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ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND DECISION-MAKING
IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST HIGH COMMAND

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Part I: Introduction
Models of Decision-Making

For the sake of brevity and simplicity (if not for lack of hard data), the great majority of extant strategic analyses of the Far East begin with the fiction of "China" as a purposive actor, its collective behavior somehow to be explained as if it were an individual possessing clear objectives, clear alternatives and a set of rational criteria with which to choose among alternatives. Indeed, such a "model" of state behavior has been the traditional assumption for most international political analysis.^{1/} While it may have served some purposes in the past -- and will continue to do so in the future -- this model clearly offers limited returns to research in Chinese decision-making and, in fact, constitutes an obstacle of such investigations because it tends to deny either the existence or the significance of controversy in the intra-national decision-making process.

Students of international political behavior have employed two alternative models of decision-making with increasing interest. The first is based on the assumption* that decisions and viewpoints within any government are structured by groups of organizations, members of which develop special interests and career investments in the survival

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and power of those organizations. Competition among these groups must inevitably invade the arena of national policy and may be expected to inject special interests into what might otherwise be "rational" choices. As one perceptive student has put it:

"The happenings of international politics are, in three critical senses, outputs of organizational processes. First, the actual occurrences are organizational outputs ... Government leaders' decisions trigger organizational routines....Second, existing organizational routines for employing present physical capabilities constitute the effective options open to government leaders confronted with any problem.... The fact that fixed programs (equipment, men, and routines which exist at the particular time) exhaust the range of buttons that leaders can push is not always perceived by these leaders....Third, organizational outputs structure the situation within the narrow constraints of which leaders must contribute their "decision" concerning an issue....As Theodore Sorenson has remarked, 'Presidents rarely, if ever, make decisions -- particularly in foreign affairs -- in the sense of writing their conclusions on a clean slate....The basic decisions, which confine their choices, have all too often been previously made.'"^{2/}

The second model is what Allison calls the "bureaucratic politics model."^{3/} According to this model:

"The decisions and actions of governments are essentially intranational political outcomes: 'outcomes' in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, coalition, competition, and confusion among government

officials who see different faces of an issue; 'political' in the sense that the activity from which the outcomes emerge is best characterized as bargaining....The actor is neither a unitary nation [Model I], nor a conglomerate of organizations [Model II], but rather a number of individual players [Model III]. Groups of these players constitute the agent for particular government decisions and actions. Players are men in jobs....Answers to questions: 'What is the issue?' and 'What must be done?' are colored by the position from which the questions are considered. For the factors which encourage organizational parochialism also influence the players who occupy positions on top of (or within) these organizations....Thus propensities of perception stemming from position permit reliable prediction about a player's stances in many cases....Government behavior can thus be understood...as outcomes of bargaining games. In contrast with Model I, the bureaucratic political model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players, who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well, in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational and personal goals, making government decisions not by rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics."^{4/}

Major Formal and Informal Groupings in the PLA

Just as most of the literature about many national policies of Communist China portrays China as a unitary state, so literature about internal politics in China usually portrays the PLA as a unitary institutional actor. Terms such as "the Army," "the PLA" and "the military" abound in both academic and government analyses. These terms do nothing to clarify the question of high command perceptions of their strategic problems. For, as in the larger sphere of national political analysis, "collective rationality" cannot be ascribed to a large group of men whose separate functions and career opportunities in any given case may be expected to generate compromise, coalition, competition and confusion, to echo Allison's statement quoted above. For purposes of Model II speculation, we must, therefore, examine the less abstract groupings of senior leaders in the PLA.

At least six major career channels existed in the PLA before the Cultural Revolution. Listed to the left of the matrix below, these channels tended to be mutually exclusive. That is, between the ending of the Korean War in 1953 and the 1966 Cultural Revolution, officers generally did not move back and forth among these six career channels. By 1966, therefore, we could expect officers in each channel to have developed a distinctive set of organizational interests, values, attitudes, and goals. According to the fundamental premises of Model II, each of these organizations would tend to encourage its members to behave in such a way as to enhance their own collective interests.

| | Generations | Field Armies | Military Regions | Central Elite | Family Relationships |
|------------------|-------------|-----------------|---------------------|------------------|-------------------------|
| Number of Groups | 11 | 5 | 13 | 1 | Infinite |

1. Local Forces
(Militia &
Public Security):
2. Ground Forces:
3. General Political
Department:
4. General Rear
Services:
5. Navy:
6. Air Forces:

Five factors, however, would tend to confuse each career group's definition of collective priority interests. These are listed at the top of the matrix and are factors which cut across career lines. The first, "military generations," has divided the PLA leadership into eleven major groups characterized by shared distinctive political and military crises. The second, Field Armies, has divided the PLA leadership into five groupings based on the affiliation of individual officers with the Field Armies which conquered China during the 1945-50 Civil War. The third, Military Regions, has divided the PLA leadership into thirteen geographic groupings, which have remained remarkably stable between the ending of the Korean War and 1966. The fourth, the Central Elite, has constituted a special geographic and functional group, the majority located in Peking with a minority scattered around the country for brief periods. (In principle, any member of the Central Elite who spends more than two years in a regional locale must be expected to suffer a shift in perspectives that tends to conform to those of his military region.) The fifth factor, Family Relationships, has divided the PLA leadership into an infinite number of obscure loyalty groupings that lie, generally, beyond our analytical and data collection capability. Yet their importance for Model III analyses demands that we appreciate this factor as a major cause for error when we attempt to explain behavior within the high command.

Each of the informal factors will be discussed first because they help provide an historical context within which current, formal organizational

values and interests may be discussed more realistically. It has been principally these informal obstacles to collective, formal institutional perspectives which have generated individual differences in values, viewpoints and goals among about 1,000 senior officers of the PLA, each of these men acting as a player in a bargaining process in which his informal and formal organizational affiliations could be expected to influence his choice of issues on which he might bargain, his perspectives toward such issues and his ultimate bargaining behavior.

After discussing informal affiliations, this paper will identify probable, if not actual, differences in organizational viewpoints toward the following questions of continuing importance to the high command:

- a. Their priority of security values and goals;
- b. Their priority of perceived threats to those values and goals.
- c. The "best" organization of available systems and resources for coping with perceived threats; and
- d. The preferred strategy and tactics for deploying available resources.

Part II: Informal FactorsMilitary Generations^{5/}

If a "military generation" is defined as a group of officers who (regardless of age) entered the PLA at the same time and shared a given period of military professional and political experiences, the history of the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army may be divided into eleven periods of major crises. From the perspective of this study, the most important generations are the first four: first, pre-May 1928; second, June 1928 - November 1931; third, December 1931 - July 1937; and, fourth, August 1937 - December 1940.

The first four military generations are the most important because these men occupy about 98 percent of the 1,000 key military positions by which we may define the high command. Within the ground forces, the majority of the Military Regional command and staff positions of significance are occupied by second and third generation officers with first generation people found principally in Peking and fourth generation people found principally at Army (Corps) and Military District levels or below. The approximate distribution in the ground forces (and probably in local forces, the General Political Department and the General Rear Service Department) of the first ten generations is shown on Chart A below.

