MILITARY CIVIC ACTION.

FINAL REPORT

Volume II:

Summary and Recommendations

Comparison of Civilian and Military Techniques

Final report, by Philip S. McMullan and others.

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MILITARY CIVIC ACTION:
EVALUATION OF CIVILIAN TECHNIQUES

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Comparison of Civilian and Military Techniques

by
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and
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FOREWORD

This is Volume II of a two-volume report on research under Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) Order No. 1444, Military Civic Action (Evaluation of Civilian Techniques), and U.S. Army Missile Command (USAMICOM) Contract No. DAAH01-70-C-0949. The data on military techniques used in this report was primarily that compiled under a companion research project pursuant to ARPA Order No. 1384 and USAMICOM Contract DAAH01-70-C-0950 (RTI Project No. OU-532).
ABSTRACT

This Final Report presents a description and summary of work performed and accomplishments of Research Triangle Institute (RTI) Project No. 51U-533 during the period April 1970 - September 1972 pursuant to Advanced Research Projects Agency Order No. 1444 and U.S. Army Missile Command Contract No. DAAH01-70-C-0949.

The purposes of this research effort were (1) to study and evaluate methods and techniques employed by U.S. civilian agencies in international development assistance; (2) to compare civilian methods and techniques with similar aspects of military civic action (MCA); and (3) to formulate recommendations for direction of MCA based upon this analysis and comparison.

This research effort has been divided into three Phases. Phase I, which covered the period April-December 1970, involved: (1) a literature search into methods and techniques employed in international development assistance by 32 selected nongovernment organizations (NGO's), and (2) a perfunctory analysis of methods and techniques employed in international development assistance by the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), the Peace Corps, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Input on MCA were provided from RTI Project No. 0U-532 which evaluated military techniques. Phase I was summarized in an interim unpublished Phase I Special Technical Report. RTI's Phase I findings and recommendations for further research were reviewed during Phase II which was completed during January 1971. Phase III has covered the period February 1971 - September 1972 and has involved further research into the methods and techniques employed in international development assistance by selected U.S. civilian and United Nations agencies, a comparison of civilian and military techniques, and the formulation of recommendations for MCA.

Volume I of this Final Report addresses itself to an analysis, comparison and evaluation of methods and techniques employed in international development assistance by 34 selected NGO's; A.I.D., the Peace Corps,
and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs in the U.S. Department of State; the Office of Saline Water and TTPI in the U.S. Department of the Interior; the Inter-American Social Development Institute, now the Inter-American Foundation; and the UNDP. Facets of international development assistance investigated included philosophy and objectives, organizational structure, and policies toward personnel, planning, operations and evaluation.

**Volume II** of this Final Report presents in summary a comparative analysis of the methods and techniques used by civilian agencies in terms of use by U.S. military forces, and recommendations regarding methods and techniques for accomplishing community and technical development work which may be applicable to MCA. Volume II also contains the executive summary, a glossary of abbreviations and the bibliography.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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Mr. Massoglia, a Senior Analyst in Systems Analysis in RTI's OIP, is a graduate of Michigan Technological University and Northwestern University, and a candidate for the Ed.D. degree at North Carolina State University. From 1948-1967 he was with the U.S. Army; he had command and staff assignments with major Army headquarters in the U.S., Europe, Korea and Japan, involving training, logistics, and research and development management; long-range planning; and public and community relations. Since joining RTI, Mr. Massoglia has performed and directed research on military and paramilitary community development activities and technical assistance programs in Third World countries; management information systems; environmental control implementation plans; and alcohol abuse and alcoholism programs.

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Mr. Harris is a multidisciplinary analyst in RTI's Center for Health Studies. His background and experience include the study of medicine and operations research and their application to research in clinical and experimental neurophysiology, toxicology, medical economics, medical information systems, health care, alcohol and drug abuse, and survey design, administration and analysis. Mr. Harris has a B.A. in zoology from Duke University and has done graduate work in medicine at Duke University, operations research at Georgia Institute of Technology, and substance abuse at the University of California at San Diego.
SUMMARY OF VOLUMES I AND II

I.  INTRODUCTION

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Volume II of this Final Report presents in summary a comparative analysis of the methods and techniques used by civilian agencies in terms of use by U.S. military forces, a comparison of civilian and military techniques, and the formulation of recommendations for MCA.

II. EVALUATION OF CIVILIAN TECHNIQUES

The philosophies upon which the civilian agencies base their involvement in international development assistance exhibit some basic similarities, whether the agency is government or nongovernment. Most seem to have developed sound doctrines and philosophies upon which their general objectives and even specific programs are based. These basic beliefs, some of which are more concisely articulated and well-documented than others, seem to focus primarily on various qualities and elements which the organizations consider important in the development of emerging countries, such as education, nutrition, leadership and other professional training, efficient government, self-help, commonality of problems, international cooperation and understanding. A.I.D. seems to have more awareness of security and socio-politico-military events and relations, while in TTPI the U.S. is attempting to foster the whole range of federal, state and local, public and private services. The civilian agencies show somewhat more differentiation in their interpretation of their philosophies and the transference and interpretation of these philosophies in the formulation of objectives and the initiation and implementation of international development assistance activities.
The NGO's involved in international development assistance do not support cumbersome bureaucratic organizations composed of large numbers of superfluous personnel, at least not to the extent practiced by their government counterparts, and most of the NGO's maintain a small staff within a relatively simple structure where channels of authority and responsibility are well-defined. Such an arrangement obviates a detailed formal organizational structure which could hinder communication and flexibility, characteristics which are important to international development assistance. Volunteers are important to the international development assistance operations of several of the civilian agencies, although there is not uniform agreement on the term volunteer in terms of selection criteria, job description, or compensation. Most of the civilian agencies maintain some overseas staff of one form or another, and several employ outside consultants and host country or third country nationals in their international development assistance operations.

In acquiring personnel for work in international development assistance, most of the civilian agencies indicated that they rely primarily on active recruitment or employ some combination of recruitment and referral. U.S. Government agencies, and the Peace Corps in particular, lead the categories as a source of personnel, while colleges and universities, applications on file, and general word-of-mouth were other leading sources cited. Of the methods/procedures cited by the civilian agencies as important parts of their personnel selection process, the application was the most often cited element, followed closely by the interview and language testing. Of the criteria cited by the civilian agencies in this study as applied in their personnel selection process, the most important appear to be those which relate to experience—professional, international and, where possible, related to the position; education; language aptitude or proficiency; adaptability; job competence; references; ability to communicate; and ability to withstand cultural shock.

Training of civilian personnel for work in international development assistance may consist of intramural or extramural programs, or programs which include elements of both; most organizations employ more than one
type of method and/or facility in some mix in their training programs. The Peace Corps maintains a particularly thorough and intensive intramural training program with extramural elements. In general, however, the civilian agencies do not maintain such intensive programs as the emphasis placed on professional and international experience, job competence and education in personnel selection tends to obviate extensive training programs. Indeed, the training methods mentioned most often by the study sample agencies as used in the intramural training of personnel for work in international development assistance are those which would most adequately complement education and experience: a general but short orientation session, language training, and on-the-job training. One effective approach appears to be a combination of structured orientation followed by a period of on-the-job training followed by a final period of formal training. An important feature of several civilian training programs is study of the host country area, and several agencies in the study sample maintain training centers in the host country area. The content of the Peace Corps training program seemed particularly noteworthy, as did the use by several of the NGO's of visual aids, special short courses, and in-service training. The most often mentioned extramural facilities utilized by the civilian agencies in their training programs are colleges and universities which are usually selected for their curriculum—skills needed on a particular project or area studies of a host country area—or, whenever possible, both.

The average duration of overseas assignment among NGO's supplying such information was 25 1/2 months, but 50 percent of such special duty personnel remain on assignment in the field for longer than the time originally agreed upon. The standard two-year tour observed by most agencies was set by A.I.D., but there is a trend to adapt the length of overseas assignment to the project. The overall effectiveness of short overseas duty tours has been seriously questioned. For the most part, the civilian agencies in this study emphasize a role of advice and assistance for their personnel involved in international development assistance; among the key words used in defining this role are adaptation, participation, relevance and understanding.
Several of the civilian agencies in the study sample perform some form of personnel evaluation, usually at regular intervals ranging from six months to three years; the usual interval is annually or semiannually. The form which these personnel evaluations take may be subjective reports, although the more objective formats of checklists and questionnaires are the more usual case.

The development assistance interests and activities of the civilian agencies in the study are fairly evenly distributed between Africa, Asia and Latin America, but more of the agencies are involved in development assistance activities in Latin America than in any of the three other areas, and more of the agencies are active in more Latin American countries than is the case in other areas of the world. The categories of development assistance which figure most prominently in the international development assistance operations of the civilian agencies in this study are community development, education, food production and agriculture, medicine and public health, social welfare and public and business administration.

Most of the civilian agencies in the study indicated that ideas for new development assistance projects most frequently originate with their overseas staff or some element of the host country. Not one agency in the study indicated that ideas for new development assistance projects originate in the home office of the organization. Most of the agencies in the study require some type of grant application or project proposal outlining suggested development assistance efforts, but the form which these proposals take varies considerably among the organizations; some organizations simply request the submission of an informal and unstructured letter, while others require a more formal and structured outline and discussion of the proposed effort. Of those criteria which are applied by the civilian agencies in this study in selecting international development assistance projects, the most important appear to be felt need, by invitation or request of host country government, compatibility with host country development goals and planning, the availability of local resources, type of project, available funding, overall plan and feasibility, self-help, impact, organizational philosophy, availability of qualified personnel,
objectives, political stability of the host country area, arrangement with the host country government, magnitude, ability to become self-supporting and continue, cost/benefits, and past experience and expertise.

