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TRANSNATIONAL WORKING GROUP ON THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT

FINAL REPORT

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
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SUMMARY

The research activities of a group of European and American social psychologists are reported. Within the general area of the origins and resolution of social conflict, specific investigations are summarized for the following topics: (1) the acquisition of information in a conflict relationship; (2) the order or sequence in which possible contracts are considered by a bargainer; (3) the effects on bargaining of difficulty of the bargaining problem, importance of the stakes, asymmetrical dependence, and "national" differences, (4) the effect of within-group conflict upon intergroup conflict, (5) methods of influence between the majority within a group and a disaffected subgroup, (6) the basis of ingroup-outgroup conflict, (7) conceptions of social interdependence relationships involving both cooperative and competitive components, (8) reactions to prior help received from another person, and (9) factors affecting the perceived magnitude of conflict. Unanticipated results pertaining to individual differences in conceptions of and orientations to conflict interactions are also summarized. The meetings of this group of scientists are reported together with their self-evaluation and recommendations for similar transnational working groups.

I. PURPOSES AND BACKGROUND OF THE WORKING GROUP

In the last fifteen years an important area of investigation in social psychology has become the dynamics of conflict. Both theoretical analysis and experimental research have been conducted on the processes involved in negotiation, bargaining, coalition formation, the resolution of cognitive differences, and intergroup conflict. In this work, social psychologists have drawn upon the knowledge of other disciplines such as political science and sociology and have attempted to supplement the body of knowledge about conflict processes with the empirical evidence they are able to derive from their laboratory experiments. During the same period, experimental social psychology has also become an active research discipline in Europe and through informal interchange interest developed there in conflict processes. The Transnational Working Group was developed for the purpose of encouraging contact and joint research between European and American social psychologists in the conflict field. There are several reasons why such contact and collaboration appear to be particularly important in the study of conflict:

- (1) Theoretical diversity. The theoretical approaches to the analysis of conflict are sufficiently different between European and American psychologists as to make the exchange of ideas between them potentially very fruitful.
- (2) Comparative experimental studies. Research collaboration between Americans and Europeans provides an opportunity for identifying and understanding possible national or cultural differences in conflict processes.
- (3) The relevance of experimental studies to natural conflict phenomena. The transnational contacts were thought to promote attention to particular natural conflicts such as those involved in cross-cultural and international relations.

Provided with the strong rationale for transnational contact and collaboration that these reasons afford, a proposal for a working group was developed in the winter of 1965 and the group of thirteen interested individuals was formed. All thirteen are psychologists who were already engaged in experimental research on some aspect of conflict or who had indicated strong interest in such research, and expressed an interest in transnational collaborative research and discussions on problems of conflict. The thirteen members of the Working Group are as follows:

1. Morton Deutsch
Teachers College, Columbia University,
New York, New York
2. Claude Faucheux
Institut Européen d'Administration des
Affaires, Montrouge (Seine), France
3. Claude Flament
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Faculté des Lettres et Sciences
Humaines d'Aix, Aix-en-Provence, France
4. Harold Kelley
University of California, Los Angeles
California
5. John Lanzetta
Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire
6. Serge Moscovici
Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale, Maison
des Sciences de l'homme, Paris, France
7. Mauk Mulder
Institute for Social Psychology, University
of Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands
8. Jozef Nuttin, Jr.
Universiteit te Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
9. Dean Pruitt
State University of New York at Buffalo,
Buffalo, New York
10. Jaap Rabbie
Institute for Social Psychology, University
of Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands
11. Gerald Shure
University of California, Los Angeles,
California
12. Henri Tajfel
University of Bristol, Bristol, England
13. John Thibaut
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,
North Carolina

The initial activities of the Working Group were supported primarily by the Group Psychology Branch, Office of Naval Research, and secondarily by Systems Development Corporation, Santa Monica, The University of California, Los Angeles and the Lincoln Filene Endowment at Dartmouth College. Three conferences were held: Dartmouth College, August 28-September 1, 1965; Nice, January 2-7, 1966; and Santa Monica, November 12-23, 1966. At these working sessions, the members of the Group first were apprised of each other's interests relating to conflict dynamics. At each conference, a certain amount of time was devoted to research summaries of individual work relevant to the field of common interest. Then, the work moved to two different levels, general sessions devoted to theoretical discussions and small group sessions devoted to planning joint research. Three projects were begun, though not completed, during these first thirteen months' activities of the Working Group. At the Dartmouth meeting were planned studies on information

acquisition under conflict and on orders of presentation of "contract packages" in the course of negotiation. At Nice, a large general bargaining experiment was planned. Data were gathered for each of these topics and initial analyses were made of the results. Support for the Working Group was sought and received from the Advanced Research Projects Agency in the fall of 1967. Under this support, the three initial projects were completed and others to be described below were also planned and carried out.

In the sections of this report that follow, the accomplishments of the Working Group made under the ARPA grant are summarized. It must be emphasized that the grant support had an effect upon the activities of the members of the Working Group at a variety of different levels. The grant, of course, made possible a number of investigations that would not otherwise have been conducted. Additionally, through its provision for meetings of the members of the Working Group, the grant contributed in many direct and indirect ways to the directions that their individual work has taken. Thus, in what follows, we will identify projects that have been directly supported by the grant, joint projects that are direct outgrowths of the Working Group's activities but were not supported by the grant, and individual projects that gained much of their direction from the Working Group's discussions.

II. THE WORKING CONFERENCES

A brief resume for each of the general meetings of the entire Working Group is given below.

1. Sorrento, September 7-12, 1967. The topics of the general discussions were first, methodology of research on conflict. The discussion centered on the problem of interpreting differences between samples studied in different laboratories and obtained from different populations, the detection and elimination of spurious differences, the theoretical basis of hypotheses about cross-cultural differences in bargaining behavior, and the relative merits of studying particular kinds of conflict vs. attempting to study "conflict in general."

A major portion of the discussion centered on conflict limiting norms. Proceeding from a theoretical paper on the topic prepared by Dean Pruitt especially for the meeting, the discussion concerned behavioral vs. subjective definition of norms, the relation between norms and views of reality, the role of norms in the resolution of conflict (as in Thibaut and Faucheux's work, 1965, and the Working Group's "international" bargaining study), and the special difficulties of resolving conflicts which involve a clash between different "world views."

A third topic concerned leadership in social change. The problem has to do with conflict between a leader (or minority) and the majority of a group. The discussion centered on variables affecting the ultimate acceptance of the minority view by the entire group, an important such variable appearing to be the consistency of the minority. (This problem of the consistent minority has figured prominently in Serge Moscovici's subsequent research and writings and is the topic of consideration of an NSF supported seminar held at

Dartmouth in August, 1971. This is one of many examples where discussions within the Working Group have stimulated an individual's further activities on a given topic.)

A fourth topic was minority group conflict, consisting of an analysis of conflict between subgroups within a larger group. The specific items here concerned the encouragement of conflict by subgroups in order to improve their internal organization and strength, the conditions under which a majority or more powerful group yields up some of its power to a weaker minority, and conditions affecting the amount of open conflict surrounding this redistribution of power.

Closely related to the preceding topic was that of intergroup relations and group structure. This concerned the effect of intergroup conflict upon internal group cohesiveness, the differential effect of such conflict upon high vs. low status members, the effect of conflict-induced perceptions of similarity and interdependence upon internal cohesiveness, and multiple membership and intergroup contacts as they relate to the loyalty felt toward one's primary groups and nation.

