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SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE: ITS FORMULATION AND DISSEMINATION

By: Harriet Fast Scott

Prepared for:

Office, Chief of Research and Development
United States Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

Under direction of:

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
United States Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

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This document deals with examining the part specific Soviet governmental agencies play in the formulation and dissemination of military doctrine. The author feels that the understanding of these two functions is requisite to preparing strategies to deal with the Soviets in force relationships and applications.

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FOREWORD

Soviet Military Doctrine: Its Formulation and Dissemination, is the second "Doctrine" study by Harriet Fast Scott. The first was Soviet Military Doctrine: Its Continuity 1960-1970. This second study deals with specific Soviet governmental agencies in examining the part each plays in formulation and dissemination. The understanding of these two functions is requisite to preparing strategies to deal with the Soviets in force relationships and applications.

R. B. Foster
Director
Strategic Studies Center

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INTRODUCTION

In March 1971 delegates to the XXIV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union assembled in Moscow. Experienced observers of the Moscow scene did not expect anything new to be decided by the assemblage. The decisions which might be announced in the name of the Congress already had been made over the previous months.

Editorials and articles appearing in the completely controlled Soviet press immediately prior to and following the meeting of such a Congress warrant close study. Whatever new that might be published at such a time can be assumed to reflect Party-approved decisions previously made. Economic goals may or may not be met, but the fact that they are announced gives economists throughout the world an indication of intent. Military goals also may not be realized, but the statements made by the Party-military leadership on doctrine and strategy indicate Soviet perceptions of the nature of war and of the weapons programmed for their Armed Forces.

The deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles in the spring of 1971, which so concerned the United States, was a direct outgrowth of a Party-military doctrinal decision, announced by Nikita Khrushchev in a speech at the IV Session of the Supreme Soviet in January, 1960. The doctrine was elaborated further by Marshal Malinovsky, the Soviet Minister of Defense, in his address to the XXII Party Congress in October 1961. The speeches of both Khrushchev and Malinovsky demonstrate that military doctrine in the Soviet Union is a matter that receives careful attention at the highest possible national level.

The purpose of this paper is to show the process by which the Soviet leadership formulates and disseminates military doctrine. There are frequent attempts in the United States to relate policy formulation and decision-making processes of the Soviet Union to those that exist in the United States, Western Europe and other non-communist nations. One reason our forecasts are so unreliable concerning Soviet-political-military moves and deployments of weapons systems is that few analysts have an understanding of the structure in which Soviet doctrine is developed and approved.

Although the highest leadership of the Party and government in the Soviet Union show great interest in military doctrine and strategy, it is obvious that basic work in these areas must begin at much lower levels. This paper will attempt to identify the more significant groups, agencies and institutions that play some role in the formulation and dissemination of military doctrine. No claim is made that the investigation is complete; at best it is only hoped that other analysts will either continue further, or correct the findings here presented.

The Soviet Union today is under the complete dictatorship of the Communist Party. This paper will attempt to outline the role of the Party itself, as well as that of the Party Congress, the Central Committee, the Politburo and the Secretariat in formulating military doctrine, and in its promulgation. The role of the "government" in this same process next will be given. It may surprise many Americans that the famed Soviet "Academy of Sciences", considered a government body, is interested in all aspects of the Soviet Armed Forces and maintains close ties with the Ministry of Defense. Lastly, the role of the Soviet Armed Forces in the

development of doctrine will be presented.

Finally, this paper will attempt to indicate how Soviet military doctrine, once formulated and issued by Party-military leaders at the highest national level, is promulgated to the Soviet Armed Forces. If we understand this process of both the formulation and dissemination of military doctrine, we will be in a much better position to recognize and to analyze its content.

PART A: The Role of the Party in Formulating Soviet Military Doctrine

1. The Role of the Party

The Communist Party of the Sovet Union (CPSU) plays a major role in the formulation and dissemination of Soviet military doctrine. Doctrine, by Soviet definition, has two sides, the political and the military-technical. Theoreticians in the Soviet Union always stress that the political side is the more important. Before any new doctrine can be announced, or before any shift in emphasis given, the Party must indicate its approval.

This does not mean, however, that the Party and the military work as two distinct elements. In actual fact, there is an intermarriage between the Communist Party and the Soviet Armed Forces, and the nature of this relationship must be appreciated if the manner in which doctrine is formulated is to be understood.

Over the past decade the interpretations of many analysts concerning Soviet military doctrine have proven to be incorrect. One reason for this is that they have seen the Party and the Soviet Armed Forces in constant conflict, with marshals and generals restive under the measures imposed by the Party to control the military. Many of these analysts seek to identify 'institutional differences' of the type that might exist in the United States or in Western European nations.

The purpose of this section is to attempt to portray as factually as possible the principles and concepts on which Party-military relationships are based. These principles have been published in a number of Soviet military publications and have been repeated again and again, so there

should be no doubt of the fact that they give the official Party view. Much of the confusion that exists in the United States today about the Soviet Armed Forces would be clarified if more attention were given to what the Soviets themselves have published. This is not to suggest that Soviet theoretical military writings do not have their limitations. Detailed figures on Soviet weapons systems and personnel simply are not found in their open literature. But their writings on basic principles and military theory are extensive, and the Party-military leadership attempts to put their stated principles and theory into practice.

According to official Soviet writings, a major task of the Communist Party and the Soviet government is to "take very necessary measure for further strengthening the defense of the country and raising the fighting power of its Armed Forces."[1] In so doing, the Soviet Union "takes into account the complicated international situation and the presence in the world of a system of inimical aggressive imperialist forces."[2] Somehow, their writings never mention the huge buildup of their own military forces along the Soviet-Chinese border.

CHART 1 COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP OF SOVIET OFFICERS



OLDER OFFICERS



YOUNGER OFFICERS

From: CAF 4, 1971, p. 30.



CHART 2 GROWTH OF THE NUMBER OF COMMUNISTS IN THE ARMED FORCES



CHART 3 GROWTH OF NUMBER OF CP MEMBERS AND KOMSOMOLS IN THE ARMED FORCES

Communist of the Armed Forces, #1

Soviet military spokesmen always give credit to Lenin for having formulated the basis and guiding principles of Soviet military organization. They claim that these principles were further developed by the "New Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" (which was adopted at the XXII Party Congress in 1961) in Plenums of the Central Committee, in documents connected with the Jubilee of the USSR in 1967 and in the new law of General Service Obligations which was effective in 1967."[3]

When writing about military organization the Soviets include economics, science, technology and 'moral political' and 'military' potentials. In formulating military policy they consider the social system of the country, on which the creation of military power depends, and the Armed Forces which utilize it. According to their own definition:

> Under military organization is meant all the complex measures by which the military policy of the Party and the state is carried out, beginning with the organization of military production, the preparation of the population in a moral-political and military relation, the implementation of mobilization measures and ending with ideological and organizational measures which are carried out in the Armed Forces themselves.[4]

This definition supposedly follows the principles of Marxism-Leninism, which Soviet writers assert guide their military organization. Under these principles the army is a special organ of the state. As such, it bears the specific features inherent in that particular state, and is part of its political superstructure. The Soviet theorists claim that the type army of any particular state is determined by the type political system in that state. The political system, in turn depends on the social system and the method of production. These are basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.*

* For a study of the role of philosophy, see: Grudinin, I.A., Dialectics and Contemporary Military Affairs, Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1971.

Soviet readers constantly are reminded that their Armed Forces represent the world's first socialist army. Their writers assert that the bases of Soviet military organization depends upon:

> The socialist economy, primarily all branches of heavy industry, transport, communications, agriculture and so forth. The productive-economic and scientific-technical possibilities of the State determine the quantity and quality of the armaments which are the material basis for waging war....
>
> The socialist social system based on public ownership of the means of production, collective labor and comradely cooperation....
>
> Marxism-Leninism and its teachings on war and the army. Communist ideology, which has become the ideology of all Soviet people, communist morals, high political consciousness, boundless devotion to the idea of communism, these things compose the spiritual world of Soviet man, they produce feelings of ardent love for the socialist Motherland, bitter hatred for its enemies, and invincible steadfastness in defending the socialist mother country.[5]

According to the official Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) the leadership of the Armed Forces is assigned to the Party. A fundamental basis of their military organization are the provisions for constantly strengthening and maintaining the role and influence of the Party throughout all echelons of their Armed Forces.

Soviet writers stress that the principles of Soviet military organization are inseparable from principles of State and Party organization. The three primary principles applicable to the military, the State and the Party are:

> The principles of Party leadership. In the Program of the CPSU, in resolutions of Congresses of the Party, Plenums of the Central Committee and in other Party documents, the decisive role of the Communist Party in managing, organizing and educating activities in Soviet military organization is stressed.... Any important question of military organization, before it becomes a program of activity for the State and the people, is decided by the Party. It formulates the military and military-technical policy of the state, and draws up its military doctrine....

The principle of unity of the army and the people. The Report of the Central Committee CPSU to the XXIII Party Congress stressed: "Civil Defense must be perfected, military patriotic work among the workers especially among the youth, must be improved, the patronage of factory collectives, schools, kolkhozes and sovkhozes over military units and subunits must be strengthened, more concern for soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army and their families must be expressed.

The principle of internationalism. In the Soviet military organization this principle is expressed in the unbreakable friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union. All socialist nations and nationalities of our country are united in a single military organization, all have equal rights and obligations in defending the Motherland. This principle now is also expressed in the fraternal socialist countries, the fighting cooperation of their armies, the joint defense of the world socialist system from imperialist aggression. Organizational embodiment of this principle is found in the Warsaw Defense Pact, and also in bilateral agreements of socialist countries on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid. A clear example of such socialist internationalism was the defense of the gains of socialism in Czechoslovakia from the intrigues of internal and external counter-revolution.[6]

Each month one or more issues of Red Star, Communist of the Armed Forces or another military publication, will have an article discussing at length a principle of military structuring. A number of analysts in the United States and elsewhere frequently report on these articles, thinking they have turned up something new in the internal Soviet Party-military "debate". The actual relationship between the Party and the Soviet Armed Forces can be understood if these 'principles' are recognized. The 1971 Officer's Guide summarizes them as follows:

The principle of cadre organization. In present-day complicated international conditions, the presence of a cadre army is vitally necessary for assuring the security of our country. While imperialism exists, while it has powerful regular armed forces, great reserves of weapons of mass destruction, our country and the fraternal socialist countries must keep and strengthen in every possible way their cadre armies....

The principle of constant perfection of the organizational structure of our army and the harmonious development of all the services of armed forces and branches of service. Victory in modern war is achieved by the efforts of all the services of the armed forces and branches of service. Our Party decides questions of the structure and changes in the organizational form and relationship of the services of the Armed Forces and service branches, taking into consideration the internal situation of the country and international conditions, and also the development of ways and means of armed conflict....

The principle of centralism. Centralism in the organizational structure of the Armed Forces and their system of control finds expression in that the whole forming of the army and navy and their staffs and other organs of control are strictly subordinated to a central organ of state power, to a single Supreme Command. Lower control organs strictly carry out orders, directives and instructions of higher ones and are accountable to them in all questions of their activities....

The principle of one-man command. The Program of the CPSU defines one-man command as the most important principle of Soviet military organization. One-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces is built in a Party basis. This means: the commander is the representative of the Party /see Chart 1/ and government in the troops, carrying out their line of action, observing Soviet laws and military regulations; he is the sole administrator of the troops entrusted to him, bearing full responsibility for all sides of their activity, for the state of combat and political training, for their combat capability and combat readiness; the one-man commander is close to the personnel, attends to their needs, sees they perform their duties and guards their legal rights; in all his work, he relies on the Party organization, uses the force of Party influence on the troops to raise the level of combat and political training and to strengthen military discipline; makes broad use of criticism and self-criticism, and the power of army and navy public opinion to improve affairs.

The principle of conscious military discipline. Subordination is also found in socialist armies, but it is different in form. It it is not based on class role as in bourgeois armies, but on the common interest of commanders and subordinates to assure the security of the socialist state. While relying on consciousness in strengthening military discipline, elements of coercion are not excluded where necessary to assure combat capability and combat readiness....

> The principle of maintaining the constant combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. The deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, the aggravation of its contradictions increases the adventurousness of imperialism, its danger for nations, for the cause of peace and social progress. This is convincingly confirmed by recent events. Militant imperialism might unleash world nuclear rocket war. Therefore Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the necessity to support high vigilance and constant combat readiness of troops, and their ability in any circumstances to repulse an attack by an aggressor and deliver a crushing defeat to him. Constant high combat readiness is the main task of the Soviet Armed Forces.[7]

These are basic concepts, the results of which frequently can be identified when travelling within the Soviet Union. The 'principle' of one-man command' is a favorite topic of military writers. In regard to 'the principle of conscious military discipline', whereby 'elements of coercion are not excluded where necessary to assure combat capability and combat readiness', visitors in any large Soviet city soon become conscious of armed military patrols. One can but wonder how the Soviet application of this principle would be accepted within the Armed Forces of the United States.

Any Western traveler to the Soviet Union, who might be interested in military affairs, cannot help but be impressed by the military schools. There are over one hundred 'higher military schools' alone, housed in well-tended buildings in the major cities. Such schools in Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, Novosibirsk and Leningrad, for example, compare favorably with the grounds and buildings of the National War College or the Armed Forces Staff College in the United States. Military training and education in the Soviet Union are based on the following principles:

The principle of unity of training and education. It is well known that the success of a soldier in fulfilling his military duty depends on his skill and understanding. They are closely interconnected. The trainer must educate and the educator must train. Compulsory military training is for two or three years according to the new law of military obligation. At the same time military affairs have become extremely complicated. This creates a demand to use time more efficiently in training and educating troops....

The principle of teaching the troops what is needed in modern war. This means inculcating such qualities as will assure the fulfillment by them of their obligations in the most complicated conditions of modern war. Therefore training must be conducted in conditions as close as possible to battle, in the spirit of active, offensive actions....

The principle of taking into consideration the features of the military collective and the individual qualities of the soldiers. Young people enter the army with different levels of education, ideological and vital erudition. Their functions in service are far from alike. The individual and the collective must be approached individually, taking into account their specifics....

The principle of Communist purposefulness. Training and education is not an end in itself but a means of producing a highly principled and skillful defender of the Motherland. The soldiers of socialist army are imbued with high ideals; consciousness of patriotic and international obligations guides all their thoughts and actions, lets them achieve military mastery without tiring, bravely overcome difficulties and dangers of military life, and lets them fight to the last drop of their blood.[8]

The Western reader will note that these Soviet writings contain a great deal of jargon which normally would be considered propaganda. No attempt has been made to clean-up statements so as to make them less offensive to the non-communist reader, because these unpleasant notions and expressions are a basic part of understanding the motivation of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet military man in particular. To a greater or lesser extent, he believes these statements. They are repeated over and over everywhere he turns: on radio, television, on street billboards, in the newspapers, in magazines and books. To separate military policy from its ideological foundations would be to study a machine without its motor.

To understand Soviet military doctrine it is necessary to appreciate that the communist ideology of Marxism-Leninism as the driving force and providing the guiding principles behind all actions. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union plays a unique role in every phase of the Soviet military structure. This fact is carefully stressed.

> The leadership of the Communist Party, the increasing role and influence of Party organizations in the army and navy, as stressed in the Program of the CPSU, is the fundamental basis of Soviet military organization. The undivided leadership of the Armed Forces by the Party, its Central Committee, is an objective rule of the life and combat activity of the army and navy. This rule is caused by the role which are Party plays in the life of Soviet society as its leading and guiding force.[9]

The leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces by the Communist Party is further explained as follows:

> First: All questions of the defense of the socialist Fatherland, of military organization, of military theory and practice, both in the past and at present are decided in strict correspondence with the ideology and policy of the Party, on the basis of directives and decrees formulated in resolutions of Congresses and Plenums of the Central Committee and the Politburo of the Central Committee CPSU.
>
> The military policy of the Party, being part of the general policy of the CPSU, provides for the solution of the most important problems of military organization.
>
> Second: the leadership of the Armed Forces by the Communist Party finds expression in that its Central Committee is directly concerned with questions of the life and activity of the army and navy, determines the main direction and tasks of its organization, and is concerned about strengthening its combat might, discipline and unity. The Central Committee of the Party plans the main directions in the development of the technical equipping of the army and navy, supplies the troops with all kinds of modern weapons and combat equipment; it determines the judicious proportion in the development of the services of the Armed Forces and the service branches; it works out Soviet military doctrine; it selects and places the guiding military cadres; it works out and puts into practice the principles of training and educating personnel;

and it is concerned with raising the vigilance and combat readiness of the troops. All these questions are decided in correspondence with concrete historical conditions, the demands of military science, taking into consideration experience and practice, combined with constant control in fulfilling directives and decrees of the Party. This is safeguarded by the fact that before making one decision or another on questions of military organization, the Central Committee of the Party carefully studies the state of affairs in the army and navy, the actual conditions and circumstances and consults with the leading military political workers. Often the leaders of the Party and government, members of the Central Committee of the CPSU visit the troops directly, acquaint themselves with their lives and studies, with the practices of training and educating personnel. All this lets our Party and its Central Committee correctly decide the most complicated questions of military organization.

Third: The leadership of the Armed Forces by the Communist Party is shown by the fact that a strict system of political organs, Party and Komsomol organizations has been created and operates within the Soviet Army and Navy which carry out enormous educational and organizational work in the troops. The Central Committee gives constant attention to questions of Party-political work in the army and navy, improving its forms and methods, raising its fighting spirit and efficiency. Party-political work rallies the troops of the army and navy around the Party and the Soviet government, mobilizes them in fulfilling tasks which stand before the Armed Forces.

Fourth: The leading role of the Communist Party in the Armed Forces is displayed by the fact that in the years of military trial, the Party, by its policy and military organizational activity, assured the unity of front and rear, turned the country into a single military camp and assured the firm leadership of the troops.[10]

According to Soviet authors, the role of the Communist Party in the Armed Forces is growing. This has been dictated, they say, by a number of factors.

First, by the fact that their task in protecting the security of the Motherland has grown and become more complicated. The Party is taking into account that the aggressiveness of imperialism has become stronger and that the threat of a new world war springing up has increased in connection with this..The main source of danger is American imperialism, playing the role of the world exploiter an gendarme, the implacable enemy of the liberation movement....

Therefore the Party will henceforth be constantly concerned with the growth of the defensive might of the Soviet Motherland, will support the constant readiness of the people and the army to repel the aggression of the imperialists, to defend the socialist Fatherland.

Second, by the scientific-technical revolution, the radical changes in military affairs, the necessity for Marxist-Leninist scientific foresight, and for working out and putting into practice the proper line in the theory and practice of military organization.

Thanks to the constant concern of the Party and government, our army and navy has everything necessary for defeating any aggressor. But military affairs are quickly developing. Imperialist states are making great efforts to achieve advantages in the military sphere. Therefore the significance of the right military technical policy of the CPSU, the development in every possible way of our economy has especially increased just now in order to support our Armed Forces at the very highest level of present-day military technology.

Third, by the growing significance of the moral factor in modern war. The history of wars shows that the deadlier the weapon, the greater the role played by the morale of the people drawn into combat actions. This rule obtains to an incomparably higher decree to a possible nuclear war. The building up of moral-political superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the armies of imperialist states now has taken on paramount importance. Because of this, the role of the Party in the communist indoctrination of troop personnel and in their moral-political and psychological training is growing.

Fourth, by the necessity to prepare the whole country and all of the people to repel imperialist aggression. Modern war is erasing the line between front and rear. Both the troops and objects deep inside the territory of the country might be subject to a surprise nuclear rocket strike. Hence the role of the Party in guaranteeing the vitality of our state in the event of war, in strengthening the military-economic might of the USSR in every possible way, in moral-political and military preparation of the population and in organizing civil defense, is growing.

Fifth, by the widening of the international obligations of the Soviet Armed Forces and the necessity to assure close cooperation and unity of action of all fraternal armies.

With the formation of the world socialist system and the growth of its political and economic might, the conditions of the armed defense of socialist states fundamentally changed. In contrast to the past when a single socialist state faced the military attack of the imperialists, in a future world war, the imperialist aggressors will be repulsed by the powerful socialist community.[11]

* * * * * * *

A decade ago few military professionals in the United States would have taken seriously the idea that Communist Party indoctrination, and Party control, would have any significant impact upon the operational characteristics of a nation's Armed Forces. By 1971 our experience in Southeast Asia may have altered our thinking. We now know that communist indoctrination has been a major factor in the Vietnamese war. There is little doubt that a close relationship does exist in North Vietnam between the Communist Party and its Armed Forces. A somewhat similiar relationship exists between the CPSU and the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. The various principles and concepts stated above, translated directly from current and official Soviet military publications, portray the nature and extent of this relationship.

