FINAL REPORT

ISSUES OF SURPRISE EXPLOITATION IN U.S. SECURITY POLICY FOR CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE

By
William Pfaff

Contributions by:
Edmund Stillman & Herman Kahn

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EDMUND STILLMAN & HERMAN KAHN

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There are two main classes of diplomatic and strategic surprise, true surprises and those which reflect failures of analysis and anticipation. Today East-West relations in Europe are jeopardized by several important forces of change which imply a deepening, perhaps eventually decisive, alteration in the configuration of power dominating the strategic and political situation in Europe. The immediate future in Eastern Europe is likely to produce more important "surprising" changes and crises than at any time since the mid-1950's. Yet the "standard" or "classic" U.S. scenarios for European crisis, confrontation, and change seem no longer relevant. For the United States to exploit surprising events in order to bring about positive and constructive change there must be American (and NATO) policy goals for Eastern and Central Europe which are themselves positive, politically responsible, and potentially attainable. This problem will become acute since a European Security Conference is likely in the near future.

Two general types of European settlements are imaginable. The more likely one apparently would confirm and regularize the Soviet role and presence in Eastern Europe. Such a settlement also is consistent with certain American tendencies towards a defensive, status-quo-preserving definition of interests. The second type of settlement would alter the situation toward what we describe as "normalization," acknowledging the national autonomy of all the European states, removing all foreign troops in circumstances assuring the security of Europe, and substituting political for military constraints generally. A "normalization" settlement is likely to be resisted by the Soviet Union. Thus a settlement on these terms would be likely to come about only under positive Western pressures, in which the exploitation of surprises and of independently-arising crises in the region would be an important factor.
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SUMMARY

1. There are two main classes of diplomatic and strategic surprise. The first arise out of evident tendencies but are not anticipated because they seemed to analysts less probable outcomes than other possible developments. The second deserve to be considered true surprises—chiefly, though not in the most interesting cases, arising from the arbitrary acts of individuals or small groups. The first class is the most important because it constitutes a potentially remediable problem. These are "surprises" because of analytic and organizational inadequacies on the part of Western policy agencies.

2. Today the established terms of East-West relations in Europe are jeopardized by several important forces of change: in the American relationship to Western Europe, within the United States in public attitudes towards European involvement, within Eastern Europe, and in the U.S.S.R. where the present political and economic situation includes serious frustrations and inner contradictions. Together, these forces imply a deepening, perhaps eventually decisive, alteration in the configuration of power dominating the existing Central and Eastern European strategic and political situation.

3. The immediate future in Eastern Europe will be affected by several important destabilizing factors, likely to produce more important "surprising" changes and crises than at any time since the mid-1950's. These will require an American policy response, and in certain circumstances will be open to positive exploitation by Western policy. Yet the "standard" or "classic" scenarios for European crisis, confrontation, and change, which involve a Western military intervention into an East German or East European
uprising or "mutiny" seem, particularly since Czechoslovakia in 1968, no longer relevant, chiefly because of the changes noted above.

4. For the United States to exploit surprising events in order to bring about positive and constructive change there must be American policy goals for Eastern and Central Europe which are themselves positive, politically responsible, and potentially attainable. To what end are surprises to be exploited? Without a clear understanding of positive goals throughout the American agencies involved in these matters, their response to crisis inevitably will continue to be conservative, defensive, status-quo-reclaiming, and in fact open to exploitation by the other side. This is even more true of NATO, as an agency of several governments.

5. This problem will be posed in fundamental terms within the next few months since a European Security Conference seems likely to come about in the foreseeable future. Two general types of European settlements, expressing two divergent views of the appropriate goals of Western policy, are imaginable. The one more likely to come about is also the one which appears to be the more consistent with present Soviet policy, confirming and regularizing the existing situation in Eastern Europe, and notably the dominating Soviet role and presence in Eastern Europe. Such a settlement also is consistent with certain apparent Western and American tendencies towards a defensive, conservative, status-quo-preserving definition of interests. The second type of settlement would alter the situation toward what we describe as "normalization," acknowledging the national autonomy of all the European states, removing all foreign troops in circumstances assuring the security of Europe, and substituting political for military constraints generally.
6. While a negotiable agreement, potentially consistent with the valid security interests of the Soviet Union and the long-term stability of Central and Eastern Europe, the terms of a "normalization" settlement are likely to be resisted by the Soviet Union as a challenge to its established policies and immediate perceptions of interest. Thus a settlement on these terms would be likely to come about only under positive Western pressures, in which the exploitation of surprises and of independently-arising crises in the region would be an important factor.

Note: the fold-out chart pages in this report elaborate, illuminate, or provide examples for the argument made in the text, or take account of factors and concerns outside the main discussion but bearing upon it.
ISSUES OF SURPRISE EXPLOITATION
IN U.S. SECURITY POLICY FOR CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE

1. TWO CLASSES OF DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE

SURPRISES

A DIPLOMATIC OR STRATEGIC SURPRISE TYPICALLY IS
NOT WHOLLY UNEXPECTED, BUT IS A CRISIS THAT ARISES FROM
A TURN OF EVENTS OR A POLITICAL OR MILITARY CHOICE MADE
BY ONE SIDE WHICH THE OTHER SIDE KNEW TO BE POSSIBLE
BUT FOR REASONS OF BIAS, INADEQUATE ANALYSIS, OR "TRAINED
INCAPACITY" DID NOT BELIEVE THE LIKELY CHOICE. EXAMPLES:
THAT REVOLUTIONARY ACTION WOULD ARISE OUT OF THE EAST
EUROPEAN POPULAR DISCONTENTS OF THE MID-1950'S "THAW";
THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA DESPITE THE
EAST-WEST DETENTE; THAT CHINA WOULD ENTER THE KOREAN WAR
DESPITE U.S. STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY, ETC.

THERE ALSO ARE GENUINE SURPRISES, POLITICAL OR MILI-
TARY EVENTS WHICH ARISE FROM THE ACTS OF INDIVIDUALS
(COUPS D'ETAT, ASSASSINATIONS, ETC.), OR POPULAR UPHEAVALS
WHICH EVEN IN RETROSPECT APPEAR THE RESULT OF WHOLLY
UNPREDICTABLE COMBINATIONS OF FORCES (PARIS 1968).

The problems of diplomatic and strategic "surprise" more often than
not arise from no true surprise but from factors of doctrinal lag and
trained incapacity. The events which occur, the decisions which are taken,
cannot properly be considered totally unexpected. Rather, they fall into
the category of conceivable or predictable events which at the same time,
for one or another seemingly good reason, simply were thought improbable
by analysts and policy-makers. China's intervention in the Korean War,
the East German, Hungarian and Polish upheavals of the 1950's, the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet deployment of missiles in
Cuba in 1962, the Franco-British attack at Suez in 1956, all surprised
American policy-makers. In fact, none would have been described as
"impossible" or inconceivable by the policy community; indeed, often they
1. **WHAT IS A CRISIS?**

**DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS:**
- An imminent turning point
- Threat, warning, or promise
- Outcome indeterminate
- Immediate decisions required

**FREQUENT CHARACTERISTICS:**
- Time pressures increase
- Events converge
- Information decreases
- Uncertainties increase
- Control decreases
- Decision-makers under stress
- Decision and bargaining relations change

2. **SURPRISES**

A diplomatic surprise typically is not wholly unexpected, but is a crisis that arises from a turn of events or a political or military choice made by one side which the other side knew to be possible but for reasons of bias, inadequate data, or "trained incapacity" did not believe the likely choice. Examples: that revolutionary action would arise out of the East European popular discontent of the mid-1950's "Yankee That the Soviets would invade Czechoslovakia despite the East-West detente; that China would enter the Korean war despite U.S. strategic superiority, etc.

There also are genuine surprises, political or military events which arise from the acts of individuals (coup d'état, assassinations, etc.), or popular upheavals which even in retrospect appear the result of wholly unpredictable combinations of forces (Paris 1968).

3. **A MAJORITY**

1. **INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP:**
   - The ability to think.

2. **POPULAR UNRELATED FAILURE OR \- CRISIS CONSE-**
   - Changed beliefs.

3. **NATIONALIST INFLUENCE:**
   - Politically relevant.

4. **VARIOUS WAYS OF VIEWING CRISIS**

RELATIVELY CONSISTENTLY
- 1. SPECIFIC POSSIBILITIES
- 2. PROTOTYPES (SPECIFIC SCENARIOS)
- 3. ADMINISTRATION

RELATIVELY RANDOMLY
- 4. STRATEGY AND TACTICS
- 5. ARMS CONTROL AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
- 6. AS IDIOSYNCRATIC TYPICAL EVENTS

5. **DISTINCTIVE DYNAMICS OF CRISIS BARGAINING**

1. Heightened apprehension
2. Moments of truth
3. Time pressures
4. Changed internal relations
5. Improvised simple solutions
6. Importance of salience
7. Importance of equity, propriety, and flexibility

6. **WHAT IS "CONSERVATIONISM"?**

A tendency to prefer:

**(MEANS)**
- Passive to active behavior
- Familiar to novel methods
- Defensive to offensive tactics
- Retrenchment to expansion of commitments

**(ENDS)**
- Status quo-maintaining to interest-advancing goals
- Loss-minimizing to gain maximizing options
- Uncertainty-reducing to "utility"-maximizing policies
A major "surprise" may involve:

1. International political crisis of the Soviet-American leadership, bringing a crisis of legitimacy and relativity of the respective systems.
2. Popular unset with specific sectors of economic failure or political repression, with international crisis consequences.
3. Nationalism (popular or elite) resistant to foreign influence.

The Soviet-American response may involve:

1. Accommodation and creative reconstruction of the international relationships so as to isolate the crisis, end foreign involvements, reduce the chances of crisis-escalation, promote longer-term stability.
2. Suppression: which if successful may (1) "permanently" change the situation and increase stability, (2) perpetuate the essential terms of strain and crisis, if unsuccessful discredits suppressing power and conduces to further crises.
3. Acquiescence/appalment/isolationism which may ordinarily weaken the great power in relation to its vis-a-vis and encourage later confrontation crises.

Typical failures in preparing for "surprises"

1. Preoccupation with in-box/ out-box.
2. Failure at the highest level to define long-term policy objectives in responsible, realistic terms to which the bureaucracy could respond in an emergency: high-level preoccupation with rhetorical goals and image-making.
3. Bureaucratic/press commitment, when the crisis approaches, to the "most likely" course of events.
4. Consequent failure to think seriously about other perfectly likely outcomes.
5. Preoccupation with containing the worst outcomes: failure to consider how to bring about good outcomes.
6. Failure to think through limited (non-catastrophe-risking) measures to make a good outcome more likely.

Typically, policy is made during the crisis, in ad hoc and discontinuing ways which do not consider the trade-offs among various interests and objectives supported by various bureaucratic organizations in the light of a considered long-term and positive policy towards the opponent.
had been anticipated or even predicted by individual analysts or journalists, but these predictions were ignored. That these events might occur was simply regarded by the majority of analysts or policy-makers as unlikely, and therefore sufficient attention was not paid to them. Serious political and strategic preparations were not made.

These failures may be condemned in retrospect; the problem is not, however, easily remedied since it expresses an inveterate tendency or underlying characteristic of government, and particularly of a big government dependent upon large staffs and bureaucratic organizations. Majority opinion tends to prevail in these agencies of government, and not reasonably so; the minority opinion, the "brilliant" or seemingly eccentric opinion, is distrusted or regarded with caution—even though officials may also be aware that the majority view, by definition a conventional view, is very often unreliable. There is a severe problem of discrimination. To go against the conventional wisdom is to run risks, and for a political or military decision-maker these may be far more momentous than career risks.

The very existence of strongly held minority views anticipating "surprising" developments produces controversy, and a consequent hardening of the positions of those on the other side of the controversy. Thus do people make emotional and professional commitments as well as intellectual ones, and the policy apparatus they control or influence may become in some degree aligned to buttressing their positions, at a sacrifice to dispassion and the cool appraisal of contingencies. Thus issues of doctrinal lag, and of trained (or office-induced) incapacity, constitute one of the most severe problems of government (and indeed of decision-making in most
organizational fields today). There is no complete solution in strictly organizational terms. The multiplication of information inputs, the reorganization in terms of multiple options—systematically viewing a very wide range of possibilities and scenarios—while they much enhance the probability that a true judgment will come under consideration, nonetheless present in new terms the problem of discrimination. The ability of an organization to deal seriously with a wide range of possibilities in any event remains finite, and the process is fatigue-inducing. Such solution to the problem as exists, which will never be total, inevitably lies in the individual intellectual quality and practical experience of the officers and officials assigned to responsible posts.

There also are true surprises, which in the area of foreign affairs first include events arising from the acts of individuals or small groups—coup d'états, assassinations. Typically these can be anticipated only in generalized contingency terms, at a level of abstraction which provides little support to strategic and political policy and decision-making. What does it mean if a coup d'état takes place in Ruritania—or Russia? The analyst must reply that the answer is scenario-contingent. What is the political character of the coup; who are its makers, and are they competent or incompetent in maintaining power once they have it; who—and how many—do they kill or lock up; what is their program—real and proclaimed; how numerous and how important is the popular support they can rally? the details are everything.

There are surprises which arise from a concatenation of individually identifiable and assessable events which together produce an unforeseen result. Paris in 1968 provides the most recent example. The growth of
Maoist, anarchist, and other leftist sentiments and commitments among French university students was well-known; the justifiable anger of students at university conditions was known; the discontent of French industrial workers with existing wage levels was perfectly well-known and widely discussed; a certain popular mood among the French people of restlessness or boredom with Gaullism after a decade of strong conservative rule would have been apparent to a sensitive observer. What was not known was that these factors would come together in an incendiary movement and produce a major popular upheaval in France.

Once the "revolution" was underway it also was possible for the analyst to see that it was no revolution at all--that the interests and instincts of both workers and the middle classes remained ultimately conservative, that the students were a marginal social group articulating certain real grievances of modern urban and technological society but devoid of serious organization or an attainable political program; that in this case the "center" would, and did, hold. That the Revolution of 1968 would fail thus was predictable, and widely predicted--and one reason the outcome was predictable was the same reason the revolutionary outbreak had been unpredictable: the combination of forces and events was implausible: there was no genuine joining of interests, no profound revolutionary interest awakened, no convergence of generally powerful forces of destruction and reconstruction.

In Communist Hungary in 1956, another modern popular revolution, but in this case a real one, deeply serious forces of revolutionary opposition to the existing political system were latent in the society: nationalist opposition to Soviet control, popular resistance to a repressive police
regime, economic discontent, reaction to the domestic failures and vacillations of the insecure regimes which had emerged during the post-Stalinist "Thaw." The incendiary event was in itself unpredictable, but that a revolution was boiling up which some catalytic event easily could set loose was perfectly clear. In France in 1968 the opposite was true. The discontents of the society clearly were subordinate to the society's essential need and wish for security and order. Thus that a "revolution" would break out had to be a surprise; that it would rapidly collapse was predictable.

In 1968 analogies were made with the Paris commune of 1871, which illustrates another point of importance. While the actual proclamation of the Paris Commune as a revolutionary response to France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War could not have been predicted, again factors of deep unrest already existed. There had been serious economic discontents during the final years of Louis Napoleon's rule, unemployment and severe social dislocations arising out of France's nascent industrialization; there was much corruption at the higher levels of politics and the economy; France's empire in Mexico had been humilitatingly ended. Yet these alone produced no revolutionary upheaval until there was added a decisive climax: France, which had been the greatest military power in Europe for nearly a century, went to war against Prussia and was routed within six weeks. The French regime--the French "establishment" of power--thereby was dramatically revealed as incompetent, even in terms of the conservative and military standards by which it had chosen to be judged. Much the same thing was true in the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1918. Serious tensions and real conflicts within the society produced revolutionary uprisings only when the leadership of the state proved itself incompetent--its armies humiliatingly
defeated in the field by enemies which had been held in contempt. In Paris in 1968 there was no such discrediting of the competence or seriousness of the regime.

We suggest, then, that of the two classes of "surprises," the problem of true surprises—wholly unpredictable or arbitrary occurrences—is perhaps less important for the policy-maker to study than those surprises which happen not because they themselves are of their nature surprising—inherently unpredictable—but because the policy-maker allows himself to be surprised. In the first case there is nothing he could have done to avoid being surprised, and contingency planning in terms of an imagined range of unpredictable events would likely have had little specific reference in the real situation. In the second case the policy-maker is surprised because he has failed to prepare himself for an event which could have been anticipated, had his analysis and judgment been better, and had the bias induced by the trained incapacities, organizational prejudices and preferences, and positive policy commitments, of his staffs been adequately discounted or compensated for.
WESTERN EUROPE

AFFLUENCE

HIGH MORALE (EXCEPT FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES)

POLITICAL STABILITY

COMMUNIST PARTIES DWINDLING "REVISIONIST"; LEFT-WING PARTIES AND INTELLECTUALS INNOVATIVE BUT DIVIDED, UNDISCIPLINED, HOSTILE TO ORTHODOX COMMUNISM

NO COLONIAL INVESTMENTS

SOVIET INVASION THREAT "FINISHED"

MASSIVE SOVIET NUCLEAR "THREAT"

BARELY CREDIBLE U.S. NUCLEAR GUARANTEE

HIGHLY URBANIZED, INDUSTRIALIZED

SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY

SOPHISTICATED ELITES

LATENT EUROPE

AUSTERE ECONOMY (MANY ECONOMIC STRESSES)

REGRETS, ELITES, "POLYCENTRIC" AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA ONCE AGAIN ASSERTIVE AGAINST MOSCOW

"SOCIALIST LEGITIMACY" BUT A TOUGH CENSORSHIP

GROWING ALIENATION AMONG YOUNG, ELITES

BUDGETARY PRESSURES ON SOVIET FORCES

DWINDLING SOVIET INFLUENCE (SOVIETS PATRONI ED, "EXPLOITED")

URBANIZING, INDUSTRIALIZING

TECHNOLOGY INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED

NEW ELITES (REOPENING TIES TO OLD)

U.S.S.R.

