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THE BLACK IN GRAY--CAN WEST POINT ATTRACT THE BLACK

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June 1972

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THE BLACK IN GRAY---CAN WEST POINT ATTRACT THE BLACK

A Thesis

Presented To

The Faculty of the United States

Army Command & General Staff College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Military Arts

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CHAPTER I

PROBLEM AND BACKGROUND

PROBLEM

One of the basic recruiting problems of the U. S. Military Academy today is attracting qualified minority group candidates for attendance. This is particularly true with regard to the black candidate.

The purpose of this study is to examine the problem of black recruitment for West Point and to recommend solutions. As this problem has evolved over the years, a product of the American culture, it can only be examined in this perspective.

BACKGROUND

A fundamental problem of government and business is effective manpower resource management. According to J. J. Morrow the nation has reached a manpower crisis. No longer can manpower, of any color, be wasted. The business community took notice of the manpower problem several years ago. J. J. Morrow in the "Harvard Business Review" said that the "Negro potential" was untapped and, in general, was not serving industry at top potential.[1]

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[1] J. J. Morrow, "American Negroes--A Wasted Resource," Harvard Business Review (Jan-Feb 1957), pp. 65-74.

Unfortunately, it appears that this same resource was not achieving its top potential in the military either. It would be too simplistic to say that more blacks attending West Point would solve the problem. Dr. Eli Ginzberg perhaps had a more encompassing grasp on the problem:

> For the Negro population to be able to compete on an equal basis for professional, scientific, managerial, skilled and other desirable jobs will require a revolution in all levels of Negro education; and beyond this, in the values and aspirations, the living conditions, and the community environments of large groups in the Negro population.[2]

The estimated racial mix for enlisted personnel in the Army of 1980 is 723,400 white and 144,300 black. This would mean over 16.6% of the enlisted force would be black.[3] The Vice Chief of Staff, General Bruce Palmer, in his banquet speech at the Leadership Conference held at West Point in June 1969 stated that "no more important a goal exists than that of strengthening our nation's military leadership."[4] To this end, the need for black officers exists.

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[2]Eli Ginzberg, The Negro Potential (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 13.

[3]Gates Commission, The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Washington, D. C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 76.

[4]Author's notes from the banquet speech given by General Palmer at the Hotel Thayer on 26 June 1969, West Point, New York.

METHODOLOGY

The aim of this study is to focus in on the problem of black recruitment for West Point and to propose methods to better attract qualified blacks.

A unique opportunity presented itself for this research. On assignment to West Point, as a tactical officer in the Department of Tactics, the author had daily contact with over 110 cadets of all four classes. A company tactical officer at West Point is vitally concerned with the development, progress, welfare and personal adjustment of each of his cadets. He continually observes and appraises each cadet's ability and potential for being an officer.

During this assignment, it became evident that more minority cadets were entering with each succeeding plebe (freshman) class, most of them being blacks. There were several black cadets assigned to the author's company. It was observed that each black had initial academic problems, particularly in sciences, and each found some difficulty in adjusting to cadet regimentation. It was obvious that none of the tradition surrounding the Academy was black. There was little to identify the black with the institution. It seemed, however, that they wanted to be part of the tradition.

Not all black cadets elected to remain at West Point. There were many reasons why the blacks resigned, academic as well as personal. There was an apparent need for additional study on

the black and his relationship to the institution in his adjustment to cadet life. At best, the adjustment is difficult for most young men, white or black. Black officers are assigned to visibility positions throughout the staff and faculty, including the Department of Tactics, to aid black cadets in the adjustment process. The key to the problem is the personality of the black cadet himself. He has to answer for himself such questions as, "Is all the effort worth the prize of being called a West Point graduate?" or "Is he losing his identity as a black in a predominately white army?" These questions cannot be easily answered by black cadets or even by the black officers at West Point.

Some of the problems can be solved by a revitalized recruiting system. Most white plebes are aware of the rigors of cadet life, especially the plebe system. For them there is some degree of identification with the traditions of West Point either regionally or within their own families. The black has no such natural identification with West Point. He comes from a civilian world of trauma to a system that is the personification of conflict and is thus less prepared for the plebe system. The problem, therefore, appears to be not only attracting qualified blacks to the academy, but also retaining them after they become cadets and officers.

HYPOTHESIS

The major hypothesis of this study is that the United States Military Academy can attract qualified blacks to seek nomination and appointment to West Point.

DEVELOPMENT

The development of a program that may help to solve the recruiting and retention problem for West Point must include an exhaustive investigation of the history of the black and his relationship with the military establishment. This research includes the history of the black in the Army and the examination of the black history at West Point. It is also necessary to understand the part that the institution itself, West Point, plays in the development of the professional Army officer corps. This includes a discussion of the congressional apparatus used for nominations and appointments to the academy. The research concludes with an examination of the recruiting problems, across the board, in black officer recruitment. This general discussion is germane to the recruiting problem at West Point because the same forces are at work.

The evaluation includes a discussion of current Department of the Army goals and the work of the National Urban League (NUL) done in this area.

To assist in the analysis of the recruiting problem at West Point, a questionnaire was distributed to the black officers on the Staff and Faculty and in the student body of the Command and General Staff College.

CHAPTER II

THE BLACK AND THE MILITARY

INTRODUCTION

There are four discrete historical periods in the black-military relationship up to 1953. The first period was the pre-Revolution-Revolutionary War era, where blacks were accepted into units regardless of color. The second period is generally described to include the period from after the Revolution until 1863. This period was characterized by very few opportunities for the black to enter either the Army or the Navy. The third era was from 1863 until the end of the Spanish-American War. The fourth period was from 1900 to 1953.

PRE-REVOLUTION - REVOLUTION PERIOD (1792)

In the preface to his history of the black in the American Revolution, Benjamin Quarles writes:

> In the Revolutionary War the American Negro was a participant and a symbol. --On the American side the Negro saw only limited service until the war dragged on into its third year. This negative attitude toward enlisting the colored man sprang from a reluctance to deprive a master of his apprenticed servant or chattel slave, and from the fear of putting guns in the hands of a class of people most of whom were not free. In the main, the Negro was thought of as a servile laborer rather than as

> a potential warrior. But when manpower needs became acute, hesitancies and fears were put into the background and the Negro was mustered in.[1]

Unfortunately, this practice has characterized all four periods of the black and his relationship to the military establishment. A similar situation existed not only in the military but also in other sectors of national society until recent years.[2]

Blacks were involved in the early fighting of the Indian wars, again, because of the shortage of men in the wilderness. There are also records to indicate blacks fought in the French and Indian Wars and were already in the Continental Army when General Washington took command. Surprisingly, more blacks were in the small Continental Navy during the Revolution than the Army. In fact, the blacks, because of their extensive knowledge of the inland waterways were much in demand as pilots.

Crispus Attucks, a mulatto, was the first person to die in the Boston Massacre of March 1770. As the British introduced more military power into the colonies and the colonial manpower problems worsened, more and more blacks were accepted into the state militias. The Blacks had continuously volunteered for the militias but were initially turned down. Blacks fought with

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[1]Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1961), p. 1.

[2]Marrow, loc. cit.

distinction at Lexington and Concord. A black named Salem Poor so distinguished himself at the Battle of Bunker Hill that his officers wrote:

> "...A Negro called Salem Poor, of Col. Frye's regiment, Cap't Ame's company, in the late Battle of Charlestown, behaved like an experienced officer, as well as an excellent soldier. We beg to say, in the person of this said Negro centers a brave and gallant soldier. The [illegible]vard due to so great and distinguished a cha[illegible], we submit to Congress.[3]

Records indicate that as many as 5,000 blacks were in the Continental Army of 300,000 men. Rolls of the militia did not carry the race of the individual. Manpower shortages were so acute by 1779 that the Continental Congress recommended that Georgia and South Carolina form battalions of slaves for service. This idea was rejected, out of hand, by the South Carolina Governor's Council of War because of the fear of a possible black revolt.

The Navy of the Revolution did not have the same problems that faced the Continental Army. It was common practice to have black sailors on ships. The general shortage of seamen for ships dictated a broad tolerance policy. In fact, this policy of integrated crews was generally continued through the War of 1812. Early records indicate that there seemed to be an entire lack of prejudice among the crews.

Unfortunately, this state of equality did not exist in the

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[3]Quarles, op. cit., p. 11.

Army. Shortly after the Revolution, Congress banned all slaves from service in the Army and only free blacks already in service were allowed to reenlist.

In summary, the American Revolution, for the most part, featured an integrated fighting force in the Continental Army. Only the colonies of Connecticut, Rhode Island and Massachusetts formed all-black units. These units fought in several engagements and were disbanded after a short time in favor of fully integrated ones. Perhaps little known is the fact that some 14,000 blacks joined the British cause and received their freedom in the West Indies.[4] The war produced its share of black heroes such as Salem Poor, but the tide of prejudice swept them all into obscurity. Congress banned blacks from the state militias in 1792, and the first Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert in 1798 prohibited blacks and mulattoes from entering the Navy or Marines.[5] In spite of this, several hundred did remain in the Navy.

The most tragic result of the blacks' participation in the fight for independence were the false attitudes concerning his character and soldiering ability. This prejudice, though in no way founded in fact, was to continue to characterize the plight of the black for the next 130 years.

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[4] Ibid.

[5] Richard J. Stillman, II, Integration of the Negro in the Armed Forces (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 8.

1792-1863

After the surrender of the British forces at Saratoga and Yorktown, the Continental Army was reduced to a housekeeping force. Several quartermaster detachments were required to guard the large supply of arms and stores captured from the British. Much of this war booty was to be stored at the fortress of West Point.

"It was during this period of time that the south developed its rigid institution of slavery and the north separated color from white society."[6] The War of 1812 saw several instances where the black was called upon to defend his country. Again, the need for manpower, and not the social justice of the matter, generated the call to arms for the black. During this period there were some instances where the services of blacks were looked on as inferior. Commodore Perry was in dire need of officers and men for his Lake Erie fleet, but complained loudly to Commodore Isaac Chauncey that what replacements he did get "were a motley set--blacks, soldiers and boys." Commodore Chauncey sent Perry a rather vitriolic reply:

> I regret that you are not pleased with the men sent you, for to my knowledge a part of them are not surpassed by any seamen we have in the Fleet; and I have yet to learn that the color of the skin, or the cut and trimmings of the coat, can affect a man's qualifications or usefulness.[7]

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[6]Ibid.