2. The Role of the Party Congress

The XXIV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union convened in March, 1971. Exactly five years had elasped since the XXIII Party Congress, which had met the last days of March, 1966. There had been an old regulation which stipulated that Party Congresses would be called at least once each four years. For this reason many columnists had speculated that the Congress had been postponed a year because of internal Party disagreements. The real reason probably was the fact that the Soviet economic planners operate on five-year plans, and this interval is therefore convenient for the calling of Party Congresses.

Such Congresses have been held every five years since 1956 (a Congress held in 1959 was an 'extraordinary Congress' and as such did not select new Party officials). During the XXIV Party Congress the old four-year regulation was superceded by a new rule, stating that henceforth Congresses would meet each five years.

The XXIV Party Congress did nothing unexpected. After the Congress, quotations from General Secretary Brezhnev's report, as well as from the speech delivered by Minister of Defense Grechko, have appeared in newspapers and journals, and they will be used as a basis for troop indoctrination.

Departing from custom, the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, General Yepishev, did not address the Congress.



CHART 4 THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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A number of other high Party officials also failed to make addresses. The reason for this probably was due to lack of time, since great attention was given to the foreign delegates, who as a group were given more time than usual for speeches. The Congress was remarkable for its unanimity, at least in public, and exuded an air of confidence and optimism.

The first Party Congress was held in March, 1898. The first Congress to take place after the Revolution was the VII, held in March, 1918. After the XVIII Party Congress in 1939, no Congress met until 1952.

At the XXIII Party Congress which met in March-April 1966, nearly 5,000 delegates atended, purporting to represent 12,000,0000 Party members. Of these 5,000 delegates, 352 were from Party organizations of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, Aerospace Defense Forces, Ground Forces, Air Forces, Navy and Border Guard units. Nearly all were generals, admirals and marshals, who previously had been 'selected' at local Party Conferences. (No list identifying the delegates attending the XXIV Party Congress of March, 1971, has yet been published).

Much of the work of the Congress consists of approving the five-year plan, ready-made resolutions and a new Central Committee (see Chart 4) which also appears to have been pre-selected. By the time things get to the Congress, all the problems have been ironed out. But the Congress does force periodic ironing out of development plans. In 1970, for instance, there appeared to be quite some delay in producing the new budget. It was sent back to "committee" at least once. Ministries and State committees must come up with plans before the Congress for inclusion in the budget.

The Party leaders find a way to fill Party posts with their supporters long before the Congress. They must share some of these plums with other Politburo members. Party leaders may have to work out a balance in the Politburo or Secretariat between opposing groups who control powerful local groups.

On March 12, 1971, the Moscow City Party Conference selected 314 members to attend the XXIV Party Congress. Over a dozen prominent generals and marshals, including Minister of Defense Grechko, are on this list. In addition to Marshal of the Soviet Union Grechko, Marshals Budenny, Zakharov, Krylov and Yakubovskiy were picked by the Moscow City Party conference to attend the XXIV Party Congress as its delegates. In other words, the Party groups of the military are represented at the conferences of the area in which they are located, and are not separated in special groups. Four generals are on the new Moscow City Committee -- the Commanders of the Moscow Military District and Moscow Air Defense District, and their corresponding political chiefs. This makes for close cooperation between the military and political sectors of the Party. This is borne out in examination of Party committee in all the republics and large city areas. It was noted in National PVO Troops, published in 1968, that 33 delegates represented National Air Defense Troops at the XXIII Congress and The Combat Path of the Soviet Navy pictured the group of 26 admirals representing the Navy.[12] A brief glance at the list of delegates shows that every important military leader and military political leader attended the XXIII Congress.

To be sure, a sailor and a sergeant attended the last conference, and even a few field-grade officers, but the top brass made up the overwhelming majority.

Is all this brass assembled to no purpose?

The reader has already noted the number of times resolutions of the Party Congresses have been quoted on policy. Of all the events that take place in the Soviet Union, none surpasses the assembly of a Party Congress in symbolic importance. The Congress provides the outsider with a periodic surfacing of what is going on inside the Soviet Union.

3. The Role of the Central Committee

From a detailed analysis of articles and books published in the USSR, it becomes apparent that the organization officially charged with the responsibility for military doctrine is the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The special relationship between the Central Committee and military doctrine is explained by a number of spokesmen.

Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, late Minister of Defense of the USSR, asserted that:

> The basic questions connected with the content and guidance of Soviet military doctrine have been seriously elaborated in recent years thanks to the attention given to them by the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government.[17]

This same view of the source of military doctrine was restated by one of the leading Soviet defense-intellectuals, General Colonel N. A. Lomov, a former department head at the Academy of the General Staff. His many articles on Soviet military doctrine, plus the announced publication, as part of the 'Officer's Library' series, of his book, Military Doctrine, (which has not yet gone on sale) can be considered as reflecting 'an official view'. General Colonel N. A. Lomov wrote:

> The bases of military doctrine are determined by the domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government in accordance with the nature and tasks of the present era. Therefore, the essence and content of military doctrine can only be correctly understood by taking into consideration those theoretical and political conclusions which are in the materials of the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the new Program of the Party....

The decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government on questions of strengthening the defense of the country, the organization and logistical support of the troops, the rules and regulations of the Armed Forces on conducting combat operations, and military-theoretical works analyzing its separate positions, are the concrete expressions of military doctrine. It relies on the most important conclusions of military science disclosing the objective laws of armed conflict.

The formulation of Soviet military doctrine is accomplished under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party, under its direct control, on the basis of the theoretical and methodological principles of Marxism-Leninism.[14]

On War and the Army, by N. P. Prokopyev (Voyenizdat, 1965), presented a popularized account of doctrine making. Although Prokopyev writes of the beginning of doctrinal formulation, starting in 1918, the basic concepts about which he writes are still followed by Soviet theoreticians. Soviet writers generally do not elaborate on previous concepts associated with Lenin unless the concepts remain relatively unchanged. Prokopyev discusses the initial formulation of Soviet military doctrine, stating:

...on the pages of the journal, Military Affairs, articles of discussion on a single military doctrine began to be published. In 1920, this discussion was continued. Not only military science workers but commanders and political workers from the troops took an active part in it. (Frunze, Tukhachevsky, Bubnov, Gusev, Shapcshnikov, Triandafillov.) In 1921, in the first number of the magazine Military Science and Revolution, Frunze wrote a long article, 'A Single Military Doctrine and the Red Army'. Based on Lenin's works, and decisions of the Party on military questions, Frunze made a successful attempt to determine a circle of questions which had to form the content of military doctrine of a proletariat state. The article stated:

> Doctrine is the teaching accepted in the army of a given state, establishing the character of the construction of the armed forces of the country, the methods of combat training, their direction on the basis of the ruling state views on the nature of the military tasks lying before them, and the methods of their solution flowing from the class nature of the government and determined by the level of development of the industrial forces of the country.

> Questions of Soviet military doctrine connected with its content and role in building the Armed Forces and with their preparation for war were discussed in congresses of the Central Committee at the VIII-XI sessions of the RCP(b), (bolsheviks). Later, questions of doctrine were brought up in subsequent congresses of the Party in connection with judging military questions and also at congresses of the Soviets and at sessions of the Supreme Soviet USSR....[15]

General Major S. N. Kozlov, writing in Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice, a book prepared by the Department of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy of the Lenin Military-Political Academy, gives a simple formula:

> Military doctrine is elaborated by the political and military leadership of the country.[16]

In 1967, a book which thoroughly examined the role of the Communist Party as regards the Armed Forces was published. This work, The CPSU and the Building of the Soviet Armed Forces, was written by General Major N. M. Kiryayev, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor at the Lenin Military-Political Academy. Soviet military doctrine, wrote General Kiryayev:

> ...elaborated on the basis of the guiding decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Soviet government, and the data of military science, represents a system of views on questions of the military defense of our country and the whole socialist camp from imperialist aggression.[17]

To celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, the main staffs of the services of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the staff of service arms and special troops, the staff of the rear services, the main and central administrations of the Ministry of Defense, the KGB and the MOOP (now MVD) collaborated to produce 50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Assist-

ing them in their work were the Institute of Marxism-Leninism attached to the Central Committee CPSU, the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences USSR, the Institute of Military History, the Historical-Diplomatic Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs USSR, the staffs of the Leningrad, Belorussian and Kiev Military Districts, the Academy of the General Staff, Frunze Military Academy, the Lenin Military-Political Academy, the Malinovskiy Academy of Armored Troops, the editors of the Military History Journal, the Central Committee of DOSAAF, the Central Government Archives of the Soviet Army, and the Archives of the Ministry of Defense USSR. The editorial commission included 8 marshals, an admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union, and 3 generals. The authors' collective was headed by General Colonel K. F. Skorobogatkin, then Head of the Military Science Administration of the General Staff. This work won the Frunze Prize for 1970, and hence its contents reflect full political-military approval. According to its authors:

> All questions of preparing the Armed Forces to protect the country from aggression and to conduct the armed struggle, all sides of the life and daily routine of the army and navy are under the continual leadership of the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee.[18]

Another authoritative book, Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces, also published in 1968, was written by the Department of Party-Political Work at the Lenin Military-Political Academy. The editor-in-chief was General Lieutenant A. Ye. Khmel'. This work states:

> The Central Committee of the Communist Party directs and coordinates the activity of all states and social organs in strengthening the defense capability of the country, organizes control for the fulfillment of decisions on military questions, determines the ruling

positions in the realm of Soviet science and military art. On the basis of the guiding outlines of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, and also on the data of military science, Soviet military doctrine is developed.

And further:

> The leadership by the Communist Party as the fundamental basis of Soviet military construction appears further in that the Central Committee of the CPSU is directly occupied with questions of the life and daily routine of the Armed Forces -- strengthening their combat readiness, raising vigilance, discipline and unity of the personnel, the selection, placing and education of the guiding military cadres and it determines the general direction in creating and developing military equipment and new means of fighting, and it guides the technical equipping and material supply of the army and navy.[19]

These books are published mainly by the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense -- Voyenizdat. The question therefore arises: might another publishing house attribute doctrine formulation to a different source? In 1969, a book entitled Army of the Soviets was published by Politizdat (Political Publishing House) representing a popular account of the Soviet Armed Forces. S.S. Lototskiy headed the authors' collective. Interestingly the book fails to describe Lototskiy as a General Lieutenant, who is Head of the Department of the History of Wars and Military Art at Frunze Military Academy. The remaining authors, who also are officers in the Soviet Armed Forces, are all from his department at Frunze. In discussing the guiding role of the Party, the authors note that:

> The Communist Party demands the discovery of the laws of development of modern war in connection with the appearance of the nuclear rocket weapon, from military cadres and the elaboration of questions of military art and the further raising of the combat readiness of the troops.
>
> An important role in answering these questions has been played by decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Central

Committee demanded that an end be put to dogmatism in the development of military theory and that new problems of conducting combat operations in conditions of nuclear war be bravely posed and solved, and that the behests of the great Lenin be studied.[20]

In summary, the Minister of Defense, the Academy of the General Staff represented by General Lomov, the Lenin Military-Political Academy represented by Generals Kozlov, Kiryayev and Khmel, and the Frunze Military Academy's General Lototskiy all say essentially the same thing: the Central Committee of the CPSU formulates Soviet military doctrine.

There is no writing in the Soviet news media - newspapers, journals, books or radio - that even hints at any other source for the preparation of Soviet military doctrine.

It is recognized that not all of the members and candidate members of the Central Committee would have an equal interest in doctrine. It is likely that a select group of the military members of the Central Committee (There were 35 military members selected by the XXIV Party Congress for the Central Committee) work with other members and draft fundamentals of the doctrine. This doctrine has two sides, as will be discussed later, "the political and the military-technical, with the political being the more important."

Through further examination it is possible to get a reasonably good idea of the steps by which military doctrine actually is developed.

V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces, which won the 1968 Frunze Prize, gives a lengthy description of the formulation of Soviet military doctrine in the first years of Soviet rule. Mixed in with historical material is much that is current today. Implicit throughout the book is

the theme that they are doing today what Lenin did in his time. It may be conjectured that any procedures at odds with present-day practices did not find their way into the book. Hypothetically, doctrine formulation can be deduced from this particular work. The following is a topic heading and explanation:

Discussions on Questions of Military Doctrine

> One of the most important directions of the Party's activity after the X Congress of the RKP(b) /bolsheviks/ was working out Soviet military doctrine. The discussions on questions of military doctrine, begun in February 1920 in the pages of the magazine, Military Affairs, was very important in this relation.
>
> The basic positions of Soviet military doctrine were formulated in the works of V. I. Lenin, in the Second Program of the RKP(b), and in the resolutions of the VIII, IX and X Congresses of the Party.

This 1968 Frunze prize winning work goes on to show how senior workers of the General Staff, who took part in the early discussions, felt that military doctrine should be politically neutral. Frunze began a new stage with his article "A Single Military Doctrine and the Red Army." Bitter battles followed between Frunze and Trotskiy. The book goes on to show more current reflections:

> The Leninist idea of a Party of a new type, of its decisive role in building socialism and communism, in the defense of the country from the aggressive actions of its enemies at the present state of communist construction were creatively developed and enriched in the Program of the CPSU, in resolutions of the XXII and XXIII Congresses of the Party, and in decisions of Plenums of the Central Committee of the Party.
>
> The decisive role in working out the fundamental instructions in the area of military science, military doctrine, strategy, operational art and tactics and in determining the content, form and methods of educating and indoctrinating the personnel of the Armed Forces belongs to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

By assuring the unity of political, economic and military leadership of the country, the Communist Party seeks the most effective use of the economy, scientific and technical achievements, and the moral-political forces of the government in the interests of defending the socialist Fatherland. Not one single important question of military structuring, not one major problem of the defense of the country is decided without the guiding directions of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The Communist Party has to keep in view an ever widening circle of problems of the development of military theory and military affairs. It determines the direction of development of Soviet military science, elaborates the principal lines of Soviet military doctrine, boldly breaks through obsolete ideas about the methods of conducting military operations and structuring the army and navy. Its Marxist-Leninist methodology is a powerful weapon for command, political, and engineer-technical cadres in guiding the troops. [21]

The Central Committee selected by the XXIV Congress CPSU on April 9, 1971, had more Members and fewer Candidates for membership than the previous Central Committee. Twenty-one of the Members were military in 1971, where there had been only fifteen in 1966, a gain of 6 members. However, there are now only fourteen Candidates for membership where there had been twenty, for a loss of six. The sum total is therefore the same, although the Central Committee itself has enlarged. In other words, the military now has more Members and fewer Candidates. Since only full Members have a vote, the military has a larger voice than previously, although the change is not significant.

There does not appear to be a set rule for membership qualification. At times it seems that certain military positions carry Central Committee membership with them, and at other times certain individuals in the military have Central Committee membership seemingly regardless of their military position. Thus, twelve full Members from the old Central Committee are on the new one. Of the nine new Members, three were previously Candidates for membership.

Viewing this from military positions, thirteen of the twenty-one membership posts are the same as the last Central Committee. Added have been a 1st Deputy Minister of Defense*, the Commander-in Chief of the Ground Troops, the Commander in Chief of the National Air Defense Troops, a general inspector, the commanders of the Leningrad and Central Asian Military Districts, the Supreme Commander of Soviet Forces, Germany and the Minister of Civil Aviation.*

Three of these changes should be further noted. General Colonel Ogarkov, the Soviet military representative at SALT, was raised from candidate for membership to full membership. His position as 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff was previously held by Batitskiy. In other words, the position carries full membership and only the incumbent is new. It is of interest because the senior Soviet representative at SALT, V. S. Semyenov (a civilian), is still only a Candidate member.

The Supreme Commander of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Commander of the newly reformed Central Asian Military District now are full Members. The strategic location of these districts, the former opposing NATO and the latter covering the whole western Chinese border -- the pivotal Sinkiang province, -- is very important.

As for the Candidates for membership, nine positions are the same as previously named, but the incumbents have changed in some cases. The Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia) did not exist at the time of the 1966 Party Congress. The Moscow Air Defense has been upgraded in importance,

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*The 1st Deputy Minister of Defense and the Minister of Civil Aviation were elevated to full membership in 1967 after the XXIII Party Congress.

while Kiev Military District has dropped from member to candidate status. Oddly enough, General Colonel Okunev, former Commander of the Moscow Air Defense District, is a candidate for membership though his present position is unknown. He is listed only as working somewhere in the Central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense.

The new Central Committee is even more interesting when age is taken into consideration. Younger men have replaced the over-aged top brass. For instance, although seven members are over 65, seven are from 60 to 65 and seven are under 60. Ten of the fourteen candidates for membership are under 60. (Eight of these are even under 55!) Thus, of the total military membership of the Central Committee, to include both members and candidates, half are under 60 years of age. In contrast, the Central Committee selected in 1966 contained 25 officers over 60 and only 12 under 60. Three of the officers on present Central Committee are under 50, where only one -- General Colonel Ogarkov -- was under 50 in 1966.

Below is a chart listing the positions in the Ministry of Defense which carry with them the high Party position of Central Committee status, as selected at the XXIV Party Congress, 1971. The present incumbent of that position is listed. A similar listing for the Central Committee selected at the XXIII Party Congress can be found in Appendix A.

XXIV PARTY CONGRESS (April 1971)[22]

Military Members of the Central Committee CPSU:

1. Minister of Defense
   (Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko)

2. 1st Deputy Minister of Defense/Commander in Chief Warsaw Pact Forces
   (Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovskiy)

3. 1st Deputy Minister of Defense/Chief of the General Staff
   (Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov)

4. 1st Deputy Minister of Defense
   (General of the Army S. L. Sokolov)

5. Chief of the Main Political Administration
   (General of the Army A. A. Yepishev)

6. Deputy Minister of Defense/Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops
   (Marshal of the Soviet Union N. I. Krylov)

7. Deputy Minister of Defense/Commander in Chief of the National Air Defense Troops
   (Marshal of the Soviet Union P. F. Batitskiy)

8. Deputy Minister of Defense/Commander in Chief of the Navy
   (Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov)

9. Deputy Minister of Defense/Commander of Chief of the Air Forces
   (Marshal of Aviation P. S. Kutakhov)

10. Deputy Minister of Defense/Commander in Chief of the Ground Troops
    (General of the Army I. G. Pavlovskiy)

11. Deputy Minister of Defense/Inspector General
    (Marshal of the Soviet Union K. S. Moskalenko)

12. Deputy Minister of Defense/Chief of the Rear Troops
    (General of the Army S. S. Maryakhin)

13. General Inspector
    (Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Kh. Bagramyan)

14. General Inspector
    (Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev)

15. Chief of Civil Defense
(Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuykov)

16. Supreme Commander Soviet Forces in Germany
(General of the Army V. G. Kulikov)

17. Commander Central Asian Military District
(General of the Army N. G. Lyashchenko)

18. Commander of the Moscow Military District
(General Colonel Ye. F. Ivanovskiy)

19. Commander of the Leningrad Military District
(General Colonel I. Ye. Shavrov)

20. Minister of Civil Aviation
(General Colonel of Aviation B. P. Bugayev)

21. 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff
(General Colonel N. V. Ogarkov)

Military Candidates for Membership of the Central Committee CPSU:

1. Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
(Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budenny)

2. Commander of the Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia)
(General Colonel A. M. Maycrov)

3. Commander of the Far East Military District
(General of the Army V. F. Tolubko)

4. Commander of the Transcaucasus Military District
(General Colonel S. K. Kurkotkin)

5. Commander of the Kiev Military District
(General Colonel G. I. Salmanov)

6. Commander of the Belorussian Military District
(General Colonel I. M. Tret'yak)

7. Commander of the Pacific Fleet
(Admiral N. I. Smirnov)

8. Commander of the Northern Fleet
(Admiral of the Fleet S. M. Lobov)

9. Commander Air Defense District
(General Colonel of Aviation A. I. Koldunov)

10. Chief of Political Administration of the Strategic Rocket Troops
(General Lieutenant P. A. Goncharov)

11. Chief of the Political Administration of the Moscow Military District
(General Colonel K. S. Grushevoy)

12. Chairman of DOSAAF
(General of the Army A. L. Getman)

13. Minister of Communications
(General Colonel Signals Corps N. D. Psurtsev)

14. Ex-Commander of the Moscow Air Defense District
(General Colonel V. V. Okunev)

The Central Committee is selected by the Congress of the CPSU. Whether the 5000-odd delegates merely approve a prepared list or whether there is some debate over the selection is not known. The Central Committee which emerged from the XXIV Party Congress in April 1971 contained 396 names. Of these, 241 were full Members with a right to vote and 155 were Candidates for Membership, who may attend deliberations but do not vote. According to Communist Party rules, vacancies among Members can only be filled from Candidates for Membership, if such vacancies occur between Congresses. Thus Commander in Chief of the Air Forces Marshal of Aviation Kutakhov, for example, did not automatically become a Member of the Central Committee when he replaced Chief Marshal of Aviation Vershinin in 1969, who was a Member. It is logical to assume that Kutakhov did attend plenums of the Central Committee unofficially until the next Congress selected him. The Commander in Chief of the National Air Defense Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union Batitskiy, happened to have been selected as a Member by the XXIII Party

Congress when he was still 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Therefore his new position did not alter his status. At the time (1966) the incumbent Commander in Chief of National Air Defense Forces, Marshal of Aviation V. A. Sudets, failed to be selected for the Central Committee altogether. This was the first sign that his replacement was imminent, and it did in fact take place in a matter of months.