2. Timber Cove, September 3-7, 1968. During the meeting at Timber Cove Lodge, Fort Ross, California, discussions centered on research projects underway and additionally, there were further discussions of (a) the methodology of cross-national research, (b) development of a different procedure for the experimental study of the effect of intergroup relations upon intergroup attitudes and behavior, and (c) a lengthy theoretical analysis of the relationship between ingroups and outgroups. At this point the Group was examining a pilot study on ingroup-outgroup relations and this afforded the basis for both the discussion of specific experimental procedures and for the general theoretical discussion. The latter constituted an attempt to outline the various ways in which relationships among subgroups within a given system affect the interaction between that system and other competing outgroups.

A highlight of the Timber Cove meeting was a presentation by Thomas C. Schelling entitled "Ingredients for an Ecological Segregation Theory." This was a thoughtful examination of the consequences of variations in individual preferences for the resulting pattern of segregation within a population. The discussion of this paper afforded another theoretical perspective on the problem of intergroup conflict.

3. Cumberland Lodge, July 18-24, 1969. This meeting at Cumberland Lodge in the Royal Park, Windsor, England, was divided about equally between discussions of specific ongoing studies, general discussions of theory and methods, and reports of individual members' research on conflict. One highlight of the meeting was John Thibaut's description of his new experimental research testing an hypothesis about the conditions under which the disadvantaged members of a group will revolt and take action against the dominant members. (This work has recently been published by Ross, Thibaut and Evenbeck, 1971.)

There was also a lively discussion of "the triangle hypothesis" recently proposed by Kelley and Stahelski (1970). Put briefly, this hypothesis is that

cooperative individuals, as compared with competitive ones, have different beliefs about what other people are like with respect to cooperativeness and competitiveness. Cooperators believe that other persons are heterogeneous in this respect whereas competitors believe other persons are uniformly competitive. Kelley and Stahelski's evidence suggests that these different beliefs, of obvious importance in the way people approach conflict situations, evolve out of the different experiences that cooperative and competitive persons have in so-called "mixed-motive" relationships, that is, relationships such as the laboratory Prisoner's Dilemma Game which are ambiguous with respect to the desirability of cooperativeness vs. competitiveness. As noted below, an important part of the data bearing on the hypothesis had been derived from the "international" bargaining study conducted by the Working Group. The discussion covered alternative explanations for the results and consideration of the limiting conditions under which the hypothesis would be expected to apply. As a consequence of this discussion, further investigations of the triangle hypothesis have been carried out by Claude Flament in his laboratory at Aix-en-Provence as well as by Erika Apfelbaum, Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale, CNRS, in Paris. (This is an instance in which the Working Group's discussions had a direct influence upon the research of one of the members or of another social psychologist.)

Finally, at this meeting, a lengthy discussion was devoted to the theory and methodology of the experimental study of conflict, led by Moscovici and Shure. There was also a very interesting theoretical exchange between Tajfel and Deutsch regarding the possible theoretical interpretations to be made of their investigations of the minimal conditions under which ingroup preferences develop.

4. Cuernavaca, October 21-28, 1970. In addition to reports of individual research and consideration of work completed by the Transnational Working Group, there were three important topics at this last meeting. First, there was a consideration of chapters from Morton Deutsch's forthcoming book entitled "The Resolution of Conflict." This work, which reports Professor Deutsch's research in the conflict area and reflects his theoretical analysis of the field, represents one of the major integrative summaries of the conflict dynamics field. Brief critiques were made by Kelley, Lanzetta, and Tajfel of the chapters then available. The ensuing discussion served to bring out clearly the different approaches to theory, and to the relation between the empirical work and theory development, characteristic of various members in the Transnational Group.

Second, there was a discussion of the experimental approach to the study of conflict processes, the question being raised as to how fully understood are the social psychological properties of the experimental situation as they relate to the operationalization of the concepts underlying the research. Shure proposed a procedure for defining the subjective environment of the conflict interaction. He emphasized that systematic assessments are necessary to provide a parameter context for each experiment and thereby, to enable cross-study comparisons.

A report by Flament and Tajfel on a recent conference sponsored by the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology concerned the unique approach to the study of social phenomena characteristic of "radical" social scientists as they contrast themselves to the more traditional practices in social science. Because these contrasts also partially characterize the difference between the European and United States approaches to social research, the discussion served once again to remind us of the importance of active and close collaboration between scientists from different cultural and intellectual traditions. As some members had observed early in the discussions of the Working Group, for reasons that may be partially traced to the history and social organization of the United States, social scientists there tend to emphasize resolution and reduction in their studies of conflict. In contrast, the European social scientists, with a background of social organization and problems more characteristic of European nations, have tended to think more in terms of the generation and encouragement of productive conflict. The parallel here to the more recent schisms between the radical and traditional social scientists are rather marked, the former emphasizing the effect on the investigator's work of his implicit assumptions about social processes and suggesting that the topics he investigates are biased by his basic beliefs in the desirability of equilibrium and stability and his optimistic assumptions about inevitable social progress.

Finally, several important sessions of the last meeting were devoted to an evaluation of the Transnational Working Group. The report of a special Evaluation Committee, as given by Morton Deutsch, was roughly as follows:

"Several points stand out in the past of our group. 1) It is a heterogeneous group in interests and background. 2) Many of the values realized from meetings came from getting to know one another as individuals and in sub-groups. This was probably our most successful approach. 3) The major area of discontent and inadequate function was as a total group. The reasons for this appeared to be heterogeneity and that the group really didn't develop clear organizational structures responsible for keeping the total group functioning well together. We probably prematurely focussed on certain collective endeavors because of felt pressure for visible products.

"Advice for future similar groups would include the following points: 1) Such a group should not form itself with the objective of developing definite products but these should emerge. Active efforts should be made to resist the temptation to form premature product goals. 2) The first order of business is to get to know one another and one another's interests (this was satisfactorily done at the Dartmouth meeting). 3) The next order of business should be to identify the central differences among the participants and articulate these through formal discussion, thereby opening up the issues and sharpening them. The issues then could become the basis for further discussion and either sub-group activity or possibly activity by the whole body. At least a significant agenda for the whole body might develop out of the articulation of such differences.

Furthermore, if such confrontation between members of the group is delayed as it was in this group, it becomes a matter of hidden agenda manifested in asides and degressions and becoming a continuing distraction to the group discussion.

"Another problem that might be alluded to is the hidden problem of anxiety about self revelation and status barriers. It is necessary to anticipate such problems and to devise policies to deal with them. A more formal approach to organizing, which we did not allow ourselves, might help avoid some of these problems. If interpersonal difficulties cannot be aired in public then it should be possible for some one member of the group to go to dissatisfied and inarticulate people in order to find out what their problems are and engage in some form of problem solving.

"In articulating differences between members and thereby identifying the issues in a field, the method of having one person present his ideas and having one or two others as discussants seems a good one. This was successfully done in the present meeting with Deutsch's theoretical paper and might have been done with the American-European theoretical differences that we brought out, if there had been more careful preparation. But even in the case of this issue we did not have discussants who could have highlighted the problem. Again, if the group had allowed itself a stronger leader, he could have gone around and sensed issues and brought them to the group. This is not a criticism of any particular members here, because the group did not assign anyone these roles."

In the discussion of the Committee's report, it was argued that debates of the kind recommended by the Committee might have led to breaking up on to less cohesiveness than we had. This argument was answered by the suggestion that a formal group structure can legitimize debate and put it into a relatively nonthreatening context. Another criticism of the Committee report was that it implied it was possible to develop a general theory of conflict. Doubts were expressed as to whether such development is possible for a group of this size and heterogeneity. The reply to this criticism was that the Evaluation Committee was recommending not a method to evolve a general theory but a method of use in articulating issues. A related criticism was that the Evaluation Committee misconstrued the direction in which intellectual progress can be made. According to this view, focusing on differences and attempting to articulate issues is not as productive as (a) taking an idea and trying to see where it leads, or (b) developing a set of data relevant to an idea, refining the idea on the basis of these data, and then proceeding to the gathering of more data.