[7]Merle Espee, The Negro Too, In American History (Nashville: Nashville National Publishing Company, 1943), p. 148.

Time would prove that there were too many Benjamin Stodderts and not enough Commodore Chaunceys in the armed forces.

The 1812 land war needed a transfusion of black manpower too. Andrew Jackson, in 1814, during his defense preparations for the defense of New Orleans, appealed to the free black community of the city for help. Franklin E. Frazier, in Black Bourgeoisie, noted that many of the free blacks of New Orleans were quite wealthy and had no reason other than moral obligation to answer this call to arms. Yet, more than 600 blacks answered Jackson's call and volunteered to fight the British.

In 1823, Attorney General William Wirt said that "it was not the intention of Congress to incorporate Negroes and people of color with the Army any more than militia."[8] The south took a more racist stand on the matter. Senator John C. Calhoun in 1842 proposed a bill in the Senate to exclude all blacks from the Navy except as cooks, stewards or servants.[9] He stated: "It was wrong to bring those who have sustained the honor and glory of the country down to the footing of the Negro race."[10] The bill passed the Senate but was defeated in the House. A few blacks participated in the Mexican War, but as late as 1860, the Army and Navy were generally white with all blacks excluded.

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[8]Stillman, op. cit., p. 9.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

This period, 1792-1863, proved to be a continuation of the policy of exclusion of the black from the military. For the first time, the political aspect of the problem emerged. The south was firmly entrenched in slavery, and the north was following a similar type policy. The southern Democrat and the northern Republican began to use the black as a political issue. This political agitation would continue through the next period, 1863-1900.

1863-1900

The Civil War saw both North and South eventually seeking the blacks for military service. Initially, Lincoln declined to allow the black to bear arms because he felt there was still a chance of the South rejoining the Union and the border states were still in question. The war began to take on alarming manpower proportions. Original volunteers, their service up, began to leave the service. The Conscription Act of 1863 caused riots in Boston and New York again driving the War Department to the blacks for manpower.

When Lincoln made his original call for 75,000 men, a large number of urban blacks tried to enlist in the Union Army. Secretary of War Cameron stated that: "I have to say this Department has no intention to call into service any colored soldiers."[11] But the lackluster performance of the Union Army

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[11] *Ibid.*

in the field and the termination of the original enlistments forced the War Department to reappraise their position on the black.

On January 1, 1863, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. Now, both the north and south began to actively recruit the black for their military forces. Many influential blacks in the north saw this as a chance for the black man to finally break the bonds of injustice. Fredrick Douglass, a noted black journalist of the time, made an impassioned appeal to his fellow blacks:

> Men of Color, to Arms! This is our golden opportunity. Let us accept it and forever wipe out the dark reproaches hurled against us by our enemies.[12]

The blacks rallied to the colors of both the North and the South. The Union Army mustered some 178,985 blacks for 163 black regiments. The blacks in these units participated in 449 engagements and suffered 36,847 casualties.[13] All the black regiments were officered by whites but there were a total of 7,122 black officers, mainly chaplains and doctors. With the expansion of the Navy during the war, blacks were accepted as sailors and as many as

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[12]Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front (New York: Random House, 1954), p. 25.

[13]Stillman, op. cit., p. 10.

25% of the members of some crews were black.[14]

The South smarted with the thought of elevating the black to the status of a soldier. With three quarters of the 4,441,830 blacks living in the south, a tremendous source of manpower was yet untapped. In 1863 there was a great deal of discussion in the Confederacy on the use of slaves for the military. By March 1865 the Confederate Congress passed legislation allowing blacks into service; but before the law could be enacted, Lee surrendered on April 2, 1865.

With the end of the Civil War, the Army was reorganized. Congress provided for four permanent all black regiments which became the 9th and 10th Cavalry organized in 1866, and the 24th and 25th Infantry organized in 1868 and 1869 respectively. These units were normally staffed by white officers. The 9th and 10th Cavalry fought extensively in the western Indian wars and were known as "buffalo soldiers" by the Indians. This name was derived from the great robes they wore in the winter when the Indians first saw them. During the wars against many tribes, soldiers of these units won twenty Medals of Honor.

All four regiments served in Cuba during the Spanish-American War. These units were some of the first to arrive and participated in combat at El Caney, Las Guasimas, and San Juan Hill. The 9th and 10th Cavalry were part of Theodore Roosevelt's

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[14] Ibid.

Rough Riders. General Pershing, then a lieutenant in the 10th Cavalry, wrote that the 10th "charged up the hill, opened a disastrous enfilading fire upon the Spanish right, thus relieving . . ." the Rough Riders.[15] A correspondent of the Washington Post related that the 10th Cavalry saved the Rough Riders from heavy casualties at San Juan Hill.

To summarize the treatment of blacks during the Civil War and post-Civil War period, one may conclude it was characterized by a continued racist and opportunistic attitude of the military establishment toward the black. Blacks were used only when necessary to relieve manpower shortages, and they were kept segregated insofar as possible.

1900-1940

The blacks' relationship to the military fell to its lowest ebb during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The turmoil between the black and the white was typified by the Brownsville Incident. A riot occurred in August 1906 at Brownsville, Texas. The 25th Infantry was stationed there and was involved in a shooting spree that left one civilian dead and a peace officer wounded. The accounts of incidents that led up to the riot are not clear, and there are several opinions about and accounts of the shootings. The most plausible story seems to be

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[15]Nichols, op. cit., p. 29.

Stillman's. This historian says that several days prior to the actual shootings black houses were burned and a white officer had fired upon a predominately black crowd. Stillman goes on to say that President Theodore Roosevelt, on the word of one inspector, dismissed three companies of the 25th for the incident. Three years later these companies were vindicated through the efforts of Ohio Senator Foraker.[16]

World War I continued the decline of the relationship of blacks with the military. Some three million blacks were registered, but only 350,000 were inducted into the Army. With the Wilson administration in desperate need of the support of the Southern Democrats, the President chose to ignore what was happening to the black in the Federal Service and in the nation as a whole.

The treatment of the black by his own army in France left much to be desired. The policy of segregation in the style of the Supreme Court's Plessy Decision of separate but equal, was carried to France. A policy statement was issued to French commanders by the U.S. Army recommending the following attitude toward black American troops:

> Although a citizen of the United States, the black man is regarded by the white American as a inferior being with whom relations of business or service only are possible. . .

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[16]Stillman, op. cit., p. 12.

> We must prevent the use of any pronounced degree of intimacy between French officers and black officers . . .
>
> We must not commend too highly the black American troops, particularly in the presence of white Americans . . .
>
> Make a point of keeping native population from spoiling the Negroes. White Americans become incensed at any public expression of intimacy between white women and black men. . .[17]

There were two results of these recommendations: first, the French, by and large, ignored them. The French Army had blacks in its ranks and regarded them as equals. Second, the "recommendations" did nothing more than cause friction rather than preventing conflict with the French. Most of the black troops that went to France spent their time in service battalions. Only about forty thousand of the two hundred thousand blacks in France saw combat. At best, the record of the blacks during the war was mixed. There were some instances where black troops did exceptionally well in combat and others where they did not measure up to expectations.

The black combat troops were primarily in two all-black divisions, the 92nd and 93rd Divisions. The former was made up mostly of draftees. Its combat effectiveness was marginal because of the friction between white officers and black enlisted men, combined with poor combat training prior to deployment to France. One of the few black officers to serve with the 92nd

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[17] Ibid., p. 14.

Infantry was Charles Houston, later to become Dean of the Howard Law School. He said:

> The hate and scorn heaped upon us as Negro officers by Americans, at Camp Mencon and Vannes, in France, convinced me there was no sense in dying in a world ruled by them. . . They boarded us off from our fellow white officers. They made us eat on benches in order to maintain segregation, and they destroyed our prestige in front of French officers.[18]

It appears that this feeling pervaded the entire division.

The case of the 93rd Infantry Division was entirely different. The division, as it landed in France, was broken up into separate regiments and put into the line with French Army units. The 93rd was also made up primarily of volunteers from the National Guard. Each of its four regiments served with distinction, particularly the 371st and 372nd. General Gobyet, the 157th French Division Commander, said:

> The 157th French Division will never forget the wonderful irresistible impetus, the heroic rush of the colored American regiments on the "Observatories Crests" and on the Plain of Mentholis. The most formidable defense, the nests of machine guns, the best-organized position, the most crushing artillery barrages could not stop them.[19]

World War I pointed out several inadequacies in the Army's use of black manpower resources. In most cases, blacks were

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[18] Ibid., p. 15.

[19] Ibid.

given menial tasks and were nothing more than bus boys in Khaki and olive drab. There were woefully few black officers, primarily due to the relative lack of sources from which the qualified black could receive a commission. When a black was commissioned, he was treated with disrespect by the majority of his fellow officers.

The war ended and the armed forces returned to a peacetime constabulary. Black units were reduced to cadre strength and black recruitment stopped. A treatise done at the War College in 1936 on black manpower gave the military view of the black:

> As an individual, the Negro is docile, tractable, lighthearted, carefree, and good natured. If unjustly treated, he is likely to become surly and stubborn, though this is a temporary phase. He is careless, shiftless, irresponsible and secretive. He resents censure and is best handled with praise and ridicule. He is unmoral, untruthful, and his sense of right and wrong is relatively inferior. Crimes and convictions involving moral turpitude are nearly five to one compared to convictions of whites on similar charges. . . Their emotions are unstable and their reactions uncertain. Bad leadership in particular is easily communicated to them.[20]

With ideas such as these prevalent in the establishment, it is easy to see that World War II started with the basic premise that black troops were not combat effective. The black never lacked the courage to answer the call to arms but he had been frustrated after each war by the military. Gunnar Mrydal, the renowned

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[20]Ulysses Lee, United States Army in World War II: Employment of Negro Troops (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), Chapter I (Memorandum to Secretary Henry L. Stimson).