The Ground Troops had no Commander in Chief in 1966, the post having been abolished in 1964 and not revived until December 1967. General Pavlovskiy was not on the Central Committee, although it is assumed that he, too, must have unofficially attended plenums once he became a Deputy Minister of Defense.

At the present time, General Colonel Okunev is a Candidate for Membership at a time when he appears to have only a vague position in the Central Apparatus of the Ministry of Defense. As ex-Commander of the Moscow Air Defense District, he may be slated for a high position. General of the Army Tolubko, for many years the 1st deputy Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops, won a Candidate membership as Commander of the Far East Military District. This does put him in line for a high post. On the other hand it is almost certain that General of the Army Shtemenko, for instance, will not be promoted to Chief of the General Staff because he has not been on the Central Committee.

4. Role of the Politburo

Having examined the role of the Central Committee in the activities of the Soviet Armed Forces, it would be well to stop briefly and look at the members of the Politburo and the Secretariat -- the groups chosen by the Central Committee to do the daily work of the Central Committee.

No active military commander sits on the policy-making Politburo. Marshal Zhukov managed to do so for a very brief time, from 1956 - 1957. L. I. Brezhnev is the General Secretary. The members are as follows:

(As selected by the XXIV Party Congress, April 9, 1971)

POLITBURO		SECRETARIAT	
Members: (15)	*Brezhnev, L. I.	General Secretary: (1)	*Brezhnev, L. I.
	Podgornyy, N. V.		
	Kosygin, A. N.		
	*Suslov, M. A.	Secretaries: (9)	*Suslov, M. A.
	*Kirilenko, A. P.		*Kirilenko, A. P.
	Pelshe, A. Ya.		*Kulakhov, F. D.
	Mazurov, K. T.		*Ustinov, D. F.
	Polyanskyy, D. S.		*Demichev, P. N.
	Shelest, P. Ye.		Kapitonov, I. V.
	Voronov, G. I.		Ponomarev, B. N.
	Shelepin, A. N.		Katushev, K. F.
	Grishin, V. V.		Solomentsev, M. S.
	Kunayev, D. A.		
	Shcherbitskiy, V. V.		
	*Kulakov, F. D.		
Candidates: (6)	Andropov, Yu. V.		
	*Ustinov, D. F.		
	*Demichev, P. N.		
	Rashidov, Sh. R.		
	Masherov, P. M.		
	Mzhavanadze, V. P.		

*These six men are on both the Politburo and the Secretariat. See Chart 5.

POLITBURO		SECRETARIAT
Members: (15)	BREZHNEV, L.I. -	General Secretary (1)
		Secretaries: (9)
Voronov, G.I. Kosygin, A.N.	Kirilenko, A.P.	
Grishin, V.V. Pel'she, A. Ya.	Suslov, M.A.	Kapitonov, I.V.
Mazurov, K.T. Polyanskiy, D.S.	Kulakov, F.D.	Katushev, K.F.
Kunayev, D.A. Shelest, P. Ye.		Ponomarev, B.N.
Podgornyy, N.V. Shcherbitskiy, V.V.		Solomentsev, M.S.
Shelepin, A.N.		
Candidate Members: (6)		
Andropov, Yu. V. Masherov, P.M.	Demichev. P.N.	
Mzhavanadze, V.P. Rashidov, Sh. R.	Ustinov, D.F.	

Chart 5. MEMBERSHIP OF THE POLITBURO AND THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE CPSU

as of April 1971

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are concerned. General Secretary Brezhnev appeared in the uniform of a Soviet General Lieutenant as late as 1963. As a political general of the Soviet Armed Forces, the General Secretary of the Communist Party must be fully knowledgeable of Soviet military doctrinal matters.

5. The Role of the Secretariat

The Secretariat of the Central Committee plays a vital role in the actual control of the Communist Party over the entire Soviet Union. It is through the Secretariat that the daily work of the Party is carried out. We know that it meets weekly. The manner in which it exercises control is not fully known, but certain assumptions can be made on the basis of what is known.

There are believed to be 22 Departments of the Central Committee, which are listed on chart 4. Ten of them are industrial - Chemical Industry, Defense Industry, Heavy Industry, Light and Food Industry, Transport, etc..Five are concerned with foreign affairs - Relations with Bloc Parties, Economic Relations with Socialist Countries, International Affairs and so on. Three are for training - Culture, Propaganda and Agitation, Science and Education. The rest deal with internal Party work.

The ten Secretaries divide up the departments for supervision. In some cases they themselves head the department. Each secretary has his own field of expertise. D. F. Ustinov held the rank of General Colorel of Artillery when he wasthe Soviet Union's arm's czar, from 1941 to 1957. He probably supervises the departments for Defense Industry, Heavy Industry and Chemical Industry.

The Soviet Armed Forces fall under the Administrative Organs Department, outside of Ustinov's control, but closely associated with it. For some time after the ouster of Khrushchev this department did not have a chief, and it was thought that Secretary Brezhnev himself was its head. Finally, in

1968, N.I. Savinkin was identified in this post, having been raised from the position of 1st Deputy Chief.

It should be noted that in Czechoslovakia the Administrative Organs Department was abolished in one of the reforms during the winter and spring of 1968. By so doing the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia lost control of both the Armed Forces and the police, without which control hardly any communist party could stay in power. It can be assumed that the Administrative Organs of the Secretariat of the Central Committee acts as a sort of watchdog over all major political-military matters, including that of the development of military doctrine.

6. The Role of the Main Political Administration

One constantly reads about the "political organs" and "Party and Komsomol organizations" of the Soviet Armed Forces, yet their actually operation remains somewhat hazy. A better understanding of these organizations can be gained by examining their structure and activities in some detail.

The political organs in the Armed Forces are the ruling organs of the Party in the area of Party and political work. They are guided by the Program and Rules of the CPSU, resolutions of Party Congresses, Party conferences, the Central Committee of the CPSU and also by the "Position of the Political Organs and the Instructions to the Organizations of the CPSU in the Soviet Army and Navy", confirmed by the Party's Central Committee. The Officer's Guide informs that:

> Leadership of Party-political work in the Armed Forces of the USSR is carried out by the Central Committee through the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, working with the rights of a department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
>
> To assure collectiveness in solving the most important questions of Party-political work and in the education of cadres of Party-political workers in the Armed Forces in the spirit of observing Leninist norms of Party life and principles of Party leadership, the Bureau of the Main Political Administration was formed by decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Decisions of the Bureau are made by majority vote and put into practice by directives and decrees of the Chief of the Main Political Administration.
>
> Directives on questions of Party-political work in the army and navy are issued over the signatures of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Main Political Administration with the approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Directives and decrees on continuing questions of Party-political work are issued by the Chief of the Main Political Administration.

For organizing and guiding Party-political work in all the services of the Armed Forces, groups of forces, military districts, air defense districts, and in fleets, corresponding political administrations and political departments have been created. At the head of the political administrations of services of the Armed Forces groups of forces, districts and fleets stand members of the military councils -- the chiefs of the political administrations (political departments.)[24]

There are also political leaders in smaller units, ships, military schools, scientific research organizations, in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense and in the staffs and administrations of districts, groups of forces and fleets.

Attached to the political organs is a Party Commission, which has the responsibility for examining decisions of Party organization on taking in new Party members and in matters of delinquencies of members and Komsomols.

Party Organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy represent a vast fighting detachment of the CPSU, closely rallied around its Leninist Central Committee. Communists and Komsomols compose more than 80 percent of Soviet Armed Forces personnel. This is the strength of our army and navy....[25]

The next question to be examined is what these Party organizations do in the Armed Forces. One of their most important functions is assuring high vigilance and constant combat readiness in the troops. This is done by the formulation of "political consciousness and psychological stability in the troops, fostering bravery, firmness of will to victory over a strong and crafty enemy, the readiness to fulfill the fighting order at any price, right up to self-sacrifice."

According to Soviet writers,

In carrying out their aggressive policies, the imperialists, primarily the United States' reactionary circles, are trying to

carry a "war of ideas" into socialist countries. They are broadening the front of ideological diversion and doing everything possible to corrupt the consciousness of our people, to undermine the foundations of socialism.[26]

The ideological struggle and the business of ideological training of the people is one of the most important sections of Party activity. It is interesting to note that the April and July Plenums of the Central Committee in 1968, on the eve of the Czechoslovakian invasion, had published the following:

> The ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism is characterized by sharp aggrevation. The whole enormous apparatus of anticommunist propaganda is now aimed at weakening the unity of socialist countries, the international communist movement, and separating the leading forces of today and undermining socialist society from inside.[27]

The Party's work does not stop with ideological work. The technical "culture" of the soldiers has to be raised. Complicated machines and equipment have been introduced into the Armed Forces which requires technical sophistication. Hence the task of military technical "advertising."

> In the troops, universities and lectures on technical knowledge, evenings of technology, schools of technical mastery, circles, technical conferences, showcases, exhibits of special and popular science films have become widespread. Engineer technical cadres of the army and navy, and also soldiers and sergeants with higher specialized training take an active part in the military technical propaganda.
>
> An important place in Party-political work is held by the broad spreading out of socialist competitions, studies, generalizations and propagation of advanced experience.[28]

Political education also includes strengthening discipline. Another task is strengthening one-man command. Political organs and Party organizations do everything possible to help command cadres master the principles of Marxism-Leninism, its theory and "the Leninist style of working."

> And so, there is not a single side of the daily life and activity of our Armed Forces where the beneficial leading role of the CPSU cannot be seen. The Communist Party and its Central Committee, are working out the military policy and are determining the main direction and tasks in perfecting the defense of the country, and the organization of the army and navy.[29]

The chapter ends with five pages of quotations from Resolutions of Party Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee concerning the guiding role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Armed Forces.[30]

Recommended books for this section of the Officer's Guide are: V. I. Lenin. On the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland. The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Documents. The CPSU and the Organization of the Soviet Armed Forces. Party-political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces. Petrov, Yu. P. The Organization of Politorgans of Party and Komsomol Organizations of the Army and Navy (1918-1968). Yepishev, A. A. Some Questions of Party-political Work.[31]

The Main Political Administration plays a very important role in both the formulation of Soviet military doctrine and in its dissemination. As will be seen in two subsequent sections of this paper, "The Officer's Library" and "The Role of the Communist of the Armed Forces journal", officers of the Main Political Administration help formulate the doctrine, have the major role in expounding on its major concepts, and are primarily responsible for ensuring that it is thoroughly understood. Thus, this Administration is the primary means through which the voice of the Party is expressed to the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

PART B. The Role of The Supreme Soviet in Soviet Military Doctrine

N.V. Podgorniy, as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, acts as "President" of the USSR. Brezhnev himself was once "President," disproving the generally held theory that the position is "the end of the road." The Supreme Soviet has two sections: the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of the Nationalities. The Supreme Soviet approves measures without questions, giving a pretense of 'legality' to the Party-dominated machinery of government.

And the military is not absent even at this level. Thirty of 767 deputies of the Soviet of the Union, and 26 of the 750 deputies of the Soviet of the Nationalities are high-ranking military officers.

About two-thirds of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet have been elected for the first time. They are workers and peasants. The other third are leading military and Party officials.

The most recent election was June 14, 1970. The following military men were elected as deputies of the Supreme Soviet:[32]

	RANK	POSITION (1970)
Altunin, A.T.	Gen/Col	CO No. Caucasus Mil Dis
Amelko, N.N.	Admiral	Deputy CinC Navy
Bagramyan, I.Kh.	Marshal S/U	general inspector
Batitskiy, P.F.	Marshal S/U	Dep Min Def/CinC National PVO
Belik, P.A.	General/Army	CO Transbaikal Mil Dis
Belonozhko, S.Ye.	Gen/Col	CO Turkestan Mil Dis
Beregovoy, G.T.	Gen/Maj/Avia	Cosmonaut
Budenniy, S.M.	Marshal S/U	Member Supreme Soviet
Bugayev, B.P.	Gen/Lt/Avia	Minister of Civil Aviation
Chuykov, V.I.	Marshal S/U	Chief of Civil Defense

Getman, A.L.	General/Army	Chairman of DOSAAF
Gorchakov, P.A.	Gen/Lt	Chief Polit Admin/Baltic Mil Dis
Gorshkov, S.G.	Adl/Flt/S U	Dep Min Def/CinC Navy
Grechko, A.A.	Marshal S/U	Minister of Defense
Ivanov, B.P.	Gen/Col	Co Southern Group of Forces
Ivanovskiy, Ye.F.	Gen/Col	CO Moscow Military District
Ivashutin, P.I.	Gen/Col	Dep Chief of the General Staff
Kasatonov, V.A.	Admiral/Flt	1st Dep CinC Navy
Khetagurov, G.I.	General/Army	CO Baltic Mil Dis
Khomulo, M.G.	Gen/Col	CO Siberian Mil Dis
Komarovskiy, A.N.	Gen/Col	Dep Min Def/ for Bldg and Housing
Konev, I.S.	Marshal S/U	general inspector
Krylov, N.I.	Marshal S/U	Dep Min Def/ CinC Strategic Rockets
Kulikov, V. G.	General/Army	Sup Cmdr Soviet Tps in Germany
Kurkotkin, S.K.	Gen/Col.	CO Transcaucasus Mil Dis.
Kutakhov, P. S.	Marshal/Avia	Dep Min Def/ CinC Air Forces
Lashchenko, P.N.	General/Army	1st Dep CinC Ground Troops
Lobov, S.M.	Admiral	CO Northern Fleet
Lyashchenko, N.G.	General/Army	CO Central Asian Mil Dis
Mal'tsev, Ye.Ye.	Gen/Col	Chief/Polit Admin/Soviet Tps/Germany
Maryakhin, S.S.	General/Army	Dep Min Def/ Chief of the Rear
Mayorov, A.M.	Gen/Col	CO Central Group of Forces
Mikhailin, V.V.	Admiral	CO Baltic Fleet
Moskalenko, K.S.	Marshal S/U	Dep Min Def/Inspector General
Obaturov, G.I.	Gen/Col	CO Carpathian Mil Dis
Ogarkov, N.V.	Gen/Col	1st Dep Chief of the General Staff
Okunev, V.V.	Gen/Col	CO Moscow PVO District
Olifirov, F.A.	Gen/Col	CO Baku PVO District
Parshikov, A.M.	Gen/Col	CO Volga Mil Dis
Pavlovskiy, I.G.	General/Army	Dep Min Def/CinC Gound Troops
Pokryshkin, A.I.	Gen/Col/Avia	Dep CinC National PVO
Psurtsev, N.D.	Gen/Col/Sig	Minister of Communications
Salmanov, G.I.	Gen/Col	CO Kiev Mil Dis
Shavrov, I. Ye.	Gen/Col	CO Leningrad Mil Dis
Shcheglov, A.F.	General/Army	1st Dep CinC National PVO Troops
Shurupov, A.G.	Gen/Col	CO Odessa Mil Dis
Sil'chenko, N.K.	Gen/Lt	CO Ural Mil Dis
Skomorokhov, N.M.	Gen/Lt/Avia	
Smirnov, N.I.	Admiral	CO Pacific Fleet
Sokolov, S.L.	General/Army	1st Dep Min Def
Sysoyev, V.S.	Vic/Adl	CO Black Sea Fleet

Tankayev, M.T.	Gen/Col	CO Northern Grp of Forces
Tolubko, V.F.	General/Army	CO Far Eastern Mil Dis
Tret'yak, I.M.	Gen/Col	CO Belorussian Mil Dis
Vasyagin, S.P.	Gen/Col	Chief/Polit Admin/Ground Troops
Yakubovskiy, I.I.	Marshal S/U	1st Dep Min Def/Chief Warsaw Pact Forc
Yepishkey, A.A.	General/Army	Chief of the Main Political Admin
Yeremenko, A.I.	Marshal S/U	general inspector
Zakharov, M.V.	Marshal S/U	1st Dep Min Def/Chief of the General Staff

* * * * * * * *

This list includes:

The Minister of Defense
3 1st Deputy Ministers of Defense
8 Deputy Ministers of Defense
Chief of the Main Political Administration(MPA)
1st Deputy Chief of the MPA
16 Commanders of Military Districts
4 Fleet Commanders
2 PVO District Commanders
4 Commanders of Groups Abroad

Deputies to the Supreme Soviet in June, 1970, included the 58 marshals, generals and admirals listed above. It is doubtful that this group, as such, considers substantive matters of military doctrine. However, the fact that Soviet military personnel participate in this body should be recognized in studying the total Party-military-government relationships in the formulation of doctrine.

PART C. The Role of the Government in Formulating Soviet Military Doctrine

1. The Role of the Council of Ministers

In discussing the Soviet Government, it should always be made clear that the "Soviet Government" is not a government in the normal sense. The Soviet Union is governed by the Communist Party, and the "government" merely carries out that which the Party dictates.

Top government officials are:

GOVERNMENT POSITION		PARTY POSITION
Chairman of the Council of Minister:	Kosygin, A. N.	Politburo
First Deputy Chairmen:	Mazurov, K. T.	Politburo
	Polyanskiy, D. S.	Politburo
Deputy Chairmen:	Baibakov, N. K.	Central Committee
	Dymshits, V. D.	Central Committee
	Yefremov, M. T.	Central Committee
	Kirillin, V. A.	Central Committee
	Lesechko, M. A.	Central Committee
	Novikov, V. N.	Central Committee
	Novikov, I. T.	Central Committee
	Smirnov, L. V.	Central Committee
	Tikhonov, N. A.	Central Committee
Ministers:		
Aviation Industry	Dementyev, P.V.	Central Committee
Automobile Industry	Tarasov, A.M.	Candidate Central Committee
Defense Industry	Zveryev, S.A.	Central Committee
General Machine Building	Afanasyev, S.A.	Central Committee
Medium Machine Building	Slavskiy, Ye. P.	Central Committee
Radio Industry	Kalmykov, V.D.	Central Committee
Ship Building	Butoma, B. Ye.	Central Committee
Electronics	Shokin, A.I.	Central Committee
State Committee for Science and Technology:		
	Kirillin, V.A.	Central Committee

The author wishes to thank Dr. Victor Fediay for his helpful contributions to this section.



CHART 6 THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

From: Politicheskaya Organizatsiya Sovyetskovo Obschchestva Politizdat, Moscow, 1968, p. 23.

A. N. Kosygin, in his capacity as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, heads the government. Kosygin also is a member of the Politburo, the real center of Soviet power. Under Kosygin is a vast network of ministries and state committees. Among these ministries are the Ministry of Internal Affairs (The MVD), the Committee of Government Security (The KGB) and the Ministry of Defense. (see chart 6)

The Ministry of Internal Affairs (The MVD) and the Committee of Government Security (The KGB) have a peculiar relationship to the Ministry of Defense. The KGB controls the Borders Guards of the Soviet Union - a military force consisting of over 200,000 personnel, armed with airplanes and tanks. The MVD controls the Internal Troops, the number of which is not known. These Soviet military forces, numbering between a quarter and a half million personnel, are part of the Soviet Armed Forces but are not a part of the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

Other ministries of the Soviet government, such as the ministries for aviation industries, defense industries, general machine building, medium machine building, ship building, radio, electronics and automobiles are the most important part of the Soviet military-industrial complex. The State Committee for Science and Technology and the Research Institutes such as TsAGI, TsIAM, NIVK, NIAT and others, and the Academy of Sciences guide all research and development.

Without exception the men heading these ministries are all on the Central Committee as well. This "two-hat" development complicates the establishment of the chain of command. In addition, Chairman Kosygin,

and his 1st Deputy Chairmen, Mazurov and Polyanskiy are Members of the ruling Politburo and make policy as well as execute it.

The apparatus of the Soviet government has a primary task of carrying out the dictates of the Party. The various ministries for industry, as well as the MVD and the KGB, are groups which must understand military doctrine, but who only indirectly participate in its formulation and dissemination.

2. The Role of the Academy of Sciences

In the formulation of military doctrine the level of scientific and technological achievement in a country must be taken into account. The highest scientific establishment in the Soviet Union is the Academy of Sciences. This Academy carries out the general scientific guidance of research on important problems of natural and social sciences in the country. Much of the actual research is accomplished by the Academies of Sciences of the republics and other scientific establishments. The Academy of Sciences is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers.

The Academy is divided into four sections, as shown on the chart 7. There is also a Siberian Branch of the Academy of Sciences, USSR located at Novosibirsk. In 1969, there were 231 academicians, 414 corresponding members and 65 foreign members in the Academy. In 1968, there were more than 210 scientific establishments of the Academy of Sciences. More than 30,000 scientific workers, including 2,000 doctors of science and 12,000 candidates of science, work in these establishments.