III. RESEARCH AND THEORETICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

1. Information Acquisition under Conflict.

Research using mixed-motive bargaining games has generally provided subjects with full information about costs and payoffs associated with the bargaining alternatives. In many real-life bargaining situations, however

one subject is not fully informed of the costs to his opponent of the latter's offers, and the utility to the opponent of one's own offers. In such situations it is of interest to know under what conditions subjects will be motivated to gain the missing information. The question of the determinants of information-seeking behavior, of interest in its own right, also has indirect implications for understanding the bargaining process. What aspects of the bargaining situation does the subject wish information about? Does bargaining behavior vary as a function of a degree of knowledge of relevant parameters? Permitting the subject to control the amount of information available to him, and comparing the behavior of subjects who differ in the amount of information taken, might contribute to our understanding of such questions.

One subgroup (Nuttin, Flament, Tajfel, Kelley, and Lanzetta) designed an exploratory study to examine behavior in bargaining situations characterized by incomplete information. The effects of two variables were of special interest: the expectations of hostile or friendly orientation from the other party, and the magnitude of the incentive for obtaining high profit.

On the basis of ad hoc reasoning it was predicted that the motivation for additional information would be higher under threatening (hostile) circumstances, and under high incentive conditions than under friendly and low incentive conditions. In addition, other dependent measures assessing degree of cooperation, "generosity," reasons for information seeking, etc., were obtained.

The bargaining task, designed after one used by Daniels (1967), required two persons to exchange "tokens" on each of a number of trials. Each one was aware of the costs to himself of sending a particular token, and of the value to him of a token received from the other party, but initially he did not know the value of a token to the other party or the costs to the other of a token received. He was permitted to purchase, at a fixed cost, the information he lacked.

Although two subjects were physically present, unknown to them an experimenter actually played the role of the other party for both subjects, delivering a standard series of tokens to each. The independent experimental variables were (1) whether the partner (in reality, the experimenter) behaved in a friendly or hostile manner on early trials, and (2) whether the instructions emphasized the importance of the task or not. This experiment with minor variations was completed at four different laboratories: Louvain, Aix-en-Provence, UCLA, and Dartmouth. A total of 192 subjects were run.

A fifth study on the same problem was completed by Tajfel at Oxford University. It differed from the others in the means used for manipulating incentives, in the values and costs of the tokens, and the cost assessed for obtaining information. It also did not examine the effects of a hostile-friendly prebargaining induction. A report of this study is available from Tajfel (Eiser and Tajfel, no date).

Analyses were made of the results from the four comparable experiments and comparisons were made between the sets of data. Apparently, the procedures

were not as comparable as had been hoped because although there were marginally significant effects of the experimental variables within each of the four samples, it was possible to interpret in any simple terms the entire set of results.

However, this experiment did yield an important insight into the possibility of different individual differences in the various samples of subjects. (The between-site differences obtained here were later found to have suggestive parallels to sample differences found in the "international" bargaining study.) During the experiment, subjects were asked to explain their actions toward the other party, i.e., why they sent the particular tokens they did. Claude Flament subjected the answers to these questions to scale analysis, using a particular type of analysis he had developed. He discovered consistent trends within the questionnaire data which were related to the tokens the subjects chose to send and which cut across the several experimental conditions. Both the questionnaire and behavioral data differentiated between the Aix and UCLA data, on the one hand, and the Louvain and Dartmouth data, on the other. At the former sites (Aix and UCLA) subjects were differentiated by the questionnaire items with respect to their degree of "social interaction" orientation to the relationship. By this is meant their intending to use their tokens in a contingent manner, depending upon what the other party gave them. Subjects who described their orientation in these terms were found indeed to use their tokens in this manner, sending ones of high value after receiving tokens of high value and returning low value tokens in exchange for low ones received. At the opposite end of the scale were subjects who reported little interest in returning what the other person gave them and who, in fact, gave tokens of low value each time without regard for what they had received. At the other two sites, subjects were not consistently differentiated with respect to a contingent "social interaction" approach. They all tended to endorse the idea of "tit-for-tat" and to use their resources in that manner. However, they were differentiated with respect to their generosity toward the other subject, i.e., the value of token they were willing to give him (though they were generally more generous than the Aix and UCLA subjects).

The report of the above analysis has been published by Flament (1967). We can suggest here several implications of his findings that are of considerable importance for comparative research and theory on conflict dynamics.

(a) Our samples of university students differed in the factors (personality predispositions), relevant to social interaction, with respect to which there was within-sample variance. We had fully expected differences in mean levels (which also appear in these data) but had not expected differences in variances (or in "factorial structure," so to speak). The differences may be interpretable in terms of different recruitment and selection policies at the several institutions (so that, for some reason, Aix and UCLA tap a broader range of the population on the "social interaction" variable). In any case, these differences indicate the importance of analyzing co-variation of attitudes and behavior within-samples as a basis for interpreting between-sample differences. This methodological "moral" of our cross-national research was emphasized again in the analysis of the results from the larger "international" bargaining study.

(b) The data suggest a correlation between (1) degree of contingent orientation toward the other player, making one's own behavioral choices in the light of his, and (2) degree of generosity in actions taken toward the other. This correlation appears within the Aix and UCLA samples and as a between-sample correlation comparing the Aix-UCLA pair with the Dartmouth-Louvain pair. (The pattern of results, which cuts across United States and European sites, does much to eliminate translation and other spurious methodological interpretations of the relationship.) The first variable would seem to indicate a person's readiness to adopt a controlling approach to the partner, attempting to shape or train him by contingent use of one's own power to reward to punish him. Interpreted in these terms, the correlation suggests there to be a general positive correlation between attempted control and willingness to be generous to the person over whom the control is exercised. This, in turn, brings to mind the Locus of Control Scale, constructed and used by Jules Rotter, Melvin Seeman (1963), and others. In this scale, there is assumed to be a correlation of this sort, specifically between feelings of control over one's fate and optimism about the quality of outcomes one can expect to receive from one's environment. Whichever of these variations in interpretation are placed upon our results, then generalization, if proven to be sound, is of great importance for theories of conflict. Conflicts are not resolved between parties who do not try to exercise their respective means of control over one another. If such attempts are also generally made by persons with optimistic expectations, the possibilities of successful resolution are greatly heightened. Thus, the degree to which a person's orientation to a relationship involves the contingent use of his control may be doubly predictive of the outcomes. One should hasten to add (to underline the tentativeness of this interpretation) that the Locus of Control Scale has not been a successful predictor of individual or pair negotiation behavior in the few studies where it has been used (e.g., Shure and Meeker, 1967), although the interaction settings have differed in significant respects from the present one.

In April, 1968, Flament and Kelley, along with one of Flament's young colleagues at Aix-en-Provence, Jean-Claude Abric, planned a further experiment on the topic of orientation to the conflict situation. This experiment was planned to vary experimentally the major dimensions of individual difference in approach to the conflict interaction. Thus, one set of subjects were to be induced to view the relationship in terms of a contingent or non-contingent orientation and another, to view it in terms of high profit or low profit (generosity). This was to be attempted first with subjects at Aix, where the typical orientation is the former. If successful, the procedure was to be replicated at Dartmouth or Louvain where the typical stance is the latter. The purpose of this study was to gain insight into the different orientations by means of attempting experimentally to control them. Unfortunately the "events of May" intervened in France at that time with the consequence that the University was closed and it was not possible to conduct the study.