In general, the emphasis in development assistance operations is on the personnel involved and careful selection of the project. There seems to be a general trend away from giveaway programs that rob the recipients of their dignity. The civilian agencies in the study emphasize the implementation of pilot, demonstration, and self-help projects; several also advocate feasibility studies and employ the Food-for-Work concept effectively. Several of the NGO's have developed techniques that appear particularly useful in international development assistance, in particular the utilization of visual aids.

All of the civilian agencies in this study consider their international development assistance operations to have been generally successful. Some organizations in the study regarded evaluation as foolish, biased and/or a hollow exercise, but all organizations in the study perform some form of evaluation at some level; most of this evaluation is focused at the project level.

The most utilized method of project evaluation is some form of report from the field, followed closely by visits to the project site by a team of evaluators. These evaluations may be done by parties directly involved with the project or not or directly involved with the organization or not, but outside evaluation experts may have a deleterious effect on the project in that their presence may question the integrity of project personnel and affect the continuity and interrelationship of projects. The most effective form of field report would appear to be an annual report which reflects both objective and subjective elements and relates the project to other efforts in the country or program; the objectives of the project, program and organization; and its potential to the recipients. Another useful evaluation tool would appear to be the post-project review, where the development assistance effort is re-evaluated one or two years after completion to assess the validity of evaluation at the time of project completion or transfer to indigenous control, and to determine the direction and impact of the project.
Of factors cited by the civilian agencies in this study as important in determining the success or failure of international development assistance projects, those considered most important are personnel, advance planning, and flexibility. Another quality which is important in determining the success or failure of international development assistance projects is motivation, of the organization and its personnel, and of the recipients of the assistance.

Of project effectiveness criteria considered important by the civilian agencies in measuring the effectiveness of international development assistance projects, the most important appear to be the assumption of control of the project by the indigenous population; the determination that the project filled a felt need; the development of local skills; and the measurement of cost/benefits.

Throughout this research effort, the cooperation and coordination of international development assistance efforts by the civilian agencies at different levels, and the NGO's in particular, was an outstanding feature. Furthermore, flexibility, continuity and the lack of constraining fiscal accountability, features that generally distinguish NGO from Government-oriented development assistance programs, are also qualities that assist the NGO's in developing an organizational memory which helps avoid repeating mistakes.

III. COMPARISON OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY TECHNIQUES

U.S.-supported MCA is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy and follows a philosophy which is not unlike that of the civilian organizations, except that its priorities are dictated in large part by the location and intensity of Communist activities. U.S. civilian Government agencies are also to follow this foreign policy directive. The philosophy and doctrine of the U.S. Government concerning MCA as an aid in the socio-economic development of friendly nations is based upon the same general foreign policy as that of the U.S. civilian agencies. The NGO's differ in one important particular: Their mission makes their international development assistance activities their primary function, while the
international development assistance activities of military forces are either subsidiary to or part of their primary military mission. This makes it essential that the military situation in each country and the primary mission of each Service be considered so that civic action methods or techniques may be tailored to each country and mission. This point is not made clear in all MCA documentation, but a part of this concept was highlighted by President Kennedy when he stated:

1. In countries fighting active campaigns against subversion, civic action is an indispensable means of strengthening the economic base and establishing a link between the armed forces and the populace.

2. In countries threatened by external aggression, forces should participate in military civic action projects which do not materially impair performance of the primary military mission.

3. In countries where subversion or external attack is less imminent, selected indigenous military forces can contribute substantively to economic and social development, and such a contribution can be a major function of such forces. [Ref. 1]

In the first of the three situations cited above, the military must give primary consideration to their mission of containing or defeating the internal enemy; in this situation, civic action has been used as an effective tactic to establish and maintain the support of the civilian population. However, the best opportunities for profiting from civilian techniques in the implementation of MCA should come in countries where subversion or external attack is less imminent, the third situation cited above, in which the focus is upon long-range improvement of the international situation. It may be feasible in some such countries to establish a program of contributing to socioeconomic development as a major function of host country military forces. The role of the U.S. military would be primarily to advise and, where appropriate, to assist with mobile training teams, Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds, and other U.S. resources from civilian agencies. It would appear that current doctrine for MCA borrows from all three of the above models, and each service emphasizes the model which it believes to be more appropriate to its mission and its interpretation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) definition of MCA.
While most of the civilian agencies have relatively clear, concise, broad formulations of functional general objectives, the overall objectives of U.S.-supported MCA are not clear from the JCS definition, and various interpretations in different parts of the world contribute to misunderstanding and difficulty in evaluation. Military programs which can be labeled nation-building MCA by indigenous military forces with U.S. advice and assistance have objectives which are not unlike those of civilian agencies.

The organizations of most civilian agencies are dedicated to their mission of international development assistance. In conformance with Congressional policy, the U.S. Military has no dedicated system for performing civic action, and it is constrained from supporting host country military forces which are organized solely to perform MCA. Possibly as a result of following this policy, the only U.S. units found to be dedicated to a civic action type of activity are the Mobile Training Teams and special Seabee teams. Only the Air Force has a military occupational specialty (MOS) designated for civic action; the function of a civic action officer is not now recognized within the Department of Defense (DOD) as being unique. At the DOD level, the relatively small amount of MAP funds used for MCA are managed as an additional duty by an action officer at a military assistance desk. There are examples of host country military subunits dedicated to MCA which include construction battalions and, in several countries, non-commissioned officers trained and assigned to perform the functions of a community development worker. The value of a U.S. Advisor to host country programs is not clear from the data available in the continental U.S. (CONUS).

In acquiring new personnel, most of the civilian agencies indicated that they employ active recruitment or some combination of recruitment and referral. U.S. civic action personnel (with few exceptions) are selected from available personnel to fill slots required by military missions. However, screening (through referral and records review) usually precedes assignment to the military advisory system and to service schooling for preparation for such assignments. The NGO's and the Peace Corps are more extensive and meticulous in their selection of personnel than are the other civilian agencies or the military. The civilian agencies cite and rank specific criteria for
selection of international development assistance personnel. No specific selection criteria were found in the military study, but the U.S. Navy reports that rigidly prescribed standards are used in the selection of personnel for assignment to Seabee Teams.

The NGO's generally try to recruit personnel already trained or experienced in the skills required and train them for a specific assignment; the military typically trains for a particular MOS or career goal with training in civic action as a special and usually small unit of instruction. In general, the NGO's do not maintain intensive training programs as the emphasis placed on experience, job competence, and education tends to obviate extensive training programs; however, the Peace Corps is often a source of recruits for the NGO's and the Peace Corps maintains a thorough and intensive training program. Language training is a feature of most civilian training programs, and it is also included in the Seabee team training curriculum. Language training is often featured in military training for foreign area advisory service, but such training is not now a requirement for civic action advisory responsibility.

The civilian agencies generally are less experienced than the military in developing job competence, but the desirable personal characteristics of effective advisors to international self-help programs are obtained by careful selection rather than by training.

The duration of overseas assignment among civilian agencies is generally more than two years. No generalizations can be made about military tours because of the variety of MCA programs, but mobile training teams for civic action are on temporary duty tours of six months or less.

Civilian agencies emphasize a role of advice and assistance for their personnel involved in international development assistance; much of the doctrine of MCA emphasizes the same role for U.S. military personnel, but the field experience review suggests that this role was subordinate to that of performing projects and other military duties.

The NGO's place emphasis on continuing personnel evaluation because of their belief that project success is generally more a function of an individual's ability to adapt and innovate than of any doctrine, methods
or techniques in which he is trained. The military evaluates through officers' efficiency reports, fitness reports and other personnel rating instruments designed to measure performance in whatever military capacity the individual may be assigned.

Both the civilian and military studies disclosed activities in parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; generally there is more intense U.S. civilian activity in Latin America than in any other part of the world. The categories of development assistance used by the civilian agencies are much the same as those listed in the JCS definition of civic action: education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation. The civilian categories include all of the MCA list as either primary or subsidiary elements.

All agencies are charged with placing their limited funds and manpower in overseas programs with the greatest chance of accomplishing their objectives. U.S. foreign policy objectives require that civilian and military resources be placed where they will further such objectives. Other than in Korea and Vietnam, the U.S. resources for civic action are so small that they receive little or no attention in Washington. Program decisions appear to be made at Unified Command or Country Team levels, but the process is not adequately described in CONUS literature. The NGO process is easier to describe systematically because of the clarity of objectives and a dedicated organization. When MCA programs are to be operated in areas of relative politico-military stability, MCA selection criteria are quite similar to those applied by civilian agencies in selecting programs or projects; however, no formal procedure was disclosed in which such MCA criteria are applied in either the selection of countries in which MCA programs would be assisted or in the projects to be performed.