In the early 60's the Academy of Sciences was reorganized and given more authority for coordinating scientific research. More than 200 scientific councils on the most important problems are in operation. This means that duplication is avoided and new discoveries speedily receive broad dissemination. The Academy operates its own translation service, reproducing foreign scientific journals with great rapidity. It operates a network of more than 170 scientific libraries with four major centers.[33]



CHART 7 - THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, USSR

From: Bolshaya Soviet Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1970

No discussion of the making of Soviet military doctrine would be complete without mentioning another role of the Academy of Sciences. The question of improving work in social sciences was posed by the XXIII Party Congress in 1966. The subsequent August, 1967, Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU on "Measures for the Further Development of the Social Sciences and for Raising Their Role in Communist Construction," introduced far-reaching changes. The decree in part stated:

> The present-day stage of social development and progress of scientific knowledge demands the concentration of scientific research work on social sciences first of all in the following directions:
>
> 1. In the area of philosophical sciences...
> 2. In the area of economic sciences...
> 3. In the area of scientific communism...[34]

Military strategy is considered as one of the social sciences.

One result of the above decree may have been the creation of the Institute on the USA, under the Academy of Sciences, in 1967. In 1968 it was renamed the Institute of the USA. Georgi Arbatov, a Candidate member of the Central Committee, heads the Institute. Beginning in January, 1970, the Institute has published a monthly magazine called USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology. Of particular interest to this study is the fact that two of the leading Soviet defense-intellectuals, General Colonel N. A. Lomov and Colonel V. V. Larionov, have written articles in the March and April, 1970, and they now work for Arbatov at the Institute of the USA.

Colonel V. V. Larionov, Candidate of Military Sciences, is best known as the composing editor of Military Strategy. From his former post in the Military Science Administration of the General Staff, Larionov published

article after article in the pages of Red Star and Communist of the Armed Forces.

Equally, if not more prominent, is General Colonel N.A. Lomov, longtime professor, heading a department of the Academy of the General Staff. Lomov was deputy chief of operations under General S.M. Shtemenko during World War II. Today Shtemenko is Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Forces. Lomov has retired from military life. He has written several articles and at least one book on military doctrine. He was announced as the author of a book of that title which was to have been part of the 'Officer's Library' series. The book so far has failed to go on sale.

Writing in Communist of the Armed Forces at the time of the XXIII Party Congress in 1966, Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy deplored the fact that the U.S. had special institutes working out questions of military strategy which employed scientists in all fields. He mentioned RAND and the Hudson Institute in the United States and the British Institute for Strategic Studies.

Marshal Sokolovsky, as is now apparent, was preparing the Soviet military for the opening of the Institute of the USA the following year. It may have been coincidential, but it is worth noting the Colonel V.V. Larionov, the composing editor for all three editions (1962, 1963 and 1968) of Sokolovsky's Military Strategy, later appeared as the Institute of the USA's most famous defense-intellectual.

Although the Institute of the USA is well known in the United States, it actually is relatively small, with between twenty and thirty full-time members. Even more prestigious is The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). This Institute has a staff of approximately

200 full time members. The International Relations portion of the Institute is headed by Doctor V.M. Kulish, a retired colonel and famous strategist of the General Staff. This Institute also is a "defense-intellectual" center, and must consider military doctrine and strategy in their broadest aspects. It also comes under the Academy of Sciences.

Thus, the world-famous Soviet Academy of Sciences, regarded in most intellectual circles of the United States only as a high level scientific society, actually plays a major directing role in the formulating of Soviet military doctrine. This is accomplished both through its role in the social sciences and through its role in basic scientific research.

3. The Role of the Ministry of Defense

a. The Roles of the Higher Military Council and the Main Military Council

It is obvious that a group as large (360) as a busy (every member has a full-time job in other areas, either in the government or in the Party) as the Central Committee, meeting in Plenums only two or three times a year, cannot do the daily work described above. Is there a smaller group that meets more frequently to direct military matters? The Politburo does not contain any military commanders. The group performing this task probably is the Higher Military Council, which may represent the deliberative body most involved with formulating and enacting military doctrine. It must certainly play an important role in decision making. The meager references to the Higher Military Council produce little conclusive evidence as to its detailed activities. The following historical examination indicates its probable importance.

The authors of Military Strategy write:

> At the beginning of March, 1918, for leadership of all military operations of the Red Army, by decree of the Council of Peoples Commissars, the Higher (Vysshiy) Military Council was formed, composed of three people: the military leader and two political commissars....Subsequently the composition and the tasks of the Higher Military Council were significantly broadened.
>
> From April, 1918, the Peoples Commissars for War and Naval Affairs, members of the Collegia of the Peoples Commissariat for Military Affairs, and also specialists on military and naval affairs were on the Higher Military Council.

However, as the war progressed, the Higher Military Council failed to function properly. Reorganization took place thus:

On 2 September 1918, by special edict of the VTsIK, the country was declared a military camp and the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic was formed as the highest organ of direction of the Red Army.[35]

The Revolutionary Military Council continued to function throughout the Civil War. It lasted until 1934 when the Military Council, attached to the Peoples Commissariat of Defense, was formed.

50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR also provides some historical background on these Councils. In this book it is stated that:

> On the 13th of March, 1938, the Main (Glavnyy) Military Council of the Red Army was organized. It was attached to the Peoples Commissariat of Defense. It examined basic questions on organizing the Red Army and of strengthening the defense capability of the country. At the same time, the Main Military Council of the Navy was formed.

In 1941, with the beginning of the war, the Main Military Council took on the leadership of the Armed Forces, but on the second day of the war, the Stavka of the High Command was formed which took over this function. Then, after the war, they state:

> In February, 1946, the Higher (Vysshiy) Military Council, which was attached to the ministry, was formed....
>
> In March, 1950, subsequent to the division of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the Higher (Vysshiy) Military Council was created. It was attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR.* Main (Glavnyy) Military Councils were formed which were attached to the War and Naval Ministries.[36]

From this it would appear that there is a Higher (Vysshiy) Military Council at the Council of Ministers' level, and Main (Glavnyy) Military Councils at the level of the Ministries of War and Navy. Nothing is said about what happened when the Ministries were reunited into the Ministry

*In the book, The Penkovskiy Papers, Penkovskiy described the workings of the "Supreme Military Council of the USSR," which he places "directly under the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU." The Minister of Defense, his deputies and service commanders are "automatically members of the Council." This sounds a good deal like the Higher Military Council described above, except that its subordination is not the same. The words "supreme" and "higher" are both vysshiy in Russian. It is possible Penkovskiy was describing the subordination in practice, without knowing the actual channel of control.

of Defense in 1953. Presumably there is still a Main (Glavnyy) Military Council attached to the Ministry of Defense.

Army of the Soviets, by Frunze Military Academy's General Lototskiy, also mentions the creation of the "Higher Military Council" in 1946.[37] V.I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces discusses the "Main Military Council."

> The most important questions of military policy are discussed and decided collectively at Congresses of the Party and Plenums of the Central Committee. Organs of collective leadership are also found directly in the Armed Forces in the Main (Glavnyy) Military Council, military councils of the services of the Armed Forces, military districts, groups of forces and fleets. Military councils collectively examine and decide all important questions in the daily life and activity of the troops.[38]

From this it seems clear that today a Main Military Council exists at the Ministry of Defense level. But what of the Supreme Military Council? Does the wording above, which speaks of organs of collective leadership also found directly in the Armed Forces, presume an organ above this level? This may be the case.

Let us return briefly to the pre-war role of the Council. During World War II, it was pointed out, the Main Military Council was replaced by Stavka. According to the authors of Military Strategy:

> The Main Military Council also made recommendations in removing from armaments obsolete forms of military equipment and on measures for working out new kinds of weapons, especially in perfecting aviation and armored equipment and also means of communications. Decisions of the Main Military Council were carried out by the People's Commissariat of Defense and other People's Commissariats.[39]

At the end of the war, Stavka was abolished and in its place the "Higher Military Council" (renamed from the Main Military Council, which had existed before the war) was restored in 1946, according to Yu.P. Petrov's 1968 book,

The Structure of Political Organs, Party and Komsomol Organizations of the Army and Navy.[40]

This reference to Stavka, as the alter ego of the Higher Military Council, is very important. In explaining the present-day structure of the Soviet Armed Forces, the authors of The Officer's Guide state:

> In correspondence with these tasks, each service of the Armed Forces is designated for waging military actions primarily in one definite sphere -- on the ground, at sea, or in the air, -- and accomplishes the fulfillment of tasks under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of this service of the Armed Forces or directly of the Stavka of the Supreme Commander.[41]

Does this mean to imply that the Stavka of the Supreme Commander exists now? Or will start to function the instant war commences? As has been noted, in World War II, Stavka was formed on the day after war started from the Main Military Council. Stavka was then replaced after the war by the higher Military Council.

In this connection, it is worth noting that Military Strategy has a section entitled "Possible Organs of Leadership of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in Contemporary Circumstances." All three editions have stated:

> The entire leadership of the country and the Armed Forces in time of war will be carried out by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with the possible organization of a higher organ of leadership of the country and the Armed Forces. This higher organ of leadership might be given such powers as were given to the State Committee of Defense in the period of the Great Patriotic War.
>
> The direct leadership of the Armed Forces in war, evidently, just as before, will be carried out by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command. Stavka will represent a collegial organ of leadership under the chairmanship of the Supreme Commander.

> As in the years of the Great Patriotic War, the basic organ of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command will be the General Staff.[42]

One phrase has been omitted in the 1968 edition of Military Strategy. At the end of the first paragraph above, this followed: "Headed by the First Secretary and Head of Government as Supreme Commander." At the time of the earlier editions of Military Strategy these positions were combined in the person of N.S. Khrushchev. Now these duties are divided between L.I. Brezhnev and A.N. Kosygin.

Regardless of the exact composition of the STAVKA, the Higher Military Council or the Main Military Council, an organization such as one of these must have the major role in the formulation of doctrine, and determining when shifts in doctrinal emphasis are to take place. This must be especially true today, when the highest political-military body in the Soviet Union has the means at its immediate disposal to blanket a sizeable portion of the world with thermonuclear weapons.

b. The Role of the Military Councils of the Services, Districts, and Fleets

In July 1950, in an effort to improve the organization of the Armed Forces, the Central Committee restored military councils. At present:

> Military councils are found in the services of the Armed Forces, in military districts, fleets and several other links of the military organism. They examine and decide all fundamental questions of the daily life and activity of the troops, and are responsible to the Central Committee, the government and the Ministry of Defense for the constant combat readiness and combat capability of the troops, their training and education. Decisions of military councils are made by majority vote and put into practice by orders of the corresponding commanders.[43]

After being restored the military councils still faced many difficulties in getting underway. In April 1958, when Khrushchev was busy restoring Party control to the Armed Forces, the Central Committee of the Party raised the status of the 'military councils' to be the 'guiding organs of the Services.' The membership of military councils is approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The council was enlarged to include:

1. The Commander (Chairman)
2. Political Worker/Council Member
3. Secretary of the local Party committee
4. First Deputy Commander
5. Chief of Staff
6. Other leading workers taking into account the character of the troops

In August 1958, when the Central Committee confirmed the makeup of the military councils, local Party Secretaries included such names as K.T. Mazurov, V.P. Mzhavanadze, N.V. Podgornyy, A.P. Kirilenko, and others.[44]

Today these men are in the Politburo. Behind them are years of working with the commanders in the military district of their area. Very often the men they worked with have become top men in the Ministry of Defense.

The exact importance of the military councils still is not fully known. They do bring together leading Party and military figures at various levels. Whether or not they have responsibilities of a substantive nature has not as yet been disclosed in Soviet military writings.

c. The Role of the Military Science Administration of the General Staff

In the 1946-1953 period, according to official Soviet writings such as 50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR, military science studied the war that had just ended. Sections and departments were created in the central apparatus and in the staffs of operational formations which were to study and generalize the experience of wars for the troops. With the end of the war, research was enlarged. The sections and departments became larger, and in the General Staff, the 'Administration for Researching the Experience of Wars' was augmented and the military history section was made an administration. History faculties were formed at the Frunze Military Academy and at the Academy of the General Staff.

By 1953, the General Staff, the Main Political Administration, the staffs of the services of the Armed Forces and service branches, and the military academies had published a considerable body of material on the war.

With the death of Stalin, significant changes rapidly took place. The military history administration was reduced to a section; the history department of the Navy was reduced and that of the Air Force 'liquidated'. Faculties at the Academies teaching the history of wars and military art were abolished.

Next came the actions of the XX Party Congress in 1956. For example:

> A new stage in the development of Soviet historical science was connected with the important decisions of the XX Party Congress. The Congress armed scientific workers with powerful weapons against subjectivism in history, which had a good effect on the results of the activities of military historians. [45]

The introduction into the Soviet Armed Forces of the nuclear weapon gave a new stimulus to the development of Soviet military science. According to official Soviet sources:

> The order of the Ministry of Defense USSR on this question had great importance for the broad unrolling of military science work, and also the military science conference held in May, 1957, which created favorable prerequisites for the sharp improvement of military science and scientific research work.[46]

One of the most important conferences held by the Military Science Administration was held 25 May 1963, entitled: "The Essence and Content of Soviet Military Doctrine." Opening the conference was General Colonel K.F. Skorobogatkin, Chief of the Administration until April, 1970.

First to speak was General Major A.A. Prokhorov. Prokhorov is one of the authors of Military Strategy, and in 1966 he received a Frunze Prize. Next was Colonel V.V. Larionov, composing editor and one of the authors of Military Strategy, also a 1966 Frunze Prize winner. The third speaker was Colonel V.M. Kulish. General Skorobogatkin noted that:

> Military science constitutes the military-technical basis of Soviet military doctrine. It recommends the most acceptable ways and means of solving problems designated by the political leadership.[47]

Other speakers at this conference which represented the highest levels of the defense-intellectual establishment were:

Prokhorov, A.A. Gen.Maj.	Kulish, V.M. Colonel
Larionov, V.V. Colonel	Goncharov, G.P. Colonel
Mochalov, V.V. Colonel	Glazov, V.V. Colonel
Denisenko, V.K. Colonel	Nazarov, N.V. Colonel
Ivanov, K.I. Colonel	Sterngkh, Ya.I. Colonel
Grylev, A.N. Colonel	Vanegyev, V.I. Eng. Col.
Khrebtovskiy, I.S. Colonel	Arzunov, I.I. Captain
Varezhnikov, P. Ye. Colonel	Golushkevich, V.S. Gen.Lieut.
Mernov, V.F. Gen.Lt.	Krainyukov, K.V. Gen. Lieut.

The Military Science Administration of the General Staff is responsible for the military science findings from which military doctrine is developed. Soviet military science can be divided into seven parts:

- the general theory of military science;
- the theory of military art;
- the theory of training and education;
- military historical science;
- military administration;
- military geography;
- military technical science.[48]

Of course the details of how research is carried out and how much work comes under this administration cannot be answered from the open press. The topics of military science conferences held from time to time and reports published in the press about them would indicate that the Military Science Administration plays a vital role in stimulating military theoretical thinking, so vital for the waging of contemporary war.

d. The Role of Military Schools

(1) The Faculties

In the Soviet Union a major "defense-intellectual" task is performed by the faculties of the academies of the Soviet Armed Forces. Certain members of these faculties, almost all of whom hold advanced degrees, are the Soviet equivalents of Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Robert Strausz-Hupe and others. Within the past ten years, these faculty members have published works of major importance on military doctrine and strategy, which are indispensable reading for anyone interested in understanding trends in Soviet weapons systems, arms control and disarmament. (See chart 6) Specific books prepared by faculty members of Soviet military schools are shown in the

section of this paper entitled "The Officer's Library.")

The work of the most senior of the Soviet Service schools, the Academy of the General Staff, is described as follows:

> The Academy of the General Staff is a center for advanced military science and conductor of the latest achievement of military theory. It carries out major scientific research work in elaborating problems of modern war and in successfully training highly qualified cadres.[49]

Next in importance after the Academy of the General Staff is the Frunze Military Academy. Here, in the post-World War II years, considerable attention was given to scientific research on key military questions. Textbooks, studies and other works were written and, equally important, the number of advanced degree candidates and doctors were significantly increased. The introduction of the nuclear rocket weapon demanded intensive research in all questions of military affairs.

In addition to the theoretical questions on doctrine, strategy and tactics, much of the research work for the military-technical side of military doctrine also is carried out in the vast network of Soviet military schools. These schools, located throughout the Soviet Union, generally are commanded by generals and admirals and enjoy a much higher prestige than do Service schools in the United States.

An article by Chief Marshal of Armored Forces P.A. Rotmistrov, entitled "Military Science and the Academies", was published in Red Star on April 26, 1964. The Marshal called attention to the recent decree of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers on raising the scientific research work in schools of higher learning, including military schools. He noted the fact that the military academies have made major contributions in developing military science and technology, but that more work needs to

CHART 8 THE SOVIET DEFENSE-INTELLECTUAL COMPLEX



* The Official Military Series

be done. At present, in his view:

> There are many opinions on how a future war will be waged. But some researchers express their views so categorically that it seems their methods have already been proven in war. Some views have already lost their influence because of subsequent research and the further imvelopment of armaments and equipment. Military art needs further elaboration, especially concerning the beginning period of war. Final strategic goals today can be achieved much faster. Not only does the development of future weapons systems need research but also military theoretical research of major proportions on how these weapons should be used.
>
> 'Old' types of weapons should neither be overevaluated nor underevaluated, or worst of all, ignored. These conventional weapons will be around for some time.[50]

(2) The Students

Marshal Rotmistrov also edited a little book entitled For Those Who Want to Study in Military Schools and Academies. The authors advised those who plan to take the entrance examinations to start preparing two or three years ahead of time. Two to three thousand hours are needed to cover the material. Thus, by spending no less than three hours a day studying, one has the best chance to pass the exam. Preparation courses are usually organized at officer's homes by the Military Sciences Societies for those wishing to take the examinations.

For the correspondence courses, each student must plan 100-120 hours a month or 1100 - 1200 a year. How is this to be done? First, the student gets three days a month to study, giving 30 hours. Those evenings when he finishes work at 1600 hours, he can study 5 hours, giving 60 hours a month. The rest of the time can come from regular working days, days off, and vacation time. If studying a foreign language, 30 to 40 minutes a day is essential. For instance, one can practice during the lunch hour with other

students of that language.[51]

There are lists of schools in many books, magazines and in the military newspapers. Details of entrance requirements are given. No complete list seems available, however, a list believed fairly comprehensive, taken from available unclassified sources, is given in appendix B.

The most important point to note is the sharp increase in Higher Military Schools. In 1965 there were approximately 55 such schools. By 1967 this number had grown to 75, and by 1971 over 100 such schools could be identified - a doubling in six years. Many 3-year military schools have been made 4-year higher military schools. (See chart 7)

It can be seen that each military academy has a feeder system coming from the higher military schools. For example, there are eight higher tank schools which prepare officers who later might attend the Malinovskiy Armored Troops Academy, and so forth.

The training of the Soviet military students has been impressive. It has been said that Lenin told the soldiers to pin letters on their backs so that when they marched, they could also be learning to read. But the success of the revolution required making leaders of ordinary soldiers. A whole network of command courses, military schools, colleges and military academies had to be set up. By the end of 1918, there were 63 military educational centers. by September 1919 -- 107, and by November 1920 there were 153.

This produced the lower level of commander, but the Red Army needed leaders. In 1918, on the base of the former Nikolayev Military Academy, the Academy of the General Staff opened, which in 1925 was renamed the Frunze Military Academy. The Artillery Academy of the Red Army soon began



CHART 9 GROWTH OF THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF PERSONNEL OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES

From: Communist of the Armed Forces 9, 1970.

functioning, as did the Military Engineer, Military Medicine, and Military Supply Academies. In 1919, the Military-Political Academy opened and the Naval Academy. Higher Infantry, Aviation, Electrotechnical and Cavalry Schools followed in rapid order.

In 1921-1922 military reforms resulted in the schools being lengthened to 2 to 3 year courses. At that time there were 48 military schools, 8 air force and 2 naval schools. At the higher level were 6 military academies, 4 higher schools and 5 military faculties at civilian schools.

By 1932, six new military-technical academies were opened, due to the increased specialization brought about by improved weaponry. Two new faculties, naval and air, were created in 1932 at the Military Political Academy. Marxist-Leninist teachings became a required subject for commanders in 1932.