CHART A
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF COMMANDER/COMMISSAR
POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY TEN MILITARY GENERATIONS

| GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN | | MILITARY GENERATION | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------|----|----|-------------|----|---------|-------------|----|----|----|
| | | CENTRAL & SOUTH CHINA | | | NORTH CHINA | | | ALL REGIONS | | | |
| AVERAGE AGE 1967 | | 62 | 57 | 54 | 50 | 46 | UNKNOWN | | | | |
| LEVEL | DATE | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| National Level (100 Positions) | Aug. 1966 | 60 | 34 | 6 | | | | | | | |
| | Dec. 1967 | 50 | 44 | 6 | | | | | | | |
| Military Region (104 Positions) | Aug. 1966 | 27 | 42 | 31 | | | | | | | |
| | Dec. 1967 | 20 | 39 | 41 | | | | | | | |
| Military District (138 Positions) | Aug. 1966 | 10 | 49 | 35 | 5 | | 1 | | | | |
| | Dec. 1967 | 6 | 39 | 49 | 5 | | 1 | | | | |
| Corps Level (102 Positions) | Aug. 1966 | 3 | 39 | 52 | 6 | | | | | | |
| | Dec. 1967 | | 38 | 53 | 9 | | | | | | |
| Division Level | 1966 | | 5 | 50 | 15 | | | | | | |
| Regimental Level | 1966 | | | 5 | 60 | 30 | 5 | | | | |
| Battalion Level | 1966 | | | | | 25 | 65 | 10 | | | |
| Company Level | 1966 | | | | | | 5 | 50 | 30 | 15 | |
| Platoon Level | 1966 | | | | | | | | 10 | 55 | 35 |

Notes: (1) Estimates of age, geographic origin and national, military regional, military district and corps-level distribution are derived from 500 biographies surveyed by the author in 1967; (2) national-level positions including MAC, MND, General Staff, General Political Department, Air Force, Navy, Armor, Artillery, Chemical, Engineers, General Rear Services Department, Public Security Forces, Railway Engineers & Signal Headquarters; (3) military regional positions include commander, commissar, three deputy commanders, three deputy commissars; (4) military district positions include commander, commissar, two deputy commanders, two deputy commissars; (5) corps positions include commander, deputy commander, commissar; (6) estimates of distribution at division-level and below are based on promotion regulations and an extrapolation from incomplete biographic data.

Although data on the other five career channels has not been assembled, a spot check of senior officer biographies in the General Rear Services, General Political Department and so-called local forces suggests that these career channels have not offered younger men a relatively better rate of advancement than the ground forces. Only the Air Force and the Navy seem to have provided such a preferred rate of advancement up to Military Regional level. At the national level (Central Elite), senior air force officers (all former army military officers) appear to be drawn principally from the second and third military generations, based on a preliminary survey of available biographies. Thus, Chart A, if drawn for the Air Force, would probably show more fourth, fifth and sixth military generation figures at Army (Corps) levels and above, a point worth further investigation since it would reinforce other factors that have tended to distinguish air force from ground force viewpoints.

Since the bulk of the high command falls within the first four military generations, it is important to underline those aspects of experience which might be expected to distinguish one generation from the other. For we should recognize that the time-spread between the entry of the oldest member of the first generation into the Communist Party in 1923 and the entry of the youngest member of the fourth generation in late 1940 would be eighteen years. Quite apart from variations in generational experiences of the post-1940 period, it is argued that an officer's earliest experience profoundly directs, shapes and dominates lifelong viewpoints toward such crucial questions as the role of the military in

society, the authority of a field commander, the proper criteria for selecting future generals, the proper organization of military power, the most effective strategic and tactical techniques for applying military power and all four contemporaneous questions raised in the Introduction.^{6/}

Based on their collective experience, it seems likely that there is a broad "generational viewpoint" toward each of those questions. That viewpoint would be based principally on early military and political experience and education, later modified by other broad factors of developing family ties, affiliation with a particular Field Army leadership, prolonged assignment to a particular Military Region and, perhaps most important, long-term membership after 1953 in one of the six major career channels.

At the risk of oversimplifying differences, a summary judgment would propose that each successive generation, as a group, tended to veer progressively further away from the philosophy, style and viewpoint of unconventional warfare, so-called "Maoist People's War." Thus, the first two generations, drawn predominantly from the poor central Yangtze Valley peasantry, the second generation especially having had minimal formal education, spent their personal and professional formative years in a context of guerrilla warfare in which almost every political or military act aimed at the political mobilization of the masses. These men, already strongly tied to local customs and organized into local units (one county in Hupei, for example, has produced approximately 150 second and third generation generals) may have abjured warlordism. But they probably acquired many of the politically myopic features of the warlord outlook:^{7/} a strong sense of local loyalty, reinforced by a traditional peasant (and Chinese) suspicion of "strangers," perhaps best stated in Sheridan:

"...a bandit became a warlord at the point where he acquired acknowledged control over a specific area and assumed the tasks of governing it."^{8/}

This sense of political role, rather than primarily professional military function, should have been reinforced by the early experiences of the first two military generations. Furthermore, since their objective was clearly revolutionary, their style necessarily demanded assumption of control over all available resources, including ideology, in their desperate struggle against adverse odds. To label these men opportunists would be to miss the point that, in a struggle for survival, opportunism is the very essence of the struggle and "opportunist" is a compliment to the victor. In their early campaigns before November 1931, when the Central Kiangsi Soviet was formally established, the defensive strategy and the offensive guerrilla tactics of People's War were imposed by circumstances. These men, at the outset, thus tended to be local and regional (rather than national) in political perspective, political rather than military professional in their sense of role, and oriented to the relatively independent strategic defense of a particular locale through offensive small unit irregular tactics.

Conversely, the third and fourth generations entered the Red Army in a context of increasing division of labor between the military and the Party. For the Party had grown to such an extent by late 1931 that it was possible to replace many military-political administrators in Kiangsi villages with Party cadres, largely removed from military affairs. After November 1931, professional military schools, an emphasis on conventional tactics and a more conventional defense of the entire "country" (that is, the Kiangsi Soviet before 1934 and much of north China after

July 1937), and a greater emphasis on the professionalization of the officer corps under Russian auspices tended to instill new values that should have distinguished the military values of the third and especially the fourth generations from the first and especially the second. The two later generations should have been less confident of the power of the untutored masses as a military force, of their own skill as political manipulators (at which they have had considerably less experience than the first two generations), and of guerrilla warfare or, broadly, People's War for national defense. Furthermore, because of their entry into the Red Army during a period of great national crisis (after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931), the third and fourth generations (the latter including a large number of north China students) tended to be motivated by significantly different arguments for joining an army. Confronted by a foreign enemy and drawn from a wider, better-educated cross-section of Chinese youth, these men might be expected to perceive their loyalties on a more national rather than a regional or local scale.

As suggested earlier, these broad comments about four major generations in the PLA high command could hardly establish more than a general foundation for differences in viewpoint toward contemporary problems of China's national security. After their first few years in service, later influences could be expected to alter generational stereotypes. Of these influences, the Field Army institutional evolution should have been of crucial importance.

The Field Armies ^{9/}


In 1954, with the reorganization of the PLA after the Korean War, all large organizations formerly labeled "Field Armies" were deactivated. Thereafter, the three-division "army" (chün) became the principal ground force operational command, directly under the control of a Military Region headquarters. At the same time, Air Force and Navy units were being organized under the local operational control of Air Defense Districts and three major Fleet headquarters. Between Military Regions, Air Defense Districts and Fleet headquarters, on the one hand, and the General Staff in Peking, on the other, there were no intervening levels of military bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, the senior officers who had led the earliest guerrilla units of the Red Army from their 1927 origins through the operations of the 1930's against the Nationalists and, after 1937, the Japanese, and who had reorganized their expanding forces after 1945 for renewed Civil War with the Nationalists and had finally fought against United Nations forces from 1950 through 1953, had pursued careers with one unique characteristic. Less than 15 percent of the high command had served in more than one stream of institutional evolution. (See Chart B for the five Field Army institutional streams.^{10/}) That is, the five Field Armies which defeated the Nationalists between 1945 and 1949 had evolved through essentially independent processes of development over the previous twenty years. Among 85 percent of 700 key military leaders analyzed, an officer who had first joined a unit, for example, from the Oylwan Soviet (Central

China) in 1928 had become a senior commander or commissar in the Second Field Army in 1949. An officer who had joined Ho Lung in central Hunan in 1928 by 1949 had become a senior commander in the First Field Army.