Swedish sociologist and economist, remarked in 1943:

> When the United States entered World War II in December, 1941, Negroes were not optimistic as to what its significance for them would be. They knew that the democratic war aims were not for them. The memories of the riots that followed the first World War rankled in their minds. Their difficulties in getting into the armed forces and into war industries in the preparation period for war convinced them that an increase of activities would only mean more fields in which Negroes would be discriminated against.[21]

1940-1953

The initial stages of the war were, in many respects, a carbon copy of other wars the American had fought. As Mrydal pointed out, blacks were not called to service. At the start of the war only five officers and 5,000 enlisted men remained in the Army. The Marines accepted no blacks in the Corps.[22]

By 1943, the old 92nd and 93rd all-black Infantry Divisions had been re-activated. Because of black demands, the all-black 99th Fighter Squadron was formed and expanded to the 332nd Fighter Group. With the exception of the 332nd Group, most black units spent little time in combat. There were some notable exceptions to this. The 92nd Division, as part of the Fifth Army in Italy, served with distinction at the Arno River, occupied the Lucca Canal and conducted mountain combat in north Italy. The Division sustained 25 percent casualties and received 12,098 military

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[21]Gunnar Mrydal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), Vol. II, p. 755.

[22]Stillman, op. cit., p. 26.

decorations. Unfortunately, some units, when they reached the combat areas, though trained for combat, were used as service troops. With few exceptions, most senior commanders' thoughts relative to the employment of black troops were guided by the War College study of 1936. General George S. Patton was one of the exceptions. He told the 761st Tank Battalion on October 10, 1944:

> Men, you're the first Negro tankers ever to fight in the American Army. I would never have asked for you if you weren't good. I don't care what color you are, so long as you go up there and kill those Kraut sonsabitches.[23]

During the Battle of the Bulge, Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, Eisenhower's Commander of Service Forces in Europe, called for 2,500 blacks to fight as infantry in the Bulge. After much trepidation on the part of General Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, approval was obtained from the Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, to utilize the black troops.

POST WORLD WAR II

The Navy took the lead toward complete integration of its force when in February 1946, the Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal ordered the end to segregation. To implement the policy, the Chief of Naval Operations issued Circular Letter No. 48-46 which reads in part:

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[23]Stillman, op. cit., p. 79.

> - - - Effective immediately all restrictions governing types of assignments for which Negro naval personnel are eligible are hereby lifted. Henceforth, they shall be eligible for all types of assignments in all ratings in all activities and in all ships of the naval service.
>
> In the utilization of housing, messing and other facilities no special or unusual provisions will be made for the accommodation of Negroes.

Almost concurrently with the Navy's action, General Eisenhower recommended that a board convene to determine how to use the black soldier during peacetime. Under the authority of the War Department, Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem chaired the board. General Gillem made his report on March 4, 1946. The report, entitled "Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post War Army Policy," made six basic recommendations in its findings:

> 1. A quota of 10% blacks be established for the Army.
>
> 2. Employment of blacks in divisional size units be abandoned.
>
> 3. Expansion of black officer corps.
>
> 4. Limited integration by utilizing black NCO's.
>
> 5. Assignment of black units to areas of least racial tension.
>
> 6. Integration of on post facilities (not to offend local civilian custom).[24]

Unfortunately, the Gillem Board offered very little of a specific

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[24]Stillman, op. cit., p. 35.

nature to end segregation in the Army. Roy Wilkens of the NAACP made a sharp attack against the Army because the conclusions of the Board, accepted by the War Department, were not being carried out on military posts in the United States.[25]

The entire civil rights question was in limbo till mid-1948. Slowly, political pressure began to be applied to the White House by various veterans organizations for action in the civil rights area. On April 2, 1948, General Eisenhower testified before a Senate Committee concerning the black and the Army. His comment, "There is race prejudice in this country. . . When you pass a law to get somebody to like someone, you have trouble," added impetus to the pressure on President Truman.[26]

In July 1948, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981. The order was designed to end racial segregation in the Armed Forces and it read as follows:

The Armed Services

> Whereas it is essential that there be maintained in the Armed Services of the United States the highest standards of democracy with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who serve in our country's defense.
>
> Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States

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[25] Ibid.

[26] New York Times, April 3, 1948, p. 3.

and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Services, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Armed Services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale.

2. There shall be created in the National Military Establishment an advisory committee to be known as the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services which shall be composed of seven members to be designated by the President.

3. The committee is authorized on behalf of the President to examine into the rules, procedures and practices of the Armed Services in order to determine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this order. The committee shall confer and advise with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, and shall make such recommendations to the President and to said Secretaries as in the judgment of the committee will effectuate the policy hereof.

4. All Executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the committee in its work, and to furnish the committee such information or the services of such persons as the committee may require in the performance of its duties.

5. When requested by the committee to do so, persons in the Armed Services or in any of the Executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government shall testify before the committee and shall make available for the use of the committee such documents and other information as the committee may require.

6. The committee shall continue to exist until such time as the President shall terminate its existence by Executive Order.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.[27]

The order represented a victory for the black but some in the Army thought it would be a divisive force that would jeopardize military effectiveness. But, close examination of the order reveals that it provided equal treatment instead of integration. It also should be noted that the order came in an election year when Truman's political future was doubtful. The order also called for the formation of the "President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services," better known as the "Fahy Committee" after its first chairman. So dubious was the entire question that the Board did not convene till after the re-election of Truman in November.

The Fahy Committee was actually formed by President Truman on September 18, 1948 when he named the former Solicitor General Charles H. Fahy to head the group. Other members of the committee were A. J. Donahue of Stanford, Connecticut, President of the A. J. Donahue Corporation; Lester Granger of New York, Executive Secretary of the National Urban League; Charles Luckman of Cambridge, Massachusetts, President of Lever Brothers; Dwight

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[27] New York Times, July 27, 1948, p. 4.

R. G. Palmer of New York, President of General Cable Corporation; John H. Sengstacke of Chicago, publisher of the Chicago Defender and William E. Stevenson of Oberlin, Ohio, President of Oberlin College.[28] The significance of this prestigious board was the fact it was civilian in nature. For the first time, the military would not dominate the thought concerning the black in the service.

The committee provided a coordinated means for data collection and established a dialogue between military leaders and blacks. The committee conducted exhaustive hearings, particularly in the areas of military attitudes toward the black. After exhaustive testimony and analysis by the committee, it was concluded that segregation inhibited rather than aided military effectiveness. The committee's report was published in 1950 under the title "Freedom to Serve."

The military departments began to act on the board's findings almost immediately. The Army was the last to implement planning on the recommendations. Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall was swayed by the conservative fears of the General Staff. The War College report in 1936 still controlled the military mind on racial issues. Hansen Baldwin writing in the New York Times on August 8, 1948, gave a more plausible rationale for the conservative view of General Bradley. He said that

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[28] New York Times, September 19, 1948, p. 61.

General Bradley's comments, in essence, outlined the problem of racial turmoil as a national dilemma. The Army could not be expected to cut across the mores and customs of the people since it was made up of a cross section of those same people.

Stillman treats General Bradley's remarks as racist in nature and having a great bearing on Secretary Royall's stand in the matter. It appears that General Bradley's views were right for the Army. Direction and leadership were lacking at the highest levels of the Army and the government.

By the time the Korean War broke out segregation in the Army was essentially dead. Again, manpower shortages and management played a major role in burying the racial problem. At Fort Jackson, South Carolina, General Frank McConnell was chosen to set up a basic training command to train draftees. Initially, segregated billets were to be established but the draftees arrived in such quantity that blacks and whites were put into the same units.

After the first year of the war, the record of the all-black 24th Regiment in Korea proved that segregated units were a handicap. Evidence indicated all-black units performed less effectively than integrated or all-white units of similar size. This did not mean the black was an inferior soldier, but the groupment of blacks and whites caused tensions that resulted in

the loss of combat effectiveness.[29] On July 31, 1950, Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea, General Ridgeway, received permission from the Pentagon to integrate all units in the combat zone.[30] Military effectiveness demanded it.

The combat zone experience in Korea led to the complete integration of the Army. Southern sentiment was dampened when political stock was taken of the situation. More blacks in combat meant less whites on casualty lists. By 1953, the black had achieved the goals of integration in the Army.

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[29] Stillman, op cit., p. 52.

[30] New York Times, July 27, 1951, p. 2.

CHAPTER III

WEST POINT AND THE BLACK

BLACK HISTORY AT USMA

The history of the black at West Point started in 1870, sixty-eight years after the academy was established by Congress.

The first congressman to consider appointing a black to West Point was Benjamin F. Butler of Massachusetts. In 1867, during the height of the Reconstruction period, Butler went to President James Fairchild of the integrated Oberlin College in Ohio for a prospective candidate. Fairchild could not find a black who both met the qualifications and wished to become a cadet; so no appointment was made that year.[1]

In 1870, a black, James Webster Smith, from South Carolina obtained an appointment from Soloman L. Hoge. Smith's time at the academy was difficult. Fellow cadets ignored him and even refused to sit at the same table with him for meals. The Superintendent put two cadets in arrest for not eating with Smith. Smith's white classmates said that "all he wanted was social equality and not an education."[2] Smith got neither. He was

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[1]Stephen Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country--A History of West Point (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 167.

[2]Ibid.

dismissed during his second class year (junior) for failing a course in natural philosophy.

In 1871, Henry A. Napier arrived at West Point and the following year Thomas Van R. Gibbs joined the Corps. Both Napier and Gibbs were dismissed for being found deficient in math.

In 1873, James Crawford Freeman, a Republican from Georgia, appointed Henry O. Flipper. In 1877 Flipper became the first black to graduate from the Military Academy. As a cadet, he appeared to be respected by other cadets because he "never pushed." Flipper graduated fifty out of seventy-six in his class and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Cavalry and served with the 10th Cavalry in the western territories for five years. Not too much is known of his service with the 10th but there appears to have been trouble between him and some of the white officers in the unit. Flipper left the service in 1882 to become an engineer of some renown.

