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HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS OF UNDERGROUNDS IN INSURGENCIES

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
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PURPOSE

The objective of this study is to describe, on the basis of existing empirical information and current state of knowledge, the organizational, motivational, and behavioral characteristics of undergrounds in insurgent movements and to relate these characteristics to the total revolutionary structure, mission, and operations.

Particular emphasis has been placed on:

- (1) Describing underground organizations and relating them to the total insurgent organization.
- (2) Describing Communist uses of undergrounds and their role in Communist-dominated insurgencies.
- (3) Summarizing descriptive and empirical information on motives for joining, staying in, and defecting from underground organizations.
- (4) Describing certain underground administrative, psychological, and paramilitary operations, and noting the human factors which appear to be related to their success or failure.
- (5) Describing the organization and countermeasures used by governments to suppress or eliminate undergrounds.

SYNOPSIS

PART I. ORGANIZATION

The structure of an insurgent or revolutionary movement consists of a relatively small visible element (the guerrilla force) which is organized to perform overt armed operations, and a much larger clandestine, covert force (the underground). The underground carries on the vital activities of infiltration and political subversion; it establishes and operates shadow governments; and it acts as a support organization for the guerrillas.

An insurgent or revolutionary movement is defined as a subversive, illegal attempt to weaken, modify, or replace an existing governing authority through the protracted use or threatened use of force by an organized group of indigenous people outside the established governing structure.

An "underground" is defined as the clandestine, covert element of the insurgent movement. In the initial stages of an insurgency, the entire organization functions in a covert manner and is therefore underground. A long, careful preparation is required, with the underground exploiting dissatisfaction and discontent, to create a structure strong enough to support a

specialized organization for armed activity. Eventually, a dual structure is formed. One element conducts overt guerrilla activities while the other, the underground, continues its infiltration and political subversion, intensifying its shadow-government activities.

The guerrilla organization, when fully developed, is composed of a mobile main force structured along conventional military lines, and two paramilitary forces—a regional force and a local militia—which conduct limited actions and support the main force. The underground arm of the insurgent movement is usually pyramidally structured, from a broad base of cells, through branches, districts, states or provinces, to a national headquarters at the top.

An essential feature of most underground organizations is compartmentalization, designed to protect the organization's security. The cellular structure follows the underground "fail-safe" principle: if one element fails, the consequences to the whole organization will be minimal. The degree of compartmentalization and the number of cells established depend upon the size of the organization, the degree of popular support given to government forces, and the relative danger that security forces pose.

Generally, there are three types of underground cells: 1) the operational cell, usually composed of a leader and a small group of members who operate directly as a unit; 2) the intelligence cell, which undertakes espionage, infiltration, and intelligence-gathering activities and is highly compartmentalized, its leader directing his agents through an intermediary; and 3) the auxiliary cell, composed of part-time workers, often found in front groups. There are several common arrangements of cells. Parallel cells are often established to provide backup support in case primary cells are compromised. Another underground structure consists of a series of interlocking cells to carry out functions which require a division of labor, such as manufacturing weapons, acquiring supplies, and providing for escape and evasion. Cell size, usually 3 to 8 members, varies on the basis of cell function, the activities of the internal security forces, and the stage of organizational development.

To show how the organizational structure of undergrounds changes in protracted revolutions, it is useful to categorize phases in the evolution of conflict. The first phase is the clandestine organization phase in which the underground begins developing such administrative operations as recruiting, training cadres, infiltrating key government organizations and civil groups, establishing escape-and-evasion nets, soliciting funds, establishing safe areas, and developing external support. During this phase, cell size is kept small and the organization is highly compartmentalized.

The second phase is marked by a subversive and psychological offensive in which the underground employs a variety of techniques of subversion and psychological operations designed to add as many members as possible. Covert underground agents in mass organizations call for demonstrations and, with the aid of agitators, turn peaceful demonstrations into riots. Operational terror cells carry out selective threats and assassinations.

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In the third or expansion phase the organization is further expanded and mass support and involvement are crystallized. Front organizations and auxiliary cells are created to accommodate and screen new members.

During the militarization phase overt guerrilla forces are created. Guerrilla strategy usually follows a three-stage evolution. In the first stage, when guerrillas are considerably outnumbered by security forces, small guerrilla units concentrate on harassment tactics aimed at forcing the government to overextend its defense activity. The second stage begins when government forces are compelled to defend installations and territory with substantially larger forces. The third stage marks the beginning of the full guerrilla offensive of creating and extending "liberated areas." During all of these stages the underground acts as the supply arm of the guerrillas, in addition to carrying out propaganda, terrorist, sabotage, and other subversive activities. Crude factories are set up by the underground and raids are conducted to obtain supplies and weapons. Caches are maintained throughout the country and a transportation system is established. Finances are collected on a national and international basis. Clandestine radio broadcasts, newspapers, and pamphlets carry on the psychological offensive. The underground continues to improve its intelligence and escape-and-evasion nets.

In the fifth or consolidation phase the underground creates shadow governments. Schools, courts, and other institutions are established to influence men's minds and control their actions, and covert surveillance systems are improved to ensure positive control over the populace.

Although there are general similarities in the organization and development of all underground movements, the Communists have added important refinements to the strategy of revolutionary warfare. With the establishment of the Comintern, an international dimension was added to organization for subversion.

Since the days of Lenin, the Communists have stressed that successful revolutions must be led by professional Communist elites. Consequently, the party structure remains the controlling force throughout the insurgency, expanding and reorganizing as necessary.

Typically, the Communist Party has both open and covert organizations, based on cells and performing in a conspiratorial manner. The lower bodies of the party select representatives to serve on higher committees until, at the top, a central committee is formed. In turn, all lower committees are responsible for carrying out the decisions of the higher ones. In theory, each proposal is discussed at the lower levels of the party and representatives pass the decisions to higher levels until a final decision is made at the top. In practice, decisions generally flow from top to the bottom, with the lower levels permitted pro forma discussion of the decisions. Also in theory, the party is organized on the principle of collective leadership with all decisions agreed upon by the majority of officers at any particular committee level. In practice, however, it functions in a highly centralized manner, with all authority and command decisions coming from the top.

Institutionalized criticism and self-criticism sessions are characteristic of Communist organizations. The criticism sessions increase the efficiency of the party by subjecting its operations to constant review and revision, and by leading to normative behavior among its members.

Operating through mass organizations and "united fronts," Communists have found that a small group of highly disciplined individuals can achieve maximum effectiveness. The objective in infiltrating organizations with a mass character is to neutralize agencies which support the government, justify the insurgent cause, and mobilize mass support. In a united front, the Communists seek to consolidate and unite forces of discontent against the government, as well as to gain access to and control of groups not identified with the Communist position. The Communists have utilized the united front technique in most insurgencies, forming alliances with other political groups by offering them the organizational support of the Communist Party.

Front groups are used when the Communists are unable to infiltrate existing organizations or unite them in a mass front. These organizations usually espouse some worthy cause in order to get the support of respectable citizens, but the leadership remains firmly in the hands of the Communists.

The transition from a peacetime clandestine underground organization into a "national liberation" movement carrying on protracted revolutionary warfare involves a number of major organizational modifications. A dual structure of underground and guerrilla arms is set up, in which the Communists maintain interlocking positions of leadership.

One of the significant functions of the Communist underground is the establishment of "shadow governments." Usually initiated in towns and villages, shadow governments attempt to subvert government control at all levels, particularly at the grassroots level. New political institutions, instruments of control, and symbols of authority are created. Population control is maintained through multiple organizational membership and techniques of agitation and propaganda. Instruments of social force, such as courts and law enforcement agencies, are also used to coerce the doubters.

PART II. MOTIVATION AND BEHAVIOR

Various environmental factors are cited as having a relationship to the "causes" of insurgency. It has been suggested that a nation's stage of economic development, rural-urban composition, rate of illiteracy, or educational level, affect the occurrence, if not the outcome, of an insurgency. However, in a review of 24 insurgencies since 1946, it was found that none of these factors was related to either the outbreak or the outcome of insurgency. For instance, a country's relative stage of economic advancement, as measured by its gross national product per capita, had little relationship to the occurrence or the success or failure of insurgency.

While economic factors may be important in the context of local or regional situations, the gross national product is not a predictive indicator of incipient insurgency.

Insurgency involves only a small minority of a country's population as active participants and can be described as a low-intensity conflict. Most of the participants are members of the underground and perform their normal functions within the society along with their clandestine, covert activities. A number of characteristics of insurgency members have been identified. Not surprisingly, men have been found to constitute the majority of both the underground and guerrilla organizations, although women have been active in both organizations, especially in the underground. Both in age and occupation, members reflect the general makeup of the country.

The motivation for joining an underground movement is typically complex. Usually, persons join because of a combination of interrelated factors, most frequently personal and situational in nature. Ideological or political reasons seem to have inspired only a small percentage and propaganda promises appear to have had little effect. Although coercion alone is only a small factor, coercion coupled with other positive incentives are significant factors. Government persecution, real or imagined, also leads people to join the insurgents.

An insurgent's motives for remaining in the underground seem often to be quite different from his motives for joining. He develops loyalties toward friends and comrades, or may be influenced by indoctrination and other propaganda. Close surveillance and threats of retaliation often make it difficult to withdraw from the movement or to defect to the government forces. Simple inertia may keep him in the movement.

An insurgent may withdraw either by ceasing to participate in the movement or by defecting to the government side. Once he is disaffected he seeks the easiest and safest avenue of escape. If circumstances are such that he can simply leave, he is likely to do that. If the possibility of defecting arises first and it is relatively easy and safe, he may defect. Insofar as the guerrilla part of the movement is concerned, situational and personal factors are more often involved than ideological ones in a decision to withdraw or defect. Once the individual is disaffected, he usually begins to rationalize and finds many flaws in the goals, organization, or individuals involved in the movement. Government appeals and offers of rehabilitation programs, when known, tend to be an influencing factor in defection.

Ideology is an important factor in unifying the many divergent interests and goals among an underground movement's membership. As a common set of interrelated beliefs, values, and norms, ideology is used to manipulate and influence the behavior of individuals within the group. Ideology also offers a way for individuals to reduce the ambiguity and uncertainty in their social and physical environment and give meaning and organization to unexplained events.

Group membership serves to satisfy several types of individual needs: patriotism, the sense of "belonging," recognition, and enhancement of self-esteem. Strong organizational ties

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protect an individual from external threats and offer him an opportunity to achieve economic or political goals not otherwise attainable. Group membership does a great deal to condition and mold an individual's behavior. For example, group membership in an underground provides a set of standards, so that an individual always knows implicitly what is right or wrong, what can or cannot be done. Underground membership structures and narrows an individual's exposure to perception of his environment. Because his view of life, of events, and of news is colored by his feelings and behavior, group organization also conditions attitudes and perceptions.

A variety of factors affect the degree of influence underground membership exercises over individuals. Small cells or working groups exercise more effective control than large ones. Frequency of meetings and length of membership affect the development of intimate relationships. The more highly structured the underground and the more clearly defined the relationships and duties, the greater the influence exerted.

Underground movements have been described as "normative-coercive" organizations, employing both persuasive group pressures and overt coercion. They are normative in that institutional norms and mores secure behavioral conformity to certain rules and group membership satisfies certain individual needs and desires. However, coercive power is applied through the threat or application of physical sanctions, or through the deprivation of certain satisfactions.

The Communists, through emphasis on ideology, democratic centralism, criticism and self-criticism techniques, the committee system and the cell structure, have created a high degree of cohesiveness. Furthermore, their techniques seem to be effective in providing informational feedback to the leadership. The criticism-self-criticism sessions particularly serve to reinforce those normative patterns of behavior established during indoctrination.

Clandestine and covert behavior is an important feature of underground practices. By establishing behavior patterns that avoid drawing attention to the underground movement, the underground organization is protected from detection. By appearing normal and inconspicuous, the underground member makes it difficult for security forces and other citizens to detect his membership in a subversive organization.

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Clandestine behavior consists of actions in which the underground member endeavors to conceal his involvement. Covert behavior attempts to conceal and cover underground activities from observation. Various techniques have been employed by the underground to achieve secrecy. Organizational practices, such as cellular structures, false fronts, and false records and communications, disguise underground operations. Certain covert communication practices such as disguised couriers, mail-drops, and various signals are also used. Members of the underground also capitalize upon customs and norms which people accept without question, or play upon human susceptibility to authority or suggestion, to effectively disguise their operations and evade police interference.

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PART III. ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

Effective underground administrative operations are essential for the survival and expansion of an insurgent movement; unless its recruitment, training, and financial needs are serviced, it can neither function nor grow. Operating in a potentially or actually hostile environment, underground organizations face the requirement of balancing the need for cautious, normal administrative functions against the risks and vulnerabilities that inevitably accompany any aggressive action. To achieve this, underground leaders must adapt administrative techniques to the changing, but always risky, situations of insurgency.

In underground recruitment, for example, the means as well as the kind of individual recruited depend upon the movement's stage of development and the political-military situation. During the early phase, primary attention is given to selecting a well-disciplined cadre. The essential need is for tight security; hence, recruitment is highly selective and recruits are thoroughly screened. Various tests and oaths are required of recruits to commit them to the movement and confirm their reliability. In later phases, as the insurgency gains in organizational sophistication, emphasis is placed on expanding the size of the multiple elements of the movement and increasing its mass support from outside. Through either persuasion or coercion, the original underground organization attempts to create a parallel mass organization. Persuasion comes through propaganda or programs to assist the people, such as helping villagers harvest the crops, build schools, etc. Once a feeling of indebtedness is created, the underground asks for help in return and may recruit or "draft" men. Coercion may vary from simple "armed invitation" to the impressment of "volunteers." Indirect techniques of mass recruitment include group pressure and suggestion. Other methods, such as alienating or compromising an individual vis-à-vis the government so that he has no other alternative but to join or support the underground, are also used. The use of indigenous "keymen" within a town or an organization is another effective underground technique. Appeals to join the underground capitalize upon the love of power, pressure from friends, anticipation of future rewards, hatred, or ideology and patriotism.

The training of special underground cadres is an essential corollary to recruitment. The underground seeks to maximize its effectiveness by preparing recruits in techniques of clandestine behavior, agitation, subversive activities, terror, sabotage, intelligence methods, and guerrilla warfare. Indeed, many underground movements have established special schools to give recruits both practical and ideological training. The International Communist movement has long stressed the essential role of training, and its schools—from the Moscow Lenin School of the 1920's to the Castro-Cuban training camps of the 1960's—provide some of the best examples of education tailored to support subversion. They have sought not only to prepare

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trainees in the art of underground and guerrilla tactics, but to imbue them with a sense of dedication and ideological purpose to ensure their carrying out directives even when the leadership has no direct control. To support this kind of training, literature such as Lenin's "What Is To Be Done?" or Mao Tse-tung's writings are used because they provide an essential link between the practical and the ideological.

Underground finance is another essential element of insurgent administrative operations. The underground may tap external sources, such as foreign governments or fraternal groups, or they may raise funds within their own country. They may persuade people to give voluntary contributions, or they may make legal or illegal sales of goods. If voluntary sources are inadequate, the underground frequently resorts to coercive methods, such as robberies, extortion, or, in areas they control, imposition of taxes. People contribute to the underground for a variety of reasons: ideological allegiance to the cause, social pressure, present or future protection, chance of personal gain, or a desire to be on the winning side.

PART IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

In an insurgency, neither victory nor warfare can be conceived solely in military terms. Few insurgencies have been won or lost by large, decisive military battles. Usually some combination of military, political, and social means is used. Much of the political leverage involved in favorable settlements is derived from effective underground psychological operations. Through the techniques of psychological operations the underground attempts to produce a social-political climate favorable to its control. To the underground, and especially the Communist underground, influencing opinions and attitudes is not an end in itself, but a means to enhance their organizational work among broad elements of society. Favorable attitudes and good intentions alone do not create revolutions: organization is necessary for effective action.

Propaganda and agitation (in Communist jargon called "agitprop") are the principal forms of underground psychological operations. Propagandists and agitators identify their appeals with society's recognized values so as to entice those who accept these widely held views to accept the underground. The tools of the underground propagandist include most techniques of the mass media—newspapers, leaflets, radio—and also stress word-of-mouth communication. It is here that the agitator in Communist movements plays a central role: it is his task to overcome the inevitable barriers in communication and to see that the message reaches the target audience in a credible and meaningful form. Appeals are usually emotional and may take the form of threats. They are directed at self-interest and prejudices. The agitator must not only convince his audience but must convert attitudes into mass action, dislodge complacency, and intensify dissatisfaction. He encourages his audience to respond and provide feedback, and uses group beliefs, values, and norms to win support through social pressure.

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To further alienate or crystallize public opinion against a government, the underground may advocate and organize passive resistance. Passive resistance implies a large, unarmed group whose activities capitalize upon existing social norms in order to provoke action by government security forces that will serve to alienate large segments of public opinion. The passive resister seeks to persuade the populace to withdraw its support and cooperation from a government; his weapon in this persuasion is his ability to suffer—to martyr himself—and demonstrate by his suffering that the government is tyrannical and unfit.

Passive resistance takes various forms and employs various nonviolent techniques. It may use attention-getting devices such as demonstrations, mass meetings, picketing, or, at another level, techniques of noncooperation such as absenteeism, and civil disobedience. It is difficult for security forces to effectively control passive resisters. The effectiveness of passive resistance, particularly civil disobedience, rests on securing widespread compliance. In gaining this popular support, passive resistance provides strong social coercion to influence the undecided or uncommitted to join the underground movement.

The underground, however, seldom relies solely on the attractiveness of its appeals or on the persuasiveness of its goals. When other techniques of psychological operations fail, it brings coercive means to bear. Terrorism represents a strong negative sanction to ensure that recalcitrant individuals comply with the underground's demands. Terrorism is used to support other underground efforts such as propaganda and agitation, and is always used with an understanding of its psychological effects and potential.

Terror may best be described as a state of mind that varies in effect and degree among individuals. It captures the attention of the individual and makes him aware of and vulnerable to the terrorists' demands. The utility of terrorism for an underground movement is multifarious: it may be used to disrupt government control of the population; it may demonstrate underground strength and attract popular support; it may suppress cooperation with the government by "collaborators"; and may be used to protect the security of the clandestine organization.

10 Three types of terrorism can be distinguished: unorganized, support, and specialized. In 10
9 spite of rules against unsanctioned acts of terror, they do occur. These acts are unorganized 9
8 and are committed by groups or individuals during underground operations. Support groups, 8
7 however, are sanctioned to enforce underground directives and threats through the use of 7
6 terrorism. For selective targets, specialized terror units made up of "professionals" are 6
5 employed. 5

4 Another technique used by the underground to alienate the populace from governments is 4
3 the subversive manipulation of crowds. The crowds that participate in civil disturbances are 3
2 particularly vulnerable to manipulation by a relatively few underground agitators who direct 2
1 them toward emotional issues and arouse them against authority. Usually a subversively manip- 1
ulated civil disturbance evolves in four phases: (1) the pre-crowd phase, where the subversive

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elements organize, train, and plan for their action; 2) in the crowd phase, a group largely composed of individuals who have been conditioned either by subversive manipulation or other events is assembled; 3) the civil disturbance phase, when agents maintain emotional excitement, create martyrs, and focus the riot situation; and 4) the pos.-disturbance phase, when the emotions aroused are capitalized upon by calling strikes, spreading violence, or creating united front parties and pressure groups.

In the subversive manipulation of crowds, as when dealing in propaganda, agitation, passive resistance, and terrorism, psychological operations are concerned not only with the "objective" world about an individual but with the world as seen by the individual. Although the "real" world or the "facts" are important in psychological operations, what matters most is what people believe and can be made to believe. The intent of the underground in crowds and riots is to focus, direct, manipulate, and create beliefs which will crystallize support for the underground.

PART V. PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS

The underground performs a variety of paramilitary activities. The political and armed activities of an insurgency overlap both in function and in personnel. Usually inferior in numbers and resources to the government security forces, the underground must use every opportunity and capitalize upon every advantage in undertaking paramilitary operations. This requires careful planning of underground missions involving the development of contingency plans, rehearsals of the mission in advance, and careful study of enemy vulnerabilities. Techniques used by undergrounders to exploit vulnerabilities in planning missions include infiltration, surprise, deception, diversion, and creation of fatigue through continuous harassment and provocation. Many other factors are also considered by the underground leaders in planning missions, from situational factors such as the most strategic time of day to human factors of enemy morale and confidence.

Adequate intelligence estimates are, of course, prerequisites to effective planning of underground missions. Intelligence allows underground operations planners to establish the necessary priorities among enemy targets and to expose, create, and take advantage of security vulnerabilities. Intelligence is also critical in the planning of psychological operations; it reveals the attitudes, grievances, and specific problems of a target group so that propaganda themes and agitation slogans may be appropriately tailored. Indeed, one of the first tasks facing an underground movement is the establishment of an adequate intelligence network, most frequently on a cellular basis. Underground intelligence relies on both reconnaissance and on the cooperation of the "part-time" members in towns or villages. The use of "innocents"—

children, old men, and women—is particularly common in providing intelligence about the movement of government security forces.

The most common paramilitary operations are ambushes and raids. Because ambushes involve a surprise attack from a concealed position on terrain of the attackers' choosing, they are as popular and easy to launch as they are devastating and difficult to counter. Not surprisingly, the ambush plays a part in 60 to 70 percent of Communist armed action. Raids and ambushes are useful to the underground in acquiring weapons and supplies, harassing and demoralizing government forces, delaying or blocking the movement of troops and supplies, destroying or capturing government personnel or installations, and undermining confidence among the populace in the power of government. Tactics in ambushes and raids stress detailed intelligence reports, careful planning, and a boldness of imagination that uses the element of surprise to its best advantage.

Unless security forces obtain complete intelligence on every move of the underground, it is largely impossible to prevent ambushes and raids. However, it is possible to forestall or at least lessen the effectiveness of ambushes. Counterambush strategies usually emphasize that: 1) security forces should not follow consistent patterns of movement; 2) reaction of troops must be swift and automatic and soldiers should be trained to "rush through" an ambush; 3) effective outside communications should be maintained at all times so that reinforcements may be called; 4) ambushers should be aggressively pursued; and 5) rural activity should be carefully observed and intelligence strengthened.

Sabotage is another principal underground paramilitary activity having as its objective the destruction or damage of resources important to the enemy's military effort. In general, underground sabotage falls into two categories: strategic and general. Strategic sabotage involves hitting targets of key importance by specially trained units in carefully planned missions. General sabotage, on the other hand, is directed at nonstrategic targets with the purpose of encouraging similar acts by the populace, as well as hampering the government in attaining its military capacity. Such acts serve to propagandize the underground movement's strength and popular support as well as to further commit the citizenry to its cause.

Essential to the planning of underground paramilitary operations are methods of escape and evasion. Underground escape-and-evasion networks usually consist of established escape routes and hideouts—"safe houses" for temporary stopover or permanent refuge. Care is taken to provide necessary supplies and cover stories for all hideouts. To protect the secrecy of the escape-and-evasion network, all strangers seeking assistance are carefully screened and interrogated. A system of hideouts is also a critical feature of any underground movement's effort to infiltrate outside persons into a country, such as North Vietnamese agents into South Vietnam. Usually such infiltration networks rely upon hideouts in remote, rural areas.

PART VI. GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES

The most effective countermeasure is the use of immediate, overpowering force to repress the first signs of insurgency or resistance. Nations with a representative or constitutional form of government are often restrained from such action by moral, legal, and social considerations, and often attempt to combat the first recognized signs of underground movement through social, economic, or political reforms. All too frequently, however, these positive programs fail, either because of the advanced stage of the underground movement, or because of inadequate resources or time. A government must then organize for more direct, increasingly forceful countermeasures.

As an insurgency gains momentum and government countermeasures move from simple police action to involvement of the armed services, a new centralized command structure is generally required for effective counterinsurgency action. Care must be taken, however, to leave area commanders a certain amount of tactical autonomy to permit swift and aggressive counteraction. Frequently a unified intelligence organization is also established so that intelligence information may be processed rapidly and efficiently, with little duplication of effort. The multiple system of intelligence organization, in which a number of separate intelligence groups work simultaneously, has the advantage of being less vulnerable to compromise by underground infiltration than the unified type.

The character of modern underground and guerrilla activity has added a new dimension to intelligence functioning in counteraction. In counterinsurgent warfare the enemy is elusive and targets are transitory. As a consequence, rapid response to intelligence is of crucial importance. Also, the kind of intelligence materials required for action is different. Counterinsurgency intelligence must provide long-range intelligence on the stable factors in the insurgent situation, such as demographic factors, nature of the underground organization, characteristics of those recruited, and the kinds of appeals made, as well as short-run information on specific individuals—biographies of underground suspects, their families, contacts—and on the behavior patterns of the underground. In counterinsurgency much intelligence, particularly contact intelligence in the rural areas where the underground thrives, is based upon informants—either paid, voluntary, or infiltrated agents. Cordon-and-search operations have frequently been used in gathering intelligence where the populace does not cooperate for fear of reprisal from the underground. Surveillance and interrogation provide another source of intelligence.

Defection programs have also played a significant role in the outcome of several counterinsurgency efforts. The psychological impact of defection on other members of the underground is significant and, in addition, defectors may provide considerable intelligence data. Defectors usually decide to defect because of situational factors—from certain long-range factors such as

an estimate of the probable outcome of the insurgency, as well as from such short-range factors as disagreement with superiors or adverse living conditions. Because many undergrounders and guerrillas are coerced into joining the movement, or join because of highly specific grievances, they can be persuaded to defect if they can be convinced that they will receive good treatment. At the point of decision, the defector is most concerned about the future and fear of possible retaliation. The government's goal should be to communicate with potential defectors, telling them of safe systems and known procedures for defecting. In organizing defection programs, a concerted effort must be made to coordinate psychological operations with other programs. If the government says that defectors will be given fair treatment and then government soldiers or police shoot or punish men who surrender, confidence in the government's promises will obviously be diminished.

Population control is an essential feature of counterinsurgency action. It seeks to accomplish two different, yet integrally related, countermeasure objectives: to restrict the movement of the underground and to separate it both physically and psychologically from the populace. The principal techniques of population control are collective-responsibility tactics, resettlement and relocation programs, registration requirements, and food controls. In addition to these more common population-control techniques, the Communists have developed what has been dubbed the "total social" approach featuring the simultaneous and coordinated use of social, economic, ideological, and political-controls.

The general target for civic action is the vast majority of the populace which does not officially participate in the insurgency. There are many methods by which the government may effect civic action programs: it can strengthen the social welfare services to help victims of the underground, expand public health and educational programs, aid agricultural areas, stimulate economic development, and control food prices.

Underground organizations have a number of vulnerabilities which security forces can take advantage of to destroy the movement. The high degree of compartmentalization makes the underground organization vulnerable to infiltration. It is also possible for security forces to play upon the fear of infiltration held by most undergrounders. If the underground can be made to believe that they have been infiltrated, their immediate response is to increase security measures and reduce their operational activities. The reduction in underground activities diminishes the effect of the constant pressure of underground terrorism and agitation.

Since underground communications are organized on a fail-safe basis, once a link is detected it may be placed under constant surveillance in order to trace the other links, perhaps to the underground leadership. In certain situations some underground work, such as finance, training, and supply, may be carried on outside of the country to reduce the possibility of detection and surveillance. Cooperative efforts with other nations or increased border checks can be effective in detecting undergrounders while they are relatively in the open. - It is most

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important in counterinsurgency operations to keep in mind that even when the guerrilla force is defeated the movement is not destroyed until all of the clandestine underground cells have been detected and destroyed.

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FOREWORD

The dynamics of social change are of prime concern for many social scientists. However, in the desire to understand the broad characteristics and societal impact of revolutionary movements, we often neglect the study of the human element involved in them.

Those ideologists who write revolutionary dogma or those who report the history of great revolutions speak of the masses as if they were a living being. But what of the individuals that make up the mass? What are the wants and aspirations that lead individuals to join, to remain in, or to leave these underground movements? How are law-abiding citizens tempted to the dangerous life of the underground? And, once committed, what influences them to stay? What rules of behavior and decision enable them to survive such a hazardous existence?

To understand the individual, his motivations, his behavior, and the pressures that society places upon him is at the heart of the problem of social change. The battleground of insurgency has been described as the hearts and minds of men. There the understanding of the human element is basic to understanding the dynamics of social change.

The information synthesized in this report is but an initial step in the attempt to understand the motivation and behavior of those in underground and insurgent movements.

Comments of readers are most welcome.

Theodore R. Vallance

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PREFACE

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies is the second product of SORO research on undergrounds. The first, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, was a generalized description of the organization and operations of underground movements, with seven illustrative cases. The present study provides more detailed information, with special attention to human motivation and behavior, the relation between the organizational structure of the underground and the total insurgent movement, and Communist-dominated insurgencies.

Because an understanding of the general nature of undergrounds is necessary to more detailed considerations, some of the information from the earlier study of undergrounds has been included in this report. Wherever possible, material from insurgency situations since World War II has been used. Occasionally, however, it was necessary to use information from studies of World War II underground movements in order to fill gaps about certain operations.

In the methodological approach it was assumed that confidence could be placed in the conclusions if data on underground operations and missions and similar data could be found in other insurgencies. An attempt was made to base conclusions on empirical information and actual accounts rather than theoretical discussions, and upon data from two or more insurgencies. An effort was made to find internal consistencies within the information sources. For example, if units were organized and trained to use coercive techniques for recruiting, and defectors described having been recruited in this manner, the conclusion that people were coerced into the movement can be made. Because of this approach there is a good deal of redundancy within and among the various chapters. *

While the main emphasis in this report has been on underground organization, many characteristics can be understood only in relation to overt portions of the subversive organization. Therefore, discussions of guerrilla forces, the visible outgrowth of undergrounds, and of Communist structures, which often inspire, instigate, and support subversive undergrounds, have been included. The report is designed to provide the military user with a text to complement existing training materials and manuals in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, and to provide helpful background information for the formulation of counterinsurgency policy and doctrine. As such, it should be particularly useful for training courses related to the counterinsurgency mission.

The authors wish to express thanks to a number of persons whose expertise and advice assisted substantially in the preparation of this report. Mr. Slavko N. Bjelajac, Director of

* See Appendix A for the methodology used in this study.

Special Operations for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army, on the basis of his personal experiences and special interest in the study of underground movements, contributed guidelines and concepts to the study.

Four men reviewed the entire report: Dr. George K. Tanham, Special Assistant to the President of the RAND Corporation of Santa Monica, California, made many helpful suggestions based upon his firsthand experiences and study of Communist insurgency; Dr. Jan Karski, Professor of Government at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., whose personal experience as a former underground worker is combined with a talent for thorough, constructive criticism, also helped the final manuscript; Dr. Ralph Sanders of the staff of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C., offered a careful and useful critique of the manuscript and helpful suggestions; Lt. Col. Arthur J. Halligan of the U. S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, provided valuable suggestions based upon his experience in Vietnam.

Within SORO, Dr. Alexander Askenasy, Brig. Gen. Frederick Munson (Ret.), Mr. Phillip Thienel, Mr. Adrian Jones, Dr. Michael Conley, Mrs. Virginia Hunter, and Mrs. Edith Spain contributed to the end product.

