which can be used when we address ourselves to the linkage of military and civilian careers and how such linkages impact on career motivation. (It may be noted that several retirement items that load on this factor also form the more specific Factor Three. This is not inconsistent with our general interpretation since retirement benefits can be seen both in terms of their specific enlistment incentive values, and in terms of their congruence with an individual's plan for a civilian career after leaving the Navy.)

**Factor Five: Release option (Table 6).** This factor, which accounted for 2.9 percent of the common variance, has as its major motivational thrust the individual's desire to be able to reject and/or change aversive factors
# TABLE 4

Factor Three: Opportunity for Retirement Benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item #</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>The opportunity to retire from the Navy at 3/4 pay after 30 years.</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>The opportunity to retire from the Navy at half pay with medical benefits after 20 years.</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Guarantee of the Navy vocational school of your choice at enlistment.</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item #</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Loading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>The opportunity to retire at half pay, with medical benefits after 15 years of service.</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Retirement at 3/4 pay, with medical benefits, after 20 years.</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>The Navy would pay up to two years of technical/vocational school training, including living expenses, at the school of your choice, in return for four years of active duty.</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>A policy of making pay and allowances on all jobs in the Navy comparable to civilian pay and benefits for smaller jobs.</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>An opportunity to work in the home port area of your choice for the first 2 years of your enlistment.</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>The opportunity to retire from the Navy at half pay with medical benefits after 20 years.</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>A 9 month leave of absence at full pay for educational and/or other personal growth activities every 6 years.</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>A special allowance for high-cost of living areas such as New York City, Washington, etc.</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item #</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Loading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>The ability to leave the Navy at any time by paying a fee of $500 with no strings attached.</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Redesigning military quarters on shore bases in order to provide for one and two-man rooms with bath.</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Eliminate drilling and reduce physical training aspects of Navy boot camp.</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
i.e., some of the tangible conditions of military life. Positive affect is associated with reduction of these aversive conditions. This may be accomplished by changes made by the Navy, or by the individual leaving the Navy. The thrust of this factor fits in quite well with the findings revealed by interviews.

Factor Six: Reduction of perceived inequities (Table 7). The last factor, "Reduction of perceived inequities" accounted for 2.8 percent of the common variance, and reflects the degree to which the Navy, as an employing institution, is perceived as providing the same job opportunities, i.e., money, interaction with opposite sex ("assign women to duty aboard ship"), and vacation time, as do civilian employers. The major theme of this factor is that the more the Navy reduces these perceived inequities, (i.e., inequities as defined by what is commonly available in civilian life)—the better.

The Identification of the Most Promising Incentives

In the process of developing incentives to enhance enlistment, we were guided by a number of considerations. First, there was the need to insure a sufficiently wide range of incentive content from which we could draw a variety of different kinds of incentives outside of the conventional domain of monetary bonuses and educational benefits. A second consideration was the possibility that particular incentives might have different degrees of appeal for different segments of the Navy eligible population. To the extent that this were the case, it would contribute to the design of our research and development program. In order to assess this possibility, we undertook an exploratory analysis of limited sample size to give us some preliminary information as to whether certain incentives did have differential appeal for individuals from different socio-economic backgrounds. Using the father's occupation as a measure of socio-economic background and eliminating cases where the father was unemployed or deceased, or where his occupation was undeterminable, the socio-economic status of 73 respondents could be classified. A three category classification was used, based on whether the father was employed in a professional or high technical occupation, in a skilled-trade occupation, or in a job involving relatively low-level, somewhat menial tasks. Those whose fathers were classified in the first group were considered to be of Upper Middle (UM) socio-economic
TABLE 7

Factor Six: Reduction of Perceived Inequities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item #</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Assign women to duty aboard ship.</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>A policy of bonuses for exceptionally good performance.</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>More pay for sea duty than for shore duty.</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>An opportunity to work in jobs that have clear civilian transferability.</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>A $5000 bonus at the time of enlistment with no strings attached.</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Free long distance phone calls to dependents when separated for more than 2 weeks (one free call every 2 weeks).</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>An opportunity to get out of the Navy after 6 months, if you are not satisfied, with no strings attached.</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>A requirement that uniforms be worn only one day per week (and on special occasions) while on shore duty.</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>A policy of making pay and allowances on all jobs in the Navy comparable to civilian pay and benefits for smaller jobs.</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>People who have been to college for one or two years would enter at higher pay grades than persons who have not had any college.</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>A 20% pay increase across the board (starting salary before the increase is $288 per month plus clothing, room, board, educational and medical benefits).</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>30 days paid vacation each year.</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>An opportunity to accumulate unused leave time up to 180 days.</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
status (N=27), those from the second group were considered to be of Middle (M) socio-economic status (N=36), while those from the last group were assigned to the Lower (L) socio-economic level (N=10).