Since then, Flament has been able to perform this type of study. Working with a sample of subjects at Aix, he attempted to shift their thinking about

the situation from their normal mode (contingent vs. non-contingent), to the alternative mode of profit vs. generosity. The manipulation was carried out by a description of how most people think about the token exchange situation--- what they see as the choice or conflict there. The results reveal that this attempt was largely unsuccessful, many subjects continuing to view it in their usual terms and others shifting to a mixed contingency and profit orientation. From his experience in this situation, Flament's informal conclusion is that it is quite difficult to shift persons away from their usual orientations to these social situations.

2. The Order of Consideration of Bargaining Contracts.

In the course of ordinary bargaining, the contracts or offers each person receives from the other party are ordinarily presented to him in an ascending sequence. That is, he is first asked by the opponent to give his consideration to a very poor package, but as the negotiations proceed the contracts he is asked to consider become increasingly good. It is not inevitable, however, that the order in which contracts are considered follows exactly an ascending sequence. One possible function of a mediator in a bargaining relationship is to induce the parties to consider various contracts "out of order," so to speak. In the extreme case, the mediator may even induce each party to consider the contracts in a descending order, that is, to first give their primary attention to possible settlements that would be extremely good from their point of view and then later, direct their attention to less profitable contracts. This problem of the order in which the bargaining contracts are considered relates to some basic judgmental phenomena that have been frequently studied in psychology, having to do with judgments made of stimuli presented in ascending vs. descending series. Accordingly, a subgroup of the Working Group interested in the role of the mediator in conflict, directed their attention to this order problem.

One such experiment was completed at the University of Utrecht. Each subject was asked to bargain, by telephone, with another person. The other person followed a standard sequence in presenting possible contracts to the subject and for each one, the subject was required to make an evaluation. For some subjects the alternative packages were presented in a steadily improving order (the ascending condition) and for others, in a steadily worsening order (the descending condition). The results of this study indicate that, as was expected from earlier psychological research, equivalent mid-range offers are more favorably evaluated if they are presented in the ascending series rather than in the descending series. Attitudes toward the bargaining situation were found to be similarly affected. On the basis of this study, Mauk Mulder, Joseph Allegro, and Henk Wilke, have prepared a report entitled "Attributing judgments to stimuli in ascending and descending order" and have submitted it for publication to Sociometry. A preliminary report of the study is available from Professor Mulder.

A number of studies on the effects of the two orders of presentation of "contract packages" on their acceptability have been completed by John Thibaut at the University of North Carolina. In these experiments, the situation has been a simulation of the interaction within a business

organization between the research and development division and a planning committee. The subject represents the R and D division which is undergoing reorganization. He receives offers, consisting of space allocations, budget provisions, personnel, etc., from a planning committee and these offers are presented to him either in an improving sequence or in the reverse order. After receiving each offer, the subject either accepted or rejected it and rates its "goodness" on a 50-point scale. After reacting to all 20 offers, the subject finally completed a brief questionnaire indicating his satisfaction with various aspects of the task. The results, as in the Utrecht study, clearly supports the prediction that equivalent offers are more favorably evaluated and have a higher probability of acceptance if they are presented in the ascending rather than in the descending order. The effect also includes a more positive evaluation of the source of the offers (the planning committee) in the ascending case. This result is interpreted as being at least in part due to the lower comparison level established by the ascending series. A report of this study has been published by Thibaut and Ross (1969). A series of further studies have been completed by Professor Thibaut. In some of these, subjects were presented with contract packages previously scaled by the method of successive intervals. Not only was the order of presentation varied but the presence-absence and degree of remoteness of anchoring packages was also varied. In another study, in addition to varying the order of presentation, the nature of the relationship with the planning committee was varied, half of the subjects being told they are in competition with the planning committee (that the success of the R and D division and of their own careers rests on their ability to get a good deal for R and D in the negotiation) and the other half being told that the company's overall interests are paramount and that they are in effect to work collaboratively with the planning committee to achieve the best for the company.

This line of work provides important insights into some of the less obvious psychological bases on which a negotiator evaluates the offers he receives. It is difficult to know how far to generalize the work but at least there is a strong suggestion here that the psychological value of bargaining offers is markedly affected by earlier offers the bargainer has seriously considered. It is interesting to note that in the usual process of offer and counteroffer, insofar as each bargainer gives most serious consideration to offers made by the opponent, these offers tend to be presented to him in the optimal order, namely, the ascending order in which mid-range and later contracts in the series are more favorably evaluated. In other words, the psychological judgmental process identified in this work indicates that the usual course of bargaining tends to facilitate mutual agreement by inducing later offers in the series, when considered in the light of the early unfavorably ones, to be highly valued psychologically.

3. "International" Bargaining Experiment.

"International" is probably a misnomer but it refers to the fact that this large bargaining study was conducted in eight of the laboratories represented within the Working Group and therefore affords some cross-national comparisons of bargaining behavior. It constitutes one of the largest and most successful studies in the comparative literature. It has been published by Kelley, Shure, Deutsch, Faucheux, Lanzetta, Moscovici, Nuttin, and Rabbie (1970A). A somewhat

more complete report of the study is also available in the mimeographed paper by Kelley, et al. (1970B). Because the experiment is fully reported in those two papers, only the highlights of the work will be summarized here.

The experimental task employed in this study involves two persons in a typical mixed-motive bargaining situation where each one's information is limited only to his own payoffs. On each of 30 trials, the pair is given a point value (a contract) which they can have if they can agree on how to divide it between themselves. Each one is also assigned an independent value which specifies what he receives if they fail to reach agreement about a division of the contract. The contract values and independent values vary unpredictably from trial to trial, so each time each person does not know what the other's independent value is. It is to their mutual benefit to agree on a division of each contract because after an uninterrupted succession of such agreements (and as long as they sustain it), the entire set of values increases for them both. On the other hand, it is often in a person's short term individual interest to take his independent value inasmuch as it represents more than he can possibly hope to gain from the contract. In any event, a person with a high independent value (or who can convince his opponent it is high) will be tempted to use it as a basis for obtaining a lion's share of the contract, as his price for agreeing to a division. This fact means that the relationship may be subjected repeatedly to stress by the threat of non-agreement and by problems arising from misrepresentation and distrust.

From this brief description, it can be seen that participants may deal with the relationship in a variety of ways ranging from active, trial-by-trial bargaining, to the development of norms or rules for making contracts, to avoiding confrontation by repeatedly opting for the independent values. In the course of active bargaining, a range of tactics is available including threats, promises, honest sharing of information, deceit and misrepresentation, and appeals to the future. The task was designed particularly for the purpose of revealing different orientations toward bargaining relationships and different patterns of tactics employed in the course of bargaining.

This task was used at eight sites: Louvain (Belgium), Paris (France), Utrecht (Holland), Chapel Hill (University of North Carolina), Los Angeles (UCLA), Hanover, New Hampshire (Dartmouth College), New York (Columbia University), and Santa Monica (System Development Corporation) with 10 dyads per cell in a 2x2 experimental design (high vs. low incentive---money vs. points, and equal vs. unequal dependence---average independent values that are equal or unequal for members of a dyad).