Flipper wrote two books about his experiences in the Army and at West Point, The Colored Cadet at West Point and Negro Frontiersman. In his work, The Colored Cadet at West Point, he gives a great deal of insight into the problems of the first blacks at the institution.

Flipper says that the life of isolation at West Point was the most difficult for the black to endure. White cadets would only talk to them in the line of duty and blacks like Smith,

Napier and Gibbs broke under the strain. Flipper is quick to add, however, that every opportunity was given to Smith by the Academy to pass his academics. Flipper sums up his feelings about West Point in this way:

> I have not a word to say against any of the professors or instructors who were at West Point during the period of my cadetship. I have everything to say in their (precise), and many things to be thankful for. I have felt perfectly free to go to any officer for assistance, whenever I have wanted it, because their conduct toward me made me feel that I would not be sent away without having received whatever help I may have wanted. All I could say of the professors and officers at the Academy would be unqualifiedly in their favor.[3]

Perhaps the most interesting black cadet to arrive at West Point in this period was Johnson Chesnut Whittaker. He had been appointed to West Point from his native Camden, South Carolina, and arrived at West Point on August 23, 1876.[4] Whittaker came from the University of South Carolina, where he had been on a scholarship and personally tutored by Professor Richard T. Greener, the first black graduate of Harvard.

Unfortunately, his academic preparation proved inadequate at West Point. He was put back a year for an academic failure. Whittaker had much the same problem as his black predecessors

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[3]Henry O. Flipper, The Colored Cadet at West Point (New York: Arno Press and The New York Times, 1969), pp. 321-322.

[4]John F. Marszalek, Jr., "A Black Cadet at West Point," American Heritage (New York: Heritage Printing Company, August 1971), Vol. XXII, p. 31.

Smith, Gibbs and Napier. No one cared to room with him and he experienced the same isolation in the mess hall.

From Marszalek's account, Whittaker was a very religious boy with a deep sense of personal honor. After supper on April 6, 1880, Whittaker received a note with this message:

> Mr. Whittaker
>
> You will be fixed. Better keep awake.
>
> A friend.[5]

The next morning, Cadet Whittaker was found unconscious and bound in his room. This event touched off an investigation that finally led to Whittaker's dismissal from West Point.

The circumstances surrounding the case are still obscure. Ambrose handles the situation as a matter of fact and intimates that Whittaker had planned the entire situation because of his academic problems. Marszalek, on the other hand, puts together a case quite to the contrary. He points out some glaring errors of omission in the formal investigation from the initial medical exam by Major Charles T. Alexander, the post surgeon, to the acceptance of a report of Lieutenant Colonel Layelle by General Schofield.

By the morning of April 9th, much of the country was aware of the incident. By the 14th of April, charges and countercharges were levied against the administration of the academy concerning

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[5] Ibid.

racial prejudice in the case. Handwriting experts examined the note sent to Whittaker. Their opinion appeared inconclusive but the government's case stated Whittaker had, in fact, written the note himself. The hearing continued for several more days and Cadet Whittaker was put on a leave of absence in June, 1880.

In August of the same year, General Schofield was summoned to Washington to see President Hayes. The President wanted a complete accounting of the situation. He was particularly interested in the image of West Point and his own political future. Most news media, though agreeing with the academy's position, alluded to the possibility of prejudice in the case. In December of the same year Whittaker appealed to President Hayes for a court martial to clear his name.

The trial began on February 3, 1881, in the Army Building in New York. On June 6, 1881, after several months of testimony, both sides gave their summations. On June 10, 1881, Cadet Whittaker was found guilty of conduct unbecoming a gentleman. The final sentence was that he only be dropped from West Point.

The transcript of the trial was sent for review to the Judge Advocate General of the Army, P. E. Swain, on December 1, 1881. Swain's opinion found the prosecution lacking and declared the court-martial null and void. On March 22, 1882, President Chester A. Arthur ruled that Whittaker be recommitted to West Point; but because of his existing academic deficiency of June 1880,

Whittaker went back to South Carolina and obscurity.[6]

Two more blacks entered West Point during this same period and both left. They were John W. Williams who failed French and Charles A. Minnie who was declared deficient in math. It was not until 1887 that another black graduated from West Point. Cadet John T. Alexander of Ohio was commissioned a second lieutenant of cavalry and assigned to the 9th Cavalry upon graduation.

The period 1889 to 1932 at the academy saw no more blacks as cadets. This was not by the design of the institution but because of the Compromise of 1877 and the acquiescence of the North to the Jim Crow laws left the black without the rights of a citizen. Since the black vote was no longer needed, the black lost the opportunity to attend West Point. Not until the early 1909's was the black vote again a political asset. Congressman Oscar De Priest was the first black congressman to appoint a black, Alonzo S. Parham, in 1929 for West Point.

The modern history of the black began with the graduation of Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. in 1936. After General Davis came James D. Fowler who graduated in 1941 and retired a colonel in 1967. Appendix A contains a list of blacks graduated from the United States Military Academy through June 1969.

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BLACK AND WHITE CADETS

CLASS OF 1973

The optimum way of examining the modern black and his cadetship is to examine the entering plebe (freshman) class. The characteristics evaluated can provide some insight to the reader as to possible problem areas. The basic input of this discussion was derived from a report of the Office of Research, United States Military Academy, Report IB 82-79-002, A Comparative Examination of Negro and Non-Negro Cadets in the Class of 1973. (Data will not be footnoted except direct quotes.)

The basic data for the report is received from the American Council on Education (ACE). The Military Academy participates each year in the ACE testing programs. The ACE testing collects data on secondary schools, backgrounds, values, interests and activity patterns of new freshmen. The study quoted, IB 82-79-002, is part of the Academy's Minority Group Research Project, and deals primarily with the intra-academy comparison.

The ACE survey is grouped into five sequential categories

1. High School Years--This category includes data on the cadet's age, high school work and activities.

2. Future Plans--This area included what the cadet planned for educationally, particularly his major.

3. Feelings About College--This category included finances and distance from home.

4. Home Life--The essence of this category was the family data of the cadet which included his parents' income, education and work.

5. Attitudes, Opinions and Values--This category was the widest in scope and covered political tendencies and personal attributes.

COMPARISON

High School Years--The data indicated very little difference between the white and black member of the class. The average grade of both in high school was a B+ and both graduated in the top ten percent of their classes.

Future Plans--There was some uncertainty displayed by both groups as to their desired major subject or field. It was significant that the white group indicated a greater preference for the military than did the black group. The researchers evaluated this category as relatively the same for both blacks and whites.

Feelings About College--Both groups showed the majority of their members living 1,000 miles or more from West Point. There was also some question as to their need to finance their education at West Point. This may be a revealing fact considering that the literature, to include Barron's Profile of the United States Military Academy, stresses that all costs are paid by the government. The three hundred dollar cost to the cadet to defray the

initial cost of uniforms is refunded and the payment may even be waived in some cases. Perhaps Barron's introductory comment that:

> While it (West Point) is one of the best known institutions of higher education in the country, it is in a sense one of the least known.[7]

This particular category also indicated that the black student was much more political during his high school years. Significant were the feelings of the blacks that they would transfer from West Point prior to graduation. Again, the data was considered equivocal by the researchers with very little significant difference between the black and white members of the class.

Home Life--Most of the blacks in the Class of 1973 came from the southern (38.63%), north central (29.54%), and the middle (22.72%) states regions of the United States. The majority of the whites came from the north central (31.76%) region. The majority of both groups came from large towns and cities.

The significant fact is a greater percentage of the blacks' parents occupy the lowest three income brackets ($7,999 to less than $4,000) while the white parents tend to fall in the top five income brackets ($10,000 to $30,000 or more).

Generally speaking, the educational level of each group's parents was equivalent. Significantly more black mothers held

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[7]Source: Barron's Profile: United States Military Academy (New York: Barron's Educational Series, 1971).

post graduate degrees than their white counterpart. Of note was the fact that 15 percent of the fathers of both groups were/are career military men. The majority of the unskilled worker group was among the black fathers.

In this category the cadets were asked to describe their parents in terms of certain specified attributes. Both groups saw their parents as follows: interested in the intellectual pursuits, interested in cultural pursuits, deeply religious, interested in politics, interested in their children, and possessing great expectations for their sons.

This category was statistically more significantly divergent than any of the preceding categories. Most significant, in the opinion of the researcher, was the large group of blacks from southern cities and the high regard that both groups had for their parents.

Attitudes, Opinions and Values--Black cadets appeared to be more liberal and left of center in political thought where his white classmate was more to the right and conservative. The most significant similarity found between blacks and whites in this category was their uniform personal objective of developing "a meaningful philosophy of life."

General Conclusions for All Categories--The group, as a class is homogeneous in most respects. There is some statistical significance in the fact that in the last two categories family background

and political suasion differ between the groups. High school experiences were generally the same as well as most opinions and values.

There were two significant indications from the report. First, today's new cadet has some different ideas about life and his place in society. This change from previous cadet norms must be reckoned with and the academy may have to modify policies and select options that reflect this new trend in cadets.

Second, the most significant differences shown by the ACE testing was not between the black and white cadets of the class, but between the black at West Point and his black counterpart entering other colleges and universities. The black cadet at West Point was academically superior to other entering black freshmen. He appeared more conservative and establishment oriented than blacks entering other colleges. Generally speaking, he is a high-powered, academically competitive black who differs in some basic characteristics from his black peer entering other colleges and universities.

SUMMARY

Prior to 1936, a black history at West Point was almost non-existent. The first black cadets to come to the academy during the Reconstruction days were more political pawns of opportunistic

politicians than young men appointed to West Point to be professional soldiers. As the blacks' political value waned, so did their appointments to West Point. The experience of the first black cadets was rather tragic. Flipper, Whittaker, Smith and the others faced some formidable odds yet several managed to graduate.

