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A STUDY OF MASS POPULATION DISPLACEMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM

PART I. ANALYSIS OF THE FORCED RELOCATION PROCESS

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7710 Old Springhouse Road
McLean, Virginia 22101

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The report is a study of the forced relocation of civilians in Viet-Nam. It is based upon information collected in 498 interviews with evacuee heads-of-household and draws comparative data from 593 interviews with voluntary refugees.

The report is divided into two parts: Part I, "Analysis of the Forced Relocation Process," consists of five chapters dealing with the characteristics of movement; the resettlement experience; comparative demography; attitudes; and the implications of forced relocation for the pactification effort. Part II, "Case Studies of Refugee Resettlement," presents eight case studies of the evacuee and refugee settlements analyzed in Part I. These case studies are of sites in I Corps.

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SUMMARY

Introduction

• This report is a study of the forced relocation of civilians in Viet-Nam. It is based upon information collected in 498 interviews with evacuee heads-of-household and draws comparative data from 593 interviews with voluntary refugees.

• "Evacuees" are defined as civilians who have been forcibly relocated from their homes; "refugees" are civilians who have voluntarily moved to a new settlement location. The principal thesis of this study is that evacuees and refugees constitute distinctly different populations presenting different problems to the Government and offering different potential new resources to the pacification effort.

• This report is divided into two parts: Part I, "Analysis of the Forced Relocation Process," consists of five chapters dealing with the characteristics of movement; the resettlement experience; comparative demography; attitudes, and the implications of forced relocation for the pacification effort. Part II presents eight case studies of the evacuee and refugee settlements analyzed in Part I.

1. Characteristics of Movement

• Forced relocation operations consist of five phases: (1) planning and preinitiation preparation; (2) roundup; (3) movement; (4) temporary relocation; and (5) resettlement. Chapter I presents criteria for evaluating the implementation of the four movement phases and measures the adequacy of the relocation operations studied. No operation achieved more than half of the possible evaluation points, while the worst achieved under 10 percent by these criteria.

II. Resettlement Experience

A set of 12 resettlement objectives are described and the extent to which these were achieved in the four evacuee study sites analyzed.

- Objective 1: Improvement of housing. 57 percent of evacuees received houses of higher quality construction than their premovement houses while under 2 percent had houses of lower quality.

- Objective 2: Provision of sufficient farm land. No relocation site provides sufficient farm land for all evacuees who had formerly been cultivators. The loss of access to land varies from 35 percent to 100 percent of the households.

- Objective 3: Provision of adequate employment. The average evacuee rate of unemployment is 49 percent, compared to 7 percent prior to movement.

- Objective 4: Improved standard of living. The evacuee standard of living is considerably lower than in the premovement situation.

- Objective 5: Improvement of health facilities. The evacuees report a 22 percent average increase in access to government health stations compared to the premovement situation with 97 percent now having access to health services.

- Objective 6: Adequate educational facilities. 64 percent of evacuee households with children of school age report that none of their eligible children are attending school in the relocation sites.

- Objective 7: Provision of adequate community facilities and public services. There is considerable variation between evacuee sites in the quality and quantity of public services available. However, all sites are served by the Vietnamese information service, have public wells and transportation.

- Objective 8: Provision of administrative services. When in need of decision-making advice, 93 percent of the evacuees would contact a local GVN official.

- Objective 9: Provision of resettlement aid. 98 percent of the evacuees have received aid of some type from the government.

- Objective 10: Provision of security. 94 percent of the evacuees rated their resettlement site as being fully secure.

- Objective 11: Exposure to government propaganda. There is little or no increase in the number of evacuees reporting exposure to various propaganda media compared to the exposure rate prior to movement.

- Objective 12: Participation in local social/political institutions. The degree of sociopolitical integration of evacuee communities appears to be relatively low.

III. Comparative Demography

The evacuee population is significantly different from the voluntary refugee population on a number of sociodemographic dimensions:

- The evacuees are an older population with a mean age of 24 compared to 21 for the refugees. 21 percent of the evacuees and 13 percent of the refugees are 45 years of age or older.

- There are only 81 males per 100 female evacuees, compared to the refugee sex ratio of 94.

- In the 15-49 age group, the evacuees have a sex ratio of 38, while the refugee population has 70 males per 100 females in this age group.

- The evacuee population has a ratio of 282 producers per 1,000 population; i.e., each productive aged evacuee must support himself plus 2.6 other persons. The refugee ratio is 328; i.e., each producer must support only two others.

- The evacuees have a mean household size of five persons compared to 5.7 persons for the refugees.

- The evacuee population has a lower fertility index (896) than the refugee population (1,097).

- 81 percent of the evacuees, 15 or older, are capable of performing normal physical labor compared to 87 percent of the refugees.

- The evacuees have a lower literacy rate than the refugees. 32 percent of the adult evacuee males tested as literate compared to 46 percent of the refugee males while 18 percent of the adult evacuee females tested as literate compared to 28 percent of the female refugees.

- Fewer evacuees (9 percent) than refugees (34 percent) have skills utilizable outside of the agricultural sector of the economy.

- On all sociodemographic measures the evacuees are a population with lower viability (in terms of ability to adapt and maintain itself in a new environment) than the refugees.

IV. Attitudes

The Cantril Self-Anchoring Scale technique was employed to determine the hopes and fears of the displaced persons. Major findings were:

- The number of topics about which forced evacuees are concerned is small.

- Evacuees express hopes for peace; for food, clothing and housing; for money; and for education for their children, in that order of frequency.

- Volitional refugees differ very little from evacuees in their hopes for the future.

- Neither group is particularly concerned over the availability of land in the future (reasons for this might vary from one location to another).

- Evacuees fear shortages of food and clothing, the prevalence of sickness without having treatment available, a generally misery-ridden existence, and the continuation of war, in that order.

- Volitional refugees' concerns are the same as those for evacuees, except that concern over a "miserable life" slightly outweighs that over sickness.

- All displaced persons rated their present life situation as significantly inferior to their past one, and in fact are the only national group ever studied using the Cantril Scale who have done this.

- While both evacuees and refugees rate the present lower than the past, evacuees rate their present life situation at a point significantly lower than do refugees.

- The majority of people in the evacuee grou[illegible]ot or cannot make predictions about conditions five years in the future; [illegible]o true of a sizeable proportion of refugees.

- Of those who do venture predictions for the future (no more than 65 percent of the persons in any one site), both groups (evacuees and refugees) feel that the future will be significantly better than the present.

- As a group, the voluntary refugees are significantly more optimistic about the future than are forced evacuees.

The following findings were derived from the responses of displaced persons to questions concerning the comparison of certain selected pre- and postmovement conditions.

- The majority of evacuees interviewed in any site felt that they were living in less comfortable dwellings now than they did prior to assuming evacuee status. This is in contrast to the apparently favorable measures of quality of house construction reported for these same sites.

- At least 80 percent of the evacuees in each location reported that their families' employment opportunities were considerably less favorable than their premovement opportunities. This finding corresponds with certain more objective measures of the situation. Volitional refugees, while far from satisfied with present employment conditions, are not as dissatisfied as are evacuees.

- From 75 to 95 percent of evacuees interviewed reported feeling that the present overall life situation is inferior to premovement conditions. On the whole, more volitional refugees were dissatisfied with present over premovement conditions than were satisfied, but the ratio of satisfied to dissatisfied persons is much more encouraging among refugees than among evacuees.

Displaced persons were asked to tell where they aspired to live under each of three sets of conditions.

- If war continues, the largest number of evacuees would prefer to remain where they are at present. The majority of volitional refugees in each site would stay where they are also, but from 10 to 30 percent would prefer to move on to a different location.

- If peace were to come to Viet-Nam and living conditions improved the majority of both evacuees and refugees would prefer to return home; an important exception to this finding is the Danang Refugee Camp residents who are split about equally between returning home and remaining in Danang.

- If peace should come but living conditions remain otherwise unchanged, at least 70 percent of evacuees and of refugees in each site would prefer to return home.

- Evacuees and refugees alike would prefer for their children to have a good education as their major vocational goal. Machinist/mechanic is the most frequently preferred vocation of displaced persons for their sons. More evacuees than refugees wanted their sons to farm, while fewer of the former group aspired to the professions of doctor, lawyer, etc., for their sons.

- When asked to name their two fondest wishes if these could be granted magically, both evacuees and refugees generated categories of wishes quite similar to the "hopes for the future" named in response to the Cantril Scale (see above).

V. Implications of Forced Relocation for the Pacification Effort

Despite its evident efficacy in other counterinsurgency campaigns forced relocation has not in the balance been an effective and efficient pacification tactic as it has been employed in Viet-Nam. The material costs to the GVN and the U. S. have been vast, the material and psychic costs to the evacuees beyond measure, and the evident damage inflicted on the Viet-Cong relatively slight. This is not to say that population regroupment is never justified: there are specific tactical situations where carefully planned and implemented relocations can be of real value to the pacification effort. But, on the basis of the evidence presented in the following chapters, forced relocation of civilians on a massive basis does not appear to offer a viable solution to the problems of rural pacification in Viet-Nam.

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Map 1. Republic of Viet-Nam, Showing Refugee Study Project Survey Sites 6

PART I

ANALYSIS OF THE FORCED RELOCATION PROCESS

Introduction

Displacement of the civilian population has been an integral aspect of the Viet-Nam War almost since its inception. The voluntary refugee movement which started in 1958-59 began to achieve major proportions by 1963 and has increased continually up to the present. Forced relocation of the rural populace into "agrovilles" and later "strategic hamlets" was initiated by the Diem regime as early as 1961; since the escalation of the war in 1965, ARVN and U. S. forces have conducted several massive resettlement operations involving the uprooting and resettlement of thousands of peasant families.

Some detailed studies have been made of the problem of voluntary refugee movement in Viet-Nam, but relatively little attention has been paid to forced relocation operations and their effects on the pacification effort. This report presents the findings of field studies of both types of movement: on four major forced relocation operations--Operation Cedar Falls in Binh Duong Province, Lam-Son 87 in Thua Thien Province, the DMZ Barrier Clearance Operations in Quang-Tri Province, and the Hung-Quang Regroupment Campaign in Quang-Nam Province; and on five voluntary refugee settlements in Quang-Nam and Quang-Tri Provinces. Part I of the report presents a comparative analysis of the nine cases studied. Part II presents detailed descriptions of individual cases.

Terminology

Before proceeding, it is essential to define what is meant by "forced relocation;" the several million displaced persons in Viet-Nam--officially designated as "compatriots who have fled communism" (dong-bao ty-nan cong-san) by the GVN, and as "refugees" by the U. S. Mission--are in actuality divided into several quite different groups. For purposes of both research and operational planning it is important to distinguish clearly between these different categories of war-dislocated civilians. In this section a typology of displaced persons is set forth and the criteria for assignment of people to subgroups are established. The terminology employed here is not that of either the Vietnamese Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR) or CORDS Refugee Division, but it does not

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conflict with official terminology and is functional for description and analysis of the "refugee problems."

"Mass population displacement" or "dislocation" is used as the generic term for all war-related movements, either voluntary or forced, of civilians from their homes to new locations. Persons involved in such movement will be referred to as "displaced persons."

There are two major subtypes of population displacement: voluntary refugee movement and forced relocation (see Figure 1). Persons forcibly moved will be called "evacuees," persons moving voluntarily are "refugees."

There are three subcategories of voluntary refugee movement: volitional--movement as a reaction to changes in the environment caused by the war; encouraged--movement in response to the deliberate offering of positive inducements by either side; and systematically generated--movement in response to negative inducements (short of actual forcing) offered by either side.

Forced relocation can be divided into three subtypes: tactical evacuation--the temporary clearing of civilians from an active operational area; regroupment--the concentrating of dispersed population elements inhabiting an area into a central nucleus; and resettlement--the removal of a population from its home villages to a new settlement area in another locale.

Data Collection Methodology

The primary data base for this investigation is provided by the 1,100 protocols collected between March and October 1967 in standardized interviews with evacuees and refugees in nine settlement sites in I and III Corps. Supplementary data was drawn from other Refugee Study Project surveys. Map 1 shows the location of the survey sites, and Table 1 presents data on the site characteristics and the sample drawn from each.

Each site was carefully mapped and then a random sample of heads-of-households was selected for interviewing. The questionnaire[1] was administered

[1]See Appendix A for an English translation.

Figure 1. Terminology





MAP 1.

REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM

Showing Refugee Study Project Survey Sites

Table 1. Refugee Study Project Survey Sites

Site	Corps Area	Sample Size (Households)	Site Population (Households)
Forced Movement			
DMZ Resettlement (Cam Lo, Quang Tri)	I	120	2,252
Lam Son 87 Resettlement (Quang Tri)	I	128	211 (?)
Hung Quang Regroupment (Quang Nam)	I	130	209
Cedar Falls Resettlement (Binh Duong)	III	120	520
Refugee Movement			
Quang Nam Camp	I	118	482
Quang Nam Settlement	I	120	281
Danang Camp	I	129	970
Danang Settlement	I	120	194
Quang Tri City Settlement	I	108	278
Other Study Sites			
Kien Giang Province-wide Survey (1967)	IV	255	470
Saigon (District 8)	III	68	405
Thuong Duc District (Quang-Nam)	I	1,900	1,959
Dinh Tuong Province-wide Survey (1966)	IV	272	5,177
Phu-Yen Province-wide Survey (1966)	II	1,193	9,845

by Vietnamese interviewers working under the direct supervision of HSR research personnel. Frequent spot reliability checks were run to ensure that interviewer bias and error were kept to a minimum.

Five major aspects of population displacement are examined in this study:

1. Characteristics of Movement (Chapter I, pp. 9-10): description of planning and implementation of the physical movement phase.

2. Resettlement Experience (Chapter II, pp. 11-32): description of resettlement measures taken with regard to evacuees and comparison of these with the treatment received by voluntary refugees.

3. Comparative Demography (Chapter III, pp. 33-40): description of sociodemographic characteristics (age, sex, physical condition, literacy, etc.) of the evacuee populations and comparison with refugee and nonrefugee Vietnamese.

4. Attitudes (Chapter IV, pp. 41-69): examination of the evacuees' views of their present situation, and their hopes and expectations for the future; comparison with those of voluntary refugees.

5. Implications of Forced Relocation for the Pacification Effort (Chapter V, pp. 70-90): assessment of the extent to which forced movement has achieved its objectives of separating the insurgents from the population and of mobilizing human resources for the government.

Chapter I. Characteristics of Movement

Evacuation of any sizable civilian population from an area is an extremely complex undertaking requiring detailed planning and careful coordination of the forces and government agencies involved if it is to be carried to a successful conclusion. In this chapter four relocation operations will be assessed in terms of the extent to which they corresponded to an ideal forced evacuation operation, one which would achieve the objectives set forth below during the four phases of evacuation.

Phase I: Planning and Pre-Initiation Preparation

- prepare master plan
- assign tasks to responsible agencies
- coordinate preparation for move, assuring provision of adequate forces, equipment and supplies at all levels.
- select site
- notify people to prepare to move
- stockpile necessary relief supplies and equipment
- brief own forces on operation and on expected behavior toward evacuees

Phase II: Roundup

- cordon off village with troops
- notify people to gather
- aid people in moving possessions to central points
- collect people at central points
- inform people of what is happening, what to expect, and why
- conduct preliminary security/intelligence screening
- provide emergency medical care
- provide adequate food and water
- search for weapons, VC supplies
- inventory evacuees' possessions to be destroyed (for compensation purposes)
- destroy nonremovable houses, crops, goods, and possessions
- provide security to concentration points

Phase III: Movement

- provide adequate transport
- secure travel route
- help with loading and unloading of people and possessions
- inform evacuees of plans and requirements
- provide rations and water for move

Phase IV: Temporary Relocation

- provide adequate shelter
- provide adequate food
- provide adequate water supply
- provide adequate sanitary facilities
- provide emergency medical care
- provide for care of evacuees' livestock, possessions
- conduct security screening of evacuees, census and issuance of ID papers
- conduct psyops--explanation of government plans and policies for evacuees
- set up feedback system for assessment of evacuee grievances
- provide security

Table 2. Comparative Evaluation of the Achievement of Objectives in the Phases of Four Evacuation Operations

Phase of Operation	DMZ Evacuees	Hung-Quang	Lam-Son 87	Cedar Falls
I	14/14*	14/14	-6/14	-14/14
II	6/22	0/16	16/20	16/24
III	2/10	2/10	2/6	8/8
IV	7/18	0/0	-8/20	12/20
Total	29/64	16/40	4/60	22/66
Evaluation Index	45.3%	40.0%	6.4%	33.3%

*Indicates that 14 points out of a possible total of 14 were achieved.

Chapter II. Resettlement Experience

It is often assumed that the achievement of certain intermediate resettlement objectives (e.g., increasing the evacuees' standards of living) will lead to realization of the strategic goal of mobilizing the relocated population on the side of the government. The government's short-term goals are to provide the evacuees with:

1. improved housing (compared to premovement situation)
2. sufficient land for those desirous of farming
3. adequate employment opportunities
4. improved standard of living
5. improved health care
6. adequate educational facilities
7. adequate community facilities
8. adequate administrative services
9. short-term resettlement aid
10. adequate security to maintain isolation from VC
11. exposure to government propaganda
12. opportunity for participation in local social/political institutions.

The following sections present an evaluation of the extent to which the counter-insurgents have achieved these instrumental objectives of resettlement.

1. Improvement of Housing

In all forced relocation sites there is a general improvement in the material construction of housing over that reported for the premovement situation.[2] 57 percent of the evacuees lived in housing judged an improvement in the quality

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[2] Quality of construction of premovement and postmovement houses was evaluated according to the following criteria:

Premovement housing:

Class A (wealthy person) = tin, tile, or cement fiber roof with brick or wood walls.