(a) Effects of Difficulty of Bargaining Problem. Consistent with results from other experiments (Kahan, 1968), increasing the difficulty of the bargaining problem (that is, narrowing the "bargaining range") was found to increase time required to reach agreement and reduce the frequency of agreement. Because with the present procedure, the value of agreement is derived in part from its cumulative effect over trials, these relationships were different for pairs of bargainers who had long vs. short histories of prior agreement.

(b) Effects of Equal vs. Unequal Dependence. The creation in one condition of an unequal dependence of the two parties upon agreement did not have the anticipated disruptive effect upon the interaction. However, an incidental finding with respect to the independent values is important and consistent with results from other investigations. This is the fact that the independent values (the values each bargainer would obtain if they failed to agree) were consistently underestimated at the end of the bargaining. That is to say, when subjects were asked at the end of each trial to estimate the independent value their opponent had had that trial, their estimates tended to be smaller than the true values. This is similar to results obtained by Pruitt and Drews (1969) and, as they suggest, may reflect a tendency for wishful thinking. Or it may indicate that a moderate degree of distrust existed in these relationships which would be consistent with the occasional occurrence of misrepresentation of the independent value. A similar result but for a very different situation is reported by Shure and Meeker (1968). The game required two persons to work out a division of a set of territories, some of which were especially valuable to one party or the other. The degree of conflict was varied by varying the number of areas of high value for each person. Post-game questions revealed that players tended to underestimate by about 25 percent the number of areas that were of high value to the other player. Thus, in effect, the subjects underestimated the degree of conflict inherent in their relationship. These several instances of such underestimation suggest the following important hypothesis: When persons interacting in a mixed-motive relationship allocate responsibility for the conflict they experience, they underestimate the contribution of the common external situation (the bargaining problem) and overestimate the contribution of the other party. The data summarized above would indicate the truth of the first part of the hypothesis, an underestimation of the degree of conflict due to the common external situation. There is, of course, a third agent possibly responsible for the experienced conflict, namely the person himself. The hypothesis asserts that the underestimation of the external situation's causal role in their conflict is accompanied not by an overestimation of their own contribution but of that of the opposing party.

(c) The Effects of High vs. Low Incentives. The experiment provides important results on the question of how bargaining behavior is effected by the level of incentive or the importance of the resources at issue. This is a very important matter in the experimental study of negotiation and conflict resolution: the results bear on the question of the possibility of generalizing from laboratory results to natural situations, and the laboratory results to date have been highly contradictory.

In the present experiment, subjects in the high incentive condition bargained for money and subjects in the low condition, for point scores as in a bridge game. The value of the money can be indicated by the fact that in the United States laboratories, subjects in the high incentive condition were able to accumulate approximately \$4.25 each. (The amounts in the three European laboratories were smaller in terms of standard conversion rates but were probably equivalent to this amount psychologically.) The overall effects of the high incentive condition, as compared with the low incentive condition, were to increase the rate of agreement (79% vs. 66%, $p < .001$) and to decrease the time required to reach agreement (44.5 seconds vs. 52.5 seconds, $p < .005$).

However, closer analysis of the data showed that the high incentive effects were selective. An important fact is that the high incentive bargainers actually required somewhat more time to reach agreement on early trials, presumably as they dealt with the more important problem by formulating norms or agreements which were then effective on later trials. Also, the money condition was particularly effective in increasing the frequency of agreement under what were otherwise the most difficult conditions. Thus, the money conditions were greatly superior to the point conditions on the more difficult problems, that is when agreement required one or both of the subjects to make a temporary sacrifice. Also, types of pairs that were found to experience the greatest difficulty in the low incentive condition were particularly improved under the high incentive condition. Pairs which included a cooperative and a competitive person, and pairs which included two persons each halfway between cooperative and competitive in his stance, were found to do especially poorly under low incentive conditions. However, under the high incentive, these pairs were greatly improved in the frequency with which they resolved their conflicts, and took their expected place intermediate between pairs in which both members were either cooperative or competitive. This provides another instance in which the high incentive condition seemed to introduce its advantages particularly for circumstances which under low incentive conditions were particularly difficult.

The monetary incentive was found to have an effect upon orientations to the relationship even before the interaction began. Subjects in the money condition characterized themselves and the typical player as more cooperative in their pre-interaction ratings. This result raised the question of whether the high incentive has a positive effect on the interaction and its outcomes over and beyond its favorable effect upon initial attitudes and orientations. Internal analyses made it clear that it does have an additional effect. This analysis was made by classifying, within each incentive condition, the various dyads as to the pre-game orientations of the two players. Then, high and low incentive dyads are compared for each type. The results show quite clearly that no matter what type of dyad exists before the game (whether both members are cooperative, both competitive, one cooperative and the other competitive, etc.), those playing under high incentives then proceed more frequently and quickly to resolve the conflict component in their relationships.

Further insight into the effects of incentives is provided below in the analysis of differences in definitions of the bargaining situation. As will be noted there, apparently this definition is affected by the kind of incentive involved.

(d) Individual Differences in Orientations to the Bargaining Situation.

A factor analysis of the pre-game ratings were reported in a working paper by Gerald Shure and John Barefoot entitled "Individual and site differences in the Nice experiment" (inasmuch as this experiment was planned at our Nice meeting some years ago, it is referred to within the Group as the Nice experiment). This factor analysis yielded an important result concerning the meaning or definition of the cooperation-competition dimension within the different samples. In some cases (most clearly exemplified by the Paris and Dartmouth samples) it was equivalent to a "good-bad" or evaluative dimension. In others (best illustrated by the Columbia and North Carolina samples), it corresponded

to an "active-passive" and "strong-weak" or dynamism factor. The point of this is that the meaning of cooperation vs. competition varied from sample to sample and there seemed to be two predominant meanings which roughly correspond to the first factors in the Semantic Differential (Osgood, et al., 1958).

To pursue the behavioral implications of these different connotations of "cooperation-competition," we combined the data for the three most "evaluative" sites (Paris, Dartmouth and Louvain) and compared them with the combined data for the three most "dynamic" sites (Columbia, North Carolina and UCLA). The main result to be emphasized is that whereas the initial cooperativeness of the pair was associated with successful conflict resolution in the "dyanmism" (D) sample, in the "evaluative" (E) sample, there was little relation between these two variables. This is of considerable interest, that the E definition of cooperativeness is such that pairs of subjects who described themselves as "cooperative" at the outset were little more able to agree than those who described themselves as "competitive." And this is the definition of cooperative-competitive in which the former means "good" (moral, honest, peaceful)!

Further behavioral differences between the two samples are consistent with the notion that the E sample tended to define the bargaining situation in moral terms. Where to be "competitive" is, relatively speaking, to be "bad," the behavioral difference between cooperative and competitive pairs seemed to be in terms of frequency of bad behaviors. What is more notable about the E sample is the fact that the "bad" behavior characteristic of the more competitive pairs was little more disruptive of agreement than was the relatively "good" behavior for the pairs who described themselves as cooperative. We may speculate that the initially cooperative E's created trouble for themselves by indulging in some misrepresentation (perhaps despite their moral scruples) to which the partners then overreacted. They infrequently used threat so it seems not to have been explicit power tactics which created trouble, but these cooperative E's did have many cases of not bargaining (a mild pressure tactic) which could easily have been another cause of their apparent difficulty.

In the D samples, where to be cooperative is to be passive and weak, the cooperative pairs created and used rules to settle the negotiation problems and were able thereby to achieve high rates of agreement. The psychological significance of the bargaining situation for the D sample seems best described in "task" or "instrumental" terms. The subjects describing themselves as cooperators seem to have treated the negotiation problems as tasks to be solved by local and direct arrangements and not (as their counterparts in the E sample) as interactions having wider, moral connotations. The competitive D's were low in rule usage but they did not, as a substitute, engage in active negotiation with threat and misrepresentation to the same degree as did their E counterparts. They appear to have used refusal to bargain and some hard bargaining and to have done so in a manner which kept both negotiation time and agreement rate at relatively low values.