It appeared that West Point, in the post Civil War days, reflected the same prejudices as the nation. Today, as then, most of the white majority had very little contact with the black and a great deal of prejudice against him.[8]

Though it is not documented, there is some indication that as late as 1953, the rapport between the black and white cadet at West Point was poor. We are too close to the history to adequately judge but some conjecture is in order.

The cadet rank of a First Classman (senior) is normally a product of a cadet's military aptitude standing among his peers and some qualitative data. The military aptitude system, sometimes referred to as ASR and peer ratings, was started in 1920 by the Commandant of Cadets, Colonel Robert M. Danford. The ASR system came into full use by the late 1930's when cadets began to suffer dismissal for continued low ratings. The principle

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[8] M. Barron (ed.), "Negro Reactions to Minority Group Status," American Minorities (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1957), pp. 193-194.

input for the ASR consists of peer ratings by the members of a cadet's own class in his company and the tactical officer's rating of the cadet. Each cadet is then ranked by class according to the quantitative results.

The basic criterion used for rating a cadet is one's opinion of his ability to lead a group of men while maintaining high standards of discipline, morale and personal morality.

In reviewing the cadet records of the black graduates in the 1930's and 1940's it is noted that Cadet Davis held no cadet rank upon graduation. Later, he rose to the rank of Lieutenant General in the Air Force. Table I gives the ranks of black cadets through 1956.

There is a significance attached to the cadet rank and ASR. The Department of Military Psychology and Leadership has conducted longitudinal studies on ASR scores as a cadet and future success as an officer. Generally speaking, the higher ranked the cadet in ASR, the more probable will be his success as an officer. The converse is true. Studies show that in a recent graduated class, seventy-four percent of the above the outstanding zone promotions came out of the group that was in the upper fifty percent of the class in ASR as cadets.[9]

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[9] Samuel H. Hays, Robert H. Marcum, James C. Bunis and Ramon A. Nadal, An Evaluation of the Aptitude for the Service System (West Point, New York: Office of Military Psychology and Leadership, 1968), p. 3.

TABLE I

BLACKS AND CADET RANK AS SENIORS

CLASS	CADET	CADET RANK
1936	B. O. Davis	No Rank
1943	C. M. Davenport	Sergeant
1943	R. B. Tresville, Jr.	Lieutenant
1944	All black cadets were either corporals or sergeants as Seniors.	
1954	H. G. Robinson	Lieutenant
1956	*R. R. Blunt	Captain

*Blunt went on to be a White House Fellow and has now resigned from the Army and is a consultant for Harbridge House of Boston.

Since ASR is a measure of leadership ability and interpersonal skills, the blacks to 1955 seemed to be singular in their lack of leadership ability as cadets; yet, when they graduated, some rose to the highest military rank.

By the late 1950's there was an apparent change in the Corps of Cadets toward blacks. This new awareness coincided with the Civil Rights Act of 1954 and the overturning of the Plessy Decision by the Supreme Court in the landmark decision Brown vs. the Board of Education.

Most encouraging is the basic similarity between the present black cadet and his white classmate. On fundamental issues, they appear to think alike.

CHAPTER IV

WEST POINT: THE IMAGE AND MISSION

HISTORY

The United States Military Academy was established by act of Congress on March 16, 1802.

West Point was a strategic fort during the Revolution. Its batteries controlled the Hudson River and prevented the British free access to Canada and the Great Lakes. Many famous names of the Revolution are connected with West Point. General Thaddeus Kosciuszko built many of the defense works and General Benedict Arnold's plot was discovered at West Point. After the Revolution, many of the arms captured from the British were stored there.

After the war, there was little thought given to having a Military Academy though regimental officer schools were started during the war and records indicate that they were continued at West Point after the war.

By 1794, Washington, Hamilton and Knox tried to have a military academy formed. Alexander Hamilton proposed an entire military school system describing basic instruction for "cadets" for both the Army and Navy to include branch schools for the Army. Thomas Jefferson agreed and Congress acted in 1802.

In its early days, the academy's curriculum and organization was ineffective. Not until 1817 when Sylvanus Thayer, a recent

graduate, returned to West Point as Superintendent, did the academy take on the look of a school for military instruction. Thayer demanded that the cadets not only be disciplined but be scholarly too. He developed a system of instruction that remains in effect today at West Point basically unchanged. The heart of this system is the requirement for cadets to be graded daily in every class.

CONTRIBUTION TO THE NATION

By the time the war with Mexico was over, the graduates of the academy had made their mark The Civil War found 294 graduates as general officers with 151 in the Confederate Army. President Theodore Roosevelt paid tribute to the academy on the occasion of its centennial:

> This institution has completed its first hundred years of life. During that century, no other institution has contributed so many names as West Point has to the honor roll of the nation's greatest citizens.

This contribution has continued through the two World Wars, Korea and now Vietnam.

NOMINATION AND APPOINTMENT PROCEDURES

Admission to the Military Academy is a complex process regardless of a candidate's color. A nomination allows the nominee to be considered for an appointment to West Point. The appointment

is an actual offer of admission to the Military Academy.

Before an applicant can even be considered for an appointment, he must pass rigorous academic, physical and mental tests as specified by public law. Normally, these tests are part of the nomination process.

There are several groups and individuals authorized by law to nominate persons for appointment to West Point. They include the President, Vice President, members of Congress, the Delegate to the House of Representatives from Washington, D. C., the Commissioner/Governor of Puerto Rico and the Department of the Army.

CONGRESSIONAL

The congressional nomination is the normal method of securing an appointment to West Point. Each senator and representative is authorized five cadetships at any one time. This means he cannot have more than five cadets in the academy at any one time. When a vacancy exists, the member of Congress may nominate up to ten individuals to compete for the vacant cadetship. In selecting the ten individuals the congressman will also rank order the group from one to ten, designating his primary or principal candidate with nine alternates.

PRINCIPAL NOMINATION

There is a significance in the ordering of the ten names. The individual selected as the principal nominee must only meet

the minimum entrance requirements to receive an appointment regardless of how much higher the alternate nominees score. This is not as inequitable as it may appear. There are just about five hundred principal nominations. Statistically, only about 30 to 50 percent of this group passes all the entrance requirements. Additionally, this group is placed against an entering class that will have about 1,400 vacancies.

THE QUALIFIED ALTERNATE

To fill the remaining vacancies in an entering class, all alternate nominees fully qualified are ranked according to test scores. The Academic Board at West Point, made up of the Heads of each Academic Department and the Director of Athletics, select the remainder of the class from the list of qualified alternates. The Superintendent heads up the Board and their deliberations are private.

SERVICE CONNECTED NOMINATIONS

An individual may gain an appointment to West Point through a military service connection. This category is divided into five discrete groups. All groups are competitive and there is no principal or alternate system used as in congressional nominations. The five categories are Presidential, Sons of Deceased and Disabled Veterans, Sons of Persons Awarded the Medal of Honor, Regular Army and Reserve, and Army ROTC.

Presidential---This category is for sons of career military personnel of all ranks of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard and Marine Corps; active, retired or deceased. This category is also open to sons of Reserve Component personnel serving eight or more years of continuous active duty and retirees receiving either retired or retainer pay. There are 100 appointments available in this category.

Sons of Deceased and Disabled Veterans---This category includes sons of all deceased veterans as well as sons of all disabled Armed Forces veterans with 100 percent service connected disability.

Sons of Persons Awarded the Medal of Honor.

Regular Army and Reserve---This category is for enlisted men of any service. Normally, the majority of this group enters from the United States Military Academy Preparatory School located at Fort Belvoir. This category has recently been combined to total 170 appointments of any mix from the two sources Regular and Reserve Components.

Army ROTC---This category is for individuals in college or high school ROTC programs.

The entrance requirements for West Point are varied and complex. The Class of 1975 was admitted in July 1971 and numbered 1,339 cadets. There were 5,517 men who were nominated and examined as potential appointees for this class. Of that group, 2,102 men were considered fully qualified academically, physically and medically; and 1,339 were selected for appointment. There were 53

black cadets admitted to West Point with the Class of 1975. Appendix B, Case Study, concerns a black youth in the Leavenworth, Kansas area and his desire to seek an appointment to West Point. The study is complete, in that the young man has received his nomination and is awaiting the West Point testing program.

THE MISSION

The mission of the United States Military Academy is to instruct and train the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate shall have the qualities and attributes essential to his progressive and continuing development throughout a career as an officer of the Regular Army.

In order to accomplish this mission, effort is directed to four areas: the mental, moral, physical and the military.

Mental---Each cadet is given a broad collegiate education in the arts and sciences leading to a Bachelor of Science degree. A cadet cannot major in a subject but the cirruculum offers 137 elective courses so a cadet can tailor his own schedule.

Moral---The moral development of a cadet is the essence of the West Point training. The environment is designed to develop in the cadet a high sense of duty and the attributes of character essential to the profession of arms. The emphasis is placed on integrity, discipline and motivation. The core of this training is the Cadet Honor Code.

Physical---A great deal of emphasis is put on physical development. Training is designed to give each cadet the skills

necessary to discharge his duties as a professional soldier.

Military---The military education provides a broad base with little individual proficiency in technical duties of a junior officer. This training is not designed to replace any schooling the new graduate will receive upon graduation.

MOTIVATION

No discussion of West Point is complete without a study of motivation. What makes an individual seek an appointment to West Point? What motivates the cadet to remain at the academy and remain in the service? Many studies have been conducted on each one of these questions. The reader must have some appreciation for these questions because their answers are essential in the attracting of qualified candidates for appointment to West Point.

A research report, number 68-11, completed by the Department of Military Psychology and Leadership at West Point in 1968, discussed motivation before entrance, during school and after the graduation of the cadet. The first two categories are germane to this research.