(Footnote continued, next page)

while less than two percent had housing of lesser quality than their premovement housing. This is in distinct contrast to the refugees, a considerable number of whom (10 percent) lived in houses that were less well constructed than their premovement houses, while 36 percent lived in improved housing (see Tables 3 and 4).

In is also interesting to note that if house ownership is used as an indicator of premovement socio-economic status, the evacuees have a lower average status rating than the voluntary refugees. Thus both in relative and absolute terms the evacuees have benefitted from improved resettlement housing to a greater degree than is the case with the refugees.

Table 3. Changes in Quality of House Construction
(Comparison of Present to Premovement Houses)

	Better House Now	No Change	Worse House Now	Total
Evacuees	209 57.1	151 41.3	6 1.6	366 100.0
Refugees	209 35.5	322 54.8	57 9.7	588 100.0
Total	418	473	63	954

chi square = 54.39
df = 2
$p < .01$

(Footnote 2, Continued)

Class B (middle-class) = thatch roof with brick or wood walls or tin or tile roof with split bamboo or clay walls.

Class C (lower class) = thatch or makeshift roof with split bamboo, thatch, clay, or makeshift walls.

Postmovement housing:

Class A = tin, tile or cement fiber roof with cement, tile or wood floor.

Class B = thatch roof with cement, tile or wood floor or tin, tile or cement fiber roof with clay or split bamboo floor.

Class C = thatch or makeshift roof with clay or split bamboo floor.

Table 4 . Comparison of Quality of Construction of Post- and Premovement Houses

Site	Postmovement			Premovement		
	House Class			House Class		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
DMZ Evacuees	0 0.0%	69 93.2%	45 38.5%	6 5.0%	13 10.8%	101 84.2%
Hung-Quang Regroupment	121 93.8	7 5.4	1 0.8	16 12.4	27 20.9	86 66.7
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	*	*	*	7 5.4	45 34.6	78 60.0
Cedar Falls Evacuees	50 42.7	67 57.3	0 0.0	41 35.0	28 23.9	48 41.0
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	4 3.4	68 57.6	46 39.0	28 24.4	13 11.3	74 64.4
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	6 5.0	69 57.5	45 37.5	25 20.8	18 15.0	77 64.2
Danang Refugee Camp	123 96.1	5 3.9	0 0.0	34 26.4	18 14.0	77 59.7
Danang Refugee Settlement	87 74.4	25 21.4	5 4.3	46 38.3	38 31.7	36 30.0
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	0 0.0	61 56.5	47 43.5	14 13.0	28 25.9	66 61.1
All Refugee Sites	220 37.2	228 38.6	143 24.2	147 24.8	115 19.4	330 55.7
All Forced Relocations	239 48.5	193 39.2	61 12.8	70 14.1	113 22.8	313 63.1

*Evacuees are living in temporary communal housing while permanent houses are being constructed.

2. Provision of Sufficient Farm Land

As Table 5 indicates, in no relocation site has sufficient farmland been provided for all the evacuees who had formerly cultivated land. The extent of reduction varies from 35 percent to 100 percent of households formerly cultivating land with an average reduction of 82 percent for all sites. If the Hung-Quang regroupment (where many of the regroupees are still able to cultivate their old fields) is removed from consideration the reduction in evacuee households having access to cultivated lands is 98 percent. Refugees have lost access to land to a similar extent, but relatively fewer refugees (66 percent) than evacuees were farmers prior to movement so that the loss of land has less impact on the welfare of the population. By contrast over 90 percent of evacuee households were cultivating land prior to their relocation.

3. Provision of Adequate Employment Opportunities

The evacuee population shows a notably higher unemployment rate after relocation than before movement--an increase of from an average of 7 percent to 49 percent of the working age population, with one site, the DMZ relocations at Cam-Lo, having a 70 percent unemployment rate The refugee unemployment rate increased somewhat less, moving from 11 percent to 39 percent. (Tables 6-8.)

When nearly half of the potential labor force is unemployed it can hardly be said that adequate job opportunities have been provided the evacuees.

4. Improved Standard of Living

Whether the evacuees' standard of living has improved or not can be measured by comparing their present ownership of goods to their premovement possessions.

If the number of citations of premovement ownership of various capital goods (livestock, fishponds, tools, vending stock and vehicles--but not houses or land) is assigned an index number of 100, the extent of postmovement ownership can be readily compared to this figure. By this measure the average ownership

Table 5. Changes in Land Cultivation Patterns

Site	Households Cultivating Farm Land		
	Premovement	Postmovement	Percent Reduction
DMZ Evacuees	110 91.7%	0 of 120 0.0%	100.0
Hung Quang Regroupees	120 92.3	78 of 130 60.0	35.0
Lam Son 87 Evacuees	122 93.8	1 of 128 0.8	99.2
Cedar Falls Evacuees	111 92.5	5 of 120 4.2	95.5
Quang Nam Refugee Camp	53 44.9	1 of 118 0.8	98.1
Quang Nam Refugee Resettlement	104 86.7	1 of 120 0.8	99.0
Danang Refugee Camp	89 69.0	0 of 129 0.0	100.0
Danang Refugee Settlement	71 59.2	2 of 120 1.7	97.2
Quang Tri City Refugee Settlement	74 68.5	0 of 108 0.0	100.0
All Refugee Sites	391 65.7	4 of 595 0.7	99.0
All Forced Relocation Sites	463 92.6	84 of 500 16.8	81.9

Table 6. Changes in Employment Situation

	Postmovement			Premovement			
	Unskilled	Skilled	Un-employed	Unskilled	Skilled	Un-employed	Total
DMZ Evacuees	38 14.6%	43 16.5%	180 69.0%	211 80.8%	35 13.4%	15 5.7%	261 100.0
Hung-Quang Regroupment	167 58.8	34 12.0	83 29.2	249 87.7	22 7.7	13 4.6	284 100.0
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	83 27.8	34 11.4	181 60.7	262 87.9	20 6.7	16 5.4	298 100.0
Cedar Falls Evacuees	127 52.5	29 12.0	86 35.5	196 81.0	15 6.2	31 12.8	242 100.0
All Evacuees	415 38.2	140 12.9	530 48.8	918 84.6	92 8.5	75 6.9	1,085 100.0
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	72 27.1	126 47.4	68 25.6	87 32.7	146 54.9	31 11.7	266 100.0
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	55 23.1	83 34.9	100 42.0	178 74.8	39 16.4	21 8.8	238 100.0
Danang Refugee Camp	92 29.8	72 23.3	145 46.9	189 61.2	81 26.2	39 12.6	309 100.0
Danang Refugee Settlement	69 25.0	112 40.6	95 34.4	142 51.4	99 35.9	35 12.7	276 100.0
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	20 8.9	101 44.7	105 46.5	116 51.3	86 38.1	24 10.6	226 100.0
All Refugees	308 23.4	494 37.6	513 39.0	714 54.3	451 34.3	150 11.4	1,315 100.0

Table 7. Postmovement Employment Rate

(Persons 15 and Older)

	Employed	Unemployed	Total
Evacuees	555 51.2%	530 48.8%	1,085 100.0
Refugees	802 61.0	513 39.0	1,315 100.0
Total	1,357	1,043	2,400

chi square = 23.41
df = 1
$p < .01$

Table 8. Premovement Employment Rate

(Persons 15 and Older)

	Employed	Unemployed	Total
Evacuees	1,010 93.1%	75 6.9%	1,085 100.0
Refugees	1,165 88.6	150 11.4	1,315 100.0
Total	2,175	225	2,400

chi square = 14.13
df = 1
$p < .01$

of capital goods by evacuees has decreased to 39, while refugees report an average index of 57. (Table 9.) Only one forced movement site has an index above 50, the Hung-Quang regroupment, which is not surprising as the regroupees were not moved far from their houses and were able to make repeated trips to bring out possessions.

5. Improvement of Health Facilities

A frequently cited advantage of resettlement is that the centralization of the population allows the government to provide better health facilities than was possible when the peasants were dispersed in small isolated hamlets. As Table 10 shows, relocation has offered an increased number of the evacuees access to government clinics with 97 percent reporting the availability of such facilities. In the cases of the evacuees from Operation Cedar Falls and the Hung-Quang Regroupment, the number of respondents reporting having access to a government health station is nearly double the number reporting such access in their pre-movement hamlets while the overall extent of increase is 22 percent. Refugees have fared less well with 86 percent reporting that they have access to a clinic--the same percentage that formerly had access to such facilities. Clearly the government has taken the opportunity offered by relocation to provide more health facilities to the evacuees.

6. Adequate Educational Facilities

Obtaining an education for their children is a matter of vital interest to rural Vietnamese of all classes and provision of a school is considered one of the best ways to gain a community's support for the government. School buildings have been constructed or are under construction in all resettlement sites but enrollment is low: 64 percent of the households with children of suitable age reporting that none of their children attend school, while 23 percent report that only some of their eligible children are enrolled[3] (Table 11). Refugee households

[3]These figures are probably too low as two of the relocation sites were not yet completed and the planned schools had not yet opened.

Table 9. Change in Ownership of Capital Goods

Site	Number of Citations of Ownership of Capital Goods in Premovement Situation	Number of Citations of Ownership of Capital Goods in Postmovement Situation	Postmovement Ownership as Percentage of Premovement Ownership
DMZ	458	82	17.9
Hung Quang	448	311	69.4
Lam Son	483	159	32.9
Cedar Falls	406	148	36.4
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	367	247	67.3
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	438	230	52.5
Danang Refugee Camp	501	275	54.9
Danang Refugee Settlement	445	291	65.4
Quang-Tri Refugee Settlement	407	188	46.2
All Refugees	2,158	1,231	57.0
All Forced Evacuees	1,795	700	39.0

Table 10. Access to Health Station

Site	In Resettlement Site			In Premovement Hamlet		
	Number Reporting Access	Percent Reporting Access	n	Number Reporting Access	Percent Reporting Access	n
DMZ	119	99.2	120	116	96.7	120
Hung Quang	122	94.6	129	86	66.7	129
Lam Son	128	100.0	128	126	98.4	128
Cedar Falls	113	94.2	120	66	55.0	120
Quang Nam Refugee Camp	117	100.0	117	108	92.3	117
Quang Nam Refugee Settlement	118	98.3	120	88	73.3	120
Danang Refugee Camp	110	85.9	128	109	84.5	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	77	64.2	120	99	82.5	120
Quang Tri Refugee Settlement	85	81.0	105	103	96.3	107
All Refugees	507	85.9	590	507	85.5	593
All Forced Evacuees	482	97.0	497	394	79.3	497

Table 11. Comparison of School Attendance Rate (for households with school-age children) Before and After Movement

Site	Premovement				Postmovement			
	Did not Attend	Some Attended	All Attended	Households with school-age children	Do not Attend	Some Attend	All Attend	Households with school-age children
DMZ	30 33.7%	23	36	89	75 84.3%	5	9	89
Hung Quang	45 41.3	38	26	109	83 75.4	17	10	110
Lam Son	50 46.7	41	16	107	77 72.0	24	6	107
Cedar Falls	29 32.6	34	26	89	25 25.8	46	26	97
Quang Nam Refugee Camp	20 21.0	37	38	95	33 34.4	39	24	96
Quang Nam Refugee Settlement	31 34.1	24	36	91	23 23.0	32	45	100
Danang Refugee Camp	6 6.2	37	54	97	18 16.5	39	52	109
Danang Refugee Settlement	15 15.2	32	52	99	22 21.2	40	42	104
Quang Tri Refugee Settlement	17 21.8	23	38	78	29 26.8	24	27	80
All Refugee Settlements	89 19.4	153 33.3	218 47.4	460	125 25.6	174 35.6	190 38.8	489 100.0
All Forced Relocations	154 39.1	136 34.5	104 26.4	394 100.0	260 64.5	92 22.8	51 12.7	403 100.0

with school age children have a much higher attendance rate with only 26 percent of eligible households reporting that none of their children are enrolled in school.

7. Provision of Adequate Community Facilities and Public Services

Table 12 presents data on the provision of basic community facilities (markets, water supply, electricity) and public services (cooperative organizations, transportation, entertainment) at the relocation and refugee settlement sites. It is noteworthy that the refugees fare considerably better than the evacuees in this regard. This may partly stem from the fact that the refugee sites are located in or near existing communities and are able to make use of already established facilities there.

8. Provision of Administrative Services

A measure of whether or not GVN administration is reaching the evacuees is the extent to which the advice or aid of various authority figures is invoked. Respondents were asked to identify the authority they contact when they have difficulties. 93 percent of evacuees would contact a recognized government official, either their hamlet, resettlement site or village chief (Table 13). Somewhat fewer refugees (86 percent) would turn to GVN officials for help with the remainder consulting traditional elders or religious leaders.

Whether the government officials are performing their administrative duties adequately is not discernible from available data but it is clear that at least some GVN administrative presence is felt by the evacuees in their resettlement areas.

9. Provision of Resettlement Aid

Given the loss both of means of livelihood and accumulated capital (as represented by land, houses, livestock and tools) implicit in the relocation process, considerable short-term government aid is necessary merely to maintain a decent standard of living for the evacuees until they can become self-sufficient,

Table 12. Provision of Community Facilities in Evacuee and Refugee Settlement Sites

	Information Service	Entertainment	Cooperatives	Market	Electricity	Public Well	Public transportation
DMZ Evacuees	✓					✓	✓
Hung Quang Regroupment	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Lam Son 87 Evacuees	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
Cedar Falls Evacuees	✓	✓				✓	✓
Quang Nam Refugee Camp	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Quang Nam Refugee Settlement	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Danang Refugee Camp	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Danang Refugee Settlement	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Quang Tri City Refugee Settlement	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
All Refugee Settlements	5	5	3	5	2	5	5
All Forced Movement Sites	4	3	1	2	0	4	4

Table 13. Recognized Sources of Advice/Aid/Decision-Making Authority

	Camp or Hamlet Chief	Village Chief	District Chief	Elders	Religious Leader	Other	Total
DMZ Evacuees	104 86.7%	0	0	0	14 11.7%	2 1.7%	120 100.0
Hung Quang Regroupment	114 87.7	11 8.5	0	0	0 3.8	5	130 100.0
Lam Son 87 Evacuees	96 76.8	224 19.2	0	0 0.8	4 3.2	0	125 100.0
Cedar Falls Evacuees	107 92.2	0	0	0	0	9 7.8	110 100.0
Quang Nam Refugee Camp	90 76.9	14 12.0	0	12 10.3	0	0 0.8	117 100.0
Quang Nam Refugee Settlement	79 65.8	22 18.3	0	11 9.2	3 2.5	5 4.2	120 100.0
Danang Refugee Camp	107 84.3	0	0	0	15 11.8	5 3.9	127 100.0
Danang Refugee Settlement	96 80.0	4 3.3	1 0.8	0	3 2.5	16 13.3	120 100.0
Quang Tri City Refugee Settlement	96 88.9	2 1.9	0	3 2.8	2 1.9	5 4.6	108 100.0
All Refugees	468 79.0	42 7.1	1 0.2	26 4.4	23 3.9	32 5.4	592 100.0
All Evacuees	421 85.7	35 7.1	0	1 0.2	18 3.7	16 3.3	491 100.0

let alone before it is possible to raise their standard of living over premovement levels.

Nearly all (98.4 percent) of the evacuees report receiving some aid from the government compared to less than 60 percent of the refugees (Table 14). Thirty percent of the evacuees reported receiving a house or house site and relief supplies, while 68 percent received only relief supplies and/or money. The number reporting receiving housing would probably be much higher now as interviewing was conducted while construction was still in process.

Available data do not allow evaluation of the sufficiency of resettlement aid but it is clear that almost all evacuees received at least minimal help, a qualitative fact perhaps more significant than the actual quantity of goods disbursed.

10. Provision of Security

Adequate security, the sine qua non of a population control program, is difficult to evaluate in the absence of reliable objective criteria, and as the Viet-Cong Tet offensive made clear, presently employed criteria are not reliable in the context of a mobile warfare stage insurgency. However, evacuees were asked to assess the security of their relocation sites and by this subjective measure 94 percent of evacuees stated that their site was fully secure, nearly six percent judged it to be partly secure, and only a fraction of one percent believed their site to be insecure (Table 15). (A higher percentage of refugees rated their settlement as secure reflecting the urban location of most of the sites in the sample.)

As all of the evacuees had come from areas officially classed either as contested or VC controlled there is no question but that relocation increased their sense of physical security. It is less certain, given the inadequate defenses observed at the sites, that this enhancement is more than illusory,[4] and it is

[4]In the course of the Tet offensive the ARVN 51st Regiment which secured the Hung-Quang regroupment site was reportedly severely mauled by the Viet-Cong.

Table 14. Receipt of Government Aid Reported by Respondents

Site	Shelter or House Site and Relief Aid	Money or Food Only	Farm Land	Employ-ment	Community Facilities	Nothing	Total Receiving Some Aid	Total Responding
DMZ Evacuees	116	101	0	0	7	1	119 99.2%	120
Hung Quang Regroupment	96	79	0	0	3	4	124 96.9	128
Lam Son 87 Evacuees	22	116	0	0	3	4	126 97.0	130
Cedar Falls Evacuees	52	57	1	5	4	0	120 100.0	120
Quang Nam Refugee Camp	44	38	9	0	14	44	73 62.4	117
Quang Nam Refugee Settlement	42	41	7	2	24	37	82 68.9	119
Danang Refugee Camp	85	118	6	3	20	2	127 98.4	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	1	15	3	1	3	99	21 17.5	120
Quang Tri City Refugee Settlement	2	44	0	3	10	49	59 54.6	108
All Refugees	147 24.8	181 30.5	4 0.7	3 0.5	17 2.9	241 40.6	352 59.4	593 100.0
All Evacuees	152 30.5	338 67.9	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	8 1.6	490 98.4	498 100.0

Table 16. Respondents' Evaluation of Resettlement Site Security

Site	Secure	Contested	Insecure	Total Responding
DMZ Evacuees	116 96.7%	4 3.3%	0 0.0%	120 100.0
Hung Quang Regroupment	121 93.8	6 4.6	2 1.6	129
Lam Son 87 Evacuees	108 85.0	18 14.2	1 0.8	127
Cedar Falls Evacuees	118 100.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	118
Quang Nam Refugee Camp	117 99.2	1 0.8	0 0.0	118
Quang Nam Refugee Settlement	116 96.7	4 3.3	0 0.0	120
Danang Refugee Camp	129 100.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	120 100.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	120
Quang Tri City Refugee Settlement	108 100.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	108
All Refugees	590 99.2	5 0.8	0 0.0	595 100.0
All Evacuees	463 93.7	28 5.7	3 0.6	494 100.0

questionable whether the insurgent political cadre have been denied free access to the evacuees even if larger armed guerrilla units cannot penetrate the site defenses.

