The views expressed in this publication are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the Department of Defense.

9 April 1973

READINESS MANAGEMENT IN NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS; A DILEMMA OF RESPONSIBILITY, INFLUENCE AND COMMAND

BY

Colonel Charles R. Bradford
Infantry VAARNG

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release; Distribution Unlimited

Copy x of x copies.
USAWC RESEARCH PAPER

READINESS MANAGEMENT IN NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS; A DILEMMA OF RESPONSIBILITY, INFLUENCE AND COMMAND

A Monograph

by

Colonel Charles R. Bradford
Infantry VAARNG

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
9 April 1973
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. COMMAND, RULES, RESPONSIBILITIES VERSUS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>READINESS MANAGEMENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. TOWARD HIGHER READINESS LEVELS</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A new era for the US Army and its reserve components has begun. The withdrawal from Vietnam, strategic arms limitation, detente in Europe and perhaps further arms limitation under Mutual Balanced Force Reduction has caused severe restructuring of Army forces to support the Nixon Doctrine. As part of the total force concept, greater reliance has been placed on the National Guard and Army Reserve. In testimony before the House Armed Service subcommittee, August 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird commented on the new role for Guard/Reserve forces:

The National Guard and the Reserve will take on increasing responsibilities and will be used initially to augment active forces should the need arise, reversing the past policy of relying primarily on the draft. Activation of standing draft authority will follow Guard and Reserve call-ups if necessary.\(^1\)

When resources are scarce and active forces must be reduced, other nations have turned to greater reliance on their reserves. Notable among the more successful armies is the Israeli Defense Force with perhaps the best trained combat ready reserve force known today.\(^2\) Discussions with Guard leaders during the past year indicate a general acceptance of the challenge imposed by increased readiness standards. These Guard leaders are dedicated to solving the many problems blocking the way to higher readiness levels.
Secretary Froehlke, in September 1972, told the 94th General Conference of the National Guard Association:

I believe that in order to meet these readiness objectives there must be some reorganization in our Army management system . . . for the National Guard and the Army Reserve, the main impact will be increased emphasis placed on readiness training and contingency planning for deployable forces.

However, not all in the army family share the thought that increased reliance on the reserve components is a feasible course of action. Concern over the ability of Guard/Reserve forces to accomplish assigned missions was expressed by the Executive Vice President of the AUSA in a letter to the US Army's Chief of Public Information:

We share a growing concern that there needs to be a serious reexamination of the missions presently assigned to the reserve components in the total force concept. Both from the standpoint of manpower and practical levels of training, we are concerned that the reserve components may have been assigned missions beyond their capabilities. This is not only unjust to the reserve components themselves, but weakens our National Defense and is used as a cause for reducing the size of our active forces.

Congressional action has been strong for increased reliance on Guard/Reserve forces, but at the same time Congress is cutting defense expenditures and hoping to reduce the strength of active forces. So without really trying the citizen-soldier finds himself central in a coming controversy over the size of army forces.

Army NG divisions are the heart of the readiness question. Congressional leaders tend to view our NATO commitments as the
primary reason for maintaining a sizeable Guard/Reserve force.

The NATO reinforcing divisions of the NG are an integral part of the NATO commitment and the lynch-pin of our planned reserve force contribution to defense of Europe. Conversely, these divisions are a most difficult military organization to train and maintain in a readiness condition for early deployment. Achievement of mobilization readiness objectives by Guard divisions is further complicated by geographical splitting of divisional combat and combat support into two or three states. Achievement of readiness within a split division presents serious problems to division commanders, State Adjutant's General and the brigade commanders.

This thesis will address the specific problem of split divisions that in their current configuration present a formidable obstacle to the achievement of maximum unit readiness. Background information was obtained by discussion and document research. Key problem areas are illuminated by analysis of the information obtained and the personal knowledge and experience of the author.

Chapter II provides an historical development of National Guard units and illustrates historical reasons for attitudes prevalent in today's citizen-soldier as well as tracing divisional organization in the National Guard.

Chapter III describes and comments on the conflicting roles and responsibilities found in a division spread over a large geographical area. The responsibilities of the division commanders, State Adjutant's General and unit commanders in readiness management is discussed and analyzed.
Chapter IV contains conclusions from the discussion in Chapter III and offers a conceptual model for a new type active National Guard division structure.
CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. Laird, Melvin F., "Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All Volunteer Force," A presentation made to the President and chairman of the House and Senate Armed Service Committees, August 1972.