Several of the civilian agencies in the study have developed guidelines and even detailed manuals to facilitate development assistance project implementation and operation in the field. Military guidelines for project implementation are contained in field manuals and standing operations procedures. The Marine Corps and most other military programs reviewed are concerned primarily with the completion of short-term, high-impact projects which will, ideally, create a desire among the recipients
for continued self-help activity. The NGO's may begin with a high
visibility short range project, but the emphasis is upon developing the
abilities necessary to carry on future projects. They plan for community
workers to remain in the neighborhood for the time required to complete
the development of abilities and to insure the local take-over of not
only the project but also the process. Although many MCA documents
agree with these principles, they would require a commitment of time
which is often not feasible for the military unit. However, these same
MCA documents caution against initiating projects which do not have a
high probability of successful completion within available time and
resources.

The military report discusses the available reports on MCA evalua-
tion in which the subjective judgment of an individual is reported, and
details a review of after-action and situation reports which give some
information on the material accomplishments of MCA projects. However,
the study concluded that objective program or project evaluation pro-
cedures are lacking in the military sector.

Most of the civilian agencies have some form of evaluation in order
(1) to determine whether they should continue to exist, (2) to select
proposed programs/projects which are most likely to accomplish their
stated goals and development objectives, (3) to assess the operational
efficiency of programs which are initiated, and (4) to evaluate the
effectiveness of completed projects. These are essential for organiza-
tions which must report to sponsoring bodies and contributors, and they
are aided in implementation by having an organization dedicated solely
to accomplishing stated objectives.

The military study reviewed the problems and potential of evaluating
image-building civic action. Where nation-building is the objective, the
evaluation techniques of several civilian agencies could be profitably
adopted by the military. However, some means must be devised to factor
out the specific effect of MCA from the complex interrelationship of all
facets of military operation. The techniques used by CARE are most
appropriate for use as a model in designing an MCA evaluation system. They
stand out over others because they are consistent from proposal evaluation
through project completion. The forms which are used are based upon a system of objectives rather than against final material or institutional goals.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. Volume I

1. Agencies interested and/or involved in MCA could profit from the international development assistance experience of civilian agencies; benefit to MCA from such experience might require some reorientation of the military, however, especially in the case of the NGO's, due to differences in philosophy and approach of government and nongovernment agencies.

2. Being well-documented, broad-based and yet specific, the objectives, methods and techniques employed by the Peace Corps in international development assistance in emerging countries might be especially useful in MCA. Furthermore, Peace Corps lessons learned may be useful to agencies interested and/or involved in MCA; the Peace Corps being a relatively well-disciplined Government agency, MCA teams or similar programs may encounter similar problems or enjoy similar success.

3. The United Nations (U.N.) and A.I.D. programming systems have little direct applicability to MCA.

4. Agencies interested and/or involved in MCA may find the objectives of the TTPI administration useful and may profit from the U.N. evaluation of U.S. development, administration, and assistance in Micronesia.

B. Volume II

1. There are many similarities in philosophy and doctrine between the nation-building type of MCA and civilian programs of international development assistance.

2. MCA generally differs from the NGO's on the following points:
   a. Whereas the NGO is specifically organized to accomplish its international development assistance mission, MCA is
performed as an adjunct to normal military operations without benefit to any U.S. military organization dedicated to this purpose.

b. Almost all NGO's have some form of reporting and evaluation system, but there is no dedicated reporting system for MCA and only *ad hoc* evaluation. While there are some grassroots evaluation procedures, the results are aggregated as reports move up the hierarchy of command; the specific impact of MCA therefore becomes merged and buried with the results of these facets of military operations.

c. Project planning for the NGO typically covers a period of years, but MCA projects are typically short and designed for immediate impact.

d. All NGO's emphasize the importance of careful personnel selection and performance review, but few units engaging in MCA have formal selection criteria specifically for MCA participants and advisors.

e. The most successful NGO's operate under a clear set of program and project objectives which allow for consistent program and project evaluation; MCA evaluation is hindered by an ambiguous definition which has led to inconsistent program and project objectives.

3. There are two basic objectives of U.S.-supported MCA programs:
   a. Economic and social development in underdeveloped nations friendly to the U.S., and
   b. Improved standing of the host country military.

4. In those areas of the world in which there is active fighting against subversion or external aggression, MCA most logically becomes one of many tactics used to accomplish military missions; socioeconomic development becomes subordinate to the short-range or tactical mission and the military do not share a common set of criteria for success with the civilian agencies in international development. In these situations, the lessons learned from the civilian agencies can only be adopted in fragmented parts.
5. In those areas of the world where subversion or external attack is not imminent, the objectives of MCA can be and sometimes are long-range or strategic in interpretation by the host country military; it is in such areas that civilian techniques are most appropriate for adoption by MCA programs.

6. MCA in the situation above has the following common characteristics with NGO's:
   a. The objective of international social and economic development,
   b. A doctrine of self-help,
   c. Compatible project planning guidelines, and
   d. Compatibility of many of the criteria of project success.

7. In order to develop an effective MCA system out of the complex of ideas and activities which now comprise civic action, it will be necessary to develop an unambiguous system of objectives and clarify the constraints under which MCA programs must operate.

8. The basic legislation prohibits the creation of an MCA organization and system *per se* and thereby precludes the military from gaining the advantages which civilian agencies have of a dedicated organization; however, the training and assignment of properly motivated advisors is feasible within present organizational structure.

9. The military establishment is often hindered in following the principles of self-help and mutual assistance by higher priorities for other missions and by the lack of a dedicated organization for international development assistance.

10. The civilian agencies, and particularly the NGO's, emphasize that careful personnel selection is the most important single step in insuring success in development assistance activities. Military officer assignments to meet civic action requirements are accomplished through the existing personnel requisitioning structure; no evidence was found of formal selection criteria for such assignments.
11. The mechanism for formal personnel selection is available within the services, and the U.S. Army has taken several steps to increase the recognition of, and motivation for, duty as an overseas advisor. These include the initiation of the Foreign Area Officer Management System (FAOMS) and the continuation under FAOMS of the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP). Although these programs are not dedicated to MCA, officers selected and trained under FAOMS and MAOP should be better equipped than their predecessors to initiate and carry out the principles of successful international development assistance.

12. Because the assignment of large numbers of U.S. forces in underdeveloped countries is to be avoided, the primary overseas role of the U.S. Military under the Nixon Doctrine is to be that of advising and assisting. When U.S. military advisors are present in countries not threatened by imminent external or internal aggression, they are in a favorable position to emphasize a mission of nation-building, or promoting stability and progress in the modernization process of developing nations.

13. Advisors in international development assistance for civilian agencies are assigned overseas for two to five years, and their assignment is exclusively related to the agencies' mission; MCA is typically an additional duty of a U.S. military advisor on permanent duty, and advisors on mobile training teams with specific civic action training assignments are on temporary duty of six months or less.

14. It is in countries in which nation-building civic action is to be performed, with U.S. Military assistance, that the experience of the civilian agencies can be most effectively applied. With the focus on nation-building and the selection of personnel motivated for this role, the type of training most appropriate for the MCA advisor is that which is appropriate for the FAOMS. It is important that such advisors understand the conditions and programs for development in the host country so that they can advise concerning opportunities for military participation in this development.
If the military is to adopt the project implementation techniques of the civilian agencies, it is necessary that they be willing to support community workers in a neighborhood for an extended period of time; the alternative for countries in which this is not feasible is to increase the extent of cooperation with civilian agencies so that the successful military project may be incorporated into a longer range program of international development assistance.

The techniques of several civilian agencies could be profitably adopted by the military in programs where nation-building is the objective. The CARE system of evaluation, which is the most comprehensive and has been tested through many years of development and use, would probably serve as the best model for the development of techniques for evaluating MCA.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Revise the current JCS definition of MCA to remove the ambiguity and permit consistent objectives to be derived by each Service. The revised definition which would be most appropriate for international development assistance, selected from the set proposed in the military report [Ref. 2], is as follows:

**Military civic action (MCA)** is the participation of military forces in projects useful to a local population in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development.

**Indigenous** MCA is that actively conducted by armed forces among and with their own people.

**Nation-building** MCA has the objective of contributing to a national program of economic and social development.

Contributions of foreign armed forces are categorized by the nature of the assistance:
MCA advice and assistance includes those activities of foreign military advisors directed toward instructing and encouraging the use of indigenous armed forces in MCA projects.

MCA support includes the activities of a foreign government, including its armed forces, in the provision of funds, manpower, or materials to another country for MCA.

2. Use Country Team input to develop a system of MCA objectives which is consistent with and measured in terms of each country's overall plan for development.

3. Establish clear staff responsibility for MCA program planning and evaluation within each Unified Command and subordinate elements in which MCA programs are to be encouraged.

4. Incorporate within personnel selection procedures for MCA advisors the relevant criteria used by the NGO's.

5. Use these criteria to select personnel for overseas advisory positions who have the personal attributes and professional experience which are most closely correlated with success in international development assistance.

6. Train and then assign personnel thus selected to countries in which the U.S. will encourage and assist in military participation in nation-building.

7. Permit the personnel thus assigned to concentrate upon their nation-building role for two or more years.

8. Continue to place emphasis on the MAOP/FAOMS program.

9. With respect to training of officers and enlisted men who may participate in training or advising at the project level, adopt training such as that represented by the U.S. Marines' Personal Response Program for use by all Services.

10. A clarification of MCA definitions and a change in personnel policies is required in order that the present planning and operational policies can be successfully implemented.
11. After the JCS definition of civic action has been made more precise,
   a. Staff responsibility for MCA program planning and evaluation should be clearly established within each Unified Command and subordinate units, and
   b. Special international development assistance objectives should be set or redefined for each country in which the U.S. may support civic action programs.