11. Exposure to Government Propaganda

As Table 16 illustrates there is little or no change in the extent of exposure to various government propaganda media reported by the evacuees before and after movement. Loudspeakers achieve the greatest saturation in both situations with radios of second rank. Printed matter has relatively limited circulation despite the fact that 32 percent of the adult male evacuee respondents are functionally literate.

12. Participation in Local Social/Political Institutions

Available data is insufficient to allow accurate measurement of the degree of socio-political integration achieved in the relocation sites. One indicator, the extent of participation in local religious ceremonies, shows 58 percent of the evacuees participating in this integrative institution. (Table 17.) Schools, another such institution, are attended by children from 29 percent of all evacuee households, while cooperatives involve under two percent of the population. By these limited measures, then, the degree of socio-political integration of evacuee communities would appear to be relatively low--a factor likely to increase the difficulty of achieving both economic development and self-defense capabilities. Refugees show a somewhat higher degree of integration which may reflect the fact that most refugees are located in or near existing communities with already functioning institutions.

Table 16. Access to Communications Media

Site	Postmovement				Premovement				Number of Respondents
	Radio	Loud-speaker	Newspaper or Magazine	No access	Radio	Loud-speaker	Newspaper or Magazine	No access	
DMZ Evacuees	86 71.7%	117 97.5%	16 13.3%	2 1.7%	79 65.8%	117 97.5%	28 23.3%	2 1.7%	120
Hung Quang Regroupment	64 49.2	109 83.8	12 9.2	5 3.8	31 23.8	110 84.6	13 10.0	13 10.0	130
Lam Son 87 Evacuees	61 47.7	114 88.4	2 1.6	7 5.5	43 33.6	126 98.4	14 10.9	2 1.6	128
Cedar Falls Evacuees	69 57.5	95 79.2	20 16.7	4 3.3	80 66.7	87 72.5	28 23.3	4 3.3	120
Quang Nam Refugee Camp	102 86.4	115 97.5	35 29.7	0 0.0	87 73.7	112 94.9	38 32.2	1 0.8	118
Quang Nam Refugee Settlement	114 95.0	111 92.5	54 45.0	0 0.0	83 69.2	97 80.8	53 44.2	9 7.5	120
Danang Refugee Camp	119 92.2	100 83.3	63 48.8	0 0.0	86 66.7	100 83.3	61 47.3	7 5.4	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	110 91.7	83 69.2	38 31.7	1 0.8	72 60.0	90 75.0	42 35.0	7 5.8	120
Quang Tri City Refugee Settlement	82 75.9	68 63.0	26 24.1	6 5.6	83 76.9	103 95.4	34 31.5	1 0.9	108
All Refugees	527 88.6	477 80.2	216 36.3	7 1.2	411 69.1	502 84.4	228 38.3	25 4.2	595
All Evacuees	280 56.2	435 87.4	50 10.0	18 3.6	233 46.8	440 88.4	83 16.7	21 4.2	498

Table 17. Involvement in Local Socio-Political Integrative Institutions

Site	Households Attending Religious Ceremonies	Households With Children Attending School	Households Participating in Cooperatives
DMZ Evacuees	64 53.3%	14 11.7%	No co-op
Hung Quang Regroupment	66 50.8	27 20.8	No co-op
Lam Son 87 Evacuees	74 57.8	30 23.4	8 6.7
Cedar Falls Evacuees	83 69.2	72 60.0	No co-op
Quang Nam Refugee Camp	49 41.9	63 53.4	13 12.0
Quang Nam Refugee Settlement	74 61.7	77 64.2	28 24.8
Danang Refugee Camp	109 84.5	91 70.5	No co-op
Danang Refugee Settlement	72 60.0	82 68.3	No co-op
Quang Tri City Refugee Settlement	73 67.6	51 47.2	0 0.0
All Refugees	377 63.5	364 61.2	41 6.9
All Evacuees	287 57.6	143 28.7	8 1.6

Conclusions

A comparative evaluation was made of the extent to which resettlement objectives had been achieved at each of the four evacuee relocation sites and the five refugee settlements. For each objective (e.g., improvement of housing, raising of standard of living, etc.) the evacuee and refugee sites were rank ordered in terms of the degree to which the objectives had been met. The site that best met the criteria was assigned a point score of nine and the site that ranked lowest received one point. Where sites were tied, each received the mean value of the range of scores involved.

Each site's scores for all objectives were then aggregated and divided by 12 (the number of objectives) to obtain a mean resettlement objective achievement index. Table 18 presents the comparative scores on each objective and the mean scores for each site. While the two highest scores and the two lowest ratings were achieved by forced relocation sites the mean value for all forced movement sites is 4.77 compared to 5.18 for all refugee settlements.

Objective is to provide adequate:	DMZ Evacuees	Hung-Quang Regroupment	Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	Cedar Falls Evacuees	Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	Danang Refugee Camp	Danang Refugee Settlement	Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement
housing	7	9	1	6	2	4	8	5	3
access to land	4	9	4	8	4	4	4	4	4
rate of employment	1	6	2	7	9	5	4	8	3
access to health station	4	8	3	9	5	7	2	1	6
standard of living	1	9	2	3	8	5	6	7	4
access to school	1	2	3	8	4	9	5	6	7
community facilities	1	6	3	2	6	9	6	6	6
government administration	4	9	8	7	5	1.5	3	1.5	6
resettlement aid	8	6	5	9	3	4	7	1	2
security	3.5	2	1	7.5	5	3.5	7.5	7.5	7.5
exposure to government propaganda	3.5	8	2	3.5	5	9	7	6	1
sociopolitical integration	1	2	3	7	4	8	9	6	5
Total points	39	76	37	77	60	69	68.5	59	54.5
Resettlement objective achievement index	3.25	6.33	3.08	6.42	5.00	5.75	5.71	4.92	4.54

Table 18. Rank Order Ratings of Achievement of Resettlement Objectives

Chapter III. Comparative Demography

Evidence indicates that certain kinds of people tend to become voluntary refugees earlier than others. While forced movement is not socially selective, the composition of the forced or evacuee population generally differs from voluntary refugees because of previous voluntary refugeeism and military conscription. Such demographic differences, if they exist to a significant extent, may require that resettlement programs for evacuees be modified from those employed for refugees.

This chapter presents data on both types of populations and assesses their differences and similarities.

1. Age and Sex Distribution

The evacuees are an older population than the refugees, with a mean age of 23.8 years compared to 20.6 years for the latter. Of the evacuees, 21 percent are 45 or older, compared to 13 percent of the refugees and 17.4 percent of a normal population[5] (see Table 19 and Figure 2).

Table 19. Comparative Age Distributions of Evacuee and Refugee Populations

	Under 45 years	Over 45 years	Total
Evacuees	1,979 78.8	531 21.2	2,510 100.0
Refugees	2,970 86.9	449 13.1	3,419 100.0
Total	4,949	980	5,929

chi square = 67.53
df = 1
$p < .01$

[5]All data on a non-war-impacted rural Vietnamese population are drawn from Hendry: 10-31.

Figure 2. Comparative Cumulative Frequency Curves of Age Distributions, Evacuee and Refugee Populations



Evacuees also show even greater deviations from the normal age and sex distribution patterns for a rural Vietnamese population than is the case with the refugees. Thus, while males constitute 48.4 percent of the refugee population, they form only 44.8 percent of the evacuees, giving a sex ratio of 81, compared to 94 for the refugees (a normal population has a sex ratio of 96, with males composing 48.9 percent of the total).

In the 15-49 year age group, males constitute only 28 percent of the evacuees in this range, giving a sex ratio of 38, while males compose 41 percent of the comparable refugee group, a sex ratio of 70, and 45 percent of a normal population, a ratio of 82 males per 100 females. In the military age group--20 to 34--evacuee males represent 21 percent of all individuals, compared to 34 percent of the same group of refugees, and 44 percent of the normal population (Tables 20-22).

Table 20. Comparative Sex Ratios of the Total Evacuee and Refugee Populations

	Male	Female	Total
Evacuees	1,121 44.8	1,383 55.2	2,504 100.0
Refugees	1,653 48.4	1,762 51.6	3,415 100.0
Total	2,774	3,145	5,919

chi square = 7.67
df = 1
$p < .01$

Table 21. Comparative Sex Ratios, Ages 15 to 49

	Male	Female	Total
Evacuees	196 27.8	509 72.2	705 100.0
Refugees	462 41.3	657 58.7	1,119 100.0
Total	658	1,166	1,824

chi square = 34.1
df = 1
$p < .01$

Table 22. Comparative Sex Ratios, Ages 20-34

	Male	Female	Total
Evacuees	60 20.6	232 79.4	292 100.0
Refugees	180 34.4	343 65.6	523 100.0
Total	240	575	815

chi square = 17.35
df = 1
$p < .01$

2. Productivity Index

Assuming that persons 15 to 49 years of age are producers and all others are essentially consumers, a crude index of population productivity can be calculated. Evacuees display a ratio of 282 producers per 1,000 population, while refugees have a ratio of 328. Thus each productive evacuee must support himself plus 2.6 other people, while each productive refugee must support only 2 others. (Each productive nonrefugee must support 1.3 other persons.) (See Table 23.)

Table 23. Comparative Productivity Ratios

	Producers	Consumers	Total
Evacuees	705 28.2	1,799 71.8	2,504 100.0
Refugees	1,119 32.8	2,296 67.2	3,415 100.0
Total	1,824	4,095	5,919

chi square = 14.42
df = 1
$p < .01$

3. Household Size

As might be expected in view of the absence of males and the higher mean age of the population, evacuee households tend to have fewer members than refugee households, with a mean size of 5.0 persons, compared to 5.7 persons for the refugees and 5.5 for the nonrefugees.

4. Fertility Rate

The evacuee population displays a lower fertility index (896) than the refugee index of 1,097, but this is still higher than the nonrefugee index of 688. (The fertility index is calculated on the basis of the number of children under age 5, to the number of women age 15-49. See Table 24.)

Table 24. Comparative Fertility Indices

	Women: 15-49	Children: 0-4	Total
Evacuees	509	456	965
Refugees	657	721	1,378
Total	1,166	1,177	2,343

chi square = 5.83
df = 1
$p < .02$

5. Physical Condition

81 percent of the evacuees over 15 years of age are capable of unlimited physical activity (i.e., can perform normal manual labor) compared to 87 percent of the refugees (Table 25).

Table 25. Comparative Physical Condition of Persons 15 and Older

	Capable of Unlimited Physical Activity	Physical Activity is Limited	Total
Evacuees	813 81.1	190 18.9	1,003 100.0
Refugees	1,176 86.7	180 13.3	1,356 100.0
Total	1,989	370	2,359

chi square = 14.01
df = 1
$p < .01$

6. Literacy

Evacuees display lower literacy rates, both for males and females, than do the refugee and the nonrefugee populations. Thus 32 percent of the adult male evacuees tested proved to be functionally literate, compared to 46 percent of the refugee males (and 86 percent of the nonrefugee men) (see Table 26). 18 percent of the adult female evacuees were literate, compared to 28 percent of the refugee women (and 56 percent of the nonrefugee females) (see Table 27).

Table 26. Comparative Male Literacy Rates

	Literate	Illiterate	Total
Evacuees	64 32.0	136 68.0	200 100.0
Refugees	127 45.5	152 54.5	279 100.0
Total	191	288	479

chi square = 8.88
df = 1
$p < .01$

Table 27. Comparative Female Literacy Rates

	Literate	Illiterate	Total
Evacuees	52 17.5	245 82.5	297 100.0
Refugees	87 27.6	228 72.4	315 100.0
Total	139	473	612

chi square = 8.90
df = 1
$p < .01$

7. Occupational Skills

Only 9 percent of the evacuees were employed before movement in skilled or semi-skilled jobs compared to 34 percent of the refugees (Table 28). No exact figures are available on the nonrefugee population, but it is estimated that some 90 percent were involved in unskilled agricultural occupations.

Table 28. Comparative Skill Rates for Persons 15 or Older

	Skilled	Unskilled	Total
Evacuees	94 8.6	1,000 91.4	1,094 100.0
Refugees	448 33.7	881 66.3	1,329 100.0
Total	542	1,881	2,423

chi square = 217.99
df = 1
$p < .01$

8. Conclusions

On all demographic measures, the evacuee population is significantly different from the refugee population.[6] Translated into social and economic terms, these demographic facts strongly indicate that the evacuee population is less viable than the refugee population. The evacuee population contains more elderly persons, fewer males, more physically handicapped persons, few literates, and few persons with occupational skills usable in the resettlement situation. Thus in comparison to the refugee population the evacuees represent a relatively minor loss of human resources to the Viet-Cong, and are more of a liability than an asset to the GVN.

[6] The probability of differences significant at the .01 level occurring by chance on all of the demographic dimensions examined in this chapter is extremely low.

Chapter IV. Attitudes

A factor which can be considered completely apart from the objectively measurable environmental circumstances into which a displaced person is placed is his attitudinal state. Regardless of whether, by objective standards, his current living conditions are better or worse than were the conditions under which he lived prior to becoming a refugee or evacuee, if he feels he has been poorly treated, he will not present as favorable an audience to those wishing to instill pro-government and anti-insurgent sentiments as he might if he were better satisfied with his treatment. This would appear to be especially true in the case of persons forced to move, since volitional refugees have had more control over such aspects of their move as the timing of their departure, their ultimate destination, etc., and have had more time to plan their movement than have evacuees. Such considerations as these would seem to make an important difference in the attitudinal states of the two types of displaced persons.

Numerous items included in the questionnaire used in the present study were designed to tap the feelings of displaced persons with regard to their current living conditions. This chapter is devoted to the description of the things that most concern the people in terms of their future; their hopes and fears; and their comparisons of present and former living conditions. A prime objective of the chapter will be to point out the attitudinal factors found to be common to all evacuee groups studied. These common factors will then be used to compare and contrast evacuee attitudes with those of volitional refugees.

The Self-Anchoring Striving Scale

In order to tap, at a rather general level, the concerns, attitudes, and aspirations of displaced persons, an instrument known as "The Self-Anchoring Striving Scale" was incorporated in the questionnaire. This scale, developed in the late 1950's by social psychologist Hadley Cantril, is intended to measure an individual's attitudes toward his overall life situation as it is now, as it was five years ago, and as it is expected to be five years in the future. The self-anchoring aspect of the instrument is that each individual defines for himself the conditions

which would make for the best possible life and those making up the worst possible life. These top and bottom anchoring points are defined in terms of hopes and fears for the future. The individual's hopes, representing the best possible life for him, assume a scale value of 10, being placed at the top of a 10-step ladder. His fears define the worst possible life, and assume a value of zero, the bottom of the ladder scale. The individual then judges where he stands on this 10-rung ladder today, where he stood five years ago, and where he feels he will stand five years in the future, always using the same anchoring points for the scale, viz., those he he has defined for himself.

The self-anchoring feature of this technique and the scale values assigned the ladder steps makes it possible to compare the attitudes and aspirations of one individual with those of another, or the average scale ratings of a group of persons with those of another group.[7]

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[7] In Cantril's own words, the scale works as follows:

"A person is asked to define on the basis of his own assumptions, perceptions, goals, and values the two extremes or anchoring points of the spectrum on which some scale measurement is desired--for example, he may be asked to define the 'top' and 'bottom,' the 'good' and 'bad,' the 'best' and 'worst.' This self-defined continuum is then used as our measuring device.

"While the Self-Anchoring Striving Scale technique can be used on a wide variety of problems, it [is] utilized in this study as a means of discovering the spectrum of values a person is preoccupied or concerned with and by means of which he evaluates his own life. He describes as the top anchoring point his wishes and hopes as he personally conceives them and the realization of which constitutes for him the best possible life. At the other extreme, he describes the worries and fears, the preoccupations and frustrations, embodied in his conception of the worst possible life he could imagine. Then, utilizing a non-verbal ladder device, symbolic of the 'ladder life,' he is asked where he stands on the ladder today, with the top being the best life as he has defined it, the bottom the worst life as he has defined it. He is also asked where he thinks he stood in the past and where he thinks he will stand in the future." (Cantril:22.)

As Cantril employs the Scale, it is used for both personal hopes, fears, and scale ratings, and for hopes, fears, and scale ratings on a national level. The latter portion of the scale was employed on a trial basis in the present study, but, probably due to the sensitive nature of political aspects of the Vietnam conflict, it was difficult to get an individual to respond to questions regarding his own hopes and fears for the future of Vietnam. This portion of the scale was subsequently dropped and no data will be presented here on national aspirations or concerns held by individual displaced persons.

The scale, then, consists of two major portions: the initial definition of anchoring points in terms of individual concerns (hopes and fears), and the scale ratings for past, present, and future.