Relevant data from this analysis are shown in Tables 8, 9, and 10. In Table 8 are listed the mean ratings of each incentive, by socio-economic grouping, while Table 9 presents those items ranked highest by members of each socio-economic subgroup (i.e., UM, M, & L) and pairs of sub-groups (UM & M). Also presented in Table 9 are the factors on which each of these items loaded (e.g., Item 5, which had a mean rating of 3.25 for the L group, loaded .65 on Factor II-Opportunity for Vocational and Financial Satisfaction). Table 10 gives corresponding data for the whole sample (those classified regarding socio-economic status, as well as those individuals who could not be so classified.

An examination of these tables suggests the following:

1. There is some indication from column means shown in Table 8 that among junior college students the most favorable overall feelings toward the Navy exist for those with either UM or M backgrounds, while those from L backgrounds seem to be least attracted (means 3.07 and 3.11 vs. 2.90). This conclusion is, of course, based on very small samples and only cautious generalization is warranted. Yet, subject to further confirmation, there is here the suggestion that the incentives evaluated in this study are least effective for attracting persons from lower socio-economic backgrounds.

2. The locus of problems associated with attracting L-category persons may be pinpointed in Table 9. With decreasing socio-economic status, the significance of tangible incentives becomes stronger; while the items reflecting aspiration for "self-control" and "equity" become stronger with increasing socio-economic status. That is, Factors II and IV are more important among those of lower SES, while Factors I and VII are more important to those of higher SES.

Taken together, these findings suggest three interrelated but distinguishable administrative implications. First, the fact that differences exist between the socio-economic levels such that upper middle class persons are more attracted to the Navy than persons lower in socio-economic status
TABLE 8
Mean Ratings and Standard Deviations for Incentives for Total Sample and the Sub-samples Based on Father’s Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total Sample N=100</th>
<th>Upper-Middle Background N=27</th>
<th>Middle-(Skilled) Worker Background N=36</th>
<th>Low-Socio-Economic Background N=10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>1.08</td>
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<td>19. Assign women to duty aboard ship.</td>
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<td>24. A policy of bonuses for exceptionally good performance.</td>
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<td>18. Educational leave at full pay for 2 months a year.</td>
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<td>.75</td>
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<td>17. A $5000 bonus at the time of enlistment with no strings attached.</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>.43</td>
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<td>31. The right to leave the Navy at any time after 2 years, with no strings attached.</td>
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<td>22. An opportunity to work in jobs that have clear civilian transferability.</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>.55</td>
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<td>29. The right to live off the base after boot camp, if you prefer.</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>.48</td>
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<td>28. Assurance that you will be able to change your job after 1 year if you don't like it.</td>
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<td><strong>Middle (N=36)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>21. An opportunity to accumulate unused leave time up to 180 days.</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>.53</td>
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<td>4. A $3000 bonus at the time of enlistment with no strings attached.</td>
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<td>6. People who have been to college for one or two years would enter at higher pay grades than persons who have not had any college.</td>
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TABLE 9 (Cont'd.)

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<td>26. A policy of guaranteed location assignments after your initial tour.</td>
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<td>Lower (N=10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. As an enlisted man, you would be paid by the government for up to four years of college, including living expenses, at the school of your choice, in return for four years of active duty.</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.43</td>
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<td>25. Periodic visits by dependents while at sea, which would be paid for by the Navy.</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Retirement at 3/4 pay, with medical benefits, after 20 years.</td>
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<td>Mean</td>
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<td>VII</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. An opportunity to get out of the Navy after 6 months, if you are not satisfied, with no strings attached.</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>.58</td>
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<td>.45</td>
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<td>33. Thirty (30) days paid vacation each year.</td>
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<td>.59</td>
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<td>.41</td>
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<td>27. A chance to enroll in an officer training program immediately after completing 2 years of college (or junior college).</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>.56</td>
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</table>
suggests that something might need to be done to increase the attractiveness
of the Navy for those from lower socio-economic backgrounds.

Secondly, the fact that there are variations in the manner by which
persons of different socio-economic groupings respond to incentives rein-
forces the view that varied incentives and appeals should be developed
and directed at different target populations of potential enlistees. One
means of doing this may be to have these appeals generated and reviewed with
the help of individuals from different backgrounds, i.e., those who have
knowledge of, or who can adopt the different "frames of reference" most
easily.