12. When objectives have been clarified and staff responsibility assigned, the CARE system of evaluation should be used as a model in developing an evaluation system for nation-building civic action.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Objectives of the Research

The purposes of this research effort were (1) to study and evaluate methods and techniques employed by U.S. civilian agencies in international development assistance; (2) to compare civilian methods and techniques with similar aspects of military civic action (MCA); and (3) to formulate recommendations for direction of MCA based upon this analysis and comparison.

B. Scope of This Report

This is Volume II of a two-volume report. Volume I of this report is entitled, Evaluation of Civilian Techniques in International Development Assistance, [Ref. 1] and reports findings of a study of methods and techniques employed by civilian agencies involved in international development assistance. Volume I thus represents the accomplishment of the first of the three purposes stated above.

Volume II is addressed to the second and third purposes of this research. Before beginning the comparison of civilian and military techniques in Chapter III, the report will summarize findings on MCA in Chapter II. Data on military techniques was primarily compiled under a companion research project. The July 1971 report on that research was entitled Military Civic Action (Evaluation of Military Techniques). [Ref. 2] Most of the information in Chapter II was taken directly from that report, along with some of the conclusions and recommendations cited in this Volume.

The reader of this Volume should have both References 1 and 2 available to him. Hereafter, they will be referred to as Volume I and the military report, respectively.
II. MILITARY TECHNIQUES: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

A. Introduction

At the beginning of the research on MCA, it was expected that a relatively clear set of programs, documents, and projects could be identified with which to describe and define MCA. It was soon discovered that Military Civic Action was more a vague concept than a specific action program. It is not unlike Community Development, in that the projects and activities performed under each concept vary widely in both objectives and techniques throughout the world. The very vagueness of the MCA concept provides a flexibility to military commanders who are able to tailor programs to meet the specific needs of the environment and the military situation within the broad scope of the current MCA concept. However, it confuses attempts at systematic analysis and evaluation. One cause of the confusion in interpretation of MCA may well be the ambiguous definition approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This definition, as it appears in the Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage, is:

Military civic action - The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military with the population. (United States forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas). [Ref. 3]

After examination of both doctrinal publications and field experience, the military report concludes that there is considerable variation in interpretation of the aims and substance of MCA under the JCS-approved definition.

The paragraphs below will review some of the more pertinent findings of the study of military techniques which bear on the comparison with civilian techniques to follow.

B. General Remarks

In the military report, the JCS definition of MCA is dissected and analyzed in the light of basic legislation, doctrinal literature, and
the role of MCA in an insurgency/counterinsurgency context. Characteristics of MCA emerging from this analysis are determined to be:

- MCA is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.
- MCA is part of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) which is, in turn, an element of foreign assistance.

Expectations of civic action programs, as derived from an analysis of the basic legislation and pertinent hearings related thereto, can be considered to be:

- Contribution to the image of the armed forces.
- Contribution to the social and economic development of less developed nations.
- No increase in political power of the military.
- Not a replacement for viable civilian agencies.

In an insurgency/counterinsurgency context, MCA has the following characteristics:

- People-to-people approach.
- Responsive to community needs.
- Emphasis on self-help.
- Primary effort through host country military.
- Emphasis on remote areas.
- Transfer to indigenous military as soon as practical.

Major objectives of MCA are determined to be:

- Economic and social development.
- Improved standing of the host country military.

Two major types of MCA can be derived from the doctrinal literature and verified by analysis of U.S. field experience:

- Type I. Joint U.S. and host country military involvement.
- Type II. Unilateral U.S. involvement.

C. U.S. System

The U.S. MCA system is described in the military report, using as parameters: objective, definition, principles, selection criteria, techniques, and evaluation. Interrelationship and coordination with
the foreign policy and foreign assistance programs are discussed. Relationships are shown in flowchart form. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps civic actions are also described. These findings pertinent to the U.S. MCA system help to illustrate some of the differences in approach and objectives within the U.S. System:

- The intent of Congress that the MAP, including U.S.-sponsored civic action, be directed toward defeating subversive insurgency appears to be reflected in the implementing directives and doctrine of the various echelons of the defense establishment.
- MCA planning and implementation are performed within the existing military establishment system.
- At the national level, civic action is coordinated with U.S. foreign policy through the structure established for the coordination of all foreign assistance activities.
- The U.S. Army conceptualizes MCA with a strong social science flavor and describes it as being imbedded in the internal defense and development programs of emerging nations.
- The U.S. Navy conducts two general types of MCA: (1) the use of Seabee teams in support of the developmental efforts of other government agencies, and (2) community relations.
- The U.S. Army normally treats MCA as a part of civil affairs.
- The U.S. Air Force treats MCA separate from civil affairs and discharges these functions through its existing command structure.
- The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) views MCA as an integral part of counter-insurgency operations with emphasis on individual-to-individual relationships.

D. Host Country Systems

Data on the details of indigenous civic action organization and doctrine were not in sufficient detail to permit generalizations or conclusions. There is, however, an indication that Latin American armed forces are closely following the U.S. Army concepts for civic action organization and operations. As in the case of the U.S. system, formal evaluation procedures and techniques appear to be non-existent.
E. Personnel and Training

Personnel and training systems specific to MCA are discussed in the military report; findings in this area are:

- The U.S. Army is the only Service which was found to provide resident programs of instruction in MCA in a Service School.
- The only formal program of instruction for enlisted personnel is a correspondence course offered by the Marine Corps Institute.
- Civic action coverage becomes broader and more general as one moves up the hierarchy of Service Schools.
- Training related to civic action is provided enlisted USMC personnel as part of the USMC Personal Response Program.
- Special selection procedures are seldom utilized for personnel assigned to positions requiring civic action duties.
- Action is being taken by the U.S. Army to enhance assignments in the military advisory system.
- Civic action instruction is included in the U.S. Navy Seabee Team Training Curriculum.
- The U.S. Navy has rigidly prescribed standards for selecting personnel for assignment to Seabee Teams.

F. Field Experience

After-action and operational reports are analyzed in the military report to describe MCA as it is being carried out in the field; findings include:

- Lack of a dedicated MCA reporting system results in an absence of detailed information in sources in the continental U.S. (CONUS).
- There are indications that such data are available and could be obtained through structured interviews with personnel who have been or are engaged in MCA programs and projects.
- After-action and situation reports do not contain sufficient data to permit an evaluation of either the effectiveness of individual projects or the appropriateness of corrective actions.
- There appears to be an increasing involvement of military forces of the Republic of Vietnam in MCA projects in Vietnam.
Table 1 summarizes a review of 1028 lessons learned reports on MCA which reflect MCA experience over the period 1962-1969. These data show the following:

- Contrary to the doctrinal emphasis of MCA on self-help and host country military participation, primary MCA emphasis of U.S. Armed Forces in Southeast Asia has been on unilateral projects by U.S. military.
- Latin American experience has emphasized either host country or joint U.S./host country military participation.
- Civilian participation is indicated in about half of the lessons learned reports in both Latin America and Southeast Asia.
- Although completed actions are usually reported, indications of success or failure in accomplishing stated objectives are seldom reported.

G. Evaluation

Relative evaluation techniques and general evaluation are reviewed in the military report. This review suggests that, when used in an appropriate manner, MCA can be an effective instrument in improving the image of indigenous military.

Evaluation terminology is discussed and the following level and scope placed on evaluation techniques:

Type I. Assessment of overall program impact.
Type II. Evaluation of relative effectiveness of different program strategies.
Type III. Evaluation of individual projects.

This paradigm is then illustrated by evaluating historical reports covering MCA experience in Vietnam, Laos, Korea, Colombia, and the Philippines, and civilian projects in Laos, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.

Reported and ongoing evaluation research is analyzed to determine suitability for use in the evaluation of MCA programs/projects.

Findings relative to the evaluation of MCA include:
- There is no evaluation system dedicated to MCA.
- Experience indicates that clarification of the JCS definition of MCA is a prerequisite to the development and implementation of an evaluation system.
Table 1
MILITARY CIVIC ACTION EXPERIENCE, 1962-1969, BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA AND SERVICE,
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA

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<th>SOUTHEAST ASIA</th>
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<td>Navy</td>
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<td>Navy</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<td>183</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>1028</td>
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(All figures below expressed as %)

**MILITARY PARTICIPATION**

| Only U.S. Military | 8    | 35   | 2      | 12    | 95   | 98   | 64      | 85   | 65   | 92   | 54      | 72     |
| Only Host Country Military | 25   | 38   | 77     | 43    | 6    | 1    | 14      | 5    | 9    | 4    | 24      | 12     |
| Joint U.S./Host Country | 67   | 27   | 71     | 46    | -    | 1    | 22      | 9    | 27   | 4    | 22      | 16     |

**CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION**

| Indicated | 45   | 51   | 45     | 46    | 38   | 49   | 69      | 54   | 41   | 50   | 65      | 52     |
| Not Indicated | 55   | 49   | 55     | 54    | 62   | 51   | 31      | 46   | 60   | 51   | 35      | 45     |

**RESULTS REPORTED**

| Qualitative | 58   | 70   | 45     | 57    | 46   | 68   | 58      | 60   | 51   | 68   | 56      | 40     |
| Quantitative | 48   | 27   | 60     | 47    | 60   | 34   | 45      | 43   | 56   | 33   | 47      | 44     |
| Success Indicated | -    | 5    | 11     | 4     | 3    | -    | 9       | 4    | 2    | 7    | 9       | 4      |
| Failure Indicated | -    | -    | -      | -     | 1    | -    | -       | -    | 1    | -    | -       | -      |
| Corrective Action Indicated | -    | -    | 4      | 1     | 1    | -    | -       | -    | -    | -    | 1       | -      |
| Basis for Evaluation Indicated | -    | -    | -      | -     | 2    | -    | -       | 1    | 1    | -    | -       | -      |

* Totals exceed 100% since sub-items are not mutually exclusive.