3. Froehlke, Robert F., Indeed the Guard Belongs, Speech before the 94th General Conference of the National Guard Association of the US, San Francisco, California, September 1972.

4. Dodge C. G. (LTG Retired) Executive Vice President, Association of the US Army, Letter to MG Siddle, Chief of Public Information, Department of the Army, 10 August 1972.
The National Guard can trace its birth back to the young evolving North American colonies and the militia system organized by those early settlers. As the fledgling citizen-soldier struggled with the hardships of a new land, he not only faced the vigors of a new frontier but military service as well. The militiaman was constantly embroiled in conflicting articulations concerning his reliability as a fighting man. Although steeped in the tradition of volunteer service, the early militiamen were, more often than they cared for, forced by one means or another into compulsory military service.\(^1\)

The colonies raised their militia from citizens within their territorial boundaries, each with its own little army whose allegiance was pledged only to the home colony.\(^2\) R. Ernest Dupuy, in his book, *The National Guard: A Compact History*, illustrates this attitude in the very early militia. It somewhat describes the feeling many guardsmen express today concerning command of National Guard units:

> Not only did the militiaman resent being commanded by officers of colonies other than their own, but the respective colonial governments showed themselves to be equally jealous of command and precedence.\(^3\)

Most National Guard leaders today would be somewhat reluctant to accept a concept envisioning active army personnel commanding or serving in Guard organizations.
The reluctance to accept active personnel in Guard units has an historical basis but is primarily the result of accomplishing objectives without active Army direct participation. This attitude is just as strong today as it was in the colonial militia three hundred years ago. One only has to bring the subject up in conversation with Guard personnel to discover their adamant position concerning active personnel serving in Guard units.

The militia continued in various degrees of military operations throughout those early days. Some attempts were made for loose confederation of units to consolidate military power against threats to two or more colonies. These endeavors ran the gamut from partial success in New England to dismal failure in the South.

After General Braddock's defeat in the Battle of the Wilderness, July 1755, England became alarmed and decided to move more British Regulars into the colonies to defeat the French effort in Canada once and for all.

Colonial militiamen were mobilized to support the British effort but the combination of Regular and militiamen was beset with deep rooted problems of training and competence that has historically plagued militia units from their inception. Militia officers deeply resented their "second class" status bestowed on them by virtue of English regulations. (the regulations decreed that holders of a Crown commision outranked all provincials, regardless of rank or ability.) The combination of forces that R. Ernest Dupuy describes as "... mixing like oil and water,"

\[5\] did produce a unique military
unit in the famous Rogers Rangers. Governor Shirly, appointed commander in chief in North America after Braddock's death, selected from the New Hampshire militia a captain who would be commissioned in the British Army and ordered to commence recruiting an independent company of "Rangers in His Majesty's Service." The success of Rogers Rangers is well known but the interesting fact is that the combination of forces under Rogers command included, along with militiamen from many colonies, a detachment of British light infantry. The Rangers were free of any single colony allegiance and operated totally for the United Kingdom. Thus an outstanding indigenous officer did surmount the allegiance of his own colony and successfully lead a combination of regulars and militia in combat.

As events in the early 1770's carried the colonies into the American Revolution, militias were in various stages of discipline, organization and training. Throughout the war militia units experienced success and failure, condemnation and praise, but in total their efforts were an essential part of our nation's birth.

Immediately after the Revolution, General George Washington prepared a document, which outlined his ideas for a national militia. General Washington proposed a small Regular Army and a formally organized national or federal militia. He refers time and time again in the document to, "the National Militia," of organized citizen-soldiers responsible to the federal government for national defense and not to the individual states. His advice was not heeded and as Col (Ret) Dupuy points out:
Accordingly, when the constitution of the United States was ratified, December 18, 1787, its dicta upon militia and its use consisted of a concise but weak compromise to the blatant advocates of states rights. The militia could be called into federal service 'to execute the laws of the union, suppress Insurrection and repel invasion,' but the lawmakers turned over to the States respectively the Appointments of the officers and authority of training the militia according to the discipline provided by the congress.9

Washington attempted during his first administration to revitalize his national militia concept, but his proposal submitted to Congress in January 1790 caused absolute havoc in the states and was denounced in loud voices as costly, unnecessary and an infringement on states' rights.