Third, these results also suggest that a group not often thought of as
being interested in a Navy career (i.e., those from upper middle class
backgrounds) might be a rich source of potential enlistees. Thus, our data
show that certain appeals may be most useful for attracting young men from
upper middle class backgrounds and that appeals to such persons could be
given more emphasis by the Navy. There has been a tendency by recruiters
and Navy officials in the past to consider this group (and college students
in general) as unreachable. Hence, such populations have been relatively
neglected as an enlisted recruiting pool.

3. The differences in the attractiveness of incentives for the
different subgroups of potential enlistees should not be allowed to obscure
the incentives which appear to be common to all subgroups (Table 10). Thus,
while some difference in attractiveness of certain incentives may occur as a
function of socio-economic status, junior college students in general seem
to be attracted both by the opportunity to (a) exercise control of their
vocational and career life as much as possible, and (b) by traditional in-
centives, such as money, advancement opportunities and working conditions.

4. Finally, these results suggest that the utilization of popula-
tion characteristics may be useful for defining differential appeals and
differential approaches in future research and administrative applications.
It appears necessary to further examine these findings using larger, more
systematically defined samples in order to evaluate the utility of segmenting
potential populations of recruits according to socio-economic variables.
In addition, there is also a need to test more fully the utility of segmenting the "market" according to such variables as urban-suburban, rural location, career interests, and related dimensions.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Suggestions for the Navy recruiting effort in the all-volunteer environment will become increasingly explicit as we obtain additional information. Thus, while the data presented here are only exploratory and reflect our hypothesis and model-generating interests at this time, several indications have emerged regarding the enlistment motives of junior college students. First, they wish to retain considerable control over their vocational and their personal lives. Second, they are interested in "traditional" vocational work incentives such as money, the opportunity for advancement, good vacations and working conditions. From these data, we would hypothesize that the current generation of junior college students differs from previous generations of college students and high school graduates in that they expect "more" from the Navy. They want both traditional incentives and increased opportunity for self-control. However, it also needs to be noted that the relative weight of these factors may be different for those of different socio-economic backgrounds in that the more "tangible" traditional incentives seem to be more important at lower socio-economic levels. There is considerable evidence in the research literature that these types of work values are quite typical of those from lower socio-economic backgrounds (cf. Davis, 1946; Goodale, 1973). Thus, while our samples in this study were of a size most appropriate for exploratory analysis, the substantive conclusions drawn are strengthened by this previous work.

The implications from these findings are several. First, it will be necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of incentives reflecting both "new" and "traditional" appeals. Second, incentives need to be selected on the basis of their appropriateness and attractiveness for specific populations in order to maximize their potential for influencing enlistment decisions. Our previous discussions have suggested that one possible procedure might be to have representatives of different socio-economic groups contribute to the development of incentives responsive to the varying motivational characteristics of different target populations.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A
AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH
NAVY ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE

The American Institutes for Research, a private, nonprofit organization, is conducting a study of young men's attitudes toward the Navy. We would appreciate your cooperation in filling out this questionnaire. Your answers will remain confidential and your name is not required. Please answer the questions on the first page before turning to page two where additional instructions will be given.

1. At this time, I:
   (circle appropriate answer)
   a. Am not interested in the Navy.
   b. Have not given much thought to joining the Navy.
   c. Am thinking about joining the Navy.
   d. Am thinking about joining the Navy and would like more information about Navy programs.
   e. Am definitely going to join the Navy.

2. Age: ____years____months

3. Highest school grade completed: ______

4. Father's occupation ____________________________

5. Have you ever been in a military service? _____(yes/no)
   If so, which one? __________

6. Have you considered any armed service other than the Navy? _____(yes/no)
   If so, which one? __________
Instructions

As the military draft comes to an end, the Navy is expecting to make some changes. Basically, the idea is to see how some of these possible changes might affect the plans of young men with respect to enlisting in the Navy. Below you will find descriptions of a number of changes which the Navy may consider adopting in order to attract more people like yourself. Before each description, you will find five choices, a, b, c, d, e. Circle the letter you feel most accurately describes how that particular change might affect you. Use the following key making your ratings:

a. If this change were introduced, I would think less favorably of the Navy.
b. If this change were introduced, I would think neither more or less favorably of the Navy.
c. If this change were introduced, I would think more favorably of the Navy.
d. If this change were introduced, I would think more favorably of the Navy and would try to get more information about Navy programs.
e. If this change were introduced, I would think more favorably and would seriously consider enlisting in the Navy.