YOUTH, INTELLIGENTSIA RESTIVE (MANY PRO-WESTERN)

ONLY MODERATE ECONOMIC PROGRESS

LIBERMANISM FAILING

LIVING STANDARD LOWER THAN IN "SATELLITES"

"THE SYSTEM IS GOOD; THE MEN ARE BAD"

PATHOLOGICALLY RIGID OLD GUARD; FRIGHTENED OF CHANGE

INCREASING NATIONALISM (CHAUVINISM) AS STRAIN INCREASES

YOUNG TURK WING WITHIN COMMUNIST PARTY (BUT APPARATCHIKS TOO)

A FEW PRESENT-DAY TRENDS

A. NATIONALIST AND LIBERALIZING TENDENCIES STRONG YET SUPPRESSED IN EASTERN EUROPE

B. GROWING NATIONALISM AND ASSERTIVENESS IN EAST GERMANY

C. INCREASING DISSATISFACTION AMONG "MODERNISTS" IN S.U.

D. DECREASING INFLUENCE OF S.U. AND U.S. IN EUROPE

E. INCREASED STRATEGIC STRENGTH OF S.U.

WHAT DO WE WANT IN EUROPE?

A LIBERATED EASTERN EUROPE?

A LIBERIALIZED COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE?

SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM EASTERN EUROPE?

ARMS LIMITATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE?

EAST-WEST TRADE?

THE STATUS-QUO IN WESTERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPE?

A DEMOCRATIC GREECE?

A PRO-WESTERN GREECE?

A NATO OF DEMOCRATIC STATES?

A NATO REDEFINED AS MILITARY ALLIANCE ONLY?

BERLIN SECURITY THROUGH POLITICAL GUARANTEES?

GUARANTEED AND ENFORCEABLE WESTERN ACCESS TO BERLIN?

MORE EUROPEAN TROOPS COMMITTED TO NATO?

FEWER U.S. TROOPS COMMITTED TO NATO?

MORE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR NATO?

LOWER OVER-ALL NATO POSTURE AND COSTS?

FRANCE TO RESUME A MILITARY ROLE IN NATO?

STABILITY IN ITALY/SPAIN/PORTUGAL/GREECE?

CONTINUED ITALIAN/SPANISH/PORTUGUESE/GREEK MILITARY ROLE IN WESTERN DEFENSE EVEN AT THE COST OF INTERNAL INSTABILITY?

DE TENTE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN?

DE TENTE IN EUROPE?
1. Credibility (and desirability) of present nuclear guarantee
2. Balance of payments
3. Feasibility of European self-defense--
   a. Nuclear vs. non-nuclear
   b. As "United" Europe
   c. As European defense community
   d. As non-integrated alliance of nation-states
4. U.S. as primary guarantor of European security vs.
   U.S. as "strategic reserve"
5. Domestic environment (and Latin America) as U.S. priority concerns
6. Compatibility of integrated alliance systems with further progress with détente
7. Détente and rapprochement as a gain--for whom?
8. Military vs. diplomatic guarantees of security (security conference)
9. Feasibility (and desirability) of united Europe
10. Redeeming pledges--
    a. To Germany
    b. To Eastern Europe
11. An American presence--how much and how long?

NEW ORGS IN EUROPEAN UNITY

1/ A "decision center" responsible for economic policy among the six, assuming many powers now nationally held, with a corresponding increase in parliamentary control through a European parliament (implying a suitable form of European election)--proposed for creation before 1980, with stages planned to begin in January 1971.

2/ A system linking the European central banks with power to decide internal monetary policy within the member states and externally to control common European monetary reserves--and a common currency.

2. "SURPRISES" IN THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF EUROPE TODAY

A. Introduction

The threat of "surprise" in Europe today arises from several existing tendencies. Neither Czechoslovakia's "October Events" in 1968 nor France's "Spring" that same year arose out of any political vacuum. There were surprises in the particular qualities of those crises, in the scale and timing of these events, yet the underlying conditions provided a sufficient explanation for what in fact happened. These conditions, if they have been seriously and sympathetically analyzed, would have made the limits of these crises, and the opportunities which existed as they developed, apparent to policy-makers. Given the intellectual, economic, and political tensions in Eastern Europe in the 1960's, that a Czechoslovak liberalization movement would cause a crisis to emerge in Czechoslovak-Soviet relations can hardly be considered a surprising matter. Given the tensions within the Soviet Union, the established political and security interests and perceptions of the U.S.S.R., the character of the present party and governmental leadership, and the traditional recourse of the Soviet government to force in defending its interests, an invasion of Czechoslovakia was highly likely. That the invasion came as a surprise to many Western analysts and observers can only be explained as a consequence of their intellectual commitment to what they wanted to see happen, to their commitment to a model of Soviet behavior consistent with the goals of established American policy, which preferred to see a "liberalized" Soviet government practicing a foreign policy able to rank Czechoslovak ideological conformity as less important than "detente behavior" and risk-avoidance in Soviet international conduct.
An examination of the possibilities for crisis and "surprise" in Europe today, as preface to a discussion of how surprise can be exploited, then must begin with the attempt to make a reasonable appraisal of several changed factors in the American relationship to Europe, in the West European relationship to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and within the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union.

It is possible to see in this European situation today a convergence of two major forces. The first, in the West, results in declining Western political, economic, and military unity, and a--thus far--slow retrenchment of the American military and political commitment to European matters. One inevitable element in this, then, is a declining Western ability--to say nothing of willingness--to act positively and in unison to affect Eastern European and Balkan political and strategic developments. This is a crucial point to which we will return later in this report.

The second force exists within the Eastern bloc, made up of a complex of nationalism, tendencies of political liberalization, and problems of political and economic development deeply influenced by the brilliance of West European economic and political progress, underscored by the pervasive sense of an "end" to the old Cold War--and to the old terms of American involvement in Europe. In Eastern Europe, then, the force of change is disruptive, unsettling. The Eastern bloc, where a stasis of sorts, a political accommodation, was achieved or imposed by the Soviet Union and the East European ruling Communist parties--achieved at considerable cost--between the period of the post-Stalinist "thaw" and the present, shows clear signs of disintegration. The next ten years is likely to be a period of crisis and turbulence in Eastern Europe.
B. Neo-Isolationism, and Political and Strategic Multipolarity

As of 1971, the American relationship with Western Europe has reached an important turning point. Strategic scenarios concerned with Europe have for a quarter of a century been able confidently to assume an underlying stability of the American-West European context. The Western relationship with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union also existed on terms essentially established in the years between 1944 and 1949. In the years since then, the changes in this context have been evolutionary, faithfully expressing a constancy in the political, economic, and strategic interests of all parties. Perhaps of more practical importance for policy is that during this same period there has also been a constancy in how the Western publics viewed their security interests—in the national moods, the framework of national public opinions, which lay behind the actions of governments.

Now a definite, perhaps even a precipitous, decline is underway both in the matter of Western unity and bipolarity of world politics. The world authority recently exercised in explicit and implicit ways by the Soviet Union and the United States seems on its way to being greatly reduced. In both the United States and the U.S.S.R., the "neo-isolationist" trends evident since the mid-1960's are growing stronger. In the long term, American "neo-isolationism" may prove a transitory phenomenon, in part deriving from the popular political perceptions, moods, and internal conditions, of the nation today, and by the end of the decade it is possible that an apogee will have been reached; but this is by no means certain. At best a new "internationalism" may emerge; at worst, an interventionist or aggressively assertive mood reappear here—or in the Soviet Union (as we will
discuss below). But we believe that during the next few years that complex of political attitudes which are conveniently summed up in the term "neo-isolationism" will be dominant in the policies and perceptions of not only the United States but of both the present-day superpowers.

**THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL PREOCCUPATIONS**

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## THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL PREOCCUPATIONS (CONT'D)

### SOVIET UNION

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At the present moment, economic issues have suddenly come to dominate the American relationship with Europe. The dollar and balance of payments problems, which involve the question of whether the West Europeans bear their fair share of the "burdens" of free world defense, now have brought about a kind of climax in the relationship of the United States to Europe. A good many repressed issues, and buried resentments, have come to the surface—at least in the American political and popular response to Mr. Nixon's defense of the dollar. The Europeans, taken aback by the abrupt style of the new American economic actions, are expressing even greater concern over the substance of what those actions may imply for the future. The question is whether the American return to protectionism might prove to possess a domestic appeal—a political momentum—which will last a good deal longer than ninety days. The fear of trade conflict, the possibility of European reprisals against the American tariff surcharge and a rise of economic nationalism in Europe, the possibility of a breakdown of the trade liberalism and currency stability of the past quarter century, all are quite real.

The international fiscal crisis, the tension it has created between the United States and Western Europe, together with American domestic and Congressional pressures for troop withdrawals from Europe, inevitably raise a newly serious question about the future of the American military commitment in Europe. The prospect that an American troop withdrawal can take place slowly and on creative political terms, enhancing the stability of all Europe, has been distinctly worsened. Senator Mansfield's persistent efforts to obtain a massive cut in the American troop strength in Europe merely symptomize a situation which over the past decade has been allowed
to develop. In the absence of political settlement in Europe and of a shifting of military burdens to the Europeans, a drastic domestic challenge to established American policy became all but inevitable.

This problem of neo-isolationism—a phenomenon which has an obvious, even symbiotic, relationship with the decline of bipolarity in world politics—has roots in more important and tangible factors than the psychology of peoples in a given point in time. The assertive policies of Russia and America over the past two decades arose from their world primacy in military and industrial power, as well as from their political and ideological confrontation. The second World War had disastrously reduced the power of the old European great powers, drawing into a central European confrontation the two traditionally isolationist extra-European powers, Russia and the United States. Both also were in a stage of great economic, technological, industrial, and population expansion. But the growth of Russia and America clearly has finite limits. GNP measures only a few of the complex forces at work in such a period in a nation, but nonetheless provides a significant index of national effort and accomplishment, and the rate of GNP growth for both Russia and America has fallen off sharply since the mid-'60's. At the

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*According to the Harris Public Opinion poll published August 23rd, 1971, better than a 2 to 1 sentiment exists in the United States that "in the future we should let other countries defend themselves." Asked specifically whether the United States should risk going to war if the Russians invaded and occupied Yugoslavia, 11 percent said yes, 66 percent no, with 23 percent uncertain. Asked the same question about a Russian conquest of Berlin and invasion of Western Europe, 47 percent said yes, 31 percent no, 22 percent uncertain. This present American popular mood of neo-isolationism is, of course, far more complex, changeable, and contingent upon time, circumstances, and specific cases, than figures such as this might suggest, but particularly with respect to Western Europe these poll results indicate an important change in the American popular mood which the Mansfield initiative, and other Congressional attempts to restrict or reduce American overseas engagements, reflect.*
same time a certain emotional and ideological urgency has drained from their political and military confrontation—detente has set in. Their foreign policies in general have encountered checks and frustrations which cast doubt upon the established assumptions of policy. Russia's inability to maintain a unified Communist bloc, China and the European new Left's hatred of Russia as an allegedly reactionary and counterrevolutionary power, Russia's failure to gain real influence in the Third World, the persistent revisionism and nationalism of Eastern Europe, have driven the Soviet Union into a form of ideological isolation and into conventional and conservative "great power" policies. America's Vietnam experience has decisively undermined the national enthusiasm which underwrote, over the last two decades, America's global involvement and assumption of the role of "leader of the free world."

The reduction of Europe and Japan in 1945 at the same time misled many of the forecasts of the future made at that time. These states were so damaged in their physical and industrial plants, so demoralized by the moral effort and consequences of the war, that it was easy to regard them as permanently reduced to the roles of second or third ranking states. The future seemed to lie with those states which believed in themselves and their missions, "young" states (as America, and post-revolutionary Communist Russia seemed to be). The future seemed to favor vast, socially conglomerate, resource-rich, continental societies, of the Russian and American kind. Both Russia and America contrasted strongly with the old style European nation, socially and racially homogenous, limited in size and resources. Russia and America were on a continental scale, already "imperial" in that they embodied a great number of nationalities and even races, still possessing great undeveloped areas.
But now internal divisions are making themselves felt within these continental "superstates." Their diverse nationalities and social elements often seem sources of actual or potential weakness rather than of strength. The nationalities of European and Eurasian Russia once again present troubling problems to a governing elite overwhelmingly Great Russian in origin, to a Russian national culture based almost entirely upon the experience of European Russia, and to a national political ideology derived from the intellectual movements of Western Europe in the 19th Century. Important elites within the technocratic and industrial establishments of the U.S.S.R. question the contemporary practice, even the values, of Leninism. The United States at the same time is undergoing racial antagonisms, "nationalist claims made by elements within its racial minorities, and also a new and serious level of ethnic consciousness within the white working and lower middle sectors of the population. These tensions seem actually to express class hostilities as well as social and generational stresses of an unexpected intensity. The national "consensus" has, for the present at least, been decisively weakened in America. It is not clear that this may not remain a problem long after the Vietnamese War and its direct consequences are ended. Among its intellectual and professional elites, America finds a vanguard in reaction against technology, technocracy, science, the applied rationalism which animates modern society--and this too may persist into the late 1970's and 1980's. Its sources are deeper than a mere reaction against the style of technological war the United States has conducted in Vietnam, or against the threat of nuclear war or the existence of "irrational nuclear armories."
In Western Europe, on the other hand, ethnic homogeneity exists, and thanks in considerable part to industrial affluence, there increasingly has come to be a social homogeneity able to overcome the worst of the old European class divisions. Despite the unmistakable internal problems and stresses of the West European nations, it seems clear that in important respects they are in a much more confident and hopeful mood today than either the United States or the Soviet Union. Popular prosperity—the consumer society—is still emerging in Europe, capturing the ambitions and changing the lives of the working masses of citizens. With the opportunity to learn from the American experience, and with the discipline of a traditional culture, the consumer society in Europe may be able to avoid some of the vulgarities and contradictions which have characterized it in the United States. Freer, perhaps, from ideological preconceptions than either Russia or America today, the Europeans possess sophisticated economic planning agencies and could prove exceedingly adroit in their technocratic and managerial adaptations to change.

This much optimism about the emerging importance—and by implication, the political and strategic role—of Western Europe remains, of course, to be justified by events. There are severe political stresses in Europe, and some European governments, notably the Italian, are obsolescent in organization and function, and the systems of political representation and party function are seriously defective. Nonetheless, there is a clear contrast between present day Europe—technologically competent, open to change and adaptation, possessing strong traditions of political and economic innovation and skill, reasonably confident of the future—and the present condition of the superpowers. They give signs of disorientation, of having reached
plateaus of national accomplishment; they seem to be in some uncertainty about national direction, suffering some loss of moral and social coherence and confidence.

The political implications of common market developments must also be taken into account, since events of recent weeks have made it much more likely than before that the Six will become Ten. If Britain joins the market it seems very probable that Western Europe as a community will, within the decade of the 1970's, possess a credible nuclear deterrent force and a common currency, and that degree of political integration necessary to make both work—which implies a far more closely united Europe than before seemed entirely likely. Inevitable, then, will be a common European policy towards the external world on at least those—crucial—matters that derive from Europe's economic union. There will be a common European security policy, with that term understood in a sense which goes much beyond military security—or is even in some sense not primarily concerned with military issues and threat at all.

This new Europe will have to respond to the forces of superpower disorientation and relative decline. At its simplest, this means "Europe" becoming a "great power"—and for all practical political (and if it so chooses, military) purposes, the effective equal of Russia and America. The economic and cultural achievement of Western Europe will continue to radiate into Eastern Europe, continually unsettling the situation there.
FIVE MEANS FOR POSTULATING CRISIS ES

A. EXTRAPOLATIONS FROM PRESENT TRENDS OR LIKELY EVENTS: "CLASSICAL" POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING
B. A-HISTORICAL EVENTS (ACCIDENTS, COINCIDENCE, IMPLAUSIBLE EVENTS OR REACTIONS, ETC.)
C. USE OF FICTIONAL ANALOGUES
D. OTHER RADICAL TRANSFORMATION OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1. REVOLUTION OVERTHROWS THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.
   A. POPULAR REVOLT
   B. POPULAR REVOLT (FOLLOWED BY NEW AUTHORITARIANISM)
   C. MILITARY COUP (FOLLOWED BY RENEWED AGGRESSIVENESS)
   D. REVOLT, FOLLOWED BY DISINTEGRATION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, BREAKDOWN OF USSR INTO REGIONAL COMPONENTS
   E. REVOLT (AS IN D ABOVE) FOLLOWED BY RENEWED CLAIMS BY GERMANY, KOREA, KOREA, KOREAN, KOREAN, KOREAN

2. REVOLUTION OVERTHROWS THE Present GOVERNMENT OF MAINLAND CHINA
   A. A PRO-WESTERN CHONG (SUCCESSORS') GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER
   B. CHINA DISINTEGRATES INTO "INDEPENDENT" WARLORD STATES
   C. U.S.S.R. INVADES, SETS UP PRO-MOSCOW GOVERNMENT
   D. U.S.S.R. INVADES, BONGS DOWN ENDLESS GUERRILLA WAR
   E. CHINA DISINTEGRATES AND U.S.S.R. AND JAPAN PARTITION MAINLAND

3. U.S.S.R. MAKES QUALITATIVE JUMP IN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY (HIGHLY RELIABLE ARM, NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS, ETC.) AND LEAVES BLACKMARKET ON U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE.