10
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7
6
5
4
3
2
1

R

CONTENTS

	Page
SUMMARY.....	iii
FOREWORD.....	xix
PREFACE.....	xod
PART I. ORGANIZATION	
Introduction.....	2
Chapter 1. Underground Organization Within Insurgency.....	3
Insurgent Organization.....	3
Organization and Evolutionary Dynamics.....	14
Organizational Influences Upon Motivation and Behavior.....	19
Footnotes.....	21
Chapter 2. Communist Organization.....	23
International Organizations.....	24
Organization of National Communist Parties.....	25
Communist Parties in Non-Communist Countries.....	27
Communist Use of Mass Organizations.....	30
Communist Insurgent Organization.....	37
Footnotes.....	54
PART II. MOTIVATION AND BEHAVIOR	
Introduction.....	60
Chapter 3. Motivation.....	61
Factors Related to Insurgency.....	61
Who Are the Insurgents?.....	63
Reasons for Joining.....	68
Reasons for Staying.....	70
Reasons for Defection.....	72
Footnotes.....	80
Chapter 4. Ideology and Group Behavior.....	83
Individuals and Group Membership.....	84
Underground Organization Processes.....	88
Footnotes.....	92

TOP
COPY BLOCK

Chapter 5. Clandestine and Covert Behavior	95
Definitions of Clandestine and Covert Behavior.....	95
Techniques of Clandestine Behavior.....	96
Human Factors in Clandestine and Covert Behavior.....	99
Footnotes	102

PART III. ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

Introduction.....	106
Chapter 6. Recruitment.....	107
Selective Recruitment.....	108
Mass Recruitment	110
Development of Keymen	115
Footnotes	117
Chapter 7. Education and Training.....	119
Schools.....	119
Training.....	123
Footnotes	130
Chapter 8. Finance.....	133
Collection Methods.....	133
Sources of Support.....	134
Human Factors Considerations.....	135
Footnotes	137

PART IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Introduction.....	140
Chapter 9. Propaganda and Agitation.....	143
Propaganda Themes.....	143
Mass Media.....	155
Agitation.....	160
Footnotes	171
Chapter 10. Passive Resistance.....	173
Objectives.....	173
Techniques.....	175
Organization.....	180
Footnotes.....	185

TOP

COPY BLOCK

Chapter 11. Terrorism.....	187
Objectives of Terrorism.....	187
Organization for Terrorism.....	193
Behavior Under Threat.....	198
Footnotes.....	204
Chapter 12. Subversive Manipulation of Crowds.....	207
Strategy and Tactics.....	207
Riots and Demonstrations.....	208
Phases of Subversive Manipulation.....	213
Footnotes.....	222
PART V. PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS	
Introduction.....	226
Chapter 13. Planning of Missions.....	227
Preplanning.....	227
Intelligence.....	234
Footnotes.....	239
Chapter 14. Operations.....	241
Ambushes and Raids.....	241
Sabotage.....	249
Escape and Evasion.....	252
Footnotes.....	257
PART VI. GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES	
Introduction.....	262
Chapter 15. Counterinsurgency Intelligence.....	267
Types of Systems.....	267
Concepts of Counterinsurgency Intelligence.....	268
Collecting Intelligence.....	273
Footnotes.....	285
Chapter 16. Defection Programs.....	287
Targets.....	287
Factors Related to Defection.....	287
Communicating With Potential Defectors.....	288
Organizing Defection Programs.....	289

COPY BLOCK

BOTTOM

TOP
COPY BLOCK

Relocation Centers.....	289
Footnotes.....	292
Chapter 17. Population Control.....	293
Techniques of Population Control.....	293
Implementation of Population Control Measures.....	299
Footnotes.....	302
Chapter 18. Civic Action.....	303
Objectives.....	303
Programs.....	303
Planning.....	306
Communication.....	307
Considerations for Countermeasure Programs.....	309
Footnotes.....	311
GLOSSARY.....	313
INDEX.....	317
APPENDICES	
A. Methodological Approach.....	324
B. Analysis of 24 Insurgees.....	326
C. Summaries of World War II Underground Rules of Clandestine Behavior.....	331

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

TOP

COPY BLOCK

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Nguyen Huu Tho	43
Mao Tse-tung	125
Samples of Communist propaganda in Vietnam	145
The passive resistance of Buddhist monks in South Vietnam	177
Rioters attack Vice President Richard Nixon's car in Caracas	217
Viet Cong briefing in preparation for a raid on government fortress	229
Viet Cong raid on Bien Hoa air base damages aircraft	248
South Vietnamese police conduct search-and-seizure operation	276
South Vietnamese strategic hamlet	296
Civic action program in South Vietnam	306

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

COPY BLOCK

BOTTOM

TOP
COPY BLOCK

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Ratios of Underground Members to Guerrillas and Combatants to Population for Seven Insurgent Movements	64
2. Percentage of Guerrilla and Underground Members in Three Insurgencies: Korea, Malaya, Philippines	65
3. Age and Sex of Korean Insurgents	66
4. Age Breakdown of Captured Malayan Insurgents	66
5. Occupational Breakdown of Korean Insurgents	67
6. Viet Cong Defectors and Area of Defection	73
7. Appeals and Defection of Viet Cong	75
8. Types of Viet Cong Defectors	75

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
LIST OF MAPS AND CHARTS

Figure	Page
1. Operational Cell.....	7
2. Intelligence Cell.....	9
3. Auxiliary Cell.....	8
4. Parallel Cells.....	13
5. Cells in Series.....	12
6. The Building of a Revolutionary Movement.....	15
7. Communist Insurgent Organization.....	38
8. Areas of Viet Cong Defection February-June 1963.....	74
9. L-Shaped Ambush.....	244
10. V-Type Ambush.....	244


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PART I
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ORGANIZATION

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INTRODUCTION

The organizational structure of an underground reflects a delicate balance between efficiency and security. While carrying out operations, underground members must be constantly aware of the hostile environment within which they act. The diverse and often conflicting requirements of security and efficiency add complications and anomalies to the underground structure and operations. Many times, in order to achieve one goal, others must be sacrificed.

After many decades of conflict and repeated trial and error, Communist organizational skills and tactics have reached a point of handbook simplicity. Although most of the Communist principles and practices have antecedents in other movements, few organizations have practiced the underground art so widely and so persistently for such an extended period of time.

Although the principles, rudiments, and techniques of political recruitment, organization, and control are elementary and can be found in all societies, their successful application is always impressive.

To fully understand how and why an individual makes certain decisions or takes certain actions, it is essential to understand how he perceives the world around him and to examine the stimuli which impinge upon him within his environment. Whether they are members of family, industrial, or social organizations, persons assume roles which are defined by the nature of the organizations. For this reason knowledge of underground organization is important and prerequisite to the understanding of the behavior of underground members. When an individual joins a subversive organization, the organization becomes a major part of his daily life and alters his patterns of behavior markedly.

If an organization is to achieve its objectives, certain activities, including decision-making and communications, must be carried on. The structuring of these activities provides the context for an individual's behavior and motivation. The roles assumed by the individual, the information he acquires, and the rules, rewards, and punishments imposed upon him by the organization establish the patterns he follows. These structural and organizational determinants of behavior will be briefly reviewed in the first two chapters.

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CHAPTER ONE

UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATION WITHIN INSURGENCY

For the purpose of this study, an insurgent or revolutionary movement is defined as a subversive, illegal attempt by an organized indigenous group outside the established governing structure to weaken, modify, or replace existing governing authority through the protracted use or threatened use of force. An underground is defined as those clandestine or covert organizational elements of a subversive or insurgent movement which are attempting to weaken, modify, or replace an existing governing authority.

In its initial stages, when the insurgency is being organized and is necessarily operating in a clandestine manner, the entire organization is considered an underground. As the movement develops strength, some elements are militarized and operate overtly. The guerrilla arm is used to combat the military force of the existing government. In this phase the military efforts of the guerrilla units are augmented by the clandestine activities of the underground, which carries on the political war, establishes shadow governments, and supports the military effort. A dual structure of a guerrilla force and a covert underground force appears in most insurgent movements.*

INSURGENT ORGANIZATION

Many factors influence the organizational structure of insurgent organizations. The social, economic, and political conditions within the country to a large extent determine who the discontented are, who the participants will be, and what issues and cleavages will appear. Insurgency tends to develop out of internal conflict. Usually the participants do not have access to governmental authority and force, and through protracted conflict attempt to win the support of the people and establish shadow governments.

10 Terrain and environmental factors also affect organization. Although an underground can 10
function in almost any environment, guerrilla forces are seldom found in harsh climates or 9
highly populated areas. If the leaders of the movement are also members of other organiza- 8
tions, they tend to work within those former organizations and to attract members from them to 7
the underground. Consequently, the character of the former organizations tends to influence 6
the form and character of an underground. 5

*In Malaya (1948-1960), there was an overt armed force, the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), and an underground force, the Min Yuen; in Yugoslavia (1941-1945), the National Liberation Army and the National Liberation Committees; in Algeria (1954-1962), the guerrilla force, the FLN, and the political force, the ALN; in Vietnam, the Viet Cong's guerrilla arm, the National Liberation Army, and the underground arm, the National Liberation Front.

Sanctuary is vital to the existence of an insurgent organization. Neighboring countries or relatively inaccessible rural areas within the country must offer the insurgents a base area to train cadre and experiment with political appeals and insurgent organization.

External support, primarily psychological but also material, is required if the movement is to survive. International relations have considerable effect on the outcome of internal conflicts.

The form of the underground organization is determined in many respects by the types of people who originate the movement and the environment within which they must operate. If the organizers are primarily military men, the organizational structure usually takes on many of the features of a conventional military organization. If the organizers are politicians, the political role and political aspects of underground activities will be stressed.

Insurgent organizations by necessity operate on both political and military fronts. Not only must they neutralize or destroy the government's military force, they must also win the support of the people and control the people through shadow governments.

The insurgent military force is usually crude and begins with small-unit guerrilla action. If the conflict runs its full course, a regular mobile force, supported by other paramilitary forces, evolves. On the political front, an underground is formed to subvert existing governmental support and organize support for all the insurgents. The underground works through mass organizations and front groups of existing nonpolitical organizational structures and eventually establishes control of people through shadow governments. The underground supports the guerrilla and military front by providing supplies, intelligence, and paramilitary support.

Many times the duties and activities of guerrillas and underground overlap and it is difficult to distinguish between the two organizations. However, several distinctions can be made. Guerrillas have responsible unit commanders, and live and operate outside of the control and surveillance of government forces. Underground members usually live within the control and surveillance of government forces. Their activities may be either legal or illegal, but their goals are illegal within the system and they try to conceal their organization and the identity of their members from the governing authority. All of the civilian organizations associated with an insurgency are defined as underground.

Although the apparent goals of an insurgent organization are well publicized, the true goals may not always be known. For example, in a Communist-inspired insurgency, the Communist Party infiltrates the insurgent organization and creates a clandestine, covert parallel hierarchy within it. In a Communist-dominated insurgency, the underground includes both the civilian organization and the Communist clandestine, covert organization.

Military Component

The military elements initially employ guerrilla tactics, usually developing a mobile main force later. The regular main force is usually organized along conventional military lines into sections, platoons, companies, battalions, and even regiments. These units operate in the countryside, moving from region to region. The main force is generally supported by paramilitary or guerrilla forces at the regional or local level.

The regional troops, the second element, are assigned responsibility for an area comparable to a province or a state. They move about conducting raids, ambushes, and attacks against government troops. They seek refuge and supplies from local villages at night.

The third element, a local militia, operates from a village and is generally composed of village residents. The members of these units live in their usual way by day and go out on raids only at night.

For definitional purposes, those elements that operate openly and are organized along conventional military lines and use conventional tactics will be considered the mobile main force. Those overt elements that operate on a full-time basis and use guerrilla tactics will be referred to as paramilitary or guerrilla.

Underground Component

Function

The underground arm of the insurgent movement is usually a hierarchical structure, rising from a base of cells, through branches, districts, states, or provinces to national headquarters. The members may be described as being of three types, depending on their degree of commitment. The leadership cadre is the hard core of the organization and consists of persons who devote full time to the cause. The regular workers continue their ordinary roles in society, but are available to perform organizational duties and attend meetings on a regular basis. The auxiliary, or part-time workers, are available to perform only particular tasks or special assignments.

Another large group is important to the underground—the unorganized sympathizers, non-members who participate through such activities as passive resistance and mass demonstrations or by withholding aid and assistance to the government.

While the guerrillas and the main force carry out the insurgent military effort, it is the function of members of the underground to infiltrate and subvert government organizations and

institutions. Besides playing an offensive role against the government, they have administrative and organizational roles. They recruit and train members, obtain finances and supplies, establish caches for both the underground and the guerrilla forces, conduct terrorist and psychological operations against the government, and try to win the people's support of the movement. In support of the guerrillas, they are charged with collection of intelligence and with carrying out sabotage against military installations. One of their most important roles is to establish shadow governments and control the people.

The Cell

The basic unit of the underground organization is the cell. It usually consists of a cell leader and cell members. The leader assigns work, checks on members, and acts as a liaison with underground committees. A large cell may require assistant cell leaders. Its size usually depends upon its assigned functions, but in dangerous times the cell is kept small to reduce the possibility of compromise. The cell may be compartmentalized in order to protect the underground organization and reduce the vulnerability of its members to capture. Compartmentalization restricts the information any member has about the identity, background, or current residence of any other cell member. He knows individuals only by their aliases and the means by which they can be reached. This follows the underground "fail-safe" principle: if one element in the organization fails, the consequences to the total organization will be minimal. Furthermore, it is a security measure which protects not only the organization but the individuals in the compartmentalized cells.

The degree of compartmentalization depends upon the size of the organization, the popular support given the government's security forces by the populace, and the probability of detection by security forces. If the security forces have neither instituted population control and surveillance, nor tried to infiltrate the underground organization, the degree of compartmentalization is usually small. At the other extreme, if the populace supports the government and willingly informs it about subversive activity, compartmentalization will necessarily be rigid.

Cells may be organized on a geographic basis or on a functional basis within such groups as labor unions, the professions, and women's organizations. Both types of cells often exist simultaneously. The cells may be highly centralized, with orders flowing from a high command throughout the organization; this tends to increase the efficiency of operations. On the other hand, the organization may be highly decentralized, with units in various parts of the country operating autonomously; this reduces its vulnerability.

The structure of underground cells usually reflects a compromise between requirements of organizational efficiency and the need for security. The structure also varies with the phase of insurgent development.

Structure. The operational cell is usually composed of a leader and a few cell members operating directly as a unit. They collect money, distribute propaganda, and carry on the necessary political functions of an underground. (See figure 1.)




Figure 1. Operational Cell

10 The intelligence cell is unique in that the cell leader seldom comes into direct contact with
9 the members of the cell and the members are rarely in contact with each other. The structure
8 is such that a member who has infiltrated into a government agency, for example, contacts the
7 cell leader through an intermediary such as a mail-drop, cut-out, or courier. The cell leader
6 is in contact with the branch leader through a courier or mail-drop. Characteristic of this cell
5 is the high degree of compartmentalization and use of indirect communication. (See figure 2.)

4 The auxiliary cell is commonly found in front groups or in sympathizers' organizations. It
3 contains an underground cell leader, assistant cell leaders, and members. Members are usu-
2 ally highly involved in the cause of the underground, but they are either unreliable or untested
1 for routine underground work. The cell leaders identify potential recruits and screen them for
the operational underground or intelligence cells. The auxiliary cell differs structurally from
the operational cell in that it is larger in size, has an intermediate level of supervision, and has

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little or no compartmentalization. It is primarily used to handle large influxes of members during an expansion period. (See figure 3.)




Figure 2. Intelligence Cell




Figure 3. Auxiliary Cell

Size. Underground operational cells are usually composed of 3 to 8 members.* Activities which call for a division of labor require a large cell and a high degree of coordination. The cell may be called upon to serve a specialized function, or it may be asked to work with other cells, each performing part of a complex function in the underground. A big cell with little compartmentalization minimizes the need for formal communications and is thus less vulnerable as far as written records are concerned. However, its vulnerability to capture is greater, because the members know each other and have frequent interaction. If one member is caught and informs, all members will be compromised. In the small compartmentalized cell, the danger that critical underground leaders and cadre will be captured is minimized. On the other hand, it has a greater need for formal communications between units.

The size of the operational cell also varies according to the phase of development of the organization. Where there is a political party which is legal, the main attempt is to recruit people into the party and then indoctrinate them. In this case the cell may be large. For example, in Germany prior to World War II, the Communist Party cells consisted of as many as 20 members who met twice a week. Each cell was headed by a political leader, an administrative organizer, and an agitprop leader.³ When it became apparent that the Nazis were gaining control of the country, the Communists prepared to go underground. The cells were reduced in size and compartmentalized to diminish the risk of infiltration by agents provocateurs. Only the leader of each group of five knew the identity and addresses of the other four members of his cell. He alone could contact the higher levels of the party.⁴ As a practice, no one person in one group knew the identity or composition of any other group.

Similarly, the Communist Party in France before World War II had cells of 15 to 20 and even 30 members. After the party was declared illegal in September 1939, until the armistice in June 1940, cell size was reduced to three men in order to maintain a high degree of security.⁵ Later, to increase the party's effectiveness and size, eight-man cells were set up, but between October and December of 1940 the size was reduced to five men. During the German occupation, the party returned to three-man cells in order to ensure maximum security.⁶ In times of maximum security the three-man cell seems to be the basic unit. But when government security enforcement is relatively loose and there is a need for recruitment, cell membership may be increased to as high as 30.

*In the North Korean infiltration into South Korea and in the Communist Party of France during World War II, cells were composed of three members; in the Soviet underground behind the German lines in World War II, in the pre-World War II anti-Nazi campaign, as well as in Cuba, the cells had three to five members; in the Polish underground and in Egypt during Nasser's revolution, clandestine cells were organized into five-man groups; and in Denmark sabotage cells were composed of six members. In Algeria, the FLN's basic unit was a half-cell, with three men, only the leader of each full cell knew the members in each half-cell. Immediately above the cell was a half-group (two cells of seven men each, plus a leader); then a group (two half-groups and a leader); and then subdistricts and districts organized on the same principles.⁷

Critical high-risk cells are usually small, compartmentalized, and detached. Intelligence cells are highly compartmentalized and usually maintained at approximately three members.⁷ Sabotage units also are usually kept to three-man cells⁸ and remain independent of other underground networks.¹⁰ The sabotage units usually work on their own and set up their own communications system.¹¹ Specialized terror units function in much the same manner and are also kept to three or four members.¹²

Auxiliary cells, such as those in youth organizations, are less compartmentalized and violate many of the rules of clandestine behavior in order to enroll members into the underground organization. These cells act as a screening device, testing members before they are accepted into the formal underground organization. †

Number. The number of cells primarily depends upon the density of the population. An underground seeks to disperse its units geographically as well as ethnically. To avoid over-concentration in any one group, organization, or geographic region, which would make surveillance by security forces easier within each area, the underground generally has cells in various blocks, districts, cities, and regions. It infiltrates and also creates cells in existing organizational elements, such as labor, youth groups, and social organizations.

Communist Party members maintain dual-cell membership. The underground member may be part of a cell made up of agents who live within a certain residential area or block: these are called street cells. He may also be a member of a cell at his place of employment: a workshop cell.¹⁴ Dual-cell membership is more or less universal in countries where the Communist Party is legal, and the number of cells a member belongs to depends on the functions he is to perform.

Parallel Cells. Parallel cells are frequently set up to support a primary cell. (See figure 4.) This is done for several reasons. First, it takes a great deal of time to reestablish cells and if there is to be a continuous flow of information the underground must have a backup cell in case the primary cell is compromised. Secondly, in intelligence, duplicate cells are needed to verify pieces of information and to check the reliability of sources. Parallel cells were set up as a protective measure by the Socialist Party in the anti-Nazi underground.¹⁵

⁷In Denmark during World War II, sabotage units were generally 6-member cells that operated autonomously.⁸ In Cuba, the cells for sabotage were kept to 3 or 4 members plus a leader.⁹

¹⁰In World War II, in the anti-Nazi movement, one underground labor youth leader was in charge of 10 subordinates who among them had 90 followers. The members were primarily young students who collected intelligence and gave it to their leaders, who in turn submitted it to the formal underground leader. In Cuba during the anti-Batista movement, a propaganda cell was led by one formal underground leader, with 12 subordinates, who in turn controlled 400 members of the propaganda section.¹¹

Communist operations are conducted with as many as 4 or 5 independent and parallel intelligence organizations.¹⁶ In various front groups parallel cells are used for clandestine support of underground members in the front organization who are seeking positions of authority or responsibility.




Figure 4. Parallel Cells

Cells in Series. In order to carry out such functions as the manufacture of weapons, supply, escape and evasion, propaganda, and printing of newspapers, a division of labor is required. In the Haganah, clandestine workshops were established to produce small arms. Materials were purchased from regular commercial sources and taken to legal workshops, each of which manufactured components of the weapons. Finally the parts were taken to an assembly plant. The operational cells as well as the operation were organized into a series with management, insuring that the assembly lines were compartmentalized and operated in an efficient manner. Only the underground leader, who kept records of materials, storage, and transportation of the various parts concealed in the company records, was aware of the entire process. Each plant had an intelligence network to act as lookouts.¹⁷

A similar procedure is used in escape and evasion. The escape network is organized into a chain-like operation where the head of a safe home in the network knows only the next link

in the chain and nothing more; an entire escape-and-evasion net is not known to any one individual.

In the Belgian underground six cells or sections were connected in a series to produce large-scale newspapers. One cell, composed of reporters, gathered the information and sent it to a second cell which was composed of editors, who wrote the material. One cell was charged with supply: that is, getting the ink, paper, and lead. Another cell was in charge of administration—keeping books and funds. An additional cell was in charge of the printing; and, finally, through various other cells the newspaper was distributed.¹²

Often cells are expanded or assembled for a short period to carry out specific, special-mission tasks. In Denmark, small, 6-man cells were increased to 10-man sabotage teams in order to carry out large-scale missions. The network eventually included 10 teams of 10 men each. This was the maximum strength allowed for security considerations.¹³ In Greece, terror cells were organized for a particular mission and then dissolved in order to protect the security of the terrorists.²⁰




Figure 5. Cells in Series

Command and Control

Within any organization there is a need for coordination—not simply at single points in time but over a duration of time. The complexities of coordination require some central control.

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The many activities must be centralized in order to provide subordinate units with services that they cannot provide for themselves. Such functions as strategy, collection of funds, procurement of supplies, and intelligence and security services are usually performed at some central agency.²¹

In conventional organizations, centralization requires a high degree of coordination and coordination in turn requires a great deal of communication. Communication is a serious vulnerability of most underground movements. Frequent meetings, written messages, and records can be used by security forces to identify and destroy the underground organization. There is a great deal of local autonomy with respect to specific actions which require adjustment to local conditions. Tactical decisions are usually made independently by lower-echelon leaders in decentralized commands.²² Generally, when higher commands issue orders, they communicate them to lower echelons in the form of mission-type orders—orders which say "do whatever is necessary to maximize a certain objective function."²³

There are two factors that dictate this practice. The first is that the local units probably know the situation better than the central command, and the second is that lower echelons are probably better prepared to make decisions with respect to implementation and time. If a mission or action must be closely directed or if there is a change in strategies and the central command wishes to exercise tight control over the specific units, a liaison representative is usually sent directly to the units to assume control. For routine operations, however, direct control is seldom necessary. One factor which tends to unified action among decentralized units is the long, intensive common training given to the cadre before they depart to assume command of a local unit.

The high degree of decentralization, compartmentalization, mission-type orders and local autonomy of action is primarily a security measure to protect the organization from compromise and is most prominent in the early stages of the movement. However, as the movement expands and the emphasis changes to overt action, main-force units are organized along the lines of conventional command and the underground units become less compartmentalized. A centralized control structure with its direct orders tends to increase the effectiveness and speed of underground and guerrilla action.

There is generally a duplication of command structure with forward and rear elements playing roughly similar roles. In Algeria there was an external command outside the country as well as an internal command within Algeria; in the Philippines there was an internal underground called the "politbureau-out," safely located in guerrilla-controlled territory. Similarly, in World War II much of the centralized underground activity was conducted by governments-in-exile and many of them were located in England. The purpose of the external command is to provide alternate command in case the internal one is captured, as well as to permit the necessary command work to take place in a relatively safe location. The internal command is responsible for the coordination of activities within the country.

This dual principle of leadership for security reasons may even extend down to the operational level. In the pre-World War II anti-Nazi underground two types of cells were used. One was composed of members who operated within the country but who were directed by a leader who resided outside the country. This was a security measure to ensure continued existence of the cell. A second type of cell was used in which the cadre and cell members both operated within the country. These cells were interconnected and operated through a common directing center. In this second type of cell, organizational security was sacrificed for organizational effectiveness.²⁴ However, the dual system of operation provided some balance between security and operational effectiveness.


Insurgents organize their areas of responsibility and administrative boundaries so that they do not coincide with those of the security forces.²⁵ In this manner the insurgents take advantage of the interface problems which exist among government security forces. In most organizations it is easier to send messages upward in the chain of command than it is to send messages laterally to comparable elements. Therefore, in many cases, the crossing of a city limit or a state line takes the insurgents out of one unit's jurisdiction and responsibility and places them under the jurisdiction of another unit of the security forces. The delays and confusion caused by interface problems often provide the underground with the narrow margin of time necessary to escape or go into hiding.

If underground units are centralized or concentrated in one section of the country or segment of the population, as the OAS was in Algiers during the Algerian independence movement, it is relatively easy for security forces to concentrate all their efforts in that area in order to control and destroy the organization. For security reasons it is advantageous to have representatives in every part of the country, at every geographic location, and in every political unit. It is also functionally desirable to use existing organizations, such as unions, military organizations, and political parties, to achieve the purposes of the subversive movement.

In addition to decentralizing and leaving many decisions to lower-echelon units, undergrounds compartmentalize their activities. The result is an organization that is highly individualistic in its operations. This in itself is a security measure, for it makes it extremely difficult for security forces to identify the modus operandi of one cell or unit by uncovering or penetrating other cells.

ORGANIZATION AND EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS

In the development of an insurgent or revolutionary movement, there are many activities which are not visible to the casual observer. The organization and activities of an insurgent movement have been likened to an iceberg, with the bulk of the organization and its activities lying submerged and only the overt operations of the guerrillas being visible.²⁶ (See figures 6.)






Figure 6. The Building of a Revolutionary Movement

Printed by permission, Slavko Bjelajac, "Principles of Counterinsurgency," Orbis, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall, 1964), p. 663.

In a protracted revolution, organizational activities of the underground undergo various changes. Although the phases of change can be identified, they do not necessarily follow a fixed pattern of development. They may overlap and their evolutionary progress may vary in different parts of the country due to local conditions.

In the clandestine organization phase, the underground begins by setting up cells, recruiting, training, and testing cadres infiltrating key industrial labor unions and national organizations, establishing external support, and establishing a base in a safe area. During this phase the organization is small and highly compartmentalized. Cell size is kept small and new cells are added. Operational-type cells are usually maintained with three members each, and intelligence-type cell structures are used for those agents infiltrating key installations and organizations.

In the psychological offensive phase, the underground capitalizes upon dissatisfaction and desire for change by creating unrest and disorder and by exploiting tension created by social, economic, and political differences. Through strikes, demonstrations, and agitation, a wider atmosphere of discontent is generated. Covert underground agents in mass organizations act in concerted effort with agitators who call for demonstrations and through subversive manipulation turn them into riots. Underground activities are directed at discrediting the police and the military and government authorities. Operational terror cells in many parts of the country operate through the selective use of threats, intimidation, and assassination. The total number of cells in the underground is increased; cells in series are created in order to run underground newspapers, make large agitation efforts, and undertake other such large-scale coordinated activities throughout the country.

In its expansion phase, after its disruptive activities create unrest and uncertainty, the movement seeks to crystallize public support for a strong organization that will restore order. The emphasis is put on recruiting people through mass organizations and winning popular support for change. Auxiliary cells are created to accommodate new members. Support is built up in front groups and created in other national organizations by covert members. An effort is also made to establish a national political front of many organizations. Trained cadres create new cells and mass organizations. Auxiliary cells are created to handle the influx of new members. Recruiting progresses from being highly selective in the early stages to mass recruitment in the communities and rural areas, and ultimately to drafting young men and women.

The overt activities of the militarization phase draw general attention to the insurgent movement. A guerrilla force is formed to harass the government military force. In its tactics the insurgent military force avoids conventional fixed fronts; there is a quick concentration for action and an immediate disengagement and dispersal after fighting.

The guerrilla strategy generally follows the three stages outlined by Mao Tse-tung.¹⁷ The first is called strategic defense. Because the government forces are usually superior, the

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guerrillas concentrate on harassment, surprise raids, ambushes, and assassinations; they try to force the government troops to extend their supply lines. Since their primary aim is control of people rather than territory, they readily trade territory to preserve the guerrilla force.

The second stage begins when the government forces stop their advance and concentrate on holding territory. As men, arms, and supplies are acquired, the guerrillas attack larger government forces and installations. In this situation, the government is prepared to fight conventional war but the guerrillas are dispersed and capitalize on their speed and mobility. Thus, harassment wears down the government troops while the guerrillas are organizing and building their army. As Mao says, "Our strategy is one against ten and our tactics are ten against one."²⁴

The third stage referred to by Mao is the counteroffensive. This begins when the guerrilla army becomes sufficiently well-trained and well-equipped to meet the government forces. The guerrillas seek to create liberated areas; within these areas of control, they build up additional military forces.

The guerrilla force is established only after the leadership has decided that the revolutionary structure is strong enough to support its own army. Underground agents infiltrate towns and villages and begin clandestine recruiting of villagers into front groups and local militia. They train and indoctrinate key recruits. Later these groups become feeder organizations for the regional and main-force units.

As the insurgent internal supply arm, the underground purchases supplies, either on the black market or in the legal market through front organizations. They raid warehouses and set up factories in urban and rural areas. Supply sources outside the country are also tapped through firms that import under noncontraband labels from friendly governments. Caches are maintained throughout the countryside.

The underground provides transportation to move supplies, concealing the load or otherwise discouraging the authorities from making an inspection. As part of the transportation system, storage facilities are provided in houses, central locations, and remote areas.

External sources, such as foreign governments or fraternal societies, are tapped for funds. Internally, loans are obtained from wealthy sympathizers. Other techniques used to raise funds include selling items from door-to-door, robbing wealthy individuals and business firms, coercing people into making contributions, levying taxes in controlled areas, and counterfeiting.

National organizations are subverted by underground members who join the organization and represent themselves as dedicated, loyal members worthy of leadership positions. With the aid of underground cells among rank-and-file members of the organization and a system of rewards, bribes, and coercive techniques, the underground obtains control of many social and political organizations.

The underground forms front groups when it is unable to infiltrate existing organizations. These front groups espouse some worthy cause that will enlist the support of respectable

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members of the community, but the underground members keep the leadership in their own hands.