Translated into American experience, the Chinese senior leadership would be comparable to an American leadership if the six American continental Armies were being led by officers who had served together (and nowhere else) for forty years. Even if the continental Armies were suddenly deactivated, we may imagine the strong informal bonds of shared victories and defeats which would remain active among former comrades, especially if deactivation did not actually remove leaders from the geographic locale which their old Army had occupied.

CHART B



NOT REPRODUCIBLE

Military Regions (See Map A)

The year 1954 brought a new geographic dimension to loyalties which remained tied informally to traditional generations and institutions (the Field Armies). Based on their own origins and operational areas, the following relationship (Chart C)^{11/} existed between Field Army senior leaders and the new Military Regions from 1954 to 1968. In general, these relationships changed very little over those fifteen years. The chart shows the relative stability of Field Army representation in Thirteen Military Regions even between August 1966 and December 1967, a year which brought the greatest number of personnel shifts in the entire post-1953 history of the PLA.

CHART C


DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY ELITE MEMBERS AT EACH MILITARY REGIONAL LEVEL (1966-67)
Percentages of all elite members known at that level

| Level | 1st F.A. | | 2nd F.A. | | 3rd F.A. | | 4th F.A. | | 5th F.A. | | Mao | | Unknown | | Double* | | Southern 1, 2, 3 | | | Northern 4, 5, M | | Total % |
|---------------------|----------|-----|----------|-----|----------|-----|----------|-----|----------|-----|-----|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------------------|-----|-----|---------------------|-----|---------|
| | '66 | '67 | '66 | '67 | '66 | '67 | '66 | '67 | '66 | '67 | '66 | '67 | '66 | '67 | '66 | '67 | '66 | '67 | '66 | '67 | | |
| National | 13 | 6 | 18 | 17 | 9 | 9 | 32 | 36 | 6 | 8 | 2 | --- | 1 | 2 | 19 | 22 | 40 | 32 | 40 | 43 | 100 | |
| Mukden Mil. Rgn. | 12 | 7 | 7 | 14 | 7 | 4 | 33 | 27 | --- | 7 | 2 | 3 | 10 | 21 | 31 | 17 | 26 | 24 | 35 | 38 | 100 | |
| Canton Mil. Rgn. | 3 | --- | 3 | --- | 3 | 10 | 62 | 57 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 8 | 7 | 18 | 23 | 8 | 10 | 62 | 57 | 100 | |
| Chengde Mil. Rgn. | 30 | --- | 14 | --- | 21 | 25 | 14 | 25 | 7 | --- | --- | --- | 14 | 25 | --- | 25 | 64 | 25 | 21 | 25 | 100 | |
| Kunming Mil. Rgn. | 4 | 5 | 75 | 67 | --- | --- | --- | 5 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 17 | 18 | --- | 79 | 72 | --- | 5 | --- | 100 | |
| Tibet Mil. Rgn. | --- | --- | 38 | 25 | --- | --- | 38 | 38 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 12 | 25 | 12 | 12 | 37 | 25 | 37 | 38 | 100 | |
| Wuhan Mil. Rgn. | 15 | 10 | 46 | 39 | 8 | 10 | 4 | 5 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 23 | 40 | 4 | 5 | 69 | 50 | 4 | 15 | 100 | |
| Nanking Mil. Rgn. | --- | --- | 17 | 16 | 31 | 44 | 12 | 4 | --- | 4 | --- | 4 | 6 | 12 | 34 | 16 | 49 | 69 | 11 | 8 | 100 | |
| Foochow Mil. Rgn. | 8 | --- | 4 | --- | 43 | 42 | 16 | 25 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 8 | 25 | 21 | 8 | 54 | 42 | 17 | 25 | 100 | |
| Tsinan Mil. Rgn. | --- | --- | 11 | 12 | 22 | 24 | 22 | 12 | 17 | 23 | --- | --- | 11 | 17 | 17 | 12 | 33 | 35 | 39 | 35 | 100 | |
| Peking Mil. Rgn. | 6 | 4 | 9 | 7 | 13 | 18 | 6 | 7 | 37 | 38 | --- | --- | 13 | 11 | 13 | 11 | 28 | 30 | 44 | 45 | 100 | |
| In. Mong. Mil. Rgn. | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 25 | 14 | 25 | 14 | --- | --- | --- | 72 | 50 | --- | --- | --- | 25 | 29 | 25 | 100 | |
| Lanchow Mil. Rgn. | 48 | 49 | 3 | 11 | --- | --- | 13 | 11 | 3 | --- | --- | --- | 26 | 25 | 7 | 7 | 51 | 60 | 16 | 11 | 100 | |
| Sinkiang Mil. Rgn. | 64 | 64 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 12 | 12 | --- | --- | 24 | 24 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 64 | 64 | 36 | 36 | 100 | |

*The "Double" column shows figures for men whose careers have straddled two Field Army systems over such long time periods that it is impossible to assign them to a single Field Army system.

MAP A

CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY REGIONS



By October 1968, when all revolutionary committees had been formed to replace the former Party Committees in charge of each province in China, the distribution of power among Field Army representatives on revolutionary committees was as shown on Chart D.^{12/} On the lower section of the chart, it may be noted that, with the exception of the First Field Army base where Ho Lung's former subordinates had suffered an unusual loss of status, other geographic power bases retained between 40 and 60 percent of the representatives of any given Field Army elite. In other words, the informal loyalty groups which had emerged from Field Armies have apparently retained significance in the on-going intra-national competition for status and influence.

CHART D
PARTY-MILITARY POWER DISTRIBUTION (1966-68) AMONG FIELD ARMY
LOYALTY SYSTEMS

Upper Section

| | 1st F.A. | | 2nd F.A. | | 3rd F.A. | | 4th F.A. | | 5th F.A. | | Unknown | | Total | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----|----------|----|----------|----|----------|----|----------|----|---------|----|-------|-----|
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| August 1966 pre-Cultural Revolution) | 50 | 15 | 67 | 21 | 45 | 14 | 89 | 27 | 23 | 9 | 44 | 14 | 318 | 100 |
| December 1967 | 27 | 12 | 46 | 18 | 39 | 16 | 64 | 26 | 21 | 10 | 46 | 18 | 243 | 100 |
| October 1968 (Military on Revolutionary Committees) | 7 | 8 | 16 | 19 | 14 | 17 | 22 | 26 | 12 | 15 | 13 | 15 | 84 | 100 |
| October 1968 (Military and Party Members of Committees) | 10 | 7 | 26 | 19 | 25 | 18 | 25 | 18 | 16 | 11 | 38 | 27 | 140 | 100 |
| October 1968 Chairmen of Revolutionary Committees | 3 | 10 | 6 | 21 | 5 | 17 | 9 | 31 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 29 | 100 |

Lower Section

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|----|----|----|-----|-----|
| 1st F.A. Power Base (a) | 9 | 32 | 4 | 14 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 14 | — | 10 | 36 | 28 | 100 | |
| 2nd F.A. Power Base (b) | — | — | 15 | 60 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 16 | — | 5 | 20 | 25 | 100 | |
| 3rd F.A. Power Base (c) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 19 | 50 | 4 | 11 | 4 | 11 | 7 | 18 | 38 | 100 |
| 4th F.A. Power Base (d) | — | — | 2 | 7 | 2 | 7 | 13 | 42 | 3 | 10 | 11 | 33 | 31 | 100 |
| 5th F.A. Power Base (e) | — | — | 2 | 11 | 2 | 11 | — | — | 9 | 50 | 5 | 28 | 18 | 100 |

- (a) Includes the Sinkiang, Lanchou and Chengtu Military Regions and the Revolutionary Committees of Sinkiang, Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi, Chinghai and Seechwan.
 (b) Includes the Kunming, Tibet and Wuhan Military Regions and the Revolutionary Committees of Yunnan, Kweichow, Tibet, Hupeh and Honan.
 (c) Includes the Nanking, Foochow and Tsinan Military Regions and the Revolutionary Committees of Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsu, Shanghai, Fukien Kiangsi and Shantung.
 (d) Including the Mukden and Canton Military Regions and the Revolutionary Committees of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang, Hunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung.
 (e) Including the Peking Military Region and the Revolutionary Committees of Hopch, Peking, Tientsin, Shansi and Inner Mongolia.