The report confirms the important role of the family in the selection process. Closely associated with the family are economic conditions and the prestige of the military as an institution in comparison with other alternatives.[1] Very important to the

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[1]Samuel H. Hays, A Review of Research on Cadet Motivation (West Point, New York: Office of Military Psychology and Leadership, October 1968), p. 2.

prospective cadet is the social environment. A paper presented to the Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society in 1967 by Hays and Rehm shows (1) that the radical changes in attitudes of our society are in variance with the values essential to a military organization and (2) the academy must present the values essential for a military career in the context of the times.[2]

MOTIVATION BEFORE ENTRANCE

When an individual begins to look at West Point as a possible alternative, he sees the institution as being impersonal, glamorous and stressing the development of leadership traits. He sees himself as a lesser man and the cadet appears as a "superman" image. This false "superman" imag causes many a prospective candidate not to compete for an appointment.

Motivation is a very essential part of attracting prospective candidates for the Military Academy. Unfortunately, the institution can do little to influence the majority of the society's opinions concerning military service but it can dispel the "superman" image.

MOTIVATION AT USMA

The reasons a cadet elects to remain at West Point are varied and complex. Research conducted with the Class of 1967 indicated that a desire for a military career played a small part

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[2] Ibid.

in their decision to remain at West Point, but twenty-two percent of the class indicated they remained at West Point because of family influence.[3]

A Medical Research project suggested that cadets who remained at West Point tended to be "more enthusiastic than taciturn; more conscientious and persevering; more self-reliant than tender minded and sensitive; more conventional and practical than imaginative; and more group dependent than self-sufficient and resourceful."[4] Conversely, a study of resignees indicated most knew little about West Point or the military and were in the lower half of the class in ASR.[5]

The importance of the family influence on the cadet cannot be overemphasized. It appears to continue through all four years at West Point. The critical time is the freshman (plebe) year. Continued parental support sustains a cadet through many of the rigors of the year

SUMMARY

West Point has provided the nation with some of its most distinguished citizens and soldiers. It is not by accident. Inherent in the mission of the academy is the mental, moral and physical development of each of its graduates. The emphasis is

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[3] Ibid., p. 6.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

on integrity and discipline, attributes essential to the profession of arms.

The nomination and appointment system for entrance into West Point is complex. The basic way to secure a nomination for appointment is through a congressional selection process though other means exist.

Perhaps the essence of West Point is motivation. Motivation is the life blood of the institution. It plays a vital role in the nominee selection process to seek appointment and in the decision process which cadets experience when faced with remain or resign choices. The mainspring of this force is parental guidance. Motivation plays the primary role in both the selection and retention process of a cadet.

There has been no differentiation made between black and white cadets in this chapter. The basic attributes of all cadets are essentially the same as illustrated by Research Report IB 02-70-002 described in Chapter 3. The profile of the black cadet of the Class of 1973 more resembles that of his white classmate than his black peer entering other colleges and universities.

CHAPTER V

THE BLACK IN THE 1970'S

SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

The last decade has seen a revolution in the rising expectations of the blacks. At times, this era has been characterized by violence in spite of men like the late Dr. Martin Luther King. Though tremendous gains have been made, the conditions of most blacks have remained the same. Dr. Eli Ginzberg has summed up the current problem:

> If the color barrier could be eliminated overnight, that fact alone would not materially improve the position of the Negro. Just as white men now must compete with each other in terms of aptitude, education, and skill, so too does this same challenge face the Negro as the artificial employment barriers which stand in his way are successively eliminated.[1]

During the same period of time, the war in Southeast Asia has dominated the political scene along with the race issue. Unfortunately, the military establishment, and in particular the Army, has received heavy criticism for the war. Many critics of the nation's Southeast Asia policy say the war has been waged at the expense of the black. The problem is obviously more complex than this but the impact on the black has taken its toll on the military recruitment effort.

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[1]Ginzberg, op. cit., p. 12.

RECRUITING THE BLACK OFFICER

The Army has a tremendous recruiting problem because of the concepts and attitudes of the black community concerning the military.

The problems of black officer recruitment are similar to those in attracting qualified blacks for West Point. The Army has three principal sources of officer input: Officer Candidate School (OCS), Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and West Point. By far, the largest input comes from ROTC.

As the strength of the Army is phased down, the OCS Program will be the first system to be reduced. The number of black lieutenants from the OCS program will drop from 238 in FY 1969 to 65 in FY 1971 and 13 in FY 72.[2]

West Point will then become second to ROTC for black officer input to the officer corps. The ROTC program has been revitalized after a short period of disenchantment on the college campus. This program will be in competition for the same qualified black as West Point. Appendix C is the present projection of blacks in the Army to 1980.

ROTC RECRUITING

Department of the Army, DCSPER, has recently developed two

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[2]LTC W. D. Vergot, Minority Officer Procurement Study (DCSPER-RUO), unpublished document, p. ii.

approaches to increase minority recruitment. The first involves mass appeal to influence public attitudes toward the ROTC programs. The second is a program of information to increase minority group interest and consists of the following eight specific actions:

1. CONARC Regulation 145-6 directs special attention be given to the recruitment of blacks on compus by Professors of Military Science (PMS's).

2. Efforts are being made to increase ROTC units in predominantly black schools. Three such schools are on the current list of schools for the Secretary of the Army to approve.

3. PMS's and selected ROTC cadets conduct public relation visits to local high schools.

4. The addition of more prominent blacks will be made to the Army ROTC Advisory Panel. This Panel now includes The Honorable Charles Wright, a black judge from Philadelphia.

5. Testing procedures will be revised for advanced ROTC to insure that cultural and ethnic biases are removed. Currently, the Behavior and Systems Research Laboratories (BESRL) are reviewing the test techniques.

6. Black ROTC announcements have been used as public service announcements.

7. High quality black advertisement has been placed in nationally known publications like Ebony and Popular Mechanics.

8. Statistical representation of black recruitment will be placed in recruiting literature.[3]

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[3] Ibid., pp. IV-V.

Concurrently with these programs has come an increase of ROTC scholarships available and a raise in the ROTC cadet pay. The increase of pay for Military Science III and IV from $50 to $100 is considered an essential motivater in the ROTC program.

The program outlined by DCSPER may not realize an increase of black cadets for ROTC programs. The educational level desired for young blacks precludes many from participating in the program. Moreover, much of the black community has been alienated against the establishment and frustrated with the system.

The educational and cultural problems are difficult obstacles to overcome. Gregg and Killian noted that on a twelfth grade test given to prospective freshmen (a score of 200 was minimal for entrance into any state university) of 6,673 blacks tested in 1962, only 139 or two percent made scores of 300 or better; just a little more than seven percent scored 200 or more.[4]

The problem of black education, housing and community environment are not problems that the Department of the Army can address. National programs are required to help solve these problems. But there is one topic the Army must address, that of its image and credibility.

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[4]Charles Gregg and Lewis Killian, Racial Crisis in America (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 122.

CHANGE OF THE IMAGE

Mr. Lewis C. Olive, Director of Military and Veteran Affairs for the National Urban League, had two significant points to make at the First CONARC ROTC Minority Recruiting Conference held at Fort Monroe, Virginia, on September 17, 1971. First, the black community has a difficult time assessing the military and the military has a lack of knowledge of the historical role of the Army. Second, that black field grade officers must reassess their role in the Army.[5]

The Department of the Army has contracted with the National Urban League to develop programs to increase minority officer recruitment through OCS, ROTC, and USMA. The Urban League asked Harbridge House, an international management consulting firm, to assist them in their in-depth study to define the problem and arrive at realistic solutions.

During the conference, Mr. John Schnopp, the Harbridge House representative, defined the role of his organization. Generally speaking, Harbridge would help develop programs to increase minority officer recruitment and then evaluate the effort.

Harbridge approached recruiting as a marketing problem. The product is a military career for minority youth and the producer, the U.S. Army. Unfortunately, the producer does not now

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[5]First CONARC ROTC Minority Recruiting Conference. Prepared by HQ, CONARC, 1971. p. 34.

enjoy a good reputation in the market place, says Mr. Schnopp.[6] He stresses that more must be done than just saying "we have a new product, it's better; we've changed."[7]

Mr. Roger Blunt, USMA '56, now Senior Associate at Harbridge House, presented the program objectives:

1. Improving the quality and relevance of the Army's message to minority target groups.

2. Upgrading the recruiting skills within the Army's newly formed minority recruiting organization.

3. Increasing minorit[illegible]up exposure and the accessibility of target individuals and institutions to Army recruiters.

4. Advancing minority group understanding of and receptivity to the benefits of careers in the Army—particularly as officers.

5. Improving the application of NUL and Army resources to the minority recruiting mission.

6. Upgrading within the NUL a capability for the presentation of a coordinated information and guidance program concerning current opportunities and benefits of service in the Active and Reserve Components of the Army.[8]

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[6] Ibid., p. 37.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., p. 42.

The plan calls for the WUL to provide direct and general support. This would include direct support to the local level which includes recruiting organizations and PMS's at various schools. The general support will be given at the national level in such areas as "encouraging new ROTC units, increasing cross-enrollment participation, giving some help in direct commissioning in critical areas, and maximizing veteran input to GCS and the Reserve Components."[9]

The plan will be implemented in the First Army area as a pilot program and direct support will be given to USMA and USMA Preparatory School promotion programs.

ANALYSIS OF CGSC QUESTIONNAIRE

Mr. Olive identified the need of the black field grade officer to reassess his role in today's Army. A questionnaire, Appendix D, was formulated to determine the following:

1. What general knowledge does the black professional officer have about West Point?

2. Does he consider military service a worthwhile profession for a young black today, perhaps his own son?

3. What organization(s) would be the most helpful in recruiting qualified blacks for USMA?

On November 29, 1971 questionnaires were distributed to a sample population (N=49) of field grade officers stationed at Ft. Leavenworth as faculty members or students in USACGSC. There were 28

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[9] Ibid., p. 39.

responses (5%). A copy of this questionnaire is included as Appendix D.

The analysis is separated into two age groups: 30-35 years and over 35.

GROUP OVER 35

There were 11 responses from this group. All but two of these respondents received their commissions through the ROTC (two OCS).

Question 1: 45% of the respondents would not encourage their sons or a young black to seek a career as a professional soldier.