General Colonel L.M. Sandalov, in Perezhitoye, describes school life which existed in the 'thirties. He writes:

> In the summer of 1936, the Academy of the General Staff opened in Moscow. Most of the students were colonels from 35 to 40 years of age. 137 men were chosen, mostly from workers in the General Staff, staffs of military districts and chiefs of staff of units and teachers at military academies. The majority were fromthe ground troops -- infantry, cavalry, artillery, tank and engineer units. But there were also aviators and sailors. Most were graduates of Frunze Military Academy.
>
> We all understood quite well why the Academy of the General Staff had been created. It was no secret to anybody that fascist Germany was creating armed forces and developing military industry for attacking the Soviet Union. Foreseeing the inevitability of an attack by fascist Germany, the Central Committee and the Soviet government in 1936 took a number or organizational measures for strengthening the defense capability of our state and increasing the power of the Armed Forces. At the same time the new theory of Soviet military art -- deep attack and defense operations, was developed. The founder of this theory by right was V.K. Triandafillov.
>
> The first five-year plan made the USSR a powerful industrial power. The possibility was created for the fundamental technical rearming of the army. Together with the improved equipment came the demand to improve the training of cadres. The operational faculty at Frunze

could no longer satisfy the demands of the growing army.

The General Staff Academy became the scientific center of the Soviet Army. Many got materials from the General Staff on operational questions.

Two or three days a week students worked absolutely alone, in the libraries or in the laboratories of the Academy. Only half of all studies were conducted in study groups composed of 12 to 15 students. Each student took by turns the role of intelligence operations chief of one or another service branch and finally the role of chief of staff and commander of the army. Then the leader would take the decision of one of the students and continue from there.

Operational games were carried out well. The probable enemy in our games was the army of fascist Germany. A clash with it was considered inevitable. However, we underestimated the speed of growth of its armies and figured it would not unleash a war quite so soon. Therefore they planned to be ready by the time war began and paid little attention to defensive operations.

Often there were speeches by authoritative leaders of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff and the commanders of troops of the more significant military districts.

The study of Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of Party-political work was constructed absolutely differently than in the other academies. Usually two or three times a month we had lectures on the international situation, on fulfilling the plan of the economy, and on important decisions of the Central Committee of the Party. Often the lectures were read by highly qualified speakers of the Moscow Party or even of the Central Committee. In turn students from the Academy were sent to speak at factories near Moscow and in Moscow.

During 1936/37 the students of the first class studied army and frontal operations in the framework of the new theory of military art and by spring they had occupied themselves with basic operational games on maps. Each played the role of commander of a front (army) then the role of chief of staff of a front (army) or his deputy. During the course of these games we in theory passed examinations in the theory of operational art and discovered our own abilities.

In the summer of 1937 the students of the Academy spent some time in the Navy. Half went to the Baltic, half to the Black Sea. At the end of the summer the Academy went to the Ukraine. There the final operational games were conducted on the area with use of communication means. Frontal and army direction was formed from the students. We also took part in joint exercises with ground troops and aviation.[52]

Such was the life of an Academy student before the war.

By 1941 there were 16 military academies and ten special military faculties at civilian schools. There were also evening classes and correspondence courses at each academy. In addition, there were 63 ground force schools, 32 flying and aviation-technical schools, and 14 naval schools.

By 1971 this number had increased to 17 military academies and over 100 "higher military schools". There are, in addition, some thirty-odd other military schools, such as the "Pushkin Military Building-Technical School" which offers a three year course and graduates its students as "Technical Lieutenants." Entrance to all schools is by competetive examination. Soviet newspapers in 1967 asserted that there were five, and sometimes more, candidates competing for each vacancy in the military schools. Ages for the schools varies, with some Ground Forces schools taking yours from 17 to 23 years of age, with an upper limit of 21 years of age for most aviation and naval schools. Academies take officers from ages 26 to 36. (These schools are listed in Appendix B)

Many civilian universities also have military faculties, which train officers for the reserve. Many of these reserve officers subsequently are called up for active duty (about 10% of junior officers on active duty are from the reserves).

Any observant visitor to the Soviet Union will note the considerable numbers of officers attending military schools. They are seen everywhere - Leningrad, Lvov, Tbilisi, Novosibirsk, Samarkand - in virtually any large city in the USSR. A sampling of books, pamphlets, brochures and newspapers, available in Soviet military bookstores, discloses the large body of writing

published by their faculties. The professors and instructors have the task not only of assisting in the formulation of military doctrine, but also in its dissemination.

e. The Role of the Graduate School

Military colleges in the United States, including the National War College, are not accredited to offer graduate degrees. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, institutions such as the General Staff Academy and the Lenin Military-Political Academy may award graduate degrees of both "candidate" and "doctor". Much greater attention is given to the holder of the graduate degree than in the United States.

There is no exact counterpart in the United States to the "candidate" and "doctor " degrees awarded in the Soviet Union. The "candidate" degree requirements appear to be much more stringent than are the requirements for the "master" degree awarded in United States universities. The degree of "doctor" is awarded only after the "candidate" already has made some substantial contribution to his field.

Professor and General of the Army P. A. Kurochkin, in his 1969 book, The Bases of Methods of Military-Science Research, explains the dissertation portion of the Soviet degree requirements, as follows:

> Dissertation -- a scientific work, presented for public defense for the purpose of receiving a science degree. In the USSR, as is known, there are two science degrees: candidate of science and doctor of science. Corresponding dissertation works have also been established: a candidate's and a doctor's.
>
> Since persons awarded a science degree by the government have definite rights and privileges (the right to occupy a position in an institute of higher learning or scientific research establishment, privileges in a material relationship and so forth), then the order of seeking science degree is regulated in detail by corresponding regulations. The basic demands for dissertations in general were

given in the Instructions on the Order of Awarding Science Degrees and Giving Science Titles, which was confirmed by the Higher Attestation Commission, 20 September, 1966. In view of the importance of these demands, it is useful to give them in full.

A dissertation for those seeking the science degree of doctor of science must be independent research work, consisting of theoretical generalization and solution of a major scientific problem which represents an important contribution to science and practice.

A dissertation for those seeking the science degree of candidate of science must contain new scientific and practical conclusions and recommendations, disclose in the seeker the ability for independent scientific research, deep theoretical knowledge in the area of the given discipline.

Thus, the candidate's dissertation as one of the kinds of military science works has as its purpose demonstrating the ability of the author for independent scientific research work and receiving new scientific results on the theme researched. The doctor's dissertation has as its purpose the receiving of a new, major achievement in military science.

The volume of a candidate's dissertation on an operational-tactical theme, as practice has shown, has from 150 to 250 pages, and on a military historical theme, from 220 to 300 pages. The volume of a doctor's dissertation is roughly three times greater than a candidate's dissertation.[53]

At the present time, according to Soviet sources, their are more than 500 doctors of science and more than 7000 candidates of science in the Soviet Armed Forces.[54]

The Lenin Military-Political Academy publishes the name of the student, the topic of the dissertation and the time for its defense. From this we know something of the background of many of the Soviet military theoreticians such as Colonels Ye. I. Rybkin, S. I. Kruprov, I. A. Grudinin and V.K. Bondarenko (See appendix C). We know somewhat less about the degrees awarded by the Academy of the General Staff. We do know, however, that they have the same

prestige as degrees awarded by the University of Moscow, the Lenin Military-Political Academy or any other institution of higher learning in the Soviet Union.

As noted elsewhere in this study, those in the United States who are regarded as military theorists and strategists are, with very few exceptions, graduates of civilian universities. Even those few men in uniform who have written on military strategy or doctrine have, almost without exception, received higher degrees from civilian institutions. The Kahns, Schellings, Osters and Kissingers - all civilian - find their nearest counterparts in the Soviet Union among the graduates and on the faculty of higher school system of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Both faculty members and graduate students of Soviet military schools make direct contributions to the formulation of military doctrine through their research in military science. Equally important, the higher military schools provide an opportunity for disseminating the doctrine to the senior command and staff element of all Services.

f. The Role of Military Science Societies (VNO)

The great attention in the Soviet Union given to military doctrine, military strategy and military science is reflected in the Soviet "Military Science Society". These societies have been formed in all officers' clubs, or "homes" as they are called in the Soviet Union.

One of the larger groups of the VNO is found in the Central Home of the Soviet Army (TsDSA) in Moscow. In February, 1957, 122 officers

mainly from the military academies and from central administrations of the Ministry of Defense, established the Military Science Society of the TsDSA. Ten years later in 1967, there were 565 members of which 180 were generals and admirals. 85.5 per cent had higher military education. Five were doctors of science and 71 were candidates of science. Two had won government prizes. 86 per cent were Communist Party members. From 1957 to 1967, 1,680 works had been produced by the Society of which 177 were books.[55]

Another active VNO is that of the Academy of the General Staff. Also founded in 1957, this VNO directs its efforts toward urging its members to do scientific research work and to perfect habits in research in the area of military theory. The staff of the VNO consider that the following areas of scientific work have been most fruitful: 1) examining actual questions of military theory; 2) giving informative speeches and short reports on new developments in military theory and military equipment; 3) preparing articles for publication; 4) preparing and taking candidates's examinations and working over dissertations; and 5) organizing military-theoretical conferences. As already noted, preparation courses for those wishing to take entrance examinations for military schools are organized by the VNOs of officer's homes.

Throughout the Soviet Union various authors under the auspices of the VNO publish lectures at clubs, factories and other groups. Theoretical conferences are regularly held by the Society. Articles published by the TsDSA in Moscow, for example, are sent to all military districts, fleets

and groups where they form the basis for further discussions on military matters.

The following cities have garrisons which have VNOs consisting of 80 to 120 members each:

Lvov	Tbilisi	Khmelnitskiy	Tashkent
Odessa	Pskov	Moscow	Chita
Leningrad	Drogobych	Uzhgorod	Vinnitsa
Minsk	Kalinin	Krasnoyarsk	Tomsk
Rostov	Tallinn	Krasnodar	Barnaul
Riga	Kishinev	Sverdlovsk	Kharkov
Brest	Stavropol	Perm	Saratov
Simferople	Volgograd	Irkutsk	G nel
Grudno	Rovno	Novosibirsk	Lugansk
Kursk	Chernovitsy	Khabarovsk	

NOTE: Military science societies are not to be confused with the "Znaniye" ("Knowledge") societies. "Znaniye" societies are civilian sponsored and run, though they might have military members and might have lectures on military themes.

PART D. Dissemination of Soviet Military Doctrine

1. The Role of the "Officer's Library"

For the period from the mid-sixties to the first half of 1971 the Soviet "Officer's Library" series of books is a unique collection of the best and most authoritative works of current Soviet military writing. According to the announcement made in December, 1964 by Voyenizdat, the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, this series was to have consisted of seventeen volumes. Four of the books published thus far have been nominated for the Frunze Prize.

The purpose of the series is "to arm the reader with a knowledge of the fundamental changes which have taken place in recent years in military affairs." Authors of these books are on the faculties of the Academy of the General Staff, The Frunze Military Academy and The Lenin Military-Political Academy. Others serve in the various administrations of the Ministry of Defense. The key points of Soviet doctrine and strategy remain the same regardless of where the book was written. Each academy or administration handles the topic that is within its competency.

Of these books, Tactics and Military Strategy have been completely translated into English. Several others have been published in part, such as the History of Military Art and the Dictionary of Basic Military Terms.

Voyenizdat described the publication of the first books as follows:

> From the works on a military-political theme, first of all must be mentioned the book V.I. Lenin: On War, the Army and Military Science. Collected in it are the articles, lectures, speeches, letters and telegrams of V.I. Lenin in which is found further development of Marxist teachings on war and the army; the theory and tactics of the Communist Party are elaborated on questions of war, peace and the revolution; the formulation of the idea of the defense of the Socialist

Fatherland, the bases of Soviet military science are given and the principles of structuring the Soviet Armed Forces are determined and the training and educating of our soldiers.

In the work Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, written by an authors' collective of the Lenin Military-Political Academy, a systematic exposition of Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army, the essence, character and types os wars, the social nature and significance of the army, the bases of military might of a state and its armed forces, the laws determining the course and outcome of a war are given and analyzed. The role of the socialist camp in averting a world thermonuclear war is characterized and also examined are other military-political and military-philosophical problems. The methodological bases of Soviet military science are pointed out and a criticism of anti-Marxist theories on military questions is given.

Both books belong in the 'Officer's Library' which will begin publication in 1965. The purpose of the 'Library' is to give the officer cadres of the army and navy works which would help them become acquainted with the essence of Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army, and would arm the reader with a knowledge of the fundamental changes which have taken place in recent years in military affairs and in the experience of party-political work. In the 'Library' there will be works in strategy, tactics, military doctrine, military pedagogics and psychology, and reference books necessary for officers. Each year eight volumes will be published; in all there will be seventeen books.[56]

"To arm the reader with a knowledge of the fundamental changes which have taken place in recent years in military affairs" - this is the stated message of the 'Officer's Library'. Great attention is paid to the revolution in military affairs, which is concerned primarily with the introduction of the nuclear weapon into the Soviet Armed Forces.

Composition of the 'Officer's Library'

Voyenizdat gave more details of publication of the 'Officer's Library' early in 1965. It was to be issued over a three-year period (1965-1967) and, as already noted, it was to consist of seventeen volumes. Eight were to be published in 1965. The publication schedule in actuality was never

followed. Two books have failed to appear altogether: Military Doctrine (announced several places for 1966 publication) and Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (promised for 1967.) Other books have been substituted. One book, 50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR, was planned to have been included in the "Officer's Library" series. However, it was not identified as a part of the series when it appeared in 1968.

The first three volumes actually printed constitute the collected works of V.I. Lenin, M.I. Kalinin, and M.V. Frunze. The fourth book in the series, Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, was written by a collective of authors of the department of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy of the Lenin Military-Political Academy. (General Major N.Ya. Sushko was the head of this department.) This book was nominated for the Frunze Prize in 1966. The fifth book, also from the Lenin Military-Political Academy, was written by a collective of authors of the department of Party-Political Work, headed by General Lieutenant A.Ye. Khmel', and was entitled Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces.

The sixth volume was a joint effort by the Lenin Military-Political Academy and Frunze Military Academy entitled The History of Military Art. Colonel A.A. Strokov, professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, was the editor. Colonel Strokov is now Deputy Chief of the Military History Institute of the Ministry of Defense.

Military Doctrine, the book announced in seventh place, has not yet been published.

Military Strategy, the eighth book of the series, was written under

the guidance of Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy, who from 1952 to 1960 was Chief of the General Staff. This was the third edition of this well-known work. The authors are almost the same for all three editions. Several of them are known to work in the Military Science Administration of the General Staff. General Colonel A.I. Gastilovich, noted as author of the seventh chapter, was Deputy Commandant of the General Staff Academy before his retirement. Gastilovich, it might also be pointed out, in World War II was the commander of the army for which General Major L.I. Brezhnev was a political officer. The war-time friendships of the Stalingrad Front and of Stavka played a large role, according to some analysts, in the post-war political scene. It is a point worth considering, at least, in connection with this book.

Tactics -- the ninth book, was written by a collective of authors from the Frunze Military Academy, headed by General Major V.G. Reznichenko, a Doctor of Military Sciences. Reznichenko became head of the Tactics Department at Frunze. Both Military Strategy and Tactics were nominated for the 1969 Frunze Prize.

The 10th book, Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs is so far unpublished.

Military Psychology, number eleven, was edited by Colonel M.I. D'yachenko of the Lenin Military-Political Academy. Colonel D'yachenko later received the first Doctor of Psychological Sciences degree given by the Academy.

Military Pedagogics, number twelve, also came from the Lenin Military-Political Academy. It was edited by Lt. Colonel A.V. Barabonshchikov, since 1968 a Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences. Both men are in the Department of

Military Pedagogics and Psychology at the Academy.

Number thirteen, The Bases of Soviet Military Law, was under the editorship of General Lieutenant of Justice A.G. Gorniy, with Professor General Major of Justice I.F. Pobezhimov heading the authors' collective. The authors are on the Military-Juridical Faculty of the Lenin Military-Political Academy.

The Organization and Armaments of the Armies and Navies of Capitalist Countries is fourteenth in the series. The NATO Armed Forces are analyzed in detail.

The Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, number fifteen, stated that it was written by the professorial staff of the Academy of the General Staff, with General Colonel A.I. Radziyevskiy writing the foreword. Editors were General Lieutenants S.N. Krasil'nikov and A.Ye. Yakovlev.

The sixteenth volume is entitled Officer's Guide for Quartermasters, which appears to have been substituted for the Officer's Guide originally announced. With the publication three years later of the Officer's Guide, this Officer's Guide for Quartermasters becomes a bonus book. The latter was edited by General Lieutenant (retired) I.V. Safronov.

The seventeeth book of the original plan -- 50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR, -- was published in 1968, but not as a part of the 'Officer's Library' series. The Commission for the book was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov, Chief of the General Staff. The authors' collective was headed by General Colonel K.F. Skorobogatkin, noted earlier as the Chief of Military Science Administration of the General Staff at that time.

Many other authors and contributors are mentioned representing the whole Ministry of Defense. It won the 1970 Frunze Prize.

In the second week of March, 1971, scarcely three weeks before the opening of the XXIV Party Congress, yet another book in the familiar blue color of the 'Officer's Library' series was found in Moscow. The appearance of the new book, entitled The Officer's Guide, came as a surprise. It was the first work published in the series since 1968.

The book contained much useful data, and in some respects provided an excellent summary of what had appeared in previous works of the 'Officer's Library' series. For example, one chapter of the book is entitled "Marxist-Leninist's Military Theory". In a few pages this chapter sums up the key points contained in two other books published in the series, Military Strategy and The History of Military Art. In addition to these two books being listed as recommended for additional reading at the end of the chapter, two other works also are given, the 1968 edition of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army and Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice.

The Officer's Guide, despite its plebian title, is of especial importance to the student of Soviet military doctrine. One small section in the book, consisting of seven pages, is a restatement of what has been written over the past decade on this subject. Appearing on the very eve of the XXIV Party Congress it must reflect those decisions made during the preceding months, and which were to be 'rubber-stamped' at the Congress. In addition, the recommended reading list given at the end of each chapter gives those books which the Party-political authorities must consider as basic texts in

their respective fields. It is hoped that the other announced books will soon join the 'Officer's Library'.

To sum up, six books of the 'Officer's Library' series were written by the Lenin Military-Political Academy: 1) Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army; 2) Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces; 3) Military Psychology; 4) Military Pedagogics; 5) The Bases of Soviet Military Law and 6) The Officer's Guide.

One was written by Frunze Military Academy: Tactics.

One was written jointly by Frunze and the Lenin Military-Political Academy: The History of Military Art.

One was written by the Academy of the General Staff: The Dictionary of Basic Military Terms.

One was written by the Academy of the General Staff and the Military Science Administration: Military Strategy.

One was written by the Military Science Administration: 50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Five are of varied authorship: three are collected works, and three are reference books.

(The chart, "The Officer's Library" shows the year of publication, the number of copies printed, the price, the number of pages, and printing dates.)

However slow and indefinite the 'Officer's Library' series has been,

TABLE 1. THE OFFICER'S LIBRARY

Title of Book (Order as announced)	Year	N° Copies	Typeset	Printed	Pages	Price (1 ruble= $1.10)
V.I. Lenin. On War, the Army and Military Science	1965	29,000	2/8/65	7/28/65	836	1r 32k
M.I. Kalinin on Communist Indoctrination and Military Duty	1967	32,000	2/9/66	11/1/66	728	1r 30k
M.V. Frunze -Selection of Works	1965	27,000	10/31/64	2/16/65	528	1r
Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army	1965	50,000	4/29/65	9/14/65	384	78k
Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces	1968	65,000	7/14/67	11/21/67	352	80k
History of Military Art	1966	35,000	8/11/65	12/1/65	656	1r 74k
Military Doctrine	1966	unavailable			220	1r 58k
Military Strategy	1968	30,000	11/23/66	11/30/67	464	2r
Tactics	1966	40,000	10/30/65	4/22/66	408	1r 61k
Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs		unavailable				
Military Psychology	1967	50,000	10/4/66	9/14/67	260	1r 20k
Military Pedagogics	1966	40,000	12/11/65	8/6/66	376	99k
The Bases of Soviet Military Law	1966	40,000	1/30/65	11/23/65	432	1r 6k
Organization and Armaments of the Armies and Navies of Capitalist States	1965	31,000	2/10/65	9/29/65	548	1r 33k
Dictionary of Basic Military Terms	1965	27,000	4/20/65	7/14/65	248	80k

Reproduced from best available copy.

THE OFFICER'S LIBRARY (con't)

Title of Book (Order as announced)	Year	No. Copies	Typeset	Printed	Pages	Price
Officer's Guide for Quartermasters	1968	32,000	4/24/67	11/28/67	272	82k
*50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR**	1968	100,000	1/4/67	11/6/67	584	2r 75k
The Officer's Guide	1971	80,000	7/2/68	27/11/70	400	1r 45k

* Although originally part of the Officer's Library series, when printed, *50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR* was sold as a separate volume.

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the writings have proven invaluable to those interested in Soviet military matters. The acceptance of the books by the Party-military leadership is attested by the number nominated for the Frunze Prize, as well as by the appearance of the Officer's Guide in 1971, which lists the other books in the series as recommended reading.