NOT REPRODUCIBLE

The Central Elite

Just as the Field Armies acquired geographic power bases after 1949, so many Field Army senior leaders assumed posts of national importance in Peking. In one sense, such men at once represented Military Regional and old Field Army interest groups; in another sense, the senior figures in Peking were channels of communication and coercion from the center to their regional colleagues. However, the post-1945 process of central-regional negotiation, competition and compromise over such matters as political and material resource allocations gradually brought the influx of regional figures into central positions. This process is reflected in Chart E,^{13/} which shows the makeup of three successive Central Committees over a twenty-four year period from 1945 to 1969.

Several interesting points emerge from Chart E. First, the high command as a whole has moved from a status of 50 percent representation on the Seventh Central Committee through a loss of power on the Eighth Central Committee (only 37 percent) to an increase of power on the Ninth Central Committee (65 percent). Second, men whose careers had been built at the center, as contrasted with men whose careers had been built principally in "the provinces" (local "Soviets," border regions, or Military Regions), have suffered a persistent decline in relative representation from 52 percent on the Seventh Central Committee

CHART E

ESTIMATED
 COMMANDERS, COMMISSARS AND FIELD ARMY REPRESENTATION OF
 THREE CENTRAL COMMITTEES
 1945-1959

| Column | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | 4 | | 5 | | 6 | | 7 | | 8 | | 9 | | |
|----------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|-----|--|---|--|--|
| | Central # % | 1st FA # % | 2nd FA # % | 3rd FA # % | 4th FA # % | 5th FA # % | 6th FA # % | 7th FA # % | 8th FA # % | 9th FA # % | 10th FA # % | Known Total | Unknown # % | Grand Total # % | | | | | |
| 7th Central Committee b/ (1945) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A. Full Members | 23 | 52 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 11 | 6 | 14 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 9 | 44 | 100% | 44 | | | | |
| 1. Commanders | 2 | | 1 | | 3 | | 3 | | 2 | | 1 | | 12 | 27% | 12 | | | | |
| 2. Commissars | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | 2 | | 1 | | | | 6 | 13% | 6 | | | | |
| 3. Both Cdr, PC | 1 | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 1 | | 4 | 9% | 4 | | | | |
| 4. Civil Party | 19 | | 1 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | | | 22 | 48% | 22 | | | | |
| B. Alternate Members | 5 | 15 | 6 | 18 | 6 | 16 | 7 | 21 | 5 | 15 | 4 | 13 | 33 | 75% | 33 | | | | |
| 8th Central Committee c/ (1956) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A. Full Members | 34 | 37 | 8 | 9 | 16 | 18 | 11 | 12 | 8 | 9 | 14 | 15 | 91 | 100% | 91 | | | | |
| 1. Commanders | 3 | | 3 | | 4 | | 4 | | 2 | | 1 | | 17 | 18% | 17 | | | | |
| 2. Commissars | | | 2 | | 3 | | | | | | | | 5 | 5% | 5 | | | | |
| 3. Both Cdr, PC | 3 | | | | 3 | | | | 4 | | | | 12 | 13% | 12 | | | | |
| 4. Civil Party | 28 | | 3 | | 6 | | 7 | | 2 | | | | 34 | 37% | 34 | | | | |
| B. Alternate Members | 15 | 17 | 14 | 16 | 20 | 22 | 13 | 15 | 15 | 17 | 12 | 13 | 89 | 97% | 89 | | | | |
| 9th Central Committee (1959) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A. Full Members g/ | 27 | 21% | 7 | 5% | 29 | 22% | 18 | 14% | 36 | 21% | 14 | 8% | 131 | 100% | 170 | | | | |
| 1. Commanders | 5 | | 4 | | 12 | | 11 | | 20 | | 5 | | 57 | 42% | 57 | | | | |
| 2. Commissars | | | 3 | | 2 | | 1 | | 11 | | 2 | | 19 | 14% | 19 | | | | |
| 3. Both Cdr, PC | 1 | | | | 5 | | | | 1 | | | | 8 | 6% | 8 | | | | |
| 4. Civil Party | 21 | | | | 10 | | 6 | | 4 | | | | 47 | 35% | 47 | | | | |
| B. Alternate Members | 4 | | 8 | 7% | 9 | 8% | 16 | 15% | 17 | 16% | 9 | 8% | 63 | 47% | 63 | | | | |

- a/ These figures are based on an evaluation of the career of each member of the 7th, 8th and 9th Central Committees.
- b/ As of April 1945, "Civil Party" cadres were men who had spent most of their careers in non-military political and administrative work in villages and cities.
- c/ By 1956, many men who had been "Commissars" in 1945 had now been "Civil Party" cadres for as much as a decade because they had doffed uniforms, abandoned military units and received responsibility for Civil Party policy and administration between the end of the Sino-Japanese War and the end of the Civil War in 1950. Teng Hsiao-p'ing would fall in this category, for example. Such a change of status meant, among other things, that they would not necessarily sympathize with the interests of contemporary Commissars or Commanders.
- d/ The majority of the "Unknown" figures were peasants and workers whose status as Central Committee members suddenly brought them from political obscurity to the center during the Cultural Revolution.
- e/ Percentage figures in brackets are a percentage of the 131 Full Members of the 9th Central Committee whose biographies permit an evaluation of career specialty and Field Army affiliation.

to a maximum of 21 percent on the Ninth Central Committee (only 27 full members out of a total of 170). Third, the accretion of power by the Second and Fourth Field Army representatives has brought them from a base of 11 percent and 7 percent respectively in 1945 to 22 percent and 27 percent in 1969. In effect, these two Field Army groups, backed up by their very powerful and wealthy Military Regional power bases, can now dominate the Politburo and the Central Committee.

If these figures have any validity, they should suggest to aspiring career officers and Party cadres that it pays to establish your credentials at the regional level first before entering the vicious struggle for power and privilege in Peking. A reputation and a political foundation in a Military Region plus, of course, useful contacts within a particular career channel (see below) would appear to be an object lesson from the past twenty-four years of intra-national conflict.

But given this process of gradual vertical movement along career channels and across geographic lines toward Peking, what effect may such a process have on the perspectives of any given officer, already obligated to other sets and sub-sets of loyalties? Unquestionably, our hypotheses about Chinese high command perspectives must account for this process. Indeed, it is precisely because the outlook of the central elite is believed to be different from regional viewpoints that we must qualify our hypotheses when we speak of "the Chinese." Undoubtedly, military (and probably Party) leaders at the center are under the greatest pressure to perceive their problems in terms of the national interest. Yet, they are also dependent on the continuing close support of and

from their regional comrades to sustain their political leverage in Peking. It would not be easy, for example, for them to detach forces from their own Military Region for some allegedly national purpose if such a detachment would clearly erode their popularity within their Region and thereby weaken their status in the eyes of their old Regional comrades and, in the long run, imperil their own political flexibility in Peking. As Allison has suggested in Model III, these central figures must engage in a bargaining process in which institutional and geographic affiliations and related military resources have real significance as intra-national political resources. As we have already suggested above, such a perspective might be especially characteristic of first and second generation leaders, now dominant in Peking and likely to remain so for the next decade.