Congress did react, however, and in March 1792 passed the militia act which not only continued the colonial militia organization but legalized their training as well. Federal call-up of the militia was limited to three months and, surprisingly, all requirements for training were excluded! The militia bill directed that "the militia of the respective states shall be arranged into divisions, brigades, regiments and companies, as the legislature of each state shall direct."10 The bill further stipulated the officer composition in each division down to regimental level, but not once did it mention what qualifications for command these officers should possess. The militia bill of 1792, as illconceived as it was, directed the organization of the militia for more than a hundred years.

Through the War of 1812 and the war with Mexico the militia remained state oriented but was mobilized to fight in both wars.
The pattern of militia performance stayed the same through both wars—a few outstanding successes among many failures. It is interesting to note that in those instances where commanders really knew the strengths and weaknesses of the militia, applied forceful leadership and strong discipline, the citizen-soldier invariably gave his best performance.

But ahead lay the dark days of the Civil War, and once again the militia, untrained, undisciplined and raw would be hurled into the awful fray to win again both accolade and disdain, both praise and scorn. Very little if any progress was made in militia organization or concepts during or immediately after the Civil War. But it should be noted, attesting to their battle service and lineage, that forty-nine National Guard units (existing as active organization in today's total Army) still proudly carry Civil War battle streamers.11

In the thirty-three years between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War, the militia, increasingly called the National Guard, slowly began to pull itself from the devastation its organizations had suffered during the Civil War. Domestic disturbances were widespread in the period, causing governors to mobilize their guard units 112 times from 1877-1892.12

The Spanish-American War caused the War Department to quickly reexamine its policy concerning the militia. With the outdated militia act of 1792 still on the books, a new act was passed in April 1898 making it possible for guard units and personnel to volunteer for active service.13
Immediately following the Spanish-American War, the War Department and Congress engaged in a controversy over the National Guard that finally was compromised by passage of the so-called Dick Act of 1903. In general the Dick act provided for a reserve component (officially now known as the National Guard) organized and equipped identical to the Regular Army. Regular Army officers were to be assigned as inspector-instructors and federal pay was provided for summer camps and drill periods. The act was amended in 1908 eliminating an original provision restricting guard participation from operations longer than nine months and from service outside the continental limits of the United States.

Some National Guard divisions by this time, 1903-1908, were forced by manning requirements and structure to be spread among two or three states. Each state governor still retained control over his portion of the division and officers were commissioned in their respective state National Guard. The division staffs consisted of personnel from all the states comprising the division.

During World War I, II and Korean, Guard divisions were mobilized, trained and deployed to combat areas. All the Guard divisions were infused with draftees and regular army personnel. In all three conflicts, time was on the side of the allies to equip and train the divisions prior to overseas deployment. The mix of National Guardsmen, regular and draftees, proved highly successful. All the once Guard divisions employed overseas accomplished their missions with professionalism and courage.
Through a series of reorganizations National Guard divisions by 1968 were reduced twenty-two to eight, all scattered between two or three states. The headquarters for these divisions (including the division commander), support command, division artillery, as well as all headquarters of combat service support battalions remained in one state, leaving the other state(s) with a "brigade slice" of the division. This parceling out of the divisions' combat service units leaves the headquarters of the battalion or company in one state while companies, platoons and sections of the battalions exist in the other states.

Thus, the problem of National Guard division readiness, now on the center stage in the arena of military strategic planning, grew to such proportions that it begs for a modern solution.
CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES


3. *Ibid*.

4. *Ibid*.

5. *Ibid*.


7. *Ibid*.


11. *Ibid*.


During the hearings before a House Subcommittee on a proposal merger of the Army Reserve components in the spring of 1965, a former CONARC commander, General Hugh P. Harris expressed his concern for the plan to split all National Guard divisions between several states. He commented from retirement, by letter, to the subcommittee:

I do have reservations as to whether the new proposed force structure is really adequate to insure flexibility and ability to react to unforeseen developments in what I consider is now a relatively hostile world. I do have reservations about the wide distribution of divisional units under the new program. I feel the training supervision, command interest, and assembly under stress will be difficult under the plan whereby an infantry or armored division contains people and resources spread over at least three states.¹

The concern of General Harris in 1965 was prevalent among many guard leaders, especially those due to have their divisional resources spread over large geographical areas.