4. U.S.S.R. MAKES QUALITATIVE JUMP IN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY (AS ABOVE) AND STARTS WORLD WAR III (NUCLEAR)

WEST EUROPEAN CRISIS EVENTS

LEFT-WING IN DETERMINATION OR OBLIQUE REGIME切れ
THE U.S.S.R. NORMAL BASES TO OFFSET THREAT OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION

NEURO-EUROPEAN LEFTIST "MODEL" Merging of Crisis
OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL OR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC/DEMOGRAPHIC SYSTEM. A SUCCESSFUL "HAPPY" OR "ALLIED" OR "SOCIALIZED" WITH A HUMAN RAIN" IN THE WEST

NEW EUROPEAN LEFTIST "MODEL"-A TECHNOCRATIC, OR
OPPORTUNISTIC, OR CORPORATIST STATE, AUTHORITARIAN AND Efficient, AN INFLUENCE UPON OTHERS IN A TIME OF ECONOMIC/DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS OR A NEW DEPRESSION

ILL-CONSCIOUS, ADVENTUROUS, OR STATUS-CLAIMING
SOVIET POLITICAL INTERVENTIONS IN WESTERN OR SOUTHERN
europe in a situation of national crisis in the west or
or of international slump or depression

ITALY

DOMESTIC LEFT-RIGHT PRESSURES AND POLITICAL
SHIFTS WHICH PRODUCE-
A LEFT-WING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT WHICH WITHDRAWALS FROM NATO AS THE PRICE FOR COMMUNIST COOPERATION
OR A DEMOCRATIC LEFT-COMMUNIST COALITION GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL REFORM WHICH WITHDRAWS FROM NATO; OR
A COMMUNIST-DOMINATED COALITION GOVERNMENT PROCLAIMING NEUTRALISM; OR
UNDER THREAT OF ANY OF THESE, A RIGHT-WING COALITION RESULTING IN CIVIL STRUGGLE OR CIVIL WAR; OR
RIGHT-WING REGIME ON THE GREEK MODEL, ALIENATED FROM AND OPPOSED BY THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMON MARKET, WITH ITALY ECONOMICALLY EXCLUDED OR PENALIZED BY THE COMMON MARKET

SPAIN

LEFT-WING, ANTI-AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN SUCCESSION
TO FRANCE; OR
CIVIL STRUGGLE WITH THE POPULAR SEEKING AMERICAN SUPPORT ON INTERVENTION

REVOLUTION, PRODUCED BY SOVIET OR
A PRO-SOVIET GOVERN
MENT WHICH THE PRO-SOVIET
LEFT-WING OR
OPPOSITION TO NATO
THE POST
CIVIL WAR IN
INTERVENTION IN

1961
3. POLAND

Strong modernization-reformist, but with economic problems producing a Chechen-style ethnic conflict. In the case of Poland, an intense nationalist feeling, one that frequently resurges, suggests the possibility of a protracted conflict where there are no easy Soviet victories.

4. ALBANIA

Internal reform arising from the ex-KGB faction. Resistance from Moscow, foreign intervention causes the regime to fall. Eastern Europe and Western Europe will then be involved and the Eastern Powers greatest interest.

10. GREECE

Revolution by force.

Protests are remembered, but the Greek people are not sufficient to prevent the movement of forces, which have opposed the Greek people. The movement of troops by the West and U.S. intervention is likely.
C. The Soviet Union

What is more and more evident in the Soviet Union is a general loss of vitality in all but the military sector. The political and economic future (compared to the Western world, and especially Japan) no longer seems an exhilarating prospect. There is the distinct possibility that the U.S.S.R., while retaining formidable military power, will become more and more a technological backwater, stagnant intellectually and ruled without particular competence by a self-perpetuating but increasingly superfluous Communist Party elite.

A curious feature of the Communist scene begins to be noticeable: Communism is by origin a European philosophy, but in Western Europe and the U.S.S.R. it is beginning to lose its grip on the intellectual imagination. Communism as a dynamic force remains only in Asia—and there it largely derives its power from nationalism and xenophobia and a rather magical belief among alienated elites that it will bring them a capacity for saving order, and social unity rather than from the "class conflict" as such.

Asian Communism as a system therefore sometimes seems nearly as repugnant to the Soviets as to the West. Nor are the new-Left revolutionary movements of Afro-Asia and Latin America more congenial in spirit. Despite a lingering Soviet hope that revolutionary disorders in the Third World will sooner or later lead to a Soviet-oriented ideology and politics, the Soviet leaders no longer back such movements uncritically, as once they did in Cuba, the Congo and Indonesia. Even in the Middle-East, coldly considered, the Soviet "victory" is, to impair Western influence (at great financial cost) without gaining truly reliable allies. In Cairo, Baghdad, and

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This section is based upon a paper by Edmund Stillman.
Damascus, the local Communist Parties remain outlawed, despite the fact that Egypt, Iraq, and Syria totally depend on Soviet military aid.

Thus, for the U.S.S.R., the Chinese frontier areas pose a long-term threat, the fundamental situation of the satellite states (vide, Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1968-70) remains precarious, the probes into the Middle-East and the Mediterranean are possibly dangerous and show little evidence of being thought through to ultimate conclusions. Despite moves beyond the traditional areas of Soviet influence and domination and much ritual boasting, the impression is one of a society on the defensive.

The contemporary Soviet Union is powerful but troubled; its best minds are alienated and in the place of the dynamism and confidence evident a decade ago, there is a mere repetition of old solutions and old slogans by Party mediocrities—and a truculent assertion by the man-in-the street (the Soviet version of the "silent majority") that the U.S.S.R., in spite of everything, is first and best.

Our view of the future of the Soviet Union in this decade foresees a continuation of the "conservatism" presently ascendant in the leadership of the U.S.S.R. While we do not subscribe to the general theory of "hawks" versus "doves" in the Kremlin there is no doubt that opinion in the Central Committee follows a spectrum. At the present time the political philosophy (whether or not the philosophy can be identified with a particular clique) which may be described as conservatism—the willingness to use force, the rejection of the idea of adjustment, certainly of radical adjustment, of the traditional social system to new demands and needs—is dominant and gained an important victory in successfully suppressing the Czechoslovak liberalization movement of 1968. Threatening as the Czechoslovak example
may have been to the Soviet hegemonial position in Eastern Europe, it was not impossible to conceive of ways in which Czechoslovak nationalism and the desire for liberal reform (even if the example had spread) could have been accommodated within a newly defined Soviet security system, perhaps even a European-wide security system. The Soviet leaders chose not to follow the radical or daring course; they chose conservatism and military repression. In other words, after more than a decade of almost uninterrupted 'liberalism' in the Soviet union, in 1968 Russia entered a period of attempts to freeze the status quo, with some reversion to certain discarded political forms.

Part of this has been an intensified suppression of dissent in the U.S.S.R. itself. This was the real effect of the Czechoslovak intervention on the internal life of the Soviet Union—not a sparking of widespread criticism among the Soviet masses or even the intelligentsia, but the reverse. (The Czechoslovak intervention produced nothing like the disturbance in Soviet life that the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution did in 1956. The Czechoslovaks are regarded in the Soviet Union in very much the same terms that the French are regarded in the United States—licentious, a little shocking, and ungrateful.) Suppressing Czechoslovakia was not in itself a vastly unpopular act. On the other hand, there remains much native dissent in the U.S.S.R. (by no means confined to Jews), and the Soviet leadership is incapable of at one and the same time carrying out a policy of vigorous suppression of dissent in Czechoslovakia and tolerating it at home. Such a controlled schizophrenia is foreign to the Slovak political mind. It may be true that Britain was able to acquire an empire while at home developing its civil liberties, but there is nothing
in the Russian political record which suggests a similar ability. In
Russian history periods of foreign adventurism such as the suppression of
the Hungarian Revolution in 1848 or the Polish Rebellion in 1863 were
normally accompanied by repressive politics at home.

This does not, however, mean a reversion to Stalinism. Apart from
the appalling bloodiness of Stalin's Russia, unmatched today, conserva-
tivism and Stalinism are quite different political phenomena. We should
remember that Stalinism was a doctrine aimed at the radical transformation
of Russian society. Between 1928 and 1953 Stalin remade Russia and had
Stalin lived he would have transformed the society of the U.S.S.R. far
beyond what it was at the time of his death: we know, for example, that
he planned to replace the collective and state farms with agrogoroda--
giant communes or agricultural cities. Stalinism was thus an activist
policy on the internal front. The new conservatism in the Kremlin is
exactly that--an effort to prop up a failing order, to conserve what has
been. This makes all the difference in the world--not only in style but
in the substance of the kind of policies which the present leaders would
be willing to countenance. The present Soviet leaders display no such
activism. They are merely seeking to maintain the main features of the
system which they inherited at the time of Stalin's death, short of its
bloody or pathological elements.

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the short-term future includes a con-
tinued strengthening of the "Muscovite" wing of the ruling Communist Parties
in the Satellites. Clearly all forms of national self-assertion remain
more dangerous today in Eastern Europe, whether they be of the liberalizing
sort (Czechoslovakia) or of the Conservative Nationalist sort (as exemplified
by the Rumanians). Clearly, a new doctrine has emerged in Eastern Europe, or more accurately reemerged since 1868—that of naked Soviet hegemony over the area and the subordinate status of the East European parties. After Stalin's death, the doctrine was gradually asserted that all parties are co-equal. This no longer is true, as the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine" made explicit. Whereas as recently as 1967 there was a general consensus throughout the bloc that reform was necessary and even desirable, today reform is seen as risking incalculable and dangerous consequences. While Hungary and Rumania in the 1970's are not likely to match the rigid conservatism of Poland, East Germany, and Bulgaria, it hardly seems likely that the Hungarian leaders, uneasy as they must be with the present Soviet leadership, will wish to call attention to the internal liberalization accomplished in Hungary over recent years.

In Rumania the situation is more complex. The usual formula given is that Rumania is defiant in foreign policy but Stalinist in internal policy. This is of course exaggeration. Not only is Stalinism a dead ideology (see above), but the Rumanian internal liberalization has been far more extensive than has usually been credited—that is to say, there is far more innovation in the arts and a freer importation of foreign movies and books than usually suspected. The Rumanian leaders seem in recent years to have been groping their way towards a more libertarian internal society, but are hesitant to press political innovations which may have the effect of causing political disturbances—thus running the risk of angering the Soviets who fear the contagion of still newer revisionist movements on their frontiers.
The Soviet Union as an ideological center faces a bleak future. It is blocked in Asia and stymied in the West. As the first Communist state, it looked forward to greatness; but it appears in retrospect merely the first expression of an ideological movement in the Communist 'world' of which it is no longer master. For a society which is, and must remain, fundamentally ideological this is a serious blow—one that can hardly be apprehended in Western terms. Ideology for the Soviet Union, even granting that since Stalin's death it has waned in intensity, is not, as in the United States, a superfluous ornament to a policy of Realpolitik. Ideology in the Soviet Union—the sense of Moscow as the center of a dynamic and inevitable world revolution designed to transform international society in the image of the U.S.S.R.—is an issue of identity. The very legitimacy of the institutions which exist in the Soviet Union today, and by extension, the very legitimacy of the authority which the present Soviet leaders wield depends on such a view. A post-ideological or non-ideological U.S.S.R. is as much a logical self-contradiction as an atheist Massachusetts Bay Colony—in which magistrates who derive, according to theory, their authority from God could not deny that God and long survive in power. In the long run, therefore, the loss of this image, or more accurately self-image, of the U.S.S.R. must contribute to the erosion of morale and development of ancien régime mentality.

Furthermore, at the back of the Soviet mind must always be the analogy of Tsarist Russia's role in Eastern and Central Europe in the nineteenth century. Tsarist Russia functioned in those years as the gendarme of Europe—the protector of conservatism, the suppressor of revolution, the enemy
of all change, especially enlightened change. Certain Soviet intellectuals have already made this parallel explicit, and the Soviet leaders, who in recent years have been driven to deny fervently the reappearance of the old problem of the generation gap (the "fathers and the sons") are haunted by this metaphor. There is much tension behind the facade of Party and national unity.

With respect to economic development, it is clear that the Soviet bloc has entered into what is likely to prove a protracted period of economic under-performance. The old orthodox solutions have been dusted off once again. Libermanism is in discard, worker management and decentralization are viewed with suspicion and even alarm. The Soviet leaders are attempting to reinstitute the command economy—a system which magnifies the role of the Communist Party but fails to respond to the necessities of an increasingly complex economic organization. The strains on the Soviet and bloc economies are increased by the burdens of the arms race and the military occupation of the satellites; hence the U.S.S.R.'s anxiety to obtain from the United States agreements on mutual arms and troop limits.

This is not so much an economic regression as an economic stagnation—and this in turn is likely to have the greatest political effect. For it is not merely an integral part of Communist theory that economies are paramount, determining political action; in the Soviet bloc the theory has proved true: far-reaching political or social changes have stemmed ultimately from economic necessities. The Hungarian New Course of Imre Nagy in 1954-55 was motivated almost entirely by the stagnation of the Hungarian economy, as was the Czechoslovak reform of 1967-68.
In the Hungarian case runaway political effects soon developed which the Party sought to suppress, ousting Nagy as premier and retreating into orthodox economics under a "know-nothing" regime. The result was the total stagnation of Hungarian life and the desperate efforts of the Gero regime (Nagy's successor) to conciliate the oppositionists at the eleventh hour. In the end the result was the recall of Nagy, in the midst of revolution. The Soviet future today must be seen as one in which there is a period, perhaps protracted, of simple-minded orthodoxy, in which time the economic and social problems will proliferate and grow in gravity. Sooner or later, perhaps within five years, a reaction to these problems will occur.
OUR PROJECTIONS OF THE
STAGES OF SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY: 1971-75

A. INTERNAL POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POLICY

1. An oligarchic centralized dictatorship; no cult of personality; despite the existence of a "military-industrial complex," civilian control remains strong.

2. There is a development of an established and "normal" dismissal process.

3. Predictability of police and judicial process, but there are occasional uses of "extra-legal" means (e.g., "medical" examinations for sanity) to discipline political deviants; certain punitive sections of the criminal code remain purposely vague.

4. The population is generally reconciled to the features of Soviet society and identifies the "socialist system" with the Motherland; there is consequently deep resentment against the "intellectuals and Jews" who "slander" the system.

5. There are moderately extensive foreign contacts: regular cultural exchanges; exchanges of lecturers, professorships; limited student exchanges; extensive foreign tourism (20-25,000 Americans yearly); but few passports are issued for Soviet citizens on unofficial business, although foreign travel is relatively common for Soviet officials.

6. There is further reduced censorship of foreign news, books, magazines; little prior censorship on non-strategic outgoing news, but foreign newsmen are still intimidated.

B. IDEOLOGY

1. The U.S.S.R. is building Communism; "all others are building socialism," Chinese claims notwithstanding; but as the target date for "Communism" approaches (1973), less and less is heard of the issue.

2. The Soviet Party asserts an ambiguous policy--theoretically recognizing "many roads to socialism" but remaining the "forefront and leader of the progressive movement in the world" and, disquietingly, avoids defining the precise limits of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," its right to intervene to support "Socialism" where, in a "friendly" state, it is threatened.

3. The doctrine of socialist realism is no longer a positive injunction; many painters, writers, poets work in modernist or semi-modernist forms but find it difficult to exhibit or publish;
Jazz and rock are everywhere; there are free canons of physical science and a noticeable weakening of sterile orthodoxy in economics and social science punctuated, from time to time, by frantic Party efforts to tighten controls.

4. The doctrine of war is ambiguous: in polemics with the Chinese, nuclear war and other "adventurism" is held to be a reckless invitation to worldwide disaster (socialist as well as capitalist); but addressing the West, military leaders seemingly assert a doctrine of Soviet nuclear "victory."

5. Competitive coexistence.

6. A general decline of ideology as such (but ideology continues to interfere with pure pragmatism, in foreign policy, economic planning, etc. nevertheless).

C. ECONOMIC POLICY

1. GNP: 400-500 million.* The living standard is at the "low-moderate European" level.

2. Still experiments half-heartedly with "libermanism," but fears political consequences of decentralization.

3. The regime affirms the relative superiority of industry over agriculture; but agricultural investment rises steadily.

4. Affirms the superiority of heavy industry over light and consumer industry; but light and consumer industry investment rises steadily.

5. Growing attempts to import consumer technology (e.g., Fiat plant at Togliattigrad) and products.

6. The virgin lands scheme has foundered; the U.S.S.R. searches, first, for an agro-technical means of raising food production; second, for organizational solutions; third, for imports from those dependent on it for security or arms.

7. There is reduced foreign aid to non-communist states.

8. The Soviet attempt to foster rational integration of Comecon economies, to match the Common Market, meets strong satellite resistance (especially in Rumania), but the Soviets persist.