Commenting on this question, one officer thought many of the desirable features were being "threatened," i.e., 20-year retirement option, opportunity to travel and authority commensurate with responsibilities. Another feels that black participation in the military is another form of "tokenism." He concludes that if any recruiting scheme is to be successful, it must aim at the "grass roots," the basic "core" community.

Perhaps, the most thought provoking remark offered was this:

> It might be a little late in the game. 8-10 years ago the very best blacks would have been honored to get a chance to go to West Point. I don't believe this is true today.

Several officers remarked that the educational credentials required present a difficult obstacle to overcome.

Questions 2 and 3: Nine officers in this group answered

"no" to both questions concerning their desire to go to West Point and the availability of admissions material at the student counsellor level. The other two officers, though they had a desire to attend West Point, indicated no information was available at the student counsellor level.

Question 4: About 75% of the officers of this group indicated they had a general knowledge of the entrance requirements for West Point.

Question 5: Concerning nomination and appointment procedures, 75% of the officers understood the congressional requirements.

One comment felt the situation had greatly improved for the black in recent years:

> . . ., but I am sure there are many congressmen who will keep their records "clean" by never nominating a black.

Question 6: The question was designed to see if the black field grade officer saw West Point as a goal to strive for as a young black. In reply, 75% indicated that West Point did not offer a black an attractive alternative.

One officer commented that "the new young black is more dedicated to doing his thing in the civilian front (private industry is more organized, promising and attractive)."

Question 7. Almost all of the officers feel the student counsellor in high school is the key man in the system. Fraternal clubs and organizations were picked as the next most important group that could effect the choice of a young black.

Question 8: There was no doubt that the role of the parent

was paramount in the school selection process. All the officers, to one degree or another, felt the parents' role was important.

SUMMARY. GROUP OVER 35

The black field grade officer over 35 appears to have had some personal experiences in the military that have caused his alienation. He does not see the Army or West Point as a suitable goal for a young black today. He feels that if anything is to be accomplished in recruiting blacks for USMA, it must be done at the local level through all media available.

GROUP 30-35

The remaining 17 respondents were in the group of officers 30-35 years of age. All members of this group were commissioned through the ROTC.

Question 1: This group answered the question with three responses: 35% "yes," 41% "undecided," and 24% "no" replies. Several officers felt that the black in the service was given "token" equality. Early in their careers these officers saw the military as an honorable profession, but some no longer view it as such.

One officer saw the needs of the young black in terms of economic and political power. The military, he concludes, will not offer this opportunity.

Questions 2 and 3: Only two of this group of 17 officers considered West Point as a college choice; 15 of the 17 had no information available at the high school student counsellor level on USMA.

One of the officers noted:

> I never considered West Point simply because blacks in the south during those days (1956-1960) were far removed from the main stream. As a boy, I grew up 1 block from the Citadel and couldn't go there.

Question 4: In this group, only 36% indicated a general knowledge of the entrance requirements for USMA.

Question 5: Only 38% of the group had any knowledge of the nomination and appointment system.

Question 6: In this group, some 65% of the officers saw West Point as a significant goal to be sought by young blacks. All but one of the officers saw West Point as being attractive to the black for both career and educational purposes.

Question 7: The high school student counsellor was identified as the predominant force in the information cycle. The local organizations and religious leaders were also indicated as playing an important part in the communication effort.

Question 8: The parents were considered an important part of the school selection process by the group.

SUMMARY: GROUP 30-35 YEARS

The group retains most of the idealism that you would normally connect with the professional officer. Most of their experiences have not influenced their opinion of the Army yet several officers feel that "tokenism" is present in the system. Their idealism is surfaced with the comments on making the military an honorable profession "again."

COMPARISON OF GROUPS

There were several significant variances in the opinion between the groups. Where 45% of the "over 35" group would not encourage their sons in a military career only 24% of the younger group shared this opinion. But, 41% of the young group were undecided on the question. Both groups were consistent in their lack of desire to attend West Point and both groups had little or no information on the academy from high school student counsellors. The older group expressed a 75% knowledge factor concerning the nomination process but the 30-35 year group only 38% had knowledge of this process.

The most significant difference between the groups occurred in their response to "Question 6." The perception of the groups was completely reversed concerning West Point. In the group, over 35, 75% felt West Point was not an attractive alternative for the black where 65% of the 30-35 group felt it was an acceptable goal to today's black youth.

BLACK RECRUITMENT FOR USMA

Qualified blacks can be attracted to West Point and a career as a professional Army officer.

A recruiting program must include two ingredients: first, the Army's image in the black community must undergo some drastic changes; second, this change must be initiated at the "grass roots level" with national support for the programs.

PROGRAMS

Any program to increase the recruitment of blacks for West Point must recognize that life has changed greatly in tempo in the past decade and will continue to change at an increasing rate in the years to come. Recruiting programs, consequently, must be more complex. This complexity is caused by such factors as the following:

1. The rapidly changing character of American youth. This change encompasses the areas of population growth, political participation, rising income and general affluence.

2. Increased competition from a variety of sources, not only other educational institutions, but suitable substitutes such as business and politics.

DIRECT SUPPORT PROGRAMS

WEST POINT

The institution, West Point, can do more to increase black enrollment. The Military Academy's first major effort to increase minority enrollment began in the fall of 1968. This resulted in an input of 54 minority cadets in the Class of 1973. This minority recruitment effort is unique to West Point.

At West Point, the admission effort is directed by the Equal Admission Opportunity Officer. His resources and the assistance he offers are limited because each appointee must meet the same entering criteria. (Reference Case Study, Appendix B). Any

concessions made in any area are made across the board to black and white alike.

A civilian university or college usually has a portion of its curriculum especially for the minority student. Usually, this is in the form of Black studies in literature, art and history. In some cases, the university or college can fund minority cadets in a "prep" school course or tailor his curriculum to fit his ability.

The West Point minority program locates and contacts outstanding minority students, creating interest in the academy and assisting them in the nomination procedures.

The West Point program can be improved. The curriculum, today, contains 37 elective courses. This includes several Black studies courses in English, history and social science but not a separate field of Black studies. In fact, as instructor expertise is lost, the current courses will be dropped. Such programs should be continued and expanded to provide the black a natural identification with the Army and West Point that his predecessors lacked. It would offer the black student a sense of belonging to the "Long Gray Line" rather than watching it pass by. Additionally, such a program could favorably compete with civilian institutions of higher learning.

USMA PREP

USMA Prep at Fort Belvoir is an organization in being that has the sole mission of preparing Regular Army candidates for West Point. In a telephone interview with Major Densforth, the Assistant Commandant of USMA Prep, on September 13, 1971, the question of enlarging the facility was discussed. He said the problem was recognized but the Prep school had not received definitive guidance from the Department of the Army or the assets to expand the facility.

In the summer of 1971, a pre-prep school was started for minority Regular Army soldiers who desired to attend USMA. There were 21 men in the six week course. All but one passed on to the regular course. Additionally, USMA Prep has sent out public relations teams made up of minority Prep members to reception centers. A $5,000 grant was given to the Prep to assist in this work.

There are several ways the existing program can be improved. Foremost, the program must receive support from the highest levels of government. This cannot be "token" support but must be a commitment to the concept of the program. In conjunction with the Volunteer Army concept, more effort should be placed on the work of the minority recruiting teams at induction centers. The pre-prep concept should be expanded and, if warranted, the appointment category should be expanded above the 170 man limit.

HIGH SCHOOLS

It appears obvious that little information about West Point admission procedures and curriculum has reached the high school counsellor level. Harbridge House has the organization to reach that level. They are now prepared to assist PMS's and recruiting organizations in the pilot area. An information program could be developed for USMA and introduced into the high schools with all black or predominantly black student bodies.

Harbridge House, with its professional civilian image could also contact black fraternal organizations as well as religious community leaders about the opportunities that West Point can offer a qualified black. These gatherings should include the prospective applicants and parents. This will visibly demonstrate to the black community that West Point and the Army is sincerely interested in the black.

GENERAL SUPPORT PROGRAMS

CONGRESSIONAL

The congressional nomination and appointment system should receive some scrutiny. The nomination selection procedure is non-standard for every member of congress. Some require the candidates to take a Civil Service competitive test to help them select their nominees. In a discussion about this problem, Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey made the following statement:

> It is difficult to say how many blacks respond (to competitive Civil Service tests), since I do not require a picture, and if a boy doesn't identify himself as such, I have no way of knowing.[10]

Senator Case also mentions the fact that many large city schools are deteriorating and black graduates of these schools feel they cannot meet the entrance requirements.

Blacks should be encouraged by their representatives to participate in the competition for nominations and appointments to West Point. Nomination and appointment procedures should be made a matter of public information.

ARMY PUBLIC INFORMATION

The Army's Public Information program must have as one of its major goals the raising of civilian respect and appreciation for the Army. This program must help in remaking the Army's image and reestablishing its credibility. The black has long enough been associated with losing causes. As one black officer commented on the questionnaire (Appendix D) ". . . being black has enough disadvantages without becoming associated with an organization that is unpopular--the U.S. Army."

CONCLUSIONS

The qualified black can be attracted to a military career

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[10]Letter from Senator Clifford Case, dated September 28, 1971.

a professional officer and West Point can recruit its share of these blacks. USMA offers the black many educational and career advantages but the information about these programs is sadly lacking at the "grass roots" level. The Army and its recruiting programs must receive the commitment of the Congress and the administration to succeed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are considered appropriate to increase the admission of blacks at West Point:

1. USMA should consider the expansion of the curriculum to include a formal Black studies program. The program should include courses on black military heritage.

2. USMA Prep should be expanded to accommodate an increased admission of Regular Army candidates. This expansion should include the pre-prep course and continuation of the recruiting team visits to induction centers.

3. Harbridge House should extend its service on the local levels to include information briefings for high school counsellors in all black or predominantly black high schools.

4. Congressmen should be encouraged to publicize the fact they are prepared to accept blacks as candidates for nomination to West Point. These public declarations should include the congressman's procedures for nomination and appointment.