The underground communicates propaganda messages by radio, newspapers, pamphlets, word-of-mouth, and slogans and symbols printed on walls. Agitators operate covertly trying to crystallize sentiment for the insurgents. Armed propaganda units go from village to village lecturing on the ways of the organization. Demonstrations are used to show dissatisfaction with the government and commitment to the insurgents. Another technique is to encourage the populace to use passive resistance. By capitalizing on longstanding antagonisms and resistances, the underground attempts to get neutral groups involved in demonstrations. The demonstrators are then moved toward violence as underground agitators create events which lead security forces to take action against the crowd. Through a precipitating event such as an assassination, and through the use of agitators within the crowd, subversive agents convert civil demonstrations into riots and violence.

The underground uses terrorism not only to instill fear but to draw attention to the movement and to demonstrate in a dramatic way the strength and seriousness of its operation. A small strong-arm unit, such as most undergrounds maintain to protect their members, may also be used against informers and people who cooperate with the enemy. Because terror is a state of mind, the underground must carefully assess the reactions that follow the use of it.

In selective sabotage the underground attempts to incapacitate installations that cannot easily be replaced or repaired in time to meet the government's crucial needs. Special attention is directed at tactical targets, such as bridges. Sabotage acts are also undertaken to encourage the populace to engage in general acts of destruction. This general sabotage is carried out with such simple devices as Molotov cocktails, gas grenades, and devices to cause fire or damage to small items of equipment.

The underground infiltrates agents into government, military, and police organizations and establishes an intelligence organization. Agents living in villages and towns also provide the guerrilla forces with tactical intelligence and local movements of the government forces.

The underground establishes escape-and-evasion operations. Egress routes that direct persons away from lines of battle are set up and fugitives are hidden in secret lodgings, in remote areas, or with guerrilla units.

Finally, there is the consolidation phase. While military operations are under way, the insurgent underground continues its political actions. One of the most important functions of the underground is the creation of shadow governments. Initially, infiltrated agents establish covert cells within a village or city. Next, small front organizations are created. Through "persuasion," or with the aid of guerrilla forces, "elections" are held and liberation committees selected on which underground members as well as local villagers are represented. Schools, courts, and other institutions which influence the minds and actions of men are brought

Under the control of this shadow government. The people within the villages are brought into mass organizations for indoctrination and control over their actions. Undergrounds do not rely on goodwill alone. When in control of an area, they occasionally resort to the elimination of all opposition, and the establishment of covert surveillance systems within the new mass organizations and the civil government. Village by village, the underground takes over and finally governmental support is eroded and an entire area is controlled by the insurgents.

ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES UPON MOTIVATION AND BEHAVIOR

The character as well as the structure of the underground are influenced by the background of the persons who organized it. It will reflect the military, political, or organizational backgrounds of its organizers. The membership in time will be affected by the predominant characteristics of the movement. The leaders of the movement tend to work within former organizations to attract members to the underground and consequently the character of such organizations influences the form and character of the underground organization.

The discipline and sanctions imposed upon members are usually a function of the effectiveness of the security forces. If the security forces are highly effective, the underground tends to be very secretive and disciplined, with severe sanctions for any deviations from the rules of the organization.

Constraints upon what an individual can or cannot do are implicit in organizational membership. Rules for decision-making and communications prescribe certain forms of behavior which members must follow. In addition, organizational rewards and punishments offer new motives and incentives, specifically influencing the member's daily activities and how he performs them.

The structure of an organization will, in itself, influence an individual's behavior. In guerrilla organizations, for example, behavior is conditioned by the kind of unit in which the individual is involved. Mobile main forces are usually large, well-disciplined units, requiring conventional military behavior. Regional forces are made up of smaller units composed of friends and neighbors within a village; operations are only on a part-time basis and discipline is less rigid. In the underground structure, an individual's behavior is affected by the kind of cell to which he belongs. Members of auxiliary cells work intimately with a large number of people; a member of an operational cell comes in close contact with only two or three other members; and a member of an intelligence cell never comes directly in contact with other members of the underground. The type of organizational unit in which an underground member finds himself also determines whether he works individually, as a member of a small group or as part of a large military unit, what sort of discipline is exercised, and finally, whether he works at home with long-time friends and relatives or away from home with new-found friends or strangers.

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The nature of the organizational command-control structure also tends to influence an individual's motivation and behavior. He may follow a strict organizational pattern of behavior or be free to take independent action depending on whether the organization is highly centralized or decentralized. The type of command order, a direct or general group order, will affect an individual's reaction and subsequent behavior. The frequency of command communication determines the extent of individual guidance and control. Behavior is also affected by whether the communications are direct or clandestine through mail-drops or intermediaries.

An individual's tasks and responsibilities influence his motivation. For example, a cadre member, because of his responsible position and power, is likely to be more willing to adopt organizational goals and presumably requires less indoctrination and motivational incentive than other members. A guerrilla in a remote redoubt, having relatively little interaction with people outside of the movement, may not have a strong ideological sense of commitment, but an underground member involved in agitation and propaganda among the masses may find himself believing the propaganda he daily dispenses. Similarly, an underground intelligence cell member who is required to assume a progovernment facade, in order to protect himself from discovery, is greatly influenced in his mode of behavior by the facade.

An underground may also require certain patterns of behavior in order to create a favorable image. Members frequently are prohibited from taking anything from the people without paying for it; there are usually strict rules regarding sex relations among underground members; undergrounders may be directed to befriend certain segments of the population in order to influence them to support the movement.

The phase of insurgent development affects the organizational structure of an underground and, in turn, shapes the behavior of underground members. During the clandestine phase of development, for instance, members refrain from doing anything which draws attention to themselves or to the organization. However, during the psychological offensive and expansion or militarization phases, members adopt a more overt role and attempt to draw the popular attention avoided earlier. Finally, in the consolidation phase, the underground member assumes

the role of just and fair administrator in establishing a shadow government.

In short, organizational goals, structure, command and control, and phases of insurgent development all, in turn, help shape an individual's goals, environment, behavior, and motivation. Many of the points discussed briefly above will be dealt with in more detail in later chapters.

FOOTNOTES

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² For details on the cell size in Korea, see Fred H. Barton, North Korean Propaganda to South Koreans (Civilians and Military), Technical Memorandum ORO-T-10 (EUSAK) (Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research Office, 1 February 1951), pp. 151-57; for Denmark, Lt. Jens Lillelund, "The Sabotage in Denmark," Denmark During the German Occupation, ed. Borge Outze (Copenhagen: The Scandinavian Publishing Co., 1946), p. 52; for Poland, T. Bor-Komorowski, The Secret Army (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1950), pp. 22-25; for Egypt and Cuba, Paul A. Jureidini, et al., Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts (Washington, D. C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1962), pp. 364-66 and p. 181, respectively; for France, A. Rossi, A Communist Party in Action (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 159 and 163; for the Soviet Union during World War II, Otto Heilbrunn, The Soviet Secret Services (New York: Praeger, 1956), p. 62; for the anti-Nazi underground, Hans J. Reichhardt, "New Beginnings: A Contribution to the History of the Resistance of the Labor Movement Against National Socialism" (unpublished mimeographed manuscript, circa 1961); and for the FLN in Algeria, Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 11, and Brian Crozier, The Rebels (London: Chatto and Windus, 1960), p. 137.

³ Arthur Koestler, "The Initiates," The God That Failed, ed. Richard Crossman (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 42.

⁴ Ibid., p. 51.

⁵ Rossi, Communist Party, p. 159.

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⁷ Barton, North Korean Propaganda, p. 127; George K. Tanham, "The Belgian Underground Movement 1940-1944" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1951); also Reichhardt, op. cit.

⁸ Lillelund, "Sabotage," p. 52.

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¹⁴ Koestler, "The Initiates," p. 24.

¹⁵ E. K. Branstedt, Dictatorship and Political Police: The Technique of Control by Fear (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 196.

¹⁶ Koestler, "The Initiates," p. 26.

¹⁷ Gershon Rivlin, "Some Aspects of Clandestine Arms Production and Arms Smuggling," Inspection for Disarmament, ed. Seymour Melman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 193.

¹⁸ Tanham, "Belgian Underground," pp. 221-26.

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CHAPTER TWO

COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION

Revolutions against indigenous governments and organized resistance to foreign invaders have been common in every era of history. Equally common in revolutionary and resistance warfare has been the use of guerrillas and guerrilla tactics. Although the terms "guerrilla" and "guerrilla warfare" originated in the Spanish resistance to Napoleon's occupation, guerrilla strategy and tactics were at that time well known throughout Europe and Asia and can be traced to much earlier times.¹

However, with the advent of the Russian Revolution, new and significant refinements were added to the strategy of revolutionary warfare. In his 1902 pamphlet "What Is To Be Done?" V. I. Lenin laid the organizational foundations of modern insurgency. He formulated the notion that if revolutions are to be successful they must be led by small, professional (i. e., Communist) elites. Later, in his Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, written in 1920, he stressed the importance of political infiltration and the use of united fronts to disguise the Communist revolutionaries' purpose. He stressed the importance of creating a covert parallel apparatus with interlocking leadership so that a small highly disciplined elite could secretly direct and control a much larger revolutionary movement, which they could then use to achieve the goals of the elite. Thus originated the Communist-dominated insurgency. Mao Tse-tung formalized the strategy and tactics of a protracted guerrilla war among the rural peasantry as a means of extending international Communism into underdeveloped areas of Asia.

When World War II began, many national groups organized underground resistance movements in Europe and Asia to resist occupation and reestablish legal, indigenous governments. The Communists seized upon this ideal opportunity to lay the groundwork for revolutionary movements. They combined the principles of guerrilla warfare with political penetration and control. Throughout Europe and Asia, Communist resistance movements sought more to gain political control than to carry on resistance warfare against the enemy.

In the aftermath of World War II, the Communists were successful in turning resistance movements into revolutionary movements in such countries as Yugoslavia, Albania, and China. In the postwar years, international Communism sponsored and, in many cases, organized and supported "wars of liberation" in Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, Indochina, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, and Venezuela.

International support of internal subversion has become a pattern throughout the world and was voiced as a policy of international Communism in Nikita Khrushchev's speech "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement" at the November 1960 Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow. He stated that wars of national

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liberation are inevitable and that Communists must fully support them. He thus established the position of world Communism as supporting worldwide insurgency.

In an article Long Live the Victory of the Peoples' War in 1965, Lin Piao, Vice-Chairman of the CCP Central Committee, Vice-Premier, and Minister of National Defense, elaborated upon Mao Tse-tung's theory of the new democratic revolution and reiterated the theme of support for worldwide wars of national liberation. Mao Tse-tung's earlier theory had emphasized the rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside. Mao has now extended this principle to the entire globe, conceiving of North America and Western Europe as the cities of the world and Asia, Africa, and Latin America as the rural areas of the world which encircle the cities. He maintains that in the final analysis the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the success of revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, since they have the overwhelming majority of the world's population.

According to Mao's theory, the new democratic revolution has two stages: first, a national revolution and then, a Socialist revolution. He maintains that the first is the necessary preparation for the second. He concludes that Socialist countries should support nationalistic revolutions and that these revolutions should be led by a revolutionary party armed with **Marxism-Leninism**.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Article 12 of the Communist International (Comintern) Statutes called for Communists throughout the world to create secret illegal Communist organizations alongside legal organizations. The covert worker of the "illegal" organization disassociated himself from the Communist Party and its members, conducted himself self-effacingly, and cultivated a harmless appearance. The agent used different cover names in different parts of town and changed his cover address and sites for meetings frequently. All his papers and files were kept separate from those of the party organization. No building was used unless its tenants had been investigated.²

In the 1930's, the Comintern was extended to every part of the world. In Western Europe and America, permanent bases were established. In many parts of the Western Hemisphere, seamen's and port workers' international organizations served as reception and reporting centers for agents. Agents could report to one of these groups and receive shelter, money, and further instructions. Agents within the maritime organizations made contacts for international functionaries, agents, and instructors passing through their districts and also provided cover addresses for covert communications. They received and handled international funds for local organizations.

During the period from 1930 to World War II, through its Executive Committee (ECCI), the Comintern became a second arm of Soviet foreign policy. The secretaries-general of the Comintern's member parties were reduced from leaders of their respective national organizations to mere regional executives of a single structure, for which policy was made exclusively in Moscow.

After 1943, no formal organization existed for the coordination of the activities of the many national Communist parties. At first, some believed that the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), with headquarters at Bucharest from 1947 to 1955, carried on the functions of the Comintern, at least with respect to the European Communist parties. However, at no time was this body supplied with the staff and clerical personnel necessary to continue the range of activities in which the Comintern had been involved; it was probably no more than what its name suggested—an agency for the distribution of propaganda. Although the Communist International was dissolved in 1943 to rid the party of the propaganda handicap of being an international subversive movement, some authorities believe that international control still exists as a result of the heavy emphasis on indoctrination and institutional character formation of its cadre.³

The Communists also distinguish between legal and illegal organizations for gathering intelligence and espionage. While the party operates openly or through front groups, it also operates through embassies, foreign trade commissions, and news agency personnel. Those agencies that enjoy diplomatic immunity are termed the "legal" apparatus within a country. The term "legal" is used because the members of such agencies have diplomatic immunity and, if arrested for espionage activities, are not jailed but declared persona non grata and forced to leave the country.

The illegal apparatus is composed of espionage or intelligence agencies such as the Soviet GRU (Military Intelligence Directorate) and the KGB (Committee for State Security) and their agents and informers. If caught and arrested, members of these units can be legally tried for espionage. The GRU is in charge of military intelligence in foreign countries and the KGB units are responsible for nonmilitary espionage in foreign countries, operating parallel and often rival units to the GRU.⁴

ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTIES

Every few years international conferences to discuss and formulate worldwide Communist policy are held. Between these conferences, the national Communist parties are responsible for adapting and implementing conference decisions within their own countries. In recent years the national parties have tended to align with either the Soviet or Chinese Communist parties.

In 1965 there were over 90 Communist parties, with an estimated 44.5 million membership. Parties in 14 Communist countries accounted for 90 percent of the world membership. The Chinese Communist Party of 18 million members is the largest and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is second with 12 million members. ⁵

The supreme authority in each country is the national congress, composed of delegates elected by the various conferences and by the next lower level of the party. The national congress meets every two or three years, when convened by the central committee, and is charged with four major responsibilities: (1) to determine the tactical line for the party on political issues; (2) to revise the official program and make new statutes; (3) to hear and approve the reports of the central committee; and (4) to elect the central committee. From time to time it is called upon to discipline top members of the leadership. In practice, most matters which are considered before the national congress have already been discussed. The central committee prepares and documents questions and problems, which are sent to the various party levels where they are discussed and agreed upon. The national congress usually approves what has already been decided. It also sanctions the decisions of the central committee. ⁶

The national conference is called into special session by the central committee if urgent political matters arise in the period between party congresses. It is restricted in size to a small number of delegates. It is often used as a substitute for the national congress when the party, to minimize the chance of police detection, wishes to conduct clandestine meetings that can be quickly called and dispersed.

Between meetings of the national congress, the maximum authority of the party rests with the central committee, composed of top party leaders and varying in size from party to party. The members must have demonstrated competence in organizational ability. Their functions include carrying out the decisions of the national congress, supervising finances, enforcing programs and statutes, and controlling the party press and propaganda. The central committee sets up a finance commission for fund raising and a central control commission to carry out party discipline and security. Its executive bureau, the political bureau (politbureau), of 10 to 12 members, is elected by the central committee and directs party activities between meetings. ⁷

A secretary-general and two aides are elected by the central committee to carry on the daily operations of the party. This secretariat transmits the decisions of the central committee and the party to the subordinate commands. The secretary-general is the highest ranking elected official and is responsible to the party congress. He makes decisions with the politbureau and is responsible to the central committee. The party presidency, an honorary post, exists in some Communist parties. ⁸

There are executive committees set up to discuss and resolve problems at the various echelons and then pass them to higher authorities for consideration. These committees supervise ideological instruction, the training of executive committees for finance and control. ⁹

committees, and the elections of delegates to the next higher level of the party. In addition, they are responsible for routing party business and directives through their area of jurisdiction, and executing the decisions of the party. All members of the party belong to a cell and have weekly or biweekly meetings.⁹

Cells may be organized geographically, with all members living within a certain territory, or functionally, with "shop units" organized according to type or place of employment. Often they are set up in both ways.

The major emphasis and fundamental principle of organizational work in the Communist Party are to create cells within nonparty organizations, no matter how small the number of Communist sympathizers within an organization. In trades and factories, professional associations, peasant and front groups, and similar places, the Communists are instructed to organize party members into a small group called a "fraction." The fraction consists of part or all of the members of a cell, selected by the Communists to work within existing legitimate organizations. It is the fraction's responsibility to learn the interests, language, and attitudes of the organization, so that they can effectively communicate and disseminate the party propaganda line. They also identify and investigate individuals who may be sympathetic to the party and organize them. In order to guide the fraction, which may include all members from several different trade unions, a nucleus is organized to work under the direction of the local party committee. The nucleus is the "shop unit" and may consist of as few as three members in any one place of employment. The purpose of the fractions is to disseminate the party line, to attract new members to the party, and to aid in developing a power base for the party.¹⁰

COMMUNIST PARTIES IN NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

The Communist Party, in countries where it is a legal political body, has two major organizations, one open and one covert. The overt organization functions as an ordinary political party. However, the Communists everywhere organize their party into a system of cells and committees, regardless of the size or strength of the party or the degree of government opposition. Even in the "legal" party, the cellular structure serves to train members in conspiratorial behavior. Cell meetings are often held secretly so that members attending them can learn how to travel to and from them without arousing suspicion. Members are assigned minor intelligence-gathering or sabotage missions which in themselves have little or no practical use but which test and train members in clandestine behavior. A press (either open or clandestine) is usually set up in order to give members experience in writing, printing, and distributing material for the party.

In addition to the open legal party, a highly compartmentalized clandestine organization is also created. Members of its cells are people who have potential value to the Communist Party

in the event of an insurgency or coup d'etat. Individuals recruited from government, vital communications centers, industry, or other organizations that the Communists seek to infiltrate may not be admitted directly to the party itself but may become members of clandestine cells. Thus a network of infiltrators and agents in important positions is in readiness. These cells may remain dormant for many years, being used only to collect selective intelligence, to be activated only in case of an insurgency. 11

The Communists also organize "front" groups to use people who are sympathetic with causes which the Communist Party promotes but who are either unreliable or would not for personal reasons join the Communist Party. Front groups are organized around currently popular issues. While the party usually controls these organizations, they are kept separate. The Communists also attempt to gain control of governmental agencies through coalitions with other, non-Communist parties. 12

The Communist cadres are full-time professionals who accept the serious risks of revolutionary leadership, and the formation of such cadres is the basic work of the Communist Party. Lenin believed that only a small, militant organization could bring about revolution. The organization proper must be confined to a small, hard core of dedicated individuals who can be counted on to maintain their own discipline and carry out orders precisely and without questions. The term "cadre"—a group or body of professionals who train and recruit new units around them—is applied to the small Communist vanguard who are to lead the revolution. 13

The party seeks to create in its cadres a body of men capable of implementing a dictated strategy with "great ability, skill, and real artistry." But such competence cannot be acquired through theoretical studies alone: the member must be constantly tested in political combat. "Each Party can master the art of political leadership only from its own extensive experience." Out of this crucible comes an apparatchik who is more than an adherent of a political doctrine: he is a person totally committed to, and with no life outside of, the party. 14

The Communist Party is highly selective in its recruiting. The potential member must show through practical work that he understands the party and is prepared to accept its discipline. Membership can be conceived of as a process rather than as a condition. The granting of a party card is not the completion of a period of preparation, whereafter the individual can relax with the assurance of having "passed the test." It is in itself only the halfway house of a process whose end product is total mental commitment.

Normally a substantial portion of those who become members do not complete the process by proceeding on in toward the center of the apparatus. Many withdraw along the way, and the party is prepared for this. Only a candidate who is well along the way toward total commitment is permitted to learn the inner workings of the party. He goes through extensive indoctrination courses in discussion groups and party schools. He must participate in the organization of rank-and-file members. These activities are designed to guarantee his total involvement and

commitment to the functioning of the party. He must be willing not only to perform legal political activities but to carry out illegal work when required.¹⁵

The Communist Party operates on the rule of democratic centralism. Within the hierarchy of party organizations and committees, each lower body selects a representative to serve on a party committee; this committee in turn selects another representative to serve on a higher committee in the hierarchy.¹⁶ The principle of democratic centralism is followed throughout Communist organizations. Unit committees are elected by the membership or the delegates of the party organization. Each committee must report regularly on the activity of the party organization and must give an account of its work. These committees are responsible for carrying out the decisions of the higher party committees. All decisions of the higher committees are binding upon the lower body members.

In theory, each proposal is discussed at the lower levels of the party, and each committee member presents the opinion of the lower body to the next higher body until a decision is made at the central committee level. Once a decision is made, the entire party must carry it out. In general practice, a decision is determined at the central committee level and, although the lower echelons discuss it, the members are well aware that they must ultimately concur in it.¹⁷

Elections for committee members and their secretaries must be "approved" by the committee at the next higher level. This enables the leadership to exercise strict control over subordinates and to suppress any opposition from the outset.¹⁸

This disposition of authority follows the party principle of "reverse representation" at all levels. The "elected" or designated leader of any organizational element of the party, regardless of the level at which he operates, represents among his associates the authority of the next highest party body. He is not the spokesman for his subordinates in high party councils, but rather the latter's liaison with lower levels.

Institutionalized criticism or self-criticism serves two essential purposes in the Communist organization: (1) it increases the efficiency of the party by subjecting its operations to constant review and revision; (2) it creates a norm of behavior in members and helps secure absolute commitment and dedication to the party.

The actual activities of criticism and self-criticism sessions consist of conferences, discussions, and meetings within the party in which attempts are made to determine and correct any weaknesses in the work of the party or party members. Criticism is practiced on all occasions and is an integral part of Communist life. Theoretically, all decisions and basic policies of the party are open to criticism and discussion in these sessions. But in actual practice, criticisms must never contradict the essential party line and are directed only to improving the practice and implementation of existing revolutionary theory. A member is expected to analyze mistakes and shortcomings of the party operations only. Unless his criticism is constructive—that is, offers a concrete proposal for improvement in work or a method for correcting

mistakes—it is not accepted and the individual making the criticism may find himself under attack. No criticism may be made of the central leadership, and no organized expressions of criticism or dissent are tolerated.¹⁹

Criticism and self-criticism sessions are designed to develop absolute commitment and ideological dedication among members, so that party orders are implemented, not mechanically but creatively. They attempt to make the individual member think in terms of a vanguard and how better to advance the current line and more effectively carry out revolutionary work. Members are compelled to report errors, mistakes, or weaknesses displayed by all party members no matter how small or trivial; they may also state and restate any change in policy.

The sessions establish and reinforce complete ideological unity among the membership. Each individual must conform to the party line. The meetings act as constant reminders of the need to raise their goals, increase their activity, and execute orders faithfully.²⁰

Every party member knows that if he does not make every effort to contribute seriously to criticism of his fellows, then in the subsequent comprehensive dissection of his own conduct, he will be obliged to confess this guilt. He also knows that participating fully in the identification of others' failings will not help him to escape his own eventual subjection to the same process. The thorough analysis of his conduct can proceed into the smallest details of his life, both private and public, both intimate and generally known. He must clearly acknowledge his faults before the group and promise to improve. He understands that an inadequate response in his own session can lead to reduction of rank or even to expulsion from the party. Thus the sessions instill in each member a need to demonstrate to his associates his unqualified responsiveness to the wishes of authority so that he can avoid undue attention by his cohorts and escape excessive criticism when his turn comes. In this fashion the Communist Party maintains a built-in, permanent uncertainty and apprehensiveness among the rank-and-file, and can be certain of obedience from below.²¹

Another characteristic of Communist organization is collective leadership. Executive and administrative decisions must be agreed upon by the majority of the officers at a given level of the party. Collective leadership, however, is an exception and practiced only during interparty conferences. In practice, the party functions in a highly centralized manner with authority and command decisions flowing from the top to the lower echelons.²²

Changes in leadership within the Communist Party are not frequent; "elections" become the equivalent of promotions. The leadership submits candidates and issues to the membership. In order to legitimize this authority, members are compelled to discuss these matters and overtly agree and vote on them.

Issues submitted to vote are not appeals to the membership for action, as they commonly are in unmobilized and unstructured groups, but are instead specific orders and plans for future

work. The member's attention is focused not on acceptance but upon what is to be done next. Emphasis is placed upon uniformity of thought and the ultimate authority of the leadership. 23

COMMUNIST USE OF MASS ORGANIZATIONS

Large groups which the Communists strive to infiltrate are called "mass organizations." Communist Party theory holds that a small group of highly disciplined individuals, operating through mass organizations, can rally the support required to win a revolution. 24

V. I. Lenin recognized the vulnerability of mass organizations to infiltration and manipulation. In turn, Joseph Stalin argued that Communist Party members must avoid the concept that efforts to build up the party should be directed solely to recruiting new members. Instead, he suggested that the Communists systematically use mass organizations as "transmission belts" to the broad masses of nonparty workers. By working through mass organizations, Communist Party workers can reach and influence many thousands of workers "not yet prepared for Party membership." Through "these organizations, led by well-functioning fractions, the Party must necessarily find its best training and recruiting ground. [Mass organizations] are the medium through which the Party... guides and directs the workers in their struggles and... keeps itself informed on the mood of the masses, the correctness of the... Party slogans, etc." 25

The Communists feel that the simple creation of disorder is not sufficient to bring power into the hands of the elite. They attempt to separate the existing leadership from the institutions and support on which it rests. While disrupting the government, Communists seek to construct new instruments of power. They build their own covert controls within existing organizations or form new organizations which they can control. They try to subvert institutional loyalties and create new allegiances within mass organizations at the community level. They undermine old forms of authority and create new ones, corrupting the authority upon which institutional foundations are built. 26

Objectives in Controlling Mass Organizations

The objectives of infiltrating mass organizations are: (1) to neutralize existing agencies which support the government; (2) to justify and legitimize causes which can be exploited by the subversives; and (3) to mobilize mass support. 27

By penetrating organizations and institutions within the society, the Communists avoid being isolated, and are in a position to neutralize competitors and monopolize mass support. The strategy of neutralization has played a large role in the relationship of the Communist Party to Socialist and other left-wing organizations. They try to infiltrate these groups and through

disruptive practices in the organization neutralize their effectiveness and put the leadership in disrepute. Where communism has no popular following in its own right, Communists have sought to mobilize popular sentiment around legitimate issues and causes and so indirectly gain legitimacy for their movement. Another major objective is to mobilize those large segments of society who are not members of groups into formal organizations.

Mass Organizations in Communist Insurgency

The use of mass organizations in an insurgency can be illustrated by several cases. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), early in its history, set about organizing a number of front groups, including the Proletarian Art League, Youth Corps, Racial Emancipation League, and General Labor Unions (GLU). The labor front was perhaps the most important. Using the demand for higher wages to match the rise in rubber and tea prices as a basis, the union movement organized a number of strikes and collective actions.²⁸ The principle of organizing labor for collective action was new to Malaya in the thirties, and the Communists' efforts to develop labor unions were to pay off in the insurgency after World War II.

After the war, the MCP set up additional organizations. It organized a General Trade Union and a Youth League to attract Chinese students. Once the insurrection was under way, a Cultivation Corps, an Anti-British Alliance Society, a Students' Union, Women's Union, etc., as well as less overtly political organizations, such as youth and sporting groups, were organized. With employment hard to find, it was often necessary for a man to join a Communist union in order to get a job. The MCP also established its own schools and clubs, so that it could approach the Chinese community to conduct political discussions and disseminate party literature.²⁹

During the insurgency in Greece, the Communists organized and controlled many front groups, such as the Seamen's Partisan Committee, the Communist Organization for Greek Macedonia, the Democratic Women's Organization of Greece. In the rural areas the Communist Party operated through the Greek Agrarian Party (AKEL) and the United All Greece Youth Organization (EPON).³⁰

In the Philippines, Communist Party officials spent much time before the war engaging in labor activities in Manila and other parts of Luzon. The printers' union was influenced by Mariana Balgos, and the League of the Sons of Labor was headed by Crisanto Evangelista, both noted Communist leaders. The League of Poor Laborers, the predecessor of the Confederation of Peasants, was among the mass support organizations which provided the base of support for the insurgency between 1946 and 1954. Most of the members of the Communist politbureau in Manila were officers in the unions affiliated with the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO).³¹

Methods of Controlling Mass Organizations

The fundamental aims of most mass organizations are those for which they are organized: labor unions, for example, are organized to improve the lot of the worker. But organizations formed primarily as pressure groups can be used for other purposes. To the Communists, they represent a chance to manipulate the social and political ideas and attitudes of the members.

Most voluntary, large-scale organizations are composed of a leadership (a small corps of individuals who represent the administration), a few faithful, full-time followers, and a large group of dues-paying members. The followers usually leave the operations and decisions to the leadership. Members may or may not agree with the leaders on all decisions and actions.³² Members who are willing to work and accept responsibility are usually given the opportunity to do so and, indeed, such willingness leads to a gradual promotion to leadership responsibilities.

When planning a takeover, the Communists first try to gain influence in the organization's membership office in order to control recruitment and to infiltrate Communist members. Once in, Communists are instructed to volunteer for all positions and for all work in the organization. They are instructed to be the first to arrive at and the last to leave meetings. They are taught how to harass non-Communist speakers and, through the tactics of attrition-through-tedium, win votes and offices within the organization.³³ They seek the leadership of political and education committees, and use these offices to identify people in the organization who might be sympathetic and those who are avowedly anti-Communist. Editorship of the organization's newspapers provides opportunities for expressing subversive ideas and gives access to printing materials which may be used to establish their own distribution routes. Once they have organized cells or fractions within the organization, they caucus and plan their organizational moves in advance.³⁴

The Communist seeks leadership positions and represents himself as dedicated and loyal to the organization, taking the initiative in planning activities and volunteering for any job, no matter how time-consuming or unpleasant. He is instructed to avoid the appearance of any subversive activity. Although his candidacy is supported by cell members in the rank-and-file, close ties between the candidates and the cell collaborators are hidden from the general membership so that the candidates' support appears spontaneous and unsolicited. Usually the most vocal members at a meeting pass resolutions and manipulate the apathetic majority. Therefore, a small articulate group can readily influence the direction of the organization and eventually gain control.

In such organizations as labor unions, systems of rewards and punishments can be utilized to maintain the obedience of members. If a man is dropped from a union he may not be able to

get employment. On the other hand, if the union leader improves the lot of the union members, they will more willingly go along with more purely political actions and obey strike calls. In addition, goon squads may be used to "persuade" uncooperative members. Having instruments of persuasion and coercion, the leadership can gain compliance of a majority of members. Most members will comply with a strike decision, since higher wages may benefit them and failure to comply will only lead to punishment, loss of membership, or worse.³⁵ In using front organizations, the Communists attempt to develop and maintain the loyalties of people who otherwise could not be persuaded to enter the Communist Party or who, even if willing, would not be sufficiently reliable. They also are able to mobilize many who are indifferent or even opposed to Communist ideology—uniting them instead behind such causes as "nationalism," "liberation," "pacifism," or other popular social issues within a particular society. The organization also attempts to gain support of those elements within the community, such as religious and fraternal organizations, that command the respect and loyalty of the workers.³⁶

The cell attempts to evaluate the power structure of the group which it is trying to infiltrate. In professional groups such as industrialists, lawyers, or university presidents, the Communists seek to control executive staff functions since this is where the power resides in such organizations. They look upon the facade of distinguished citizens on the board of directors as an asset to the organizational infiltration. Hence, they do not seek the prestige positions but instead positions of control which affect the day-to-day operations of the organization.³⁷

In the Malayan Communist insurgency, for example, the MCP maintained its influence within the General Labor Union through three separate control systems. The first system was made up of a president or secretary and 2 or 3 full-time organizers, who were part of the open membership of the labor union. Although they were party members, they avoided any connection with meetings or activities that might identify them with the party. They reported to and took orders from the GLU. They were told to operate within the law and to give the impression that their primary interest was the advancement and concern of trade unionism.