*Estimate, in 1970 dollars.
D. EXTERNAL RELATIONS (WITH COMMUNIST NATIONS)

1. Rather tense relations with Belgrade (following high-point of 1962 rapprochement). On the Yugoslav side the issue has lost emotional importance, but the Soviets give occasional disquieting evidence of interest in "Socialist" Yugoslavia's internal affairs and uncertainty regarding the Brezhnev Doctrine's application to events in Belgrade.

2. National communists in satellites attempt heterodox policies but are severely constrained by the Brezhnev Doctrine justifying Soviet intervention in emergency.

3. There are many latent strains in satellite-Soviet relations: Rumanian and Hungarian leadership desire closer relations with West; middle level and rank-and-file Party members in Poland desire either more liberal policies, that is closer ties with West, or are violently nationalist, that is anti-Semitic, anti-Soviet; Czechoslovak leadership largely isolated from rank-and-file who are still pro-Western and "liberal"; Even after Ulbricht, the East-German leadership, relatively less interested than Moscow in importing Western technology, is at odds with Moscow's "detente" policy which threatens the regime's stability.

4. Break with Albania continues.

5. Moscow/Havana relations somewhat cool. Castro still seen as dangerously heterodox.

6. Virtual rupture of Party relations with Peking; serious territorial disputes over central Asian and maritime province frontiers continue.

7. Non-ruling parties are highly unstable, shifting allegiance between Moscow and Peking, or denouncing both.

E. EXTERNAL RELATIONS (WITH NON-COMMUNIST NATIONS)

1. General
   a) "Detente." There is some interest in bargain-striking with the West in an effort to freeze the present international order and prevent a further growth of world pluralism, to reduce the cost of the overall military program, to facilitate the import of advanced technology, and to concentrate on China.
   b) There is a general loss of direction; "knee-jerk" opportunism in Middle East, Africa, without serious analysis of costs, consequences, genuine possibilities, etc.
   c) "Showing the flag."
2. United States
   a) There is a significant truce in Cold War as the Soviet regime's former desire to supplant the United States is modified to a more practical desire to achieve co-primacy.
   b) Embarrassed by U.S. actions in Vietnam and elsewhere which in effect demand that the U.S.S.R. makes good its proclaimed role as protector in "national liberation wars."
   c) The prestige of U.S. is still high and the U.S.S.R. is covertly seeking to emulate it, but Moscow is increasingly contemptuous of signs of American "decadence."

3. Western Europe
   a) A growing concern about the strength of the Comm. Market.
   b) Still attempting to hasten dissolution of NATO.
   c) Beginning of realization that a European security conference will not merely damage the U.S. position, but inevitably erode Warsaw Pact.
   d) Strong desire to import modern technology from Western Europe (rather than from U.S., which is humiliating).

4. Afro-Asia and Latin America
   Increased skepticism about reliability of distant revolutions.

F. MILITARY POSTURE:

1. Strategic Forces
   Approaching or has achieved "strategic parity" with the United States. Massive nuclear forces also targeted against Western Europe, China.

2. Other Forces
   Some superiority over Western conventional forces, compromised by need to guard Chinese frontier.

   Making effort to develop overseas "strike" capability in emulation of U.S.

   Strong buildup of naval forces without real understanding of sea doctrine; naval forces seriously compromised by lack of air cover, distant bases.

   No aircraft carriers; heavy (superstitious?) reliance on Missile defenses.

*Based on unclassified sources.
The prospective situation of the Soviet Union by 1980 must be discussed with less confidence than in dealing with the period between now and 1975. Yet in 1980 the Soviet Union will be 63 years old. The Russia whose historic features (in a "republican" rather than in a monarchical form) will be more than a thousand. As the revolutionary frenzies recede into the past, more and more the problems of Soviet society will appear more to be the age-old problems of Russia's uneasy and ambiguous relationship to the West. It is not merely that the generation gap—the conflict between "the fathers and the sons"—will have reappeared; or that the intellectuals, as chronically the case in the Russian past, will have proven chronically dissident and disloyal. It is that Russian society, despite the agony of the Revolution and the post-revolutionary industrial plans, will be seen to be falling farther and farther behind the West.

By 1980, through a kind of revolutionary "fin de siècle", Russia will have equalled, and even in selected areas surpassed, the Europe and the America of the model of the first half of the twentieth century: but we believe that just as Czarist Russia in the early 1800's saw its painfully acquired eighteenth century-style great power status compromised, as Europe and America developed a new industrial civilization, so in 1980, the U.S.S.R. will likely be the master of industrial techniques which are increasingly outmoded by the West's advance into post-industrial society. The Soviets are not ready for the "second industrial revolution" underway in the West. Thus we would project the U.S.S.R. of 1980 in the following way.

While the Russian sense of obsolescence may be somewhat mitigated by the spectacle of continued social dissent and the proliferation of the "counterculture" in the United States (trends perceived in the Soviet
Union as decadent), the continued progress of Western Europe and Japan within the capitalist world would confirm the Soviet's mood of depression. By 1980 Japan has clearly passed the Soviet Union in GNP—a contradiction of Marxist-Leninist theory, a blow to Soviet pride, and an implicit rebuke to harsh Soviet development policies which have, since 1917, demanded so much in suffering. West European progress, while numerically less spectacular than the Japanese growth, is even more obviously tied to rising standards of living—a development seen in many quarters as confirming the old chasm dividing "backward" Russia from the developed world.

The obsolescence is seen both outside the U.S.S.R., and by wide new groups in the Soviet Union itself. The unilingual young see the Communist Party (with its pretensions and narrow-mindedness) as essentially comical, or "square." The new intelligentsia find the Party less amusing: their reaction is the more obvious, one that the Party is a reactionary clique, a "brake on progress." The ideological technocrats who staff the nation's industries are less abstract in their complaints: they see the Party professional, or Apparatchik, as a more or less useless man—a nuisance. Whatever the function of the Party may once have been, to galvanize a moribund Tsarist Russia and "rationalize" it, there is less and less need for professional administrators of other people's talents and labor—men whose claim to understand all science and economics by virtue of having studied Marx and Lenin are now seen as absurd.

The polarization between the Party and these groups is by no means complete. For one thing, the Party makes sincere, though not always consistent, efforts to recruit the talented young, the intellectuals, the technocrats and scientists.
It pays them increasingly well—so that by 1980 the reemergence of a class system, albeit a class-mobile system, is virtually complete.

Thus it is still likely that the effort to draw the most vigorous elements of Soviet society into the circle of the Party will prove generally successful. But the bloom is off the Party and everyone knows it except...the man in-the street.

In this projection it is not so much the masses who are disaffected. Nor are the young "stilyagi" who may wear tight trousers and sport long hair, or the factory administrators and engineers, likely to mount strong political initiatives. They will not challenge authority on their own; least of all will the unimaginative "common man" whose material and legal lot is palpably improving. The challenge is merely latent in these groups. The key element is once again the intellectual. They are formulating a general critique of Soviet society. They are formulating the reasons for Soviet backwardness. A general loss of confidence by the masses could cause them to turn to the dissidents for leadership; then the regime could fall.

But the parallel with the satellite states like Hungary and Poland following Stalin's death should not be pressed too far. Barring a catastrophe (for example, a humiliating defeat or a protracted crisis in a war with China) sufficient to destroy utterly the prestige of the Communist Party, no armed challenge should be expected but rather a general stagnation of life and a steadily eroding Party morale.
OUR PROJECTIONS OF THE
STAGES OF SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY: 1975-80

A. INTERNAL POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POLICY

1. Still an oligarchic, centralized autocracy (quasi-dictatorship), with increasingly smooth-functioning processes of dismissal, policy debate within limits, etc.

2. Civilian control of military still sure.

3. High predictability of police and judicial process for ordinary citizens; there is hesitation and inconsistency apparent in the treatment of dissident intellectuals; some effort is made to placate and meet opinions of scientific intellectuals who sympathize with demonstrators.

4. There is a growing social schism between the highly nationalistic, unthinking "man-in the street" and the intelligentsia who are actually needed to man the more modern sectors of the Soviet economy and society.

5. Foreigners are more or less disliked, constantly harassed, by populace, not merely by the political police. Tourism does not keep pace with its spectacular growth outside the bloc.

6. Inconsistent censorship policies.

B. IDEOLOGY

1. The U.S.S.R. has "achieved Communism" as promised; but the boast is actually an embarrassment.

2. The ideology is a dogmatic inheritance which no longer generates enthusiasm or deep belief but which cannot be dropped without calling the legitimacy of individual careers, the Party, and even the government itself, into question.

3. More and more the appeal of the state is to naked nationalism and traditional cultural rivalry with the "decadent" West.

4. There is ritual boasting of military superiority to the West and Communist China, but no expectation of actual war against the West (in contrast to much anxiety about China).

C. ECONOMIC POLICY

1. GDP: approximately 5600-650 billion.* Despite the theoretical gains, the living standard remains low or low, at the "low-modern European" level, there is surprisingly little mass pressure for improvement.

*Estimate, in 1970 dollars.
2. Experiments with decentralization in some disrepute as politically dangerous; attempt is now to "computerize" a centrally planned economy.

3. Industry is still favored over agriculture; there are massive efforts to improve agricultural productivity by technical means, hidden incentives to agricultural labor. Imports of agricultural produce are gradually replacing efforts to stimulate native production.

4. Heavy industry still dominates, leading to an underdevelopment of advanced sectors of the economy like computers, general electronics. (As distinct from strategic sector.)

5. Comecon is largely a dead letter.

D. EXTERNAL RELATIONS (WITH COMMUNIST NATIONS)

1. The next 10 years will pose a series of critical challenges to the stability of Eastern Europe. Some scenarios of crisis are suggested below. As a general proposition it must be said that especially if there is anything remotely resembling a European security settlement, the U.S.S.R. may find it difficult, if not impossible, to maintain authority over the satellites—particularly if, as part of the settlement, "all foreign troops are to withdraw from the territory of other states" (Rumanian formula).

2. Relations with Havana distant; there has been a considerable evolution of Cuban "socialism" on a divergent path.

3. The conflict with Communist China will probably be contained at low violence levels. (Following the death of Mao Tse-tung the transfer of power in Peking will probably be orderly and anti-Soviet policies remain in force.) There will, however, be a considerable nuclear threat to the Soviet rear. If simultaneously the Chinese avoid ideological excesses and concentrate on building an armaments industry (conventional) also, the threat to Soviet security will be severe. There is also much anxiety about U.S.-Chinese relations which, as they warm, cannot help weakening Moscow's bargaining position.

4. If in case of miscalculation, an armed conflict (at high violence levels) breaks out with Communist China, two dangers loom: (a) a long drawn out Chinese guerrilla resistance which would strain the Soviet social fabric (Amalric scenario); or (b) nuclear weapons may be used by both sides. In the second case, while the U.S.S.R. has far more impressive forces than the Chinese, nevertheless damage to central authority and command and control in the U.S.S.R. might lead to the fall of the Soviet regime.

Rated at low probability for 1975-85.
E. EXTERNAL RELATIONS (WITH NON-COMMUNIST NATIONS)

1. General
   a) In spite of the economic burden imposed by the arms race, no agreement to sweeping arms-control limitations (SALT) is likely. Instead there are piecemeal agreements to limit ABM deployment, possibly MIRVs.
   b) Still "showing the flag" in the world's oceans but without a well-thought-out strategic purpose.
   c) Influence in the Middle-East beginning to wane. There has probably not been a major confrontation in the region, with Israel or the U.S. There may have been skirmishes, and even limited actions during which Soviet personnel and equipment came into play. So long as the numbers involved remain limited (and it is not easy to introduce large numbers without risking a world war), the Soviet performance is likely to be poor (i.e., on a man-for-man, airplane-for-airplane, or small unit-for small-unit basis the Israelis should win). The Arab states are likely to be increasingly impatient with Soviet advice which has not led to important results for them.

2. United States
   "Ritual" cold war.

3. Europe
   The crucial issue will be the success or failure of the European Security Conference. An imaginative Western diplomacy could move the Soviets back to the U.S.S.R. itself and attempt to stabilize East Central Europe. Failure to do so runs the risk in the long run that the Soviet authority will break down in the region (in revolutionary fashion) or that the German problem could explode. The probability, however, is a reactionary attempt by the Soviets to maintain the status quo successfully through 1975-1980, but at increasing political, economic, and social costs, among them the growing stagnation of Soviet bloc mass technology and general intellectual life.

4. Afro-Asia and Latin America
   a) Only residual interest in far-distant regions.
   b) Stung by Japanese economic successes, grows truculent in the Far East.

F. MILITARY POSTURE

1. Strategic Forces

Despite economic pressures to arrive at a limitation of strategic arms mutually agreed to by East and West, broad efforts throughout

*Based on unclassified sources.*
the decade of the 70's are likely to fail: on the Soviet side a fundamental suspicion of the West, indeed a hostility to it, coupled with a fear of growing Communist Chinese strategic power, force the Soviets to continue their arms buildup. Consequently a light ABM system is installed around major Soviet cities capable of rapid expansion in time of national insecurity (in addition, the extensive SAM air defense network is partially upgraded to enhance overall ABM capability)--in effect, a pre-crisis mobilization base.

ICBM forces level off around the mid-70's with 1500-1750 ICBM's of varying configurations--missiles with three-six accurate MIRV's of yield ranging between 1-25 megatons. There is an ambitious SLBM capability of 40-50 Polaris/Poseidon-like submarines which are forward based, possibly at man-made islands near the continental U.S.

IRBM/MRBM capacity levels off at about 700 missiles, retargetable against Western Europe and China as the need may be.

The Soviet strategic nuclear capability is highly visible and of high quality, easily lending itself to judicious utilization as an international political lever, although strategic doctrine remains somewhat ambiguous.

The Soviets in general follow technology: they have ICBM's, ABM, reconnaissance satellite killers, city busting warheads, counterforce warheads, tactical "clean" and low-yield weapons systems, all without any clear strategic doctrine. So far as there is a strategic doctrine at all, it can be summarized as: it is better to be strong than weak, more is better than little, high yield is better than low yield, develop any weapon possible because a use will turn up.

One impressive innovation may be a large Manned Orbital Space Station, which serves as a reconnaissance platform as well as a testbed for exotic space weapon systems (e.g., laser radiation weapons). The Soviets are also highly innovative in antisubmarine warfare, extending their concept of helicopter carriers to surface effect vehicles (carrying high-sensitivity magnetometers and other nonacoustic sensors, as well as bistatic sonar)--the survivability of American SLBM submarines is gradually eroding, and this "fact" is of great consequence in the perceived strategic balance.

2. Other

The armed forces remain at approximately five million in all. The Soviets have added two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers to the naval forces and they've equipped them with advanced manned bomber and interceptor aircraft. They are also emulating the United States and developing a powerful overseas "Strikcom" capacity. These mobile-and mobileibious forces number three divisions.
### FIVE CLASSES OF WARS

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### ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM EXPERIENCES: HOW WILL ESCALATIONS BE HANDLED IN THE THREE-WAY SYSTEM WHAT WILL BE THE ROLE OF SMALL TRIBES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

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### EIGHT BASIC CONTEXTS OF CIVILIZATION

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| MIDDLE REGIONS |
| LOWER REGIONS |

### ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM EXPERIENCES: HOW WILL ESCALATIONS BE HANDLED IN THE THREE-WAY SYSTEM WHAT WILL BE THE ROLE OF SMALL TRIBES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

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3. SOURCES AND SCENARIOS OF EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND BALKAN CRISIS AND "SURPRISE"

A. Factors of Destabilization

We look upon the time period 1971-1975 as promising a more dangerous situation in East-Central Europe and the Balkans than we have experienced at any time since the mid-1950's. A number of factors of latent crisis and unrest which have been suppressed, or repressed, in this region for the past twenty years seem likely to find explosive expression. At the same time those forces of change within the Soviet Union, the Western alliance, and the bipolar world power configuration, which we took note of in the previous section are tending to weaken or remove certain external pressures which in the past have contributed to the relative stability of the area. The present period, we believe, then represents a turning point, affording some opportunity for Western initiatives and policies to bring about a form of European political settlement capable of reestablishing in different ways, according to the type of settlement, the stability of the region (the subject of the following sections of this report), but in the absence of those policies inaugurating a renewed period of troubles.

The most important of the new or emergent factors of East European and Balkan destabilization seem to us the following:

1. The erosion of Soviet national competence and political will.

2. The undermining of the Soviet Union's reputation, its "image," or—in the current usage—its "charisma."

3. The ascendance of Western European unity, power, prosperity, reputation, "charisma."

4. East European popular nationalism (most important in East Germany, Poland, and Romania).
5. East European ethnic nationalisms and irredentism--Croatian, Transylvanian, Montenegrin, Albanian, Slovene, Slovak, etc.

6. East European revisionist Communism or "Socialism with a Human Face."

7. Conceivably, German irredentism.

As our remarks on Russia and Western Europe in the preceding section make plain, we regard the first six of these factors as considerably more important to the 1970's than the long-debated issue of German irredentism. Germany's division, now more than twenty-five years old, took place, as it happened, largely along an established line of cultural differentiation.