1. A $1000 bonus at the time of enlistment.
2. The Navy would help you get started in a civilian job after finishing your active duty, by providing training in a civilian skill.
3. An enlistment of 2 years instead of 3 or 4 years.
4. A $3000 bonus at the time of enlistment with no strings attached.
5. As an enlisted man, you would be paid by the government for up to four years of college, including living expenses, at the school of your choice, in return for four years of active duty.
6. People who have been to college for one or two years would enter at higher pay grades than persons who have not had any college.
7. The Navy would pay up to two years of technical/vocational school training, including living expenses, at the school of your choice, in return for four years of active duty.
8. An opportunity to work in the home port area of your choice for the first 2 years of your enlistment.
a. If this change were introduced, I would think \textit{less favorably} of the Navy.

b. If this change were introduced, I would think \textit{neither more or less favorably} of the Navy.

c. If this change were introduced, I would think \textit{more favorably} of the Navy.

d. If this change were introduced, I would think \textit{more favorably} of the Navy and would try to get more information about Navy programs.

e. If this change were introduced, I would think \textit{more favorably} and would seriously consider enlisting in the Navy.

\textbf{9. A special allowance for high-cost of living areas such as New York City, Washington, etc.}

\textbf{10. A requirement that uniforms be worn only one day per week (and on special occasions) while on shore duty.}

\textbf{11. An opportunity to get out of the Navy after 6 months, if you are not satisfied, with no strings attached.}

\textbf{12. A 9 month leave of absence at full pay for educational and/or other personal growth activities every 6 years.}

\textbf{13. A 20\% pay increase across the board (starting salary before the increase is $288 per month plus clothing, room, board, educational and medical benefits).}

\textbf{14. The opportunity to retire at half pay, with medical benefits after 15 years of service.}

\textbf{15. A policy of making pay and allowances on all jobs in the Navy comparable to civilian pay and benefits for similar jobs.}

\textbf{16. Retirement at 3/4 pay, with medical benefits, after 20 years.}

\textbf{17. A $5000 bonus at the time of enlistment with no strings attached.}

\textbf{18. Educational leave at full pay for 2 months a year.}

\textbf{19. Assign women to duty aboard ship.}

\textbf{20. Eliminate drilling and reduce physical training aspects of Navy boot camp.}
a. If this change were introduced, I would think less favorably of the Navy.
b. If this change were introduced, I would think neither more or less favorably of the Navy.
c. If this change were introduced, I would think more favorably of the Navy.
d. If this change were introduced, I would think more favorably of the Navy and would try to get more information about Navy programs.
e. If this change were introduced, I would think more favorably and would seriously consider enlisting in the Navy.

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a b c d e  21. An opportunity to accumulate unused leave time up to 180 days.
a b c d e  22. An opportunity to work in jobs that have clear civilian transferability.
a b c d e  23. More pay for sea duty than for shore duty.
a b c d e  24. A policy of bonuses for exceptionally good performance.
a b c d e  25. Periodic visits by dependents while at sea, which would be paid for by the Navy.
a b c d e  26. A policy of guaranteed location assignments after your initial tour.
a b c d e  27. A chance to enroll in an officer training program immediately after completing 2 years of college (or junior college).
a b c d e  28. Assurance that you will be able to change your job after 1 year if you don't like it.
a b c d e  29. The right to live off the base after boot camp, if you prefer.
a b c d e  30. Redesigning military quarters on shore bases in order to provide for one and two-man rooms with bath.
a b c d e  31. The right to leave the Navy at any time after 2 years, with no strings attached.
a b c d e  32. Free long distance phone calls to dependents when separated for more than 2 weeks (one free call every 2 weeks).
a b c d e  33. 30 days paid vacation each year.
a b c d e  34. Guarantee of the Navy vocational school of your choice at enlistment.
a b c d e  35. The ability to leave the Navy at any time by paying a fee of $500, with no strings attached.
a. If this change were introduced, I would think **less favorably** of the Navy.

b. If this change were introduced, I would think **neither more or less favorably** of the Navy.

c. If this change were introduced, I would think **more favorably** of the Navy.

d. If this change were introduced, I would think **more favorably** of the Navy and would try to get more information about Navy programs.

e. If this change were introduced, I would think **more favorably** and would seriously consider enlisting in the Navy.

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a b c d e  36. The opportunity to retire from the Navy at half pay with medical benefits after 20 years.

a b c d e  37. Guaranteed two year duty overseas in the country of your choice.

a b c d e  38. The opportunity to retire from the Navy at 3/4 pay after 30 years.
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A questionnaire designed to assess reaction to possible enlistment incentives was administered to 100 junior college students. A factor-analysis of the measure indicated the importance both of traditional tangible incentives and of the "newer" incentives of control over one's work life. The data also indicated that: a) low socio-economic individuals were less attracted to the Navy overall than those from middle-or-higher levels, and b) the traditional incentives were more important for the low socio-economic respondents while the newer incentives were more important for the higher level individuals.
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