The second system of control was exercised through underground party members, who held no official office and were members of the open rank-and-file. They were activists who recruited new members for the union and for the MCP. They served to simulate grassroots sentiment for policies favored by the party, enabling the leader to avoid the appearance of dictating to the union. This group also reported on the financial status of each member and provided information to the party on membership attitudes; the party then based organization policy on these reports. The underground members reported to the section of the party responsible for trade unionism, which was separate from the regular party. These members were more trusted than the leaders, who were considered expendable if discovered.

The third control system consisted of the regular party members who formed a fraction within the union membership. They held no official posts. They reported their activities to and received orders from the regular party.³⁸

United Front Activities

The term "front" has been used in three different ways in Communist political warfare. Commonly, it refers to political activities carried out behind the facade of an apparently non-Communist organization. The front has been used to gain control of peripheral leftist groups. It has also been used to gain access to wide segments of society having no ideological commitment to communism or Marxism. In a "united front" operation, the Communists seek to consolidate and unite forces of discontent against the government. The groups in the united front need not agree with the objectives or goals of the Communist Party. However, the party does offer its support. In this manner the Communists maintain organizational integrity while becoming associated with other, legitimate organizations.³⁹

The Communists have utilized the technique of the united front in most of their insurgencies. They form alliances with other groups, offering them the organizational support of the Communist Party in return for a united front against some issue. The rank-and-file of most organizations are more than willing to accept anyone who professes to share their views. Many organizations have assumed that the Communists would enter into cooperative ventures without subverting the organization and that their cause would benefit from the additional strength of the Communist Party.⁴⁰

Lenin's formula was to go where the masses are located, vie for leadership positions or neutralize the existing leadership, and gain access to the rank-and-file. By drawing a number of legitimate groups into a united front, the Communists can gain the prestige of speaking for a large and diverse group of people. Once in the front, they seek to discredit the leaders of the other organizations so as to gain control of their followings.⁴¹ Usually organizations join a mass front or coalition in order to achieve particular ends; the Communists join for an opportunity to subvert them. The theory is to fill power vacuums and to create new organizations to cope with new problems which are not being effectively handled within the context of existing organizations.

In Venezuela, the creation of a united front was the first major step in initiating an insurgency and is characteristic of most Communist-dominated insurgencies. For example, the Venezuelan Communist Party (Partido Comunista Venezolano—PCV) initially used its legal status to cover its illegal activities. Communists infiltrated the Democratic Action Party (Acción Democrática—AD) and in 1960, under Domingo Alberto Rangel, the left wing of the party was expelled. The party formed a new group called the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierdo Revolucionario—MIR). In the mid-fifties, both the MIR and PCV were in militant opposition to President Rómulo Betancourt. In 1961, the MIR used its congressional immunity to carry on terrorism against the Betancourt regime. Finally, in 1962, both the PCV and MIR were ruled illegal by the Supreme Court of Venezuela. After this decision a National Liberation Front (Frente de Liberación Nacional—FLN) was formed to unite all left-wing elements

against President Betancourt and initiate an insurgency. The FLN organized the Armed Forces of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional—FALN) to conduct urban terror and guerrilla warfare against the government.

In 1962, the Minister of Defense of Venezuela described the Communist plan as it appeared in captured FALN documents. The FALN proposed: (1) agitation against the government; (2) demonstrations, disturbances, strikes, and terrorism; (3) sabotage and guerrilla actions throughout the country; and (4) insurrection culminating in violent takeover of power. The purpose was to create such chaos that the armed forces would take power through strong-arm methods; then the Communists would overthrow the army and gain control of the government. The Communists have gained support in the left wing of the Republican and Democratic Union (Unión Republicana Democrática—URD) which withdrew from the Betancourt coalition in protest against the government's anti-Castro action in 1960, as well as the AD opposition which split from the AD in 1962. Both of these elements supported the terroristic campaign.⁴²

In May 1941, members of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) formed the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (League for the Independence of Vietnam) or, as they were popularly known, the Vietminh. The organization was a broad coalition of political parties, all of which wished to free Vietnam from French rule. Since many nationalists did not join the coalition because it was Communist controlled, Ho Chi Minh officially dissolved the ICP on November 11, 1945. In May 1946, in still another move to win nationalist support, he announced the establishment of the Mat Tran Lien Hiep Quoc Dan Viet Nam (Vietnamese Popular National Front), a broader front than the Vietminh, whose goal was "independence and democracy."

In 1951, since the front received most of its aid from Communist China and the Communist bloc, the Communists felt that they had sufficient control over the movement that they could reestablish a Communist Party. In addition, if some unforeseen event should occur in which they lost control of the front, they wanted to leave some official representation in the organization. The name, Dang Lao Dong (Workers' Party), was carefully selected. One party document describes the reasons which went into the choice of name.

It should never be admitted outside Party circles that the Workers' Party is the Communist Party in its overt form for fear of frightening and alienating property owners and weakening national unity. To party members and sympathizers it can be admitted that the Workers' Party is the Communist Party, but to others it should neither be admitted nor denied. . . .⁴³

In this way they avoided alienating people who for one reason or another could not accept communism, but at the same time won recognition from other Communist parties throughout the world.

Using the same tactics as in the war against the French, in 1962 the Communists organized the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV). In order to control the movement, key members of the central committee of the Lao Dong Party went to the South to run the

operations. Once they had firm control, a thinly disguised Communist Party (People's Revolutionary Party—PRP) was formed which is ostensibly independent of the North but in fact is an extension of the Lao Dong Workers' Party. * Except in the rare cases involving attempted coups d'etat, the creation of a united front has preceded the initiation of Communist insurgency and guerrilla warfare.

COMMUNIST INSURGENT ORGANIZATION

Underground and Guerrilla Structure

Far-reaching organizational changes are required to convert a peacetime party into a national liberation movement designed to carry on a protracted revolutionary war. While the party apparatus itself remains essentially the same, an additional structure, composed of underground members and guerrillas, is created. Through interlocking positions of leadership within the movement, the party directs the underground and guerrilla organizations and operations.

At the top of the organization is a central committee, a politbureau, and a secretary-general. The secretary-general directs the national committees for military organization, mass organization, education, finance, and intelligence. Below the national level are provincial, district, and local committees and individual cells. There are two parallel national organizations, one civil and one military. (See figure 7.)

The civil organization or national liberation front is usually made up of several political parties and affiliated mass organizations. The front is responsible for mass recruitment and for support for the guerrillas in the form of intelligence, supplies, and safe homes. It is also responsible for population control and the establishment of a shadow government to provide schools, courts, taxation, and administrative offices. The front has liberation committees in regions, districts, villages, and towns. Within each of them is a parallel covert Communist organizational element.

* When Radio Hanoi announced the formation of the PRP, it avoided the word "Communist" and described the party as "representatives of Marxist-Leninists in the South." A captured Viet Cong document which originated in North Vietnam and was sent to a provincial party committee in South Vietnam, states that the formation of the PRP should be explained to party members as a tactical move to rebut accusations about the invasion of the South by the North to permit the NFLSV to recruit new members and win sympathy and support from nonaligned nations. It goes on to say that the independence of the PRP is only apparent and that in reality the party is the Vietnamese Workers' Party united in North and South under President Ho Chi Minh.

In July 1962, when the North Vietnamese signed the international agreements on Laos, a member of the delegation reported to foreign journalists that the list of members of the central committee of the Workers' Party was necessarily incomplete. Some names had been left off in order to protect the identity of men who were directing military operations in South Vietnam. 44




Figure 7. Communist Insurgent Organization

Three major military forces evolve. The mobile main force, the regional forces, and the local militia. The first is a regular army and the last two are paramilitary. The regular mobile main-force units are organized on the basis of battalions, companies, platoons, and squads. There is a heavy emphasis, however, on political indoctrination. Each unit generally has a military leader, a political leader, and a party member who make tactical and political decisions.

The military organization is set up according to the principles formulated by Mao Tse-tung. Vo Nguyen Giap, in elaborating on Mao Tse-tung, distinguishes three military phases of insurgency: "guerrilla warfare," "mobile warfare," and "entrenched camp warfare."⁴⁵ Certain organizational and political developments are prerequisite for transition from one phase to another.

The guerrilla forces carry on a war of harassment until basic political structures can be created. The more proficient of these forces are then singled out to launch the mobile warfare phase. New main-force units are created and organized along conventional lines but remain mobile and use guerrilla paramilitary forces as a protective screen. Although this mobile main force assumes a formal structure of battalion strength, it may fall short of conventional military strength and fire power. By contrast, the guerrilla paramilitary forces retain a simpler organizational form, being composed of small units approximately the size of platoons and continue their harassment of government security forces. It is the responsibility of local forces to maintain a presence among the civil populace and to harass government forces. Giap maintains that even in the mobile warfare phase a judicious balance must be achieved between these two forces.

The importance of maintaining both a main force and paramilitary formations was also stressed by Mao Tse-tung:

Considering the revolutionary war as a whole, the operations of the people's guerrillas and those of the main forces of the Red Army complement each other like a man's right arm and left arm; and if we had only the main forces of the Red Army without the people's guerrillas, we would be like a warrior with only one arm.⁴⁶

The militarization phase of the insurgency is simply part of the larger political struggle. As one former high-ranking Communist has remarked, guerrilla war is just a feature of the overall political war.⁴⁷ The character of Communist insurgent organization as it is transformed during a militarization phase of insurgency has been illustrated in Malaya, the Philippines, Greece, and South Vietnam.

In Malaya, the insurgent movement was made up of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), and the Min Yuen (People's Movement). In theory, the highest authority in the Malayan Communist Party was the central committee of 11 to 15 members. In practice, however, the politbureau, through the secretary-general, issued policy

decisions and through the military high command gave directives or orders to the armed forces. Three regional bureaus controlled party activities in the Malay states. Below the regional bureaus were district committees. The branch, with three to five members, was the basic unit.

Typically the Communist technique of interlocking the underground with the military organization was used. A committee from the politbureau was established within the high command of the Malayan Races Liberation Army. Regional committees controlled the MRLA units in the regions. Each committee usually consisted of three members: a party representative, a military commander, and a military vice commander (for troop indoctrination). The party representative was the controlling figure.

The Min Yuen, at first a front organization established to replace the party-controlled trade unions that disappeared when the Emergency began in 1948, became an underground organization. Its functions were to collect funds for the MRLA, furnish supplies, collect intelligence, disseminate propaganda, and serve as a pool for recruits for the party and the MRLA. In many areas the Min Yuen had its own armed forces, which protected the political organization and carried out independent terrorist activities in support of the MRLA.⁴⁸

In the Philippines the Hukbalahap (Huk) organization was patterned after other Communist insurgent organizations. The chain of command included the secretary-general, a 31-man central committee, and an 11-man politbureau. The secretary-general directed national committees for organization, education, finance, intelligence, and the military. The military committee, made up of members of the politbureau, exercised command control of the army. Its policies and decisions were carried out by the commander of the army who, with his deputy commanders and staff, formed the GHQ.

The party's organization bureau was at the same level as the army GHQ, and was charged with handling political affairs and furnishing political and propaganda guidance to the commander of the army. Directly under GHQ were the party regional committees (RECOs), which at one time numbered about 10 and were believed to be the highest headquarters in direct command of troop units for tactical operations.

The RECOs functioned also as territorial and administrative headquarters, with responsibility for organization and propaganda functions. Regional commanders represented GHQ in their area, supervising and coordinating military plans and political activities. They also developed tactical plans for implementation by their subordinate field commanders. At the regional level there were also organization committees in charge of establishing local Communist cells, observing the loyalty of party members, indoctrinating new members, and supervising their training.

Young men who were Huk members were sent back to their native villages to recruit for the guerrilla force. They were to organize their villages for the Huks by establishing committees of trusted and respected elders. Each village committee was organized into two groups: one a

nonmilitant underground group, the other military. Most of the male villagers were recruited as guerrilla fighters and organized into local reserves. They worked their farms by day and served as guerrillas at night. The local underground provided intelligence, food supplies, and medical care for the guerrilla units.⁴⁹

The Greek resistance movement during World War II provides another example of how a small but relatively well-organized party can organize a vast military and civil insurgent movement and maintain control over a large segment of the population. In September 1941, the Greek Communist Party (KKE) began a nationwide resistance movement. The Communists organized the Greek National Liberation Front (EAM) to recruit and enlist all sectors of Greek society. All citizens and classes that favored resistance against the Nazis and free elections after the war were welcomed. The EAM sought and won the support of some left-wing political leaders and formed a coalition made up of the KKE, the Union of Popular Democracy (ELD), the Socialist Party of Greece (SKE), the United Socialist Party of Greece (ESKE), and the Greek Agrarian Party (AKE). Each of these parties had one representative on a central committee. This committee was the policy-making organ of the EAM. Although it appeared that the EAM was composed of many parties, in fact the Communists held most of the power through the front's functional groups. The EAM organized the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS), the United All Greece Youth Organization (EYON), the National Mutual Aid (EA), and the Workers' National Liberation Front (EEAM).

The British estimated that the ELAS was composed of approximately 50,000 men while the EAM had from 300,000 to 700,000 members. The EAM gave estimates of 85,000 for the ELAS and approximately 2 million for the EAM. By 1943, the EAM controlled a good portion of Greece through an administrative hierarchy and local self-government. In each village there were four EAM groups: the EA, the EYON, the Guerrilla Commissariat or ETA, and the general EAM committee. The secretary of the EAM was called the ipeftinos or "responsible one." It was his duty to check on all travelers coming into a village to confirm their identification, to recommend individuals for training to the ELAS, and to follow orders from his district superior. The ETA collected taxes and gathered materials for the ELAS.

It was through the ipeftinos in each village that the Communists exerted control. Before the war the Communists were the only party with widespread underground experience and most of the organizers of the EAM were Communists. Thus, the Communists who organized the EAM in a village usually became the leading EAM functionary. Through the election of higher level officials, the Communists further increased their influence. Village ipeftinos elected the members of the district EAM committee. The district members in turn elected a regional committee. Each region in turn had one representative on the EAM central committee. Cities such as Athens, Piraeus, and Salonika also had one representative on the central committee.

The city representatives were elected by neighborhood EAM committees, and EAM professional and trades organizations.

The 25 delegates on the central EAM committee represented political parties, the functional organization, the ELAS, EPON, EA, and regions and large cities. Through the ipeftinos the Communists had a majority of the delegates on the EAM central committee although they made up approximately one-tenth of the EAM membership. The EAM central committee appointed the two top leaders of the ELAS. The ELAS had two bodies, a high command which carried out the military operations, and a central committee which passed on policy. However, all political issues were resolved or handled by the EAM. The EAM controlled the armed services through the kapetanios. While each ELAS unit was led by a military commander who was responsible for all military decisions, at a comparable level there was a kapetanios who was responsible for propaganda and morale within the unit and the relations between the units and civil population.

In the ELAS headquarters there was a military commander, a kapetanios, and an additional EAM representative. Invariably the kapetanios and the EAM representative were Communists. Although the military was in command of all military operations, the army was controlled by the EAM and, ultimately, the Communist Party. ⁵⁰

The most recent example of Communist insurgent organization and one which requires detailed description, is in South Vietnam. Again, the liberation front and the establishment of separate but interlocking organizations have been employed by the Communists. The North Vietnamese Lao Dong (Communist) Party provided the impetus for establishing the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) and the National Liberation Army. Collectively, these organizations are known as the Viet Cong. To promote the idea that the South Vietnamese National Front and the Lao Dong were separate organizations, and to counter the charge that North Vietnam had invaded South Vietnam, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) was organized. The leadership of the NFLSV, the National Liberation Army, and the PRP is an interlocking one, the Communists holding multiple positions in all three organizations. ⁵¹

The Liberation Army receives direction from the Lao Dong, the Ministry of Defense, and the high command of the North Vietnamese People's Army. The highest military headquarters of the Liberation Army in South Vietnam is the Central Office for South Vietnam (CCSVN), which is below the high command of the People's Army. The Central Office maintains lines of communications with Hanoi and the major military units in the South. ⁵²

The National Liberation Army is composed of regular military and paramilitary units. Within the regular army are the main forces that operate across provincial borders and the regional forces that operate within single provinces. The paramilitary force, the Guerrilla Popular Army, has three elements: the village or hamlet guerrillas, the combat guerrillas, and the secret guerrillas. These are organized in squads or platoons and are essentially



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NOT REPRODUCIBLE

Nguyen Huu Tho, a former Saigon lawyer, is now President of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam.

part-time guerrillas who carry out harassing and sabotage missions and serve as a replacement pool for the regional units. 53

Political direction and control of the National Front are exercised by the Lao Dong through the COSVN. 54 The NLFV is composed of a number of organizations. Besides the Communist inner core—the People's Revolutionary Party—two other political parties are represented in the movement: the Radical Socialist Party and the Democratic Party. Then there are various liberation associations (farmers, women, youth, students, cultural, and workers) and many professional and special interest groups. Finally, there are several minor groups, such as the Afro-Asian Solidarity League and the Peace Preservation Committee, which are oriented toward external or international matters. 55

To insure control by the party, the policy is to have at least two party members working openly on most committees. In practice, the number is usually determined by the control the Viet Cong exercises in the area. To achieve a broad base of representation in the NLFV, it has been standing policy that party members on NLFV committees should never exceed two-fifths of the committee's membership. 56

Administratively, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam is organized along geographic lines, with an interzone, zone, province, district, village, and cell structure. Operating at the interzone level are a committee and a committee chief. The committee is organized into six branches, with the dan van branch responsible for civil and military recruiting and proselytizing. The organizational branch is responsible for the dich van movement or armed propaganda and terrorism among the government civil service workers and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). This branch is charged with influencing government employees through demonstrations and riots. The binh van is responsible for infiltrating, building cells, and subverting the morale of government troops and encouraging them to defect. The training and indoctrination branch is charged with training agitprop and armed propaganda teams. A liaison and communications branch conducts the organizational communications needs through couriers and runners. The security branch is responsible for the internal security of the organization. This administrative structure is represented at each level of the organization.

The NLFV focuses its attention on several major activities. The political struggle (seeking out and fomenting class conflict) is one of its principal activities. Another major activity is the organization and expansion of the united front groups. Finally, the NLFV is directed to undertake "armed struggle," including sabotage, assassination, and other forms of violence and coercive persuasion.

The front is primarily charged with the administration of liberated areas, liberation associations, and the various professional and special interest groups. It also carries out missions of espionage and sabotage against the government and is responsible for action among the masses. Mass communication, ranging from radio to agitation, falls within its responsibility. 57

At the provincial level, the front has established shadow governments headed by a commissioner who presides over a pyramidal structure topped by a central committee for the province, which supervises district commissioners, village or township cadres, and hamlet committees. Political administrators, many of whom have received from 6 months to 2 years of training in civil administration in Hanoi, govern these areas. Although many administrators are South Vietnamese, there are some North Vietnamese advisers as well.

The basic administrative bodies in the "liberated" areas are the liberation committees. There are subcommittees for military matters, health, information, culture, education, and communications. There is a Foreign Relations Commission which has missions in Moscow, Peking, Prague, Algiers, Djakarta, and Havana. In addition to the committees on the national level, there are liberation committees at the province, district, and village levels.

When a village is liberated, elections are held to choose a local committee for self-administration, which then establishes groups for military matters, public health, education, and economic questions. The village committee elects representatives to the district committees, who in turn elect delegates to the provincial committees. However, these higher committees were initially appointed. Elections are to be held at some later date.

Although village committees can contact district and provincial committees for advice, the higher committees usually provide the general political line and leave local affairs to the self-administration committees. One reason for this is the difficulty of maintaining daily communication among the various administrative units. Messages usually come from broadcasts of the clandestine Liberation Radio or circular letters.

For training purposes, books are distributed by the provincial education committees. These committees have crude jungle print shops in which most of the work is done manually. In addition to standard textbooks, books are also printed for the national minorities. Each village sends people to the teacher-training programs in the district or provincial headquarters; they then return to their villages and organize schools.

Each village also sends two people to the district center to receive a 6-months training course in medicine and hygiene. On returning to the village, they set up clinics, where most attention is paid to problems of hygiene and the control of malaria and intestinal diseases. Serious medical cases are sent to district or provincial clinics.

Because of transportation difficulties, each liberated village is responsible for growing its own food, with surplus food going to the National Liberation Army. #

Communications

In Communist insurgencies, there are several kinds of communication networks. There is a communication network within the Communist Party, another within the National Liberation

Front (NFLSV), and a third within the National Liberation Army. The systems vary from the simple to the complex in operation. 59

Within the party, disruption in communications between members of the cadre would affect operations very little, for the cadre is so well trained and indoctrinated that its members need little guidance or instruction in day-to-day operations. Only major policy changes or new programs make it necessary to communicate within the organization.

There are two types of formal communications. One is the written directive, which is relatively slow. The fast type is the radio message, communicated through clandestine stations. When radio is used, the message is disguised through some type of code, often in the form of key words or phrases. Intensive training and preplanning reduce the need for fast communications. 60

If a message is of extreme complexity or great secrecy, a meeting may be arranged. The lower echelons receive word by courier that a meeting is to be held. A liaison member from higher headquarters outlines the wishes of the central committee and entertains questions at this meeting. He may cite and quote documents which he has read and burned. To maintain maximum security, secret documents are seldom carried to meetings and no notes are taken.

Administratively, there are four levels at which such meetings take place—the national headquarters of the central committee, the provincial central committee headquarters, the district or town central committee, and the cells. Each central committee has as part of its administrative operation a communications liaison section. Each of the lower echelons has its own liaison with its parallel units. The communications section handles all messages, coding and decoding them, and supervises the couriers.

The communications system of the NFLSV operates much as the party system does, but with less emphasis on security and a greater volume of messages. There are message liaison centers at central committee headquarters, interzone headquarters, zone headquarters, province headquarters, district headquarters, and village headquarters. Messages may concern new missions and assignments, reviews of policies and programs, or distribution of publications and propaganda.

In discussing communications within the National Liberation Army, it is important to distinguish between the regular mobile main force and the paramilitary units. The guerrilla units operate out of the villages and use runners to the district central committee. Messengers carry communications between the lower echelon paramilitary units and their political counterparts without going through headquarters. The guerrillas communicate with the regular forces by runners, although they keep contacts to a minimum. Most communications between these two originate within the NFLSV.

Main-force communications are more sophisticated, depending upon the type of equipment captured from government forces. At headquarters, captured radios and walkie-talkies may be

used, as well as couriers and messengers. Since the main body of central headquarters is dispersed, telephone systems and switchboards are used to coordinate central committee operations. Communications systems are extensively used as an alert system. Field telephones, telegraphs, and lights or visual signals are used to warn the main force of enemy approach. During operations, communications are generally limited. In the "liberated" areas a regular telephone and telegraph system may be used.

A National Courier Division is charged with running messages between the regional central committees and the district committee or cell level. Courier services are usually a system of liaison and jungle mail-drops. Training for couriers, who are frequently "innocents" (children, girls, women), is detailed. A courier for district headquarters spends approximately a year within the organization before being given his assignment. The district headquarters controls as many as six branch committees and platoons which work on the edges of the jungle or in rural areas. The courier's job is to spend his days visiting "jungle letter boxes" collecting and delivering messages. Letter boxes are the only fixed point of contact between regional headquarters and the district branches and platoons. Couriers seldom meet each other, leaving messages on different days in order to maintain security. Letter boxes are also changed from time to time and their location is secret.⁶¹

While the party is highly secretive, limiting communications to only the most vital, the National Liberation Front (NFLSV) has more extensive communications, often concealing the substance in propaganda and morale messages. The Liberation Army's communications are complex on the tactical level, using modern technical equipment in addition to runners, couriers, and jungle mail-drops. Within the party and NFLSV, the communications structure consists of a series of liaison couriers and runners.

Shadow Government and Population Control

Communist underground strategy is to build as well as to disrupt. Through shadow governments, the Communists develop new political institutions and new symbols of authority which serve as instruments for population control. The Communists gain control of the civilian populace by combining the positive incentives of political doctrine and institutional order with the negative sanctions of terrorism and coercion. They develop institutions, such as rural courts, youth leagues, schools, and farmer cooperatives to exert normative and regulatory control over individuals, and reinforce this control with coercive means, such as surveillance, threats, and physical punishments.⁶²

Shadow governments are usually initiated in towns and villages, where little or no governmental control exists. Such places frequently have none of the advantages of community action or organization, such as schools, sanitation facilities, medical services, police protection,

courts, or political participation. The shadow government parallels local governmental structures. Through the systematic removal or assassination of government officials, and through agitation and propaganda, official government control is eroded and replaced by new institutions.

In the opening phases of subversion, infiltrators live among townsmen, carefully select young, potential leaders, and organize them into nucleus cells. Cell members then agitate and turn specific grievances into crystallized attitudes. Later, armed guerrillas and professional agitators visit the villagers. With the implicit threat provided by the guerrillas, "free" elections are held. The slate of candidates includes members from the covert cells. A shadow government is organized behind a facade of representative government. Through social and professional organizations, social control is established and initial resistance is turned into varying degrees of acceptance as villagers welcome the advent of a school, social organizations, sports clubs, and so forth. The old power structure is assaulted as drastic changes are made in the village's political and economic institutions. As a multiplicity of new organizations requires new leaders, young members of the village, usually those reunited by the underground, are given the responsibility and power usually reserved for the elders or the wealthy. 6

As a village gives more and more support to the underground shadow government, the legal government may be prompted to retaliate or launch a counterattack. Villagers who were involved in the shadow government or who resist the government's return may be punished. However, the government's return is often short-lived, with government troops generally leaving after a brief period, because of the remoteness or seeming unimportance of the village in overall government programs. The Communists then return to resume their shadow-government control. Local commitment tends to be made on the practical basis of who is in control rather than who is preferred.

When a village has acquiesced, the underground progressively transforms it into a base. The villagers are induced, through normative or coercive means, to provide food, money, and a place to store arms and ammunition. Village men are recruited into active service, farming their land by day and conducting ambushes or raids at night. The villagers are also a valuable source of intelligence. They infiltrate government headquarters and installations and provide advance warnings, helping the militarily weaker guerrilla forces to plan offensives and ambushes or to avoid encirclement.

Population control is maintained by organizing multiple, interlocking memberships among the inhabitants. Constant social interaction and propaganda-oriented discussions are enough to convince many to support the insurgent government. Instruments of social force, such as courts and law enforcement agencies, are usually sufficient to coerce any doubters. Information from self-criticism sessions, covert agents, and political police alert the insurgents to any organized opposition. 6

The steps through which the Communists go in establishing shadow governments are illustrated in the example of a South Vietnamese village. Captured records of a Viet Cong commander revealed some of the techniques and problems the Communists faced in gaining control of a village in Kien Phong Province in 1960.⁶⁵ The village, dubbed "XB" for security reasons, had 6,000 inhabitants and was effectively transformed from a non-Communist into a hard-core Communist combat village. Interestingly, the Diem government had done a relatively good job of administering the area, and the Communists, in order to build a mass organization, finally had to use farmers' latent interest in land to focus grievances against the government. The farmers merely wanted low rent and the right to farm the land they maintained. The government soldiers in the area collected taxes and reclaimed land from delinquent tenants for the landlords, who usually lived in the cities. At first, the Communists voiced various slogans against the landlords, but achieving little success with these, they dispatched an agitprop team to organize the village. Living in fields and marshes during the day, the team slipped into the village at night to propagandize. Government mobile troops were active in the area during the first year and largely thwarted the Communists' efforts—killing three party members and arresting over 100. Indeed, only one cadre member finally remained, and he had no local support.

Eventually, through persistent efforts, several farmers were induced to join the party by "the promise" of land. Slowly, a base of seven members was established as the beginning of the local XB party. These in turn recruited others, and eventually the cadre grew to 26 members, while the XB expanded front organizations to 30 members in the Lao Dong youth movement, 274 in the Farmers' Association, 150 in the Youth Group, and 119 in the Liberation Women's Group. They were instructed to open as many private schools as possible and to form groups and associations among professionals, tradesmen, workers, and peasants.

Within two years, 2,000 villagers had become involved in the Communist front activities. Yet, despite these apparent successes, the mass of farmers remained passive to Communist appeals for action. The party adopted a new tack, beginning with a concentrated campaign to eliminate the influence of village leaders and government security agents. By applying pressure—often physical threats—to leading villagers, they were persuaded or coerced into joining the party. When government forces came to the village with projects, they were unable to find any leader who would cooperate. Even government medical supplies were turned down. Finally, the government virtually abandoned the village in terms of civic projects. The party encouraged people to take over land and began to establish public health, sanitation, and education facilities. It even assisted in the marketing of produce.

Thus the party, by persistent persuasion and coercion, grew from a small cell to the ruling authority in village XB. Throughout this process the people in the village seemed to be motivated by individual interests rather than by Communist doctrine.

At this point an attempt was made to get active support for the National Liberation Movement from the villagers. The party saw to it that Viet Cong flags were flown from village flagpoles and frequent propaganda sessions were conducted. The party began to press the villagers into military activities. In spite of initial reluctance, the village was eventually transformed into a "combat village." Villagers were induced to set up booby-traps, build barricades, and establish defensive positions against government troops. With this, the village became a target for government attack. The more the villagers were pressed by the Communists into building defenses, the more government troops came to clean up the rebel "stronghold" (even though no guerrillas were there). The Communists had maneuvered the village into "defending" itself from its own government. Inevitably, the more the government troops attacked, the more the people turned against the government and toward the Communists. The axiom that "people learn war through war" became a fateful truism: whereas the villagers were once reluctant and hesitant in their military support of the Communists, they now had a vested interest in supporting the guerrilla units and protecting the village from the government.

In another village in Vietnam, the Viet Cong entered and let it be leaked to government troops that they were going to hold the village for 3 days. Government troops attacked the village, although the Viet Cong had left in the meantime. The net result was that villagers who were once neutral were alienated from the government.⁶⁶

Another example of the operation of shadow governments by Communist undergrounds appears in the Huk movement during World War II in the Philippines.⁶⁷ As described by Luis Taruc, the Huk leader, the Communists found that the easiest villages or barrios to organize were those which had strong prewar organizations. Once they had a "beachhead" in a village, the principal focus of their organizational effort went into establishing a Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC).

When a BUDC unit was established, a council was formed. The size of the council depended upon the size and importance of the barrio. Elected by secret ballot, the barrio council consisted of a chairman, a vice-chairman, a secretary-treasurer, a chief of police, and directors of recruitment, intelligence, transportation, communications, education, sanitation, and agriculture. Often one man held several positions. Councils were formed only in those areas where Huk squadrons could protect a barrio and defend it against the Japanese. Elsewhere, barrio relief associations and antirobbery associations were formed.