The Army's rationale for the split divisions was expressed to the subcommittee by LTG W. H. S. Wright (then chief of the Office of Reserve Components) commenting on General Harris' letter:

From our point of view, taking the 6 to 8 high priority divisions which were formerly in 8 states and now spreading them over 20 states is a plus. In the first place, in event of a nuclear strike on this country, any one division would suffer far less damage. In the
second place, the goose eggs which comprise
these divisions are sufficiently close together
so they can be rapidly assembled, particularly
in an era of air plenty which we see coming
up, then can be air transported to a
mobilization center.  

General Wright explained further that the privilege of serving
in the high priority divisions should be spread among more states,
rather than concentrating them in a few New England and two other
states. He also touched on the possibility of all casualties
coming from one state if the divisions remained in one state and
committed to heavy combat after mobilization.

The problems of how to manage readiness training in the split
divisions was not addressed in the subcommittee hearings. After
the reorganization of 1968 became effective, it was left to the
states to determine the best method of training management.

The NG units of any given state are totally, in peace time,
under the command of the Governor, who administers control through
his Adjutant General. The Adjutant General is assisted by a staff
at state level consisting of both state and federal civil service
employees. The federal civil service employees must be members of
a National Guard unit. Consequently, key staff officers are usually
assigned to the state headquarters and headquarters detachment.
This detachment is a special TDA organization tailored to each
state, and approved by Department of Army for structure and
equipment. The Guard units in any state receive their support
from the National Guard Bureau and CONUS armies channeled into
each states' military headquarters. Almost all types of support
necessary to maintain a military unit is coordinated by personnel on the Adjutant General's staff. Mobilization readiness and training supervision is also a responsibility of the Adjutant General. In one state with an authorized Army National Guard strength of 8200, containing approximately 3600 personnel in a divisional brigade, the Adjutant General has an operations and training staff section of eight full-time and twenty part-time military personnel to assist him in managing mobilization readiness training. In the division headquarters, the Division commander has two full-time and eighteen part-time military personnel in his G3 sections to assist him in supervising training of the entire divisions spread over a two or three state area. The division commander's influence on training is further limited by his out-of-state status; that undercurrent of resentment in brigade personnel that command of their unit comes from another state. This strong state relationship, most guardmen feel, is centuries old, but it must be recognized and managed as a strength rather than a weakness. Any attempt to circumvent or minimize the strong state allegiance would have disastrous effects upon the morale of its personnel and esprit-de-corps of the Guard units.

The central thrust of a dynamic divisional training program must emulate from division headquarters and the division commander himself. But no matter how well planned and dynamic a division training program may be, the management and supervision of its execution is an extremely difficult task for the division commander.
because of his limited resources. Readiness training for the
brigade commander of a brigade located in a different state than
the division headquarters becomes complicated if the state
Adjutant General does not agree with the division commander's
concept of training and decides to inject his own ideas and training
plans. Who then does the brigade commander obey? There is one
big loss in such a dilemma—unit mobilization readiness.

How much pressure can a division commander exert on his
out-of-state brigade commanders? Perhaps when the division is
together during the two week Annual Training period, the division
commander can use his influence and command position with considerable
latitude if necessary to accomplish division objectives. But once
the brigades have returned to their home states, division command
influence weakens and the brigades settle into a quasi-separate
brigade status; back again under the influence and support of
state military headquarters.

During interviews and discussions with brigade officer personnel,
one central dissatisfaction with split divisions was prevalent.
The brigade officers can never, unless they move to the division
state, serve on the division staff or command the division. There
career potential ends as either a battalion, brigade or assistant
division commander. These officers look to the state headquarters
then as their only hope of serving on a senior staff and their best
chance to obtain colonel or general rank. There is a definite
feeling of non-allegiance to a distance division headquarters
directing progress and establishing objectives, while their entire
career is limited to only executing the division directives. The ties with state military headquarters become closer and allegiance to the state even more pronounced.

The split brigade commander walks a constant "thin line" between command influence of the division commander and the allegiance he must hold for his Adjutant General and his state. Trying to serve two commanders and answer to two headquarters is confusing and certainly does not meet the criteria of clear command channels so vital for effective management techniques.

In this chapter, some of the underlying problems occurring in a split division have been brought into focus. Not everything is wrong with the concept as this discussion might lead one to believe, for as stated earlier in this chapter the privilege of serving in high priority units is expanded, equipment is more readily available to a greater number of units, the structure does foster decentralized training concepts and encourages self-reliance by brigade personnel. These are all plus factors, but unless mission readiness training is dynamic, constantly supervised and professionally executed, the plus factors become of little consequence in the overall readiness capability of brigade units.