The German Democratic Republic today consists of that part of Germany which historically has had a tradition of (agrarian) military autocracy and has expressed anti-mercantile, pessimistic, xenophobic, and nationalist characteristics. Now, in some significant degree its political tradition has been transmuted into a "Prussian-Socialist" authoritarianism built upon a traditionally militant proletariat. The German Federal Republic consists of those sections of the old Germany, which have been Western oriented, Latin and Roman Catholic in culture, with urban, mercantile, and bourgeois traditions, and democratic and parliamentary political experience. As Konrad Adenauer recognized in the 1950's, the permanent integration of this part of Germany into a larger Europe otherwise made up of France, Italy, and the Lowlands, is a culturally and politically consistent and hopeful enterprise. The other, "eastward looking", Germany had dominated both the Wilhelmine and Nazi empires. (The age of German unity has, in any event, been a brief one in historical perspective. Germany was unified for less than a century between Bismarck and the Nazi collapse in Berlin in 1945. Before 1870 Germany was a linguistic and economic collectivity of politically autonomous or semi-autonomous kingdoms and principalities.)
The real problem which Germany today poses for the future is only indirectly the problem of reunion (or revanchism—from whatever side).

It seems to us that the serious question is East Germany's own future course in its relationship with the Soviet Union, and perhaps in its relations with the other East European states. It is a dynamic and industrially powerful nation. Its present political subordination to the Soviet Union must seem an insecure, not to say unrealistic, relationship. The tensions between them, like those at work in the other East European states subordinated to Russian power, are as much cultural as political.

"Socialism" of an authoritarian, competent, austere, purposeful variety, such as exists in the GDR today, is not inconsistent with the experience and cultural traditions of this part of Germany. Subordination to, and dependence upon, the Russian nation is profoundly inconsistent with that past. Because the East German uprising of 1953 was anti-Communist as well as anti-Russian, we often tend to assume that popular feelings today would be pro-Western, sympathetic to union with the Federal Republic. This may not be an accurate judgment. Hostility towards Russia is quite reconcilable with hostility towards capitalism, and particularly with hostility towards the luxurious, and allegedly corrupt, forms of capitalism which West Germany has known since the 1950's (and not only West Germany, of course). With significant groups within Western Germany, and in Western Europe as a whole, in rebellion against the materialism of values, the "technocratic despotism" and political failures of Western Capitalism and parliamentary democracy, the East Germans can easily find moral reinforcement for a vision of socialism which is authoritarian, spartan, and also nationalistic and original. If there were to be a
major economic crisis in the West, the effects on East Germany could decisively confirm this version of Socialism combined with Nationalism.

Certainly it is difficult to believe that this decade will end with a very large Soviet military garrison still in Eastern Germany. The thrust of events in both Western and Eastern camps today seems directed towards a kind of European settlement which would allow removal of those forces while perpetuating Soviet authority in Eastern Germany. That may not easily be accomplished; or rather, the one may be accomplished but not the other, and the difference can make for the most serious kind of crisis. The issues of settlement are critical to our argument in this report, as we will make clear below.

B. PROBABLE AND LESS PROBABLE CRISIS SCENARIOS*

Yugoslavia

One virtually inevitable source of tension in the next decade will arise in Southeastern Europe out of the succession crisis following the death or retirement through incapacity of Josip Broz Tito. It is widely assumed by observers that what we have been witnessing in Yugoslavia since the Tito-cominform split in 1948 is the gradual humanization of the Communist system. Our own view is that this process has been less one of reform of Communism than of a progressive jettisoning of features which are integral to the Communist system in its modern European form.

It seems almost inevitable that following Tito's death or retirement we will witness a very rapid evolution of the system in Yugoslavia, in effect a dissolution of the remaining constraints on the free sector.

*By Edmund Stillman.
What is likely to emerge is a kind of state capitalism (large-scale industry, financed by the state, operating with considerable market autonomy, state banking, etc.) alongside a very rapidly developing free sector--small scale, light industry service trades, etc. This trend will not easily be reversed, but it is likely to arouse considerable anxiety among the older Communist Party functionaries and their younger recruits who will find themselves less and less relevant to this emerging society.

Simultaneously, there is likely to be a deterioration of the authority of the central regime in Belgrade--an authority which has always been more precarious than outsiders have supposed in its ability to dominate the contending nationalities of Yugoslavia or institutionalize an authority which actually has largely derived from the personal charisma of Tito. It seems not likely that Yugoslavia will be unable to produce a form of collective leadership capable of mediating permanently between the contending interests of so faction-ridden a society: in other words, somewhere in the 1970's the nationality issue may become extraordinarily embittered, with the old Serb-Croat rivalry reemerging as part of a general reluctance by the richer areas of the country (like Slovenia, Croatia and the autonomous region of the Voivodina, north of Belgrade) to sacrifice for the so-called "negative" regions of the country like Montenegro, the Kosmet, and Macedonia. There is very considerable feeling, for example, throughout the richer parts of Yugoslavia that the Montenegrins, who are overrepresented in the Communist Party, have been milking the "positive" regions for narrow sectional advantage.

Assuming that the Soviet Union will maintain its conservative posture through this time frame, and likewise will maintain its old
hegemonic interests in Eastern Europe and the vaguely defined "socialist world," the Russians then may view the Yugoslav developments with alarm and see new opportunities for interfering in the internal affairs of the Yugoslav state. We say this because we believe that Communism, as such, will cease to be recognizable in Yugoslavia--and the "defection" of Yugoslavia from the socialist ranks, by that point obvious to all, will be seen as a serious threat to the satellite states to the north and to the Soviet Union itself.

Albanian irredentism in Southwestern Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia is riven by ethnic and linguistic rivalries, rather more so than any other state in Europe today. But the great time bomb ticking away in Yugoslavia is the presence of a compact Albanian minority of some one million persons dwelling adjacent to the Albanian frontiers in the southwestern portions of the country. This region, known as the Kosmet (a contraction of Kossovo-Metohija), is backward, poor and pretty much administered by the Slavic-speaking Yugoslavs, whatever they say about local liberties and autonomy, in the fashion of a third-class colony. Albanians constitute the blacks of Yugoslavia--a group regarded with contempt by all the Slavs. (The Albanians are not, incidently, a Slavic people but descendants of the ancient Illyrian inhabitants of the Balkans.)

Tensions in the Kosmet have been rising in recent years; around Pristina there has been considerable violence. The development of an outright Albanian secessionist movement has been hindered by the repressive character of the Hoxha regime to the south in Albania itself. But though Enver Hoxha is a zealot who has associated himself with the Chinese
and is sufficiently young to remain in power throughout this decade, there is no absolute reason why a post-Kosygin-Brezhnev leadership in the U.S.S.R. might not seek some rapprochement with him—especially if a Sino-Soviet rapprochement becomes possible in that period. In such a case a Soviet Union increasingly dismayed by the dissolution of Communism in Yugoslavia might very well begin to support Albanian irredentist claims on the Kosmet; the claims would have very considerable justice since there are nearly as many Albanians living in oppressed conditions in the Kosmet as in Albania itself. The possibility therefore arises of the outbreak of guerrilla activities in southwestern Yugoslavia supported by the Albanians and possibly at one remove by the Soviets. The terrain in the southwest is extremely mountainous and rough—an area in which the Yugoslav partisan movement itself was able to hold out indefinitely against the Germans. The Albanians are a warrior people of great courage and savagery (a common Balkan characteristic) who held out for centuries against the Turks. After their conversion to Islam they became formidable foes of their Slavic neighbors like the Serbs and Montenegrins. There is no reason to suppose that such a guerrilla movement would be quickly crushed by the Yugoslavs, whose own experience in guerrilla warfare by 1975 will be thirty years out of date.

A successful conclusion to such a war, ending with the ceding of the Kosmet or a portion of it to Albania would touch off a chain reaction in the Balkans. It would, first of all, be a first breach in the post-1945 tacit rule that all frontiers in Europe are firmly fixed. One result of such a settlement might very well be the secession of other constituent

Such a move, however, would contradict another Soviet interest, namely that all post-1945 boundaries in Europe are fixed.
republics of Yugoslavia, particularly Slovenia—a region which is Alpine, highly civilized, industrially developed and sophisticated, located in the northwest adjacent to Italy and Austria. Slovenia sees itself as a potential new Switzerland.

Such an irredentist war might also be used by the Soviets to justify other punitive changes in the frontiers of central Europe—possibly the secession of Transylvania to Hungary as a reward for loyalty and punishment to Rumania for its defiance of Soviet authority (see below).

Instability in Poland

Another potential source of instability in Eastern Europe is Poland. Here there are several possibilities: modernizing trends paralleling those of Czechoslovakia 1968; a simple popular revolt by a population which since the reforms of 1956 has largely experienced actual regression; and the emergence of a simple nationalist challenge to Soviet hegemony rather on the Rumanian model—that is to say, not necessarily accompanied by internal liberalization but expressing a traditional kind of hyper-Polish nationalism. Poland took such a beating in the last war (one in ten killed) that it is entirely possible that the romantic streak in the Polish character has been eradicated forever. But this is not certain, and the country still seems a potential storm center. In the initial stages of any Soviet intervention, at least, Soviet forces might meet formidable resistance.

An East German Replay of the 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis

This scenario is not difficult to describe; it merely plays the events of 1968 in an East German context, with the exception that there
are already substantial Soviet forces on East German soil—although these may be reduced during the 1970's. Nevertheless, the East German regime during the next decade might adopt either a liberal cast or a kind of hyper-nationalist Prussian-Socialist defiance of both the "corrupt" capitalism of West Germany and Soviet domination. Such an East Germany would not necessarily subordinate itself to the Soviet Union; its internal stability by 1975-80 might have been achieved through reconciliation with the East German proletariat and lower middle classes. And such an East German government, either Prussian-Socialist or liberal, might actually exert considerable appeal for the disenchanted youth of West Germany. (This last is a related scenario for trouble in Western Europe—a West Germany in which the young are increasingly radicalized and come into violent conflict with the established order: a kind of Marcusian New Left state of mind leading them to attack the old "corrupt, ex-Nazi Establishment." Such a youth movement might logically, or illogically, find some identification with the East German regime in the post-Ulbricht era.)

A Punitive Dismemberment of Rumania

The Soviet Union grows increasingly annoyed with the Rumanian challenge to its integration plans and either foments rebellion in Transylvania or intervenes militarily, as in the Czechoslovak case in 1968. It then detaches the Transylvanian province from Rumania, granting it to Hungary. A thoroughly plausible case can be made for such a

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See below for a note on current developments affecting Romanian-Soviet relations and the plausibility of this—and the following—scenario.
dismemberment since there are, depending on how they are counted, and by whom, nearly as many, or perhaps even more, Hungarians in the region than the Rumanians themselves.

Soviet Annexation of Eastern Europe

Not unrelated to the scenarios above in which the Soviet Union plays on ethnic difficulties throughout Eastern and Central Europe is the possibility that the Soviet Union, increasingly perplexed by the problem of the recurrent satellite nationalist challenges, decides to incorporate Eastern Europe, substituting direct Soviet control for indirect.

There is some evidence that annexation of at least part of the region was in fact the Soviet intention after World War II. The Baltic states which had been by historical precedent part of the Czarist Empire were seized in 1940 and reincorporated in 1945. Large areas of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania were similarly seized. If, as is possible, the Soviet Union will continue to meet the kind of challenge that Czechoslovakia posed in 1968 and Hungary in 1956 (and we consider this entirely likely), the Soviet Union which has seen itself in Czechoslovakia forced to rely increasingly on its own mechanisms of control may decide that incorporation into the already multinational federated Soviet Union is the best way out. It can argue also that the preceding two or three decades of Communist rule in Eastern Europe will have sufficiently closed the gap between the societies in Eastern and Central Europe on the one hand and in the Soviet Union itself.

Nationality Troubles on the Soviet-Asian Frontier

Not implausibly, however, a Soviet Union which might seek to move on its European front could find itself infected by the same nationality
problems which have bedeviled other multinational states—in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan, etc. So far the Asiatic nationalities of the Soviet Union have been pretty badly overmatched by Soviet police power, but it is not impossible to conceive of a national liberation movement beginning in the area, especially if (see below) the Chinese were to offer encouragement.

A Chinese Sponsored National Liberation Struggle

While Chinese interventions into the European situation today largely take the form of diplomatic and economic activity supporting the dissident Communist forces in the region, not wildly implausible scenario for Chinese action indirectly affecting Europe in a decisive way is the following: in the late 1970's the Chinese achieve a respectable thermo-nuclear capacity, sufficient to deter the Soviets from any attack on China itself by nuclear means. Operating under this overarching balance of terror the Chinese might then seek to do what so many American analysts in the early sixties considered likely for the Soviets—namely to make conventional probes against the Soviet Union, all the while avoiding the risk of large-scale conventional war.

The ability of the Chinese to stimulate national liberation movements among the Asiatic minorities of the Soviet Union would depend, of course, to some degree on the actual attractiveness of the Chinese Communist state itself. The China of the mid- and late 1970's may not be less attractive than the Soviet Union as judged by the Asiatic nationalities. On the other hand, the Chinese suffer the considerable handicap of a bad historical record—steady expansion by the Han, or ethnic Chinese people against the "barbarian" minorities on their borders.
This would be a powerful deterrent to any rising stimulated by Peking taking hold in the Soviet border regions. Similarly, the well known Chinese lack of tact when dealing with non-Chinese peoples could hinder the spread of the movement.

A possibility therefore might be less of spontaneous local uprising than a Chinese effort to infiltrate saboteurs and other irregular forces to work up a crisis in which China's by no means illegitimate claims to the lost regions could be brought to the fore--conceivably before the U.N., assuming that China will soon be a member, or simply before the bar of world opinion, for whatever that might be worth.

A Soviet Debacle in the Middle East or Elsewhere

The process of disintegration and rebellion in the Soviet Union would be powerfully stimulated, of course, by a debacle for the ruling elite. Revolutions usually are far less the outcome of economic deprivation than a function of the declining competency and reputation for competency of the ruling elite. It is significant that the Russian revolution of 1905 and the subsequent revolution of 1917 both occurred in the context of Russian military defeats. It is difficult to see the Soviet Union in the 1970's suffering the kind of debacle Czarist Russia suffered in 1917; but a failure in the style of the Russo-Japanese War is not entirely impossible--as the American agony in Vietnam gives evidence.

A superpower, in the last third of the twentieth century, may very well find itself losing or doing badly in an overseas limited war. It will do badly possibly because the risk of escalation is too high, because the economic or social costs of the war begin to outweigh the potential gains, etc. In such a case, the failure overseas will have a
feedback effect, increasing social dissidence at home and making it difficult for the superpower to pursue its original goal.

A plausible locus for such an overseas disaster (or discomfiture to be more accurate) would be the Middle East: conceivably in a new Arab-Israeli war the Soviet Union might engage its forces in one degree or another (at the very least at the advisory level as did the United States in the early stages of the Vietnamese war) and nevertheless suffer defeat. An Egyptian military defeat, for example, suffered even though several thousand Soviet advisors had been present would severely shake the reputation of the Soviet arm; and by extension of the Soviet ruling elite.

Similarly the Soviet Union might find itself meeting a military check in one of the Central European insurrections outlined above--conceivably in an invasion attempt on Poland which might meet considerable resistance, either with or without Czechoslovak forces fighting alongside. A bogged-down war in Central Europe--one that extends over a two or three week period and ends in a stalemate through external intervention (by the U.N., U.S., etc.) might very well be a catalytic event in the Soviet Union itself.