Organizing the BUDC in a village involved several phases. The first step was to send a contact man to find out who in the barrio were loyal, who were anti-Huk or spies, and what kind of people the barrio leaders were. If barrio sentiment was favorable, a squadron would enter and call a meeting of leading individuals and talk to them. Then a meeting of the entire village would be called and the Huk program explained. Taruc reports that these barrios were easily organized.

However, in barrios which had collaborators, spies, or were predominantly against the Huks, a contact man would identify the agents and where they lived, and watch their movements. Then a Huk squadron would surround the barrio, arrest collaborators and suspected enemy agents, take them to a public place, and on the basis of information gathered from the people of the village, make charges against them. In a public meeting people were asked if the charges were correct or if there were any additional charges. If the people repudiated the charges, the prisoners were released. If they confirmed the charges, the Huks tried to determine if the individual collaborated under force or willingly. Traitors were usually executed, but those who cooperated under duress were lectured and asked to work for the underground.

After the trial, the whole barrio was lectured and the squadron left, returning at a later date to check on village activity. If the enemy had returned to establish control and people had collaborated, the Huk unit arrested the collaborators and took them with the squadron for 2 or 3 months. During this time they lectured them. When they felt they were convinced, they returned them to the barrio.

This type of direct military intervention was not normal procedure. Usually, organization of civilian support and population control was effectively maintained through the establishment of mass organizations and new institutional forms. To develop mass organizations, the Huks initially worked with a small number of former union organizers and professional men who had been associated with popular movements. With this nucleus they set up schools to teach the techniques of mass organization. They instructed recruits in the methods of infiltration, organizing barrios, and how to penetrate and combat the Philippine constabulary. These schools eventually trained barrio council members as well. The major functions of the barrios were to help in military operations and to develop their economy so as to provide supplies for the insurgents.

Although the Huk squadrons usually camped at a distance from the barrios to avoid drawing suspicion or attention to them, occasionally they did stay in a barrio and soldiers were assigned to various houses and families. In return, the Huks helped with household chores and assisted in farming duties.

The BUDC acted as reserves for the mobile units. For each Huk in the field, there were two in the barrios, engaged in productive work and civilian pursuits. Recruits also received military training in the barrios. Usually men on active duty were rotated back to the barrios for rest periods and the barrio reserves would spend some time with the regular guerrilla units. As Tarcé concludes, "In this way we are able to build an army that was very much like an iceberg in appearance, two-thirds of it beneath the sea."

The Huk avoided encounters with the enemy that might result in punitive action against the barrio. When an ambush was to be staged near a barrio, a meeting was held with the BUDC council in order to obtain its permission.

The director of intelligence of the barrio was an integral part of the overall intelligence network. Every man, woman, and child in the barrio reported information to the director who in turn transmitted this information via runner to the guerrilla agents. The most significant contribution of the barrio intelligence was their observation and investigation of strangers, which greatly limited the enemy's use of spies and agents. A director of transportation was responsible for maintaining carriage horses and carts and for placing them at the disposal of the Huks at a moment's notice.

There was an inner communications system among the barrios, and no one could move from one barrio to another without an appointed "connection" to accompany him. There were two types of courier systems, direct and relay. Important messages were always sent directly by courier and traveled a well-defined route. The relay system was circuitous and took considerably longer. Other devices were used for alerting barrios, such as a flash of light through an open window, flags, banners, or clothes hung on a clothesline.

A director of education was responsible for setting up schools so that the children would not have to attend schools established by Japanese occupation authorities. Health and sanitation projects were also undertaken. The director of economy and agriculture had an important position. His task was to organize the village so that a maximum amount of food was available for the Huks and the villagers and kept from the enemy. Cooperatives were launched for the planting, care, and harvesting of crops. To protect food from Japanese confiscation, Huk squadrons attacked the enemy frequently during the harvesting season to divert troops from the fields. The squadrons also helped in the harvesting. The barrio organized groups to put the food into drums and bury it or pour it into hollow bamboo poles that were hidden in the rafters of houses.

Courts and a jury system were set up to administer justice. The barrio council handled both civil and criminal matters. Cases which involved informers, spies, or traitors were generally referred to the military committee in order not to involve barrio people in the executions. In order to curtail black-marketing in food, a system of licensing and patrol was established to check on the movement of all rice. No one could sell rice without a license from the insurgents and anyone caught in black-market activities was investigated and turned over to barrio courts.

In summary, the importance of shadow governments has often been overlooked in the analysis of Communist organizational strategy. The Communists seek not merely to disrupt constituted government, but to supplant it. They employ such positive forces as organizational ties and institutional norms to exert social control. But lest these "voluntary" and "normative" appeals fail, they also employ the threat of coercion, using such means as clandestine cells for surveillance and terrorism. Through shadow governments, the Communists create effective instruments of population control that not only offer an area of support for guerrilla activity but lay the foundation for the later emergence of provisional governments.

FOOTNOTES

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INTRODUCTION

Historically, people have endured hardship and tyranny passively for generations. Then suddenly one generation, one segment of society, or even one individual rebels, while others continue to tolerate their traditional lot. The question of what causes such rebellions is one of the most intriguing of our times.

There are other associated questions: Are there particular factors associated with the outbreak of insurgency? Are these factors related to the success or failure of the insurgency? Who are the insurgents; are they the outcasts and malcontents who represent the criminal element of society, or are they a typical cross section of society? What circumstances and reasons motivate them to become part of an illegal, subversive movement? Once a part of the insurgent movement, what makes them persist, under hardships and danger, for the long years of struggle necessary to win a protracted war? Who are those who falter and defect?

Ideology is an integral part of most insurgent movements. Especially in the early phases when the entire organization is underground, ideology rallies people to the movement. Coupled with other organizational processes, it steels and disciplines underground members. What are the ideological and behavioral techniques of social control? How are they used in underground organizations, and what special ones are used in Communist undergrounds?

Especially important in the underground arm of the organization is the role of clandestine and covert behavior; indeed, special attention and training are usually given to teaching underground members such forms of behavior. Is there a common pattern of subversive behavior which shields undergrounders from detection and capture? What human factors techniques are used to deceive security forces?

These are some of the questions to which the following chapters are addressed. Chapter Three presents a summary of findings about factors related to the underlying causes of insurgency, the characteristics of insurgents, and the reasons for joining, staying in, and defecting from underground and other insurgent organizations. Chapter Four presents a summary of findings based upon theoretical studies of group behavior, relating them to qualitative descriptions of underground behavior. In Chapter Five the rules of clandestine and covert behavior are described and related to human factors considerations.

CHAPTER THREE

MOTIVATION

FACTORS RELATED TO INSURGENCY

It has been assumed that there are certain underlying causes for insurgency and that certain economic-social conditions are more conducive to the outbreak of insurgency than others.

It is commonly believed that countries rich in economic resources are not likely to be threatened by insurgency, since the basic needs of most of their citizens are satisfied. The Communists have concentrated their subversive activities on the developing nations on the assumption that a low level of economic development offers the necessary objective conditions for the creation of an insurgency and the psychological fuel to carry it through to a successful conclusion. In the 1960 conference of the Communist Workers' Parties in Moscow, Nikita S. Khrushchev advocated a "three-continent theory" which would commit world communism to the support of wars of national liberation in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Although the Chinese Communists currently are in disagreement with Soviet policy, Lin Piao's 1965 declaration supports the contention that world revolution can be obtained through the less-developed areas of the world.

Casual observation would confirm the Communist assumption. Since 1946 insurgency has occurred in countries at all levels of economic development except the highest or mass-consumption level, as in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and most Western European countries. Interestingly, however, in Latin America insurgency has occurred in those countries with high levels of development for the area—Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia. (Haiti is an exception.)

There are few comprehensive studies on the relationship between economic factors and insurgencies. One study of world economic conditions and violence found a curvilinear relationship between gross national product per capita and political domestic violence. There was a low level of violence in countries with a high GNP per capita (more than \$800) and a relatively low level of violence in those with extremely low GNP per capita (below \$100), in contrast with a high rate of domestic political violence in the middle-income countries.¹ This would suggest that there is no simple relationship between economic factors and the outbreak of violence.

In order to further investigate this assumption, information was gathered on 24 recent (since 1946) insurgencies, and comparisons were made of such factors as gross national product per capita and annual increase in GNP per capita, among countries which had insurrections and those which did not. Another comparison was made to determine the relationship of these factors to the success or failure of the insurgency. (See Appendix B.)

One hundred and twenty-two countries of the world were divided into four groups on the basis of GNP per capita, and a comparison made to determine how the 24 insurgencies were distributed with respect to GNP per capita. No relationship between GNP per capita and the outbreak of insurgency appeared. Insurgency occurred at all levels of GNP per capita.

People may be less prone to rebellion if the economy is improving, thus providing them with a rising level of expectations. They may feel that although they do not possess wealth now they may be able to attain it in the future. However, a comparison of the level of growth in gross national product per capita showed that insurgencies occurred in countries with high growth rates as well as low growth rates; there was no relationship between growth in gross national product per capita and the outbreak of insurgency.

In addition, neither the GNP per capita nor the annual increase in GNP per capita was related to the success or failure of the insurgencies in the countries studied. One explanation for the lack of relationship between economic factors and the outbreak of insurgency may be that in addition to poor economic conditions a precipitant event is required to crystallize dissent and to trigger the insurgency. Another explanation may be that while economic factors may be important when considered on a local or regional basis or for various subgroups within a nation, the gross national product is probably too broad an indicator to be generally valid. However, on the basis of the available information and the comparisons made, the economic theory of insurgency is not substantiated by the data.

Within recent years, the occurrence of insurgency in rural areas has drawn attention to low population density as a necessary condition for insurgency. In comparing the population characteristics of nations involved in recent insurgencies, it was found that although half of these insurgencies occurred in rural, low-density population countries, a relatively high number of insurgencies also occurred in countries with high concentrations of people in urban areas. This suggests that insurgencies are not restricted to countries with rural, low-density populations, but occur also in countries with high-density urban populations. Further, there was no relation between urban-rural characteristics of the country and whether the government or the insurgents won.

There was no relationship between a country's percentage of adult literacy and the occurrence of insurgency, nor was this factor related to the outcome of the insurgency.

Since student populations seem to be involved in insurgent movements, an analysis of the percentage of students enrolled in higher education was made, and it showed no relationship between the percentage of students in higher education and the occurrence or outcome of insurgency within a country. It may be hypothesized that the educational level of those within the insurgent movement itself may be important to its success or failure, but there seems to be no relationship between national literacy and higher education and either the occurrence or the outcome of insurgency.

In those countries with a high percentage of military personnel in the total population, there were more insurgencies than in other countries. It is difficult, however, to draw conclusions from the gross figures available; the percentage of military personnel per capita may have increased because of the insurgency, or the insurgency may have occurred because of the high number of military personnel.

In another study of the relationship of the size of the military establishment and deaths due to domestic violence in 33 countries, it was found that as the size of the military establishment increases there is a decrease in domestic violence. The author concludes that the motive for the creation of many large military establishments may well be the suppression of domestic dissent. It was also found that executive stability was negatively related to the size of armies in these countries and that there was a more rapid rate of turnover in countries with large armies than with small ones.²

1. Insurgency and the stage of economic development. A country's stage of economic development provides no immunity to insurgency. With the exception of the few mass-consumption societies, insurgency has occurred in countries at all levels of economic development. While economic factors may be important when considered on a local or regional basis or for sub-groups within a nation, neither gross national product per capita nor GNP per capita increase is related to the outbreak or the success of the insurgency. There may, however, be some relationship between GNP per capita and the level of violence.

2. Rural versus urban insurgency. Insurgency is not restricted to countries with rural low-density population; it also occurs among urban, high-density population countries. Further, no relationship is apparent between the rural-urban pattern and the success of the insurgency.

3. Literacy and education. Insurgency occurs in countries with both high and low adult literacy. While it may be hypothesized that the educational level of those within the insurgent movement affects its success or failure, there seems to be no relationship between national literacy or higher education and either the occurrence or the outcome of insurgency.

4. Percentage of military personnel. No clear evidence appears as to the relationship between the percentage of military personnel in the population and the occurrence of or the success or failure of an insurgency. However, there is a decrease in domestic violence in those countries with large military establishments, and no insurgency. There is also less executive stability and a rapid turnover in countries with large military establishments.

WHO ARE THE INSURGENTS?

How widespread is the insurgency in terms of the number of people actively involved? In a study of undergrounds in seven countries, it was found that only a small percentage of the total population actually participated in the movement. (See table 1.) Considering the peak

percentage of combatants—both insurgents and government security forces—it was found that from 0.7 to 11 percent, with an average of 6 percent, of the population were directly or indirectly involved. However, there may have been sympathizers within the rest of the population.

The ratio of underground to guerrilla personnel ranged from 2 to 1 to 27 to 1, with an average of 9, indicating that a large proportion of insurgents work at everyday jobs and only 1 out of 9 joins a guerrilla group.

Table 1: RATIOS OF UNDERGROUND MEMBERS TO GUERRILLAS AND COMBATANTS TO POPULATION FOR SEVEN INSURGENT MOVEMENTS:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Underground Guerrilla</u>	<u>Percent of Combatants* in Total Population</u>
France (1940-45)	3/1	2.2
Yugoslavia (1941-45)	3/1	2.9
Algeria (1954-62)	3/1	8.3
Malaya (1948-60)	18/1	8.1
Greece (1945-49)	27/1	11.2
Philippines (1946-54)	8/1	0.7
Palestine (1945-48)	2/1	7.0

*Underground, guerrilla, and security forces.

In summary, since so few of the total population participate, insurgency can be described as a low-intensity conflict in which the active combatants make up only a small proportion of the country's population. Most of the combatants maintain themselves by performing their "normal" functions within the society along with their clandestine underground activities.

Documented evidence on the place of origin of the insurgents is scarce. Available data are based on interrogation of captured insurgents, on interviews with local civilians, and on security forces' intelligence records.

In the Malayan (1948-1960) and Philippine (1946-1954) insurgencies and the Korean conflict,* 70 to 80 percent of the members of the movements were native to the provinces in which they operated; of these, 60 percent were native to the settlements in which they were active. †

*Although the Korean conflict (1950-1953) was a limited-war situation, there was a significant degree of guerrilla activity behind the lines. The references herein to Korea refer to the organization and operations of the Communist guerrilla forces and the supporting covert underground units.

† This gave the insurgents certain advantages: they were acquainted with the terrain and accustomed to its hardships; relatives and friends offered various forms of aid and assistance; their knowledge of the local people made it easy for them to pose as "neutrals" when questioned by government forces. It also gave them a feeling of fighting for their own homes and local interests.

Although men constitute the majority of insurgents, sizable numbers of women are active in insurgent movements. ⁶ In Korea, women played an unusually prominent role in the urban People's Self-Defense Units, which provided for a company of three platoons of women. About 26 percent of all prisoners held in Korean Government detention camps were female. Of 4,039 guerrillas captured from December 1, 1951, to January 2, 1952, about 32 percent were women. The percentage of women in the underground organization was probably even larger. In Malaya the underground arm of the insurgency, 5 to 15 percent of the Min Yuen, were women who acted as couriers, agents, and occasionally as saboteurs. In the Philippine Huk uprising, a few women held high positions in the movement's leadership.

In Korea, Malaya, and the Philippines, most age groups were represented. The underground noncombatant units had proportionately more old people and young people than did the guerrillas. (See table 2.)

Table 2: PERCENTAGE OF GUERRILLA AND UNDERGROUND MEMBERS IN THREE INSURGENCIES: KOREA, MALAYA, AND THE PHILIPPINES ⁷

<u>Age</u>	<u>Guerrillas</u> (%)	<u>Underground Members</u> (%)
12-15	1	5
15-20	8	7
20-25	18	32
25-30	29	22
30-35	25	13
35---	19	21

In a sample of 2,700 Korean insurgents, more than half were below age 30. ⁸

Armed boys and girls 15 years old and under were captured; children 11 and 12 years old were used as regular couriers between guerrilla units and in other underground activities. It is significant to note that there is a difference in the age distribution of male and female guerrillas. While 19 percent of the male guerrillas were either below 17 or over 40, 50 percent of the female guerrillas were in this age group. (See table 3.)

According to British data on 2,000 captured Malayan insurgents, 63 percent were under 30 years of age. The data sheets on 1,300 guerrilla and underground prisoners and information on

⁶ In contrast, only 30 percent of the counterinsurgency forces came from the same province in which they operated, and of this number only 35 percent came from the same vicinity. ⁷ The counterinsurgents thus lacked the advantages of having people of local origin. But when they do not have old friends and relatives in the local population, soldiers are less reluctant to enforce unpopular measures. ⁸

about 230 killed bandits indicate that the younger people (12 to 15 years old) and the older people (over 35) were more often active in underground operations than in the guerrilla fighting units.⁹ (See table 4.)

Table 3: AGE AND SEX OF KOREAN INSURGENTS¹⁰

<u>Age Groups</u>	<u>Male Insurgents (2,000)</u> (%)	<u>Female Insurgents (700)</u> (%)
Below 17	5	26
18-30	49	30
31-40	32	20
Over 40	14	24
Total	100	100

Table 4: AGE BREAKDOWN OF CAPTURED MALAYAN INSURGENTS¹¹

<u>Age Groups</u>	<u>Percent</u>
15-17	9
18-25	28
26-30	26
30-35	22
Over 35	15
Total	100

Fragmentary data on 600 members of the Hukbalahap in the Philippines supplemented by information from 62 Huks resettled through the government's Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) show age distribution similar to that found in Korea and Malaya.¹²

In Vietnam, a study of the age of Viet Cong members showed that well over half (81 percent) were under 29 years of age, with the average age being 23.8 years. The study was based upon captured personnel history records of the Viet Cong's 261st Battalion. The average age of the cadre varied with rank. The assistant leaders averaged 24.6 years old, squad leaders 26.8 years, a platoon-grade cadre 30.8 years, and company-grade cadre older than 30 years.¹³ The greater age of the higher ranking officers probably reflects the long, intensive training which the Communist cadres receive before reaching ranking positions.

In Korea, the Philippines, and Malaya the occupational backgrounds of insurgents were similar. The bulk of the membership consisted of peasants and workers. In the town centers

and urban areas, more industrial workers and members of the intelligentsia were found, and these had great influence on planning and policymaking. ¹⁴

Table 5: OCCUPATIONAL BREAKDOWN OF KOREAN INSURGENTS¹⁵

<u>Occupational Group</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Laborers and artisans	40
Farmers and peasants	30
Students	20
Former municipal employees	5
Former police employees	5
Total	100

A survey of captured Korean insurgents described a large majority of the insurgents as coming from working-class or peasant background. (See table 5.) In Malaya, it was estimated that 70 percent of the Chinese members of the guerrilla arm of the movement were from the working classes. This group formed the rank-and-file. Those classified as intelligentsia and professionals were primarily engaged in political activities and held medium- or high-level executive posts. ¹⁶

In Indochina, additional data from a French poll among Vietminh prisoners taken during the Indochinese War shows that 46 percent were peasants and laborers, with laborers predominating; 48 percent were classified as "petty bourgeois"; and 6 percent came from the trades and miscellaneous professions. ¹⁷

In summary, that small percentage of the total population involved in insurgency can be characterized in several ways:

1. Type of insurgent. The insurgent organization is composed of an underground and a guerrilla force, with an average ratio of nine undergrounders to every guerrilla.
2. Local origin. Most insurgents are assigned to units in areas to which they are native, while counterinsurgent forces are usually not native to the area in which they fight.
3. Sex. Although most of the insurgents are men, a relatively large proportion of women participate. There is a tendency for women to be members of the covert underground elements rather than to serve with guerrilla units.
4. Age. The membership of the insurgent movements surveyed is generally youthful; however, this tends to reflect the age pattern of the population involved. The youngest and oldest members appear most often in support activities. The average age of the cadre is generally older than that of the members of a unit.

5. Occupation. The occupations of the insurgents tend to be similar to those found in the area within which they operate. Units in the rural areas are composed mostly of farmers and peasants; those in the urban areas are made up of workers and intelligentsia. In general, the occupation of the insurgents tended to reflect the occupational pattern found in the population as a whole.

REASONS FOR JOINING

As an insurgency escalates in size and scope, the kind of individual it attracts and the nature of motivation for joining change. In the early stages of an underground movement, recruitment is selective. Recruits are thoroughly screened and tested for leadership potential and dedication. At the later stages of expansion and militarization, the underground usually aims for mass recruitment. (See Chapter Six.) Although there is little information on why individuals join the underground during the early stages, several motivational factors can be assumed from the underground recruiting technique itself. In its initial recruiting of cadre, for example, the underground specifically looks for those with ideological sympathies. Rational ideological considerations undoubtedly influence early recruits.

Motivation for joining during the expansion and militarization phases is better documented. However, the motivation for joining an underground movement during the militarization phase is typically complex, with no single reason dominant. In addition, motivational data are usually based on interviews and records from prisoners and defectors. Prisoners being interrogated are likely to feel at the mercy of their captors and may tend to conceal their true motives and opinions and may give false answers to save face. Furthermore, the more dedicated members of the movement are less likely to defect and thus may not be represented in the available samples.

A study of the Philippine insurgency suggests that individuals usually join as the result of a combination of factors—most often reflecting immediate needs and situational constraints. A chance to obtain personal advantage—ownership of land, leadership, or position of authority—was frequently cited. Situational problems, such as family discord, violations of minor laws, and so on, also influenced decisions to join. First contact with the movement usually came through chance. An individual joined if it filled a personal need or served as an escape, or if social pressure or actual force were applied. Once he was in the movement, indoctrination and other organizational processes helped him to rationalize his commitment.* This chain of

*A former Huk exemplifies the interplay of motives. This man was recognized as a leader in his barrio and became the local contact for the Huks. He got involved in the arrangement of a rally. When the local people then decided to form a Huk unit, they chose him as its leader.

interlocking acts eventually led to full-fledged membership. While not invariable, this process was typical of most of the ex-Huks interviewed. 19

A survey of a group of captured Vietminh showed that 38 percent of the prisoners expressed a belief in the Vietminh cause. 20 Yet only 17 percent of a Huk sample of 400 prisoners expressed sympathy with the political objectives of the Communist Party. 21

Promises and propaganda appear to have been involved in a number of cases, although their actual effects are difficult to determine. One source has noted that among ex-Huks a majority had joined the movement without any noticeable propaganda influence; most had been primarily concerned with issues like land distribution and lower interest rates. Less than 15 percent gave their only reason for joining the Huks as propaganda or verbal persuasion, although 27 percent reported persuasion or propaganda as a contributory factor. Thirty-eight percent of the Huks became involved through personal friends. It was probably later, after being exposed to propaganda and indoctrination, that motives for joining were related to specific grievances. 22

A number of prisoners claimed that they were coerced into joining the movement, but because they were prisoners their claims may have been exaggerated. At any rate, in one study 25 percent of the Vietminh prisoners stated that they had been forced to join against their wishes and had resented being coerced. Another 23 percent also claimed to have been forced to join, but did not appear to resent the fact. 23

Huk leaders realized that recruiting could not wait for the slow process of persuasion and free decision. In one study it was found that 20 percent of ex-Huks had been forced to join at the point of a gun or because of threats of violence against their families;* for another 13 percent, violence was one important factor among several others. 24

During the Indochinese War some cases were reported of young men who had been forced to join the Vietminh by direct physical coercion. Other men entered the movement because of indirect pressure on their families or on village leaders to provide recruits. The Communists in general combined strong-arm and other pressure techniques with propaganda appeals stressing independence. They generally avoided open appeals for communism. 25

Coercion alone did not seem to be a large factor (20 to 23 percent) in either the Huks or Vietminh. Coercion combined with other positive incentives related to personal and situational factors, however, accounted for a larger proportion of joiners (33 to 48 percent). Another

He couldn't refuse without antagonizing the Huks nor could he leave the town and move elsewhere. The Huks sent him to a "Stalin University" where he was exposed to Communist thinking and propaganda, and the propaganda points which particularly impressed him were promises to eliminate usury and government corruption and to distribute land to the poor. 18

*One type of coercion is seen in the example of a farmer's young son who, while working in the fields, was asked by the Huks to help carry supplies to their mountain hideout. Since they were armed, he complied. After they got to the mountains, the Huks told him he had better stay or else they would report him to the constabulary, who would punish him for helping them. 14

important factor was the action of government troops. Of the 95 ex-Huks interviewed, 19 percent said they joined the Huks because of persecution or terrorization by government forces. The effort of the army to suppress the revolt apparently was a factor in leading many to join the movement. 27

Reviewing the reasons stated by captured members for joining a movement, one finds a paucity and ambiguity of data and further difficulties in the interpretation of the data available. Nonetheless, certain conclusions may be stated:

1. Multiplicity of motives. Usually, more than one motive is present when a member joins. A combination of factors is usually cited, with no one factor being preeminent.
2. Personal and situational factors. Most of the motives cited for joining tend to be related to situational or personal problems and to reflect the individual's immediate needs.
3. Belief in the cause or political reasons. Only a minority admit that political reasons or sympathy with the Communist Party are related to joining.
4. Propaganda and promises. Few join because of propaganda or promises alone. These are apparently more effective when combined with situational factors.
5. Coercion. Coercion alone is a small but important factor in joining.
6. Coercion with other positive incentives. Combined with other positive incentives related to personal or situational factors, coercion accounts for a significantly large number of recruits.
7. Government persecution. This factor, real or imagined, appears to be a small but significant factor leading individuals to join the movement.

REASONS FOR STAYING

Although there are few empirical studies of insurgent motives for remaining with the movement, a review of two studies of conventional military personnel may provide insights into the motives of men in combat situations and into the sustaining role of ideology.

In a study of American soldiers during World War II, it was found that the soldier's willingness to fight was not significantly affected by indoctrination, ideological justifications, or by receiving awards for exceptional valor. More important were the norms of conduct developed in small, intimate group associations with other soldiers. 28 The concern for what his fellow-men within the unit thought of him was an important influence on his performance and group effectiveness. It was concluded that most nonprofessional soldiers fight reluctantly and are probably motivated by status-group considerations.

Another study, based on the collapse of the German Army in World War II, found that in those units which did not surrender, values such as honor and loyalty had created a sense of obligation among the soldiers. Loyalty to their comrades was more important than ideology in

their willingness to continue fighting to the end. Ideology, however, did play an indirect role. The type of leadership had a positive effect upon the combat effectiveness and commitment of the individuals within a unit. When the men in the units accepted the leadership of officers and noncommissioned officers who were devoted Nazis, the units' performance was much more effective than that of units without ideologically oriented leaders. 29 If the leadership is ideologically oriented, the units seem to be more cohesive and effective, even if the members are apolitical.

In most military units, individuals fight less because they agree with the political system than because they feel a loyalty to their fellow soldiers. They develop an esprit de corps and, in spite of adversity, try not to let their comrades down. Many insurgents who have defected still have favorable memories of the comradeship and togetherness of the guerrilla camps or the underground cells.

In one study of the Philippine insurgency, it was concluded that although people joined the Huks for various reasons, there was a tendency for a person, once a member of the movement, to gradually develop new motives for staying. Members stayed on because they were made to believe that the movement would bring about a better life for them and for the masses. 30

Insurgents often are influenced by their own propaganda and agitation themes. The impact of agitational slogans was shown in one study of 400 captured Huk guerrillas: 95 percent asserted that their main reason for fighting was to gain land for the peasants. 31

Psychological methods and morale-sustaining techniques have been used to induce loyalty. Since defections often occurred after serious losses, the Viet Cong went to elaborate lengths to keep up morale. Those killed in battle were carried away, often by special volunteers for that purpose, and buried with great ceremony. If it was not possible to carry the dead away immediately after the battle, the insurgents returned for them at night. This experience built up support for the movement through a desire to avenge the deaths of comrades and was apparently a significant psychological factor in keeping up morale. 32

New recruits or suspected individuals are not usually given tasks of responsibility and are kept under close surveillance. They are not allowed to leave the camp area alone. Most underground movements require recruits to take an oath promising to remain with the movement on the penalty of death. Terror or enforcing squads are also used to retaliate against defectors. Threats of revenge are especially effective when it is difficult to defect to safe areas. * Atrocious stories about how the government mistreats defectors are also used.

*In Vietnam, insurgents controlled much of the countryside; even government-controlled hamlets were vulnerable to the Viet Cong; there were political agents in the villages; and the countryside was patrolled by small Viet Cong units who shot deserters or persons suspected of cooperating with government forces. 33

The Communists' frequent criticism and self-criticism sessions act as a form of catharsis and permit members to voice fears and problems. In this manner members may speak out and be heard. No matter how limited and directed it may be, this process apparently serves as an outlet for emotions which might otherwise lead to defection. In addition, an individual who is disillusioned with the movement will find it difficult to conceal this in the frequent self-criticism sessions.

Another significant factor which prevents people from leaving a subversive movement is the human tendency to inertia: to do what is customary and expected of them in spite of any displeasure with the organization.

Several conclusions can be drawn as to why insurgents tend to stay with the movement:

1. Changing motives. Motives for remaining within the movement are usually quite different from those for joining. Indoctrination and propaganda expose the individual to new ideas, of which he may have been unaware before joining. New friends and organizational responsibilities are also motives for staying.

2. Group norms. Insurgents are influenced by other members of the movement. They are probably more motivated by what their friends and comrades think of them than by any ideological considerations and tend to stay out of loyalty to them.

3. Ideology. Ideology plays an indirect role. Units whose leaders are ideologically oriented are more cohesive and effective than those whose leaders are not, even when the members of the group are apolitical.

4. Morale-sustaining techniques. Various psychological techniques are used to maintain morale, such as special ceremonies and group discussions that give members an opportunity to air their emotional problems and receive group support and reinforcement.

5. Surveillance and threat of retaliation. Continual surveillance and threats of retaliation from terror enforcement units keep many members within the movement.

6. Inertia. Simple inertia and habit may be stronger than any inclination to leave. It is easier to continue a habit than to change it.

REASONS FOR DEFECTION

Disaffection may result in a person's leaving or defecting from an insurgent movement to the government side. He seeks the easiest and safest avenue of escape. If circumstances are such that he can simply leave, he will likely do so; if, on the other hand, the possibility of going to government forces arises first, and is relatively easy and safe, he may defect. The process of leaving is, of course, an unseen phenomenon. Only defection to government forces is recordable.

Little systematic research has been done on the motivation of insurgent defectors. However, there have been case studies based on interviews with defectors from the Vietnam insurgency, the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, and the Malayan insurgency.

In Vietnam, in January 1963, President Ngo Dinh Diem began the chieu-hoi (open arms) program. Viet Cong defectors were offered amnesty and assistance after a short indoctrination and retraining course. Between February 18 and June 25, 1963, 6,829 Vietnamese defectors took advantage of the chieu-hoi program. (See table 6.)