With regard to the effects of the higher incentives (monetary vs. "point" scores), there are several respects in which the money incentive made the E sample like the D one. For example, whereas with the points incentive the E sample was high on bargain hard with threat, in the money condition they were indistinguishable from the D sample. On the other hand, whercas money increased

rule discussion for the D's, it decreased it for the E's. The implication of these trends seems to be that while money inhibited certain behaviors characteristic of the E sample (and thereby decreased time and increased agreement), it did not encourage for these pairs the positive, rule-using behavior more characteristic of the D sample. Thus, of two general possible effects of higher incentives (reducing interfering behaviors and increasing agreement-promoting behaviors), the first seems to be more prominent in the E sample and the second, in the D sample.

It may also be noted that a tendency for money to change the definition of the situation in the direction of "dynamism" is suggested by factor analyses made of all the data from the five United States sites. These were made separately for the money and points conditions. While the basic factor structure is essentially the same for the two conditions, the cooperative-competitive scale loads more on the evaluative factor in the points condition and more on the dynamism factor in the money condition.

We regard as a major outcome of this research the identification of the two different meanings given to cooperation vs. competition. In this and in other research (cf., Shure, Meeker, Moore and Kelley, 1966; Kelley and Stahelski, 1970), the orientation a person adopts before the interaction is found to predict his behavior in the interaction. Thus, this particular set of polar opposites seems to reflect important variations in orientation to the relationship. Our present evidence takes us considerably beyond this simple fact and shows that the cooperative-competitive distinction does not have a constant meaning but rather, varies from one situation or set of subjects to another. Presumably, these variations reflect different psychological definitions which may be given to the same objective bargaining situation. In some instances, the situation seems to be defined in moral terms and in this case to be cooperative is to be good (moral, honest). In other instances, the situation seems defined more in task or achievement terms and to be cooperative is to be weak and passive. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that the behavior associated with a cooperative or competitive outlook depends upon the definition of the situation.

The present study is not the first one in which our Working Group found site differences. And it is interesting that the differences obtained here have considerable resemblance to those obtained in the earlier study. In that investigation (described earlier and reported by Flament, 1967), through an analysis of reasons subjects gave for their behavior, Flament ascertained that the major dimensions of individual difference at two of the laboratories (Aix-en-Provence and UCLA) was different from that at the other two (Louvain and Dartmouth). (The reader will note the correspondence at the D and E samples, respectively, in the present study, UCLA being in the D set and Louvain and Dartmouth, in the E set.) In the first two instances, subjects were mainly different in their degree of "social interaction," that is, in the degree to which the gift they gave each time depended upon what they had just received. Some subjects (can we describe them as "active"?) responded in a highly contingent manner and others ("passive"?) gave the same gift each time without regard to what they had received. In the Louvain and Dartmouth samples, the main difference among subjects was in "generosity vs. profit orientation,"

that is, in the cost to themselves of the gifts they gave. Some subjects (the "good" ones?) gave costly commodities and others ("bad" ones?) kept their own costs down.

Thus, there are striking parallels between the two studies, both in the empirically derived groupings of sites and in the definitions of the major dimension of individual difference within the two groupings. The two studies seem to reflect the same distinction between different samples of subjects, and the "dynamism" vs. "evaluative" distinction seems to describe the difference rather well.

The evidence from the earlier study makes salient two important additional considerations: (1) Certain overall characteristics of the behavior within a given sample (say the E sample) may reflect in part the general level of the subjects on the other dimension (say the D factor). This is illustrated by the fact that the earlier Louvain and Dartmouth samples, differentiable on the basis of "generosity," were generally high on contingency. That is, the degree of contingency was high for both more and less generous subjects. This suggests, of course, that the general level of "activity" was high throughout the sample. This implication is consistent with evidence from the present study that there was a high level of activity within the E sample as indicated by both the pre-game ratings and the long trial times. (2) The effect of a given dimension may vary from one situation to another. Thus, in the present study, cooperatively inclined subjects in the D sample (that is, the less active) seemed to evolve rules as a means of handling the conflict in the situation. In the earlier study, the less active (low contingency) subjects tended to be very low in "generosity." These two facts together suggest that in a situation where passive subjects are not able to handle their interpersonal conflicts by rules or by some similar impersonal device, they will tend to discontinue responding to one another and, in effect, withdraw from interaction. In the commodity exchange situation employed in the earlier experiment, establishing explicit rules was not possible but withdrawal was and it could be accomplished by means of disregarding the other person's gifts and giving him very little.

(e) Relation Between Own Orientation and Expectations of Others' Orientations. The data from the "international" bargaining experiment were also analyzed to test an hypothesis suggested by Kelley and Stahelski (1970). The hypothesis is that persons who adopt the competitive orientation to an interaction will expect others to adopt a similarly competitive orientation, but persons who adopt a cooperative orientation will expect others to differ in this respect, ranging from cooperative to competitive in their orientations. The results from the international bargaining study were strikingly consistent with this hypothesis.

The overall evidence provides important support for the final argument in a line of reasoning advanced by Kelley and Stahelski which deals with the relationship between a person's view of his social world and the way in which his behavior tends to shape and determine that world. The argument is that (a) in interactions between cooperative and competitive persons, the cooperative ones are induced to behave competitively, (b) by virtue of this fact, competitors

misjudge the cooperators to have competitive intentions like their own, (c) the cooperative persons but not the competitive ones are aware of what has occurred and of the competitors' dominant role in the relationship and, therefore, (d) the competitive persons come to believe others are also generally competitive, but cooperative persons are aware that although some others are cooperative like themselves, there also exist different, competitive persons. This argument, of course, has important implications as a model of how a person's own orientation to his world, as it effects his behavior, tends to shape that world and thereby to provide justification and support for that very orientation. Further implications of the argument were investigated in work, described below, on conceptions of social interdependence.

(f) Methodological Implications. In planning and conducting this large comparative experimental study, the Working Group learned several important "morals" with regard to the methodology of such investigations. It became very clear to us that the interpretation of differences between laboratories was greatly facilitated by having a rich matrix of observed variables, both in terms of pre-bargaining information and post-bargaining information. Thus, for example, the pre-game ratings made by each subject of how he expected to behave and how he expected the typical counterpart to behave gave us important information about the way the relationship was defined and about the way it was affected by incentive variations. While the behavioral consequences of increasing incentives were fairly constant across the different samples, there was some important evidence that the introduction of the money tended to shift the definition of the relationship in the direction of the "dynamic" one. Similarly, richness in the behavioral measures provided by the situation enabled us to gain some insight into the way the definition of the situation affected the actions within it. These and other important methodological implications of this study are discussed in the introduction to the published paper.

4. The Effect of Within-Group Relations Upon Intergroup Relations.

This topic represents the convergence of two of the major interests of members of the Working Group: intergroup relations and bargaining. Initial discussion of the problem area at the Sorrento meeting led to the conclusion that inasmuch as most conflict resolution between groups takes place between group representatives, this particular kind of interaction should figure prominently in our work.