The dilemma of command and control in split division is real and it does exist. What then is the solution? What type organization can be used that will draw on the strengths of the National Guard and the active army while diminishing the weaknesses inherent in any reserve component program? Chapter IV offers a possible answer.
to the dilemma and a course of action, if implemented, can raise and maintain mobilization readiness to the levels demanded by the increase reliance on Guard/Reserve forces in the total force concept.


CHAPTER IV

TOWARD HIGHER READINESS LEVELS

By fiscal year 1974, forty five percent of the total Army force will consist of units and personnel in the National Guard and Reserve. Guard divisions, as stated previously, are expected to react rapidly to an attack in Europe, and are the building blocks of our planned defense for NATO commitment. Defense officials have issued countless statements attesting to the increased reliance on the Army’s reserve components. The recent CONUS Army reorganization placed heavy emphasis on the new structure to aid Guard/Reserve commanders. Earlier in Mr. Froehlke’s article, he alludes to drastic changes, if necessary, to insure the highest possible degree of readiness in reserve components.

Speaking before the 94th General Conference of the National Guard Association of the United States, Mr. Froehlke, commenting on "The One Army Concept," remarked:

As part of all this, we need an active Army system to get active Army people with a deep sense of urgency and responsibility closely engaged in Reserve readiness training.

The stress should be on participation and involvement as opposed to mere advising. The Army is now actively seeking ways to accomplish this.¹

A major army organizational framework is to be established solely to improve reserve component readiness. The new CONUS Army reorganization will, no doubt, provide some assistance to Guard/Reserve commanders. But can it infuse into the leadership of the
reserve components, the motivation and thrust necessary to gain and maintain high levels of unit readiness?

Organization can create problems—people solve them. However, organizations can make it easier for people to identify and then solve problems.2

The National Guard today, as with its organizational ancestor, the militia, struggles with the old, old problem of what is the best way to increase its combat effectiveness. The Guard is faced with a rapidly aging senior officer corp: and consequently is losing its once highly prized combat experience. Combat veterans from Vietnam have not come in the Guard in sufficient numbers to fill the gap. Equipment continues to pour into Guard units and intensive management is necessary to insure that adequate training and maintenance is performed by receiving units. Technician Manning for Guard units was substantially increased in 1972, especially in operations and training personnel criteria. An additional full-time training NCO was added to each battalion and higher headquarters and officer technician ratings were generally upgraded. These actions will help unit commanders to push forward for high readiness. But is it enough to gain a quick reaction capability for a guard division?

Perhaps the time has arrived for a totally new approach to readiness and its associated problems. A course of action is needed that will require very little change in dollars budgeted, but a gigantic change in perception, attitude and understanding. Such a concept must couple the active Army and the National Guard
into functioning organizations from division level to company level. It must present opportunities not only for infusion of active Army personnel in Guard organizations but more importantly provide for the reverse—infusion of Guard officer and enlisted personnel into active units. The concept must retain the constitutional provision for command of Guard units by governors (in peacetime), keep the number of Guard divisions at eight, draw on the strengths of the active Army and state oriented National Guard and offer the possibility of attaining a high readiness posture for all divisional units. Such a concept is presented below.

Over a two year period, phase all current National Guard division headquarters and headquarters companies, support command HHC and division artillery HHB out of the guard inventory and place them in an active duty status. These units would be relocated to the nearest Army installation that has the capability to provide necessary training facilities for all divisional units.

The remaining divisional organizations would stay in the Guard inventory but would require consolidation of combat support and combat service battalions and companies into states currently comprising the division structure. For example, the Engineer battalion consolidated into one state, Signal battalion into another state and so on, to insure an equitable distribution of troop strength to all the states with divisional units.