Table 6: VIET CONG DEFECTORS AND AREA OF DEFECTION³⁴

<u>Area</u>	<u>Number of Defectors</u>
Central Lowlands	779
Highlands	128
Capital City (Saigon)	13
Eastern Area	1,252
Western Area	4,657
Total	6,829

The defections from the Central Lowlands were primarily from Quang Ngai and Binh Thuan Provinces, both sparsely populated; there were none from the city of Da Nang. The majority of the defections from the Central Highlands were in the rural provinces of Darlac, Lam Dong, and Phu Bon. There were no defectors reported from the city of Da Lat and only 13 from Saigon.

The largest number of defectors, more than twice as many as from the other areas combined, came from the western region. The majority of these defections were in the An Giang Province. The wide range in the number of defectors from the various areas probably reflects local political, social, and psychological conditions, as well as Army of the Republic of Vietnam's military strength in particular areas.

One explanation for the low defection rate in the more populated urban areas, where it would appear to be easier to defect, could be that underground members in the cities do not have to endure the hardships that units in the field do.

An analysis was made of the relationship between RVN Government appeals and the number of Viet Cong defectors. (See table 7.) On the basis of this sample, there appears to be a low relationship between appeals for defection and the number of people who defect. Of those who defected as a result of government appeals, most heard of defection appeals indirectly from civilians and other insurgents. It is likely that many individuals decided to defect first and then became sensitive to propaganda appeals. A large number found their reasons for defection so compelling that they defected without ever having heard any appeals.

Central Lowlands 

- | | |
|--------------|---------------|
| 1 QUANG TRI | 6 BINH DINH |
| 2 THUA THIEN | 7 PHU YEN |
| 3 QUANG NAM | 8 KHANH HOA |
| 4 QUANG TIN | 9 NINH THUAN |
| 5 QUANG NGAI | 10 BINH THUAN |

Central Highlands 

- | | |
|------------|--------------|
| 11 KONTUM | 15 TUYEN DUC |
| 12 PLEIKU | 16 LAM DONG |
| 13 PHU BON | 17 QUANG DUC |
| 14 DARLAC | |

Eastern Vietnam 


- | | |
|----------------|---------------|
| 18 PHUOC LONG | 23 LONG KHANH |
| 19 BINH LONG | 24 BINH TUY |
| 20 TAY NINH | 25 PHUOC TUY |
| 21 BINH DUONG | 26 BIEN HOA |
| 22 PHUOC THANH | 27 GIA DINH |

Western Vietnam 


- | | |
|---------------|--------------------------|
| 28 HAU NGHIA | 37 CHAU DOC |
| 29 LONG AN | 38 AN GIANG |
| 30 KIEN TUONG | 39 PHONG DINH |
| 31 DINH TUONG | 40 BA XUYEN |
| 32 GO CONG | 41 BAC LIEU |
| 33 KIEN HOA | 42 CHUONG THIEN |
| 34 VINH BINH | 43 KIEN GIANG |
| 35 VINH LONG | 44 AN XUYEN |
| 36 KIEN PHONG | 45 KIEN GIANG (Phu Quoc) |

 **TOTAL NUMBER OF DEFECTORS**

MILES



----- International Boundary
 - - - - - Province Boundaries



- 6 BINH DINH
- 7 PHU YEN
- 8 KHANH HOA
- 9 NINH THUAN
- 10 BINH THUAN

Highlands

- 15 TUYEN DUC
- 16 LAM DONG
- 17 QUANG DUC


North Vietnam

- 23 LONG KHANH
- 24 BINH TUY
- 25 PHUOC TUY
- 26 BIEN HOA
- 27 GIA DINH


South Vietnam

- 37 CHAU DOC
- 38 AN GIANG
- 39 PHONG DINH
- 40 BA XUYEN
- 41 BAC LIEU
- 42 CHUONG THIEN
- 43 KIEN GIANG
- 44 AN XUYEN
- 45 KIEN GIANG (Phu Quoc)

NUMBER OF EFFECTORS



International Boundary
Province Boundaries




AREAS OF


- 30 KIEN TUONG
- 31 DINH TUONG
- 32 GO CONG
- 33 KIEN HOA
- 34 VINH BINH
- 35 VINH LONG
- 36 KIEN PHONG
- 37 AN GIANG
- 38 PHONG DINH
- 40 BA XUYEN
- 41 BAC LIEU
- 42 CHUONG THIEN
- 43 KIEN GIANG
- 44 AN XUYEN
- 45 KIEN GIANG (Phu Quoc)

CAMBODIA

128 — TOTAL NUMBER OF DEFECTORS



International Boundary
Province Boundaries




AREAS OF VIET CONG DEFECTION
in the Republic of Vietnam
February - June 1966

RCH


- 38 AN GIANG
- 39 PHONG DINH
- 40 BA XUYEN
- 41 BAC LIEU
- 42 CHUONG THIEN
- 43 KIEN GIANG
- 44 AN XUYEN
- 45 KIEN GIANG (Phu Quoc)

CAMBODIA

**NUMBER
SECTORS**



--- National Boundary
- - - Province Boundaries



**AREAS OF
VIET CONG DEFECTION
in the Republic of Vietnam
February - June 1963**

SECRET



Figure 8. Areas of Viet Cong defection, February-June 1963

Table 7: APPEALS AND DEFECTION OF VIET CONG³⁵

Returned of own will	210
Responded to direct appeal	48
Responded to indirect appeal	124
Total	<u>382</u>

In an analysis of 382 Viet Cong defectors, figures for defectors from guerrilla units were higher than those for political defectors. This is significant in that there are usually far more underground members and liaison agents than guerrillas.³⁶

Table 8: TYPE OF VIET CONG DEFECTOR³⁷

Guerrilla	189
Political	69
Liaison	19
Deserteers, Draft Dodgers	91
Detained by Viet Cong	14
Total	<u>382</u>

There are several explanations for this disproportion: political units have a less rigorous physical existence than military ones; political units' day-to-day activities require them to reiterate propaganda themes and carry on persuasive arguments in favor of the movement, so that they tend to be insulated from thoughts of defection. The number of defections of liaison agents suggests that, in spite of insurgent efforts to place only the most reliable people in such positions, it is a highly vulnerable job. The liaison agent has unusual opportunities for defection, since he usually travels by himself and goes into government-controlled areas. Amnesty offers probably influence liaison agents to take advantage of their chance to escape.

In October 1964 the chieu-hoi program reached its low point, with only 253 Viet Cong defecting during that month. Defection continued at this low level until April 1965, when 532 defected. Then the figures began to climb: 1,015 defectors were reported for May and 1,089 for June. The increase in the defection rate coincided with and was largely attributed to the stepped-up Viet Cong conscription program. The young men pressed into service did not have the ideological conviction of earlier recruits and, in many cases, resisted recruitment. Among the new conscripts who defected, personal hardships and the contempt shown them by the veteran Viet Cong were among the reasons cited for defecting.³⁸

A 1965 study of 1,369 men and women who defected from the Viet Cong showed that most attributed their defection to the harshness of material life in the Viet Cong. Food shortages and limited medical supplies were most often mentioned. Almost none of the defectors mentioned ideological factors. ³⁹

In addition to material and personal factors, the military situation also affected the decision to defect. Members of guerrilla units, for example, were found to be most susceptible to defection appeals immediately after a battle—especially if their unit had suffered heavy losses. ⁴⁰

An analysis of defection from the Huk movement in the Philippines has also been made. ⁴¹ Several motives for leaving were given by the 95 former Huks interviewed, just as they gave several reasons for their earlier entrance into the movement.

Sixty-one percent gave physical hardship as their chief reason. * In particular, they complained about the cold, hunger, and lack of sleep. The government forces contributed to these hardships by frequent attacks. Many of the interviewees said that they were tired of years of being fugitives and just wanted to live in peace. Forty-five percent said they defected because of the failures and disappointments of the Huk organization. Specifically, they resented the strict discipline in the movement and found orders distasteful, or had lost the feeling of progress and foresaw failure of the insurgency.

Twenty-three percent surrendered because of promises and opportunities offered by the government. The most effective promise was that of free land. Mentioned almost as often was the promise that the surrendering men would not be tortured. Other promises cited were those of a job, of payment for surrendered firearms, and of freedom for those against whom no criminal charges were being held.

Almost half (45 percent) of the defectors had heard of the government-sponsored Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), and most of these indicated that the program was influential in their decision to give up. Some said the EDCOR program gave them hope for a new life. ⁴²

Not more than 5 percent said they surrendered because of pressure by their families. Of course, most of the Huks were unmarried young men who did not have many family responsibilities.

In sum, there was no single overall motive for the defections. The hardships of existence and the constant pressure of pursuit, disillusionment with the Huk organization, and government promises appeared, in that order, to be the main reasons for surrender. Thus, the government effectively pressed the Huks toward surrender by maintaining steady pressure against them and by various promises and opportunities—in particular, EDCOR.

* The reasons for surrender given in the following discussion add up to more than 100 percent because more than one reason was given by defectors.

Interviews with 60 former Communist insurgents in Malaya indicated that some of the reasons that led them to join the Communist movement were related to their later defections. 43 Many joined as an avenue for personal advancement and security. They saw the party as a strong organization which would give them a voice in the future. But as they perceived the party to be growing weaker, they felt that they had made a mistake and wanted to extricate themselves as expeditiously as possible.

Most defectors gave no serious thought to leaving the movement during their first year, being too strongly involved in party work or still having high expectations. The critical phase for most came about a year and a half after joining the party. At this point they gave critical thought and reappraisal to their current position and possible future. Most had made great sacrifices for the party, and it was increasingly clear that greater sacrifices were to be demanded even while the chances of victory grew slimmer.

Many began to feel that the future was hopeless and passed through a period of doubt in which various "crises" arose that often triggered defections. One category of crisis centered on the member's inability to meet the requirements of party membership. Generally, an individual who developed personal difficulties within the party simultaneously developed critical arguments against the party's goals and methods and the Communist cause in general. Most defectors specified communism as "bad" in terms which were most meaningful in a setting of personality politics. If the party and its leaders were seen to be "corrupt," the defector could justify his own personal position and his subsequent defection.

Another category of crises resulted from the party's attitude toward sex. Party members were supposed to lead chaste lives even though 10 percent of those in the jungle were women. Even thinking about sexual matters was classified as symptomatic of "counterrevolutionary" attitudes. Permission to marry was generally refused. The party made death the penalty for rape, which was loosely defined and judged by party leaders rather than by the woman. Accordingly, the women tended to attach themselves to the party leaders, and members resented this departure from the party policy of "equality."

Another type of crisis appeared when the party failed to satisfy the defector's personal hopes, either not meeting his needs at all or doing so at too high a price. After World War II, the living standard of the general population increased and social stability improved in Malaya. In contrast, the party member often saw his life as rugged and unrewarding. Among the immediate problems cited by many ex-Communists were that they had to work too much, that life in the jungle was too boring, or that they underwent too much physical suffering. Almost one-third felt that their existence had become too dangerous. Some were pushed into a decision to defect by the death of a friend.

In nearly all cases, the decision to defect took place after several minor crises. The likelihood of a crisis leading to defection was especially strong if earlier crises were not resolved.

The psychological preparation for defection was complete when a member began to formulate general criticisms of communism. Once members became disaffected, they sought to disengage themselves from the party as rapidly as possible.

Although these interviewees, because they were defectors, are not necessarily representative of the whole party membership (many of whom might conceivably fight to the bitter end rather than surrender), the Malayan data strongly indicate that there is a continuity in the defectors' motivations. At one point in time they joined the movement, at another they deserted it; the roots for both actions lay in the same purposes and hopes. As conditions changed, the attractiveness of the alternative paths for achieving these hopes also changed. As the overall prospects of the rebellion changed, many felt their desire for personal security and social advancement could be better fulfilled by defecting than by staying in the movement. Thus, apparently contradictory actions (joining and defecting) had a motivational consistency.

Certain generalizations can be made about acts of defection among insurgents in general and among members of the underground and of guerrilla forces:

1. Types and rate of defection. Once the individual becomes disaffected, he may stay in the movement but not participate actively, he may leave the movement simply by withdrawing, or he may defect to the government side. The rate of defection varies widely, with a high rate in some areas and a low one in others. Local factors chiefly determine the rate of defection.

2. Multiplicity of reasons. Defectors usually give many interrelated reasons for their defection, usually involving personal and situational factors.

3. Conflict and crisis. Internal conflicts and personal crises within the organization usually precede defection. Conflicts usually arise over frustration of individual goals, harsh discipline, or lack of advancement.

4. Time of defection. Young recruits who are forcibly conscripted tend to defect early; those who join for ideological reasons tend to reconsider and have second thoughts some months (approximately a year) after joining the movement. It is at this time that they are most susceptible to defection.

5. Appeals. Although many defectors are unaware of government appeals and rehabilitation programs, these programs appear to be an influencing factor among those who do hear of them.

6. Underground defection. There are some unique characteristics related to underground defection. There is less defection to the government side among members of the underground engaged in political work than among members of guerrilla units; similarly, there is less defection in the populated urban areas than in the rural areas. There are several reasons for this: political activities probably insulate underground members from thoughts of defection; the underground is not exposed to the rugged, harsh existence of guerrilla life; and while defection may be the only option of guerrillas, underground members may be able to simply withdraw or be passive.

7. Guerrilla defection. Among the guerrilla units, the rigors and hardships of life in a guerrilla unit, such as bad weather and lack of food and sleep, are often cited as reasons for defection. Usually, however, a personal crisis involving individuals in the guerrilla force is the ultimate triggering force. Defection is also frequent immediately after battle, especially if there have been heavy losses among the guerrillas.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 306-307.

² Ibid., p. 319.

³ Andrew R. Molnar, et al., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), pp. 13-16.

⁴ Fred H. Barton, Salient Operational Aspects of Paramilitary Warfare in Three Asian Areas, ORO-T-228 (Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research Office, 1953), pp. 70-71.

⁵ Ibid., p. 71.

⁶ Ibid., p. 73.

⁷ Adapted from Barton, Paramilitary Warfare, p. 74. This is a cumulative distribution for Korea, Malaya, and the Philippines. See pp. 15, 33, and 53 for tables for each country.

⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

⁹ Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 14-15

¹¹ Adapted from Barton, Paramilitary Warfare, p. 33.

¹² Ibid., p. 53.

¹³ U.S. Information Service, VC Battalion 261—A Quantitative Profile (Saigon: U.S. Information Service, March 1964).

¹⁴ Barton, Paramilitary Warfare, pp. 74-75.

¹⁵ Adapted from Barton, Paramilitary Warfare, p. 15.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁷ George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 58.

¹⁸ Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 116-17.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 118-22.

²⁰ Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare, p. 57.

²¹ Barton, Paramilitary Warfare, p. 82.

²² Scaff, Philippine Answer, pp. 116, 122.

²³ Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare, p. 57.

²⁴ Scaff, Philippine Answer, p. 121.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 118.

²⁶ Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare, p. 57.

²⁷ Scaff, Philippine Answer, p. 119.

²⁸ S. A. Stouffer, et al., Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949).

29 Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion and Propaganda, eds. D. Katz, D. Cartwright, S. Elderwold, and A. McLee (New York: Dryden, 1954).

30 Scaff, Philippine Answer, pp. 121-122.

31 Barton, Paramilitary Warfare, p. 82.

32 Seymour Topping, "Portrait of Life With the Viet Cong: A Defector's Own Story," The New York Times, May 23, 1965, p. E-3.

33 Ibid.

34 Adapted from Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam's Chieu-Hoi Policy (Saigon: Psychological Warfare Directorate, Department of National Defense, June 1963), p. 28.

35 Ibid.

36 Molnar, Undergrounds, pp. 14-15.

37 Adapted from Republic of Vietnam, Chieu-Hoi Policy.

38 Seymour Topping, "Defection Plan of Saigon Lags," The New York Times, August 8, 1965.

39 Topping, "Life With the Viet Cong," p. E-3.

40 Andrew R. Molnar, Considerations for a Counterinsurgency Defection Program (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1965).

41 Scaff, Philippine Answer, p. 112.

42 Ibid., pp. 123-24.

43 All of the following material on Malaya was drawn from Lucian Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 324-38.

CHAPTER FOUR
IDEOLOGY AND GROUP BEHAVIOR

Common to most underground movements is an ideology, a set of interrelated beliefs, values, and norms. Ideologies are usually highly abstract and complex.¹ An ideology is more than a group of rationalizations and myths that justify the existence of a group; it can be used to manipulate and influence the behavior of the individuals within the group.²

In every society ideas, knowledge, lore, superstitions, myths, and legends are shared by its members. These are cultural beliefs. Associated with each belief are values—the "right" or "wrong" judgments that guide individual actions. This value code is reinforced through a system of rewards and punishments dispensed to members within the group. In this way, approved patterns of behavior, or "norms," are established.³

Human beings dislike ambiguity and uncertainty in their social and physical environment. Through generalized beliefs individuals seek to give meaning and organization to unexplained events. Common agreement on certain beliefs also enables individuals to operate collectively toward a desired goal. Leaders can interpret ambiguous situations in terms of the group's beliefs or ideology, translating abstract, ideological beliefs into specific, concrete situations in which actions are to be taken.⁴

Because beliefs and values are only distantly related to concrete action in daily life, an interpretive process is essential to derive specific rules of behavior. Commonly agreed-upon historical truths are used to justify the norms, values, and beliefs of the group. Significant events which occurred in distant times are given symbolic meanings, and a reinterpretation or "reification" of these events in the form of myths or legends supporting the group's purpose is developed. In doing this, the group may select certain concepts and adapt or distort them to justify specific forms of behavior; where existing concepts conflict with current activities, the group may deny that a particular concept is relevant in a particular case.⁵

Within any organization, there are reification sources whose role it is to apply official interpretations to significant changes in the social environment. An example of this is the Communist Party theoretician who modifies the official party line to fit world events.

In established groups, many beliefs are based upon authority; that is, since they are voiced by the leaders of the group, they are accepted as true. When a leader controls the dissemination of information to the members of an organization, he censors and approves various types of information. As a result, the group receives a restricted range of information, and group members tend to develop a set of common beliefs. Thus, in some cases, members need not be persuaded by argument, induced by reward, compelled by pressure, guided by past beliefs, or influenced by the opinions of other people; the restricted range of information to which they have access is sufficient to determine their beliefs.⁶

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There is a constant drive among people to understand and validate certain beliefs. However, experiences are not always based on first-hand observations but upon second-hand accounts. Beliefs that cannot be validated empirically by events may be verified through a process called "consensual agreement," or agreement within the group. That is, each individual says to himself that whatever everyone else believes must be true. Members of a group tend first to seek a consensus within the group and then enforce the decision of the group. If subsequent events do not justify a group's beliefs or behavior, it may redefine the real world. A group tends to rationalize any situation and to blame external factors rather than internal group behavior.⁷

Within organizations, certain rules specify desirable behavior and the consequences of not conforming. The rules are enforced by organized rewards and punishments that are relevant to the objectives of the group. Normative standards are also enforced by surveillance of members.

INDIVIDUALS AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP

Group membership, such as in an underground, serves to satisfy several types of individual needs. It satisfies the need to "belong" and offers recognition and prestige. The member's status is enhanced and self-esteem is raised. A strong organization protects its members from external threats. It also gives opportunities to gain economic or political goals which could not otherwise be obtained.⁸

What others think of us, their praise or reproof for our actions, affects our self-esteem. Threats to our self-esteem can motivate us to perform poorly or well. Thus, group assessments of individual performance can exert a strong influence on our behavior.⁹

The individual carries out ideas to which he thinks the group aspires and is either encouraged or intimidated by how the group responds to his actions. Further, an individual's "level of aspiration" is influenced by the standards of his group and his culture, and his group can influence him to raise or lower that level.

People see things—other people, objects, and events—not in isolation but within a frame of reference (the standard or yardstick by which an individual evaluates new information). To understand what a person sees when he looks at an object or event, we often need to know the properties of the frame of reference to which he relates the perceived information. Identical events can be given different meanings, depending upon individual frames of reference. If a landowner distributes money among his peasants, some may be irritated, feeling that of all the wealth he "stole" from the peasants he is returning only a small part, while others interpret the act as a sign of generosity.

A man in certain circumstances and situations can be led to make decisions and take actions which might be against his better judgment under normal conditions. A man is particularly suggestible when he must seek a totally new frame of reference in order to interpret a particular event, or when his mental context is so rigidly fixed that all events are rationalized within it.¹⁰ In either case, group pressure can lead an individual to take action consistent with group objectives.

Factors Related to Group Influence

In his efforts to make his environment meaningful, man distorts, emphasizes, and suppresses the information he receives. Further, he perceives only a limited number of those things to which he is exposed, and tends to listen to those which interest him most. Selective exposure to environment is furthered by membership in occupational and other groups.

Human perception is also limited by the tendency to concentrate on a few immediate alternatives when making a decision. Instead of developing other, or more logical, alternatives, man tends to take the best of those available to him at the moment.¹¹ This tendency is probably one reason why situational factors are so important in recruitment and defection of insurgents.

When events contradict normal expectations, the need to understand and explain the frustration frequently leads to a distortion of facts. When Stalin concluded a nonaggression pact with Hitler, until that time the foremost enemy, Communist members had to rationalize the situation and remain loyal.

An individual conforms to group norms for many reasons. He may conform out of habit, he may anticipate group-administered rewards, such as promotion or group approval, or he may be directed through the use of group disapproval or sanctions.¹² Group signs of disapproval ranging from mild disapprobation to utter condemnation are immediately recognized by members. For slight deviations from group norms, the group may withdraw signs of approval rather than offer reproach. Such psychological sanctions depend for their effectiveness chiefly on the value which the individual places on his status in the group. While great loss of status seldom results from a single act, serious or persistent deviations may lead to partial loss of status, in which recognition of the individual as a "member in good standing" may be temporarily withheld.

The leader's authority is often sufficient to maintain social control. Persuasion may be used to present a particular judgment in such a way that the individual members see the value of accepting it in place of their own judgment. They remain free to decide how and in what way they will act. The group can also be manipulated by a calculated presentation of facts, or the unit consensus may be represented as the total group when in fact it is only a small part of it.

Coercion may be used, but, since it may create a high degree of alienation, only as a last resort; even then, the threat of physical punishment is more often used than the actuality.¹³

Expulsion from the group is another form of punishment. This may have extreme effects upon the individual, especially if he is dependent upon the group for protection.* Underground and guerrilla units frequently kill deviant members and the possibility of this penalty serves to keep members in line.

A group's code of normative behavior is largely implicit; members know what is right and wrong, what can and cannot be done, but find it difficult to express the code in words. They cannot define a role but can say "this is the way it is done."¹⁵

Within any organization, the individual has a status position. Certain things are expected of him. He plays his role and expects others to act toward him in certain ways. Status roles involve a set of clearly defined and rigidly maintained rights, including such "status symbols" as special uniforms and insignia and deference from others.¹⁶

Rituals or ceremonies may be developed to bring about normative behavior as well as to create a feeling of belonging. They may involve signs or symbols signifying membership in the organization or ceremonial entrance and initiation rituals. Most underground organizations have a formal initiation and pledging ceremony which attempts to impress on the new member the value of membership in the group as well as the desirability of conforming to the group's point of view and group norms. Candidacy for a group may involve considerable pretesting. A candidate may be invited to participate on a guest basis, then may face an election, and finally be inducted into the main group. Such procedures are not always functional; sometimes they are purely ritualistic and valued in themselves.¹⁷

There are several factors which will determine how much influence the group exercises over the individual through group pressures and norms. One factor is the size of the group. The smaller the group, the more effectively control is exerted over an individual. Other things being equal, the control exercised by the group is in inverse proportion to its size.

The frequency with which a group meets also affects the relationships of its members—the more often it meets, the more intimate the relationships within the group. The ability of the group to control the behavior of an individual is directly related to the length of time that the group has existed and the frequency of its members' contacts with each other.

In highly structured groups, whose members' relationships and duties are clearly defined and in which there are generally recognized norms, more control is exercised over members than in loosely structured groups.¹⁸

*In Greece, during World War II, a member of the National Liberation Front (EAM) was expelled and threatened with physical harm. He felt compelled to join the rival underground group to get protection against his former associates.¹⁴

Factors Related to Conformity

Factual matters and personal preferences are resistant to change, while political ideologies, social attitudes, and expressions of opinion are susceptible to pressures toward conformity.¹⁹ Ambiguous topics are more changeable than clear-cut ones and suggestibility increases when it is difficult to check the accuracy of one's response. Knowledge of another person's response in a similar situation also increases suggestibility, especially when influence is exerted by a person of higher status than oneself. Suggestibility is also greater under pressures from friends or acquaintances than from strangers. Conformity grows progressively with the size of the group. However, influences toward conformity decrease when other group members are not in unanimous agreement. When interaction among group members is increased or a permissive group-centered approach is employed, susceptibility to conformity is increased. Susceptibility to group pressures is greater when rewards are given for "successful" performance and penalties for "mistakes," and among group members who have shared success.

An individual who makes a definite commitment and is then subjected to pressure tends to resist and maintain his position strongly. This is especially true if the commitment has been made in public. This is one reason why insurgents require formal oaths for new members of their movement and why they insist upon symbolic acts of public commitment in exercising population control.

If the individual displays anxiety before a pressure situation appears, he tends to be more susceptible to suggestion. Also, young people consistently give in to social pressure more readily than older persons. This is probably why young people are more readily coerced into joining insurgent movements. Loss of sleep, too, tends to make an individual more susceptible to pressures.

10 — Tendencies toward conformity increase when the views presented to a person appear to him
9 — to be only slightly different from what he believes to be his own convictions. Resistance is — 10
8 — minimized when the new views are presented gradually in small steps. This is reflected in — 9
7 — underground recruitment techniques. — 8

7 — Conversion, like conformity, is highest among persons who are uncertain about factual — 7
6 — matters. The degree of conversion is limited by how intensely a man held his initial views. — 6
5 — The less intensely he held them, the easier it is to convert him. The longer an individual re- — 5
4 — sists, the longer he will stick to a new position once he has altered his views. It has been found — 4
3 — that behavior which was altered by social pressure generally persists over time. — 3

UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATION PROCESSES

Underground movements can be described as "normative coercive" organizations. They are normative in that they appeal to people by offering to satisfy certain goals and to provide rewards, prestige, and esteem. However, coercive power is also applied through the threat of deprivation of certain satisfactions or the application of physical sanctions such as pain, deformity, or death.²⁰

Although an individual may be persuaded, coerced, tricked, or forced to join the movement, his goals and desires change as he stays with the organization. Recruitment is only the initial phase of involvement. Indoctrination brings about a socialization of the individual, and his experiences in participation with members of the movement change his attitude and eventually his goals.²¹

Insulation and Absorption

During the indoctrination period, the aim is to have the individual internalize the values of the organization. Total control is achieved through insulation and absorption. Through ideology the individual is insulated and given a separate moral and intellectual world within which to think and operate; all events are interpreted within the context of ideology.²² The conspiratorial atmosphere, with an emphasis on illegal work, starts a process of disintegration of normal moral principles and a reduction of inhibitions which hampers an individual's actions and manipulability. All of his time is absorbed by organizational activities—meetings, demonstrations, distribution of literature, and recruitment. This constant activity gives the individual's life an apparent meaning and removes him from outside interests and contacts.²³

Indoctrination and education tend to reinforce an individual's loyalty to the underground organization and to immerse him in the movement. The individual is disciplined and schooled to think in terms of how individual actions help or hinder the organization, not how they suit personal goals.²⁴

When an individual joins an organization, the number of decisions and alternatives available to him decreases. That is, he devotes most of his time to organizational activity and therefore limits his outside interests. As an individual reduces the number of personal relationships with others, he tends to internalize the rules of the organization and the less he searches for alternate forms of behavior. Small, closely knit cohesive groups are highly predictable in behavior. This rigidity increases the extent to which the group goals are perceived to be shared by all the members of the group, and thus its esprit de corps. In this manner individuals within the group protect themselves from outside pressures.²⁵

The internalization process is complete when the group member maintains his conduct without such enforcing agents as surveillance or direct threat of punishment and when he performs his duties for their own sake. As the individual builds up institutional habits and internalizes a code of conduct, he is less likely to leave the organization.²⁶ The smaller the group, the greater the individual's involvement and compatibility. The larger the organization, the greater the chance of conflict. The more extensive his participation in group activities, the more likely the individual is to develop loyalty and moral involvement and finally a commitment to the general goals of the organization.²⁷

Frequent assignments and a high degree of activity also have a useful side effect, providing the individual with an "invulnerability concept." He becomes so engrossed in his work that he loses any fear of harm coming to him. While aware that others have been caught, he is so busy with his daily routine that he unconsciously considers himself invulnerable.

Joining an underground movement is quite different from joining an ordinary political group. One ex-Communist says that it is not like joining a political party but like joining a church. It is a way of life.²⁸ Another former undergrounder says:

A faith is not acquired by reasoning. One does not fall in love with a woman, or enter the womb of a church, as the result of logical persuasion. Reason may defend an act of faith—but only after the act has been committed, and the man committed to the act. Persuasion may play a part in a man's conversion; but only the part of bringing to its full and conscious climax a process which has been maturing in regions where no persuasion can penetrate.²⁹

The act of commitment in insurgent organizations is uniformly an oath-taking process. The individual performs some symbolic, overt act which demonstrates that he is willing to accept the rules of the organization and abide by its sanctions if he does not conform. Once committed, the individual reorganizes his frame of reference and the way he views the world to conform to his commitments.

There are several major mechanisms for keeping members cooperative and working in unison. An individual rises to leadership positions by being highly active and then assuming a full-time position within the organization. Those individuals who have special qualifications but lack essential disciplinary characteristics can be put in special positions through the process of co-optation: they are put on certain committees and participate in some organizational activities without following the rules of ordinary membership. Individuals outside of the organization may also be brought in to support the organizational goals through cooptation. An individual who does not agree with the subversive group's main goals or activities may be brought to support the organization by giving him assistance in attaining limited goals which the individual favors within the community. This happens frequently in front groups. An individual may favor disarmament or be opposed to the government for specific reasons; the subversive group sponsors and supports him, obtaining his loyalty in return.³⁰

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The atmosphere of the underground has been described as

... a paradoxical atmosphere—a blend of fraternal comradeship and mutual distrust. Its motto might have been: Love your comrade but don't trust him an inch—both in your own interest, for he may betray you; and in his, because the less he is tempted to betray, the better for him. This, of course, is true of every underground movement; and it was so much taken for granted that nobody seemed to realize the gradual transformation of character and of human relationships which a long Party career infallibly produced.³¹

Communist Factors in Organization Processes

Communist organizations are characterized by five major organizational factors: (1) ideology, (2) democratic centralism, (3) criticism and self-criticism techniques, (4) the committee system, and (5) cell structure. The effectiveness and use of these organizational techniques rest on some basic principles of social organization.

Endless indoctrination sessions are characteristic of Communist organizations. They are not primarily designed to teach specific or detailed ideological content. The organization coins value terms—such as "deviationist" and "personality cult"—which to the outsider have no real semantic value but within the organization carry positive or negative connotations and indicate to the membership those things which the leadership favors or does not favor. Through constant indoctrination, the value systems these terms represent are inculcated into the membership and normative patterns of behavior are developed.

Individuals tend to abide by a decision as long as they are permitted to voice their opinions, notwithstanding the outcome. Through the principle of democratic centralism, the Communists have capitalized upon this common social phenomenon. Members are seemingly permitted to participate in the decision-making process even though the leadership fully controls the structure. Although the Communist organization does not allow free elections, and even though decisions are largely made in advance, the membership does discuss and criticize issues before they are guided to the "correct" position. Further, if the individual has supported a measure, even superficially, he is more committed to carrying out required action.