- Less than .5%.
• With very few exceptions, information currently available to evaluate MCA comes from personal observations of the participants.

H. Hypotheses

MCA is based on several key hypotheses that also underlie economic and social development, especially the type broadly designated community development.

The concepts implied by both MCA and community development involve purposeful intervention in the cultural pattern of communities, primarily through efforts to promote higher standards of living. Although this practice has gained quite a respectable following, the rationale for it remains largely hypothetical.

Hypotheses underlying community development and MCA are analyzed with the following finding:

• There are areas in which the military can benefit from the experiences of theorists and practitioners in the field of international development assistance.

• Volume I of this report is designated to promote these inputs.

I. Recommendations

Major recommendations presented in the military report include:

• The current definition of MCA should be revised to permit programs and projects to be categorized by participant (U.S. Forces, Indigenous Military, or Joint), by objective (Military Image Building, National Image Building, Nation-building, Relief and Welfare), and by nature of assistance (MCA Advice and Assistance, MCA Support).

• A three-stage evaluation system should be utilized for the evaluation of U.S.-sponsored MCA programs/projects.

• Criteria for selection and assessment of individual MCA projects should be developed.

• Research performed by American Institutes for Research in Thailand should be reviewed and evaluated for application to Type II MCA evaluation.

• Structured interview procedures should be employed to obtain detailed information on U.S.-sponsored MCA projects. Such data could be used as the basis for a Type II evaluation instrument.
III. COMPARISON OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TECHNIQUES

A. Introduction

Most of the information on civilian techniques which will be presented in this section pertains to the 34 nongovernment organizations (NGO's) which were studied in depth during Phase III of this research effort, but reference will be made when appropriate to the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), the Peace Corps, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), and agencies of the United Nations (U.N.).

B. Philosophy and General Remarks

The philosophy of the military and most civilian agencies regarding international development assistance is fairly well summed up in the statement by the Near East Foundation that more and more the world is being brought into a single community so that conditions in one area directly affect people in other lands [Ref. 4] and the greater need overseas is not a handout but a helping hand.[Ref. 5] This philosophy appears in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as the principle of self-help and mutual aid.[Ref. 6] However, the Foreign Assistance Act directs that in providing assistance priority shall be given to the needs of those countries in danger of becoming victims of Communist aggression.[Ref. 6] Since U.S.-supported MCA is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, it follows a philosophy which is not unlike that of the civilian organizations, except that its priorities are dictated by Communist activities. U.S. civilian Government agencies are also to follow this foreign policy directive, but the NGO's seem to set priorities based on those specific qualities and elements which each organization considers most important in the development of emerging nations, such as education, nutrition, training, efficient government, and other specific areas of need.

The philosophy and doctrine of the U.S. Government concerning MCA as an aid in the social and economic development of friendly nations is based upon the same general foreign policy as that of the U.S. civilian agencies. However, the NGO's differ in one important particular: Their mission makes their international development assistance activities their primary function.
The international development assistance activities of military forces are either subsidiary to or part of their primary military mission. This makes it essential that the military situation in each country and the primary mission of each Service be considered so that civic action methods or techniques may be tailored to each country and mission. This point is not made clear in all MCA documentation, but a part of this concept was highlighted by President Kennedy when he stated:

1. **In countries fighting active campaigns against subversion, civic action is an indispensable means of strengthening the economic base and establishing a link between the armed forces and the populace.**

2. **In countries threatened by external aggression, forces should participate in military civic action projects which do not materially impair performance of the primary military mission.**

3. **In countries where subversion or external attack is less imminent, selected indigenous military forces can contribute substantively to economic and social development, and such a contribution can be a major function of such forces. [Ref. 7]**

In the first of the three situations cited above, the military must give primary consideration to their mission of containing or defeating the internal enemy. In this situation, civic action has been used as an effective tactic to establish and maintain the support of the civilian population, and the *all out friendship* program of Magsaysay in putting down the Huk insurgency is the most successful example of such MCA. [Ref. 8] However, the effectiveness of that program was clearly measured by the accomplishment of the counterinsurgency mission and not by any long-range social or economic measure of development. The program was essentially terminated after the insurgency was contained, and there is current evidence that the grass roots dissatisfaction and high level corruption which Magsaysay’s program countered are again contributing to instability in the Philippines. At this writing, in fact, the Philippines are under martial law.

With regard to the second of the three situations for MCA cited by President Kennedy, the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) program
is the best available model for a successful civic action program in a country threatened by external aggression. The AFAK program grew out of apparently genuine concern of American servicemen for the suffering and homeless Korean people, especially the children. The U.S. Congress institutionalized the program, authorized use of military supplies and equipment, and appropriated additional funds. Many of the activities were later phased into and taken over by Korean military and by U.S. and Korean civilian agencies. The AFAK model, however, like the Philippine model, is not easily compared with the models found in the evaluation of civilian techniques. In Korea the needs were obvious and physical, the resources were available in abundance in the form of U.S. money and manpower, and the motivation for helping was spontaneous. The model is inappropriate both because civilian techniques are seldom applied at this scale of manpower and resources, and, under present U.S. policy following the Nixon Doctrine, U.S. armed forces should not be present in such significant numbers abroad that a program such as AFAK could be implemented.

The best opportunities for profiting from civilian techniques in the implementation of MCA should come in countries where subversion or external attack is less imminent, the third situation cited above, in which the focus is upon long-range improvement of the international situation. It may be feasible in some such countries to establish a program of contributing to economic and social development as a major function of host country military forces. The role of the U.S. military would be primarily to advise and, where appropriate, to assist with mobile training teams, MAP funds, and other U.S. resources from civilian agencies. The Literacy Corps in Iran is a useful model for discussing the characteristics of an indigenous, nation-building, MCA program; there are also several examples which could be cited from Latin American experience.

At the time of initiation of the Literacy Corps, Iran had been through a long period of both external military pressure and internal disruption. The Literacy Corps was but one program of the White Revolution announced by the Shah in January 1963. It was an MCA program in concept, although it was not labeled as such at the time. The military actively participated
by recruiting and providing uniforms, training facilities, and logistical support. The Corps may have contributed to improving the image of the Imperial Iranian Army to some extent, but there is no clear evidence of this and it was not the program's objective. The objective was to decrease the high rate of illiteracy. There is evidence of a favorable image having developed toward the Corps itself, and this contributed to both the national and international stature of the government.

The model of the Iran Literacy Corps is used to typify the kind of program which the U.S. military might encourage and support under the Nixon doctrine. Like the two other types of civic action exemplified by the Philippine and Korean programs, the U.S. military was present in the country, but little published doctrine of the various civic action programs was available when these programs were initiated.

It would appear that current doctrine for MCA borrows from all three of the above models, and each service emphasizes the model which it believes to be more appropriate to its mission and its interpretation of the JCS definition of MCA.

The comparison of military and civilian techniques and the recommendations which follow are designed to be applicable to the type of program typified by the Literacy Corps and the Colombian civic action program.

C. Objectives

Most of the NGO's have relatively clear, concise, broad formulations of functional general objectives for their organizations which govern their activities. These objectives leave little doubt in the minds of staff, contributors, or recipients as to the purposes of the organizations, and provide a basis for direction and evaluation.

The overall objectives of U.S.-supported MCA are not clear from the JCS definition, and various interpretations in different parts of the world contribute to misunderstanding and difficulty in evaluation. Military programs which can be labeled nation-building MCA by indigenous military forces with U.S. advice and assistance have objectives which are not unlike those of civilian agencies.

1/ A more comprehensive model with similar features can be found in Colombia, but few details can be found within CONUS and no evaluation of success was available to the military study.
D. Organizational Structure

The organizations of most civilian agencies are dedicated to their mission of international development assistance. In conformance with Congressional policy, the U.S. Military has no dedicated system for performing civic action, and it is constrained from supporting host country military forces which are organized solely to perform MCA. Possibly as a result of following this policy, the only U.S. units found to be dedicated to a civic action type of activity are the Mobile Training Teams and special Seabee teams. Only the Air Force has a military occupational specialty (MOS) designated for civic action. At the DOD level, the relatively small amount of MAP funds used for MCA are managed as an additional duty by an action officer at a military assistance desk.

The military study uncovered several examples of host country military subunits dedicated to MCA. These include both construction battalions and, in several countries, non-commissioned officers trained and assigned to perform the functions of a community development worker.

The value of a U.S. Advisor to host country programs is not clear from the data available in CONUS. One report placing a high value on them was uncovered. The Chief of Mission in Guatemala objected to the Inspector General's recommendation that the civic action space be eliminated from the Military Group Support Division. He stated:

"The position of the Civic Action Officer would be the last position in the Mil Group I would voluntarily relinquish. The advisors in the Service Sections of the Military Group, being completely devoted to their technical specialties, have little or no time, training, or capability to perform the Civic Action role. [Ref. 9]"

The function of a civic action officer is not now recognized within the Department of Defense (DOD) as being unique.