The principal TO&E positions in the active duty portion of the division headquarters would be filled with an equal mix of National Guardsmen
on two to four year tours of active duty and active duty personnel. This interface of Guard and active personnel is the key to this concept. By providing an opportunity to serve on the division staff, qualified officers and enlisted men from all the states containing divisional units could then be infused into the entire division operation. After a tour with division level headquarters these Guardsmen would return to their respective states for assignment to division or other units. The experience gained from serving on division level staffs would be invaluable to their units and their state. To further expand the mix of active personnel and guardsmen and to introduce active officers and NGOs into the guard system early in their career, assignments could be made to modified TO&E positions in division units down to and including company/troop/battery level. At the company level three or four modified TO&E positions could be allocated for active Army personnel assignments. The mix could be further expanded to include battalion and brigade level positions, both staff and command. Two or three officer and three or four enlisted positions could be filled on brigade and battalion staffs. Active Army personnel may be working for Guardsmen or the reverse, but all would be members of the same unit, sharing in its problems and working together to attain greater unit combat effectiveness.

To tighten command and control lines, a modification to the brigade TO&E could be made to utilize the currently authorized brigadier general (assistant division commander) position, allocated to each state with a split out divisional brigade. The BG would
be designated as the brigade commander. The brigade commander (BG) position would then be allocated as a two to four tour of active duty for the incumbent. Of necessity the position would be filled by a Guard officer from the brigade state. He would provide a critical link between the Adjutant General and the active duty division commander. Normal support activities would continue and be coordinated between the division, State Adjutant and his staff and the brigade commander.

This new type division would retain the bulk of divisional resources under command of state governors, at the same time providing a maximum mix of active duty and Guard personnel serving together in a common bond, that bond found so frequently in divisional organizations. The division staff would be on active functioning day-to-day organization, comprised of active duty and National Guard personnel working together for the attainment of realistic unit readiness.

Federal legislation might be necessary to implement this concept. But most important would be some type of legislation or agreements as to use of active duty personnel during mobilization of division units for state duty. However, the National Guard exist primarily for the purpose of providing combat ready units to augment the active Army; Guard units are authorized for Defense needs not state needs. Over ninety percent of the support for Guard units comes from the Federal budget. So in reality the Guard is, for the most part, federally supported for performance of its TO&E missions. Training and operations must be directed toward accomplishment of unit mobilization readiness objectives in support
of the total force concept. A Guard TO&E unit, highly trained, adequately supported, and professionally led can perform almost any state mission one can visualize from an infinite variety of scenarios. So by increasing the unit readiness levels Guard units would possess an even greater capability to perform state missions.

Under this concept the current technician program should be continued at its present level and if possible be increased. For the Guardman, then, a three way option would be possible for divisional duty during his career. One, on just regular inactive duty unit training assembly status, second, as a civil service technician, and third, a combination of one of the two above plus a two to four year tour of active duty.

One realizes that this concept is a radical change from current organization and current thinking. But if the present administration fully expects the reserve components to be prepared to perform their assigned missions, then perhaps the time has come for a drastic change in the reserve component system. The day has passed when the active army can only afford to send a few advisors to assist its reserve components in mobilization training. The readiness region commands proposed under the new reorganization still does not provide the critical interface between active and Guard personnel. This division concept visualizes the positions authorized the Readiness Regions to be incorporated in the active divisional headquarters or National Guard divisional units, with the division commander reporting directly to CONUS Army Commanders.
There are many obstacles blocking the implementation of this concept, not the least of which is acceptance by governors, Guard and active army leaders. But what are the alternatives for National Guard divisions faced with missions almost equal to their active army counterparts? Divisions spread over large geographical, mostly urban, areas with extended and confused lines of command and authority, with limited resources for supervision of readiness training. Guard divisions can be restructured to bring both active and National Guard personnel into units together learning respect for each other's professionalism and dedication to the defense of the United States.

The years ahead hold the promise of difficult times for the American Military community. Problems must be met with fresh new solutions and staunch dedication by all military professionals, both active and reserve. Jim Dan Hill, ardent Guardsman and exponent of the citizen-soldier concept, offers hope for all engaged in reserve component operations:

America always has had and there is every reason to believe that she will always have, a high percentage of young men of high spirit and a keen sense of service. It is they who will grow to become middle-aged and older leaders of sterling worth who will always constitute the continuing cadre of the National Guard.

Charles R. Bradford
COL, INF, VAARNG
FOOTNOTES


2. Froehlke, Robert F., Indeed the Guard Belongs, Speech before the 94th General Conference of the National Guard Association of US, San Francisco, California, 11 September 1972.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Periodicals


Public Documents


Statements


Letters


Student Research Papers


Speeches

21. Froehlke, Robert F., Indeed the Guard Belongs, Remarks before the 94th General Conference of the National Guard Association of the US, San Francisco, California, 11 September 1972.