All cells within the party hold criticism and self-criticism sessions in which each member must criticize others' activities as well as his own. These sessions permit the leadership to better understand the individual member's capabilities and problems and provide social pressure to reinforce normative behavior. The group discussion provides consensual validation of group beliefs, and the individual can justify his behavior in his own mind because the rest of the group approves of it. The leader also can use the self-criticism session to praise members. However, precautions are taken to prevent attacks on the goals of the party itself; criticism is directed toward improving means to further the ends of the party. Furthermore, each individual must state his plan to correct his defects; the group thus requires him to raise his level of aspiration in performing his duties.

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The committee system provides ample opportunity for everyone to participate in leadership roles. Members learn to be leaders in this way, and in the process the group satisfies the power desires of its members.

The small size of the cell makes it a more cohesive group and tends to reduce inner frictions. As stated earlier, the smaller the group, the more effective its control over its members. Where the party is illegal, and where such control is especially important, cells average four to six members.

In summary, it may be seen that the Communist Party has evolved value and norm systems as well as organizational mechanisms which create a high degree of cohesiveness in its operations. Furthermore, the techniques seem to be effective in providing informational feedback to the leadership. The criticism and self-criticism sessions apply social pressure to reinforce the behavior patterns acquired through indoctrination; they also increase levels of aspiration and commitment.

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FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER FIVE
CLANDESTINE AND COVERT BEHAVIOR

A former underground leader has suggested that while it is difficult to completely escape from modern scientific surveillance methods, there are many ways to mislead the surveillants. The underground member, wishing to minimize risk and chance factors, attempts to be as inconspicuous as possible and refrains from activities which might bring attention or notoriety.¹ He strives to make his activities conform with the normal behavior and everyday activities of the society in which he lives. By appearing conventional and inconspicuous, he makes it difficult for the security force to detect, identify, or locate him. Besides making himself inconspicuous, the underground member avoids materials or contacts that might give him away. Subversives keep a minimum of records and contact other agents only when essential. Without physical evidence, signed confessions, or defectors who accuse others, it is difficult to link an individual to a subversive organization. Contact and communications between agents is considered the most critical phase of subversive operations.

Even when a subversive is identified and his activities known, the practice of clandestine and covert behavior makes it exceedingly difficult for security forces to locate him among a country's millions of citizens.

DEFINITIONS OF CLANDESTINE AND COVERT BEHAVIOR

Both clandestine and covert operations are secret, but in different ways. Clandestine operations are those whose existence is concealed, because the mere observation of them betrays their illegal and subversive nature. Secrecy depends upon skill in hiding the operation and rendering it invisible. For example, weapons might be manufactured in some rural redoubt, out of view and hidden from the eyes of the security forces. Covert operations are usually legal activities that serve as a cover for their concealed, illegal sponsorship. In short, clandestine behavior is hidden from view, while covert behavior is disguised to conceal its subversive character.²

A classic example of a covert operation appeared in Italy at the end of World War II. The Mossad was the Jewish underground organization in charge of the movement of Jews from Central Europe to Mediterranean ports. In 1946, the Mossad unit operating in Italy found it impossible to move on roads and obtain fuel and spare parts without special licenses and permits. The unit had acquired 40 British Army vehicles, but a major problem was how to maintain and fuel the vehicles without arousing the suspicion of the British military police. To provide the

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needed cover, the Mossad created and staffed an imitation British Army installation of their own on land "requisitioned" near a town. Since many of the underground had served in the British Army, they were able to duplicate the authentic military atmosphere. The camp was complete with badges, insignias, and notices. It had identification numbers in accordance with British practice, and local laborers were employed. With forged company papers, work tickets, and requisition papers, they took over a large courtyard and garage in the center of Milan. They provided themselves with everything that the Army should have—signboards, official documents, papers, guards, motor pool, and so on. The whole installation operated without suspicion from the Italian civilians it employed or even from the genuine British soldiers who periodically brought their jeeps to the motor pool for gasoline. In this manner, the Mossad provided both provisions and fuel for the motor vehicles that transported many thousands of refugees. The camp functioned for two years without arousing suspicion. It attained the reputation among the British camps in the zone as being a proper, well-disciplined camp, which would "not issue even a drop of petrol without orders."³

TECHNIQUES OF CLANDESTINE BEHAVIOR

The techniques of clandestine and covert behavior utilized by undergrounds are multifarious. They involve organizational devices, patterns of communication, and rigid security procedures.*

Organization

Subversive organizations try to distribute cells and units over widely separated geographic areas and among different ethnic and social groups. In this way, the government security forces can be extended so that they cannot concentrate on any single area or social group. The Malayan Communist Party, made up almost entirely of indigenous Chinese, was easy prey for the security forces. On the other hand, the FLN in Algeria was composed mostly of Muslims, who constituted 90 percent of the population, and its cells were widely distributed throughout the country.

The specific geographic location of the cell can minimize the chance of being detected. During the Palestine insurgency the Jews set up a major transportation center less than 100 yards from the headquarters of the British forces in Tel Aviv but aroused no suspicion. However, it was also near a powerplant and a central bus station and amid many garages and auto workshops where day-and-night traffic was normal.⁴ Similarly, in Algeria, Yassef Saadi, a

*For a brief summary of the rules of clandestine and covert behavior practiced by five underground organizations during World War II, see Appendix C.

political-military commissar of the FLN, took advantage of the hustle of a busy spot, and set up his offices only 200 yards from the office of the Army Commandant of the Algiers Section.⁵

Individual cell members are instructed to seek no more information than is required to perform their tasks.⁶ The cell members must go through an intermediary or through a mail-drop in order to get in touch with the cell leader, whose identity and location are unknown to them. Liaison between echelons is so regulated that a captured member cannot lead his captors to the next highest official with whom he regularly conducts business. All contacts with higher echelons are prearranged through intermediaries, and the higher official sets the time and place for meeting. If a cell member is captured, the chain between the cell and the leader is broken, thus cutting off the cell from the organization and protecting the underground organization from compromise. This fail-safe principle is found in almost all underground organizations and operations.⁷

Records are kept to a minimum; wherever possible, information is memorized rather than recorded. Messages are coded in some manner before being written down. Cover names are used in order to protect the identities of the people. Individual members are instructed not to keep any written messages or diaries.⁸ False units are established and communications and records created for them in order to confuse the security forces should they acquire or capture any organizational records.⁹

Communications

Communicating with another underground member is the most dangerous activity in clandestine or covert operations.¹⁰ A cardinal rule in underground operations is that agents should be seen together in public only when absolutely necessary. They usually work through an intermediary who meets each agent separately and conveys messages back and forth. The use of couriers is probably the safest means of communication and transmission of information between various agents. Ninety percent of all communications in the Philippine insurgency and in Korea involved the use of couriers. Couriers generally are children, women, or aged men, who can move about without drawing attention to themselves. This was true in Italy, in Poland, and in Belgium. Preferably, the courier should travel as a natural part of his job, and such people as taxi drivers and traveling vendors make good couriers.¹¹

Another means of transmitting information between agents is the mail-drop. The underground agents come by prearranged schedule, one at a time, to a particular location where a message is left. The location of the mail-drop must be a natural and safe place, such as an old log in a park, where strangers will not accidentally pick up the message. Usually, a reserve drop is designated in the event the first one is unusable. The communication should not be left in the mail-drop for long. Signals are prearranged for each drop, usually at a different

location, so that the agent will know when the drop is full or when it is empty. In this way he need not go there and perhaps arouse suspicion only to find that there is no communication.¹² Ideal locations for mail-drops or for the alerting signals are places such as telephone booths or washrooms where an individual commonly goes alone without suspicion.¹³

The telephone is seldom used; agents are usually forbidden to call each other directly. If telephones are used in an emergency, the individual goes to a pay station and uses a prearranged code. Neither is the open mail used often. If mail must be received from abroad, it is sent to a cover address, which may be that of a person who has frequent visitors, such as a merchant. Mail is never delivered to an agent's house. He goes to the post office to get it so no letter can be traced through the mails directly to an agent.¹⁴

Strict rules for meetings are observed. Underground members are careful not to use the same meeting place too frequently. Before the meeting, the family at whose house the meeting will be held is checked to be sure that they are thoroughly reliable. Someone within the family is assigned to answer the door in case an outsider knocks and to serve as a lookout. Times of arrival and departure are staggered to avoid attracting attention to large groups coming or going.

Once at the meeting, explanations or cover stories are arranged among the members in case the meeting should be broken up by security forces and the group interrogated separately. A reason for the gathering is established, such as "getting together to play cards." Others would be such occasions as birthdays, anniversaries, or weddings. No more documents are taken or carried to the meeting than are absolutely necessary. Note-taking is not permitted; the individual must use his memory. After the meeting, a rearguard checks to be sure that no materials have been forgotten.¹⁵

When meeting in public, visual identification marks and passwords are usually used as recognition signals. Generally, passwords are innocent-sounding, so that if the wrong person is approached or the exchange is overheard by bystanders, it will not be interpreted with suspicion. The password may ask directions or make similar innocent requests. Visual identification marks include the wearing of unique combinations of clothes or the carrying of specified objects. For any meeting between agents, should contact be missed on the first try, a second place is prearranged for ten minutes later.¹⁶

There are many ways in which an individual takes precautions to insure against being followed to a rendezvous with another agent. When driving to make a contact, an individual can alter his speed, enter intersections on a yellow light, or turn a corner and stop abruptly. Or he may use the switch-point technique: he drives to a particular location in a "drop car," gets out of the car, and walks across a parking lot or into a department store to another location where he is picked up by a second car (the "pick up"), is driven to another place to be picked up by a third vehicle, and then is taken to his destination.¹⁷

When traveling on foot, an agent attempts to leave a subway at the last minute or to enter a hotel or bus terminal at one door and leave by another. He can also use a store window along a main street as a mirror to see if anyone is following him.¹⁸

Security

Recruits are usually not accepted until their family life, jobs, political activities, and close associates have been investigated. Most undergrounds also require a probationary membership period. The individual is assigned limited tasks and his contacts with other members of the cell are restricted. Even in guerrilla units, the recruit is given no assignments that would bring him in contact with outsiders. The new member goes through an indoctrination period and is given tests in order to determine how he thinks and what he feels on particular issues. In addition, disciplinary squads are used to inspect the belongings of individuals on occasion to find out if they have violated any security rules.¹⁹

Most underground movements require new members to take a loyalty oath designed to commit them to the organization and impress upon them the seriousness of the job. Such oaths usually require the individual to accept all missions and obey all orders on penalty of death. Sometimes there are lesser penalties for lesser violations of security rules.²⁰

HUMAN FACTORS IN CLANDESTINE AND COVERT BEHAVIOR

The most serious danger in clandestine operations comes not from spies or infiltrators but from the inadequacy of the human beings who compose the underground. One of the most critical areas of underground work is the teaching of members to maintain silence. Normal curiosity leads members to find out more information than they should know. A second difficulty is that people want to talk about their accomplishments to someone; it is through idle talk and un-
10 guarded conversations that most clandestine organizations are compromised. To guard against
9 this, undergrounds stress discipline. At the same time, they try to develop a sense of dis-
8 cretion among the members so that "adherence to the rules" won't stifle initiative. Maximum
7 observation of rules can lead to passivity and inaction, so members must be willing to waive
6 any rule and attempt any action which circumstances demand, if the end seems worth the risk.²¹

Within any society there are customs and norms by which people abide without question. By
5 capitalizing upon these customs the underground can carry out many of its activities in a normal
4 manner and under good cover. For example, one woman courier carried a message concealed
3 among half a dozen eggs in a bag; the guard, afraid of breaking the eggs, did not inspect the bag
2 closely.²² The role of women and children in most societies is a protected one and they are
1 usually beyond suspicion, which is why they are so frequently used as couriers.

Certain social roles can be assumed to avoid interrogation. Pretending to be insane, deaf-and-dumb, or sick—e.g., having a toothache—is effective because such roles are generally accepted without question.²³ Similarly, certain locations are unlikely to be investigated. One courier who could not find lodgings sought out the redlight district of a major city; he assumed that the underworld had agreements with the police and he could be safe for a short time in these quarters.

In populations where there are many subcultures, a knowledge of normative behavior is critical. During the Arab-Israeli campaign, Arabic-speaking Israeli raiders disguised themselves as Arab military personnel, police, tribesmen, or pilgrims to carry out sabotage missions. A special unit of dark-skinned Jews from Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Morocco was formed. This "Black Regiment" had many successful exploits. However, in some cases their operations failed because of human error. For example, not knowing that only Arab officers—not the rank-and-file—use handkerchiefs and toilet paper jeopardized missions. A Mecca-bound Muslim pilgrim never relieves himself facing east, for this is the direction of the holy city and is reserved for prayer. Further, it is a grave offense to clean one's nose with a finger of the left hand; this hand is reserved for the lavatory. Other missions failed because the raiders smoked Israeli-made cigarettes and dropped butts along the beach after clandestine landings—Arabs not only did not smoke Israeli cigarettes but seldom, if ever, threw cigarette butts away. These cultural factors compromised many of the disguises of the raiders.²⁴

Another example of habit being relied upon for use as cover occurred in Palestine. An illegal cargo was covered with a tarpaulin and a layer of fresh manure. The police disliked searching such a load too closely and the cargo got through police inspection without being stopped.²⁵

An individual who has a preexisting frame of reference reacts immediately to new events, without reflection. When a person's mental context is thus fixed, he possesses what has been described as a "will to believe."²⁶ This factor may be capitalized upon by the underground by knowing the mentality and habits of the police. For example, in Palestine trucks with insignias of well-known transport companies were used to transport illegal cargo. A "policeman" preceded the truck, which appeared to be moving from an established factory.²⁷ In addition, diversionary efforts were made: a man would strike a policeman just as the truck was about to pass. The resulting commotion permitted the truck to go by unnoticed. Another device used to avoid roadblocks was to have trucks join military convoys. It was necessary, however, to call ahead and include in the convoy two or three trucks from "another unit." The unit was usually expressed in some abbreviation which would be unquestioned by the men at roadblocks.

Trademarks of well-known products have been put on illicit equipment. Capsules for explosives have been marked "Bayer" (like the aspirin). In this manner, suggestion and the use of normal everyday patterns of behavior have concealed illegal activities.²⁸

Within any society, there are symbols associated with certain roles. Individuals can be recognized as important, but not specifically identified, by the uniform or clothes worn. In one operation, an Israeli reconnaissance squad requisitioned a set of fancy dress uniforms from the Hebrew National Opera in Tel Aviv. The commanding officer put on a 19th-century, Imperial Austro-Hungarian Hussar uniform with gold shoulder boards and glittering buttons. In a white jeep, the squad calmly drove across the Arab lines and introduced themselves to the sentries at the first control checkpoint as United Nations military observers from Luxembourg. They cruised up and down the enemy lines for a day and even lunched with an Arab colonel.²⁹

Sometimes an underground establishes certain innocent patterns of behavior that it later capitalizes on. For example, in Palestine an isolated seashore police post was penetrated by a young boy and girl working for the Haganah. They went swimming daily, and, on leaving the bathing area, walked directly past the police guards. The police became accustomed to seeing the couple, and even the dog at the police station got to know them and stopped barking. In this manner, information was obtained for a raid.³⁰ By conditioning the guards to an apparently innocent pattern of behavior, the underground was able to take advantage of opportunities for gathering intelligence.

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INTRODUCTION

To develop an effective organization, undergrounds must perform certain basic administrative activities, such as recruiting qualified and loyal personnel, indoctrinating and training the membership, and obtaining financial support. In all of these activities a number of critical human factors are involved.

For instance, people must be recruited in such a manner that those who refuse to join do not later inform on the recruiters or expose the movement. Undergrounds must also devise means to persuade and deeply commit those who join for a whim. Training processes must be structured so that recruits are steeled to carry out dangerous assignments, yet remain loyal for long and stressful periods of time. In order to finance an insurgency, a regular supply of funds is required. Because tax collection or other imposition of financial burdens on a populace is unpopular even under normal circumstances, undergrounds must devise ways to get large sums of money while keeping the voluntary support and protection of the people.

The following three chapters discuss these three important administrative operations: recruitment, education and training, and finance. The performance of these administrative activities varies widely and is contingent upon the situation and the effectiveness of the security forces. There is no one best way to perform them, and so several approaches are described for each operation. For example, both selective and mass recruitment methods are discussed. In the chapter on education and training, topics and documents which have been considered important enough to be included in various training programs are reviewed. The chapter on finance attempts to bring together the little that has been written on collection techniques and places a special emphasis on human factors considerations.

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CHAPTER SIX
RECRUITMENT

The types of people recruited into an underground movement and how they are recruited depend largely upon the movement's stage of development. At first, primary attention is given to the development of a carefully chosen, well-disciplined cadre. Later, greater emphasis is given to developing mass support.

First the recruiter identifies talented people with grievances, surreptitiously tests each individual's loyalty to the government, and then through a process of gradual commitment leads the recruit into illegal and underground work. Recruits are seldom placed in positions where they must immediately decide to join or not to join the underground. Instead, through a series of seemingly innocent or slightly illegal acts which, when viewed by an outsider, appear subversive or illegal, the recruit is led to believe that an overt commitment to the underground is his only alternative. He suddenly finds himself in a position where to betray the underground he must also incriminate himself; if he does not join, the underground may tell the police about the illegal acts he has been enticed to commit.

Appeals to recruits are usually based upon the assumption that everyone has grievances, temptations, and vulnerabilities. It is the recruiter's task to uncover, crystallize, and exploit the right combination of these personal and situational factors. Appeals to ego, power, or recognition are strong factors in attracting individuals to a movement. Such rewards and profits are devices used to entice individuals and to keep them involved, whereas techniques of social pressure and threats of social sanction are used to obtain final commitment. In short, the recruit is attracted by making appeals which coincide with his value system, yet which lead him from lesser acts for profit to final acts of commitment.

Undergrounds seldom rely solely upon the good intentions of recruits. Typically, they
10 _ avoid leaving anything to chance. Because reasons such as patriotism, social justice, or
9 _ personal grievances may or may not be sufficient for attracting or sustaining recruits through
8 _ the long dangerous struggle of protracted war, coercive measures are also implied, or even
7 _ applied, by the underground. Incriminating evidence may be kept to insure that recruits do not
6 _ defect. In the recruit's oath, a death penalty is usually the price for betrayal of organizational
5 _ secrets or defection, and special terror squads are retained especially to carry out the penalty.
4 _
3 _ During mass recruitment the recruiter realizes that while many people will volunteer,
2 _ others must be persuaded and coerced into joining. For those who are likely to volunteer (per-
1 _ haps because of personal grievances), the recruiter finds that listening is a technique as im-
portant as persuasive argument. Professional recruiters also recognize that knowing the
values, vocabulary, and specific grievances of local people is important in mass recruiting.

But since the knowledge to make such specific appeals requires a long association with the people, recruiters usually must rely upon keymen who are native to the area or village to help them tailor their appeals. Through such keymen they attempt to use local customs as well as social and group pressures as tools in winning recruits.

SELECTIVE RECRUITMENT

The recruiting process is dangerous to the underground organization for several reasons. If an individual who is approached informs the police, a valuable recruiter may be lost. Accepting any recruit without investigation and trial may lead to infiltration or the inclusion of undesirables. Recruitment is conducted by a small team which follows the fail-safe principle in each step of the process. A potential recruit is identified and put in a position where he can safely be approached about joining the movement. Then he is led to commit himself through various acts to the underground. He must be tested and trained and finally, if he proves acceptable, he is assigned to a permanent cell.

The Recruiters

At meetings, organizational groups, or discussion clubs, the first recruiting agent, or steerer, identifies individuals who are in positions which might be useful to the underground or who are ideologically susceptible to recruitment. The steerer may engage an individual in general discussion to identify his grievances and feelings toward the government. If an individual is considered ideologically attuned, he is then introduced to the next person in the recruitment chain. The steerer never mentions the underground organization or voices any subversive opinions. It is his job to discover an individual's characteristics and pass the information on. In this way, the steerers conceal their subversive connections and escape the danger of being denounced by recruits whose attitudes they may have misjudged.

The Buildup

The second member of the recruitment team asks the potential recruit to join him at an informal social party or discussion group at which current events and political issues are discussed. In the discussion, the individual's attitudes can be further evaluated and at the same time his background can be checked. The underground agent befriends the recruit and plays upon his ego and personal desires for position, power, and importance.

In Malaya, in some of the Communist-led unions, lectures were given to party members several times a week. Agents in the audience observed the reactions of the workers. Those

who seemed interested and receptive and who possessed leadership ability were identified as potential recruits. The topics discussed were usually broad social issues rather than ideological material. Front groups were used in a similar way to evaluate the attitudes and inclinations of potential recruits.²

Commitment

The individual is not asked pointblank to join but is led gradually toward commitment through a series of small decisions. He is asked whether he is free to distribute leaflets, collect funds, or carry messages. The final decision to join the underground really becomes an extension of lesser decisions preceding it. He may be asked to buy food or other materials from a local store. Later, he is told by a third member of the team that he was buying supplies for the underground and warned that if the police were to find out he would be arrested. He is not given the option of joining, but may merely be asked whether he wishes to stay in the village as a tax collector or leave to join the guerrillas in the mountains. Faced with this choice and implicit threats of violence from the underground or arrest by the police, he will select the least undesirable alternative.

In another approach a person may be asked to donate funds to the movement. If he seems reluctant, the third member of the team may suggest to him that if he collects money from others, he himself need not donate to the movement. The individual may half-heartedly attempt to collect some money and once he has committed himself to this extent, even if he collects only a token amount, he can be coerced into performing other assignments.

The Test

The individual's loyalty to the underground is tested by assessing his willingness to perform some minor illegal task. He may be asked to deliver an "important" message to a particular location. The message may be a blank piece of paper with a hidden seal. The individual is then evaluated as to how well he carried out the assignment and whether or not he examined the contents. Even if he reports the incident to the police, nothing is lost.³ Desire to join is important but often desire wanes, therefore acts which may be used to coerce loyalty are also required.

The Oath

Most, if not all, underground movements administer a loyalty oath to new members to impress upon them the seriousness of their jobs and the necessity for secrecy. In most of the

European resistance movements, violation of the oath was punishable by death.⁴ In the Mau Mau movement, oaths were especially significant, for the Kikuyu tribesmen believed that if they violated the oath they would be punished by a supernatural power.⁵

In the Viet Cong, the ceremony for admission is simple but very serious. A Viet Cong flag and a picture of Ho Chi Minh are used to convey authority. At the swearing-in ceremony the only people present are the applicant himself, the secretary, and two comrades who sponsor the member.

In the Malayan Communist Party, after recruits had been screened in security investigations, they had to be recommended by members with whom they had had contact. Members were often held personally responsible if the recruit proved unreliable.⁶

Assignment

During the background check, the recruit's personal record is thoroughly investigated. Until cleared as reliable, he is placed in a probationary cell. During probation, he is tried on various underground activities to determine which he performs best. He is assigned a variety of tasks during this apprenticeship and is forced to practice a variety of security precautions; in this way he is trained to become a well-disciplined, highly security-conscious individual who can be counted on to work independently and to show initiative in future assignments in his permanent cell.

This last step in the recruitment process, assignment to a permanent cell, is reached only after the recruit has been thoroughly tested, observed, trained, and evaluated.

MASS RECRUITMENT

After the underground cadre has been established, a base of support is sought among large segments of the population.* Cells set up in the cities and throughout the countryside form the nucleus for action devised to win sympathy and, ultimately, popular support. Most often such support is rallied behind a specific grievance and only later channeled into active insurgency. Many techniques are used to infiltrate mass organizations and gain leadership posts.

Feelings of Indebtedness

Members of the underground are instructed to create social indebtedness by finding and helping families "in trouble"—the propertyless, the unemployed, and the sick. This enables the

*In Indochina, Vo Nguyen Giap said that, in order to prepare for an insurrection, organizations must be developed and consolidated within the cities, mines, plantations, and provinces; he stressed that only on the basis of strong political organization could armed organizations be set up.

underground worker to enter the family or the neighborhood and gain the attention and loyalty of a large number of people. Pressure is then applied to have the people repay their indebtedness by assisting the movement and eventually joining it. A favorable word from a mother, father, relative, or close friend can be a more powerful persuader than any impersonal propaganda message.⁸

The agent, much like a ward or precinct politician, surveys the needs, likes, and dislikes of the people in his district. He may keep individual records on all who live in his area of responsibility. He may find jobs for the unemployed, arrange housing for those who do not have shelter, or assist farmers with their crops.*

In rural areas and small villages, where the close personal contacts among the villagers make it difficult to organize secret cells, a special technique is used. An insurgent force marches into and takes over a village. They assist the farmers in the fields and help raise production, hoping in this way to develop close contacts in spite of having come uninvited.¹²

Coercion

Coercion is widely used against those who do not voluntarily join the movement. Techniques range from the simple "armed invitation," where recruiters brandish their weapons and extend an invitation to "volunteers," to more-complex techniques of gradual involvement and threat of exposure. † Another technique in insurgent-controlled areas is to assign quotas to local officials, such as mayors and village chiefs, who use the social power and prestige of their office to recruit new members.¹⁵

*The Communist Chinese used mutual aid teams to help farmers harvest crops.⁹ Vo Nguyen Giap said, "Our army has always organized days of help for peasants in production work and in the struggle against flood and drought. Political work begins by establishing good relations with the populace."¹⁰ In Cuba, Alberto Bayo recommended that the men should volunteer to repair household items, help put up fences and sow fields, or do any kind of manual work, in order to "demonstrate our affection and gratitude and bring him over to our cause."¹¹

10 †A typical example of coercion was used in Malaya. A rubber tapper's duties took him
9 daily into the jungle to tend the rubber trees. On one occasion, he was approached by three
8 armed men. They were friendly, and talked him into bringing them cigarettes the next day. 8
7 Soon he began smuggling such items as aspirins and flashlights; getting these things past the
6 guards at the village added a little interest to his life. One day, only two of the three men 7
5 showed up, explaining that the third had been captured and would almost certainly reveal the
6 rubber tapper's smuggling activities. Faced with the alternatives of returning to his village and
5 facing arrest and prison or joining the Communists who would protect him, he joined.¹³

4 In Cyprus, the EOKA underground used coercive means to secure recruits. A respected
3 watchmaker in Nicosia was warned that his name was high on the EOKA list for execution be-
2 cause he was suspected of having been in contact with the British Army, which he had served
1 with during World War II. He was told, however, that he could save his life and protect his
family if he joined the underground. Once in, he became more and more involved. His shop
was one of the mail-drops for the underground and he was given increasingly dangerous as-
signments. He was considered so thoroughly committed to the underground that he was allowed
to meet George Grivas, the closely guarded leader of the Greek Cypriot movement.¹⁴

Even after "recruitment," coercion is continued to discourage defection. Underground recruits are often given money for which a compromising receipt is obtained. They are made to sign documents and papers which would also incriminate them. Even those who are initially attracted by some idealistic approach may lose enthusiasm under stress, but by then they are trapped with evidence of their membership in the movement and have little choice but to remain there.¹⁶

Mao Tse-tung described what he called the "Road to Yen-an" for winning control of the people. He said, "People like doctors, generals, dentists, town mayors, lawyers, who are not rich, do not seek power for itself; much less for the good they can do with it. They want it for the wealth it can bring." He went on to say that if the Communists can help these greedy people, they should. It would be absurd not to help them. The more help they receive the more positions they will help the Communists capture. However, he admonished, never openly participate in fraud or plunder, and in carrying out collaboration, never leave evidence that can be used against the Communists. In selecting people, Mao suggests that politicians who have been passed over, doctors mired in mediocrity, and lawyers with limited means be sought out, for, he said, these people know they must fulfill their end of the bargain or be destroyed. The objective is not so much to win friends and sympathizers as it is to gain servants. Workers will stay with you if you get them something and abandon you if you don't.

In countries which have democratic processes and civil liberties, Mao suggests adopting a popular front to attract all groups, leftist or not, good or bad, sincere or insincere. But above all, "tempt them, each through his particular weakness. . . help them to get what they want, put pressure, first with offers, later with threats. Compromise them if you can, so that they can't get away."

Mao said, "We seek people who serve us, through greed, through fear, inferiority, vengeance, what have you, but who serve us, serve the party, serve the design of the Comintern, serve the cause of the revolution. . . that is the essence of the Yen-an way."¹⁷

Suggestion

In recruiting young people, persuasion is particularly effective. Teenagers are highly suggestible and strongly influenced by their peers.¹⁸ It is a usual technique to separate the youngsters from the elders, so that cooler heads will not prevail against youthful enthusiasm.

According to a Viet Cong recruiting document, the first step is to organize large gatherings of young people for a celebration, a political rally, or a cultural event, segregating them from the older people of the village. During the gathering recruiters make heated speeches denouncing the government. Earlier recruits are planted in the audience to applaud the speeches

and volunteer to follow the Viet Cong to the mountain bases. The young people, emotionally aroused by the speeches and seeing fellow teenagers "volunteering," also volunteer to go.

Another technique used by the Viet Cong in areas where they have little or no following, is to bring in armed propaganda teams. If they have little success in getting volunteers, they kidnap several young men who have not evidenced positive hostility. After training and indoctrination, the young men are returned to their villages where they report on their good treatment. The Viet Cong seldom has difficulty getting subsequent volunteers from the area.

Alienation From the Government

Counterinsurgent actions can be used by the rebels to alienate the local people from the government. Insurgent activity may be designed chiefly to draw heavy reprisals, most of which fall on innocent villagers' heads. The insurgents can then point out how unfairly and harshly their government treats its loyal citizens. Recruits will be gained from the vengeful or disillusioned members of the populace.

In Algeria, terroristic action such as assassinations and bomb-throwing caused the French to take severe repressive measures against the general populace. These measures drove many people into the rebel camp.¹⁹ Similarly, in Greece, guerrillas made their attacks on installations appear to come from nearby villages; government troops then retaliated against the villagers. This alienated the villagers from the government forces, and many joined or supported the underground cause.²⁰

In South Vietnam, the Viet Cong marched into one hamlet and allowed information to be passed to government security forces that they were going to hold the hamlet for at least 3 days. The next day, Republic of Vietnam military forces arrived and for 18 hours strafed the area from air and ground. When they entered the hamlet, they found that the Viet Cong had long departed; the villagers had borne the losses, both of personnel and property.²¹ In the Philippines, one man who was beaten up by government troops as a suspected Huk bitterly joined the Huks in order to get revenge.²²

Thus, government measures and military actions have alienated a number of individuals and driven them into the insurgent camp. The use of mass destruction weapons such as napalm and artillery on villages believed hiding insurgents is probably sufficient to turn an entire village against the government and toward the insurgents.

Appeals

Several types of appeals are used to draw people into the movement. Some individuals join because they feel they will receive positions of power as a result of being on the "winning side."