The problem for the analyst, therefore, is to assess the extent to which local obligations among central figures may impinge on their dialogue over "national" issues and produce outcomes which are "rational" principally in terms of the cross purposes of local interests and goals, mutually balanced to maintain or reflect a prevailing intra-national power relationship. We would suggest that the experience of the second generation and their relatively local, traditionally peasant perspectives, as contrasted with broader, more nationally oriented perspectives which we have ascribed to third and especially fourth generation leaders, would underscore a continuing concern for local loyalties among those second generation leaders, most recently arrived in Peking during Cultural

Revolution personnel shifts. Indeed, various scholars have seen the Cultural Revolution as a socio-political trauma in which the near destruction of the Party apparatus and the purge of many central leaders brought a dramatic shift of power over routine decisions and resource allocations toward regional authority at the expense of a confused central elite.^{14/} While this trend may have been reversed after mid-1968, perhaps partly in the name of "war preparedness," the continuing absence of a national Party machine suggests that the Military Region and its burdened but largely undamaged hierarchy through Military District, Armies, People's Armed Departments and Public Security Bureaus has become and is likely to remain a locus of major political as well as military decisions. We must, therefore, assume that the perspectives of the Central Elite, now (according to Chart E) increasingly dominated by figures transferred from regional posts, strongly reflect their Military Regional origins and obligations.

Family Associations

Despite Communist assertions to the contrary and a certain success in weaning children away from Confucian notions of filial piety, among the four older generations that are the subject of this analysis, family connections have remained of major significance in their approach to the jungle of political and professional career competition. Indeed, during the Cultural Revolution, Red Guard accusations against Ho Long and others for their preferential treatment of relatives managed to

side-step comment on the far more obvious role of Mao Tse-tung's wife, Lin Piao's wife and the assorted cousins and in-laws of various senior figures on the Central Cultural Revolution Group which attempted (largely unsuccessfully) to stage-manage the Cultural Revolution. Unfortunately, this critical dimension of Chinese intra-national political competition has remained largely unresearched if not disdained among political analysts. This factor must weigh significantly on the decisions of senior figures about promotions, preferred assignments, preservation of local interests and so forth. But the dearth of reliable data demands that we also ignore this factor in this study and accept whatever margin of error that results.

Part III: Formal Career Institutions

Local Forces ^{15/}

A brief analysis of each so-called career channel should complete our analysis of major groups and organizations engaged in China's high command intra-national competition. Beginning at the lowest level and most locally oriented forces within the military and para-military hierarchy of China, the militia has hardly been a career channel in the customary sense of the word. However, it has acquired a set of functions under the leadership of aged or aging Party and military leaders who have been released from service in the regular forces. By 1957, the militia and reserves were merged into a single organization under the local control of the Party, aided by the PLA. For the

vast majority of China's rural youth, the militia is the closest that they will ever get to a military organization.

In actual practice, the militia has fielded few effective units, received minimal training, has been and remains responsive principally to Military District and People's Armed Department (Commune-level) control and has performed only local guard and patrol duties which would not detract from their principal duties in agricultural production. Although the precise distribution of military generation and Field Army representatives within the militia remains to be researched, it seems likely that over-age officers and NCO's from local regular and Public Security ground force units have moved into the preferred senior posts of the militia "paper" units (regiment, battalion and company). Thus, the collective loyalties and perspectives of these men are likely to echo those of units and senior leaders who have traditionally (since 1953) occupied relatively fixed garrison posts throughout China. Further, it seems likely that the majority of the senior figures in the militia organization are first and second generation PLA leaders.

These assumptions are approximately accurate, and given a natural career interest in fostering the growth and power of their own organization, these men should have consistently favored People's War as a philosophy and should have argued for more resources with which to equip and train the militia. Despite China's claim to a strategy of People's War, the militia has received minimal attention since the late 1950's.

Only since 1968 has it again received increased, though still marginal attention, primarily in the name of war preparedness, local security and population control and discipline.

Better trained and equipped than the militia, public security forces have been almost equally concerned with local security problems ranging from criminal investigations to local guard duty on railroads, at warehouses and at Party headquarters. Originally drawn from regular PLA units toward the end of the Civil War, public security forces were temporarily separated from PIA control between 1955 and 1962. Thereafter, they were gradually reassimilated by the PLA, the process being largely completed by late 1966. On the one hand, Border Defense forces probably have been under the direct control of Military Region headquarters since 1953. However, Military Internal Security and municipal garrison forces have probably fallen under the control of Military District headquarters (and now Revolutionary Committees).

On the basis of a cursory survey of key biographies, it appears that key leaders of public security forces have spent their lives as ground force commanders (or commissars) and today reflect approximately the same generational and Field Army distribution found in regular ground force units (see Chart A). However, there appears to have been minimal transfer back and forth from Public Security to regular forces. Thus, public security channels appear to have provided a career stream for officers, a stream tied very closely to the fate of local Party and military leaders.

In consequence, we would expect that, like militia leaders, the top priority security values and goals of public security force commanders would be in consonance with local interests, the preservation of local resource allocations, etc. Such local perspectives would be expected to identify internal (non-local) threats (from other Chinese) as the most significant. Indeed these tendencies were criticized frequently during the Cultural Revolution, when "local forces" were under persistent Red Guard attack for simply performing their job, protecting local Party leaders.^{16/} Relatively immobile and rarely shifting from one district, not to mention one province, to another, these forces suffered a temporary eclipse during the Cultural Revolution but appear to be returning to many functions and posts of traditional responsibility.

From the viewpoint of organization and preferred strategic deployment of available military resources to cope with perceived threats, local forces and their leaders, armed with only light infantry weapons, minimal artillery, and very few vehicles, have probably retained a view of warfare only slightly more sophisticated than their country cousins, the militia. Consequently, we would expect them to be most concerned with local political and internal security problems, the impact of any national decisions (domestic or foreign) on such problems, and their ability to either mobilize or control the peasantry in the event of a major crisis. At best, they would probably perceive their responsibility to be provincial (or at most Military Regional rather than national) and their "strategic" combat function to be either guerrilla command or light infantry conventional local defense.

From the viewpoint of political leverage, public security leaders had a voice at the national (Peking) level until 1962, when the gradual PLA assimilation of public security forces stripped those forces of top-level representation since, for most purposes, they fell under the control of Military Regions. A few forces remained under the Minister of Public Security. However, Hsieh Fu-chih, the Minister, eloquently expressed the situation when, in 1967, he asserted that he really did not know his subordinates in the public security system sprawling across China nor could he evaluate their reliability.^{17/} In truth, their loyalties and career interests probably did not reach as far as the State Council and Peking.

Ground Forces ^{18/}

The high command appears to be dominated by career ground force officers of the first three military generations. Not only is the ground force hierarchy the dominant one among all career channels; also all other career channels are currently controlled by former ground force officers. This situation is least evident in the Air Force (see below) and the Navy.

As noted earlier in the discussion of Field Armies and Military Regions, until the Cultural Revolution, army units rarely moved between provinces within a given Military Region and almost never between Military Regions. Possessing several basic military schools in which to train their officers, Military Region staffs probably could assume that they and their subordinates would spend the majority of their

careers within the same Military Region. Only would specialized training in artillery, communications, armor, airborne engineering and political operations require an officer's probably temporary absence from the Military Region in special schools under national control. Certainly among the four military generations with which we are most concerned, widespread shifts among Military Regions were unusual before the Cultural Revolution and actually were held to a minimum during the Cultural Revolution. A survey, for example, of officers assigned to Revolutionary Committees by September 1968 revealed that a maximum of 15 out of about 140 Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen (including about 80 military officers; see Chart D, page 19) were newcomers to the Military Region. The remainder had served either at the same Military Region or at subordinate provincial levels before and during the Cultural Revolution.

Several implications follow from the Chinese Communist high command's "ground force syndrome" and from the relative immobility (after 1954) of ground force units and senior commanders.