C. A NOTE ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

Certain current developments in Eastern Europe cannot be discussed as a scenario. Soviet pressure upon Rumania, and indirectly upon Yugoslavia, has become acute at the same time that Chinese diplomacy has become very active in Eastern Europe. The U.S.S.R. on August 18th accused Rumania of organizing an "anti-Soviet" bloc in the Balkans under American and Chinese patronage. Implausible as this charge may be, it
clearly reflects Soviet anxieties over both the Sino-American rapprochement and the stubborn endurance of Rumanian autonomist and nationalist impulses. Rumania, of course, restated its commitment to "independence and full freedom to establish friendly relations with all socialist countries, including China," and Premier Ceausescu challenged the idea that any one Communist party can properly claim to be the "center" or "leader" of Communism--a fairly provocative reiteration of Rumania's well-established opposition to the claims made by the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Rumanians, according to press accounts, again rejected a Soviet demand to send troops into Rumania on their way to maneuvers in Bulgaria. Rumania is cultivating its relations with Yugoslavia, while Chinese-sponsored Albania has been seeking an improved relationship with its old enemy Yugoslavia (as well as with Greece). What is emerging in the Balkans seems a tacit alliance of expediency among the three dissident or deviant socialist states, with China intervening in the situation to exploit Soviet difficulties. The probabilities, no doubt, are that the present tensions, like those which repeatedly have arisen over the last few years (but also have cumulatively deepened), will stop at a point short of war, or an open break between the Balkan States and the U.S.S.R. But the possibility that the Soviet Union will move against Rumania cannot be disregarded. In the Soviet view Rumania is an increasingly troublesome and threatening problem. China's role is exceedingly offensive. It might seem that if Rumanian intransigence has to be overcome--by subversion or coup, or by military and political pressures, or even by invasion--it would be better for the U.S.S.R. to wait until Yugoslavia enters what may be a troubled post-Titoist period. But the timing of
Tito's exit from the political scene cannot be predicted, and Yugoslavia now seems moving back from some of the separatist and ethnic-national tensions which were prominent during the last two years. The Yugoslavs, under Soviet pressure, seem more united today than in recent months, thus with America still engrossed with Vietnam, Europe angry with the United States because of the fiscal crisis, the Chinese-American rapprochement only in its initial stage, and Yugoslavia still troubled with internal conflicts, the present may be a more favorable time for a Soviet move than the immediate future seems entirely likely to present. The scenarios we have presented of Soviet punitive dismemberment of Rumania or even annexation of Eastern Europe could come about much sooner than anyone until now has been disposed to expect. And if the U.S.S.R. should move against Rumania, a major European war is perfectly possible. Czechoslovakia acquiesced in the Soviet invasion of 1968; Hungary's popular revolution of 1956 was doomed to failure when the Soviets invaded, since the government, army, and economy were in drastic disorder. But Rumanian national resistance to Russia, supported by Yugoslavia, could prove formidable, and if the battle lasted for days, weeks, or even longer, it could spread through the Balkans to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia within incalculable repercussions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland—and elsewhere.
DRAFT STAGES OF CONFLICT

1. GSU AND OTHER FORCES BEGIN TO VIOLENCE IN EAST GERMANY OR LEBANON
2. A HIGH LEVEL OF PUBLIC ACTIVATION WITH SMALL VIOLENCE FALLING IN EAST GERMANY
3. THE EAST-GERMANY STAGE (GSU OR LEVANT DUE TO THE GSU'S HAVING MADE THE FIRST MOVE BY EAST GERMANY)
4. THERE IS A LIMITED BUT IMPORTANT DEGREE OF INTERVENTION BY WEST GERMANY "UNIVERSITY"
5. THE GSUS DELIVER A WARNING TO WEST GERMANY AND SALT
6. LIMITED EVACUATIONS BE GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES
7. WEST REFUSES TO THE GSUS WITH A WARNING AGAINST GSU INTERVENTION
8. VIOLENCE AND BORDER CROSSINGS CONTINUE, WITH WEST GERMANY INVOLVED IN LARGE NUMBERS
9. THE GSUS INTERVENE, LAUNCHING A LIMITED FURY ACROSS THE BORDER OR INITIATING OTHER MAJOR VIOLENCE, OR PERHAPS MAKING A MULTIPARTY DEMONSTRATION OF NUCLEAR FORCE
10. FURTHER EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES
11. A SUSPENSION OF THE ARMAMENT IN HOSTILITIES
12. "ARMISTICE" IS VIOLATED
13. HUMAN EVACUATION AND THE INITIATION OF OTHER EMERGENCY READINESS PROGRAMS
14. HUMAN BURDEN CROSSING BY BOTH SIDES
15. SUSPENSION OF EMERGENCY READINESS PROGRAMS
16. PREPARATION AND COMPLETION OF EMERGENCY READINESS PROGRAMS
17. EITHER THE GSUS MAKE A LIMITED ATTACK ON WESTERN EUROPE, DESIGNED TO DROP中小学 AND TO SALT NATIVE (WITH THE INTENT OF GIVING CAPTIVITY OR PRESSURE FOR CAPTIVITY, OR NO CAPTIVITY AND CAPTIVITY), OR THE GSUS MAKES A LIMITED ATTACK TO DEPIG THE GSUS
20. EITHER THE GSUS MAKE A LARGE ATTACK ON WESTERN EUROPE, DESIGNED TO DROP SALT NATIVE (WITH THE INTENT OF GIVING CAPTIVITY OR PRESSURE FOR CAPTIVITY, OR NO CAPTIVITY AND CAPTIVITY), OR THE GSUS MAKES A LIMITED ATTACK TO DEPIG THE GSUS
21. ....

COMMENTS ON DRAFT STAGES OF CONFLICT

A. THE GSUs ARE THE MOST VIOLENT, BUT THE EAST GERMANY INTERESTS (E.G.U.) ARE THE MOST VIOLENT FOR THEIR INTERESTS, AND THE GSUs ARE THE MAST VIOLENT FOR THEIR INTERESTS
B. GSUs MAKE A MIGHTY EFFORT TO THE EAST GERMANY OR LEBANON, AND THE EAST GERMANY RESPONSES THIS WITH A MIGHTY EFFORT
C. EAST GERMANY EFFORTS TO THE EAST GERMANY, SUPPORT THEIR INTERESTS, AND THESE ARE APPEALING FOR WESTERN SWITZERLAND TO THE SALT FOR THE SALT OF NUCLEAR PROTECTION, THIS LEADS TO THE SALT IN THE WEST-SWITZERLAND NUCLEAR-POWERED STATEMENTS
D. ALTERNATIVE, WEST GERMANY, PARTIALLY BREAKS OFF THE EFFORTS TO REACT, THE PRECISE FOR A POST-CRISES EXCLUSION OF THE GSUs, AND ITS INTERESTS FROM EASTERN EUROPE, WINDE THE WAY FOR A POST-CRISES EXCLUSION OF SOVIET INTERESTS FROM EASTERN, AND A REVERSAL IN THE COLD WAR RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT

R. B. A.
4. THE PROBLEM OF PURPOSE: SURPRISE EXPLOITATION TO WHAT END?

The fundamental problem of surprise or crisis exploitation is the problem of goals for action. Certain general objectives of American policy in Europe are clear. These are to prevent the Soviet conquest (or blackmail) of Western Europe, and also to avoid nuclear war and avert or contain crises which contain within them a risk or promise of major war. These objectives express basic American national interests: war-avoidance, as an expression of the primordial national interest in the physical and political survival of the American nation, and the defense of Europe as an expression of the American national interest that Europe, this major zone of physical and human power and resource, remain free from hostile control. But these, in sum, are defensive interests. While they may imply positive tactics and positive actions in many eventualities, these nearly always--in the nature of the situation--will be addressed to restoring a lost or jeopardized political or strategic position, or even to containing the consequences of such a loss.

It is impossible to exploit a surprising event for strategic gain without a clear, responsible, and politically realistic and attainable definition of positive policy objectives. Otherwise by what standard, or in the light of what goal, are we to judge what an improvement might be? Obviously there are better or worse tactical situations in a military crisis, and advantageous or disadvantageous political developments in a changing situation which may be measurable by criteria unrelated to the major issues of European policy. But in the absence of a definition of positive changes which the United States might wish to see come about in Central and Eastern Europe, the agencies of government are left with the...
defensive interests described above, or with certain general policy
injunctions concerning the stability of Europe, the preservation of detente,
the strengthening of the alliance, etc. These are well enough understood,
but their relevance to specific surprises and crises may be anything but
clear, and in nearly any particular case other than a frank Soviet military
challenge, their effect is almost certain to be conservative, counseling
passive, risk reducing, status quo reclaiming behavior—or salvaging as
much of the status quo ante as may be feasible after a Soviet initiative
or innovation.

CONSERVATIVE BEHAVIOR

A TENDENCY TO PREFER:

(MEANS)

PASSIVE TO ACTIVE BEHAVIOR
FAMILIAR TO NOVEL METHODS
DEFENSIVE TO OFFENSIVE TACTICS
RETNRENCMENT TO EXPANSION OF COMMITMENTS

(ENDS)

STATUS QUO-MAINTAINING TO INTEREST-ADVANCING
GOALS
LOSS-MINIMIZING TO GAIN-MAXIMIZING OPTIONS
UNCERTAINTY AND RISK-REDUCING TO "UTILITY"-
MAXIMIZING POLICIES

NATO as an alliance inevitably is conservative in its response to
unexpected situations. It prefers reaction to action, passive to active
behavior, familiar actions and programs, resisting novelty, defensive
measures, shrinking from taking even the tactical offensive in any but the hypothetical case of a clear-cut military operation of the kind long-planned as a response to a Soviet attack. Its collective interest is to preserve the status quo, or when the status quo is overturned by an opponent, its instinct again is to restore as much of the familiar structure as can be recovered, rather than to exploit the new situation to improve on the past condition. In short, its institutional instincts—in the absence of clear direction from above—are to minimize losses and reduce risks.

**TYPICAL REACTIONS TO "SURPRISES"**

1. **DON'T ROCK THE BOAT.**

2. **CONSIDER OPTIONS IN TERMS OF CATASTROPHIC CHOICES.**

3. **IGNORE LONG-TERM GOALS AND INTERESTS IN THE PRESS OF SHORT-TERM URGE TO CONTAIN THE WORST CONSEQUENCES.**

4. **TRY TO "LOOK GOOD" BY CONTRAST WITH OPPONENT.**

5. **EFFORT BY GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES TO CAPITALIZE ON THE CRISIS TO PROMOTE THEIR OWN INTERESTS: "RAISE THE MILITARY BUDGET," "BUILD UP NATO," ETC.**

6. **WAIT FOR "NEXT TIME."**

These conservative tendencies infect nearly all government staffs, and become acute in international bodies where the institutional conservatism of individual national members becomes mutually reinforced. This problem can be overcome only by conscious action from above, establishing positive objectives. But what positive objectives are reasonable, politically responsible, and attainable in Eastern and Central Europe today?
With respect to Central and Eastern Europe, and the Balkans, the United states has not since the early 1950's possessed a policy designed positively to alter the strategic and political situation. The public policy of "liberation" of Eastern Europe, or of "rollback," associated with the late Secretary of State Dulles, possessed a fundamental flaw as an action policy in that, ultimately, it involved a threat of war which the United States actually was not willing to accept. The most fundamental Soviet security interests were bound up in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless it was not merely a rhetorical policy; it articulated an action program that had begun as early as the 1946-1948 years of developing East-West confrontation, and accelerated with the Greek Civil War and the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc. Through guerrilla operations, the support of underground political organizations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and through radio and other political warfare operations from Western Europe, the Western powers actively worked to overthrow the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and to sponsor subversive and disintegrative forces within Soviet Russia. As a result of the Philby Case, the major British-American-sponsored guerrilla operation against the Communist regime in Albania between 1946 and 1952 has become known, as well as the Western support given to Ukrainian nationalists and Russian "solidarist" (NTS) movement. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation (as it was then known) functioned in those years not as "American" stations but as the voices of the East European and Russian political oppositions. Exiled government officials, political party and trade union leaders, journalists and artists, broadcast to their home countries in much the manner in which exiles from Nazi-occupied Europe broadcast over the BBC during the war years. The problem was that
there was no actual war, only a war of subversion, propaganda, and political action; hence "liberation" remained an intangible promise.

When liberation suddenly acquired a real shape and possibility in the Hungarian Revolt and Polish Mutiny of 1956, the Western powers discovered themselves unable to give it decisive support. The desiderium of liberation ran in, a primordial Soviet national security perception and policy. No doubt because the Western powers had allowed "liberation" to slip into a merely rhetorical stance, or had never seriously dealt with its real possibilities and risks in their planning, they proved in the event unwilling or unable to find any positive resolution for their policy other than a military intervention which they were, for good reason, unwilling to carry out. The rebellions in Eastern Europe collapsed; the Western-sponsored exile groups subsequently, if only by implication, gave up their claim to constitute political alternatives for their lands, and Western clandestine operations shifted away from political action. Since then, as the Czechoslovak events of 1968 clearly confirmed, the thrust of Western policy in Eastern Europe has been to preserve stability and the detente in Soviet Western relations, and only within that canon to do what might be done to mitigate the political conditions of the East European peoples or, in some tactical circumstances, to embarrass Soviet policy or discredit Soviet propaganda. There has been no positive goal to take the place of the abandoned goal of liberation. Liberation, no doubt, had in any event ceased to be a serious Western objective after Stalin died and the detente emerged under the Soviet leadership of Nikita Krushchev. As for alternate methods or programs for altering the Central and Eastern European situation, they tended after 1956 to be discredited, or disregarded, because liberation had been a costly failure.
Today the criticism still can be heard within the West that the Western powers only react to Soviet moves; that the initiative invariably is conceded to the Soviet Union and its allies, and the West, confronted with such faits accomplis as the Berlin Wall, is condemned to make the best of the situation, ratifying the Soviet gain under protest. This criticism ordinarily is coupled with the argument that the United States and its allies should turn the same tactics against the Soviets, again interfering or sponsoring subversion in Eastern Europe, aggressively capitalizing on discontent or rebellions there, and imposing upon the Russians the choice between acquiescence or world war.

But it is reasonably clear today— as it has been since at least the mid-1950's—that neither the Western governments nor the Western publics have the will to conduct a risk-taking and aggressive policy. Especially today, when the detente has relaxed tensions and the fear of a war in the West, and has multiplied cultural and economic links with Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., and the United States has become preoccupied with Asia and undergone a considerable disillusionment with policies of intervention, and as the Soviet leadership itself has lost many of the totalitarian qualities it possessed under Stalin, an aggressive Western program has become politically unsupportable. Indeed, among Western political and academic elites there has emerged some conviction of 'convergence' between Western and Soviet systems as both move more deeply into advanced industrial and post-industrial society. These predictions have found an echo in dissident Soviet scientific and artistic circles, where the argument has been made that Russia and America should give up their old political and ideological conflict in order cooperatively to meet the new 'global' problems of
industrial/technological society. Indeed, the simple passage of years has tended to ratify the status quo of a divided Europe. Even the German problem—the great outstanding issue—has in the past two years advanced towards, not solution, but regularization.

THE SHIFTING WEST EUROPEAN-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

1950'S

COMMON PERCEPTION OF GREAT RISK.

COMMON DEFENSE EFFORT DOMINATES: COSTS, TRADE-OFFS, BURDEN SHARING CONSIDERED "DETAILS" TO BE FILLED IN.

POLITICAL VISION OF "ATLANTIC WORLD" OR "ATLANTIC COMMONWEALTH" WIDELY ACCEPTED, AT LEAST IN GENERAL TERMS.

EUROPEAN GRATITUDE FOR U.S. AID, DEFENSE; EUROPEAN RESPECT FOR AMERICAN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP; AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL DOMINANCE IN STRATEGIC STUDIES, THEORY; AMERICAN POLITICAL DOMINANCE.

RESIDUAL EUROPEAN LACK OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONFIDENCE, A LEGACY OF WORLD WAR II.

UNSHAKEN AMERICAN CONFIDENCE IN SELF AND IN U.S. "MISSION."

1960'S

DIVERGING DEFINITIONS OF RISK; EUROPEANS TEND TO EMPHASIZE DETENTE MORE, RISKS LESS, THAN AMERICANS.

NATO COMMON EFFORT FORMALIZED, BUREAUCRATIZED; COSTS AND RELATIVE BURDEN-SHARING A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION; GROWING U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM; DECLINING EUROPEAN WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE FOR FORCE-LEVEL GOALS, MAINTAIN CONSCRIPTION, ETC. FRANCE WITHDRAWS FROM NATO MILITARY COOPERATION.
EUROPEAN POLITICAL VISION DIVIDED: GAULLIST NATIONALISM, COMMON MARKET "EUROPEANISM," "DUMBBELL" MODEL OF ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP, RIVAL THE OLD ATLANTIC VISION. INCREASING AMERICAN PREOCCUPATION WITH THE THIRD WORLD; AND AFTER 1965 VIETNAM DOMINATES AMERICAN POLICY; NATO DEFINITELY SUBORDINATED IN PRACTICE, IF NOT THEORY, TO U.S. VIETNAM NEEDS.

EVOLVING EUROPEAN EMOTIONAL AND MORAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM AMERICA; DOUBTS, HOSTILITY, TOWARDS VIETNAM WAR, AND TOWARDS U.S. POLICY-MAKING AND THEORETICAL PROCESSES TIED TO VIETNAM. EUROPEAN DISINCLINATION TO CHALLENGE AMERICA OR WEAKEN NATO ALLIANCE, ALTHOUGH MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO SUFFERS FROM BOTH U.S. AND EUROPEAN ACTIONS--THE LATTER REFLECTING NEED TO LIMIT INTIMACY WITH AMERICAN POLICY AS WELL AS DIFFERENT RISK PERCEPTION. NONETHELESS ULTIMATE EUROPEAN RELIANCE ON AMERICA REMAINS, REINFORCED BY CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968.

GROWING EUROPEAN SELF-CONFIDENCE, CHIEFLY DUE TO COMMON MARKET ECONOMIC SUCCESS, GROWING SENSE OF INDUSTRIAL, COMMERCIAL, TECHNOLOGICAL POWER.

1970'S

SHARED AND FAIRLY LOW SENS OF RISK; EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS BOTH CULTIVATING DETENTE, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ACCORD WITH U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPE.

NATO COOPERATION WEAKENED, AT POLICY LEVEL AT LEAST, BY DIVERGENT EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN VIEWS OF BURDEN SHARING, ECONOMIC CRISIS, AMERICAN "NEO-ISOLATIONISM" AND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM. MARKED EUROPEAN SENSE OF DIFFERENTIATION FROM AMERICA, SKEPTICISM ABOUT AMERICAN POLITICAL AND DOMESTIC STABILITY, ANGER AT AMERICAN FISCAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES.

"EUROPEAN" NUCLEAR FORCE AND COMMON POLITICAL AND FISCAL POLICIES ARE ENHANCED PROSPECTS AS THE COMMON MARKET EXPANDS. ECONOMIC RIVALRY WITH U.S. (AND JAPAN) GROWS.

TENTATIVE INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN INITIATIVES IN EASTERN EUROPE; WEST GERMAN "OSTPOLITIK" GENERALLY JUDGED BY EUROPEANS TO BE SUCCESSFUL (DESPITE AMERICAN DOUBTS); CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF WEST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE.