Professors Rabbie and Thibaut constituted a special subgroup which developed experimental procedures for investigating this area. The experiment they conceived involved two experimental variables: (1) homogeneity vs. heterogeneity of attitudes within each group and (2) whether the group's representative (at the intergroup conference) was unquestionably reliable and loyal to his group or not. Two pilot experiments using these variables, one conducted at North Carolina and the other at Utrecht, produced rather different results, particularly in regard to the weakening or strengthening effect of initial within-group heterogeneity of attitudes. Heterogeneity tended to break up the group and create attraction toward the opposing group in the North Carolina experiment, but to make for a better image of one's own group (though also, a better attitude toward the outgroup) in the Utrecht studies.

Subsequently, Rabbie modified his procedures at Utrecht to make them more comparable to those used in the North Carolina pilot study and obtained rather similar results to the earlier ones reported by Thibaut. In the situation represented in this experiment, the effect of attitudinal heterogeneity within the group was to reduce the evaluative preferences members show for it over a competing outgroup, and to scale down the minimum position the members set for themselves in negotiating with the outgroup. Rabbie's experiment also has interesting data on the reactions of an out-voted minority to the prospect of negotiations with the competing group, and the development of belief systems in the context of initial agreement or disagreement. Professor Rabbie provides a summary of his two experiments on homogeneity vs. heterogeneity of attitudes in a working paper entitled "A summary of two hom/het experiments." A report on Rabbie's original pilot experiment is also available in a working paper entitled "Summary of hom/het, coop/comp experiment."

As an outgrowth of this work, Professor Rabbie has incorporated the homogeneity vs. heterogeneity variable and the negotiation context into his ongoing program on research on intergroup cooperation vs. competition. An example of this research is described in a paper by Rabbie and deBrey, "Intergroup cooperation and competition in anticipation of public and private negotiations."

In his summary of his two experiments on homogeneity vs. heterogeneity, Professor Rabbie reports that in line with previous research, these experiments show that people who are strangers to each other and who are randomly assigned to ad hoc laboratory groups show a significantly greater preference for the ingroup than for the outgroup. Heider's (1958) balance theory seems to be the most parsimonious explanation of these results.

As expected, there was a significantly greater preference for the ingroup over the outgroup in the homogeneous than in the heterogeneous condition. This differentiation was almost entirely due to more negative ratings of the outgroup in the homogeneous condition. An internal analysis showed that this positive attitude toward the outgroup was mainly due to those members of the heterogeneous ingroup whose attitudinal positions were closer to those held by the outgroup. The hypothesis that similarity in attitude leads to attraction seems to be supported by the outgroup but not by the ingroup ratings. Social interaction seems to be the major determinant of ingroup attraction. These data suggest that social interaction was such a strong determinant of ingroup attraction that it overrode the possible negative effects of heterogeneity in opinions. This is all the more remarkable in view of the heated discussions that took place in the heterogeneous group, the attitudinal topic being that of euthanasia, attitudes toward which are anchored in various philosophical and personal values.

Each group, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, prepared itself for competitive negotiations with an unknown adversary group which they saw briefly before the group discussion began. The pairs of negotiating groups were supposed to negotiate a common position paper regarding the question of legalizing euthanasia, but each group was urged to have as much of its point of view represented in the common paper as possible. For this purpose, each

group prepared instructions for its negotiating representative who was to meet with a representative from the other group.

This problem of preparing a mandate for the representative was particularly difficult in the heterogeneous groups inasmuch as it was necessary for the two conflicting sides to agree upon a position for their group and then to instruct the representative in how to support that position. In the instructions given the representatives, it was found that homogeneous groups pushed for a more extreme position to be attained by their representative than did the heterogeneous groups, and the former were also much less likely to be willing to make concessions to the other group. The representative for each group was chosen by chance. If within a heterogeneous group, the spokesman happened to be from the "losing" side (that is, his original opinion was different from that which the group had decided to advocate as their own), much less was expected of him. In general, the losing members in the heterogeneous groups, that is, members who had been out-voted in the decision about their group's position, demanded less of their representative and were much more lenient about how many of their group's ideas must be represented in the final common agreement.

In general, these and other findings confirm the view that the loser felt more loyal to their own original positions than to the position the group had more or less imposed upon them. This is reflected in a greater preference for the opposing group's position, their readiness to compromise with the outgroup rather than to compete with them, and their willingness to strive for a moderate rather than an extreme position in the negotiations. This does not mean they were disloyal toward their own group, because as noted above they felt as positive about the ingroup as did members of the homogeneous groups. However, in these ad hoc experimental groups, the minority (out-voted) members seemed to have been more strongly motivated by their convictions than by their needs to belong.

Professors Rabbie and Pruitt also worked together on studies dealing with internal conflict as it affects relations with an outgroup. Their hypothesis was that with a moderate degree of internal conflict, in an effort to control the resulting divisive tendencies the group will tend to build up a negative image of the outgroup (as a threatening enemy). This will not occur under low internal conflict, and with high conflict, the group will be unable to act effectively to generate outgroup derogation.

Internal analysis of Rabbie's first experiment (on homogeneity vs. heterogeneity of internal attitudes as they affected attitudes toward a cooperating or competing outgroup) yielded results consistent with this hypothesis. Attitudes toward the competitive outgroup were more negative with internal heterogeneity than with internal homogeneity. (This is contrary to his and Thibaut's later results.)

Rabbie then designed and ran a new study (8 groups per cell in a 2x2 design) which also yielded evidence consistent with the hypothesis. With heterogeneity of opinion within the ingroup, there appeared to be an increase in derogation of the competing outgroup. In contrast, homogeneity of attitude led to heightened approval of the ingroup when there was competition

with the outgroup (as compared with there being cooperative relations with the outer group).

Pruitt tested the same hypothesis with a different procedure (8 subjects per cell in a 2x2 design). Although he was able successfully to manipulate the necessary independent variables (homogeneity of attitudes within the group and cooperative-competitive relation with the outgroup), he found no confirmation of the derogation hypothesis.

Thibaut has suggested that the crucial factor mediating the relation between ingroup conflict and outgroup derogation is that there be a history of exploitation of a subgroup of the ingroup, which subgroup then threatens to defect. This threat to internal solidarity can only be met fully by derogation of the outgroup. Thibaut has designed and conducted several experiments to test this idea of the "instrumental magnification of external threat in order to moderate and control internal dissension." The investigations involve a role-playing or simulation procedure in which the subject gives advice to the leader of a country as to the types of persuasive arguments to address to a mistreated minority group in that country to induce them to maintain their loyalty and resist defecting to a competing hostile country. The results of these investigations are described in the next section below.

These various studies of the conditions favoring the development of outgroup derogation and antagonism are conflicting in their results. A major problem for the future is to identify more clearly the conditions that favor this development and those that inhibit it. Alternatively, the problem is to investigate more thoroughly the consequences of ingroup divisiveness in order to determine when the conflict is disruptive of that group and when, in contrast, it results in an ultimate strengthening of the group as through stimulating the development of a unifying conception of a common external threat.

5. Methods of Influence Between Majorities and Minorities.

As noted above, interest in this problem grew out of the above topic on intergroup relations. The relevant situation, as defined by Professor Thibaut, concerns the relationship between the more and less powerful subgroups within a given group and their relation to an outgroup that is seeking to induce the less powerful subgroup to break away and join it. The general conceptualization of the situation follows that of earlier experimental work by Thibaut and Faucheux (1965) on the question of when a more powerful member of a group may be induced to use his power justly and fairly in return for the lower power member's pledge of continued loyalty to the group. The new experiment focused upon members of the powerful subgroup and the kinds of arguments and proposals they make to the less powerful subgroup to maintain its loyalty to their coalition in the face of the outgroup's instigations of disloyalty. The two independent variables concern (1) similarity vs. dissimilarity between members of the two subgroups, and (2) whether the more powerful subgroup has recently treated the lower group fairly or unfairly in the distribution of resources within the group. The interest is in how these circumstances will affect the type of appeal made to the lower group to maintain its loyalty, whether that appeal will be a moral one, referring to

prior agreements and commitments; a promise of future concessions; threat of the use of force to maintain the coalition; appeal to basic similarities; emphasis on the attractiveness of the high power group, or emphasis upon the dangers of coalition with the outgroup. With 12 groups in each cell of a 2x2 design, the first study's results supported the hypothesis: when the subgroup had been treated unfairly, the appeals directed to them were more often derogatory of the outgroup and, moreover, the derogation tendency was manifested in the subjects' judgments of the outgroup.