Ground force high command priority of security values and goals has probably reflected the ambiguity of national versus local defense responsibilities, depending upon the Military Region. Military Regional commanders and staffs most threatened by external military forces (the six Military Regions stretching from Shenyang to Canton along China's east coast) have probably been most conscious of a dynamic priority relationship between the internal and external security responsibilities.

Farther inland, seven other Military Regional commanders and staffs have probably been more intent on preserving internal stability as a consistently primary goal since external threats have been relatively minimal since 1950.

In all cases, however, it seems likely that the security values of these commanders and their staffs have ascribed primary importance to their own political survival within their own Military Region, regardless of the temporary source of greater threat, internal political or external military. In brief, it would appear that a proprietary concern for their own status, their own resources and their own political survival, especially among the now dominant first and second military generational leaders, would have linked their perspectives very closely with those of local force leaders.

As to their preferred organization of available resources, we have already noted the translation of Field Armies into a Military Regional organization during the 1950-54 period. It appears that the Military Regional headquarters gradually acquired powers over recruiting, logistics, personnel and unit assignments, operational planning, maneuvers and, generally, military resource control that reflected a probable focus on the Military Region as a potentially self-contained theater of operations.

This is not to say that Military Regions have enjoyed equal power in their ability to negotiate with the central elite. In fact, a review of the Ninth Central Committee leadership would suggest that

those Military Regions which have traditionally controlled the greatest wealth and the most powerful ground forces have emerged from the Cultural Revolution with the greatest political stature. Thus, the commanders of the "Top Three" most powerful Military Regions (Shenyang commanded by Ch'en Hsi-lien; Nanking commanded by Hsü Shih-yu; and Canton commanded by Huang Yung-sheng, now Chief of General Staff) were "elected" to membership on the Ninth Politburo. Although all Military Regional commanders are on the Ninth Central Committee, those three commanders would appear to have special powers, backed up by their dominant share of ground force units.

As to the dominant ground force leadership's preference for strategy and tactics, the following points seem worth noting:

a. The high command has failed to accent the long-range projection of military power, either through naval or strategic air forces. Instead, it has designed force levels best equipped to defend China against external ground threats on her borders and against internal threats. We spell out this point in greater detail under our discussion of the other career streams.

b. The modernization and professional development of the other services has probably been delayed by a general high command concern for a ground-oriented defense posture. Even ground force professionalization has proceeded fitfully, the majority of the regular ground units having experienced minimal combined arms maneuvers (with naval and air forces).

c. Indeed, the accent in the PLA during the past decade seems to have shifted away from massed artillery and infantry-armor-artillery coordination to a ground defense strategy oriented on separate

Military Regions and a tactical scenario of infantry conventional combat supported by limited artillery and mechanized forces in selected areas. Perhaps this delay in the modernization of PLA mobility and fire support has been traded for greater resource allocations to the advanced weapons program, a bluff that the Russians called in the spring of 1969.

General Political Department ^{19/}

First organized in the late 1920's as a kind of institutional conscience to insure that commanders would not take advantage of their power to abuse either their authority or their peasant subordinates, the GPD ("the commissars") has evolved through forty years of political and military campaigning as an important career channel for military men with intra-military political duties ranging from indoctrination of recruits to surveillance of senior officers whose behavior suggests unreliability. Normally acting as secretary of the unit Party committee, a political officer (or Commissar at Army level and above) had become a very specialized careerist by 1950. In spite of the conventional wisdom about the PLA, which allegedly was led by officers equally adept at either political or military tactics, a survey of about 800 high command biographies shows that only about ten to fifteen percent had been worthy of high marks in both specialized fields. Indeed, by 1950, the majority of the first four generations had served either in a professional military command or staff role or in the military political sphere, with little concern for troop management.

As a consequence of their concern for civil-military relations and especially the role of the peasant in providing combat service support to combat units, many commissars tended to acquire expertise at primitive logistical operations and moved, after 1949, into the new General Rear Services Department (see below). Aside from this relatively more technical field, however, their concern with non-technical subjects tended to bring them into conflict with commanders over priorities at various periods in the history of the PLA. During the Korean War, their utility was challenged successively by United Nations forces, their own commanders and finally their own troops. After the war, their status gradually declined to a point where, in 1960, 6,000 companies in the PLA did not have Party branches and commissars were denied jeeps to use on field maneuvers. ^{20/}

From 1960 through the Cultural Revolution, the traditional competition between the commanders and commissars for power and control over resources waxed and waned. Although the entire senior staff of the GPD was finally purged in August 1967, probably much to the satisfaction of senior career commanders, their institutional function remained too important to be turned over to non-professionals. Furthermore, not all commissars have necessarily been primarily loyal to the GPD career channel. Biographic evidence suggests that, like the ground forces, commissar mobility between Military Regions and Field Army loyalty groups has been minimal. Thus, patterns of obligation have probably not been too different from those prevailing in the local and regular ground forces already discussed.

It was probably partly a consequence of those parochial loyalties that commissars suffered a notable decline in status during the Cultural Revolution. In addition to their temporary loss of their formal voice in Peking, they lost representation on the new (Ninth) Central Committee, as compared with representation on the Seventh and Eighth Committees (see Chart E, page 21). If we assume that men equally adept at command and commissar roles should be rated a commissar, they held 20 percent of full memberships on the Seventh Central Committee (28 percent held by commanders) and 19 percent of Eighth Central Committee full memberships (18 percent held by commanders). In 1969, however, while still holding 21 percent of the available full memberships, they had lost heavily to commanders who now held 44 percent of such memberships.

Although limited evidence exists to show that, at any given level of the military bureaucracy, commissars have traditionally been slightly older than commanders at the same level, it is likely that the generational distribution of commissars throughout all services would approximate the distribution shown on Chart A, page 9. In general, commissars of the first four military generations have been better educated than commanders insofar as formal civil education is concerned. They have also had more experience with the Maoist concept of People's War since they were normally charged with the training of militia, self-defense forces, peasant mobilization, etc. while commanders tended to focus their energies on the organization and training of regular forces.

Later generations of commissars, especially after 1946, shifted their functions away from mass mobilization and logistics because the entire PLA experienced a process of professionalization. Younger recruits into the GPD could thus expect to attend specialized political staff schools where they could study such technical subjects as intra-military broadcasting, leaflet design and writing, mass warfare, stratagem, psychological warfare, counterintelligence, etc. All increasingly technical and complex, these subjects also tended to encourage a sense of professional status and expertise in younger commissars, who could prove their utility to contemporary commanders without threatening commander roles and specialization.^{21/} Thus, one former political officer told the author that his contemporaries (sixth generation) had little interest in leaving the professional military context, where their duties were clear, their status was co-equal with commanders under most circumstances and they did not have to worry about the risks of "politics" present in the civil community. Truly, the routine of military life had clipped the wings of potential revolutionary followers of Mao!

Despite the risks of purge for excessive local loyalties, the fate of the GPD at the national level during the Cultural Revolution probably has encouraged commissars at the Military Regional level and below to remain sensitive to their status in the eyes of regional leaders. Indeed, just as the apex of a commander's career might be considered a post as Deputy Commander of a Military Region, so the commissar might

be equally pleased with his achievement of a Deputy Commissar post at the same level to cap a career. In short, despite the vaunted separate channel which the GPD has provided for the "Party within the Army," a practical concern for career equities probably has focused commissar interests on local and Military Regional ground rules of behavior and promotion. This judgment is speculative, however, since only limited evidence from interviewing in Hong Kong can be adduced to support this thesis.