Concerns for the Future Held by Displaced Persons

Hopes Expressed by Evacuees. The initial observation to be made regarding hopes expressed by the evacuees interviewed is that only a relatively small number of categories of hopes was expressed (see Table 29). Those responses given by evacuees included: education for children; money; food; clothing; housing; peace; happiness; an easy life; job security; hope for a vehicle; for radio; for a television set; for land; and numerous other incidental items which received only minor mention. On the basis of the frequency of occurrence of these responses, and the apparent similarities between certain responses, a set of seven categories of hopes was established. These categories are:

1. Peace, happiness, easy life, job security
2. Food, clothing, housing
3. Money
4. Education for one's children
5. Vehicle, radio, TV
6. Land
7. Other

Only minor differences were found between sites in terms of frequency of citation of the categories by evacuees. The category including peace and happiness was cited by over 60 percent of the evacuees in three of the four forced movement sites in I Corps, making this the most frequently mentioned category in those three sites. The second most frequently cited category in these same locations was the hope for future availability of life's necessities, viz., food, clothing, and housing; this category was also the most frequently cited by evacuees resulting from Operation Cedar Falls in III Corps,[8] among whom money was the second most frequently cited concern.

[8] The strong concern with food and shelter expressed by the Cedar Falls evacuees may reflect their relatively recent experience of deprivation. During the relocation operation evacuees reportedly had to sleep on the open ground and go without food for two days (Schell:69, 84).

Table 29. Hopes for the Future Expressed by Displaced Persons

Site	Hopes							n
	Peace Happiness Easy Life	Food Clothing Housing	Money	Education for one's children	Vehicle Radio TV	Land	Other	
DMZ Evacuees	76 63.3	47 39.2	20 16.7	35 29.2	0 0.0	10 8.3	7 5.8	120
Hung Quang Regroupment	79 60.8	54 41.5	39 30.0	17 13.1	2 1.5	5 3.8	5 3.8	130
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	81 62.3	79 60.8	27 20.8	32 24.6	0 0.0	5 3.8	2 1.5	130
Cedar Falls Evacuees	32 26.7	69 57.5	56 46.7	25 20.8	25 20.8	6 5.0	3 2.5	120
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	80 67.8	32 27.1	35 29.7	25 21.2	1 0.8	2 1.7	7 5.9	118
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	67 55.8	47 39.2	25 20.8	16 13.3	1 0.8	5 4.2	10 8.3	120
Danang Refugee Camp	82 63.6	40 31.0	38 29.5	34 26.4	4 3.1	4 3.1	2 1.6	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	77 64.2	29 24.2	45 37.5	34 28.3	0 0.0	2 1.7	6 5.0	120
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	66 61.1	39 36.1	32 29.6	18 16.7	0 0.0	7 6.5	10 9.3	108
All Refugees	372 62.5	187 31.4	175 29.4	127 21.3	6 10.0	20 3.4	35 5.9	595
All Evacuees	268 53.6	249 49.8	142 28.4	109 21.8	27 5.4	26 5.2	17 3.4	500

There is less agreement between persons in different sites in terms of the third most frequently mentioned category of hopes. Education for one's children ranked third in two locations, money in another, and peace and happiness in a fourth. The only other category of responses receiving a significant number of citations was the hope for future ability to acquire items of real or status value, viz., a vehicle, radio, or TV. In only one location, the DMZ Evacuee Resettlement Site at Cam-Lo, was the desire to have land mentioned by more than five percent of persons interviewed.

Comparison of Evacuees and Volitional Refugees. The general picture is essentially the same for volitional refugees as for evacuees when considering the frequency of citation of the several categories of hopes for the future. In all five voluntary movement sites the "peace and happiness" category was the most frequently mentioned; second most frequently mentioned in three of the five locations was the category including food and clothing; money was third in these sites, while in the remaining two sites money was the second most frequently mentioned hope. Education holds fourth place, as it did with evacuees. No other single category was cited by over five percent of the refugees in any one site.

Fears Expressed by Evacuees. As was true in the case of hopes for the future, the number of categories of fears is extremely limited (Table 30). They include:

1. Fear of sickness, with no medicine
2. Fear of inability to obtain food, clothing
3. General misery, typified by lack of educational facilities
4. War activities, including bombing, VC activities, etc.
5. Fear of death (cause unspecified)
6. Other

Of these, the most frequently cited category overall is fear that food and clothing may not be available in the future. Fear of sickness and shortage of medicine was the second most frequently cited category for evacuees, while,

Table 30. Fears for the Future Expressed by Displaced Persons

Site	Fears						n
	No Food or Clothing	Misery, No Education	Sickness	War	Death	Other	
DMZ Evacuees	50 41.7	58 48.3	47 39.2	32 26.7	13 10.8	8 6.7	120
Hung Quang Regroupment	100 76.9	34 26.2	67 51.8	40 30.8	9 6.9	4 3.1	130
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	78 60.0	53 40.8	55 42.3	42 32.3	9 6.9	12 9.2	130
Cedar Falls Evacuees	103 85.8	43 35.8	31 25.8	28 23.3	4 3.3	1 0.8	120
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	60 50.8	62 52.5	44 37.3	16 13.6	6 5.1	9 4.5	118
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	52 43.3	61 50.8	28 23.3	15 12.5	12 10.0	10 8.3	120
Danang Refugee Camp	75 58.1	58 45.0	42 32.6	28 21.7	3 2.3	20 2.3	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	74 61.7	34 28.3	50 41.7	36 30.0	7 5.8	20 16.7	120
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	54 50.0	40 37.0	44 40.7	33 30.6	15 13.9	7 6.5	108
All Refugees	315 52.9	255 42.9	208 35.0	128 21.5	43 7.2	66 11.1	595
All Evacuees	331 66.2	188 37.6	200 40.0	142 28.4	35 7.0	25 5.0	500

overall, fear of general misery, typified by lack of educational facilities, ranks next. Fear of continued war activities received citation by from 23 percent to 32 percent of evacuees.

Comparison of Evacuees with Volitional Refugees. No differences of any significance[9] obtain between refugees and evacuees in expressing their concerns over the poorest possible life. The same categories are represented in approximately the same proportions for the two groups, albeit with some internal variations in the extent of concern over each category within each of the groups.

Ladder-Scale Ratings of Evacuees

The average (mean) group rating on the 10-point scale assigned to conditions as they were five years ago vary somewhat from one forced movement relocation site to another (Table 31). Evacuees' mean ratings range from a low of 4.57 (on a 10-point scale) for the Hung-Quang Evacuee Regroupment Site to a high of 5.95 for participants in the Cedar Falls evacuation in III Corps. This is a considerably wider variation than that among sites housing volitional refugees, where the lowest mean rating of the five sites was 4.55 at the Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement and the highest was a 4.96 among residents of the Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement. The mean rating for all four forced movement sites for the past is 5.19, that for all five voluntary movement sites is 4.78. The difference between the two is highly significant in statistical terms.

Ladder-scale ratings for present conditions among evacuees again show considerable variation between sites, but the most outstanding feature is the extremely low mean ratings assigned present conditions in all four sites. Not only is the mean rating for the four forced movement sites significantly lower than that for the five voluntary sites, but the decrease from mean past rating to mean present rating for evacuees is so large as to be almost unbelievable. To give an idea of the order of magnitude of this discrepancy between past and present,

[9] In the present discussion, the term "significant" will be used to denote statistical significance at the .05 level of probability. "Highly significant" will mean statistical significance at the .01 level.

Table 31. Mean Cantril Scale Ratings by Displaced Persons

Site	Mean Scale Ratings		
	Past	Present	Future
DMZ Evacuees	5.55	2.42	4.96
Hung Quang Regroupment	4.57	1.90	3.00
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	4.79	1.33	2.24
Cedar Falls Evacuees	5.95	1.65	2.48
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	4.72	3.08	5.05
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	4.55	2.51	5.00
Danang Refugee Camp	4.81	3.11	4.13
Danang Refugee Settlement	4.64	2.87	3.17
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	4.96	2.53	3.58
All Refugees	4.78	2.86	4.39
All Evacuees	5.19	1.81	3.20

it should be pointed out that in the fourteen other nations[10] where Cantril has administered his Self-Anchoring Striving Scale, no national group has rated its present lower than its past.[11] Similarly, in a recent study of this type among Vietnamese peasants who were associated with the Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces--i.e., people who were not classified as displaced persons--only women felt that present conditions were worse than conditions five years ago (Worchell:61-79). These differences were not of the same order of magnitude as the present findings are. Vietnamese refugees (volitional) in the present study rate themselves significantly lower at present than five years ago (a discrepancy of 1.90 scale points, significant at well beyond the 99 percent level of confidence in statistical terms). And forced evacuees in the Viet-Nam sample show a discrepancy between past and present mean ratings nearly double that of volitional refugees. There can hardly be any more dramatic proof that, first, all Vietnamese displaced persons are far from satisfied with their present conditions, and that, of the two types of displaced persons, forced evacuees are significantly less satisfied than are volitional refugees. In fact, the lowest mean rating for a voluntary movement site is higher than the highest mean rating for any single forced movement site.

If these displaced persons are so unhappy with their present circumstances, what is their view of the future? For forced evacuees alone, we again have the phenomenon of high intersite differences, as we have for volitional movement sites. Some common factors can be found despite the high site differences, however. First, the mean future rating for each site is significantly higher than the mean present rating for the same site. (This is also true of four of the five voluntary sites.) And finally, the mean future rating for the combined forced

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[10] These include the United States, West Germany, Yugoslavia, Poland, Japan, Brazil, Nigeria, India, Israel, Egypt, Cuba, The Dominican Republic, Panama, and the Philippines.

[11] One similar set of findings arose from a group of American Negroes which constituted part of Cantril's United States sample. These Negroes, interviewed in 1959, felt that the present was slightly worse than the past, but the difference was not significant.

movement sites is significantly lower than that for the combined voluntary movement sites.

Comparison of Present with Past and Future

Another measure comparing displaced persons' present and past situations is the proportion of the population who feel they are better off now than five years ago. This is a relative measure rather than one in absolute numerical terms. A very brief look at Table 32 shows that on all forced movement sites at least 83 percent of the residents rated the past as better than the present. The proportion of evacuees in any one site who feel the present is better or at least as good as the past is extremely small, never beginning to approach 10 percent of the population in any one site. While volitional refugees demonstrate the same general feeling tone, i.e., that the present is worse than the past, in only one case, that of the Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement, does the proportion regarding the past as better exceed 80 percent. One additional difference between forced and volitional displaced persons is that there is a slightly greater tendency for evacuees to decline to respond to such a comparison than there is for refugees. The statistical significance of this trend is doubtful, but the tendency exists, nevertheless.

When looking at individuals' comparisons of present with projected future conditions (Table 33), the most striking result is that anywhere from 50 to 75 percent of evacuees cannot or will not respond to the future projections. The comparable range for refugees is 35 to 70 percent. We can only speculate on the reason for this reticence. One possible explanation for it would be that these persons, living under wartime conditions, are so unsure of what will happen tomorrow that they cannot bring themselves to speculate about a point in time five years in the future. Some verification for this point of view comes from the tendency for volitional refugees to be more likely to speculate than are evacuees, the latter group having rather recent proof that they have less control over their destinies than they might consider desirable. In addition, the previously mentioned RF/PF study done under ARPA sponsorship found that about 80 to 85 percent

Table 32. Comparison of Present with Past for Displaced Persons

Site	Present Better	No Change	Past Rated Better	No Answer	Total
DMZ Evacuees	1 0.8	2 1.7	105 87.5	12 10.0	120
Hung-Quang Regroupment	2 1.5	9 6.9	109 83.8	10 7.7	130
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	1 0.8	5 3.8	115 88.5	9 6.9	130
Cedar Falls Evacuees	3 2.5	4 3.3	100 83.3	13 10.8	120
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	7 5.9	14 11.9	94 79.7	3 2.5	118
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	8 6.7	5 4.2	105 87.5	2 1.7	120
Danang Refugee Camp	26 20.2	15 11.6	87 67.4	1 0.8	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	15 12.5	23 19.2	78 65.0	4 3.3	120
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	11 10.2	11 10.2	80 74.1	6 5.6	108
All Refugees	67 11.3	68 11.4	444 74.6	16 2.7	595
All Evacuees	7 1.4	20 4.0	429 85.8	44 8.8	500

Table 33. Comparison of Present with Future for Displaced Persons

Site	Future Rated Better	No Change	Present Rated Better	No Answer	Total
DMZ Evacuees	39 32.5	7 5.8	3 2.5	71 59.2	120
Hung-Quang Regroupment	11 8.5	11 8.5	13 10.0	95 73.0	130
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	15 11.5	9 6.9	13 10.0	93 71.5	130
Cedar Falls Evacuees	23 19.2	11 9.2	26 21.7	60 50.0	120
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	55 46.6	14 11.9	5 4.2	44 37.3	118
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	51 42.5	8 6.7	7 5.8	54 45.0	120
Danang Refugee Camp	19 14.7	26 20.2	8 6.2	76 58.9	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	15 12.5	10 8.3	10 8.3	85 70.8	120
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	24 22.2	12 11.1	7 6.5	65 60.2	108
All Refugees	164 27.6	70 11.8	37 6.2	324 54.5	595
All Evacuees	88 17.6	38 7.6	55 11.0	319 63.8	500

of their respondents did make projections into the future (Worchell:61-79). No peacetime data from Vietnamese are available for comparison.

An alternate explanation for the observed reticence of displaced persons to speculate about the future might lie in a general tendency for the Vietnamese as a people to be past- or at most present-oriented. A recently completed study of Vietnamese value orientations gives external verification for this explanation (Sternin, et. al.:65-66), while certain aspects of the present study tend to confirm it, also. For example, when asked to define their hopes for the future, with an undefined frame of reference with regard to time, we observe that the Vietnamese displaced persons in our study rarely named hopes that could not be fulfilled immediately. Take as an example the responses categorized as hopes for money, food, clothing, shelter, land, vehicles, radio, TV. These hopes could just as easily be filled in a month as in five years. The only tendency to look into the long- or moderate-range future revolved about the hope for educational opportunities for one's children and the hope for peace to come to the land.

Considering only those persons for whom the present-future comparison can be made, there seems to be a decided preference for the future in only one location, the DMZ Evacuee Regroupment Site at Cam-Lo. In the other three forced movement sites, the proportions are about equal for preference of present and future. On the whole, volitional refugees appear to be rather more optimistic than are evacuees, with preference for the future decidedly outweighing preference for the present in three of the five voluntary movement sites.

Summary and Conclusions--The Self-Anchoring Striving Scale

The Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale is designed to make comparable the judgments made by individuals of their positions in life with reference to the best and worst life possible. Group trends can then be determined from combined

judgments of individuals. In the present study we have found the following:

1. The number of topics about which forced evacuees are concerned is small.

2. Evacuees express hopes for peace; for food, clothing and housing; for money; and for education for their children, in that order of frequency.

3. Volitional refugees differ very little from evacuees in their hopes for the future.

4. Neither group is particularly concerned over the availability of land in the future (reasons for this might vary from one location to another).

5. Evacuees fear shortages of food and clothing, the prevalence of sickness without having treatment available, a generally misery-ridden existence, and the continuation of war, in that order.

6. Volitional refugees' concerns are the same as those for evacuees, except that concern over a "miserable life" slightly outweighs that over sickness.

7. All displaced persons rated their present life situation as significantly inferior to their past one, and in [illegible] are the only group ever studied who have done this. (No other [illegible] has been studied under wartime conditions.)

8. While volitional refugees rate the present lower than the past, evacuees rate their present life situation at a point significantly lower than do refugees.

9. The majority of people in the evacuee group will not or cannot make predictions about conditions five y[illegible] in the future; this is also true of a sizeable proportion of re[illegible]es.

10. Of those who do venture predictions for the future (no more than 65 percent of the persons in any one site), both groups (evacuees and refugees) feel that the future will be significantly better than the present.

11. As a group, the voluntary refugees are significantly more optimistic about the future than are forced evacuees.

Comparison of Selected Pre- and Postmovement Conditions

While the previous portion of this chapter dealt with a very general comparison of past, present and projected future conditions along dimensions defined by the individual, the present section concerns attitudes of displaced persons with regard to certain more specific conditions in their former and present places of residence, including comfort of housing and employment opportunities as well as the overall situation.

Present and Former House Comfort

To determine on a subjective basis the feelings that displaced persons hold for their present surroundings, they were asked to compare the comfort of their present house with that of their former (premovement) house. The individual was asked to state whether their present house was much more comfortable, a little more comfortable, much less comfortable or little less comfortable than the former, or whether there was no significant change.

Among evacuees, at least 60 percent and as many as 90 percent, depending on the site surveyed, stated that the present house was, to some degree, less comfortable than the house in which they formerly lived (Table 34). Satisfaction was most widespread among Cedar Falls evacuees, in that almost 40 percent felt their present housing was at least as comfortable as the former. In the Hung-Quang Regroupment site, nearly 20 percent felt that they were better off now than before. In the other two sites, less than 10 percent felt the same way. Dissatisfaction with housing was as widespread among volitional refugees as it was among evacuees, with only one site (Danang Refugee Camp) having less than 70 percent comparing the present unfavorably to the past.