EUROPEAN SELF-CONFIDENCE FAIRLY HIGH, BUT PERHAPS LESS HIGH IN THIS PERIOD, WHEN AMERICAN DISENGAGEMENT SEEMS A REAL-- AND IN SOME WAYS THREATENING--POSSIBILITY, THAN IT WAS IN THE LATE 1960'S. GENERAL UNWILLINGNESS SERIOUSLY TO CONFRONT THE POSSIBILITIES OF EAST EUROPEAN CRISIS.
THE AIMS OF THE ALLIES

1. The principal objective of the Allies is to achieve the complete and unconditional surrender of the Axis powers and the restoration of national sovereignty in the countries occupied by them.

2. The Western Allies determine the strategy of the war against Germany and the general strategy of the war against the Axis powers.

3. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to reconquer all territories occupied by the Axis powers and to bring them under the control of the Allied governments.

4. The Western Allies shall take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

5. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

6. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

I. THE NATURE OF SUCCESS

1. The Western Allies determine the strategy of the war against Germany and the general strategy of the war against the Axis powers.

2. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to reconquer all territories occupied by the Axis powers and to bring them under the control of the Allied governments.

3. The Western Allies shall take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

4. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

5. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

II. THE GOALS OF THE ALLIES

1. The principal objective of the Allies is to achieve the complete and unconditional surrender of the Axis powers and the restoration of national sovereignty in the countries occupied by them.

2. The Western Allies determine the strategy of the war against Germany and the general strategy of the war against the Axis powers.

3. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to reconquer all territories occupied by the Axis powers and to bring them under the control of the Allied governments.

4. The Western Allies shall take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

5. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

II. THE NATURE OF SUCCESS

1. The Western Allies determine the strategy of the war against Germany and the general strategy of the war against the Axis powers.

2. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to reconquer all territories occupied by the Axis powers and to bring them under the control of the Allied governments.

3. The Western Allies shall take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

4. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

5. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

II. THE NATURE OF SUCCESS

1. The Western Allies determine the strategy of the war against Germany and the general strategy of the war against the Axis powers.

2. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to reconquer all territories occupied by the Axis powers and to bring them under the control of the Allied governments.

3. The Western Allies shall take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

4. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

5. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

II. THE NATURE OF SUCCESS

1. The Western Allies determine the strategy of the war against Germany and the general strategy of the war against the Axis powers.

2. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to reconquer all territories occupied by the Axis powers and to bring them under the control of the Allied governments.

3. The Western Allies shall take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

4. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

5. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

II. THE NATURE OF SUCCESS

1. The Western Allies determine the strategy of the war against Germany and the general strategy of the war against the Axis powers.

2. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to reconquer all territories occupied by the Axis powers and to bring them under the control of the Allied governments.

3. The Western Allies shall take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

4. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.

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II. THE NATURE OF SUCCESS

1. The Western Allies determine the strategy of the war against Germany and the general strategy of the war against the Axis powers.

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5. The Western Allies shall make every possible effort to ensure the safety and security of the Allied forces and to prevent any attempts to disrupt the Allied war effort.
1. NATO AS AN INSTRUMENT VS. NATO AS A VALUE
2. EUROPEAN RECONCILIATION VS. EUROPEAN UNIFICATION
3. DISENGAGEMENT DESIGNED TO MITIGATE COLD WAR VS.
   SETTLEMENT DESIGNED TO RATIFY COLD WAR'S "END"
4. EAST GERMAN LIBERATION VS. ALL-GERMAN REUNIFICATION
5. LIMITED TREATY RESTRICTIONS VS. "PERPETUAL" RESTRICTIONS
6. NEUTRALIZATION VS. DISARMAMENT

THE OBJECTIVES ARE:

1. TO OBTAIN A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES
   AND POLITICAL AGENCIES—and remove the threat of
   SOVIET INTERVENTION—from the nations of Eastern Europe
   in order to recreate a Europe of stable international relationships.

2. TO PREVENT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN, AND EXPLOITATION
   OF, DETERIORATION—OR "SURPRISES"—IN THE ESTABLISHED
   ORDER OF STABILITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE.

THIS MEANS ESTABLISHING NONINTERVENTION AS A PRINCIPLE OF
INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT IN EUROPE.

THE POLICY

1. IS CONSISTENT WITH THE "NIXON DOCTRINE," AND INDEED
   IS INHERENTLY A LONG-TERM POLICY OR REDUCING
   THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE.

2. ACCOMMODATES THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S HOPE FOR DOMESTIC
   PROSPERITY, DEVELOPMENT WITH SOVIET INTERVEN-
   TIONS AND EXPORTS, COMMENDS THE REALITY OF
   A WEAKENED U.S. AND AMERICAN TRADE BALANCE.

3. RESPONDS TO THE TREMENDOUS EUROPEAN IMPULSE TOWARDS
   INDEPENDENCE, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNITY IN ADDI-
   TION TO ECONOMIC CONVERSION, A "EUROPEAN IDENTITY,"

4. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, ESTABLISHES A
   POLICY OF SELF-HELP AND SELF-DEFENSE, MAKING AMERICAN
   WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE WITH SOVIET WITH-
   DRAWAL, FACILITATING EUROPE'S RATHER THAN
   EUROPE'S TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC, STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL
   CRISIS, AS A REACTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF TIGHT-TECH
   EUROPE, AND AMERICAN REALISM AND FREEDOM.
GOAL OF NORMALIZATION

DEFINITION OF MODERN INTERDEPENDENCE

THE RELATIVE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND
SCIENTIFIC INTERDEPENDENCE OF CIVILIZATIONS
And Regions, Including the Communist Bloc,
Shedding Light on the Concept of a "Global Community.

DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY AND
INTERVENTION INTO SUCH AREAS.

PRACTICE NONINTERVENTION WITH
SUCH POTENTIAL CONFLICTS,
INSTEAD OF PRIMARY RELIANCE ON DIPLOMATIC AND
POLITICAL MEANS TO MAINTAIN BALANCE.

A STRATEGY OF NORMALIZATION

1. DETERMINATION AND PROMULGATION, IN CONSULTATION
WITH AMERICAN ALLIES, OF THE GENERAL TERMS OF A
EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT AND SECURITY "NORMALIZATION"
ACCEPTABLE TO U.S.

2. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THIS THROUGH
NEGOTIATION.

3. EXPLOITATION, THROUGH POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES,
OF CRISIS AND DIPLOMATIC "SURPRISES" TO
ADVANCE TOWARD THE GOAL OF NORMALIZATION.

4. GENERAL CONFORMITY OF SECURITY MACHINERY TO REAL
NATURE AND SCALE OF THREATS.

5. PRIMARY RELIANCE ON DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL
MEANS INSTEAD OF PRIMARILY MILITARY MEANS TO
MAINTAIN BALANCE.

6. GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT WORLD WAR II CLOSED.

THE IMPROBABLE FORMULA FOR NORMALIZATION

"MAY THE FORCES ARE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER STATES."

C. A. L.
THE KOREAN FORMULA FOR TERMS OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY SETTLEMENT

"ALL FOREIGN TROOPS ARE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY OF SEVEN STATES,"

A PROVISIONAL SOLUTION

1. AN AUSTRALIAN TYPE SOLUTION
2. A FEEDER-GATEWAY SOLUTION
3. A FEEDER-STATE SOLUTION

THE KOREAN FORMULA FOR TERMS OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY SETTLEMENT

"ALL FOREIGN TROOPS ARE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY OF SEVEN STATES."

A PROVISIONAL SOLUTION

1. AN AUSTRALIAN TYPE SOLUTION
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THE KOREAN FORMULA FOR TERMS OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY SETTLEMENT

"ALL FOREIGN TROOPS ARE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY OF SEVEN STATES."

A PROVISIONAL SOLUTION

1. AN AUSTRALIAN TYPE SOLUTION
2. A FEEDER-GATEWAY SOLUTION
3. A FEEDER-STATE SOLUTION
THE ACTION PRINCIPLE OF A DYNAMIC POLICY

IN A CRISIS OR "SURPRISE" TO RAISE THE STAKES IN CALCULATED AND RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY WAYS, SO AS TO MAKE NORMALIZATION THE PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE FOR THE OPPONENT.

AN UNDERLYING AND INELUCTABLE ASSUMPTION OF A "NORMALIZATION" POLICY:

THAT EUROPE SHOULD BE OPEN TO NEW IDEAS AND POLITICAL CHANGE - IN BOTH EAST AND WEST.

THE ROMANIAN FORMULA FOR TERMS OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY SETTLEMENT:

"ALL FOREIGN TROOPS ARE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER STATES."

AN "AUSTRIAN-TYPE" SOLUTION.

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN NONCOMMUNIST OR NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

SOVIET DIFFICULTIES (AGRICULTURAL, SUCCESSION-OF-LEADERSHIP CRISIS AT HOME, UNREST OR TITOIST MOVEMENTS AMONG THE BLOC COUNTRIES)

SHOW OF WESTERN RESOLVE INFLUENCING SOVIET DECISION - INTERNATIONAL FORCE

SOVIETS MAY PREFER AUSTRIAN-TYPE SOLUTION RATHER THAN ATTEMPT TO REPEAT "HUNGARY" AND PERHAPS LOSE THE ENTIRE BLOC

A "POLAND-IRANIAN-TYPE" SOLUTION:

POLISH HERETICAL MOVEMENT

BUFFER STATE STATUS MAINTAINED

SECURITY OF SOVIETS AND OF POLAND MAINTAINED (RECOGNIZED SOVIET INTEREST IN POLISH FOREIGN RELATIONS, MUTUAL DEFENSEfait, ETC.)

A "CUBAN-TYPE" SOLUTION:

ANOTHER "HUNGARY" REPEL, NEW GOVERNMENT, TO BEFORE SOVIET OR OTHER COMMUNIST INTERVENTION APPEAL FOR HELP TO DISCOURAGE INTERVENTION

SUPPORT OF NEW GOVERNMENT WITH VISIBILITY, IF SUPPORT (AS IN THE SENDING OF SOVIET EqU AND TROOPS TO CUBA)

INTERNATIONAL FORCE (UN OR NON-UN)
PAST REPEATED:

IGHT WE HAVE DONE!

ITED NATIONS: RECOGNITION OF THE THREE IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF NEUTRAL OBSERVERS PRESENTATION DURING THE THREE DAY SECOND SOWET INTERVENTIONS... RAPID MUNICIPATION OF A MILITARY INTEREST IN A NAME, "MAURITAN" STATUS FOR TERTIARILY GUARANTEED. (3) ASSURANCES TO IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND RESPECT FOR SECURITY INTEREST IN THE HUNGARIAN IN FORCIBLE TERMS TO THE U.S.S.R. OF IC AND MILITARY REFUSALS THAT COULD IMPACT HUMANITY.

AS: U.S. AND ALLIED COMMUNICATION ON TO THE INVASION, THAT NON-CONDITION OF CONTINUED DETENTE IN CONTINUED AND EXPANDED TRADE RELATIONS, NEGOTIATIONS... INDEED THAT NONINTERVEN- TO THE CONFESSION WHICH UNDERLIE ITS. PROPOSALS TO THE SOVIETS FOR WARK AUTONOMY, AND POLITICAL AND IN EUROPE, AND FOR LARGER ALLIATONS ABLE TO PROVIDE THE U.S.S.R. SECURITY GUARANTEES AND PROTECTION NICAL INTERESTS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

CUBAN-TYPE! SOLUTION:

ICAL MOVEMENT (AS IN 1953, OR S ELSEWHERE—WEST GERMAN ARMY ACE-SAVING!

ZONE EAST OF BERLIN EN BERLIN AND ODER

GERMAN-TYPE!! SOLUTION:

(REVOLT, NEW GOVERNMENT, THEN PAUSE IN OTHER COMBAT INTERVENTIONS, P TO DISCOURAGE INTERVENTIONS) ARMED WITH VICTORY, IF NECESSARY, THE LIBERATION OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT ERA (UN OR NON-IN)

HIS: "PERMANENTLY DIVIDED GERMANY?"

GERMANY NOW HAS BEEN DIVIDED FOR 26 YEARS.

A UNITED GERMANY EXISTED ONLY FROM 1871 TO 1945--AND EVEN THAT UNION EXCLUDED GERMAN-SPEAKING SWITZERLAND AND., FOR 67 OF those 76 YEARS, AUSTRIA. THERE ARE TODAY AT LEAST FIVE "GERMANY'S": AUSTRIA; THE WEST GERMAN FEDERATION OF RHINELAND AND LIECHTENSTEIN (CATHERINE) STATES: THE EAST ('MIDDLE') GERMAN FEDERATION OF (PROTESTANT) HANOVER-BAUERNBURG-MICHELBERG-SAXOV-THURINGIA; THE GERMAN-SPEAKING SWITZERLAND, AND SILESIA-POMERANIA- EAST PRUSSIA, NOW NON-VOLUNTEERED TERRITORIES WITH THE GERMAN POPULATION EARLY EXPELLED. FROM THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES UNTIL NAPOLEON, GERMANY WAS A COLLECTION OF SMALL PRINCIPALITIES, FROM 1816 TO 1918 IT WAS A CONTINENTAL WITHOUT CENTER OF POWER—"INCAPABLE OF ATTACK, UNREPELLEABLE IN DEFENSE.

SINCE THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, WEST GERMANY HAS BEEN INTRODUCED INTO A WEST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC UNION WHICH IS EVOLVING FORMS OF POLITICAL UNITY.
5. EUROPEAN SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE GOAL OF "NORMALIZATION"\(^2\)

A European security conference now seems virtually certain to take place during 1972. In the preparations for this conference the question of America's positive policy objectives in Central and Eastern Europe is likely to receive a formal answer, even if the answer may prove to possess unconsidered implications. It is necessary to distinguish in general terms between two kinds of European settlement, either one of which might be sought by the United States and its allies in this conference. The first version of settlement is the one which since the 1950's has been recommended by certain policy analysts and commentators in the West and by certain East European governmental spokesmen. Described in the 1950's and 1960's as "disengagement," it might better in present circumstances be given the title of "normalization." The "norm" of normalization is fairly simple and traditional: all the European states are acknowledged to be autonomous, free from the threat of foreign intervention into their internal affairs and from the presence of foreign troops on their soil; in general, political arrangements and restraints are substituted for the military security arrangements which now dominate the relationship of Eastern and Western powers in Central Europe. No doubt there would be certain generally agreed, and accepted, constraints upon the external policies and perhaps the military forces of Germany, and possibly of the East European nations, as concessions to Soviet security needs and perceptions.

THE GOALS OF NORMALIZATION

TO SUBSTITUTE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS FOR MILITARY ONES.

TO MAKE MILITARY PENALTIES AND PRESSURES THE ULTIMATE RESORT, AND THE PENALTY FOR A BROKEN "NORMALIZATION," RATHER THAN THE IMMEDIATE AND CONVENTIONAL TERMS OF EAST-WEST POWER RELATIONSHIPS.

TO END THE DIVISION OF EUROPE.

TO RESTORE NORMALITY TO THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS AND RELATIONS OF THE EAST EUROPEAN STATES BY REMOVING FOREIGN TROOPS FROM THEIR TERRITORIES.

TO END THE DEPLOYMENT ON EUROPEAN SOIL OF AMERICAN FORCES.

TO RATIFY IN CREATIVE AND LASTING TERMS THE EUROPEAN DETENTE.

A POLICY OF NORMALIZATION

1. IS CONSISTENT WITH THE "NIXON DOCTRINE," AND INDEED IS INDISPENSABLE TO A LONG-TERM POLICY OF REDUCING THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE.

2. ACCOMMODATES THE AMERICAN PUBLIC MOOD OF DOMESTIC PREOCCUPATION, DISILLUSIONMENT WITH FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT; CONFORMS TO THE REALITIES OF A WEAKENED DOLLAR AND AMERICAN TRADE BALANCE.

3. RESPONDS TO THE EMERGING EUROPEAN IMPULSE TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE, FISCAL AND/political unity in addition to economic cooperation, a "EUROPEAN IDENTITY."

4. BUT DOES THESE THINGS CREATIVELY, ESTABLISHING A POSITIVE GOAL FOR AMERICAN POLICY, MAKING AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL, STABILIZING EUROPEAN POLITICS RATHER THAN DESTABILIZING THEM, TURNING DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL CRISES AND "SURPRISES" TO THE ADVANTAGE OF LONG-TERM EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PEACE AND FREEDOM.
The second form of European settlement is that apparently envisaged in Soviet policy today. It would preserve the present political situation in Eastern Europe, including the Soviet claim to a right to intervene against "anti-socialist" developments within the East European states, but it would make the preservation of this status quo less uncertain and expensive through certain agreements, among them an agreed mutual reduction of Soviet and American troop levels in Europe.

PRESENT-DAY MOTIVES FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE:
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

FOR THE U.S.S.R. (WHICH IS ANXIOUS THAT THE CONFERENCE COME ABOUT)

1. REDUCE OR ELIMINATE AMERICAN TROOPS IN EUROPE, AMERICAN INFLUENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE.

2. UNDERCUT OR DISARM WEST EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC INTEREST AND INFLUENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE.

3. REGULARIZE OR RATIFY SOVIET CONTROL OF THE EAST EUROPEAN STATES, ISOLATING DISSIDENTS (AS IN RUMANIA), UNDERMINING LIBERALISM (AS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA), INCREASING THE PRESSURE ON YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE U.S.S.R.