Nevertheless, by virtue of their collective knowledge of Maoist military principles, their long experience in applying those principles on the Chinese stage, their historic concern for the "correct" use of local military power to achieve local political objectives, the generally higher survival rate of local (Military Regional) commissars as contrasted with national-level commissars, and the post-Cultural Revolution shift of further non-military administrative powers to Military Regional and provincial Military District authorities, the General Political Department senior leaders are likely to share many of the following viewpoints during the 1970's.

Possessing only limited representation in Peking, where a new GPD has been painfully emerging from the ashes of the Cultural Revolution, they are likely to accent the security of their own Military Region and sub-regional status, especially with respect to the new Party organs that have been undergoing cautious revitalization since late 1968.

Given such a focus on their own power status with respect to both local commanders and civil Party figures, the ranks of which many career military commissars are likely to join as they did in 1949-53, they are most likely to perceive radical Red Guard and other dispossessed groups as the priority threats to their own status and the stability of their local political sphere. Indeed, their professional experience with internal political mobilization has probably reinforced their focus on internal threats while encouraging commanders to shift their emphasis to real or imagined external threats, particularly in northeast China.

In the ongoing search for saliency among a multiplicity of threats, commanders and commissars will probably continue to contend over the question of "correct" resource organization. However, the commanders will probably be glad to assign to commissars the responsibility of mobilizing the military potential of the peasant masses and the millions of disgraced Red Guards who have been sent into the countryside. To the extent that the General Political Department may mobilize the paramilitary strength of those people, the regular ground force commanders may return troops to professional routines. That such a process has already become a nation-wide movement is suggested in the 1969 creation of youth companies which appear to be releasing regular soldiers from the menial tasks of farming on PLA-managed farms.

In consonance with the foregoing, the older (first four generations) leaders of the General Political Department will probably continue their

historic preference for a strategy of local People's War, a strategy which affords them maximum opportunity to extend their own political power at the expense of both commanders and civil Party competitors for local status and privilege. Thus, for different reasons, they are likely to share with many local and ground force professional commanders a preference for defense, decentralized among relatively independent Military Regions. Such a preference must be expected to clash with the tendency of coastal Military Regional commanders to look further outward rather than inward as China's weapons technology promises a capability to project her military power beyond the Asian arena.

General Rear Services Department ^{22/}

There is some doubt about the career dimension of this channel, since schools seem to be very limited in this field. However, given the existence of a Rear Service College in Peking and the increasing complexity of the logistical system and the defense mobilization base, over which the GRSD has acquired increasing responsibility, it seems likely that both the senior and the younger members of this corps of logisticians have gained a sense of professional self-awareness and an expertise that must have laid the foundation for routine selection and promotion procedures.

We are not clear on the relationship between military production (advanced weapons, conventional weapons, and military research and development) and the General Rear Service Department elite. While the GRSD probably has responsibility for the procurement of military hardware

and for its distribution, their control over the production of such hardware is probably minimal. Thus, the GRSD is primarily concerned with distribution, not production logistics.

Despite the evidence of their performance during the Cultural Revolution, there is great doubt that the available logistical system and its personnel could sustain a major campaign beyond China's borders or could even transfer resources in significant numbers from current locations to other areas inside of China. Despite the national performance of China's railroads during the Cultural Revolution, when more than a million Red Guards were shifted around the country to and from Peking, it appears likely that the high command has allocated key GRSD senior officers and materiel to local regions most likely to consume large quantities of ammunition and other resources in a war of defense.

The point of the foregoing paragraph, for our purposes, is that many, perhaps most, GRSD senior officers probably share key Military Regional command perspectives about the priority of allocation of international and intra-military regional resources. Yet, we must recognize that the planners of military production logistics perceive the national security problem in broader terms than local distribution of military consumables. Their concern with advanced weapons production as well as the less complex conventional weapons production cycle must reflect a national or central elite vision of priorities.

Thus, within the GRSD as in the navy and air force, there is unquestionably a younger generation of technocrats who must seek the most efficient, nationally (not locally) rationalized production of heavy military equipment, even if the apparent defense strategy of independent Military Regional theaters of operations should be deprived of thirteen separate tank, artillery, aircraft and missile production centers. Since small arms and small arms ammunition seem to have been produced to excess to date, there should soon emerge a definite trend toward restraint in such production with a shift of resource priorities toward more complex weapons systems. Such a shift would be accompanied by increased power over budgetary resources and strategic decisions among the more competent technocrats of the third and fourth military generations, men whose air force and naval colleagues probably share similar views. Furthermore, to the extent that defense industrial facilities are located in separate Military Regions (Szechuan, Lanchou, Sinkiang, etc.), the hinterland political parochialism of regional commanders and their staffs in those regions must be attenuated by the sense of national weapons priorities that probably influence their "captive" military industrialists.

We must, therefore, conclude that the GRSD, especially first and second generation senior leaders, probably retains a strong and pervasive element of localism in its collective outlook and even in its selection of younger men for promotion. However, the mandate of weapons modernization probably has already begun to erode such a perspective in favor of viewpoints more generally associated with the central elite.

The Navy

Of the six career channels discussed in this paper, the navy is the smallest. By an accident of post-Civil War troop distribution (1949-50), most of the first appointees to the fleet headquarters along China's east coast came from the Fourth Field Army (in Canton providing the South Sea Fleet's initial senior officers and in Shenyang providing North Sea Fleet leaders) and from the Third Field Army (in Nanking, Foochou and Tsinan Military Regions, providing officers for the East Sea Fleet). Second and third generation army officers from the better educated Third and Fourth Field Armies soon assumed the responsibility of creating a new navy with the help of Russian advisors. In spite of some Cultural Revolution changes within the navy in Peking, the fleets remain dominated by the same generations that control the rest of the high command. However, younger men are obviously bringing new skills to the navy along with a new respect for "weapons over men," the antithesis of the Maoist military ethic.

As these young men advance, we may expect them to argue that the fleet, as an organization, must be conscious of a national orientation, consonant with a national mission of coast defense. Although the fleets have not received heavy budget allocations for a deep sea navy, it must be anticipated that such allocations will be forthcoming during the next decade or so. And they will be in response to a national and international perspective that the navy high command may be expected to sustain in opposition to more parochial local force, ground force, commissar and rear service force viewpoints and interests.

That time is yet to come, however, even though the Navy's Political Commissar has won a seat on the Ninth Politburo. For the navy's fate has been a hostage to a ground force viewpoint, which has presumably been responsible for a shortage of deep draft vessels and an emphasis on many small, high-speed patrol boats and torpedo boats, designed for short-range coastal defense. Even China's submarines have remained within her coastal waters and her few destroyers have never ventured into the game of flag-showing and international visits normally associated with a global power. At best, the navy seems to perceive its mission in Asian regional defensive rather than offensive terms.

On the intra-national stage, its officers evidently rallied behind Peking in order to help stabilize some of the more chaotic situations that developed during the Cultural Revolution. In so doing, the navy probably expressed a sense of technical superiority over not only the ground forces but also over the peasant masses, from whom the navy has been generally remote. This Cultural Revolution behavior notwithstanding, the navy's future would not appear to be tied to its role on the intra-national stage but rather to its ability to demonstrate a need for its services (and improved equipment) along China's coasts against Asian regional enemies and across the Pacific and Indian Oceans against China's global enemies. Thus, in contrast with the leaders of the ground forces, still preoccupied with limited projections of power internally to solve problems of internal stability, the navy's leaders may be expected to demand increasing support for naval modernization in order to achieve strategic projections of power to cope with problems of external threats.

The Air Force 23/

By 1969, boasting more than 3,000 aircraft in their inventory, including over 2,000 jet fighters, the air force leadership, like that of the navy, was shifted from the ground forces in 1949-50 to build a new air force with the help of Russian advisors. Although a few pilots had been trained during World War II, the majority of the top leaders of the air force are nonrated. Nevertheless, the experience gained against United Nations forces in Korea provided a new generation of rated leaders who gradually assumed command of operational units. Between 1953 and 1969, these younger leaders moved quickly into key positions in air armies and divisions. As a result, fourth, fifth and sixth generation air force members of Military Region and Air Defense District staffs tend to be among the youngest members of those staffs and, therefore, the entire high command. As suggested earlier, this fact would tend to create certain frictions between the air force and other career channels, even if other factors did not help reinforce such frictions.