These attitudes are quite in contrast to the objective measures of house construction presented in Chapter II, where it was noted that marked improvement in house construction was commonplace in both evacuee and refugee relocation sites. It is likely that evacuees were reacting to something completely different from the quality of construction when they express their attitudes. Their

Table 34. Comparison of the Comfort of Present House with That of Premovement House by Displaced Persons

Site	Present Much Better	Present a Little Better	No Change	Present a Little Worse	Present Much Worse	Number Responding
DMZ Evacuees	1 0.8	4 3.3	1 0.8	14 11.7	100 83.3	120
Hung-Quang Regroupment	10 7.6	14 10.8	18 13.8	36 27.7	51 39.2	129
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	6 4.6	4 3.1	3 2.3	32 24.6	85 65.4	130
Cedar Falls Evacuees	12 10.0	25 20.8	12 10.0	22 18.3	49 40.8	120
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	2 1.7	3 2.5	4 3.4	31 26.3	78 66.1	118
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	15 12.5	5 4.2	6 5.0	26 21.7	68 56.7	120
Danang Refugee Camp	29 22.5	31 24.3	6 4.7	27 20.9	36 27.9	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	4 3.3	13 10.8	11 9.2	35 29.2	57 47.5	120
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	1 0.9	9 8.3	2 1.9	19 17.6	77 71.3	108
All Refugees	29 5.8	47 9.5	34 6.8	104 20.8	285 57.1	499
All Evacuees	51 8.6	61 10.3	29 4.8	138 23.2	316 53.1	595

concept of comfort might include furnishings, location, surroundings, layout of housing with relation to the market or administrative center, terrain, etc. Whatever it is that makes up an individual's definition of house comfort, it is evident that these displaced persons are not satisfied with their present housing situation.

Present versus Former Employment Situation

A glance at Table 35 shows that anywhere from 80 percent to 98 percent of evacuees feel that their family's employment situation is worse now than was the situation before they moved. Persons in the Lam-Son 87 site are least satisfied with present conditions. No forced movement site has more than 10 percent of its population falling into the categories stating that the present is as good as or better than the former situation. The trend is the same among volitional refugees, but the number of dissatisfied persons is less there than among refugees. For example, while about 59 percent of the inhabitants of the Danang Refugee Camp feel the employment situation is worse now than before, over 32 percent feel that it is better to some degree.

This would appear to correspond with objective measures of the employment situation--for example, the number of unemployed persons--as reported in Chapter II. It was indicated there that the increase in the unemployment rate (as measured at the time of the study) from pre- to postmovement was considerably higher in three of the four forced movement locations than in any of the voluntary relocation sites. A second measure, that of job satisfaction, is difficult to study here, but may well play a part in the poor attitude toward the employment situation held by displaced persons.

Comparison of Overall Life Situation Before and After Movement

The figures in Table 36 indicate that the vast majority of evacuees feel that, in general, their life situation was better before they were forced to move than it has been since moving. No fewer than 75 percent and as many as 95 percent of the people in the forced movement sites studied felt that life overall was

Table 35. Comparison of Present and Former Employment Situations by Displaced Persons

Site	Present Much Better	Present a Little Better	No Change	Present a Little Worse	Present Much Worse	Number Responding
DMZ Evacuees	0 0.0	1 0.8	3 2.5	29 24.2	87 72.5	120
Hung-Quang Regroupment	0 0.0	2 1.5	4 3.1	37 28.5	86 66.2	129
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	1 0.7	1 0.7	0 0.0	4 3.1	124 95.4	130
Cedar Falls Evacuees	2 1.7	5 4.2	4 3.3	23 19.2	86 71.7	120
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	0 0.0	17 14.4	9 7.6	48 40.7	44 37.3	118
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	12 10.0	11 9.2	7 5.8	39 32.5	51 42.5	120
Danang Refugee Camp	6 4.7	36 27.9	11 8.5	33 25.6	43 33.3	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	3 2.5	23 19.2	18 15.0	36 30.0	40 33.3	120
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	3 2.8	10 9.3	8 7.4	21 19.4	65 60.2	107
All Refugees	3 0.6	9 1.8	11 2.2	93 18.6	383 76.8	499
All Evacuees	24 4.0	97 16.4	53 8.9	177 29.8	243 40.9	594

Table 36. Comparison of Present and Former Overall Life Situation by Displaced Persons

Site	Present Much Better	Present a Little Better	No Change	Present a Little Worse	Present Much Worse	Number Responding
DMZ Evacuees	0 0.0	13 10.8	3 2.5	28 23.3	76 63.3	120
Hung-Quang Regroupment	1 0.8	16 12.3	14 10.8	41 31.5	58 44.6	130
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	0 0.0	5 3.9	2 1.6	14 11.7	106 83.5	127
Cedar Falls Evacuees	2 1.7	20 16.7	2 1.7	28 23.3	68 56.7	120
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	6 5.1	22 18.8	5 4.3	52 44.4	32 27.4	117
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	14 11.7	18 15.0	7 5.8	48 40.0	33 27.5	120
Danang Refugee Camp	11 8.5	50 38.8	10 7.8	43 33.5	15 11.6	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	3 2.5	34 28.3	14 11.7	43 35.8	26 21.7	120
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	6 5.6	30 27.8	8 7.4	23 21.3	41 38.0	108
All Refugees	40 6.7	154 25.9	44 7.4	209 35.2	147 24.7	594
All Evacuees	3 0.6	54 10.9	21 4.2	111 22.3	308 61.9	497

better before they were evacuated from their homes, while only from 4 to 18 percent feel that it is better now, and the remainder have noticed no change. There is a marked difference between evacuees and refugees on this dimension. While it is true that in four of the five voluntary movement sites more people felt life was better before moving, the ratio of favorable to unfavorable comments on the present is a less discouraging one than that for evacuees. The highest proportion of refugees in any one site to feel that the present is worse was 71.8 percent, which is still lower than the lowest proportion in a forced movement site (76.1 percent).

It is extremely unfortunate that, while the comparison of pre- and post-movement life made by volitional refugees presents a far from encouraging picture, the situation among evacuees is markedly worse.

Summary of Pre- and Post-Movement Comparisons

It has been found that, when displaced persons are asked to compare certain features of their existence as they were perceived before and after movement, evacuee groups invariably feel much worse off, on the whole, now than they did before being forced to move. This applies to comfort of housing, to employment situation, and to overall life situation. Volitional refugees, with a few notable exceptions, follow the pattern of opinion found among evacuees, but dislike for present conditions is not quite as pervasive.

Specific Aspirations and Wishes of Displaced Persons

During the course of each interview the respondent was asked what he would do under certain specified conditions. His reply was to be phrased in terms of where he would live and what employment he would seek if: (1) the war continued; (2) peace came and life improved; (3) peace came and life remained the same. It was then possible to categorize responses into four types with respect to location, viz.: (1) stay in present location; (2) return to former home; (3) rely on the government to make the determination; and (4) those responses not

fitting any other category. (This final category would include such responses as that of the wife of a GVN soldier stating that it would depend on her husband's next assignment; or persons stating that they would go to Danang to work or go elsewhere to join relatives.)

Tables 37, 38 and 39 indicate the responses of displaced persons to these questions. No one mentioned reliance on the government as a peacetime alternative, and with two exceptions, few--in one site, only one person--indicated reliance on the government for relocation if war continued. The high frequency of citation of reliance on the government by evacuees in the Cam-Lo DMZ Evacuee Resettlement site and the Hung-Quang Regroupment site appears quite outstanding. In the former location, the majority of residents feel dependent on the government for such decisions, while over 35 percent in the latter site feel the same way.

The trend among evacuees, except for those at Cam-Lo, assuming continuation of the war, is to want to stay where they are; the opposite tendency is manifest in all sites, however, under the assumption of peacetime conditions. Again here, as in our examination of other similar variables, the same overall tendency is present among volitional refugees as among evacuees, but a greater proportion of evacuees than of refugees set the trend. That is to say that in the two groups, on the whole, the majority of persons feel the same way; the plurality of the most frequently cited alternative over other alternatives is greater in the case of evacuees, however.

In the course of analyzing these data on aspirations, sex and occupational differences were tested. There appear to be no significant differences between male and female heads of households with regard to their desires to remain where they are if war continues and return home if peace comes. And there is no difference along this dimension between those displaced persons who are (or were formerly) farmers, those who are not (and were not) farmers, and those who are unemployed.

In general, then, it can be said that the majority of evacuees at all sites except the DMZ evacuees at Cam-Lo would prefer to stay where they are if war continues. The most frequent choice for the DMZ evacuees would be to rely on

Table 37. Aspirations of Displaced Persons if War Continues

Site	Stay Here	Return Home	Rely on GVN	Other	Don't Know	n
DMZ Evacuees	25 20.8	1 0.8	63 52.5	21 17.5	10 8.3	120
Hung-Quang Regroupment	108 83.1	1 0.8	10 7.7	9 6.9	2 1.5	130
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	70 54.7	0 0.0	46 35.9	8 6.3	4 3.1	128
Cedar Falls Evacuees	111 92.5	0 0.0	0 0.0	5 4.2	4 3.3	120
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	87 73.7	3 2.5	1 0.8	27 22.9	0 0.0	118
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	81 67.5	3 2.5	0 0.0	26 21.7	10 8.3	120
Danang Refugee Camp	109 84.5	0 0.0	3 2.3	14 10.9	3 2.3	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	89 74.2	1 0.8	5 4.2	24 20.0	1 0.8	120
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	59 54.6	0 0.0	12 11.1	31 28.7	6 5.6	108
All Refugees	425 71.4	7 1.2	21 3.5	122 20.5	20 3.4	595
All Evacuees	314 63.1	2 0.4	119 23.9	43 8.6	20 4.0	498

Table 38. Aspirations of Displaced Persons if Peace Comes and Life Improves

	Stay Here	Return Home	Other	Don't Know	n
DMZ Evacuees	6 5.0	98 81.7	15 12.5	1 0.8	120
Hung-Quang Regroupment	27 20.8	94 72.3	6 4.6	3 2.3	130
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	20 15.6	106 82.8	1 0.8	1 0.8	128
Cedar Falls Evacuees	32 26.7	87 72.5	0 0.0	1 0.8	120
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	21 17.8	81 68.6	15 12.7	1 0.8	118
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	8 6.7	101 84.2	9 7.5	2 1.7	120
Danang Refugee Camp	54 41.9	60 46.5	10 7.8	5 3.9	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	40 33.3	68 56.7	10 8.3	2 1.7	120
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	22 20.4	75 69.4	10 9.3	1 0.9	108
All Refugees	145 24.4	385 64.7	54 9.1	11 1.8	595
All Evacuees	85 17.1	385 77.3	22 4.4	6 1.2	498

Table 39. Aspirations of Displaced Persons if Peace Comes and Life Remains the Same

Site	Stay Here	Return Home	Other	Don't Know	n
DMZ Evacuees	1 0.8	104 86.7	13 10.8	2 1.7	120
Hung-Quang Regroupment	6 4.6	113 86.9	7 5.4	4 3.1	130
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	1 0.8	126 98.4	0 0.0	1 0.8	128
Cedar Falls Evacueesq	7 5.8	111 92.5	0 0.0	2 1.7	120
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	16 13.6	88 74.6	13 11.0	1 0.8	118
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	4 3.3	108 90.0	6 5.0	2 1.7	120
Danang Refugee Camp	27 20.9	90 69.8	8 6.2	4 3.1	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	16 13.3	95 79.2	8 6.7	1 0.8	120
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	10 9.3	86 79.6	10 9.3	2 1.9	108
All Refugees	73 12.3	467 78.5	45 7.6	10 1.7	595
All Evacuees	15 3.0	454 91.2	20 4.0	9 1.8	498

the government for guidance. The largest proportion of volitional refugees would also prefer to stay where they are. If peace comes and life improves, the majority in all sites (forced and voluntary) would return home, while far fewer would prefer to remain where they are. And if the life situation remained the same as now but peace came, by far the largest proportion of people in each site would return home, with no other alternative receiving citation by more than 20 percent of the persons in a site.

Aspirations of Displaced Persons for Their Sons

There is little communality among persons now residing at different sites with regard to their aspirations for their sons, as shown by Table 40. For evacuees from all sites as a whole, and for refugees from all voluntary sites, the preference for a good education is prevalent, and the desire for sons to be employed as machinists and mechanics is cited only slightly less frequently. For evacuees, farming was third; the professions--doctor, lawyer, etc.--took third place among refugees. Variation in preferences among individual sites is widespread, however.

Wishes Expressed by Displaced Persons

A final interview item of the type with which we have been dealing asked the respondent: "Suppose a jinni appeared and offered to grant you two wishes for anything you wanted to have, to do, or to be. What would your two wishes be?"

In response, the wish receiving most frequent mention by evacuees in three of the four forced movement sites was that for peace (Table 41). In those three sites, that wish outweighed all others by a considerable margin, and shows the overwhelming concern of evacuees for discontinuance of hostilities. The one site which differed from the other three was again the Cam-Lo Regroupment site, where no decided orientation toward one category of wishes was noted, the wish for peace being the second most frequently mentioned, by 22.5 percent of evacuees there, while the category including personal happiness and an easy life was most prevalent, being mentioned by 28.3 percent. The wish for personal wealth was mentioned with relatively high frequency at all sites.

Table 40. Future Wanted for Son

Site	Get A Good Education	Doctor Lawyer Engineer	Business Trade	Machinist Mechanic	Military	Farmer	Other	n
DMZ Evacuees	4 12.9	10 32.3	0 0.0	5 16.1	4 12.9	8 25.8	0 0.0	31
Hung-Quang Regroupment	19 31.7	2 3.3	0 0.0	24 40.0	4 6.7	4 6.7	7 11.7	60
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	20 26.7	2 2.7	1 1.3	13 17.3	4 5.3	14 18.7	13 17.3	67
Cedar Falls Evacuees	29 38.7	4 5.3	1 1.3	28 37.3	5 6.7	8 10.7	0 0.0	75
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	11 18.6	17 28.8	5 8.5	11 18.6	5 8.5	3 5.1	7 11.9	59
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	31 46.3	16 23.9	1 1.5	13 19.4	3 4.5	2 3.0	2 3.0	68
Danang Refugee Camp	17 21.5	19 24.0	0 0.0	25 31.6	12 15.2	2 2.5	4 5.1	79
Danang Refugee Settlement	21 31.3	5 7.5	0 0.0	25 37.3	6 9.0	1 1.5	9 13.4	67
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	8 18.6	15 34.9	0 0.0	6 14.0	5 11.6	3 7.0	6 14.0	43
All Refugees	88 27.8	72 22.7	6 1.9	80 25.3	31 9.8	11 3.5	28 8.9	316
All Evacuees	72 30.9	18 7.7	2 0.9	70 30.0	17 7.3	34 14.6	20 8.6	233

Table 41. Wishes Expressed by Displaced Persons

Site	Peace	Wealth	Happiness, Easy Life	Good Health	Food	House Clothes Land	Education	Other	Number Respondents
DMZ Evacuees	27 22.5	25 20.8	34 28.3	26 21.7	10 8.3	15 12.5	9 7.5	9 7.5	120
Hung-Quang Regroupment	62 47.7	38 29.2	24 18.5	25 19.2	18 13.8	9 6.9	0 0.0	5 3.8	130
Lam-Son 87 Evacuees	60 46.9	30 23.4	28 21.9	19 14.8	23 18.0	22 17.2	2 1.6	9 7.0	128
Cedar Falls Evacuees	61 50.8	43 35.8	27 22.5	5 4.2	39 32.5	30 25.0	2 1.7	1 0.8	120
Quang-Nam Refugee Camp	26 22.0	32 27.1	37 31.4	11 9.3	3 2.5	8 6.8	16 13.6	13 11.0	118
Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement	27 22.5	33 27.5	31 25.8	8 6.7	5 4.2	7 5.8	8 6.7	12 10.0	120
Danang Refugee Camp	52 40.3	26 20.2	39 30.2	24 18.6	12 9.3	15 11.6	10 7.8	12 9.3	129
Danang Refugee Settlement	42 35.0	32 26.7	33 27.5	24 20.0	3 2.5	5 4.2	8 6.7	11 9.2	120
Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement	36 33.3	27 25.0	17 15.7	22 20.4	8 7.4	9 8.3	9 8.3	13 12.0	108
All Refugees	183 30.8	150 25.2	157 26.4	89 15.0	31 5.2	44 7.4	51 8.6	61 10.3	595
All Evacuees	210 42.2	136 27.3	113 22.7	75 15.1	90 18.1	76 15.3	13 2.6	24 4.8	498

Among volitional refugees, peace was again the most frequently mentioned wish overall, being mentioned by no less than 22 percent nor more than 40 percent of refugees in all sites, and less often by refugees than by evacuees. Personal happiness and personal wealth were rated next overall.

Again in the case of these wishes, as with aspirations for one's son, site differences were prevalent and very little communality was found.

It is interesting that the categories of wishes as expressed by displaced persons and their hopes as described earlier are quite similar in orientation. In fa when adjustments are made for the differentially constituted categories of hopes and wishes to make them comparable (e.g., "peace," as a wish must be combined with "happiness" and "easy life" in order to make these wishes comparable to a similar category of hopes), we see that the content and the order of preference are quite similar when frequency of citation of hopes is compared with frequency of citation of wishes. Peace is still cited most frequently, followed by citations of food, clothing, shelter, and land, then by personal wealth; education for one's children is fourth-ranked in both instances.

Concluding Notes

The foregoing description of the concerns, attitudes, and aspirations of persons displaced from their homes has shown several trends, among both evacuees and volitional refugees.

The primary concerns of evacuees, in terms of their self-expressed hopes, fears, and wishes are very basic ones. They hope for peace, adequate food, clothing, housing, or for money to acquire these necessities. They are concerned only secondarily with items of luxury status, such as radio, television, a vehicle, or even land, while their chief (and perhaps sole) long-range hope is for their children to have educational opportunities. They fear war, sickness, and death.

The concern that these persons express over the very basics of existence reflect the wartime conditions under which they are forced to live, with the dangers and uncertainties that are an integral part of war.

The evacuees studied here have expressed their feelings of complete dissatisfaction with their present conditions by stating that they feel they are decidedly worse off now than they were five years ago. Many of them refuse to speculate about the future, but those who do speculate are rather optimistic, indicating that, by no means do all evacuees harbor feelings of despair and hopelessness. By far, the majority of these persons feel that their housing is less comfortable now than it was before moving, that employment opportunities are poorer now than before, and that life in general is not so good as it was prior to movement, but they would prefer to remain where they are rather than return to their former home hamlets to resume their former life.