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173

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An interview with a former anti-Nazi underground member revealed that he joined in hopes of getting a high-ranking post in the government. 23 One undergrounder said:

... The love of power is today endemic even to those social classes which in other days were least susceptible to its temptations. It drives men to run risks and make sacrifices of which they would not otherwise be capable. 24

One Soviet agent was instructed to search for those who would profit from connections with him. He was instructed not to be concerned with offering material advantages. Instead, he was told to seek out those who were hurt by fate or nature. The types of people to look for are the ugly, those suffering from inferiority complexes, those craving for power and influence, and those who have been defeated by circumstances. He was told to look for people who have suffered from poverty—not so much those who lack material wealth but those who have suffered from the humiliation associated with poverty. Belonging to a strong organization gives them a sense of importance and a feeling of superiority over the handsome and more prosperous people whom they have always envied. 25

The underground is careful to appear highly selective in its recruiting, thus flattering the prospective recruit with the knowledge that he is wanted by an exclusive group. One former underground member said that he was told that they were interested in him but not his friend; later he found that both he and his friend had been recruited. Another recruit was told that everyone in the movement felt the same as he did, and that if he joined he would have an entire organization at his disposal to help him carry out his own ideas. 26

Some individuals are enticed into joining the underground in hopes of bettering their condition economically. In Poland during World War II, the underground members never lacked food, clothing, or other necessities, even when such items were generally unavailable. 27 In the Philippines during the Huk insurgency, young men were offered jobs at salaries far higher than could be gotten outside of the movement. Others joined simply because there were no jobs of any kind available on the outside. In many areas, individuals have prospered by black-market dealings with the underground. 28

Individual grievances can be amplified to create feelings of helplessness and frustration. The organization is then offered as a means for redress. The individual is led to believe that by joining he will receive the massive support of a large organization to remedy his personal grievance.

It is clear, therefore, that effective appeals for recruiting underground members are many and varied. One individual may feel that the cause is good and join the movement out of conviction; such a decision is usually based upon careful deliberation. A second individual may join as an emotional reaction against people or conditions: he identifies himself with the leaders or members of the movement and once committed may use its goals and ideas as a substitute religion. A third type of individual is influenced by social pressures and joins the movement

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because his parents, friends, relatives, or neighbors are members. A fourth type seeks personal advantage. Another may join because of a "bandwagon" effect; if the movement is succeeding, he may join because others join or because he fears being penalized or persecuted in some way if he does not join before victory is obtained.²⁹

DEVELOPMENT OF KEYMEN

In areas where the agent must remain secret or where the insurgent underground has no control, the agent-organizer is instructed to form secret channels consisting of himself, a keyman, and sympathizers. He may recruit up to three keymen, each of whom recruits two or three sympathizers, who in turn contact the people of the village.

The type of keyman sought by the agent is one with natural leadership abilities, the respect of his community, and some susceptibility to recruitment. The approach to this individual is tailored to his dissatisfactions. The most important thing that the agent can do is to be a sympathetic listener, hearing complaints and using these details to build up a sense of dissatisfaction. According to one captured member of the Viet Cong:

You must be patient in listening to people's problems. You must know what they are talking about and, most of all, you must leave the impression that their specific grievance is your main concern. With the peasants you discuss land reform and perhaps you promise education for the youth. You do not go far on generalities.³⁰

Thus, the first step of the agent in his recruitment of keymen is to survey the conditions and attitudes of the group from which he seeks recruits. Once a natural leader has been spotted, the second step is to involve this potential keyman in some campaign, preferably one related in some way to his personal grievance. Once his interest has been aroused, he is given minor assignments. The third step is to change the individual's specific dissatisfaction into general unrest regarding the status quo. All current evils are blamed on the government. Where there
10 is overlapping loyalty to the government and to the movement, the agent must polarize it, build 10
9 up an "in-group" feeling, and alienate the recruit from the government. In doing this, the 9
8 ruling authority is always referred to abstractly; government leaders are not attacked 8
7 personally. 7

6 Once he is recruited, the keyman in turn recruits sympathizers and is asked to infiltrate 6
5 and seek leadership positions in civic organizations. His recruiting is clandestine until a 5
4 cohesive group has been developed. Then the collective support of the organized group serves 4
3 to encourage others; there is a bandwagon effect—other members in the community join be- 3
2 cause their friends are members or because of the social pressure brought to bear by the group. 2

1 Keymen are important because people are more willing to accept guidance from members 1
of their own community than from outsiders. Further, a keyman knows the special conditions

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116

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within his community and can phrase appeals within its context. Since there is more confidence in the keyman than in the agent-organizer, it is the keyman who communicates with the people, not the organizer.

In summary, underground recruitment techniques are probably most successful when selectively applied. To a large degree, underground recruitment depends upon the careful screening and constant testing of potential recruits. This is true for both selective and mass recruitment. Careful study of potential recruits' loyalty to the government and their personal likes and dislikes is important in all underground recruitment.



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FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER SEVEN
EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Educational and training programs are an essential organizational feature of underground movements. The importance of training special cadres for the successful launching and operation of insurgencies has been emphasized in most undergrounds.

SCHOOLS

The training activities of the international Communist movement are particularly illustrative of underground training. The Communists have long specialized in the establishment of special schools for providing "international instructors." These schools have frequently been established, on an international basis, outside of the countries involved. During the early phase of the Comintern, the primary training headquarters for the Communist movement was the Soviet Union. The University of the Workers of the East, located near Moscow, was established in 1921 to train revolutionaries selected from throughout the world for special instruction. The school trained agents in underground political tactics, guerrilla warfare, intelligence and organizational methods, and the promoting of agitation and strikes. Students at the school used cover names and addresses, so that when they returned to their own countries they could instruct others in subversive methods without danger of exposure. 1

Today, the Lenin School near Moscow provides advanced training to Communists who have proven themselves in national parties. Again, the students follow the rules of conspiratorial behavior in their day-to-day activities, with assumed names and false biographies. The courses vary in length from one to three years, and the subjects covered include ideology, mass agitation, strikes, and guerrilla tactics. During the summer the classes move to the field for special exercises, map reading, and weapons training. Prominent Communists, such as Stalin and Tito, have lectured at the school. One well-known graduate of the Lenin School is Walter Ulbricht of East Germany. 2

There are other schools where young students receive political and ideological training. The Communist University for Western National Minorities (KUNMZ) was established in Moscow in 1921 to train White Russians and Ukrainians living outside the Soviet Union. A German sector was created after 1933 when large numbers of German Communists emigrated to the Soviet Union. Over a 3-year period, the youths covered Marxism-Leninism, party history, dialectical materialism, and other political and cultural subjects. One year before the school closed, there were 250 students enrolled, approximately half of whom were German or Austrian. 3

The People's Friendship University in Moscow was established to "train leaders for new countries of Africa and the poorer, older ones of Latin America." Its colleges concentrate on psychological-political warfare. One former Communist trainee reports that the range of instruction in political warfare subjects includes:

General

- The doctrines of Marx and Lenin concerning the role of government (the state, the party, and their roles in society);
- The Communist Party insurrectionary organization, its structure and methods;
- Labor unions as an instrument of economic and political warfare against capitalist democratic society;
- The strategy of neutralizing or demoralizing the middle classes;
- The strategy of winning over or neutralizing the farm population of the advanced countries;
- Communist colonial policy—the teachings of Lenin as elaborated by Stalin;
- The peasants as a main base for igniting colonial revolution.

Underground Warfare

- The role of Communists in the event of war against the Soviet Union;
- Infiltration of armed services;
- The relation between aboveground (legal) and underground (illegal) activities and the necessity of carrying on both at the same time;
- The purpose and methods of infiltrating government departments;
- The role of sabotage and espionage in political warfare.

Armed Insurrection

- How to form a paramilitary combat force;
- Means and methods of arming such a force;
- The role of such a force in case of war against the Soviet Union;
- The general scheme of seizing a city;
- How to hold a city after seizure;
- The supremacy of surprise in carrying out a successful insurrection;
- Techniques and objectives of guerrilla warfare;
- Probable countermeasures of a government sensing an insurrection and methods of overcoming same;
- The consolidation of power. 4

It has been reported that several thousand men and women have been trained in these colleges and then assigned to various posts throughout the world. Those from foreign areas are assigned to the countries from which they came, but can be recalled to Moscow at any time the university desires. 5

As interest grows in new areas, new subjects are introduced and tailored to the situation. For example, the potential use of witchcraft is included in programs for African nations. Reportedly, native Africans are trained in witchcraft so that upon their return to Africa they can use it to create unrest and cause the population to rise against the Caucasians. 6 One student who had participated in such a course but who later defected, stated that he was instructed in how to produce speech or noises from a skull or a skeleton by the use of hidden microphones,

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how to simulate spirit rappings, how to make a phantom appear from a cloud of smoke, and other bizarre techniques. 7

In reviewing the activities of past and present Moscow schools and the Communist undergrounds organized since the 1930's, there is evidence that many underground leaders have been trained in the Soviet Union. Besides Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia and Walter Ulbricht of Germany, these include Maurice Thorez of France, Crisanto Evangelista of the Philippines, Lai Teck of Malaya, Ho Chi Minh of Indochina, Chou En-lai of China, and Tan Malakka, Muso, and Alimin of Indonesia. 8 Muso remained more than 20 years in the Soviet Union. He was said to have been Stalin's choice as chief Communist leader in Southeast Asia. Both Muso and Alimin attended Lenin University, where the latter met Earl Browder of the United States, Pollitt of Great Britain, Sharkey of Australia, Thorez, and Chou En-lai. 9 There were, of course, many others such as Ana Pauker of Rumania who, because of their training in the Soviet Union, were chosen for positions of importance in post-World War II Communist governments.

The Moscow schools and universities were significant because they inculcated students with the importance of the policies of the Communist Party. In addition, they provided the technical knowledge necessary to run secret organizations throughout the world and to bind them together, both on a personal and organizational level. The graduates also served as a backup for Russian intelligence, one of the principal reasons for establishing schools for foreign students in the U.S.S.R. 10

The idea of training special cadres has spread from Moscow and schools have been established in many other parts of the world. For example, the Chinese Communist Party maintains a number of schools for pupils from Latin America. In a conference between Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev in Peking it was agreed that the Chinese had more experience than the Russians in guerrilla warfare and therefore could more effectively operate training centers for South American needs. 11

Alberto Bayo, Castro's teacher and mentor, directs a training site in Cuba which acts as a center for Latin American subversion. Bayo learned his lessons in tactics as an officer in the Spanish Foreign Legion. While serving in Morocco he became impressed with the ability of a few guerrillas to harass columns of troops many times their number. Bayo made a study of guerrilla warfare and advocated that it be used by the Spanish Republican forces (with whom he later served) against the forces of General Franco. His superiors demurred, however, because "conventional warfare" was the order of the day. With the defeat of the Republicans, Bayo fled to Cuba, and later to Mexico, where he trained exiles from Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic who made abortive attempts to start revolutions in their respective countries. 12

After his initial failure in Cuba in 1953, Fidel Castro went to Mexico and prevailed upon Bayo to train his first band of 56 men. This group underwent a rigorous 6-month course which included long daily marches with full pack, traversing jungle country at night, firearms practice, and the manufacture and use of all types of demolition equipment.

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Alberto Bayo now heads nine training schools for revolutionaries in Cuba. A Venezuelan student in one of these schools has stated that during the 4-month course the students worked 16 hours a day, 7 days a week. The principal textbook was Bayo's book, 150 Questions for a Guerrilla. The students were taught to make various kinds of incendiary and time bombs, booby traps, mines, and torpedoes. They also learned specific techniques for destroying bridges, oil pipelines, communication facilities, police stations, and even large government buildings. ¹³

Sabotage, however, was only part of the course. Emphasis was also placed on terror tactics to be used in urban areas to provoke riots and incite mobs. Techniques of robbing banks, destruction of natural resources, and assassination were also on the curriculum. ¹⁴

On July 3, 1963, the Council of the Organization of American States called attention to the existence in Cuba of a training center for subversive activities sponsored by international communism. The instructors for this center came from the U.S.S.R., China, and Czechoslovakia, while most of the students were from Latin American countries. The Council foresaw not only the danger of the ideology taught at the Cuban center, but the even greater danger in the eventual return of students to their own countries as underground agents. ¹⁵

External training bases are common to most insurgent movements. The Algerian Front for National Liberation (FLN) followed the Communist pattern. Headquartered in Cairo, the FLN early made arrangements for establishing training bases for Algerian revolutionaries in Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco. Training was also provided in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. ¹⁶

In Greece, an external training base for Communist guerrillas was located in Yugoslavia. A report issued in 1947 by the United Nations Special Commission on the Balkans mentioned the existence of a training camp at Bulkes, Yugoslavia. ¹⁷

The anti-Portuguese insurrection in Angola began in March 1961. Angolese insurgents were sent to Tunisia where they undertook a 7-month training course with the Algerian Liberation Army. Upon their return, 18 were appointed officers and given the task of training the entire rebel army. The Congolese provided an abandoned bivouac area about 70 miles from the Angolan border for the site of the training base. By November 1963 the camp was reportedly training 2,200 men every 8 weeks. In addition to weapons training, emphasis has been placed on political indoctrination. ¹⁸

External sources also influenced the training of the Vietminh in the early 1950's. Mao Tse-tung's scheme for conducting victorious wars of national liberation was outlined at a conference in Peking in November 1949, attended by Vietminh members and Communists from other South-east Asian countries.

The Vietminh quickly adopted the Mao formula and General Giap returned to North Vietnam in the 1950's with two basic plans. The first ordered general mobilization while the second made provisions for a change from purely guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare. While in China, General Giap also made arrangements for Vietminh guerrillas to be trained as regular forces.

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in Kwantung. Accordingly, early in 1950, thousands of Vietminh traveled to China. As the Mao influence increased, Ho Chi Minh introduced far-reaching political changes. To emphasize the need for a long-term struggle, he personally translated Mao Tse-tung's On Protracted Warfare into Vietnamese. 19

Much of the present-day training of the Viet Cong takes place in North Vietnam. One of the principal training centers is Xuan Mai near Hanoi. Political and military subjects are taught and training is given in such specialties as metallurgy, medical treatment, and intelligence work. The courses range from 4 to 6 months. The trainees then move to Vinh on the east coast and stop for additional training at Don Hoi, from where they are trucked to the Laotian border. From Laos they infiltrate South Vietnam and implement their training. 20

TRAINING

Literature

An international body of literature on the strategy and tactics of modern insurgency, underground, and guerrilla warfare has markedly increased during the past half century. Communist writers have perhaps contributed most to the literature. One of the first was Lenin, who in 1901 began writing "What Is To Be Done?" followed later by State and Revolution and Left-Wing Communism. 21 These works are not remote philosophical essays, but concise statements of the strategy and tactics of revolution. Lenin called for an integration of organizational and combat factors with Marxist economics and sociology, and set forth a guide to such necessary organizational and political work. Similarly, Mao Tse-tung's writings 22 serve as a primer for revolutionary strategy and tactics, emphasizing the political as well as the role of purely guerrilla-type forces in insurgent action. Both Lenin and Mao Tse-tung stress the close relationship between political and military or guerrilla action. Their works have been reprinted in millions of copies and are used as basic training manuals in many countries.

Following Mao Tse-tung's lead, General Giap of North Vietnam elaborated on the techniques and strategy of guerrilla warfare in People's War, People's Army. General Giap stresses the coordination of political, propaganda, and military strategies during insurgencies. He calls this "armed propaganda," advising that "political activities [are] more important than military activities, and fighting less important than propaganda." General Giap's lists of principles and advice for "preparing forces for an insurrection" make it an important modern handbook for insurgents. 23

Similarly, Ernesto "Che" Guevara in Guerrilla Warfare relates in detail various procedures and tactics developed during the Cuban insurrection of 1959. Although influenced greatly by the works of Mao Tse-tung, Guevara tailors his strategies to fit the Latin

American environment. He deals more with daily tactics than with overall organization or planning. 24

More pragmatic still is Gen. Alberto Bayo's 150 Questions for a Guerrilla. In terse, specific fashion, this experienced insurgent spells out the most mundane elements of organizing and executing underground and guerrilla warfare. For example, he explains how a camp is best organized and manned, down to latrine orderlies. Bayo also has prepared a kind of do-it-yourself kit for insurgents, explaining multifarious techniques and giving detailed instruction for making such things as "Molotov cocktails," tank traps, mines, and booby traps. 25

An example of a non-Communist handbook for guerrillas is Abdul Haris Nasution's Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare. 26 This Indonesian army officer reports on the experiences of Indonesia's insurgency against the Dutch. He lists a number of "fundamentals" for insurgent operations, enumerating the kinds of political, psychological, and military factors that should be considered.

Because these writers, particularly Giap, Guevara, and Bayo, emphasize action as well as ideological analysis, their works have been used as training manuals for both anti- and pro-Communist forces.

Political Indoctrination

Political and ideological training in Communist movements has importance over and beyond its content. Such training imbues the individual with a sense of dedication and ideological purpose that will insure his carrying out all directives, even under conditions where the party has no control. 27 The more distant a unit is from central control, the greater is the political training.

In the Viet Cong military organization, for example, full-time regular units have a rigid training schedule in which two-thirds of the time is spent in military study and one-third devoted to political content. At the district level, the proportion is fifty-fifty for political and military study. At the village level, study is 70 percent political and 30 percent military. The units are required to study the scope and objectives of the National Front (NFLSV) as well as the guerrilla warfare tactics of Mao Tse-tung. 28 Political training includes discussions of communism, plans for winning control of the country, and the need for support of the National Liberation Front. They are instructed to study each issue and are then required to "adopt an attitude." This is designed to enable each man to react immediately in a politically "correct" manner on every question.

The aim of Communist political instruction is to imbue students with the proper attitudes, beliefs, and objectives of the Communist system. Thus trainees learn to apply the "correct" approach even in the absence of directives.

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(United Press International Photo)

The writings of Mao Tse-tung, more than any Communist leader since V. I. Lenin, have been widely used by undergrounds throughout the world as basic training documents. Outlining the close relationship between political and guerrilla action, they serve as a primer for revolutionary strategy and tactics.

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Organization

One of the most important aspects of Communist training is its emphasis on organizational techniques. A former Communist who was in charge of the Communist Party's Latin American bureau has described the party's training approach. His first task upon arrival in Bogotá, Colombia, was to set up courses in organizational work for local labor unions and peasant groups. Organization was the aspect Latin American leaders knew least about, and they were greatly impressed with anyone who could bring them organizational knowledge. He trained ten people at a time during a series of 2-week courses in organization, and by the end of the year his trainees' organizations had all increased their membership. Later, he established courses for training students in organizational techniques at a university in Caracas, Venezuela. 29

An American and former Communist who served with the Huks' National Education Department in the Philippines described the daily activities of this center of revolution. One of the important features of the department's work was to publish, twice a month, 4- to 6-page self-study booklets, one for Huk soldiers and one for political workers, covering such subjects as organizing people and operating schools. 30

Guerrilla Training

The study of guerrilla warfare principles, particularly Mao Tse-tung's protracted war thesis, is also stressed in many Communist training programs. Communist doctrine suggests that military training should be carried out every day and that new techniques should be introduced regularly. Frequently, trainees are instructed to discuss and draw conclusions from field exercises and from documents exchanged between regions, and they are admonished to carry out battle analysis after every engagement.

The Vietnamese training program varied for the different levels of military forces. The local or village level units had a self-training program consisting of political, small arms, and sabotage instructions. More advanced village units performed close-order drill and received automatic weapons instruction. Assistance for these training programs was provided by regional or occasionally main-force troops. 31 At the district level, additional instruction on the use of automatic weapons and individual arms was given and fundamentals of small-unit tactics were introduced.

The regional units usually were made up of men who had been in the local and district guerrilla units and had received basic training with those units. At the regional level, more emphasis was placed on individual instruction on advanced weapons, unit tactics, special skills, and low-level staff duties. Instructors were usually officers from the main force. The men of the main force were usually chosen from the regional guerrilla units.

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The process of training and rising through the levels of organization often took several years and political training was stressed throughout. The main objective of the training program was to produce politically reliable and enthusiastic soldiers who could serve both as experienced fighters and propaganda agents.

Underground Support Training

North Vietnamese have trained infiltrators to manufacture and repair crude weapons to make simple blast furnaces for producing cast iron for weapons. Specialists, such as doctors, pharmacists, union and youth organizers, and radio technicians have also been given 2 months of basic training before infiltrating south. 22

Training for the Viet Cong has included special intelligence instruction in radio transmission, coding and decoding, use of ambush techniques, sabotage tactics, methods for enlisting draft-evaders, and terrorist techniques.

Training in propaganda techniques is also stressed. One ex-Communist has described how trainees learned to produce propaganda leaflets under clandestine conditions. The methods and ways of manufacturing materials needed for production were explained. They were instructed in methods of production, such as using a lump of clay to produce up to 100 copies of short text. They were also shown photographic methods of reproducing leaflets and newspapers, including drawings and caricature.

Although the instruction was very detailed, trainees were not permitted to take notes and were required to memorize everything. Reportedly, this was to give the students practice in clandestine behavior. 23

Courier activities are also frequently stressed in training for underground operations. For example, the non-Communist underground movement in Czechoslovakia in 1952 operated a special school in the Tatra Mountains in Eastern Slovakia to train couriers. Trainees in this program were required to run until they felt exhausted, and then run another mile. They were taught to swim rivers with their clothes on in zero temperatures and, having crossed, to run in order to keep their clothes from freezing to their bodies. They were also taught to go into hiding for a week without food, in both summer and winter. Emphasis was placed on the identification of contacts. They were, of course, warned against gambling, heavy drinking, and women, since the Communist regime utilized women as decoys. 10
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Once the students were considered thoroughly trained, they were given easy missions, such as making contact with other underground members; finally they were sent on more dangerous missions in which they had to cross the Czech border into Austria and return, bringing with them materials needed by the underground. The couriers had to avoid fishermen on both the Danube and Morava rivers because the Communists issued fishing permits only to those who 4
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took an oath to turn in border-crossers, and they had to avoid well-traveled trails on the Austrian side as the Czech authorities offered large rewards in Austrian currency to anyone who caught a border-crosser on Austrian soil. ³⁴

Practical Training for the Cadre

Besides political indoctrination of cadres, "trial by fire" seems to be an important aspect of all underground training. Cadres must be tried and tested in the field. According to Communist theory, work in the field not only increases an agent's knowledge, but gives him an opportunity to exercise leadership in a specific situation. Further, field activities deepen commitment and test reliability and capabilities. ³⁵ While ideology may be the chief factor for joining, Communists do not believe that ideology alone will sustain commitment to the organization. Hence, constant participation in activities is emphasized.

In summary, education and training are essential elements in underground administrative operations. Undergrounds need schools in order to train cadre in the tactics, techniques, and strategy of underground operations and methods; most frequently these schools are located in a foreign nation, outside of the area of conflict. Underground training particularly emphasizes organizational skills and political training, equipping its cadre to make independent, rapid decisions in the field. Indeed, to make underground decentralization operative, such training is essential. Finally, underground training provides the skills and knowledge necessary for members in adapting to the requirements of clandestine work.

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FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER EIGHT

FINANCE

An underground organization needs funds to carry out its activities. Full-time agents must be paid and military units armed; escape-and-evasion networks must have money for extra food, for safe houses, and to give to escapees; psychological operations need funds for publications, visual aids, and portable radios; headquarters and administrative sections need typewriters, radios, and so on. The exact income needs of an underground naturally depend on the nature and scope of its operations.

COLLECTION METHODS

When a government-in-exile is associated with the underground movement it can provide a symbol of legalism; it can negotiate substantial loans from other governments, issue bonds, establish currency, and perform similar fund-raising tasks.

Collection methods in underground movements vary with the source being tapped. Funds from sources outside of the country—foreign governments, expatriates, foreign sympathizers, business speculators—are usually solicited by small teams of collectors. The funds collected are transferred back into the country through couriers, international banks, or dummy corporations set up by the underground.

During the Algerian revolution, the FLN sent fund-collecting teams to Arab and European countries. In Arab towns the imam or other religious leader was contacted and requested to plead for the rebel cause or allow the team members to do so. Using the religious setting to advantage, emotional appeals for Arab brotherhood were made. The congregation was then asked to contribute to the FLN. The imam was given a percentage of the collection—sometimes as much as half—in return for sanctioning the collection. Implicit threats of retaliation were used to deter the collectors from taking funds for themselves, but as long as the net amount was satisfactory, the leaders ignored slight discrepancies. The funds were taken to Tangier and eventually deposited in numbered accounts in Spanish or Swiss banks.¹

Often the underground movement establishes a central finance collection agency to acquire funds from sources within the country. In Malaya, for example, the Min Yuen had this responsibility; they extorted cash from landowners, mine operators, and transport companies, and "taxed" workers in the local plantations and tin mines.²

In the Philippines, the Communist underground apparatus organized its finance department on three levels—national, regional, and district. Each district finance department had an accounting section with an accountant, bookkeeper, and cashier, and a "contactmen and collectors" division.³

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SOURCES OF SUPPORT

Foreign governments often assist if an underground movement is in opposition to a common enemy. Sometimes a foreign government contributes so that if the movement is successful it can expect some reciprocity from the new government.

Wealthy individuals or commercial enterprises may contribute voluntarily to the movement. For instance, the Hukbalahap movement in the Philippines and the Malayan Min Yuen received substantial contributions from wealthy businessmen in Manila and Singapore.⁴

The underground can solicit for loans among the population and business community, but it must deal with the problem of establishing the authenticity of the collecting agent and the reliability of the organization itself. In most cases, some form of IOU is offered.

Private friendship societies or quasi-official aid groups often assist an underground when their special interests are involved. The international labor movement supported the early anti-Nazi underground. One of the more celebrated cases of support was the Jewish Agency's support of the Palestine revolution. Throughout the western world, the agency established officers or representatives to make open appeals for money in newspapers, at lectures, and at social events.⁵

An underground may raise money by selling various items, including narcotics and fraudulent lottery tickets. One underground unit in the Philippines raised money by having dances and charging admission. The Min Yuen sold stolen rubber and tin on the black market and is said to have collected a million and a half British pounds for its efforts. The underground may conduct sales either door-to-door or through "front" stores. The Malayan Communist Party operated a bookstore, coffee shops, and general stores.⁶ Undergrounds sometimes resort to such measures as bank and payroll robbery and train hijacking. Some have special units for this purpose: The Blood and Steel Corps of the Malayan Communist Party was an example of this.⁷

A system of taxation can provide substantial funds for an insurgency. The Viet Cong tax system calls for an economy-finance committee to be established in each provincial capital, and a specially selected collection committee in each town, village, and hamlet. The collection committee's activities are divided into three phases: investigation, consultation, and collection. First, the committee investigates in detail the occupation and annual income of each individual in its assigned area. The individual's normal annual production, in appropriate units, is ascertained and divided by the number of members in the family, including any members who are presently with the Viet Cong forces or who have been killed or imprisoned by the government forces. For instance, if a family consists of father, mother, one son at home, and two sons with the Viet Cong, and if its total annual production amounts to 60 units of grain, the total is divided by five. This quotient is then assessed in money at the going rate and taxed according to an established percentage. The greater the annual production, the greater the tax.

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After the estimated tax has been figured for each householder in the village, the collection committee begins the "consultation" phase by holding meetings and lecturing the villagers. Agents planted in the audience support the lecturers and spontaneously volunteer to pay in the name of patriotism. If an individual does not volunteer, he is taken aside and privately asked how much he is willing to donate. If he decides to donate an amount higher than the committee's assessment, it is accepted. If the amount is lower than the committee expected to collect, tax information is used to intimidate him into a higher pledge. Throughout the discussions, the implicit use of force is present.

This system has apparently been effective in the areas controlled by the Viet Cong, but considerable difficulty is experienced in areas controlled by government forces, where the people have already been taxed by the government. To overcome this, propaganda is intensified to convince the people that the Viet Cong will eventually win the war and that they should support the future, rather than the present, government.⁸

In some cases a subversive movement can control transportation routes and collect tolls. The Viet Cong operate toll booths on arterial Route 1, 50 miles east of Saigon. Nearly all cars, buses, and trucks are stopped and charged \$2.00 to \$10.00, depending on the weight of the vehicle and the cargo. In a 4-month period from November 1964 to February 1965, an estimated \$40,000 was collected.⁹

The use of local currency facilitates exchange for local goods and services, but the physical transfer of the money presents a problem, and the government may take countermeasures by replacing the local currency with scrip.¹⁰ Substitutes for local currency range from IOU's to U.S. dollars or British pounds; in the Congo, travelers' checks were used in lieu of local currency. The Viet Cong use North Vietnamese currency in some areas in South Vietnam and issue their own money in other areas. The underground civil government in the Philippines issued its own scrip in some instances.¹¹ It has been said that it is possible to determine how the movement is progressing on the basis of commercial investment and the use of rebel currency.

HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS

People may contribute to an underground for a variety of reasons: allegiance to the cause, social pressures, present or future self-protection, chance of personal gain, or a desire to be on the winning side.

Some people who have been influenced by the movement manifest their support through regular and voluntary donations. Individuals confronted with social pressures to contribute to a movement may find it difficult to refuse to comply. Applied social pressure is seen in the FLN's use of Muslim religious leaders to make pleas for money within the Muslim community.

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and in the Viet Cong tax-collection system of planting enthusiastic "volunteers" in an audience to pressure others into contributing.

Businessmen may contribute to a movement as an investment in or a hedge against the outcome of the revolution, so that if the movement is victorious they can be identified and treated as supporters. Some people find it profitable to deal with an underground. An underground may willingly pay inflated prices for various items obtainable only through the black market. Individuals and firms sometimes make loans and contributions to an underground with stipulations for later concessions from the movement if and when it gains control of the government. A foreign firm allegedly gave weapons to the Algerian underground in return for a pledge that it would be given the oil concession in the country when the revolutionaries took over the government.¹²

If the underground employs coercive means to collect funds, individuals and business concerns may contribute for their own protection, paying the minimum acceptable amount to avoid reprisals. People who have once contributed, for any reason, may continue to contribute upon threat that their initial support will be revealed to the government.

People tend to be more amenable if there is an indication of return on their investment. Even a simple IOU helps, and underground members are usually directed to give some form of IOU. There are less strenuous objections to taxes imposed by an underground if they are levied with apparent fairness, as in the Viet Cong's impartial production unit assessment system.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Interview with a former member of the Algerian FLN collection group.

² Andrew R. Molnar, et al., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), pp. 253-54.

³ Fred H. Barton, Salient Operational Aspects of Paramilitary Warfare in Three Asian Areas, ORO-T-228 (Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research Office, 1953), p. 162.

⁴ Molnar, Undergrounds, pp. 254 and 322.

⁵ Interview with a former member of the anti-Nazi German Social Democratic group, the "New Beginning"; Molnar, Undergrounds, p. 340.

⁶ Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 80.

⁷ Ibid., p. 88.

⁸ Peter Grose, "Vietcong's 'Shadow Government' in the South," The New York Times Magazine, January 24, 1965, pp. 65-66.

⁹ The Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), February 11, 1965, p. A-3.

¹⁰ Franklin A. Lindsay, "Unconventional Warfare," Foreign Affairs, XL (January 1962), pp. 264-74.

¹¹ Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), pp. 113-14; Pomeroy, The Forest: A Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 163; and Molnar, Undergrounds, pp. 61-66.

¹² Molnar, Undergrounds, p. 278.