The gradual spread of air bases around the east coast of China and then westward across her borders with Vietnam, Thailand and Burma has reflected a primary concern with the mission of air defense against a conventional external threat. "Conventional" is stressed because the Chinese air force seems to have minimal defensive capability against nuclear-tipped missiles. Despite the obsolescing of many of their aircraft, the air force and its anti-aircraft artillery and radars could probably give a creditable performance against manned fighter and bomber attacks. Thus, like the navy, the air force perspective seems to have been focused outward rather than inward.

The record would suggest that the air force has been more responsive to central elite directives than has the army, General Rear Services, General Political Department, or local troops. On the other hand, the probable subordination of Air Defense District commanders to Military Regional headquarters and the long-term garrisoning of air bases by the same air force units suggest, before 1968, that unit commanders and air force Deputy Military Regional commanders for air (Air Defense District Commanders) probably established closer bonds with local ground force and Party leaders than the navy did. Because of the importance of his airpower for the coordinated defense of his Military Region, the Military Regional commander probably has enjoyed relatively direct, routine and uninterrupted control over most available air force units within the region. Such relatively independent Military Regional control of jet fighters would be more likely than regional control of the more limited bomber and transport units. These units, and their bases, probably have been more directly responsive to the central elite.

Just as the majority of the air force has been concerned with air defense, so its perspectives have probably not focused on problems of strategic (global) airpower. Instead, strategic Asian threats have probably been the focus of air force leaders and operational units. That focus should have taken priority over any problems of internal security and would thus join senior air force and navy commanders together in their search for solutions to a common problem, the external threat to China's borders and border Military Regions.

Looming on the horizon as a competitor for funds and resources devoted to modernization, the advanced weapons program has reached a stage in China where career equities within the high command have already been affected. Still a relatively small elite of military scientists and engineers plus a few unit commanders concerned with organization and training of missile units, these men may be expected to play an increasingly significant role in the inter-elite process of negotiation and compromise over resources and rewards. The 26 April 1970 public announcement of China's successful satellite launch tended to confirm a time-schedule predicted earlier by Mr. McNamara and Mr. Laird, who anticipated Chinese possession of around 25 ICBMs by 1975.^{24/}

FOOTNOTES

1. For some general comments on this model of political analysis, see Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Crisis" in The American Political Science Review, Vol LXIII, No. 3, September 1969, pp. 689-718.
2. See Allison, ibid., p. 699.
3. Ibid., p. 690.
4. Ibid., pp. 707-9.
5. For a more detailed discussion of military generations in the PLA, see William W. Whitson, "The Concept of Military Generation: The Chinese Communist Case," in Asian Survey, November 1968.
6. For theoretical and factual evidence in support of this assumption, see Davis B. Bobrow, "Chinese Communist Response to Alternative U.S. Active and Passive Defense Postures" (Oak Ridge, December 1965), pp. 31-2.
7. For excellent discussions of the warlord outlook, see Hsi-sheng Chi, The Chinese Warlord System: 1916 to 1928 (Washington, D.C., Center for Research in Social Systems, 1969), Chapter Three. See also James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, The Career of Feng YU-hsiang (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966), especially Chapter One, pp. 16ff.
8. Sheridan, op. cit., p. 19.
9. For a more detailed discussion of Field Armies, see William W. Whitson, "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics," in The China Quarterly, No. 37 (January-March 1969).
10. Chart taken from ibid., p. 27.
11. Chart from ibid., p. 28.
12. Ibid., p. 29.
13. This chart is taken from William W. Whitson, The Chinese Communist High Command, 1928-1970, to be published by Praeger Publishers in late 1970.

14. For judgments underscoring a revival of regionalism in China after the Cultural Revolution, see Leonard Schapiro and John W. Lewis, "The Roles of the Monolithic Party Under a Totalitarian Leader," in The China Quarterly, No. 40 (October-December 1969), p. 62; and, for an excellent survey of factors which tended to erode the totalitarian unity of the central elite, see Michel Oksenberg, "The Institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Revolution: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the Cultural Revolution," in The China Quarterly, No. 36 (October-December 1968), pp. 61-92. For contrasting judgments (to the effect that the Cultural Revolution's politically centrifugal trends were only temporary), see Victor C. Falkenheim, "The Cultural Revolution in Kwangsi, Yunnan and Fukien," in Asian Survey, Vol IX, No. 8 (August 1969), pp. 580-97 and Gordon Bennett, "China's Continuing Revolution: Will It Be Permanent?" in Asian Survey, Vol X, No. 1 (January 1970), pp. 2-17.
15. For a standard, though dated, reference on the militia, see Ting Li, Militia of Communist China (Hong Kong, The Union Research Institute, May 1955). For updated analyses, see John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), Chapter 10, and Samuel B. Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), Chapter Sixteen. For a remarkably perceptive comparison of the role of local military forces, see the excellent MA Thesis by Michael M. Lent, "Local Military Control in Communist China, 1949-52 and 1967-68" (Berkeley: University of California, 1968).
16. The literature of the Cultural Revolution, especially during 1967, is replete with criticism of the entire public security apparatus plus the "local forces." For especially useful analyses of "local force" responses to Central elite directives during the Cultural Revolution, including "fake power seizures," see Chalmers Johnson, "China: The Cultural Revolution in Structural Perspective,"

in Asian Survey, Vol VIII, No. 1 (January 1968), pp. 1-15; Charles Neuhauser, "The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese Communist Party Machine," in Asian Survey, Vol VIII, No. 6 (June 1968), pp. 465-88; and Jürgen Domes, "The Cultural Revolution and the Army," in Asian Survey, Vol VIII, No. 5 (May 1968), pp. 349-63.

17. See SCMP 4023 (September 19, 1967), pp. 21-22, for excerpts from Hsieh Fu-chih's speech of 22 July 1967, when he "noticed" that the Public Security Bureau, the Procuratorate and the Courts of Justice (all ostensibly subordinate to Hsieh as Minister of Public Security) had been deeply poisoned by Lo Jui-ch'ing and others.

18. For general descriptions of the role of the ground forces up to 1966, see Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, and Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army. For post-1966 roles, all previous references pertaining to the Cultural Revolution underline the expansion of power in the hands of ground force commanders at all levels. For a most recent analysis, Charles Neuhauser's "The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese Communist Party Machine" is of special value together with the excellent tabulation of key leader backgrounds in Richard Baum's "China: The Year of the Mangoes," in Asian Survey, Vol IX, No. 1 (January 1969), pp. 1-17.

19. For an excellent account of the role of the commissar in the Korean War, see Alexander George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). For an account of more recent commissar roles and conflicts with commanders, see Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965).

20. For this figure, see J. Chester Cheng (ed.), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army (Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution, 1966), Document Number 23.
21. Many of these views about younger "commissars" in the General Political Department derive from interviews held with refugees, former political officers, in Hong Kong in 1968.
22. It is very difficult to obtain reliable data on the role, strength and status of the General Rear Services Department. Interviewing in Hong Kong has provided much of the information contained in this section. For an exceptionally useful treatment of military production economics, see Chu-yuan Ch'eng, "Growth and Structural Change in the Chinese Machine-Building Industry," in The China Quarterly, No. 41 (January-March 1970), pp. 26-57.
23. For the most recent, unclassified treatment of the Chinese Air Force, see Richard M. Bueschel, Chinese Communist Airpower (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968).
24. For these figures, see The Washington Post, 26 April 1970, p. 1.