When the attitudes, concerns, and aspirations of these evacuees are compared with those of volitional refugees, some interesting facts emerge. The two groups share common concerns (hopes, fears, wishes), indicating that forced movement is not so much a factor in determining these concerns as is the war in general, which has affected both groups.

The two groups show a similar trend in their comparisons of present living conditions with those of the distant (5 years ago) and recent (prior to movement) past, and with those projected for the future, in that both groups feel that the present is decidedly worse than either past or future. The effect of forced movement on attitudes is evident, however, in that the evacuee groups see themselves as being significantly lower on the "ladder of life" at present than do the refugee groups. In other words, the same general trend appears in both groups, but it is much more pronounced among evacuees than among refugees.

In terms of aspirations for the future, the two groups are virtually identical in that the majority would prefer to stay where they are if war continues, and return home if peace comes.

Chapter V. Mass Population Displacement and the Control of Human Resources: Some Implications of Forced Relocation for the Pacification Effort

This evaluation starts from a set of three basic assumptions--(1) that the primary objective of the protagonists in revolutionary warfare should be to achieve and maintain effective control of the population; (2) that this is because the people are the key resource from which grow all other strengths; (3) that mass population displacement is important because it can affect the exercise and maintenance of control over this key resource by the Viet-Cong and by the GVN and Allies.

1. Population Control as the Objective of Revolutionary Warfare

Among theoreticians of revolutionary warfare there is little argument over the first assumption. Thus Galula, one of the least mystical of the French practitioners of la guerre revolutionnaire, writes, "If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war..." (7-8). He then sets forth his so-called first law of counterinsurgency: "The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent" (74). Numerous other quotations from writers on counterinsurgency could be supplied in support of this view. And in practice, at least by the insurgents, there has been little deviation from this position.

It is widely agreed that the Viet-Cong have since the beginning of the war consistently demonstrated their awareness of this principle. Thus Pike writes "...the primary purpose of the violence program [guerrilla activity] was to make possible the political struggle movement" (99). "Beginning in 1960 the NLF grew into a structure that reached to some degree into virtually every village in the country... The purpose of this vast organizational effort was not simply population control but to restructure the social order of the village and train the villagers to control themselves. Not the killing of ARVN soldiers, not the occupation of real estate, not the preparation for some pitched battle at an Armageddon or a

Dien Bien Phu, but organization in depth of the rural population through the instrument of self-control--victory by means of the organization weapon" (111).

The effectiveness of the Viet-Cong strategy is hardly open to question at this date. Allied strategy, on the other hand, has appeared to be less clearly articulated and achievement of control over the population has seemed to be considered secondary in importance to the destruction of insurgent military forces (Thompson 1968:449).

2. Human Resources as the Basis of Politico-Military Power in Revolutionary Warfare

There is at present no comprehensive system for categorizing human resources as these relate to the conduct of revolutionary warfare. Table 42 presents an attempt to set forth the major psychological, social and economic variables that appear relevant to the development of insurgent and counterinsurgent politico-military power.

Politico-military power represents the sum of the psychological, social and economic resources of the population mobilized by the insurgents or counterinsurgents less the expenditures of resources required to mobilize that power. For example, if the Viet-Cong can utilize civilians as porters they are in effect augmenting their military power by releasing an equal number of troops from support tasks--but if the villagers are forced to do the work they will require guards, or if they are convinced by NLF propaganda to volunteer their labor there will still have been an expenditure of effort by the political cadre to achieve this end. Thus some power must always be expended to release new resources for exploitation. But the aim of the insurgents or counterinsurgents must be to minimize the expenditure of this power while maximizing the exploitation of new resources.

Table 42. Principal Determinants of Human Resources in Revolutionary Warfare

Psychological Characteristics of Population

- Extent of individual gratification/alienation from group/system
- Aspirations/expectations
- Degree of adaptability to change
- Value orientations.

Social Characteristics of Population

- Demographic characteristics
- Group structure and solidarity
- Settlement pattern
- Extent of intragroup conflict
- Prestige reward system.

Economic Characteristics of Population

- Productive capability/extent of surplus generation
- Ownership of means of production
- Allocation of economic surplus.

3. Forced Relocation and the Control of Human Resources

Voluntary refugee movement has in some areas of Viet-Nam removed large segments of the rural population from insurgent control and, at least potentially, offered new resources to the government. Forced relocation may offer a systematic method to achieve the same result, and has been so employed in numerous other insurgencies (see Table 43).

Two sets of criteria will be employed to evaluate the effectiveness of forced relocation as a pacification tactic: the first set measures the extent to which the insurgents are separated from the civilian population.

Measures of separation are:

- reduction of insurgent conscription pool
- reduction of labor force
- reduction of tax base
- disruption of infrastructure
- interruption of propaganda flow
- destruction of rest areas/base areas
- removal of civilian "shield"

The second set of criteria are to assess the extent to which relocation results in mobilization of new human resources for the counterinsurgents.

Measures of successful mobilization are:

- enlargement of government conscription pool
- enlargement of labor force
- development of economic self-sufficiency
- development of government infrastructure
- development of social stability
- increase in pro-government or anti-insurgent sentiments
- increase in government propaganda flow
- development of self-defense capability

In the following pages, the extent to which four forced relocation operations achieved these objectives will be assessed.

Table 43. Historical Examples of Employment of Forced Relocation as a Counterinsurgency Tactic

Location	Date	Insurgent Force	Counterinsurgent Force	Population Displaced	Estimated Size of Population Displaced
MANCHURIA	1933-37	Communist and non-communist Koreans and Chinese	Japanese Kwantung Army and Manchurian Army	Korean and Chinese peasants	5,500,000
MALAYA	1948-60	Communist Chinese	British and Malay Armies	Chinese Squatters	530,000
CAMBODIA	1952-54	Viet-Minh and Khmers-Issaraks	French and Cambodian Armies	Cambodian peasants	500,000
ALGERIA	1956-58	FLN	French Army	Algerian peasants	1,500,000
VIETNAM	1961-63	Viet-Cong	Republic of Vietnam Forces	Rural Vietnamese and Montagnards	Unknown
CUBA	1960	Anti-Castro Cuban guerrillas	Cuban Rebel Army	Cuban peasants	Unknown
MOZAMBIQUE	1964+	Mozambique Nationalists	Portuguese Gov't.	Tribes people	250,000+
INDIA	1967	Mizo Tribal Rebels	Indian Government	Mizo Tribespeople	50,000

4. Evaluation of Forced Relocations

Separation Criteria

Reduction of Insurgent Conscription Pool. Despite introduction of large Northern (NVA) forces, the Viet-Cong are still heavily reliant on local recruitment of manpower for their military units, especially at the local guerrilla and regional force levels. A major argument in favor of forcible removal of civilians from insurgent-dominated areas is that this would cut down the flow of men to the guerrillas. Examination of demographic data on the evacuee populations indicates that the measure has been largely ineffective in reducing the Viet-Cong conscription pool: males between the ages of 20 and 34 constitute only 2.4 percent of the evacuee population, compared to 5.3 percent of the refugee population and 7.6 percent of the nonrefugee population.

Reduction of the Labor Force Available to Insurgents. The Viet-Cong are dependent on the civilian population for numerous logistic and support activities. Heavy demands are placed on peasants in insurgent controlled areas to serve as porters, to dig battlefield trenches and tunnels and to fortify combat hamlets. Any reduction of the available labor force as a result of population resettlement will place an increased burden on Viet-Cong guerrilla units by forcing them to divert combatant personnel into logistic support activity.

The evacuees, however, are a population with an extremely low productive capacity due to the shortage of persons between the ages of 15-49 and the predominance of women. Thus for every 1,000 evacuees there are only 282 persons between 15 and 49 compared to 435 persons of this age per 1,000 population in a normal Vietnamese population. Further limiting the labor value of these persons of productive age is the fact that over 70 percent are females. Thus, while the Viet-Cong have suffered a reduction of their civilian labor pool, in view of the total number of people relocated, it has not been one of major dimensions.

Reduction of Insurgent Tax Base. Despite outside support, extortion from large companies and plantations and capture of supplies from the government forces, a main basis of support for the Viet-Cong has been taxation of peasants in the "liberated zones" and contested areas. As the war has escalated and the size of the insurgent armed forces increased, the importance of taxation has also grown.[12] Thus, a key objective of relocation efforts has been to cut off the flow of supplies and funds from the populace to the guerrillas.

Voluntary refugee movement has been of a magnitude to significantly shrink the insurgent tax base in many provinces. A captured Viet-Cong cadre (who had studied economic problems in Quang Tin and Binh Dinh) stated that "...in 1966, the amount of contributions coming from the people has lowered because of the number of people who have left the Front controlled areas for the Nationalist areas" (RAND Interview AG-527:14-15). When it is considered that from 15 to 20 percent of the total population of the central coastal provinces have become refugees, with up to 75 percent depopulation occurring in some rural districts it is not difficult to imagine the economic problems faced by the Viet-Cong in Central Viet-Nam. Available evidence suggests that relocation has also been effective in narrowing the Viet-Cong tax base in certain limited areas. In this regard the economic cadre stated that in the case of Binh Dinh, "...if every time the Nationalist forces conducted an operation in an area, they took the people away with them...then the situation became hopeless. There was no way to salvage the economy of that particular area" (RAND Interview AG-527:12). As an example of what this loss represents in objective terms, the 481 farmers evacuated in Operation Cedar Falls from the Front-controlled village of Ben Suc would have produced approximately 1,308 metric tons of polished rice per year (minimum estimate). NLF taxes vary greatly from place to place, but between 6 percent and 35 percent of the total rice yield of each household (or its equivalent cash value) would have been taken in direct production taxes (Sansom:14). Large

[12] A captured Viet-Cong economic cadre estimated that by 1965 "the people's contributions covered about one-third of the overall Front expenses" (RAND Interview AG-527:15).

quantities would also have been collected in the form of "voluntary contributions" to various insurgent "troop support funds" and "solidarity rice pots." Thus the Viet-Cong would have drained off a substantial portion of the 779 metric tons of surplus rice left over the immediate consumption needs of the producer had been met.

Other factors than the rice production of the evacuated population must be considered in assessing the tax losses to the VC resulting from forced relocation, however. If the cleared area cannot be kept cleared the insurgents can bring in people from other villages to farm the abandoned fields on a contract basis thus maintaining production at close to former levels. This reportedly occurred in an area in southwestern Kien Tuong Province which had been abandoned as a result of refugee movement.[13] Or, if the land in an evacuated area is particularly desirable, peasants from surrounding uncleared areas may spontaneously reclaim it despite the risks of working in a free strike zone. This is reported to have occurred in the case of Ben Suc. If the resettlement camp is not fully secured and a careful resources control program implemented, the evacuees may continue to contribute to the insurgents, only now they will be offering payment in USAID bulgar rather than home-grown rice. The District Chief at Ben Cat believed that the Iron Triangle evacuees residing in camps there were continuing to provide supplies to the guerrillas despite having been relocated. Even if people are kept out of the cleared area and the evacuees are successfully isolated from the VC, in densely populated regions such as the delta, any limited local losses in insurgent taxes as a result of relocation operations can be made good by increased levies on neighboring localities. However, in central coastal provinces such as Phu-Yen where the guerrilla bases are largely confined to the sparsely populated (and unproductive) mountain regions, relocation of the farming population from along the edges of the hills into more secure central valley areas has markedly reduced the flow of rice to the Viet-Cong.[14]

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[13] HSR Interview in July 1966 with province chief.

[14] "Seized V.C. Documents Voice Note of Alarm: Red Control in Phu-Yen Province Slumps," Saigon Post, 14 August 1967, p. 1.

Such a result can only be achieved, however, where alternative sources of supply cannot be readily typed, as is the case in the delta, and where the remaining areas of production are effectively controlled by the government.

In conclusion it can be said that in certain limited circumstances forced relocation offers an effective method of reducing the insurgent tax base but that as a single general measure employed apart from a comprehensive counterinsurgent strategy it has not been successful in the past (as illustrated by the strategic hamlet program failures) and is unlikely to be productive in the future.

Disruption of the Insurgent Infrastructure. It has been suggested that the mass dislocation of insurgent-controlled populations will result in the elimination of, or at least severe damage to, the insurgent's covert political apparatus--the "infrastructure." One of the stated objectives of relocating the inhabitants of Ben Suc, and of destroying the village as a physical entity, was to destroy that village's infrastructure and the political center that was thought to exist there. As one officer explained in a pre-operation briefing: "Now, we can't tell you whether A, B, and C are at their desks or not, but we know that there's important infrastructure there--what we're really after here is the infrastructure of the V.C." (Schell:21).

Popular usage of the term "infrastructure" has tended to blur the distinction between the insurgents' overt and covert organizational activities. Overt organizational activities employed to control the population in Viet-Cong areas have as their central mechanism the liberation associations and other social organizations, such as the Farmers' Liberation Association, the Youth Liberation Association, and the Soldiers' Mothers' and Sisters' Association. These overt activities would, of course, be affected by mass population displacement, since the organizations would in effect cease to function once the population had been resettled in GVN areas. But "infrastructure" in its correct usage refers to the Viet-Cong's largely covert political apparatus. In contrast to the effect population displacement would have on overt Viet-Cong organizations, it is doubtful that large-scale resettlement of Viet-Cong-controlled populations would automatically result in a serious disruption of the insurgent infrastructure. Such a

disruption, in fact, is contingent on several complex factors, all of which have rarely, if ever, been met in population resettlements thus far.

The theory or assumption that population resettlement can or will seriously damage the insurgent infrastructure is based on two premises. The first premise is that a surprise round-up, interrogation, and resettlement of the subject population will permit the identification of Viet-Cong cadres and guerrillas, and their separation from the rest of the population. This may prove successful in some instances, but it is likely that the degree to which it will succeed is dependent on two additional factors: (a) the information already in hand identifying individuals in the infrastructure, and (b) the kind of follow-up control and security provided for the population once it is resettled. If the populated area in question has been controlled for some time by the Viet-Cong and leading members of the insurgent apparatus have publicly revealed themselves, it is likely that the local GVN officials will have a good deal of intelligence on these individuals. On the other hand, intelligence on Viet-Cong personalities may not be so plentiful if the area is a contested one and the Viet-Cong apparatus and its operations are still largely covert. In any case, whatever the status of the area--contested or Viet-Cong-controlled--or the amount of intelligence that exists, it is clear that the local GVN police officials must be included in the operation if their knowledge of the Viet-Cong infrastructure is to be utilized during the interrogation process. Also, once the population is resettled, total security must be provided and a systematic interrogation procedure implemented. The provision of full-time, effective and reliable security is absolutely essential if evacuees are to be expected to risk possible reprisal by identifying underground cells.

In the Ben Suc operation none of the above conditions appear to have been met. First, there was no prior coordination with local GVN officials who might have possessed accurate and detailed information on the Viet-Cong operations in the Ben Suc area. Second, much of the interrogating was carried out by American soldiers using interpreters. Third, the population was not kept under tight security during the movement to the resettlement area and one observer reported that for about a day "any of the villagers who wished to escape could easily have done so at this point, and any outsiders could easily have come to join them" (Schell:83).

The second premise underlying the theory that population resettlement will damage the insurgent infrastructure is that, even if the VC political operatives are not captured during the early stages of the operation or are not swept up in the resettled population, members of the local infrastructure will be so disillusioned and demoralized once they are separated from their families that they will defect to the government side. This was not the case in the resettlements of Iron Triangle evacuees at Ben Cat. Here, although the resettlement sites were controlled by the government during the day, it was known that the guerrillas were visiting their families at night.

Interruption of Propaganda Flow. By merely resettling and exercising some control over the subject population the counterinsurgents hinder the activities of insurgent propaganda cadres and interrupt the normal "flow" of propaganda. But this in itself may not automatically be a conclusive, determining development in impairing the effectiveness of insurgent propaganda, since effectiveness is determined as much or more by the quality of propaganda used as by the quantity.

The interruption of insurgent propaganda flow--like the disruption of the insurgent infrastructure--is dependent over time on the kind of security and control that is provided after the evacuees are resettled. In the already much-cited case of Ben Cat, the evacuees were left unprotected once they were resettled and the guerrillas were known to be entering the camp at night.

Of course, it would be impossible to completely isolate the subject population. Rumors could be started and leaflets might still be made available within the relocation site. But if the site were tightly controlled there clearly would be no overt propaganda work or political action by the insurgents. Also, there is the fact that quantity is not so important in propaganda as is its content. It is a combination of how the message is delivered (which includes quantity) and what the message is. Thus, the fact that the propaganda flow in terms of sheer volume may be interrupted would not necessarily mean that the value or the effect of the insurgent's propaganda had been significantly impaired. It would have to be determined what the content of the propaganda is and whether it is credible in the context of the situation before one could judge whether the effectiveness of the

propaganda used by the enemy is really being counteracted by the fact of resettlement.

Thus, it is not the "flow" of propaganda (i.e., the vehicle) that is so important; rather it is the credibility of the message that continues to reach the people. What is said is more important than how much is said or the way in which it is communicated.

Destruction of Insurgent Base Areas. Probably the most conclusive observable result to be expected from the relocation of the population in a Viet-Cong-controlled area is the physical destruction of the insurgent base. The complete removal of the surrounding population would probably delay the restoration of the base area facilities inasmuch as the Viet-Cong labor pool had been reduced by the dislocation. A minimum gain to the counterinsurgents could be counted in that the rural population would not get in the way during subsequent operations in the area to "update" the destruction of base area facilities.

Removal of Civilian "Shield". There can be little argument with the assertion that the removal of the population from an insurgent-controlled area also removes a restraint from extensive counterinsurgent shelling and bombing of that area. What is questionable, however, is whether the removal of the civilian population can ever be achieved to the degree that it ceases entirely to serve as a "shield" behind which guerrilla activities are conducted with partial impunity. But if it is impossible to keep the area cleared--as has been the case in part of the Iron Triangle--then the counterinsurgents soon will be faced once again with the problem of distinguishing between "hostile civilians" and the guerrillas themselves.