4. LEGITIMIZE THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE DIVISION OF GERMANY.

5. ALLOW MILITARY REDEPLOYMENTS TO THE SOVIET-CHINESE BORDER, PERHAPS REDUCED SOVIET MILITARY BUDGETS.

6. EXCLUDE CHINESE INFLUENCE FROM EASTERN EUROPE.

7. INCREASE THREAT AND BLACKMAIL POTENTIAL TOWARDS WESTERN EUROPE.

ALL THESE BUT THE LAST ARE REDUCIBLE TO AN ATTEMPT TO REGULARIZE AND STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET SECURITY POSITION--IDEOLOGICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY AND POLITICAL--IN EASTERN EUROPE, AT LOWERED COST IF POSSIBLE.
FOR THE U.S. (WHICH HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO SEE THE
CONFERENCE COME ABOUT)

1. WITHIN THE GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF CONTINUING TO ASSURE THE
SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE AND PROMOTING EAST-WEST STABILITY
AND DETENTE;

2. REDUCING AMERICAN BUDGET COSTS AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
DEFICITS THROUGH MUTUAL AND BALANCED EAST-WEST TROOP REDUC-
TIONS, AND/OR THE TRANSFER OF SECURITY COSTS AND RESPONSI-
BILITIES TO THE WEST EUROPEANS, WITH A MAJOR REDUCTION IN
U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE.

3. AND SO FAR AS POSSIBLE, MAKING SECURE THAT DEGREE OF
AUTONOMY OF FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION
ACHIEVED WITHIN CERTAIN EAST EUROPEAN STATES.

THESE SEEM REDUCIBLE TO AN ATTEMPT TO PRESERVE THE
EXISTING POLITICAL SITUATION AND RELATIONSHIPS IN CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE WHILE REDUCING THE COSTS TO THE UNITED
STATES—BOTH FINANCIAL AND IN TERMS OF ACTUAL TROOPS AND
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS. THE DOMINATING INFLUENCES ARE FIS-
CAL (BALANCE OF PAYMENTS) AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL ("NEO-
ISOLATIONISM," THE MANSFIELD AMENDMENT).

The formulation of motives made in the above chart no doubt would be
debated, but it is difficult to believe that any alternate listing of
American and Soviet policy objectives in the matter of European security
would alter certain conclusions. These are that the Soviet objectives are
positive and directed towards improving the Soviet's strategic position by
reducing the insecurities in their relationship with the East European
states, and reducing or eliminating the American force deployed in Europe.
The American objectives are negative; to cut costs while maintaining essen-
tially the present political structure in Europe. The improvement sought
by the Soviet Union is not primarily a matter of tangible, immediate gains,
or concessions from the Western powers. Rather it lies in eliminating
certain sources of insecurity and opposition within the Soviet bloc, actual
or potential threats to the status quo. The status quo, then, must be
understood as one which, to the Soviets, includes element of risk and possible change. The present situation is one in which certain dynamic forces are at work which jeopardize the present stability of the region and cast doubt upon what is, in Soviet eyes, the desirable condition: a Warsaw bloc wholly made up of governments in essential matters subordinate to and dependent upon the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, these dynamic forces, in combination with the American military force deployed in Europe, today requires a large and expensive Soviet garrison in Eastern Europe. If the Soviet Union were to achieve the substance of the goals attributed to it above (even excluding the aggressive seventh point), its strategic situation would be immensely improved.

In contrast, the American goals we list could in two out of three cases be achieved in a manner consistent with the substance—if not intent, as the third point makes clear—of the Soviet Union's goals. It is not in the least implausible, then that a European security agreement could actually come about which provided or brought about:

1. Mutual and balanced U.S. and Soviet troop reductions (negotiated separately).

2. A major shift of Western security responsibilities to the West Europeans, with American troops in substantially a reserve role.

3. But with mutual NATO and Warsaw Pact troop reductions as well, a reduction, or at least no significant increase, in West European troop levels.

4. And by virtue of these steps, together with the act of security agreement itself, an implicit but seemingly unmistakable pledge by the Western powers not to attempt to alter, or intervene to support an alteration, in the political situation in Eastern Europe, thus—
5. An implicit Western acquiescence in the Brezhnev Doctrine, perhaps coupled to a--

6. Non-aggression treaty, a formal or implicit Soviet guarantee of the present status of West Berlin, or an assurance of non-interference and non-intervention outside the Warsaw Pact bloc (possibly including a specific assurance of non-interference in Yugoslavia).

But the question which must be asked is whether, of the two versions of settlement we have described, this one is the more advantageous for the West, or more consistent with the national security interests of the United States. Either version of settlement remains a possibility. It is the second one, tacitly conceding the perpetuation of Soviet authority over the affairs of Eastern Europe, which presently seems the more likely to come about. In our opinion the short term effect of this probably would be stabilizing, tending to reiterate and reinforce the lessons of the Czechoslovak invasion of 1968 and ratifying the substance of the "Brezhnev Doctrine." In the longer term this version seems to us likely to introduce new, and newly intensified, instabilities into the region, in time bringing about a more risk-taking mood of nationalism, popular discontent, and anti-Russianism in Eastern Europe, inviting eventual Soviet actions of a kind which would seriously affect West European and American interests.

The alternative, which we have called a policy of "normalization," constitutes a positive policy directed to constructive change in Europe. Moreover, it postulates an objective which, while it clearly is negotiable, in practice may be attainable only through an intelligent and adroit exploitation of surprise and crisis in Europe.
6. THE GOAL OF "NORMALIZATION" AND THE EXPLOITATION OF SURPRISE

A. The Strategic and Tactical Value of a Positive Goal

A policy goal may be valuable because it is reasonable to expect that it can be attained, and the steps towards it, together with the costs which it involves, are fully understood and accepted. This, however, may be a situation infrequently met. Certainly in a political relationship where major national interests are in conflict the attainability of a goal becomes in important ways contingent upon the process and progress of the policy. A policy goal is also valuable when that goal is clearly understood to be a definition of purpose which may or may not be achieved in its stated terms, and is likely to be revised or reframed in the course of events and under the pressure of change.

In the second case there is value in the fact that while the goal may or may not be attained (in the terms in which it was initially stated), the goal nonetheless establishes a series of secondary policy objectives which are attainable, and desirable in themselves, and the goal also provides an intelligible standard of progress, a measure of gain or loss, a framework for decision, in a political process which otherwise is likely to become dominated by immediate events, specific problems, and improvised or ad hoc, decision-making.

The goal of normalization, then, is interesting not only because of the importance of what it might accomplish in the longer term evolution of European politics and America's security situation, but also because it provides an intellectual and political structure for policy and action in the shorter term. It addresses the problems of drift, improvisation, and defensive decision-making, which critics attribute to America's European policy today.
Just as the military and political agencies of government tend to be disarmed by a lack of positive goals, reduced to conservative and status quo seeking behavior, public opinion cannot easily be summoned to the support of policy without a reasonable statement of the positive goals of that policy. So long as the European alternatives are understood in the West as largely a choice between maintaining or marginally altering an existing situation and, on the other hand, that kind of risk of catastrophic war which became apparent in the policy of "liberation" and "rollback," the inevitable choice will by default be the status quo. And as we have argued, a defense of the status quo against an opponent with positive objectives is foredoomed to at least incremental failures. If our European policy is recast in terms of a goal of normalization, then it becomes possible to summon public support for those measures—including contingent military commitments in Europe—which clearly support that goal. Argumentation, debate, becomes possible which can create through public discourse a popular consensus supporting an American policy in Europe, and in NATO, which possesses both a purpose and an intelligible outcome.

It should parenthetically be said that this has been a widely misunderstood issue in recent years. The "credibility" problem is essentially a creation of government, not of the press, however much the press may have contributed to the development of the problem. It is a responsibility of government to formulate policy and recommend it to the public, to structure debate and enter into the debate to win a consensus for the actions which a professional elite and the responsible officers of government regard as necessary or desirable. There obviously can be no serious policy if government turns itself to supine subordination to public opinion polls, which in
any event are in an important respect irresponsible consultations of opinion (unlike voting, where the citizen performs a considered act with a definite outcome). But at the same time representative government means an ultimate submission of policy to the public will—even if the public will, in the eyes of the elite, proves mistaken or ill-informed. After the experience of the Vietnam War it should be unnecessary to labor this point. Unless the public has given government a clear—if necessarily generalized—mandate for a given course of action, it is a fatal step for government to go ahead on that course. To do so is an irresponsible act in terms of principle, but is also likely to prove fatally damaging in practical political terms since popular trust in government is challenged and a repudiation of the responsible administration or governmental officers may ensue—no doubt after a period of divisive national controversy.

It is important to make this point in the present context since a forward policy of normalization in Europe is feasible only if it enjoys popular support. At present it seems reasonable to say that the public has been given little consideration of the options open to Western policy in Europe other than acquiescing in the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe. If the public debate has in this case been inadequate, it is in part because of a failure within government, a failure to define and articulate a serious alternative choice. An even worse failure would of course occur if the government were itself to shift policy but treat public opinion as unworthy of serious and open consultation and debate.
B. A "Normalization" Program

Let us formulate the goals of a normalization policy as, briefly,

1. To obtain a Soviet acknowledgement, explicit or at least effective, of the autonomy of all the East European governments and of their right to conduct the internal policies they individually choose.

2. To obtain a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe as a condition of withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe, and with that a general withdrawal of all foreign troops in Europe from the soil of other countries.

3. Implicit in this is the understanding that the Soviet Union has a reasonable security interest that the East European countries will not enter into hostile military alliances or arrangements; certain constraints on the external policies of the East European states and possibly (as part of a general European settlement) of Germany are appropriate subjects for negotiation, as are non-aggression assurances or other multilateral security assurances among all of the European powers and the United States—as the interested non-European power and as well as a victor of World War II.

4. A general opening of political, trade, economic, and cultural relations across the borders of the existing Eastern and Western blocs.

These are not objectives likely to be achieved through negotiation in the present circumstances, when, as we have noted, American troops seem likely to be reduced or withdrawn for reasons of American economic needs and domestic public opinion, and when the Soviet relationship with the East European states seems increasingly troubled. The former circumstance reduces, if it does not promise to eliminate, the main external pressure upon the Soviet Union to make concessions. The latter offers the prospect of solution in two different ways: through renewed repression and Soviet military pressures and intervention—the Brezhnev Doctrine—or through political adjustments which render nationalism and internal liberalizations in Eastern Europe no longer threats to Soviet security.
The purpose, then, of a new American policy would be (1) to make use of residual American leverage through making troop withdrawals contingent upon Soviet concessions, (2) to supply new forms of leverage through a program of active and forward promotion of "normalization," in order (3) to make political adjustments in the Soviet relationship to all of the European powers a more advantageous and reliable solution to the perceived Soviet security problem than their present course of repression and intervention.

To do this would involve the following

THE WESTERN ALLIES EXPLICITLY CONDEMN INTERVENTION, AND SPECIFICALLY THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE ITS APPLICATION OR TO REGARD AS LEGITIMATE ITS EFFECTS.

This act is obviously a challenge to the Soviet Union, which would interpret such a declaration as itself an intervention into the affairs of the socialist bloc. The result would unquestionably be a heating up of Cold War rhetoric, which is unimportant provided that the Western powers have an intelligible, politically and morally responsible response put forward. That response would be that nonintervention, national self determination, are indispensable principles of a world order which provides a promise of permanent peace and stability among nations. Detente, a profoundly desirable condition in East-West relations, requires a commitment on both sides to the full sovereignty and internal autonomy of all the states of Europe. A certain standard of political conduct is required if the states of Europe are to have that confidence in their future which will allow them to reduce their military deployments and expenditures, and begin to dismantle the security arrangements which are the inheritance of World War II, Stalinism, and the years of Cold War. That standard of conduct, which was assumed to exist
during the early years of detente, is irreconcilable with the Brezhnev Doctrine; that Doctrine, then, is irreconcilable with a European political settlement which the Western powers could accept. There cannot, of course, be any reasonable expectation that the Soviet government would publicly repudiate the Brezhnev Doctrine. Conveniently, as it happens, that Doctrine has remained to some extent ambiguous in the formal statements of Soviet policy since 1968.

THE WESTERN ALLIES SEEK NEGOTIATIONS FOR A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT ON "NORMALIZATION" TERMS, ACKNOWLEDGING AND PROVIDING PRACTICAL SAFEGUARDS FOR SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS ALONG THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN DEFENSIVE GLACIS.

The stand we have described undoubtedly could delay, even jeopardize, the European security conference which now is expected to take place following ratification of the ambassadorial agreement on Berlin. However it is the Soviet Union and the East European states who are anxious to have this conference. The Western powers can only improve their positions with respect both to such a conference and to an eventual normalization by adopting a clear and positive position on the terms for normalization and settlement.

THE WESTERN ALLIES DECLARE THE PRACTICE OF NONINTERVENTION TO BE A SINE QUO NON OF DETENTE, AND SPECIFICALLY OF ARMS CONTROL TRUST AND GOOD COMMERCIAL/TRADING RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

The first stage in the normalization program establishes a positive stance as Western policy and articulates the Western objective. The second stage is to make use of "surprises" or "crises" to move towards that goal. A crisis situation in fact provides favorable circumstances, since the
leverage possessed by the Western powers is more easily employed in a crisis. That leverage consists in (1) military pressures—troop reinforcements and troop movements, heightened readiness preparations, new weapons deployments, etc.; (2) political pressures: including the suspension or breaking off of diplomatic or consular relations; negotiations or a refusal to negotiate on a range of practical issues, the most important of those being arms control and trade and other economic agreements; and a very wide range of political warfare and propaganda activities directed to third parties, or to the opponent's populations or elements in those populations; (3) economic and fiscal pressures, including embargoes.

In all of these matters the Western powers obviously have things to lose; these steps in some degree would be self-penalizing; but in nearly all of them the Soviet Union and the East European states have more to lose than the Western powers. They are in need of Western consumer plants, Western technology, trade with Western Europe, Western economic credits, and arms limitations agreements. These pressures could have been employed to deter, or to exact a penalty for, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. They were not because the will to employ them was lacking; one important reason the will was lacking was that a positive and intelligible course of action and long-term objective was lacking in the West. In a future crisis, with contingency planning and a considered formulation of goals and public policy, they might be used effectively. The importance of these pressures will steadily increase as Eastern economic ties and arms agreements with the West increase over the next few years.
THE WESTERN ALLIES PRACTICE NONINTERVENTION WITH RESPECT ESPECIALLY TO SUCH POTENTIAL OR CONCEIVABLE CRISIS AREAS AS GREECE, SPAIN, ITALY, AND THEY ENFORCE SOVIET NONINTERVENTION IN SUCH AREAS.

There is, inevitably, a reciprocal element in such as a program as this, and if normalization is taken seriously as a long-term objective of policy then the standards which it would attempt to establish within Eastern Europe must clearly prevail within the West. That is, the Soviet Union's present attitude towards the Eastern bloc expresses not only a naked power interest, an ideological interest, and certain not unreasonable (in terms of historical experience) security interests, but also reflects a view of Europe as divided into spheres of influence. Stalin once observed to Winston Churchill that the U.S.S.R. did not concern itself with what the British did in liberated Belgium and the Netherlands; why should Soviet conduct in Poland concern Great Britain? The question was both provocative and untrue in its implications, since the U.S.S.R., through its political agencies and the foreign Communist Parties was already interesting itself in the lowlands, and since what the Soviet Union was doing in Poland in 1944-1945 included extinguishing that country's political independence. But the question reflected a reality as well: the Western Allies of World War II dominated Western Europe and tolerated little interference from the U.S.S.R. in that area. The U.S.S.R., dominating Eastern Europe, intended to suffer no interference in the vastly different political regime it intended to impose—at what proved to be intense human cost. Today the U.S.S.R. may still believe that a left-wing government elected in Italy which included the Communist Party, or an uprising in Spain or Greece which seemed to offer the prospect that the Communist Party would come to power through its own actions and without external intervention in its support.
would bring American political, if not military, intervention.

ENFORCEMENT MEASURES TO BE CONTINGENT IN INTENSITY AND DURATION UPON THE SCALE AND DURATION OF THE OPPOSING INTERVENTIONS (INTO EITHER EASTERN OR WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS' AFFAIRS), AND DIRECT, NOT THROUGH PROXIES OR BY MEANS OF SUPPORT FOR ONE OR ANOTHER CONTENDING GROUP OR FACTION.

Soviet action which contravenes the national autonomy of another European state should be met with direct measures of reprisal, whether these are political, economic, or in some circumstances, military in character. That these should be direct is a significant point. To respond to a Soviet initiative that makes use of indirect methods or proxies with tactics of the same kind, establishing a client or proxy of our own, tends (as our experience in Greece as well as Vietnam would suggest) to dilute and distort the real issues of conflict. Setting proxy against proxy tends to perpetuate the conflict, and the parochial interests of the proxy inevitably will dominate his own actions, thus creating American political and moral investments which may be unwanted but also unavoidable (the sponsor may find that in important respects it has become the client). Irrelevant or unwanted issues obscure the real significance of what is at stake and the real objectives of action and counteraction. Our policy objective should be unmistakable: that the nations of all Europe should be free from foreign interventions into their affairs.

THE ACTION PRINCIPLE OF THIS POLICY:

IN A CRISIS OR "SURPRISE" TO RAISE THE STAKES IN CALCULATED AND RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY WAYS, SO AS TO MAKE NORMALIZATION THE PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE FOR THE OPPONENT.

AN UNDERLYING AND INELUCTABLE ASSUMPTION OF THE POLICY:

THAT EUROPE SHOULD BE OPEN TO NEW IDEAS AND POLITICAL CHANGE--IN BOTH EAST AND WEST.