For some reason or other, the 1968 edition of Military Strategy, published in the 'Officer's Library' series, was hailed in the United States as a controversial work. Perhaps the reason was its reiteration of Khrushchev's military doctrine with its emphasis on nuclear weaponry. In 1968 a popular view in the United States was that the Soviet Union would not seriously challenge the lead of the United States in its quality of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The growth of the Soviet strategic missile force by 1971 clearly reflected the doctrine and strategy so clearly presented in all three editions of Marshal Sokolovsky's famed work.

The 'Officer's Library' series serves as a basis of study for the compulsory political indoctrination courses which all officers must attend. Fifty hours a year are given to Marxist-Leninist training. Seminars lasting four to six hours are held every two to three months. Preparation for these hours must be done independently from prepared lists of recommended books.

The central theme of all books of the 'Officer's Library' series is the revolution in military affairs. The introduction of the nuclear rocket weapon into all the five services of the Soviet Armed Forces, along with the 'cybernetics revolution' caused a complete revolution in the ways in

which future wars will be fought. Every officer and every soldier must know how to fight in conditions of the use or threatened use of the nuclear rocket weapon. The 'Library' books were primarily written to help the Soviet officer understand the effect of the revolution in military affairs on Soviet military thought.

Historical note:

The 'Officer's Library' series published in 1965-67 was not the first time this series has appeared. In 1957-59 15 books (18 volumes) were issued under the same title, the 'Officer's Library'. The following titles were taken from the original announcement:

1. V.I. Lenin. On War, the Army and Military Science
2. F. Engels. Selected Military Works
3. Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army
4. M.I. Kalinin. On Communist and Military Education
5. The Civil War and Foreign Military Intervention in the USSR
6. A Short Outline on the History of the Great Patriotic War and World War II
7. The Officer's Companion
8. The Air Forces
9. The Navy
10. National PVO Troops (Air Defense)
11. The Physical Basis of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons, the Basis of Their Use and Protection From Them
12. Rocket Weapons
13. Radio and Radio Locator Equipment and Its Use
14. Guide to the Armed Forces of Imperialist States
15. Atlas of the World

Such were the plans in 1957. But in 1960 only eight had been printed: the book on Lenin, on Engels, on Marxism-Leninism; the book on the Air Forces,

the Navy, Rocket Weapons, and radios and radar equipment. The Second World War 1939-1945 had not even been on the original list. The rest apparently never were printed at least by 1960.

2. The Role of the Frunze Prize

Those in the United States and elsewhere who follow Soviet military affairs have a problem in determining what the Soviets themselves consider significant and worthwhile among their military writings. This problem has been somewhat simplified since March 26, 1965, at which time the Council of Ministers of the USSR approved the annual awarding of the "Frunze Prize" for the writings of "excellent military or military historical works."

For a book to win this prize, or even to be nominated for it, means that the Ministry of Defense, as well as the Communist Party, places high value on the work. At times the prize will go to a group of authors for making specific contributions, without mentioning the title of their publication. The very mention of an author suggests his high standing and the attention given to his views.

Books nominated for the Frunze Prize represent a wide spectrum of interests. The Academy of the General Staff, the Frunze Military Academy, the Lenin Military-Political Academy and the Gagarin Air Force Academy all have produced books which have received nominations. The subjects are varied, and have included titles such as Military Strategy, V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces, Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces in the Years of the Great Patriotic War, and Tactics.

In March, 1966, the first Frunze Prize winners were announced. Interestingly, authors were mentioned, with little attention given to what they had produced. The top winners were:[57]

Gen. Col. K.F. Skorobogatkin	Chief, Military Science Admin., General Staff
Gen. Maj. A.N. Strogiy	Military Science Administration
Gen. Maj. A.A. Prokhorov	Military Science Administration
Colonel V.V. Glazov	
Colonel V.K. Denisenko	Military Science Administration
Colonel N.M. Korzhov	
Colonel N.I. Kratinsky	
Colonel V.V. Larionov	Candidate of Military Sciences
Colonel S.V. Malyanchikov	
Capt. 1st Rank Ye.N. Mamayev	
Colonel (res.) A.S. Pekin	

In addition, Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army (4th edition), one of the books of the 'Officer's Library' series, won gold watches for its editors:

Gen. Maj. N. Ya. Sushko	Head Marxist-Leninist Phil.Dept. Lenin M-P Academy
Colonel S.A. Tyushkevich	Doctor of Philosophical Sciences
Colonel B.A. Belyy	Docent
Major D.A. Volkogonov	Candidate of Philosophical Sciences
Colonel Ya. S. Dzyuba	Doctor of Philosophical Sciences
Gen. Maj. S.N. Kozlov	Candidate of Military Sciences
Capt. 1st Rank V.M. Kulakov	Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor
Colonel Ye.V. Medvedev	Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Docent
Colonel K.V. Spirov	Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Docent
Colonel Ye. F. Sulimov	Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Head Dept. Sciences Com
Colonel Ye. A. Khomenko	Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Docent

A gold watch for researching and working out several problems of military theory was awarded to:

Gen. Maj. Engineer Technical Service I.I. Anureyev	General Staff Academy Voctor of Military Sciences, Head.Dept., Prof.

Last to be given were the certificates which went to:

Gen. Col. I.S. Glebov	General Staff Academy
Gen. Maj. P.K. Altukhov	General Staff Academy
Gen. Maj. B.M. Golovchiner	
Gen. Maj. V.I. Vol'khin	General Staff Academy
Gen. Maj. L.M. Krylov	
Gen. Maj. B.G. Plashchin	Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent,G/S Ac
Gen. Maj. P.G. Yanovsky	
Gen. Maj. D.K. Slepenkov	
Colonel S.F. Begunov	

for writing valuable textbooks.

In 1967, the Frunze Prize went to a group of authors representing the Frunze Military Academy "for working out the theoretical basis of combined arms battle." No name was given for their work. The authors were:[58]

General of the Army P.A. Kurochkin	Commandant, Frunze Military Acad.
Gen. Lieut. V. Ya. Petrenko	Candidate Military Sciences, Docent
Gen. Maj. R.G. Simonyan	Doctor of Military Sciences
Colonel P.V. Galochkin	
Colonel L.M. Druzhinin	
Colonel D.M. Milyutenkov	Candidate of Military Sciences
Colonel N.F. Miroshnichenko	Candidate of Military Sciences
Colonel P.M. Petrus	
Colonel A.A. Sidorenko	Candidate of Military Sciences
Colonel P.V. Shemansky	Candidate of Military Sciences

Valuable prizes were also given to a group of authors for their work:

Gen. Maj. D.I. Osadchiy	
Eng. Colonel G.I. Il'in	
Gen. Maj. N.S. Vasendin	
Major I.P. Terekhov	
Lt. Colonel K.A. Alekseyevskiy	
Gen. Lieut. Artillery S.A. Torkunov	Head Dept.Dzerzhinsky Mil.-Eng.Acad.
Colonel A.M. Umanskiy	
Colonel A.P. Gorbunov	
Colonel N.H. Kuznetsov	
Colonel A.I. Kuz'min	

A work on military art won honorable mention:

Gen. Lieut. P V. Stepshin	Chief of Staff, North Caucasus Military Dis.
Gen. Maj. M.G. Titov	
Colonel N.G. Ganotskiy	
Colonel I.M. Bershadskiy	

For a work valuable to the development of military science, honorable mention went to:

Gen. Col. M.I. Povaliy	Deputy Chief of the General Staff

and a group of authors from the General Staff Academy.

Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov, Chief of the General Staff chaired the commission in 1967 while Chief Marshal of Armored Troops P.A. Rotmistrov served as his deputy.

Three books were nominated for the Frunze Prize in late 1967. They were:

1. The Yassko-Kishinev Cannas, 'Nauka' 1964
2. Budapest - Vienna - Prague, 'Nauka' 1965
3. Finale, 'Nauka' 1966 [59]

However when the prizes were awarded in 1968, the prize went to V.I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces, written by the Lenin Military-Political Academy. Its authors were: [60]

Gen. Col. A.S. Zheltov	Commandant, Lenin M-P Academy
Gen. Maj. A.A. Strokov	Doctor Historical Sciences, Dep. Ch., Mil. Hist. Inst.
Colonel N.R. Pankratov	Candidate of Historical Sciences
Colonel V.A. Ustimenko	Candidate of Historical Sciences
Colonel Yu.I. Korablev	
Colonel S.V. Baranov	
Colonel A.A. Babakov	
Colonel P.S. Smirnov	
Colonel A.M. Iovlev	
Colonel M.V. Vetrov	Dept. Scientific Communism, Lenin M-P Acad.
Colonel A.D. Kiselev	
Colonel V.A. Matsulenko	Doctor of Historical Sciences, Editor Military History Journal

A number of other authors contributed to Soviet military science and received honorable mention:

Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Kh. Bagramyan Was Commander, Rear Services
General of the Army V.F. Margelov Commander, Airborne Troops
Gen. Col. F.M. Malykhin 1st Dep., Rear Services
Gen. Maj. P. F. Pavlenko
Gen. Maj. I.M. Golushko Doctor Military Sciences, Rear Services Acad.
Colonel F.I. Patyk
Colonel V.Ye. Kondrashev
Colonel V.A. Feklin
Colonel I.N. Chaban
Colonel A.A. Bykov
Colonel V.A. Bulatnikov
Colonel Ya. P. Samoylenko
Colonel (res.) N.M. Sorokin

In late December, 1968, five books were nominated for the 1969 Frunze Prize. They were:[61]

1. 50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR and 50 Years Soviet Armed Forces, 'Voyenizdat', 1967-1968. Gen.Col. K.F.Skorobogatkin, K.V. Kraynyukov
2. Military Strategy, 'Voyenizdat', 1968, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky
3. Tactics, 'Voyenizdat', 1966. General Major V.G. Reznichenko
4. The Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District, 'Lenizdat', 1968 General Colonel A.M. Parshikov
5. The History of the Baltic Military District, 'Za Rodinu' Publishers, 1968, General of the Army G.I. Khetagurov

Military Strategy and Tactics were both part of the 'Officer's Library' series. The Frunze Prizes for 1969 were never announced.

Two books were nominated in late 1969 for the 1970 Frunze Prize. They were:[62]

1. The Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War, 'Voyenizdat', 1968, Marshal of Aviation S.I. Rudenko
2. Aviation and Cosmonautics, 'Voyenizdat', 1968, Marshal of Aviation S.A. Krasovskiy

Red Star for 8 March 1970 announced that 17 February 1970 at the meeting of the commission, the book, 50 Years of the Armed Forces USSR had been awarded the Frunze Prize for 1970.[63]

On 28 November, 1970, Red Star published the names of the books nominated for the 1971 Frunze Prize. They were as follows:[64]

1. Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces in the Years of the Great Patriotic War, Voyenizdat', 1968, Gen. Col. K.V.Kraynyukov
2. Kiev Red Banner 'Kiev', 1969, Gen. Lt. N.A. Soloveykin
3. Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice, 'Voyenizdat', 1969, Gen. Col. A.S. Zheltov
4. The Last Storm, 'Voyenizdat', 1970, Parot'kin, I.V. Gen.Maj.; Colonels A.T. Shimanskiy and F.D. Vorob'yev

Regrettably, the prize winner for 1971 was never published.

As already mentioned, announcements of the Frunze awards were drastically curtailed beginning in 1969. This curtailment may have been a result of the Soviet fetish for secrecy. They may have felt that an announcement of the prize gave away too much information - even though the prize may have gone to a history of some second world war battle.

The books which are known to have either received the Frunze Prize or been nominated for it have been outstanding publications. The authors mentioned by the Frunze Commission generally are well-known for the articles they have had published in military journals or in Red Star. Most readers would agree with the Frunze Prize Commission, both in regard to books nominated and authors mentioned.

3. The Role of Communist of the Armed Forces

Every fortnight, the Main Political Administration publishes its journal, Communist of the Armed Forces. The magazine has a "Political Studies" section devoted to the current study theme being taught at the compulsory political lectures for the troops. But even more important are the lectures for officers who must also devote so many hours a year to political studies.

These lectures are always footnoted to the effect that they are for officers, admirals and generals studying various theoretical themes. It has been from this section and these authors that the most significant articles of the past ten years have come. Among them have been:

"The Nature of World Nuclear Rocket War"
Lt. Colonel Ye. I. Rybkin

"On Contemporary Military Strategy"
Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy and General Major M.I. Cherednichenko

"The Modern Revolution in Military Affairs and the Combat Readiness of the Armed Forces"
Lt. Colonel V.M. Bondarenko

"The Political Side of Soviet Military Doctrine"
Colonel V.V. Larionov

"The Bases and Principles of Structuring the Soviet Armed Forces"
General Colonel N.A. Lomov

"V.I. Lenin -- the Founder of Soviet Military Science"
Colonel I.A. Seleznev

These articles are not for troop indoctrination or to boost morale. They are deeply serious articles written by the Soviet Union's leading intellectuals. Many, like N. Inozemtsev, are academicians from the Academy of Sciences. Others are leading economists and scientists. Some of the articles have been treated in the West as embittered military officers criticizing the Party. Such misinterpretation of the Party's leading military journal is dangerous. These are Party-approved themes, widely discussed by all military officers.

A list of these authors, identified where possible, can be found in Appendix D

SUMMARY

The formulation of contemporary Soviet military doctrine began in late 1953. At that time, the Soviet Union already had tested a thermonuclear bomb, and laid the foundation for the start of the "complete revolution in military affairs."[65] While the nuclear weapon was being developed, Soviet scientists worked on producing rockets as its chief means of delivery. At the same time radioelectronics and remote control systems underwent intensive development.

While the scientists and engineers were working on the new weapon, "new and responsible tasks, which had to be successfully decided on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, on the military theoretical inheritance of V.I. Lenin, and also taking into consideration past military experience, appeared before Soviet military science."[66]

The importance of this theoretical basis must not be underestimated. The above quotes are taken from one of the first books on military theory to appear in the USSR after the XXIV Party Congress, held in March, 1971. It is entitled V.I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science and was published, not by the military publishing house 'Voyenizdat', but by the Academy of Science of the USSR through its 'Nauka' publishers. Colonel N.N. Azovtsev, Doctor of Historical Sciences, who is associated with the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense, is the author of this work.

In describing doctrine, the author asserts that:

> "Doctrine is not dogma but a guide to action. It has the force of law and our military cadres are guided by it, but this does not exclude creative organizational work. On the contrary, doctrine is the basis which gives organizational work a purposeful character, unity of views and effort, directed at raising the power of the Soviet Armed Forces."[67]

Colonel Azovtsev repeatedly brings out the role of the Communist Party in building up the economy and increasing production, in sponsoring fundamental research and development, as well as its work in the purely political area.

The Party Congresses spell out the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet Union at approximately five-year intervals. They approve a Central Committee, which now numbers almost 400, of which, as already noted, 36 are military commanders. The daily work of the Central Committee is accomplished by its Secretariat, headed by the General Secretary of the CPSU, Leonid I. Brezhnev. The Politburo, with 15 members and 6 candidate members (six of whom also serve as Party secretaries) guides the policies approved by the Party Congresses. It firmly directs the Soviet Union along the line set by the CPSU. Several plenums of the Central Committee are held each year to approve actions the Politburo feels are needed.

The Central Committee has a direct link to the Armed Forces in the Main Political Administration. The Main Political Administration is responsible for seeing that Party policy is carried out in the Armed Forces and that the troops are indoctrinated with fundamental Marxist-Leninist teachings. Basically this teaching is as follows:

> "The contemporary epoch has been scientifically determined as a transition from capitalism to socialism, an epoch of the downfall of imperialism and the triumph of socialism on a universal scale and the essence of the two opposed tendencies of modern development has been disclosed: the increasing danger of the imperialists unleashing a new world war, and the growing possibility of preventing it. The first tendency is connected with imperialism, the source of all wars of our time, and the second rests on the forces of progress headed by the world socialist community."[68]

Soviet military science is guided by the decisions of the Central Committee and the Soviet government on military questions. The Soviet government executes Party policy. The Council of Ministers is composed of high Party officials. They, through the various ministries, guide the economy and productive forces of the country. Through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they guide foreign policy. Through the Academy of Sciences, they guide fundamental research and development. And finally, through the Ministry of Defense, the Party defends its system of government.

Soviet military doctrine is worked out by the military and political leadership of the country. Colonel Azovtsev writes that Soviet military science "works out recommendations for Soviet military doctrine and for teachings on war and the army."[69] To a great extent, the Military Science Administration of the General Staff does this work. The suspected body which actually formulates Soviet military doctrine, as has been shown, is the Higher Military Council, which is theoretically attached to the Council of Ministers. Recommendations come to the Military Science Administration from below, on the basis of requests from above for research into various complexities of military affairs. Military Science Societies (MSS) stimulate the exchange of military thought and experience and also promote research among their members. The students and the faculties of the numerous military schools do tremendous work in such areas as preparing for large troop maneuvers testing this or that theory or piece of new military equipment, and doing individual research on far-ranging theses. Military history, psychology, medicine, engineering, topography, pedagogics, housekeeping, cybernetics, and weapon designing — every pos-

sible topic is studied. Military strategy since 1967 has increasingly become the concern of the Academy of Science through its institutes such as the Institute of the USA and the Institute of World Economics and International Relations.

The General Staff also takes theories and tests them in annual troop maneuvers conducted by military districts. Sometimes several districts are involved in a maneuver; sometimes groups of Soviet troops abroad combine with Warsaw Pact armies to conduct gigantic joint maneuvers. Colonel Azovtsev, for instance, speaks highly of the 1970 'Dvina' exercise. He states:

> The most important theoretical positions of Soviet military science at the present-day stage of its development on questions such as making operational landings in the defender's rear areas of a whole airborne division, encounter battle with the participation of masses of tanks with both sides using nuclear weapons, crossing water barriers, assuring a combination of strikes from the front and tactical helicopter landings from the rear, activeness, steadfastness and enterprise in defense, and other questions, were tested during the course of 'Dvina'.[70]

After such maneuvers, the military councils of the military districts discuss and summarize their findings. These then go to the General Staff for study and evaluation.

Another role of the Military Science Administration is the conduct of military science conferences. These are often large and sometimes international. They are held on specific themes such as World War II and its results, or Soviet military doctrine and its maintenance. Sometimes a service such as the National PVO (air defense) Troops or the Ground Troops of the Soviet Army will hold a military science conference. These primarily will deal with the one service and its problems.

The Military Science Administration publishes its theoretical arti-

cles in its classified journal, Military Thought. It also publishes numerous other classified collections of articles read by the higher military leadership. There also exist many books published in the closed press, some of which have apparently won Frunze Prizes but cannot be mentioned by name in the open press. The same authors, however, do write in the open press on similar themes.

Once the highest political and military leadership has agreed on military doctrine, and the Supreme Soviet, with its 56 military members, gives its rubber-stamp approval, the doctrine must undergo widespread dissemination. In addition, doctrine is incorporated into new troop rules and regulations. The faculty members of the military academies and schools develop lectures on the new doctrine, turn these lectures into articles and the articles are then collected in textbooks. Some of the most outstanding of these have been incorporated into the 'Officer's Library' series. The articles may appear in any of the military magazines, most often in the Main Political Administration's twice-monthly Communist of the Armed Forces, and quite often in the Ministry of Defense's daily newspaper, Red Star.

These lectures are subsequently worked up into the compulsory indoctrination lectures for troops, carried in the 'Political Studies' section of Communist of the Armed Forces, and into articles recommended for officers. The best works each year are nominated for the annual Frunze Prize, and in early March the jury sometimes makes known those authors and works which have won this distinction.

This, in rather simplified form, summarizes the way in which military doctrine is formulated and disseminated in the Soviet Union.

FOOTNOTES

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27. Ibid., p. 39.

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30. Ibid., p 42-26.

31. Ibid., p. 46.

32. Pravda, June 17, 1970.

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34. The Party Worker's Guide, Politizdat, Moscow, 1968. Pp. 251-52.

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36. 50 Years, op. cit., pp. 199,256 and 478.

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42. Sokolovskiy, op. cit., p. 433.

43. Kozlov, op. cit., p. 32.

44. Petrov, op. cit., p 444.

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51. Rotmistrov, P.A., For Those Who Want to Study in Military Schools and Academies, Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1968. p. 158.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A.

MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, XXIII CONGRESS CPSU (1966)

In 1966, the Central Committee had fifteen members and twenty candidates for membership who were marshals, generals or admirals. There were altogether 195 members and 165 candidate members on the Central Committee. (Candidates sit in on the Committee's deliberations but do not vote. Vacancies among the members can only be filled by candidate members.) The Minister of Defense and all his deputies were selected as members at the time of the XXIII Party Congress in 1966. There have been a number of deaths and advancements since that time. Military representation on the Central Committee and the positions of the men at the time they were selected in April, 1966, and on the eve of the XXIV Party Congress, March, 1971 were as follows:

Members:

1. Minister of Defense
   (Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, now deceased)

2. 1st Deputy Minister of Defense/Commander in Chief Warsaw Pact Forces
   (Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko, now Minister of Defense)

3. 1st Deputy Minister of Defense/Chief of the General Staff
   (Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov, same position)

4. Chief of the Main Political Administration
   (General of the Army A.A. Yepishev, same position)

5. Deputy Minister of Defense/ CinC Strategic Rocket Troops
   (Marshal of the Soviet Union N.I. Krylov, same position)

6. Deputy Minister of Defense/ CinC of the Navy
   (Admiral of the Fleet S.G. Gorshkov/ now Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union and in the same position)

7. Deputy Minister of Defense/ CinC of the Air Forces
   (Chief Marshal of Aviation K. A. Vershinin, now a general inspector)

8. Deputy Minister of Defense/Chief of the Rear
(Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Kh. Bagramyan, now a general inspector)

9. Deputy Minister of Defense/ Inspector General
(Marshal of the Soviet Union K.S. Moskalenko, same position)

10. Commander of the Moscow Military District
(General of the Army A.P. Beloborodov, now an invalid)

11. Commander of the Kiev Military District
(General of the Army I.I. Yakubovskiy, now Marshal of the Soviet Union and 1st Deputy Minister of Defense/CinC Warsaw Pact Forces)

12. Chief of Civil Defense
(Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I. Chuykov, same position)

13. General inspector
(Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, same position)

14. 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff
(General of the Army P.F. Batitskiy, now Marshal of the Soviet Union, and CinC National Air Defense (PVO)

15. Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
(Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Ye. Voroshilov, now deceased)

Candidates for membership:

1. Deputy Minister of Defense for Combat Training
(General of the Army V.A. Penkovskiy, now deceased)

2. Supreme Commander Soviet Forces, Germany
(General of the Army P.K. Koshevoi, now Marshal of the Soviet Union and a general inspector)

3. Commander of the Leningrad Military District
(General Colonel S.L. Sokolov, now General of the Army and 1st Deputy Minister of Defense)*

4. Commander of the Belorussian Military District
(General Colonel S.S. Maryakhin, now General of the Army and Chief of the Rear Services)

5. Commander of the Turkestan Military District
(General Colonel N.G. Lyashchenko, now a General of the Army and Commander of the Central Asian Military District)

* Elevated to full membership in 1967.

6. Commander of the Transcaucasus Military District
(General of the Army A.T. Stuchenko)

7. Commander of the Volga Military District
(General Lieutenant N.V. Ogarkov)

8. Commander of the Pacific Ocean Fleet
(Admiral A.A. Amelko)

9. Commander of the Northern Fleet
(Admiral S.M. Lobov)

10. Chairman of DOSAAF
(General of the Army A.L. Getman)

11. Minister of Civil Aviation
(General Colonel of Aviation Ye. F. Loginov, now deceased)*

12. Minister of Communications
(General Colonel of the Signal Corps N.D. Psurtsev)

13. General inspector
(Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovskiy, now deceased)

14. General inspector
(Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D.Sokolovskiy, now deceased)

15. General inspector
(Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, now deceased)

16. General inspector
(Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Yeremenko, now deceased)

17. Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
(Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budenny)

18. Chief of the Political Administration of the Strategic Rocket Troops
(General Lieutenant I.A. Lavrenov, now deceased)

19. Chief of the Political Administration, Moscow Military District
(General Lieutenant K.S. Grushevoy)

20. 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff
(General of the Army M.I. Kazakov)

* Elevated to full membership in 1967.

APPENDIX B.

I. Military Academies:

1. Academy of the General Staff im. Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Ye. Voroshilov (Moscow)

2. Military Order of Lenin Red Banner Order of Suvorov Academy im. M. V. Frunze (Moscow)

3. Military-Political Order of Lenin Red Banner Academy im. V.I. Lenin (Moscow)

4. Military Engineering Order of Lenin and Suvorov Academy im. F.E. Dzerzhinskiy (Moscow)

5. Leningrad Military Engineering Red Banner Academy im. A.F. Mozhayskiy (Leningrad)

6. Military Artillery Order of Lenin Red Banner Academy im. M.I. Kalinin (Leningrad)

7. Military Order of Lenin Red Banner Academy of Armored Tank Troops im. Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy (Moscow)

8. Military Engineering Order of Lenin Red Banner Academy im. V.V. Kuybyshev (Moscow)

9. Military Air Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Academy im. Yu.A.Gagarin (Monino, near Moscow)

10. Military Air Engineering Order of Lenin Red Banner Academy im. Prof. N. Ye. Zhukovskiy (Moscow)

11. Military Command Academy of Air Defense (PVO) (Kalinin)

12. Military Engineering Radiotechnical Order of the Patriotic War Academy of Air Defense (PVO) im. Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov)

13. Military Red Banner Academy of Chemical Defense (Moscow)

14. Military Order of Lenin Red Banner Academy of Communications (Leningrad)

15. Military Order of Lenin Academy of the Rear and Transport (Leningrad)

16. Military Naval Order of Lenin and Ushakov Academy (Leningrad)

17. Military Medical Order of Lenin Red Banner Academy im. S.M. Kirov

II. Special Schools:

1. Military Institute of Foreign Languages (Moscow)

2. Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense (Moscow)

3. 'Vystrel' Higher Officers' Course im. Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov (nr. Moscow)

III. Higher Military Schools: (1971)

1. Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School

2. Armavir Higher Military Aviation Red Banner School of Pilots of National PVO Troops

3. Baku Higher Combined Arms Command School im. Supreme Soviet Azerbaidzhan SSR

4. Balashov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots

5. Barnaul Higher Military Aviation School of Pilots

6. Blagoveshchensk Higher Tank Command Red Banner School im. Marshal of the Soviet Union K.A. Meretskov)

7. Borisoglebsk Higher Military Aviation School of Pilots

8. Voroshilovgrad Higher Military Aviation School of Navigators im. Proletariat of the Donbass

9. Higher Naval Engineer Order of Lenin School im F.E. Dzerzhinskiy (Leningrad)

10. Higher Naval Order of Lenin Red Banner Order of Ushakov School im. M.V. Frunze (Leningrad)

11. Higher Naval School of Underwater Cruising im. Lenin's Komsomols (Leningrad)

12. Higher Naval School of Radioelectronics im. A.S. Popov (Leningrad)

13. Higher Military Engineer-Technical Red Banner School (Leningrad)

14. Gor'kiy Higher Military Command School of Communications

15. Far East Higher Combined Arms Command School im. Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovskiy (Blagoveshchensk)

16. Donetsk Higher Military-Political School of Engineer Troops and Signal Corps

17. Yeysk Higher Military Aviation Order of Lenin School of Pilots im. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Pilot Cosmonaut USSR V.M. Komarov

18. Zhitomir Higher Zenith Rocket Command Red Banner School of Air Defense im. Lenin's Komsomols

19. Kazan' Higher Command Engineer School

20. Kazan' Higher Tank Command Red Banner School im. Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR

21. Kaliningrad Higher Military Engineer Command Order of Lenin Red Banner School im. A.A. Zhdanov

22. Kaliningrad Higher Naval School

23. Kamenets-Podolskiy Higher Military Engineer Command School

24. Caspian Higher Naval Red Banner School im. S.M. Kirov

25. Kacha Higher Military Aviation Order of Lenin Red Banner School im. A.F. Myasnikov

26. Kemerovo Higher Military Command School of Communications

27. Kiev Higher Artillery Engineer Order of Lenin Red Banner School im. S.M. Kirov

28. Kiev Higher Naval Political School

29. Kiev Higher Military Engineer Twice Red Banner School of Communications im. M.I. Kalinin

30. Kiev Higher Engineer-Aviation Military School of the VVS

31. Kiev Higher Engineer Radiotechnical School of Air Defense

32. Kiev Higher Combined Arms Command Twice Red Banner School im. M.V. Frunze

33. Kiev Higher Tank Technical School

34. Kolomna Higher Artillery Command Order of Lenin Red Banner School im. October Revolution

35. Kostroma Higher Military Chemical Command School

36. Kurgan Higher Military-Political Aviation School

37. Lvov Higher Military-Political School of the Soviet Army and Navy

38. Leningrad Higher Artillery Command Order of Lenin Red Banner School im. Red October

39. Leningrad Higher Naval Engineer School

40. Leningrad Higher Military Political School of Air Defense (PVO)

41. Leningrad Higher Military Topography Command Red Banner Order of Red Star School

42. Leningrad Higher Zenith Artillery Command School

43. Leningrad Higher Combined Arms Command Twice Red Banner School im. S.M. Kirov

44. Leningrad Higher Order of Lenin Red Banner Command School of Railroad Troops and Military Communication im. M.V. Frunze

45. Minsk Higher Engineer Zenith Rocket School of Air Defense (PVO)

46. Minsk Higher Radiotechnical School National PVO Troops

47. Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command Order of Lenin Red Banner School im. Supreme Soviet RFSFR

48. Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms School

49. Novocherkassk Higher Military Command Red Banner School of Communications im. Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D.Sokolovskiy

50. Odessa Higher Artillery Command Order of Lenin School im. M.V. Frunze

51. Omsk Higher Combined Arms Command Twice Red Banner School im. M.V. Frunze

52. Omsk Higher Tank Technical Order of Red Star School

53. Ordzhonikidze Higher Combined Arms Command Twice Red Banner School

54. Orenburg Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots im. I.S.Polbin

55. Orenburg Higher Zenith Artillery Command Red Banner School im. G.K. Ordzhonikidze

56. Penzensk Higher Artillery Engineer Order of Red Star School

57. Perm Higher Command Engineer School

58. Poltava Higher Military Command School of Communications

59. Poltava Higher Zenith Artillery Command Red Banner School im. General of the Army N.F. Vatutin

60. Pushkin Higher Command Order of Red Star School of Radio-electronics of PVO

61. Riga Higher Military Engineer Aviation School im. Ya. Alkenis

62. Riga Higher Command Engineer Red Banner School im. Marshal of the Soviet Union S.S. Biryuzov

63. Rostov Higher Command Engineer School im Chief Marshal of Artillery M.I. Nedelin

64. Ryazan' Higher Military Automotive Command Order of Red Star School

65. Ryazan' Higher Military Command School of Communications

66. Ryazan' Higher Airborne Command Twice Red Banner School im. Lenin's Komsomols

67. Samarkhand Higher Tank Command School

68. Saratov Higher Military Chemical Command School

69. Saratov Higher Command Engineer Red Banner Order of Red Star School im. Hero of the Soviet Union General Major A.I. Lizyukov

70. Sverdlovsk Higher Military Political Tank Artillery School

71. Sevastopol' Higher Naval Engineering School

72. Serpukhov Higher Command Engineering School im Lenin's Komsomols

73. Simferopol' Higher Military Political Building School

74. Smolensk Higher Zenith Artillery Command School

75. Stavropol' Higher Military Aviation School of Pilots and Navigators of Air Defense (PVO)

76. Stavropol' Higher Military Command School of Communications

77. Sumy Higher Artillery Command Twice Red Banner School im. M.V. Frunze

78. Syzran' Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots

79. Tambov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots im M.M. Raskova

80. Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command Red Banner Order of Red Star School im. V.I. Lenin

81. Tashkent Higher Tank Command Order of Lenin School im. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of Armored Troops P.S. Rybalko

82. Tbilisi Higher Artillery Command Red Banner School im. 26 Baku Commissars

83. Pacific Ocean Higher Naval School im. S.O. Makarov

84. Tomsk Higher Military Command Order of Red Star School of Communications

85. Tula Higher Artillery Command Order of Lenin School im. Tula Proletariat

86. Tyumen' Higher Military Engineering Command School

87. Ul'yanovsk Higher Military Technical School im. Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy

88. Ul'yanovsk Higher Military Command School of Communications im. G.K. Ordzhonikidze

89. Ul'yanovsk Guards Higher Tank Command Twice Red Banner Order of Red Star School im. V.I. Lenin

90. Ussuriysk Higher Military Automotive Command School

91. Khar'kov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots im. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union S.N. Gritsevets

92. Khar'kov Higher Command Engineering School

93. Khar'kov Guards Higher Tank Command School im. Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR

94. Khmel'nitskiy Higher Artillery Command School

95. Chelyabinsk Higher Military Aviation Red Banner School of Navigators im. 50 Years of the VLKSM

96. Chelyabinsk Higher Military Automotive Command School

97. Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School im. 50 Years of Great October

98. Cherepovets Higher Military Command School of Communications

99. Chernigov Higher Military Aviation School of Pilots im. Lenin's Komsomols

100. Black Sea Higher Naval School im. P.S. Nakhimov (Sevastopol')

101. Vilnius Higher Command Radiotechnical School of PVO

102. Engels Higher Zenith Rocket Command School of PVO

103. Yaroslavl Higher Zenith Rocket Command School of PVO

IV. Military Schools:

1. Achinsk Military Aviation Technical School

2. Vasil'kov Military Aviation Technical School im. 50 Years of Lenin's Komsomols

3. Military Technical School (Kaliningrad)

*4. Vol'sk Military School im. Lenin's Red Banner Komsomols

5. Voronezh Military Aviation Technical School

6. Gor'kiy Zenith Rocket School of Air Defense (PVO)

7. Gor'kiy Radiotechnical School National PVO

8. Daugavpils Aviation Technical School PVO im. Ya. Fabritsius

9. Daugavpils Military Aviation Radiotechnical School National PVO

10. Zhitomir Radiotechnical Red Banner School National PVO

11. Irkutsk Military Aviation Technical School im. 50 Years VLKSM

12. Kaliningrad Military Aviation Technical School

13. Kamyshin Military Building Technical School

14. Krasnoyarsk Radiotechncial School National PVO

15. Novosibirsk Military Building Technical School

16. Opochka Zenith Rocket School of Air Defense (PVO)

17. Opochka Radiotechnical School National PVO

18. Ordzhonikidze Zenith Rocket School of Air Defense (PVO)

19. Ordzhonikidze Radiotechncial School of National PVO

20. Perm' Military Aviation-Technical School im. Lenin's Komsomols

* Now the Vol'sk Higher Military School of the Rear im. Lenin's Komsomols

21. Pushkin Military Building-Technical School

22. Pushkin Radiotechnical Order of Red Star School National PVO

23. Riga Military Aviation-Technical School

24. Tambov Artillery Technical Red Banner School

25. Tambov Military Aviation-Technical Order of Lenin Red Banner School im. F.E. Dzerzhinskiy

26. Khabarovsk Command Technical School

27. First Khar'kov Military Aviation-Technical Red Banner School

28. Second Khar'kov Military Aviation-Technical School

29. Engel's Radiotechnical School of National PVO

30. Yaroslavl' Military School im. General of the Army A.V. Khrulev

31. Yaroslavl' Radiotechnical School of National PVO

32. Saratov Military Aviation School for Pilots

Appendix C: Higher Degrees of the Lenin Military-Political Academy

The Lenin Military-Political Academy is the only military academy which regularly announces dissertations of seekers of higher academic degrees. However the list is helpful in ascertaining authors who are primarily political. Many of the degree holders listed below also appear as authors of books, or as winners of Frunze Prizes. Some have even become noted in the West for being 'military dissidents' criticizing the Party, when the opposite is far more likely to be the case.

The titles of the dissertations are always listed. Many of them touch the USA and its activities one way or another, but unfortunately listing them all is beyond the scope of this present work. Note that a dozen or more officers receiving degrees come from East European communist countries or Mongolia.

The following officers defended their dissertation of the degree of DOCTOR OF SCIENCES in the subject listed: (from 1965)

Arakelyan, M.A.	Colonel	1967	History
Barabanshchikov, A.V.	"	1968	Pedagogy
Bedzhanyan, R.M.	"	1969	History
Dudkov, I.S.	"	1971	Philosophy
D'yachenko, M.I.	"	1969	Psychology
Dzyuba, Ya. S.	Colonel	1966	Philosophy
Fedenko, N.F.	Lt.Colonel	1970	Psychology
Iovlev, A.M.	Colonel	1968	History
Korablev, Yu. I.	"	1967	History
Korobeynikov, M.P.	"	1970	Psychology
Krupnov, S.I.	Colonel	1971	Philosophy
Kuz'min, G.V.	"	1967	History
Milovidov, A.S.	"	1965	Philosophy
Ponomaryev, N.A.	Lt.Colonel	1968	Philosophy
Popov, M.V.	Colonel	1967	Philosophy
Rybkin, Ye. I.	Lt.Colonel	1969	Philosophy
Savel'yev, V.M.	Colonel	1971	History
Seleznev, I.A.	Colonel	1966	Philosophy
Shurygin, A.P.	"	1968	History
Smirnov, P.S.	"	1967	History

DOCTOR OF SCIENCES: (con't)

Sulimov, Ye. F.	Colonel	1967	Philosophy
Tabunov, N.D.	Lt.Colonel	1969	Philosophy
Tikhonov, I.I.	Colonel	1968	Pedagogy
Tyushkevich, S.A.	"	1969	Philosophy
Ustimenko, V.A.	"	1971	History
Vazhentsev, I.A.	Colonel	1971	Philosophy
Volkogonov, D.A.	Lt.Colonel	1971	Philosophy

The following officers defended their dissertation of the degree of CANDIDATE OF SCIENCES in the subject listed: (from 1965)

Alekseyev, L.I.	Lt.Col.	1966	Philosophy	
Andreyanov, N.P.	"	1965	History	
Antipov, A.I.	Col.	1970	Pedagogy	
Artemov, Zh.L.	Lt.Col.	1968	History	
Babichev, P.N.	Col.	1967	Pedagogy	
Badmayev, B. Ts.	Major	1966	Pedagogy	
Bartenev, S.A.	Lt.Col.	1965	Economics	
Bazhenov, V.G.	Lt. Col.	1969	Philosophy	
Belin, A.S.	Lt. Col.	1968	History	
Beloglazov, N.V.	Major	1969	History	
Belov, M.V.	Major	1967	Philosophy	
Belyaev, A.A.	Capt.2 Rk	1967	Philosophy	
Beychek, E.	Major	1965	Philosophy	Czechoslovakia
Bezuglov, I.G.	Lt. Col.	1969	Pedagogy	
Belorutskiy, A.G.	Col.	1970	Philosophy	
Biryukov, Yu. M.	Lt.Col.Jst	1968	Jurisprudence	
Bobikov, A.F.	Lt. Col.	1967	Pedagogy	
Bogomolov, A.F.	Lt. Col.	1966	Philosophy	
Bokarev, V.P.	Lt. Col.	1970	History	
Bondarenko, V.M.	Lt. Col.	1965	Philosophy	
Chaldymov, N.A.	Major	1968	Philosophy	
Cherepanov, N.M.	Col.	1968	History	
Chliyants, A. Ya.	Lt. Col.	1969	History	
Danilenko, I.S.	Lt. Col.	1971	Philosophy	
Daunis, I.A.	Lt. Col.	1971	Philosophy	
Dement'yev, V.D.	Col.	1966	History	
Demin, B.P.	Lt. Col.	1970	History	
Derkach, V.I.	Lt. Col.	1970	History	
Dmitriyev, A.P.	Lt. Col.	1965	Philosophy	
Gatal, F.	Lt. Col.	1965	Pedagogy	Czechoslovakia
Gidirinskiy, V.I.	Capt.2 Rk	1970	Philosophy	
Gnatko, I. Ya.	Lt. Col.	1971	Philosophy	
Gofman, Yan	Col.	1965	History	Poland
Golubev, V.I.	Capt.2 Rk.	1967	History	
Gromakov, A.F.	Major	1970	History	

CANDIDATES OF SCIENCE: (con't)

Gubin, V.A.	Lt. Col.	1966	Pedagogy	
Ivanov, V.N.	Major	1968	Philosophy	
Kadomtsev, G.A.	Capt.2 Rk	1967	Philosophy	
Kadykov, V.V.	Lt.Col.	1967	Philosophy	
Kalashnikov, A.G.	Col.	1969	Pedagogy	
Kantor, Yu. N.	Col.	1970	Philosophy	
Karpushenko, V.I.	Col.	1971	Philosophy	
Kazantsev, G.N.	Lt. Col.	1971	Philosophy	
Khalipov, V.F.	Major	1965	Philosophy	
Khitrenko, M. Ya.	Lt.Col.	1965	Economics	
Khvatkov, G.N.	Lt.Col.	1968	Philosophy	
Kilin, I.A.	Lt.Col.	1971	Philosophy	
Kirichenko, M.S.	Col.	1970	Philosophy	
Kirshin, Yu. Ya.	Major	1967	Philosophy	
Kiryashov, N.I.	Lt.Col.	1966	Pedagogy	
Kitayev, N.I.	Lt.Col.	1970	Philosophy	
Kitov, A.I.	Lt.Col.	1967	Pedagogy	
Kobenko, A.A.	Lt.Col.	1971	Pedagogy	
Kontsev, A.I.	Col.	1966	History	
Korobov, V.I.	Lt.Col.	1968	Philosophy	
Korochkin, B.P.	Lt.Col.	1968	Pedagogy	
Korolev, V.D.	Capt.	1967	Economics	
Kosev, Y. K.	Col.	1970	History	Bulgaria
Kostikov, N.A.	Capt.3 Rk	1968	Philosophy	
Kostin, N.D,	Lt. Col.	1969	History	
Kotlyarov, V.G.	Lt.Col.	1967	Philosophy	
Kovalev, V.I.	Lt. Col.	1968	Pedagogy	
Krasikov, R.I.	Lt.Col.	1971	Philosophy	
Krugleyevsky, N.V.	Capt.2 Rk	1967	Pedagogy	
Kuchma, A. Ya.	Col.	1969	Philosophy	
Kudinov, A.N.	Lt.Col.	1969	History	
Kurchatov, L.I.	Lt.Col.	1970	History	
Kuzin, N.G.	Lt.Col.	1967	History	
Kuznetsov, N.I.	Lt.Col.Jst	1966	Jurisprudence	
Kvachuk, P.T.	Col.	1970	Economics	
Ladanov, I.D.	Maj.	1965	Pedagogy	
Lisenkov, N.M.	Col.	1970	History	
Lishak, V.K.	Lt.Col.	1967	Pedagogy	
Lobusev, S.A.	Lt.Col.	1970	History	
Logachev, V.G.	Lt.Col.	1969	Philosophy	
Login, V.T.	Major	1966	Philosophy	
Lugansky, N.I.	Lt.Col.	1969	Psychology	
Lutsenko, V.K.	Lt.Col.	1971	Pedagogy	
Lutskiy, Ye.F.	Col.	1969	Philosophy	
Lytov, B.V.	Major	1971	History	