Mobilization Criteria

Enlargement of Government Conscription Pool. Forced relocation has not significantly increased the volume of the pool of potential GVN military conscripts as males between the ages of 20 and 34 constitute less than 2.5 percent of the total evacuee population. Further, the evacuees show a lower service rate (45 percent of those eligible) than the refugees (56 percent of those in eligible age

group), suggesting that benefits to ARVN would be limited even if larger numbers of young men were rounded up in the course of relocation operations.

Increase in Labor Force Available to the Government. Potentially the evacuees represent a considerable increase in the labor force available to the GVN. Relatively little use has been made of this new resource, however, as is evident from the 49 percent rate of unemployment reported by the evacuees. In part, this may be because most of the evacuees were formerly farmers or agricultural laborers and lack skills for employment in any capacity other than as general laborers.

Development of Economic Self-Sufficiency. None of the resettlements with the exception of the Hung-Quang Regroupment are even potentially economically viable. Land for farming (the premovement occupation of 90 percent of the evacuees) is either unavailable or of poor quality unsuitable for rice culture. The resettlements are located in relatively isolated areas with limited alternative sources of employment (general labor, etc.) open to the evacuees. The unemployment rate is currently just under 50 percent and even if full employment could be achieved the ratio of productive to nonproductive persons is so low as to make it doubtful that the evacuee population can maintain a decent standard of living without continuing large-scale government aid.

Development of Government Infrastructure. According to pacification doctrine elimination of the Viet-Cong infrastructure must be followed by development of a pro-government infrastructure if the initial success is to be consolidated and reinfection of the evacuee population by the insurgents prevented. It appears that the GVN has had some success in establishing its representatives in positions of authority in the resettlements. At least, 93 percent of the evacuees state that they view their camp or village chief as a source of decision-making authority. It is uncertain, however, to what extent these officials receive genuine popular support and to what degree they are capable of exercising effective control over the population.

Development of Social Stability. If further research is done on displaced persons in Viet-Nam the question of social stability in resettlement camps should receive major attention as current information is wholly deficient. Certainly, long-term viability of the resettlements is dependent on creating a community out of the mass of evacuees. No direct evidence was collected on the degree of social stability of the evacuee relocations, but available information suggests that it is very low. For example, turnover of families in the sites appears to be high precluding the development of strong neighborhood bonds. Many households are fragmented, with males absent in the guerrillas or the ARVN, creating an inherently unstable situation.

Increase in Pro-GVN or Anti-NLF Sentiments. Physical isolation of the guerrillas from the people is not a sufficient outcome of relocation operations. The people must also be psychologically alienated from the Viet-Cong and enlisted on the side of the government. Thompson, for example, states that, "the fundamental aim behind the establishment of the security framework based on the strategic hamlets is to isolate the insurgent both physically and politically from the population" (1966:123) [emphasis added].

No direct measurement of evacuee political attitudes was attempted, but a considerable quantity of data was collected on evacuee attitudes toward their current living situation in general (see Chapter IV). These data all point to the conclusion that the evacuees are a psychologically depressed population (even in comparison to refugees), placing an extremely low valuation on their present living situation and holding rather meager hopes for improvement in the future. Given this orientation it is improbable that they are either being won over to the government or alienated from the Viet-Cong.

This evident failure to increase pro-government sentiments among the evacuees appears to result from two factors: (1) an erroneous assessment of the initial political sympathies of the target population and (2) an over-emphasis on social and economic betterment in the material sense and an under-emphasis on the manner in which this betterment is achieved as a way of winning the evacuees over to the GVN. Thus, in relocation operations it is assumed that the evacuees are a basically apathetic or neutral population that can be weaned away from the

Viet-Cong and won over to the government by means of physically improving their social and economic conditions.

Such a "ward heeler" approach to political mobilization is based on what Galula (75) calls the "second law of counterinsurgency," i.e., support of the population is gained through an active minority. This "law" assumes that "In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.... To be sure, the better the cause and the situation, the larger will be the active minority favorable to the counterinsurgent..." (75-77), and it is further assumed that it is by social and economic betterment programs that the government develops the case that can expand its active minority.

In the light of available information on evacuee sentiments both basic assumptions are open to question, i.e., (a) there may be no initial pro-government minority in the relocation camps, and (b) the neutrals may not be being won over by social and economic betterment efforts on their behalf.

(a) Initial Political Orientation of the Evacuees. As was mentioned before, direct measurement of evacuee political sentiments was not attempted so it is necessary to work by inference and deduction from other information. It appears probable that the evacuee population contains a large anti-government active minority, with the remainder of the population varying shades of neutral. Few if any GVN adherents are likely to be present in the relocation sites. This can be assumed on the basis of the following:

1. The evacuees are not a random sample of rural Vietnamese. They are people who remained in Front liberated areas when many of their neighbors were leaving as refugees and they are thus more likely than usual to be pro-Viet-Cong.

Initially, refugees from Front controlled or contested areas were predominantly persons motivated by fear or dislike of the insurgents. These are the local GVN civil cadre and paramilitary forces, landlords, militant Catholics, etc., who constitute the government's active minority. As the intensity of the conflict increased, people began moving into GVN areas to escape the hazards of military

operations and to get away from the increasingly oppressive social and economic policies of the Viet-Cong--taxes and forced labor, conscription, political indoctrination. This second wave of refugees represents the neutrals. The people remaining in the Front liberated areas after this refugee movement are either persons with insufficient means or initiative to leave or people who for one reason or another are committed to the insurgents.

2. The experience of forced relocation is unlikely to create sympathetic attitudes towards the government. Relocation, even when efficiently handled by humane forces is not exactly a pleasant experience for the evacuees. Their houses and nonmovable possessions are destroyed without compensation, they are separated from their homes and means of earning a livelihood, and are often subjected to the squalid and degrading conditions of life in temporary shelters before they are permanently resettled.

It is this population, then, that must be won to the government by means of social and economic betterment.

(b) Effectiveness of Social and Economic Actions in Changing Attitudes. It has become counterinsurgency dogma that civic actions are the keys to the hearts and minds of the masses. Thompson, for example, writes that

> "Winning" the population can tritely be summed up as good government in all its aspects. From the point of view of the immediate impact, there are many minor social benefits which can easily and fairly inexpensively be provided, such as improved health measures and clinics (it is a fact that no population suffering from debilitating diseases will ever take positive action either on behalf of the government or even on its own behalf); new schools (education for their children is probably the priority demand in most rural communities); and improved livelihood and standard of living. This last point covers every aspect of increased agricultural production, including better seeds, livestock and poultry, and the provision of

> fruit trees and other suitable cash crops. More desirable than outright gifts are schemes which are self-perpetuating or encourage a chain reaction. For example, building plans should stimulate the production of local building material. Improved communications are particularly important in the remoter areas, and this calls for a major programme for the repair of rural roads, canals, and bridges. All this helps to give the impression not only that the government is operating for the benefit of the people but that it is carrying out programmes of a permanent nature and therefore intends to stay in the area. This gives the people a stake in stability and hope for the future, which in turn encourages them to take the necessary positive action to prevent insurgent reinfiltration and to provide the intelligence necessary to eradicate any insurgent cells which remain. (1968:112-113)

Unfortunately in the case of the displaced persons counterinsurgency doctrine does not correspond to reality. Economic and social betterment actions appear to have been totally ineffective in changing the attitudes of the target populations. As Figure 3 illustrates there is no clear relationship between the objective resettlement situation of the displaced persons and their subjective assessment of their current living situations. In fact the resettlement site where the most has been done to improve living conditions (Cedar Falls resettlement) shows the second lowest mean present Cantril scale rating of the nine sites studied, while the evacuee site with the highest mean Cantril rating of the four studied (DMZ) has the second worst resettlement objective achievement record of all nine sites. It is also noteworthy that no evacuee population, regardless of resettlement conditions, has a subjective rating of present living conditions as high as the lowest rating given by a refugee population.

Thus, it appears that the experience of forced movement outweighs all other factors in conditioning evacuees' views of their situation.

However, as Figure 4 shows, the manner in which the relocation operation is conducted does appear to have a direct relationship to the way the later subjective assessment of conditions is made by the evacuees. Thus populations experiencing the better conducted forced movement operations report higher mean present Cantril scores than populations moved in the less well implemented operations.

Figure 3. Scatter Diagram: Relation of Objective Resettlement Situation to Displaced Persons' Subjective Assessment of Situation



Figure 4. Scatter Diagram: Relation of Evacuation Experience to Subjective Evaluation of Resettlement Situation



Increase in Government Propaganda Flow. Evacuees present the government with an ideal opportunity for psychological action. First, they are a true "captive audience" and second, they are a population that should be extremely vulnerable to propaganda. According to Ellul (92-99), an essential precondition for successful propaganda work in underdeveloped countries is the formation of a mass population--"...societies [such as China, Indochina and the Arab world] could not and cannot be captured, manipulated, and mobilized by propaganda, except when their traditional structures disintegrate and a new society is developed which is both individualistic and massive" (98) and population displacement as it has occurred in Viet-Nam is definitely contributing to the formation of just such a social milieu.

However, the GVN has not taken advantage of the evident opportunity for psychological action provided by the resettlement situation. The evacuees report virtually no increase in exposure to information media over what they had in their former residences and no special propaganda efforts have been directed at the evacuees (although an abortive effort was made to launch a camp newspaper at Cam-Lo). Thus relocation does not appear to have increased the flow of government propaganda to rural Vietnamese.

Development of Self-Defense Capability. The three requisites for developing a self-defense capability appear to be lacking in the evacuee resettlements. These are: (1) manpower, (2) motivation, and (3) social organization.

Manpower is in short supply with males between 15 and 49 years of age constituting less than 8 percent of the total evacuee population, and not all of those falling in this age group would be mentally or physically suitable for even home-guard type military service. However, some males could probably be recruited for local defense purposes.

More serious, however, are the organizational and motivational problems affecting the efficiency of local forces. As a recent study demonstrated, Popular Forces performance levels are closely linked to the social structure of the units. Those units having a high degree of internal social interaction and good relations with the local villagers are rated as superior in morale and

performance to those with a low degree of internal integration and poor relations with the villagers (Worchell:24-29). As integration is to a large extent a function of the social homogeneity of the unit and close relations with the peasants are largely dependent on the RF/PF personnel being natives of the village they are defending it seems questionable that effective self-defense units could be assembled from a heterogeneous population of evacuees to defend a resettlement site where most of the people are not linked to the PF by ties of long-term coresidence.

Conclusions

Despite its evident efficacy in other counterinsurgency campaigns forced relocation has not in the balance been an effective and efficient pacification tactic as it has been employed in Viet-Nam. The material costs to the GVN and the U. S. have been vast, the material and psychic costs to the evacuees beyond measure, and the evident damage inflicted on the Viet-Cong relatively slight. This is not to say that population regroupment is never justified: there are specific tactical situations where carefully planned and implemented relocations can be of real value to the pacification effort. But, on the basis of the evidence presented in the preceding chapters, forced relocation of civilians on a massive basis does not appear to offer a viable solution to the problems of rural pacification in Viet-Nam.

APPENDIX A

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF B5 QUESTIONNAIRE

B-5 QUESTIONNAIRE

Setting of Interview

1. Date: _____day _____month _____year

2. Persons present during the interview:

   [ ] Interviewee only
   [ ] His family members
   [ ] His family and neighbors
   [ ] In a public place

3. House type:

   [ ] House for one family only
   [ ] House for two or more families
   [ ] Makeshift shelter for individual family
   [ ] Makeshift shelter for two or more families
   [ ] Communal shelter for 2-5 families
   [ ] Communal shelter for 6-10 families
   [ ] Communal shelter for over 10 families
   [ ] Other

4. Roof:

   [ ] Tin
   [ ] Tile
   [ ] Cement fiber
   [ ] Thatch
   [ ] Makeshift

5. Wall:

   [ ] None
   [ ] Tin
   [ ] Brick
   [ ] Wood
   [ ] Clay
   [ ] Bamboo lattice
   [ ] Thatch
   [ ] Makeshift
   [ ] Trench

6. Floor:

   [ ] Cement
   [ ] Tile
   [ ] Clay
   [ ] Bamboo lattice
   [ ] Wood

Demographic Data

7. Persons presently living with head of household:

	Age	Sex	Former Occupation	Former Income	Present Occupation	Present Income	Physical Condition
7.1							
7.2							
7.8							
7.9							

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8. **Persons separated from the household:**

Relationship to head of Household	Age	Sex		Time of Departure			Reason for Departure	New Location	Occupation Before	Occupation After
		M	F	Before	During	After				
8.1										
8.2										
8.7										
8.8										

[A] Rural in province
[B] Rural out province
[C] Urban in province
[D] Urban out province
[E] Do not know

9. Members of Household killed as a direct result of war:

Relationship to head of Household	Age	Sex		Occupation Before Death	Place of Death	Year of Death	Circumstances of Death
		M	F				
9.1							
9.2							
9.3							
9.4							
9.5							

[A] In or near old hamlet
[B] Away from old hamlet

Questions

Following are several questions created as a standard measurement used as a test in several different countries and different cultures.

10.1 All of us want certain things out of life. When you think about what really matters in your own life, what are your wishes and hopes for the future?

In other words, if you imagine your future in the best possible light, what would your life look like then, if you are to be happy?

_____

_____

_____

10.2. Now, taking the other side of the picture, what are your fears and worries about the future? In other words, if you imagine your future in the worst possible light, what would your life look like then?

_____

_____

_____

10.3. Here is a picture of a ladder. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder (pointing) represents the best possible life for you and the bottom (pointing) represents the worst possible life for you. Where on the ladder (moving finger rapidly up and down ladder) do you feel you personally stand at the present time?

Step number _____.

10.4. Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago?

Step number_____.

10.5. And where do you think you will be on the ladder five years from now?

Step number_____.

Premovement Life Situation

11. If members of the household were farmers:

11.1. How many mau were cultivated?

[ ] None
[ ] 0-1
[ ] 2-3
[ ] 4-5
[ ] 6 or over

11.2. How many mau were rented?

[ ] None
[ ] 0-1
[ ] 2-3
[ ] 4-5
[ ] 6 or over

11.3. How many mau were owned?

[ ] None
[ ] 0-1
[ ] 2-3
[ ] 4-5
[ ] 6 or over

12. Ask interviewee: "Think of your families' employment situation during your life as it was before you moved away. How would you compare your present family employment situation to that of before?"

Present situation is:
[ ] Much better
[ ] Little better
[ ] About the same
[ ] Little worse
[ ] Much worse
[ ] Don't know
than before.

Premovement house type

13. Roof:
[ ] Tin
[ ] Tile
[ ] Cement fiber
[ ] Thatch
[ ] Makeshift

14. Wall:
[ ] None
[ ] Tin
[ ] Brick
[ ] Wood
[ ] Clay
[ ] Bamboo lattice
[ ] Thatch
[ ] Makeshift
[ ] Ham

15. Floor:
[ ] Cement
[ ] Tile
[ ] Clay
[ ] Bamboo lattice
[ ] Wood

16. Was house:

[ ] Owned
[ ] Rented
[ ] Shared with someone

17. Ask interviewee: "Think of your house as it was during your life before you moved away. How would you compare your present house with the one before?"

Present house is:
[ ] Much more comfortable
[ ] Little more comfortable
[ ] About same
[ ] Little less comfortable
[ ] Less comfortable
[ ] Don't know
than the original house.

18. Personal property interviewee had before he moved: [Multiple check]

[ ] Draft animals [horse, cows, buffalo]
[ ] Livestock [pigs]
[ ] Poultry
[ ] Fish pond
[ ] Trade tools (specify _____)
[ ] Vending stock
[ ] Motorized vehicle (Type_____)
[ ] Nonmotorized vehicle (Type_____)
[ ] Other (specify_____)

19. Community facilities available at point of origin: [Multiple check]

[ ] School (if checked, complete item 20.1 through 20.4)
[ ] Health service (if checked, complete items 21.1 through 21.2)
[ ] Information service (if checked, complete items 22.1 through 22.1)
[ ] Entertainment (if checked, complete items 23.1 through 23.1)
[ ] Cooperative
[ ] Market
[ ] Electricity
[ ] Public well
[ ] Public transportation
[ ] Other _____

20. If school is checked:

20.1 What level school?

[ ] Primary: grades 5-3
[ ] Primary: grades 5-1
[ ] High school: grades 7-4

20.2. Did interviewee's school age children attend the school?

[ ] None
[ ] Some
[ ] All
[ ] No school children

20.3. If some or all attended the school, how many days per week did they attend?

[ ] 5-6 days per week
[ ] 2-4 days per week
[ ] less than 2 days per week

20.4. If none or some did not attend the school, why did they not attend?

[ ] Children had to work or remain at home to guard possessions
[ ] Could not afford tuition/books
[ ] Failed examination
[ ] Children sick or disabled
[ ] Other_____

21. If health station is checked:

21.1 Did interviewee's family go to health station when they were ill?

[ ] No
[ ] Yes
[ ] Sometimes

21.2. Was interviewee satisfied with the health service?

[ ] No
[ ] Yes
[ ] Sometimes

22. If information center is checked:

22.1. What service did the information cadres perform? (Multiple check)

[ ] Nothing at all
[ ] Loudspeaker announcement
[ ] Motion pictures
[ ] Poster emplacement
[ ] Booklet and newspaper distribution
[ ] Public radio
[ ] Other _____
[ ] Other _____
[ ] Don't know

23. If entertainment is checked:

23.1. Who performed the entertainment? (Multiple check)

[ ] GVN troupe
[ ] VC troupe
[ ] Local talent
[ ] US/Allied forces
[ ] Other _____
[ ] Other _____
[ ] Don't know

24. If cooperative is checked:

24.1. What type of cooperatives? (Multiple check)

[ ] Farmers'
[ ] Fishermen's
[ ] Consumers'
[ ] Producers'
[ ] Other _____
[ ] Other _____
[ ] Don't know

24.2. Did interviewee benefit from participation in the cooperatives?

[ ] Did not participate
[ ] Not benefit at all from participation
[ ] Occasional benefits
[ ] Yes, a good benefit from participation
[ ] Don't know

Communication accesses at point of origin

25. Did interviewee have access to: (Multiple check)

[ ] Radio
[ ] Newspaper/magazine
[ ] Loudspeaker
[ ] Other_____
[ ] Other_____

26. Mobility at point of origin.

26.1. Did interviewee travel to other hamlets or towns?

[ ] Not at all
[ ] Once per year
[ ] 2-4 trips per year
[ ] 5-7 trips per year
[ ] 8-10 trips per year
[ ] Once per month
[ ] Once per week
[ ] Daily

26.2. What was the purpose of the trips? (Multiple check)

[ ] Market
[ ] Attend family rites
[ ] Business requirements
[ ] Visit friends/relatives
[ ] Attend a political meeting
[ ] Attend religious ceremonies
[ ] Watch a game or theatre
[ ] Other_____
[ ] Other_____

27. Indicate the interviewee's movement pattern by alphabetical designations of point of origin and present location as follows:

27.1. If the point of origin is interviewee's native hamlet, check the "A" box. If the interviewee's movement as a refugee originated in other than his native hamlet, check the "B" box.