E. Personnel Policies

1. Recruitment

In acquiring new personnel, 11 of the NGO's indicated that they employ some combination of recruitment and referral while ten others rely primarily on active recruitment. A.I.D. and TTPi actively recruit personnel, while the U.N. recruits only for specialized posts in their development agencies; the World Health Organization...
relies primarily on referral. U.S. civic action personnel—with few exceptions—are selected from available personnel to fill slots required by military missions. However, screening (through referral and records review) usually precedes assignment to the military advisory system and to service schooling for preparation for such assignments.

2. **Selection**

The NGO's and the Peace Corps are more extensive and meticulous in their selection of personnel than are the other civilian agencies or the military. The staffs of the NGO's and the Peace Corps are in large part volunteers rather than career professionals, and careful selection is cited by the NGO's as the most important factor determining or influencing the success of a development assistance project.

The civilian agencies rank *professional experience, adaptability, international experience, job competence and references* as among the most important criteria for selection of international development assistance personnel. No specific selection criteria were found in the military study, but the U.S. Navy reports that rigidly prescribed standards are used in the selection of personnel for assignment to Seabee Teams.

In Iran, the members of the Literacy Corps are selected from draftees for military service with high school or higher education. Further selection is made during a four-month military and scholastic training course. The Corpsman is tested upon completion of the course and must demonstrate satisfactory intelligence, knowledge, teacher competence, and teacher attitude in order to remain in the Corps. Many other countries have military supported literacy, health, and other programs, but their procedures and criteria for selecting personnel were not available from CONUS sources.

3. **Training**

The NGO's generally try to recruit personnel already trained or experienced in the skills required and train them for a specific...
assignment. The military typically trains for a particular MOS or career goal with training in civic action as a special and usually small unit of instruction. In general, the NGO's do not maintain intensive training programs as the emphasis placed on professional and international experience, job competence, and education tends to obviate extensive training programs. However, the Peace Corps is often a source of recruits for the NGO's and the Peace Corps maintains a thorough and intensive intramural training program with extramural elements. Language training is a feature of most civilian training programs, and it is also included in the Seabee team training curriculum. Language training is often featured in military training for foreign area advisory service, but such training is not now a requirement for civic action advisory responsibility. The civilian agencies generally are less experienced than the military in developing job competence, but the desirable personal characteristics of effective advisors to international self-help programs are obtained by careful selection rather than by training.

4. Tour of Duty

The duration of overseas assignment among civilian agencies is generally more than two years. The overall effectiveness of short tours has been seriously questioned. No generalizations can be made about military tours because of the variety of MCA programs, but mobile training teams for civic action are on temporary duty tours of six months or less.

5. Role

Civilian agencies emphasize a role of advice and assistance for their personnel involved in international development assistance; the key words in such role definition are adaptation, participation, relevance, motivation, and understanding. Much of the doctrine of MCA emphasizes the same role for U.S. military personnel, but the field experience review suggests that this role was subordinate to that of performing projects in Southeast Asia, as it was in Korea under AFAK; this role is also subordinate to other military duties.
6. Personnel Evaluation

Eleven NGO's and A.I.D. provided information on their personnel evaluation methods. The NGO's place emphasis on continuing personnel evaluation because of their belief that project success is generally more a function of an individual's ability to adapt and innovate than of any doctrine, methods or techniques in which he is trained. The military evaluates through officers' efficiency reports, fitness reports and other personnel rating instruments designed to measure performance in whatever military capacity the individual may be assigned.

F. Planning Policies

1. Scope of Activity

Both the civilian and military studies disclosed activities in parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; generally there is greater U.S. civilian activity in Latin America than in any other part of the world.

The categories of development assistance used by the civilian agencies are much the same as those listed in the JCS definition of civic action: education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation. The categories most prominent in the international development assistance operations of civilian agencies are: community development, education, food production and agriculture, medicine and public health, social welfare, and public and business administration. These civilian categories include all of the MCA list as either primary or subsidiary elements.

2. Program and Project Selection

All agencies are charged with placing their limited funds and manpower in overseas programs with the greatest chance of accomplishing their objectives. U.S. foreign policy objectives require that civilian and military resources be placed where they will further such objectives. Other than in Korea and Vietnam, the U.S. resources for civic action are so small that they receive little or no attention in Washington. Program decisions appear to be made at Unified Command or Country Team levels, but the process is not adequately described in CONUS literature.
The NGO process is easier to describe systematically because of the clarity of objectives and a dedicated organization. The CARE system of project selection is of particular interest because its proposal evaluation procedure is but the first step of an evaluation procedure which continues beyond the life of the proposed activity. CARE has developed, tested, and applied this system over many years.

Table 38 in Volume I lists the criteria applied by civilian agencies in selecting programs or projects (the civilian agencies often interchange these terms). When MCA programs are to be operated in areas of relative politico-military stability, MCA selection criteria are quite similar to those listed in Table 38; however, no formal procedure was disclosed in which such MCA criteria are applied in either the selection of countries in which MCA programs would be assisted or in the projects to be performed.

G. Project Operations

Several of the civilian agencies in the study have developed guidelines and even detailed manuals to facilitate development assistance project implementation and operation in the field. Military guidelines for project implementation are contained in field manuals and standing operations procedures. Several are reviewed in the military study.

Table 2, *The Good Self-Help Project in Ten Easy Steps*, is a down-to-earth example of project guidelines which illustrates the basic principles which appear in most military operational documents. The civilian agencies would not disagree in any major particulars with these ten steps, but they would not agree that they should be labeled easy. Several of the NGO's would not agree that the task is easy primarily because they emphasize the process rather than the project. [Ref. 10] The Marine Corps and most other military programs reviewed are concerned primarily with the completion of short-term, high-impact projects which will, ideally, create a desire among the recipients for continued self-help activity. The NGO's may begin with a high visibility short range project, but the emphasis is upon developing the abilities necessary to carry on future projects. They plan for community workers to remain in
A unit desires to help the people of Vietnam. This is a natural and commendable reaction. But how do we translate willingness into action? First, let's keep in mind that a good self-help project must have continuing usefulness to the majority of the people involved. Their investment of money, material and labor must give them something worthwhile in return and must benefit more than one individual or only a small percentage of the group. To aid in translating willingness into action and to ensure that any self-help project started is a good project, the following steps to success are suggested:

1) **Need.** In most every hamlet or village there is a need for one or more priority projects which would improve the economic or social conditions of the community.

2) **Desire.** Talk to the local leaders to identify the particular project or projects that the people want and are willing to participate in, using their own resources, skills, and labor.

3) **Plan.** A simple plan of action must be developed by the local leaders. Assistance or technical guidance may be provided but the plan should be theirs.

4) **Request.** Based on the plan a request must be submitted to the civilian provincial authorities using the GVN chain of command with the assistance of CORDS advisory personnel.

5) **Approval.** After consideration, the provincial must approve, amend, or reject the request.

6) **Release.** If approved, the materials and things will be made available to local villages that are ready to start the project.

7) **Construction.** As soon as materials are received the people of the hamlet or village should start construction. The sponsoring unit should provide technical assistance during this phase.

8) **Acceptance.** Upon completion of the project, a provincial counsel in cooperation with the local leader should have a dedication ceremony and formally accept the project.

9) **Maintain.** A good self-help project is one that the people of the village can and want to maintain with limited further assistance.

the neighborhood for the time required to complete the development of abilities and to insure the local take-over of not only the project but also the process. Although many MCA documents agree with these principles, they would require a commitment of time which is often not feasible for the military unit. However, these same MCA documents caution against initiating projects which do not have a high probability of successful completion within available time and resources.

H. Program/Project Evaluation

The military report discusses the available reports on MCA evaluation in which the subjective judgment of an individual is reported, and details a review of after-action and situation reports which give some information on the material accomplishments of MCA projects. However, the study concluded that objective program or project evaluation procedures are lacking in the military sector.

The aforementioned Literacy Corps of Iran exhibits features which are among those listed as favorable to success by both military and civilian doctrine:

1. Its objectives were clear and measurable.
2. Its objectives were compatible with and had the potential of contributing to national development goals.
3. The need for literacy training was apparent in national statistics, and it is reported to have been a strongly felt need by those whom the program aided.
4. Personnel were available and motivated by a desire to help and/or because the Corps was an alternative to routine military service.
5. The full support of the government was assured because the program was part of the Shah's proclaimed White Revolution.

The Literacy Corps after ten years has become but one of many facets of the civilian education program of the Ministry of Education. The gradual phasing out of military support is completely consistent with preferred military and civilian techniques. No systematic evaluation procedure was disclosed for the Literacy Corps, and the evaluation must be made using data collected for other purposes, but its effectiveness in increasing the literacy rate can be fairly well isolated and shown to be great.
Some indication of the effectiveness of the Literacy Corps can be seen in the large number of Corpsmen, and now Corpswomen, who stay on as teachers in the village upon completion of their military service. Many of these remain at the request of the villagers. [Ref. 11]

Most of the civilian agencies have some form of evaluation in order (1) to determine whether they should continue to exist, (2) to select proposed programs/projects which are most likely to accomplish their stated goals and development objectives, (3) to assess the operational efficiency of programs which are initiated, and (4) to evaluate the effectiveness of completed projects. These are essential for organizations which must report to sponsoring bodies and contributors, and they are aided in implementation by having an organization dedicated solely to accomplishing stated objectives.