CANDIDATES OF SCIENCE: (Con't)

Mal'tsev, N.A.	Lt.Col.	1970	History	
Merkulov, V.N.	Lt.Col.	1970	Philosophy	
Migolat'yev, A.A.	Lt.Col.	1967	Philosophy	
Mikhnushev, A.G.	Lt.Col.	1969	Pedagogy	
Minyushev, F.I.	Lt.Col.	1971	Philosophy	
Mitin, A.N.	Major	1966	Philosophy	
Molchanov, V.F.	Major	1971	Philosophy	
Molchanovskiy, V.F.	Lt.Col.	1970	Philosophy	
Molodtsygin, M.A.	Col.	1968	History	
Nikolov, Iv. T.	Col.	1970	Philosophy	Bulgarian
Novozhilov, M.L.	Lt.Col.	1969	Pedagogy	
Orobinsky, P.N.	Col.	1967	Philosophy	
Oropay, F. Ye.	Lt.Col.	1967	Philosophy	
Osyk, A.P.	Lt.Col.	1967	History	
Pagma, Dorzh	Major	1967	History	Mongolia
Pantyukhov, V.A.	Capt.2 Rk	1965	History	
Pavlov, A.P.	Lt.Col.	1967	Philosophy	
Pavlov, S.P.	Lt.Col.	1970	Philosophy	
Pokur, V.N.	Capt.2 Rk	1969	Philosophy	
Petlyakov, P.A.	Lt.Col.(r)	1969	History	
Petrov, A.M.	Col.	1967	History	
Plekhov, A.M.	Capt.2 Rk	1966	Philosophy	
Podobed, I.M.	Col.	1967	History	
Pomyanovskiy, E.	Col.	1966	Pedagogy	Poland
Pozharov, A.I.	Capt.2 Rk	1967	Economics	
Przhikryl, L.	Lt.Col.	1965	Pedagogy	Czechoslovakia
Pupko. A.E.	Eng.Maj.	1969	Philosophy	
Pustoshkin, V.V.	Lt.Col.	1966	Philosophy	
Radulov, G.A.	Col.	1968	Pedagogy	Bulgaria
Renzin, M.M.	Lt.Col.	1967	History	
Reznik, A. Sh.	Lt. Col.	1969	Philosophy	
Romanova, I.A.		1970	Pedagogy	
Rosenberg, M.L.	Lt. Col.	1968	History	
Roshchin, L.V.	Capt.2 Rk	1970	Philosophy	
Roshchupkin, S. Ya.	Col.	1967	History	
Rusinov, M.M.	Capt.2 Rk.	1970	Philosophy	
Ruzhin, V.I.	Capt.2 Rk.	1970	Pedagogy	
Safronov, B.V.	Maj.	1968	Philosophy	
Sakharov, V.R.	Lt.Col.	1969	Psychology	
Samborskiy, G.F.	Major	1971	History	
Sarychev, Ye. V.	Lt.Col.	1970	Philosophy	
Seregin, V.P.	Maj.Just.	1970	Jurisprudence	
Seyranyan, F.G.	Capt.	1971	History	
Sgrabilov, V.V.	Capt.2 Rk.	1966	Philosophy	
Shabanov, V.P.	Lt.Col.	1971	Philosophy	

CANDIDATES OF SCIENCE: (Con't)

Shapkin, M.V.	Lt.Col.	1970	History	
Shubinskiy, Ya. I.	Lt.Col.	1970	Philosophy	
Shulepov, S.K.	Col.	1969	History	
Shumikhin, N.A.	Capt.1 Rk.	1971	Philosophy	
Shumniy, A.V.	Lt.Col.	1966	Philosophy	
Shvets, V.S.	Lt.Col.	1967	Pedagogy	
Shvytkin, M.G.	Col,	1969	Pedagogy	
Skleznev, Ye.V.	Major	1969	History	
Skryl'nik, A.I.	Capt.2 Rk	1968	Philosophy	
Slepov, V. Ya.	Lt.Col.	1967	Pedagogy	
Snezhko, V.S.	Col.	1967	Philosophy	
Sokolov, V.A.	Lt.Col.	1970	Psychology	
Staribratov, G.K.	Col.	1966	History	Bulgaria
Starostin, M.P.	Col.	1970	Pedagogy	
Stolyarenko, A.M.	Capt.2 Rk.	1965	Pedagogy	
Strezhnev, V.V.	Major	1965	Pedagogy	
Sumbatyan, Yu. G.	Lt.Col.	1969	Philosophy	
Svetlishin, N.A.	Col.	1970	History	
Svoboda, N.K.	Lt.Col.	1967	Philosophy	
Tikhonov, M.I.	Capt.3 Rk.	1970	Philosophy	
Tovkes, I.S.	Col.	1970	History	
Tsvrchek, Ya.	Major	1965	Philosophy	Czechoslovakia
Tushentsov, L. Ya.	Lt.Col.	1966	History	
Vdovyuk, V.I.	Lt.Col.	1970	Pedagogy	
Vigdorchik, B.Ye.	Col.	1968	Philosophy	
Volkogonov, D.A.	Major	1966	Philosophy	
Volkov, A.F.	Eng.Maj.	1967	Philosophy	
Vorob'yev, K.A.	Capt.	1967	Philosophy	
Vorzhisnek, V.	Lt.Col.	1968	Pedagogy	Czechoslovakia
Vovk, V.S.	Major	1967	History	
Voytenko, S.P.	Lt.Col.	1967	History	
Vyalikov, P.F.	Lt.Col.	1970	History	
Yakushevskiy, A.S.	Lt.Col.	1971	History	
Yakushin, I.F.	Major	1967	History	
Yarotskiy, B.M.	Lt.Col.	1970	Philosophy	
Yefimov, S.M.	Capt.1 Rk	1968	History	
Zagorodnikov, N.A.	Lt.Col.	1967	Philosophy	
Zakharov, S.Ye.	Admiral	1969	History	
Zamorskiy, V.F.	Lt. Col.	1970	Philosophy	
Zapara, N.I.	Lt.Col.	1969	Philosophy	
Zarechin, S.U.	Lt.Col.	1971	Philosophy	
Zheleznyak, L.F.	Lt.Col.	1968	Pedagogy	
Zlatkov, L.V.	Lt. Col.	1970	Psychology	Bulgaria
Zlotnikov, Yu. Ya.	Major	1970	Philosophy	

APPENDIX D.

The following authors have written articles for the official lecture section of Communist of the Armed Forces. The lectures are designated for officers, generals and admirals studying various theoretical themes.

Abadzhan, A., Col. Cand. Hist. Sci.	#13	1963
Abdrakhmanov, M.	#3	1969
Abramovich, V.	#15	1963
Adenin, A., Col. Cand. Hist.Sci.	#13	1962
Alekseyev, V.,Col. Cand. Phil. Sci.	#1	1969
	#9	1970
Aleksashin, V.,Col. Cand. Phil. Sci.	#15	1967
Arkhipov, A.	#9	1962
Averchuk, S.,Vice Adl	#8	1962
Azovtsev, N., Col. Dr. Hist. Sci.	#16	1968
Babakov, A.,Col. Cand.Hist.Sci.	#19	1965
	#19	1968
"	#11	1969
Bartenev, S.,Lt.Col. Cand.Econ.Sci.	#22	1965
	#18	1967
"	#5	1968
"	#8	1969
"	#20	1970
Bigashev, A.	#6	1965
Bokarev, V. Eng.L/C Cand.Phil. Sci.	#9	1963
Boltin, Ye.,Gen.Maj. Professor	#6	1968
Bondarenko, V., L/C Cand.Phil. Sci.	#24	1968
	#21	1970
Bugayev, Ye. Cand. Hist. Sci.	#1	1969
Bul'ba, T. Cand. Econ. Sci.	#24	1964
Bychkov, T., Col.	#10	1962
Chegrincts, A., Col. Cand. Econ. Sci.	#5	1967
	#4	1968
Cheprakov, V. Dr. Econ. Sci.	#4	1966
Cherednichenko,M.,G/M Cand.Mil.Sci.	#7	1966
	#15	1968
Davydov, A., Gds Col. Cand.Hist.Sci.	#11	1962
Demidov, B., Capt.1st Rank Cand.Phil.Sci.	#5	1966
	#3	1969
Demin, V.	#6	1964
Dovbnya, N., Lt.Col. Cand.Hist.Sci.	#4	1968
Druyanov, L.	#6	1962
Dudinskiy, I. Dr. Econ.Sci.	#23	1964
Dudkov, I., Col.	#2	1965
Duzenko, B.,Lt.Col.-Col. Cand.Econ.Sci.	#23	1965
	#21	1966
D'yachenko, N.	#12	1964
Fedenko, N.,Lt. Col.	#4	1962
Filonov, A.	#1	1962
Galkin, N.,Col. Cand.Phil.Sci.	#12	1966
	#22	1966
Gavrilov, V., Lt.Col. Cand.Hist.Sci.	#15	1969
Glazov, V., Col.	#10	1961
"	#3	1964
"	#11	1965
Gol'dman,G., Col.	#2	1966
Golikov, S., Gen.Maj. Dr. Hist.Sci.	#11	1965
Golovko, N. Cand.Hist.Sci.	#4	1970
Gornyy,A., Gen.Lt. Just.	#2	1967
Gorshechnikov,I.,Col. Cand.Econ.Sci.	#18	1970
Grudinin, I.,Col. Dr. Phil. Sci.	#23	1963
	#3	1965
	#3	1966
Gusakovskiy, I.,Gen.Army	#1	1969
Il'in, S.	#6	1964
Inozemtsev, N. Cand. Hist. Sci.	#10	1961

Iovlev, A., Col.	#15	1963
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Isakov, F., Col.	#5	1969
Dr. Hist. Sci.		
Ivanov, V., Gen.Army	#12	1966
Karpenko, N., Col.	#16	1969
Karpov, G.	#5	1962
Kassirov, L.	#9	1962
Kazakov, D., Lt.Col.	#18	1965
Cand.Phil.Sci.	#24	1966
Khalipov, V.,Lt.Col.	#3	1967
Cand.Phil.Sci.	#9	1969
Kheyman, S.	#9	1966
Dr. Econ.Sci.		
Khitrenko, M.,Lt.Col.	#12	1963
Khotochkin,A., Col.	#7	1963
Khrustov, F.,Col.	#23	1968
Professor		
Kirillov,A. Col.	#19	1966
Cand.Phil.Sci.		
Kiselev,A., Col.	#13	1967
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Kizima,A.	#1	1965
Klimenko, A.,Eng.Col.	#10	1963
Cand.Tech.Sci.		
Klimov, A.	#18	1966
Kolesov, I. Col.	#23	1965
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Kondratkov, T., Maj.	#22	1962
Cand.Phil.Sci.		
Konoplev, V. Col.	#14	1966
Cand.Phil.Sci.		
Konyukhovskiy, V.Col.	#2	1968
Dr. Hist. Sci.		
Kopelev, A., Col.	#1	1963
Kornienko,A., Gen.Maj.	#24	1970
Dr.Econ.Sci.		
Korobeynikov, M.,Col.	#14	1965
Cand.Ped.Sci.		
Korolev, N.,	#2	1969
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Korolev,V., Capt.	#7	1968
Cand.Econ.Sci.		
Korotkov,S., Lt.Col.	#12	1968
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Korshunov,V.,Col.	#21	1964
Koryagin,A.	#2	1961
Cand.Econ.Sci.		
Kovalev, A.	#1	1964
Kovalev,I.,Gen.Lt.	#23	1967
Dr. Mil. Sci.		
Kozlov, N., Col.	#20	1968
Cand. Hist. Sci.		
Kozlov, S., Col.	#2	1961
"	#11	1961
Kozlov, V. Lt.Col.	#19	1967
Cand.Phil.Sci.	7,18,21	1968
Kravchun, N.,Capt.2nd Rank	#12	1962
Cand.Ped.Sci.		
Kristostur'yan,N.	#18	1969
Cand.Phil. Sci.	#1	1971
Kurskiy,A.	#2	1962
Kuz'menko, V.	#9	1965
Kuz'min, I.	#8	1964
Kuznetsov,Ya., Col.	#8	1968
Cand. Hist.Sci.		
Kuzovnikov,A.,Gen.Maj.	#8	1968
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Lakhtikov, M.	#22	1965
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Larionov, V., Col.	#22	1968
Cand.Mil. Sci.		
Lazutkin, Ye.	#22	1967
Cand.Econ.Sci.		
Lebedinskas, A.	#11	1967
Cand.Econ.Sci.		
Leont'yev, N. Gen.Maj.	#1	1963
Likhachev, F.	#5	1962
Lomov, N., Gen.Col.	#21	1965
Professor	#22	1966
Lukava, G. Lt.Col.	#14	1965
Cand.Phil. Sci.		
Lukonin, S., Col.	#5	1963
Cand.Phil.Sci.		
Lutskov,V.,Lt.Col.	#3	1966
Cand.Ped.Sci.		
Makeyev,P., Col.	#15	1963
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Maslennikov,I.,Capt.2nd Rk	#9	1968
Cand.Econ.Sci.		
Mel'nikov, M., Col.	#2	1966
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Meshcheryakov,M.	#4	1964
Miftiyev,G.,	#18	1964
Cand.Econ.Sci.		
Mikhaylov,I.,Col.Just.	#2	1967
Cand.Juri.Sci.		

Milovidov,A,Col.	#9	1967
Dr.Phil.Sci.	#7	1968
Mironov,N.,Gen.Lt.	#16	1964
Monin,M.,Col.	#9	1969
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Nikiforov,L.	#18	1966
Nikitin,Ye.,Gen.Maj.	#4	1968
Dr.Hist.Sci.		
Nosyr',I.,Capt.2nd Rk	#21	1963
Oblomskaya,I.	#1	1967
Cand.Econ.Sci.	#19	1969
Osipov,Ye.	#15	1964
Ovsyannikov,A.,Gen.Maj.	#12	1966
Padorin, Ya.,Col.	#20	1962
Ponomarev,N., Lt.Col.	#1	1966
Cand.Phil.Sci./Dr.	#24	1969
Platkovskiy,V.	#6	1961
Plekhov,A.,Capt.2ndRk	#1	1965
Cand.Phil.Sci.	#20	1969
Popov,M., Col.	#10	1965
Cand.Phil.Sci.		
Prilepskiy,D.,Col.	#22	1964
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Prusanov,I.,Col.	#3	1966
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Punanov,I.	#1	1962
Cand.Econ.Sci.	#12	1963
"	#18	1964
Puzik, V.,Capt.2ndRk	#4	1967
Cand.Phil.Sci.		
Radayev, V.	#1	1967
Cand.Econ.Sci.		
Rodin,V., Lt.Col.	#3	1963
Cand.Phil.Sci.	#4	1965
Ruban,M.,Capt.1st Rk	#1	1965
Cand.Hist.Sci.	#1	1970
Rubanov,A.,Col.	#3	1971
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Rut'kov,V. Col.	#7	1968
Rybkin, Ye. Lt.Col.	#7	1964
Cand.Phil.Sci.	#17	1965
Sakharov, Ye. Col.	#12	1966
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Savel'yev, V.,Col.	#5	1967
Cand.Mil.Sci.		
Savitskaya,R.	#7	1966
Cand.Hist. Sci.		
Sekistov, V., Col.	#12	1968
Dr.Hist.Sci.		
Seleznev,I., Col.	#6	1966
Dr.Phil.Sci.	#6	1970
Semenov, V.,	#23	1968
Dr.Phil.Sci.		
Semenov, V.,	#19	1969
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Sergeyev,V.	#4	1962
Sertsova,A.	#5	1962
Shatalin, M.	#6	1962
Shelyag, V. Rear Adl	#11	1966
Cand.Phil.Sci.		
Shemanskiy,P., Col.	#5	1967
Cand.Mil.Sci.		
Shishkov, A.	#18	1970
Shishlin, N.	#22	1969
Shutkin, M.,Lt.Col.	#11	1963
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Shutov, A.	#9	1971
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Sinyak, V., Col.	#18	1963
Cand.Mil.Sci.		
Sitnin, V.	#4	1971
Cand. Econ. Sci.		
Sivolobov, A.	#6	1969
Dr. Econ.Sci.		
Skatershchinkov, V.	#4	1963
Cand.Phil. Sci.		
Skryl'nik, A. Capt.1st Rk	#24	1968
Cand.Phil.Sci.	#23	1969
"	#24	1970
Slepov, L.	#2	1961
Dr. Hist.Sci.	#2	1969
Sokolov, P.	#1	1968
Cand. Econ. Sci.		
Sokolovskiy,V. Mar.Sov.Un.	#7	1966
Sulimov, Ye., Col.	#24	1962
Cand.Phil. Sci.	#14	1967
Sushko, N., Gen.Maj.	#16	1965
Cand. Phil. Sci.		
Sytov, L., Col.	#18	1969
Cand. Hist. Sci.		
Tabunov, N.,Col.	#9	1965
Cand. Phil. Sci.	#21	1969
Tatarchenko,A. Eng.Col.	#8	1967
Cand. Mil. Sci.		

Telyatnikov, G.,Lt.Col.	#24	1965
Cand.Phil.Sci.		
Tikhonenko,V.	#13	1964
Timofeyechev, M.,Col.	#12	1962
Cand.Hist.Sci.	#4	1969
Timorin, A., Maj.	#24	1962
Titov, A.	#22	1967
Tkachenko, G.,Col.	#24	1964
Trifonenkov,P.,Col.	#1	1966
Cand.Phil.Sci.		
Trushin, [illegible], Col.	#9	1968
Cand.Econ.Sci.	#9	1971
Tsemkalov, I.	#5	1967
Cand.Econ.Sci.		
Tulin, M.	#2	1965
Tyushkevich, S.,Col.	#4	1963
Cand. Phil. Sci.	#10	1964
"	#20	1966
Ul'yanov, P.	#3	1962
Cand. Econ.Sci.	#14	1968
Undasynov, I.	#4	1965
Uzen'yev, B.	#6	1961
Vare, V.,Col.	#18	1963
Cand. Mil. Sci.		
Vasin, V.	#15	1964
Velikina, R.	#20	1962
Velikovich, L.	#16	1962
Cand. Hist. Sci.		
Verkhovtsev, I.	#1	1962
Vinogradov, L.	#4	1965
Vlas'yevich, Yu.,Col.	#12	1967
Cand. Econ. Sci.		
Volkogonov, D., Maj.	#2	1966
Volkov, C.	#20	1969
Cand. Phil. Sci./Dr.	#22	1970
Vovk, S., Col.	#21	1968
Cand. Econ. Sci.		
Voznenko, V.,Gen.Maj.	#11	1966
Cand. Mil. Sci.	#6	1969
Yakushkin,V.,Col.	#10	1966
Cand. Hist. Sci.		
Yasyukov, M., Lt.Col.	#16	1963
Cand. Phil. Sci.	#14	1964
"	#1	1967
Yefimov, V.	#21	1966
Cand. Econ. Sci.		
Yelesin, N., Col.	#11	1962
Cand. Hist. Sci.		
Yeremin, A.	#18	1966
Yes'kov, G.,Lt. Col.	#7	1962
Cand.Hist.Sci.	#22	1964
"	#23	1965
Yevzerov, R.	#23	1968
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Zagladin, V.	#9	1966
Cand. Hist.Sci.	#6	1967
Zaytsev, A., Lt.Col.	#23	1970
Cand.Econ.Sci.		
Zharov, L.	#19	1969
Cand.Hist.Sci.		
Zubarev, V., Col.	#7	1969
Cand. Phil. Sci.		