5. The Army's Public Information Program should have as one of its major goals to raise the respect and appreciation of all our citizens for the Army.

APPENDIX A

Negroes Graduated from the United States Military Academy

Name	Branch Choice	Date Of Graduation
Flipper, Henry O.	10th Cav	June 1877
Alexander, John H.	9th Cav	June 1887
Young, Charles	10th Cav	August 1889
Davis, Benjamin O., Jr.	Inf	June 1936
Fowler, James D.	Inf	June 1941
Davenport, Clarence M.	CAC *	January 1943
Tresville, Robert B., Jr.	AC	January 1943
Francis, Henry M.	FA	June 1944
Davis, Ernest J., Jr.	AC	June 1945
Rivers, Mark E., Jr	Arty	June 1945
McCoy, Andrew A., Jr.	AC	June 1946
Smith, Charles Lee	CAC	June 1949
Howard, Edward Brinkley	SigC	June 1949
Carlisle, David Ray	CE	June 1950
Green, Robert William	CE	June 1950
Brown, Norman James	Armor	June 1951
Robinson, Roscoe, Jr.	Inf	June 1951
Warner, Douglas Frederick	SigC	June 1951
Woodson, William Brooks	Arty	June 1951
Young, James Russell	AF	June 1951
Corprew, Gerald Wilsor	SigC	June 1953
Hughes, Bernard Charles	CE	June 1953
Worthy, Clifford, Jr.	Arty	June 1953
Lee, Ronald Barry	SigC	June 1954
Robinson, Hugh Cranville	CE	June 1954
Turner, Leroy Clarence	Inf	June 1954
Batchman, Gilbert Rodney	Inf	June 1955
Brown, John Mitchell	Inf	June 1955
Cassella, Cyrus C., Jr.	AF	June 1955
Hamilton, John Mark, Jr.	Inf	June 1955
Olive, Lewis Cortez, Jr.	AF	June 1955
Blunt, Roger Reckling	CE	June 1956

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*Coast Artillery Corps

APPENDIX A - Continued

Hadley, Martin C.	AF	June 1957
McCullum, Cornell, Jr.	SigC	June 1957
Brunner, Ronald Shelton	SigC	June 1958
Baugh, Raymond Chapman	Arty	June 1959
Kelly, Wilburn	CE	June 1959
Dorsey, Ira	Arty	June 1960
Brown, Reginald J.	Inf	June 1961
Quinn, Kenneth L.	SigC	June 1961
Gordon, Fred A.	Arty	June 1962
Banks, Edgar, Jr.	Arty	June 1962
Hancox, Robert C.	Inf	June 1963
Ivy, William L.	AF	June 1963
Jackson, David S.	Arty	June 1963
Miller, Warren F.	Arty	June 1964
Ramsay, David L.	AF	June 1964
Anderson, Joseph	Inf	June 1965
Conley, James S.	Arty	June 1965
Hester, Arthur C.	Armor	June 1965
Jenkins, Harold A.	Inf	June 1965
Cox, Ronald E.	Armor	June 1966
Davis, Thomas B., III	Inf	June 1966
Ramsay, Robert B.	AF	June 1966
Fowler, James D., Jr.	Arty	June 1967
Whaley, B. G.	Inf	June 1967
Flowers, E.	Arty	June 1968
Garcia, V.	SigC	June 1968
Howard, J. T.	MSC	June 1968
Jordan, L. P.	Armor	June 1968
Martin, J. T., III	Inf	June 1968
Outlaw, L. B.	Arty	June 1968
Rorie, W. L., Jr.	Inf	June 1968
Robinson, B. L., Jr.	Inf	June 1968
Tilden, R. B.	Inf	June 1968
Cooper, Cornelius	Arty	June 1969
Coobland, Rene G.	Armor	June 1969
Groves, Sheridan	Armor	June 1969
Hackett, Jerome P.	SigC	June 1969
Minor, James A.	Inf	June 1969
Steele, Michael F.	Inf	June 1969
Tabella, Francis	Inf	June 1969
Williams, Michael A.	Inf	June 1969

73-B

APPENDIX B

CASE STUDY: HOWARD X

This study was made of a black Leavenworth high school senior who desired to attend West Point. He first became interested because of a friend who is now a cadet. Though a son of a career military man, he had no knowledge of West Point, the nomination procedures or curriculum. The high school that Howard attended had a junior ROTC program in which he was a participant. My first contact with him was on October 21, 1971.

The study is a chronological report of the time, effort and results of Howard's attempt to secure a nomination for appointment to West Point.

October 21--I met with Howard's parents concerning his desire to attend the Military Academy. The parents were enthusiastic that there was interest on the institution's part but they had no idea of the procedures for entrance.

I explained the nomination and appointment procedures and the fact Howard was eligible for a Presidential appointment by virtue of the fact that his father was a career military man. They planned to dispatch a letter that evening to the Adjutant General requesting the nomination for appointment.

I also advised Howard to seek a nomination through his congressman and senator. In addition, I gave him the name of LTC Cornell McCullum, the Equal Admission Opportunity Officer at

West Point.

October 24--Howard received word from the Adjutant General that his application had been received and was being processed.

October 25--I again met Howard and his parents to discuss some of the fine points about West Point. Howard's mother was interested in his social life and curriculum. I went into some detail on the core curriculum and the elective program. We also discussed the Prospective Candidate Questionnaire and the interpretation of the document.

Howard seemed a very intelligent lad; but at the time, he was overweight to the point where I felt it would affect his Physical Aptitude Evaluation (PAE). He decided on a weight control program that would probably make him ready to take the March test at Fort Leavenworth. This session lasted about three hours.

November 6--I called Howard and he advised me that he had heard from Colonel McCullum and that his file was current. There was no answer to his request for a congressional nomination. His Presidential nomination had been received.

November 11--Howard called to say he had received notice to take the PAE test. He was not ready because of his weight. I advised him to write Colonel McCullum to have his test deferred.

December 7--Howard received permission to take the PAE test in the spring. He had completed his medical and was taking the necessary college board exams. I informed him he could take the college board exams as many times as they were offered but the

[illegible] test was a one time test. The best college board score would be used for entrance requirements.

Howard received his congressional nomination. This made him eligible in two admission categories which also increased his odds for selection for appointment. He congressional appointment was an alternate, unspecified at the time.

Howard continued to lose weight.

APPENDIX C

PROJECTION OF NEGRO OFFICER CONTENT IN THE ARMY TO 1980

CY	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	19 8	1979	1980
COL	80	107	134	167	179	192	194	212	225	235
LTC	800	760	797	704	740	698	645	587	550	530
MAJ	1,080	1,135	907	876	807	723	658	583	520	480
CPT	910	729	619	553	464	392	325	263	230	210
1LT	550	545	570	590	575	620	670	690	700	720
2LT	1a 560	575	1b 600	600	600	600	600	600	600	600
TOTAL	3,980	3,851	3,070	3,570	3,365	3,225	3,092	2,935	2,825	2,776
% ACTIVE 1c ARMY OFF	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.2	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.7

1. NOTES:
   a. Decrease in OCS.
   b. ROTC output at 500 per year.
   c. Assumes an Active Army Officer strength of 100,000.

2. Projection Rationale:
   a. 2LT input as shown.
   b. Low loss rate to 1LT.
   c. Retention of 1LT--25%.
   d. Promotion to CPT--2 Yrs TIR thru 1971, then gradual increase in TIR thru 1976.
   e. Loss rates--assumed constant throughout the period:
      COL--13.7%
      LTC--17.7%
      MAJ-- 6.2%
      CPT--18.5%

3. Selection rates--constant each year:
   MAJ RA and OTRA combined - 75%
   LTC " - 75%
   COL Previous consideration 10
   First consideration-RA50%
   First consideration-OTRA-
   10

4. Size of zone--will vary between 4 - 6 years.

SOURCE: a. Input-DIT, DPD
b. Projection-PA&T

29 Nov 71

Dear Sir:

By way of introduction, I am Maj John Lenti. I am in section 21.

I hope to complete a thesis on minority recruitment for the U.S. Military Academy. My paper will only address the problems in black recruitment. I hope you can find a few minutes to answer the eight questions on the next page.

I plan to send this survey to many of the black officers in the class and on the faculty. Your intimate knowledge of the black and his relationship to the service is without parallel. The objective of my study is to show that the Military Academy can attract qualified blacks as cadets for careers as future regular Army officers. This survey is designed to help me obtain data to develop recommendations for increasing black admissions to West Point. A note of interest, I have contacted the National Urban League and Mr. Lew Olive, head of the NUL military affairs is interested in my results for his own project of a similar nature. Your cooperation, insight and comment will be greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time and interest.

JOHN M. LENTI
Maj Inf
Sect 21

P.S. Excuse the typing...The "Greatest Year of Our Lives" does not come with a secretary!

Age under 30____
30-35 ___
over 35 ____

Branch Combat Arm___
Combat Svc___
Combat Spt___

Source of Commission:

ROTC_____
OCS _____
USMA_____
Other_____

1. You are at about the mid point of your career. In retrospect, would you encourage your son or a young black in seeking a career as a professional soldier?

unqualified yes_____
yes _____
undecided _____
no _____
unqualified no _____

2. Did you give West Point consideration when you were ready for college?

yes ____
no ____
never had the option ____

3. At the time you were selecting a college, was there any information on West Point available to you at school or from the student counsellor?

yes ____
no ____

4. Are you aware of the entrance requirements for West Point?

yes ____
no ____

5. Do you understand the nomination and appointment system used for attendance at West Point?

yes ____
no ____

6. Do you feel that the education and career potential offered by West Point is attractive to a young black today?

yes ____
no ____
If "yes", for which reason: education_____; career_____; both_____.

7. If you were responsible for public relations and recruitment of blacks for West Point, what person(s) or organizations would you consider most helpful in assisting you? (please indicate in priority, 1-6)

NAACP_____
CORE _____
Urban League_____
School or counsellor_____
religious leader_____
local club or fraternal org._____

8. In your opinion, how influential is the black parent in the school attendance and selection process?

very important_____
important_____
not significant_____

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