The military study reviewed the problems and potential of evaluating image-building civic action. Where nation-building is the objective, the evaluation techniques of several civilian agencies could be profitably adopted by the military. However, some means must be devised to factor out the specific effect of MCA from the complex interrelationship of all facets of military operation. The techniques used by CARE are most appropriate for use as a model in designing an MCA evaluation system. They stand out over others because they are consistent from proposal evaluation through project completion. The forms which are used are based upon a system of objectives which realistically assess in-process accomplishments against in-process objectives rather than against final material or institutional goals.  

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IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. General Conclusions

As the preceding comparison of military and civilian techniques shows, there are many similarities in philosophy and doctrine between the nation-building type of MCA and civilian programs of international development assistance. The generally accepted principles of successful self-help and mutual assistance are found throughout MCA literature. However, the military establishment is often hindered in following these principles by higher priorities for other missions and by the lack of a dedicated organization for international development assistance.

1. There are two basic objectives of U.S.-supported MCA programs:
   - Economic and social development in underdeveloped nations friendly to the U.S.
   - Improved standing of the host country military.

   a. In those areas of the world where subversion or external attack is not imminent, these objectives can be and are sometimes long-range or strategic in interpretation by the host country military. It is in such areas that civilian techniques are most appropriate for adoption by MCA programs.

   b. In those areas of the world in which there is active fighting against subversion or external aggression, MCA most logically becomes one of many tactics used to accomplish military missions. Economic and social development become subordinate to the short range or tactical mission and the military do not share a common set of criteria for success with the civilian agencies in international development. In these situations, the lessons learned from the civilian agencies can only be adopted in fragmented parts.

2. MCA in situation (a) above, has the following common characteristics with NGO’s:
The objective of international social and economic development.
A doctrine of self-help.
Compatible project planning guidelines.
Compatibility of many of the criteria of project success.

3. MCA generally differs from the NGO's on the following points:
- Whereas the NGO is specifically organized to accomplish its international development assistance mission, MCA is performed without benefit of any U.S. military organization dedicated to this purpose and as an adjunct to normal military operations.
- Almost all NGO's have some form of reporting and evaluation system, but there is no dedicated reporting system for MCA and only ad hoc evaluation. While there are some grass roots evaluation procedures (MACORDS), the results are aggregated as reports move up the hierarchy of command. The specific impact of MCA becomes merged and buried with the results of these facets of military operations.
- Project planning for the NGO typically covers a period of years, but MCA projects are typically short and designed for immediate impact.
- All NGO's emphasize the importance of careful personnel selection and performance review, but few units engaging in MCA have formal selection criteria specifically for MCA participants and advisors.
- The most successful NGO's operate under a clear set of program and project objectives which allow for consistent program and project evaluation. MCA evaluation is hindered by an ambiguous definition which has led to inconsistent program and project objectives.
B. Missions and Objectives

1. In order to develop an effective MCA system out of the complex of ideas and activities which now comprise civic action, it will be necessary to develop an unambiguous system of objectives and clarify the constraints under which MCA programs must operate.

2. Because the assignment of large numbers of U.S. forces in underdeveloped countries is to be avoided, the primary overseas role of the U.S. Military under the Nixon Doctrine is to be that of advising and assisting. When U.S. military advisors are present in countries not threatened by imminent external or internal aggression, they are in a favorable position to emphasize a mission of nation-building, or promoting stability and progress in the modernization process of developing nations.

3. It is in countries in which nation-building civic action is to be performed, with U.S. Military assistance, that the experience of the civilian agencies can be most effectively applied.

C. Organizational Structure

The basic legislation prohibits the creation of an MCA organization and system per se. It thereby precludes the military from gaining the advantages which civilian agencies have of a dedicated organization. However, the training and assignment of properly motivated advisors is feasible within the present organizational structure.

D. Personnel Policy

1. Selection

There has been a major difference between the civilian agencies and the military in the selection of personnel for overseas assignment in international development assistance. The civilian agencies, particularly the NGO's, emphasize that careful personnel selection is the most important single step in insuring success in such activities. Military officer assignments to meet civic action requirements are accomplished through the existing personnel requisitioning structure, and no evidence was found of formal selection criteria for such assignments.
The mechanism for formal selection is available within the services, however, and the U.S. Army has taken several steps to increase the recognition of, and motivation for, duty as an overseas advisor. These include the initiation of the Foreign Area Officer Management System (FAOMS) and the continuation under FAOMS of the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP). Although these programs are not dedicated to MCA, officers selected and trained under FAOMS and MAOP should be better equipped than their predecessors to initiate and carry out the principles of successful international development assistance.

2. **Tour**

Advisors in international development assistance for civilian agencies are assigned overseas for two to five years, and their assignment is exclusively related to the agencies' mission. MCA is typically an additional duty of a U.S. military advisor on permanent duty, and advisors on mobile training teams with specific civic action training assignments are on temporary duty of six months or less.

3. **Training**

With the focus on nation-building and the selection of personnel motivated for this role, the type of training most appropriate for the MCA advisor is that which is appropriate for the FAOMS. It is important that such advisors understand the conditions and programs for development in the host country so that they can advise concerning opportunities for military participation in this development.

E. **Project Implementation**

If the military is to adopt the project implementation techniques of the civilian agencies, it is necessary that they be willing to support community workers in a neighborhood for an extended period of time. This has been done in Colombia and Iran by the military. The alternative for countries in which this is not feasible is to increase the extent of cooperation with civilian agencies so that the successful military project may be incorporated into a longer range program of international
development assistance. Current U.S. Army doctrine requires turnover of projects to civilian agencies as soon as practicable. The civic action program in Laos is a prime example of failure when the attempt was made to do too much too quickly and without civilian or military followup.

F. Evaluation

The techniques of several civilian agencies could be profitably adopted by the military in programs where nation-building is the objective. The CARE system of evaluation, which is the most comprehensive and has been tested through many years of development and use, would probably serve as the best model for the development of techniques for evaluating MCA.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Introduction

The following recommendations for MCA have been formulated from the review of the military report and Volume I of this report, and from the foregoing conclusions based on the comparison of civilian and military techniques in international development assistance.

B. Philosophy and Objectives

1. Revise the current JCS definition of MCA to remove the ambiguity and permit consistent objectives to be derived by each Service.

The revised definition which would be most appropriate for international development assistance, selected from the set proposed in the military report, is as follows:

*Military civic action (MCA) is the participation of military forces in projects useful to a local population in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development.*

*Indigenous MCA is that actively conducted by armed forces among and with their own people.*

*Nation-building MCA has the objective of contributing to a national program of economic and social development.*

Contributions of foreign armed forces are categorized by the nature of the assistance:

*MCA advice and assistance includes those activities of foreign military advisors directed toward instructing and encouraging the use of indigenous armed forces in MCA projects.*

*MCA support includes the activities of a foreign government, including its armed forces, in the provision of funds, manpower, or materials to another country for MCA.*

2. Use Country Team input to develop a system of MCA objectives which is consistent with and measured in terms of each country’s overall plan for development.\(^3\)

\(^3\) The findings of the military study indicate that Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command is already operating under host country development plans, but it has not yet developed a satisfactory system of sub-objectives or evaluation procedures consistent with these plans.
G. **Organizational Structure**

Establish clear staff responsibility for MCA program planning and evaluation within each Unified Command and subordinate elements in which MCA programs are to be encouraged.

D. **Personnel Policies**

In order for the military to apply the personnel policies found to be successful by the civilian agencies, the following is recommended:

1. Incorporate within personnel selection procedures for MCA advisors the relevant criteria used by the NGO’s.

2. Use these to select personnel for overseas advisory positions who have the personal attributes and professional experience which are most closely correlated with success in international development assistance.

3. Train and then assign personnel thus selected to countries in which the U.S. will encourage and assist in military participation in nation-building.

4. Permit the personnel thus assigned to concentrate upon their nation-building role for two or more years.

E. **Training**

1. Continue to place emphasis on the MAOP/FAOMS program.

2. With respect to training of officers and enlisted men who may participate in training or advising at the project level, adopt training such as that represented by the U.S. Marines’ Personal Response Program for use by all Services.

F. **Planning Policies and Program Implementation**

The civilian policies regarding project selection, project operations, and project activities have already found their way into military documents. The field experience of the military indicates that a clarification of MCA definitions and a change in personnel policies is required in order that the present planning and operational policies can be successfully implemented.

G. **Program/Project Evaluation**

The design of an evaluation system must be preceded by the clarification of objectives and an assignment of responsibility for evaluation. It is recommended that:
1. After the JCS definition of civic action has been made more precise,
   a. staff responsibility for MCA program planning and evaluation be clearly established within each Unified Command and subordinate units, and
   b. specific international development assistance objectives be set or redefined for each country in which the U.S. may support civic action programs.
2. When objectives have been clarified and staff responsibility assigned, the CARE system of evaluation should be used as a model in developing an evaluation system for nation-building civic action. 