Point of origin:

[ ] "A" (native hamlet)
[ ] "B" (non-native origin)

27.2. The letter designation of the present location depends on the number of locations the interviewee went to as a refugee seeking refuge and assistance. Each location should be counted alphabetically from the letter "C". For example, if the interviewee went directly from his native hamlet "A" to the present location, designate "C". If he went (or was taken) first to one location prior to coming to this present location, the designation would be "D".

Present location:

[ ] C (direct move from point of origin)
[ ] D (one stop over from point of origin)
[ ] E (two stop overs from point of origin)
[ ] F (three stop overs from point of origin)

28. Where was interviewee located just before he came to this location?

_____Ap/Camp

_____Xa

_____Quan

_____Tinh

29. If this location is <u>not the point of origin</u> of interviewee's movement. (Present location D, E, or F).

29.1. Was this location:

[ ] Government temporary refugee camp
[ ] Government refugee resettlement camp
[ ] Religious organization's refugee camp
[ ] Military base or outpost?
[ ] Hamlet with many refugees
[ ] Hamlet with very few refugees
[ ] Other_____
[ ] Other_____

29.2. How long was interviewee in this location?

[ ] Less than one month
[ ] 1-3 months
[ ] 4-6 months
[ ] 7-9 months
[ ] 10-12 months
[ ] 13-18 months
[ ] 19-24 months (1 1/2 - 2 years)
[ ] Over two years

29.3. Why did he leave this location?

[ ] Programmed resettlement plan
[ ] No security
[ ] No employment
[ ] No house site
[ ] Inadequate community facilities
[ ] Directed by GVN officials
[ ] To join family/friend
[ ] To join coreligionists
[ ] Other_____
[ ] Other_____

29.4. What was his point of origin?

_____Ap
_____Xa
_____Quan
_____Tinh

30. What date did interviewee leave his point of origin?

_____day _____month _____year

[ ] Calendar [ ] Lunar

31. What were the circumstances of interviewees' original movement?

Interviewee's account:_____

[ ] Imposed (interviewee had no choice)
[ ] Encouraged (interviewee had options and made final decision)
[ ] Volitional (interviewee made decision on his own)

32. If interviewee's movement was imposed:

32.1. Who forced interviewee to move?

[ ] ARVN
[ ] GVN civil cadre
[ ] U. S. forces
[ ] ROK forces
[ ] Australian/New Zealand forces
[ ] Allied forces (unspecified)
[ ] Viet-Cong
[ ] Other_____

32.2. Did interviewee have advance notification of imposed movement?

[ ] None at all

If yes:
[ ] Less than 1 day
[ ] 2-4 days
[ ] 5-7 days
[ ] Over one week

32.2.1. If interviewee did have advance notice, from whom did he receive it? (Multiple check)

[ ] Heard from people in the hamlet
[ ] GVN official announced in person: Title_____
[ ] Aircraft or truck loudspeaker
[ ] Religious leaders/priests
[ ] Leaflets
[ ] Viet-Cong agents
[ ] Other_____

32.3. Did anyone try to explain to the interviewee the reason for the imposed movement? (Multiple check)

[ ] No, no explanation at all

If yes:
Who explained_____
How explained_____
Text of explanation_____
At time of movement did interviewee believe the explanation reasonable?_____
Does he believe it reasonable now?_____

32.4. Does interviewee feel that [the imposing agent] has tried its best to help him?

[ ] No
[ ] Yes
[ ] No opinion
Why? _____

32.5. "What do you think would happen to you if you were to leave this place and resettle in another place of your own choosing?"

_____

32.5.1. Why? _____

33. If movement was result of encouragement:

33.1. Who induced interviewee to move? _____

33.2. What was the nature of the encouragement?

_____

33.3. Why did the interviewee decide to comply with the encouragement?

_____

33.4. Ask interviewee: "If you were able to make the choice again, under the same conditions, would you make the same decision to move?

[ ] No
[ ] Yes
[ ] Don't know
[ ] Why? _____

34. If movement was interviewee's own decision:

34.1 What were the reasons for his decision to move?

_____

34.2. How long did the conditions exist before interviewee made the decision to move? _____

34.3. When was decision to become a refugee first made?

[ ] Same day as departure
[ ] Within one week of departure
[ ] Within two weeks of departure
[ ] Within three weeks of departure
[ ] Within one month, prior to departure
[ ] Within two months, prior to departure
[ ] Over two months prior to departure

35. By what mode of transportation did interviewee leave from his point of origin?

[ ] Walking
[ ] Lambretta/horse cart
[ ] GVN/Allied truck
[ ] Aircraft
[ ] Boat
[ ] Other _____

36. What personal possessions did interviewee retain during the movement? (Multiple check)

[ ] Nothing at all
[ ] All possessions
[ ] Money
[ ] Paddy
[ ] Extra clothing
[ ] Kitchen and household utensils
[ ] Livestock and/or trade tools
[ ] Vehicle
[ ] Furniture
[ ] Other_____
[ ] Other_____

37. Other persons moving at the same time as interviewee:

[ ] None at all
[ ] Members of household only
[ ] With relatives only
[ ] 1-5 other family groups
[ ] 6-10 other family groups
[ ] More than 10 family groups
[ ] The entire hamlet
[ ] Don't know

38.1. What people of your hamlet did not move at same time as interviewee?

_____

38.2. Why did they not move?_____

39. Ask interviewee:

39.1. "Who do you think has the better life now, the people who moved or the people who stayed?"

[ ] People who moved
[ ] People who stayed
[ ] Don't know

39.2. Why?_____

40. Did the VC do anything to people who moved with interviewee?

[ ] Did nothing at all (if checked go to item 41)
[ ] Attempted to prohibit movement
[ ] Encouraged movement
[ ] Interviewee does not know
[ ] Other_____

If VC attempted to prohibit movement:

40.1. What methods did they use?

[ ] Threatened death for people leaving
[ ] Threatened imprisonment for the people leaving
[ ] Threatened property confiscation for people leaving
[ ] Threatened reeducation for people leaving
[ ] Actually detained or killed person attempting to leave

(continued)

[ ] Actually confiscated property of those persons who left
[ ] Told of maltreatment by GVN/Allied
[ ] Other_____

40.2. If interviewee indicated any VC reaction, why does he think the VC did it?

_____

41. How did interviewee learn of this relocation site?

[ ] Had no prior knowledge of area
[ ] Heard from people in the hamlet
[ ] Heard from GVN official personally: Title_____
[ ] Loudspeaker, leaflet or poster
[ ] Personal observation from previous visits to the area
[ ] Other_____

42. Why did interviewee relocate in this place?

[ ] Site arranged by government
[ ] Friends/relatives living here already
[ ] Land available for home site
[ ] Followed other refugees to this place
[ ] Employment available
[ ] Religious leaders or coreligionists influenced
[ ] Availability of government aid and relief
[ ] Familiarity of area from previous visits
[ ] Closest secure hamlet
[ ] Other

43. Do interviewees feel that this place is secure?

[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[ ] Sometimes
[ ] Don't know

Resettlement

44. If members of household are presently farmers:

44.1. How many mau are now cultivated?

[ ] None
[ ] 0-1
[ ] 2-3
[ ] 4-5
[ ] 6 or over

44.2. How many mau are presently rented?

[ ] None
[ ] 0-1
[ ] 2-3
[ ] 4-5
[ ] 6 or over

44.3. How many mau are presently owned?

[ ] None
[ ] 0-1
[ ] 2-3
[ ] 4-5
[ ] 6 or over

The following four questions should be asked for three different actors: the Government [A]; the friends/relatives of the interviewee [B]; and the villagers who lived in or near this resettlement site before the interviewee [C].

Mark the alphabetical designation for each of the three actors, at least one for each question, and as many times as necessary.

45. When interviewee first moved from his point of origin, did he expect [A, B, C] to do something for him (or to him)?

45.1. A (government
45.2. B (friends/relatives)
45.3. C (people here before)

A [ ]
B [ ] Had no idea what to expect
C [ ]

A [ ]
B [ ] Expected nothing at all
C [ ]

A [ ]
B [ ] Expected punishment or ostracism
C [ ]

A [ ]
B [ ] Expected shelter or house site and assistance temporarily
C [ ]

A [ ]
B [ ] Expected shelter or house site and assistance for duration of refugee period
C [ ]

A [ ]
B [ ] Expected employment
C [ ]

A [ ]
B [ ] Expected land site for farm or garden
C [ ]

A [ ]
B [ ] Expected provisions of basic community facilities [school, health station]
C [ ]

A [ ]
B [ ] Other (specify_____)
C [ ]

A [ ]
B [ ] Other (specify_____)
C [ ]

46. When interviewee relocated here, what did the [A, B, C] actually do?

46.1. A (government)	A [ ]	Interviewee does not know
46.2. B (friends/relatives)	B [ ]	
46.3. C (people here before)	C [ ]	
	A [ ]	Did nothing at all
	B [ ]	
	C [ ]	
	A [ ]	Punishment or ostracism
	B [ ]	
	C [ ]	
	A [ ]	Provided shelter or house site and assistance temporarily
	B [ ]	
	C [ ]	
	A [ ]	Provided shelter or house site and assistance for duration of refugee period
	B [ ]	
	C [ ]	
	A [ ]	Provided employment
	B [ ]	
	C [ ]	
	A [ ]	Provided land site for farm or garden
	B [ ]	
	C [ ]	
	A [ ]	Provided basic community facilities [school, health service]
	B [ ]	
	C [ ]	
	A [ ]	Other (Specify_____)
	B [ ]	
	C [ ]	
	A [ ]	Other (Specify_____)
	B [ ]	
	C [ ]	

47. Does interviewee expect [A, B, C] to do anything in the future?

47.1. A (government)	A [ ]	Does not know
47.2. B (friends/relatives)	B [ ]	
47.3. C (people here before)	C [ ]	
	A [ ]	Expects nothing at all
	B [ ]	
	C [ ]	

(continued)

A [ ]
B [ ] Expects punishment or ostracism
C [ ]

A [ ] Expects to be provided with
B [ ] temporary assistance shelter,
C [ ] or house site

A [ ] Expects to be provided with assis-
B [ ] tance shelter or house site for as
C [ ] long as he is a refugee

A [ ]
B [ ] Expects to be provided employment
C [ ]

A [ ]
B [ ] Expects land site for farm or
C [ ] garden

A [ ]
B [ ] Expects basic community facilities
C [ ] [school, health service]

A [ ]
B [ ] Other (specify_____)
C [ ]

A [ ]
B [ ] Other (specify_____)
C [ ]

48. What personal possessions does interviewee have with him in this location? (Multiple check)

[ ] Draft animals (horses, cows, buffalo)
[ ] Livestock (pigs)
[ ] Poultry
[ ] Fish pond
[ ] Trade tools (specify_____)
[ ] Vending stock
[ ] Motorized vehicle (type_____)
[ ] Nonmotorized vehicle (type_____)
[ ] Other (specify_____)
[ ] Other (specify_____)

Present Community Facilities

49. If school is available in present location:

49.1. Do interviewee's school age children presently attend school?

[ ] No [ ] All
[ ] Some [ ] No school age children

49.2. If some or all are presently attending school, how many days per week?

[ ] 5-6 days per week
[ ] 2-4 days per week
[ ] Less than 2 days per week

49.3. If presently some or all of your children are not in school, why?

[ ] Children had to work or remain at home to guard possessions.
[ ] Failed examination
[ ] Could not afford tuition/books
[ ] Children sick or disabled
[ ] Other (Specify_____)

50. If health station is available in present location:

50.1. Does or will the interviewee's family go to the health station when they are ill?

[ ] None available
[ ] Available but do not go
[ ] Go occasionally
[ ] Go whenever they are ill

50.2. If health station is available and interviewee does not go to it, why does he not go?

[ ] Prefers traditional medical practices
[ ] Does not feel that the facilities are adequate
[ ] Does not feel that the personnel are competent
[ ] Other _____

51. If cooperatives are available in present location:

51.1. Does interviewee participate in any local cooperatives?

[ ] None available [ ] Cooperative available but does not participate

If yes:

[ ] Farmer's
[ ] Fisherman's
[ ] Producer's
[ ] Consumers'
[ ] Other (Specify_____)

51.2. If interviewee does participate in local cooperatives, does he feel that he benefits from his participation?

[ ] No benefit at all
[ ] Sometimes
[ ] Yes, a great deal

Communication access at present location

52. Does interviewee have access to: (Multiple check)

[ ] Radio
[ ] Newspapers/magazines
[ ] Loudspeaker
[ ] Other_____
[ ] Other_____

53. Ask interviewee: "Think of the community facilities as they were during your life before you moved. How would you compare the present community facilities to those of before?"

	[ ] Much better	
Present	[ ] Little better	
facilities	[ ] About same	than those of before.
are:	[ ] Little worse	
	[ ] Much worse	

54. Mobility at present location:

54.1. Does interviewee travel to other hamlets or towns?

[ ] Not at all (if checked go to item 55)
[ ] Once per year
[ ] 2-4 trips per year
[ ] 5-7 trips per year
[ ] 8-10 trips per year
[ ] Once per month
[ ] Once per week
[ ] Daily

54.2. What are the purposes of the trips? (Multiple check)

[ ] Market
[ ] Attend family rites
[ ] Business requirements
[ ] Visit friends/relatives
[ ] Attend political meetings
[ ] Watch a game or theater
[ ] Attend religious ceremonies
[ ] Collect possessions from point of origin
[ ] Other _____

55. Does interviewee attend ceremonies held here?

[ ] No

If yes:

[ ] Buddhist ceremony
[ ] Catholic/Protestant ceremony
[ ] Wedding
[ ] Funeral
[ ] Death ceremony
[ ] Dinh ceremony
[ ] Other_____
[ ] Other_____

56. When interviewee has difficulties, who does he contact?

[ ] Religious leader
[ ] Hamlet chief or camp chief
[ ] Elders
[ ] Village chief
[ ] District chief
[ ] Other _____

57. Ask interviewee: "Think of your overall life situation as it was before you moved. How would you compare your present overall life situation?"

Present life situation is:
[ ] Much better
[ ] Little better
[ ] Same
[ ] Little worse
[ ] Much worse
than premovement life situation.

58. Ask interviewee: "If the war continues, and your life situation remains the same, what will you do?"

Employment, location_____

59. "If peace comes to Viet-Nam and your life situation improves, what will you do?"

Employment, location_____

60. "If peace comes to Viet-Nam and your life situation remains the same, what will you do?

Employment, location_____

61. "Suppose a jinni appeared and offered to grant you two wishes for anything you wanted to have, to do, or to be. What would your two wishes be?"

_____

62. "If respondent has a son not yet working, what type job would interviewee prefer his son to have when he is old enough?"

[ ] Not applicable

_____

READING TEST

Explain to interviewee that we are interested in how people understand certain GVN proclamations. To determine this we would like for the interviewee to read the statements (below) and to answer some questions about what is said in the statements:

1. Report immediately to the nearest Hamlet, Village, or District Headquarters.
2. Submit your Identification Card and your previous Family Registration card, if available, to the Local Administration to obtain a Refugee Affidavit.
3. Ask the Hamlet Leader or Village Chairman to take you as soon as possible to the local Temporary Refugee Camp.
4. During your stay at the Temporary Camp, put in a request to the Local Administration for a homestead.

Allow interviewee to read the statements and when he completes, ask the following questions:

If interviewee cannot read or refuses to read, check. [ ]

Where are people directed to report immediately?

_____

What are people supposed to submit?

_____

What are people supposed to ask hamlet leaders?

_____

What are people supposed to do at the temporary camp?

_____ _____

INTERVIEWER COMMENTS:

65.1. Was interviewee sincere?

[ ] a - Very sincere
[ ] b - Fairly sincere
[ ] c - Not very sincere
[ ] d - Not sincere at all

65.2. Was interviewee fluent?

[ ] a - Very fluent
[ ] b - Fairly fluent
[ ] c - Not very fluent
[ ] d - Not fluent at all

65.3. Was interviewee:

[ ] a - Very open and cooperative
[ ] b - Fairly open and cooperative
[ ] c - Not very open and cooperative
[ ] d - Not open and cooperative at all

Interviewer number_____

APPENDIX B

REFERENCES

REFERENCES

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