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4/ Methods of evaluating image-building civic action were reviewed and recommendations made in the military study.
REFERENCES


Appendix A

Résumés of Authors/Research Team, Volume II

Benjamin S. H. Harris III
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BENJAMIN S. H. HARRIS, III, Analyst

Background and experience include the study of medicine and its application to clinical and experimental neurophysiology, toxicology, medical economics, health service systems, medical information systems, substance abuse, and survey design, administration and analysis.

Professional Experience

1964 to Date. Research Triangle Institute, Research Triangle Park, N. C., 27709.

1971 to Date. Analyst, Center for Health Studies. Currently involved in coordinating site visits to alcoholism treatment centers and monitoring grant review committees for the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. Supervised survey of Medicare procedures used by physicians in selected metropolitan areas; major contributor to a study involving the collection and analysis of data relating to civilian techniques in international development assistance, and a survey of attitudes and capabilities of major hospitals in North Carolina regarding the handling of patients involved in radioactive accidents. Project Leader of a study of diagnosis and determination of disability in alcoholism; the preparation of a directory of State and local alcoholism services; and a pilot follow-back study of patients treated for tuberculosis in the North Carolina Sanitorium system by pneumothorax and pneumoperitoneum with fluoroscopy during the period 1930-1950. Assists in the preparation of new contract proposals related to health services, and served as a consultant to the Craven County (N. C.) Health Department in the preparation of a proposal to the North Carolina Regional Medical Program.

1966 - 1971. Analyst, Operations Research and Economics Division. Principal investigator on studies of hospital utilization in the last year of life and the economic costs of kidney disease; major contributor to study of the post nuclear attack prevention and control of communicable respiratory diseases and in the establishment of a registry of chronic intermittent dialysis patients in the U. S.; supervised survey of drug usage among arrestees for serious crimes in selected metropolitan areas; research on the economic costs of alcoholism.

1964 - 1966. Biologist, Natural Products Laboratory. Responsible for biological assays and pharmacologic evaluation of synthetic and naturally-occurring toxic agents, the immediate operation of the Institute's animal colony, coordinating the Laboratory's bio-assay program, and assisting in the preparation of new contract proposals in bio-medical areas.

1961-1964. Duke University Medical Center, Durham, N. C., 27706. Research assistant, Department of Psychiatry, Division of Electroencephalography (EEG). Research activities included portable EEG, the EEG in various types of epilepsy, guides for teaching EEG, neurophysiologic changes in the brain of the cat after administration of hallucinogens, and changes in electrical activity resulting from drowsiness and psychopharmacologic agents; preparation of Keysort data cards for classification and condensation of EEG's; and recording EEG's in operating rooms during neurosurgical procedures. During this time also served as junior staff psychiatrist, John Umstead (state mental) Hospital, Butner, N. C.
Education

Graduate work in medicine, Duke University School of Medicine, 1960-1965.
Course in Operations Research, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, 1968.
San Diego Summer School of Alcohol Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1972.

Honors

President, Pre-med scholastic honorary society, Duke University, 1959-60.
NIMH student research stipends, summers of 1961 and 1963.

Selected Publications


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1948-1967. U.S. Army. Command and staff assignments with major Army headquarters in the United States, Europe, Korea, and Japan. Training management, long-range planning, logistics management, research and development management, and public and community relations.


Education

B.S., Chemical Engineering with honor, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, Michigan, 1936.

M.S., Chemical Engineering, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1947.


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"Economics of National Security" (correspondence), Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1961.

Professional Activities

American Institute of Chemical Engineers.

The Society of the Sigma Xi.

Phi Kappa Phi.

Association of the United States Army.

American Ordnance Association.

Registered Professional Engineer, Illinois.

Adult Education Association of the United States.

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Education

B.S., Mechanical Engineering, Duke University, Durham, N. C. 1952.


Advanced Studies, Industrial Management, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1959.

Professional Activities

Member, Operations Research Committee, North Carolina State University, 1968-69.


Member, Presidential Committee to Reevaluate Civil Defense, 1969.

Member, Operations Research Society of America, Pi Tau Sigma, Order of St. Patrick.


Selected Publications

A Preliminary Study of Cirrhosis of the Liver Among Males, Aged 15 to 44, in Races Other Than White, Report to the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, April 11, 1972.


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Appendix B

List of Acronyms and Selected Abbreviations Used in this Report
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List of Acronyms and Selected Abbreviations Used in this Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDI</td>
<td>Agricultural Cooperative Development International</td>
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<td>ACE</td>
<td>American Council on Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>Activity Characteristic Sheets</td>
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<td>ACVA</td>
<td>American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service</td>
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<td>ADC</td>
<td>Agricultural Development Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>AER</td>
<td>Annual Estimates of Requirements</td>
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<td>AFAK</td>
<td>Armed Forces Assistance to Korea</td>
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<td>AFME</td>
<td>American Friends of the Middle East</td>
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<td>AFSC</td>
<td>American Friends Service Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>A.I.D.</td>
<td>Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>AID/W</td>
<td>Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. (as opposed to field missions)</td>
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<td>AIFLD</td>
<td>American Institute for Free Labor Development</td>
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<td>AKF</td>
<td>American-Korean Foundation</td>
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<td>AMICOM</td>
<td>Army Missile Command</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>ARPA Order Number</td>
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<td>ARPA</td>
<td>Advanced Research Projects Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Bachelor of Arts</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIOA</td>
<td>Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOB</td>
<td>Bureau of the Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCNY</td>
<td>Carnegie Corporation of New York</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Community Development</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Community Development Foundation; Capital Development Fund, United Nations</td>
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</table>
CDW  Community Development Worker
CFS  Country Field Submission
CIMS  Center for International Management Studies, YMCA
CODEL  Corporation in Development, Inc.
CONUS  Continental United States
CORDS  Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CP  Congressional Presentation
CRESS  Center for Research in Social Systems, American University
CRS  Catholic Relief Services
CSC  Civil Service Commission
CUNA  Credit Union National Association
CWS  Church World Service
DOI  Department of the Interior
DOD  Department of Defense
DOM  Division of Overseas Ministries
DP  Displaced Persons
ECOSOC  Economic and Social Council, United Nations
EWA  Education and World Affairs
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAOMS  Foreign Area Officer Management System
FCH  Foundation for Cooperative Housing, Inc.
FSC  Foreign Service Committee
FSI  Foreign Service Institute
FSR  Foreign Service Reserve
FUNDWI  Fund of the United Nations for the Development of West Irian
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, United Nations
GS  General Service
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
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<td>His Royal Highness</td>
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<td>ICAO</td>
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<td>International Executive Service Corps</td>
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<td>IIRR</td>
<td>International Institute of Rural Reconstruction</td>
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<td>IITA</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
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<td>IMCO</td>
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<td>International Rice Research Institute</td>
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<td>Inter-American Social Development Institute</td>
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<td>IVS</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>KAVA</td>
<td>Korea Association of Voluntary Agencies</td>
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<td>LWR</td>
<td>Lutheran World Relief</td>
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<td>MACORDS</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>MAOP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Officer Program</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program</td>
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<td>MCA</td>
<td>Military Civic Action</td>
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<td>MLAT</td>
<td>Modern Language Aptitude Test</td>
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<td>Manual Order</td>
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<td>MPA</td>
<td>Manpower Programming Annex</td>
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<td>NAE</td>
<td>National Association of Evangelicals</td>
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<td>National Council of World Churches</td>
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<td>Near East Foundation</td>
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<td>Office of Saline Water</td>
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<tr>
<td>OYB</td>
<td>Operational Year Budget</td>
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<td>PAAD</td>
<td>Program Assistance Approval Document</td>
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<td>Pan American Health Organization</td>
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<td>PAR</td>
<td>Project Appraisal Report</td>
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<td>PAS</td>
<td>Public Administration Service</td>
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<td>PAIS</td>
<td>Project Analysis Information System</td>
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<td>PBS</td>
<td>Project Budget Submission</td>
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<td>Project Implementation Plans</td>
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<td>Public Information Office</td>
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<td>Public Law</td>
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<td>Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, BOB</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Preliminary Project Proposal</td>
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<td>PROAG</td>
<td>Project Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROP</td>
<td>Noncapital Project Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRRM</td>
<td>Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent Teachers Association</td>
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<td>RFP</td>
<td>Request for Proposal</td>
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<td>RTI</td>
<td>Research Triangle Institute</td>
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<td>SCI/IVS</td>
<td>Service Civil International/International Voluntary Service</td>
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<td>SORO</td>
<td>Special Operations Research Office</td>
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<td>SPAR</td>
<td>Staffing Pattern Action Request</td>
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<td>Technical Assistance Information Clearing House, ACVA</td>
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<td>TESL</td>
<td>Teaching English as a Second Language</td>
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<td>TR</td>
<td>Technical Requirement Number</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTPI</td>
<td>Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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<td>United Nations Fund for Population Activities</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations International Development Organization</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<td>UNITAR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Training and Research</td>
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<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPU</td>
<td>Universal Postal Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCC</td>
<td>United States Catholic Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>USOM</td>
<td>United States Operations Mission</td>
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<td>VID</td>
<td>Volunteers for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>VISTA</td>
<td>Volunteers in Service to America</td>
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<td>VITA</td>
<td>Volunteers for International Technical Assistance, Inc.</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization, United Nations</td>
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<td>WMO</td>
<td>World Meteorological Organization, United Nations</td>
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<td>WN</td>
<td>World Neighbors</td>
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<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men's Christian Association</td>
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<td>YWCA</td>
<td>Young Women's Christian Association</td>
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