The North Carolina study was replicated at Utrecht again with 12 groups in each cell of a 2x2 design. The results from this study are consistent with the North Carolina study in terms of overall effectiveness ratings of the various appeals: the most effective appeals are judged to be those that flatter the minority group, emphasize similarities, and describe the virtues of the majority group. Perceived as least effective are threats to use force and appeal to normative commitments. Derogation of the outgroup falls in the middle of the perceived effectiveness range. Despite the overall comparability of the results from the two laboratories, the experimental manipulations were not found to have either significant main effects or significant interaction effects in the Utrecht data.

Thibaut subsequently completed a further experiment in which the messages from the majority were evaluated from the point of view of the minority group receiving them. The results make it impressively clear that senders and recipients are not likely to evaluate the various possible persuasive appeals in the same way. While in the original experiment there was a significant tendency for the majority to prefer to use derogation of the outgroup when the evidence was quite clear that the minority had been treated unfairly, the minority themselves were not particularly impressed by this appeal. Further examples of the effects of the different perspective are provided by the fact that the minority rated reward and force as more effective appeals than did the majority while, on the other hand, majority subjects rated flattery and normative appeals as more effective than did the minority role players. In these comparisons there seem to be individual differences in reactions to the messages among the subjects identifying with the minority group. Subjects with low scores on the Machiavellian Scale (Christie and Geis, 1970) respond more favorably (and hence would be more influenced) by the outgroup derogation message. In general, the comparison of senders and recipients suggests that the senders place more emphasis on influence attempts that involve little cost or commitment on their part such as flattery of the minority group and derogation of the outgroup. In contrast, the minority recipients report that they would be most impressed by messages requiring some commitment to costs by the majority such as the use of rewards or the threat of force. This line of experimentation obviously moves us into a very important area in terms of practical implications. An exceedingly important topic for further research concerns the means of influence judged to be most effective (and actually most effective) from different perspectives within a social system.

The reader interested in more details about Thibaut's work can obtain from him a working paper entitled "Report to the Transnational Working Group of experiments on the style of persuasion adopted by a majority attempting to maintain the loyalty of an exploited minority and on the persuasive appeals preferred by such a minority."

6. The Basis of Ingroup-Outgroup Conflict.

This work was initiated by Tajfel and the rationale for and properties of the work presented here follow very closely his arguments.

A major characteristic of large-scale conflicts (such as, for example, in race, inter-ethnic and international relations) is that fact that behavior towards a given individual is determined by the category to which he is assigned. In situations involving prejudice against a minority group or some form of international tension, the less information an individual has about another individual belonging to a category such as "Negro" or "national of country X," the more fully will his behavior towards the other be determined by the pre-existing notions. This behavior is likely to be modified later in directions determined by the subsequent individual interaction, but this does not mean that the previous global categorizations cease to act as a causal factor nor does it mean that behavior towards other members of the "outgroup category" will necessarily be affected.

Questionnaire studies are rarely able to unravel causal variables in these intergroup relationships. And small group studies have not ordinarily reflected the crucial variables which are at play when the relations between large groupings are involved. The interaction between members of such large groups rarely entail face-to-face contacts and direct, personal relations. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the psychological processes discovered in the study of face-to-face small groups are necessarily the same as those which characterize the development of intergroup relations at large. In addition, the methodological and procedural difficulties of intergroup studies have inhibited the growth of knowledge in this field. Part of the explanation for the infrequency of experimental studies of intergroup relations lies in the mistaken assumption that studies inevitably require large numbers of subjects. In fact, research on relations between groups that are not in face-to-face contact permits an economy in experimentation due to the greater ability of the experimenter to program the experiences of the subjects in the experiment. The crucial psychological aspect of intergroup relations at large is that they are not based on individual interactions, but rather that individuals from the various groups interact and form their attitudes on the basis of previous interaction between groups as a whole, or conceptions about the nature of their interactions.

Experimental studies in this field present two possible advantages as compared with questionnaire studies or studies in complex field settings: (1) In situations in which the experimenter can "program the experiences of the subject," the various hypothetical causal factors responsible for intergroup attitudes can be systematically investigated and controlled. (2) The flexibility of experimental design allows the creation of situations in which the subsequent behavior is directly elicited and investigated.

The experimental procedures employed by Tajfel and his colleagues to study ingroup-outgroup differentiation (described in Tajfel, Flament, Billig and Bundy, in press) have been designed to fulfill the following criteria:

1. There should be no face-to-face interaction whatever between the subjects, either in the ingroup or in the outgroup or between the groups.
2. Complete anonymity of group membership should be preserved.
3. There should be no instrumental or rational link between the criteria for intergroup categorization and the nature of ingroup and outgroup responses requested from the subjects.
4. The responses should not represent any utilitarian value to the subject making them.
5. A strategy of responding in terms of intergroup differentiation (i.e., favoring the ingroup and detrimental to the outgroup) should be in competition with a strategy based on other more "rational" and "utilitarian" principles, such as obtaining maximum benefit for all. A further step in this direction would be to oppose a strategy of maximum material benefit to the ingroup to one in which the group gains less than it could, but more than the outgroup.
6. Last but not least, the responses should be made as important as possible to the subjects. They should consist of real decisions about the distribution of concrete rewards (and/or penalties) to others rather than of some form of evaluation of others.

More specifically, the experimental procedure has been as follows: Groups of boys aged 14-15 were asked to estimate numbers of dots contained in clusters presented at rapid exposure. After this had been done, in one of the experimental conditions the subjects were told that in a situation such as this, some people tend consistently to under-estimate the number of dots in a cluster, others to over-estimate the number. In another condition, they were told that some people tend consistently to be more accurate than others in a task of this nature.

The boys were then led one by one to a large laboratory room in which individual cubicles were prepared. This was done in such a way that no subjects knew where another subject was, and there was no possibility whatsoever of communicating from one cubicle to another. In the first condition, each subject found on his table information as to whether he was an "over-estimator" or an "under-estimator;" in the second condition as to whether he was in the high or the low accuracy group. The task for each of the subjects was to choose one term (such as, for example, $8/11$) in an ordered matrix of 14 terms. There were 18 such choices to be made, each in a separate matrix. In six of the matrices, the choice was between another person from the subject's own group (e.g., another unknown "under-estimator," or "over-estimator," or high accuracy subject or low accuracy subject, as the case may be) and one unknown person from the other group. (For example, to choose the term " $8/11$ " meant that the own-group person would receive 8 points and the person from the other group would receive 11 points.) In the second set of six matrices, the choice was between two people other than himself from the subject's own group; in the third set of six matrices, the choice was between two members of the other group. The subjects were told that at the end of the experiment each of them will receive the number of pennies equivalent to the number of points that were awarded to him by all the others.

The matrices were so constructed that in the first set of six (choice between a member of own group and a member of the other group), an assessment

could be made of the extent to which three major hypothetical determinants of choice played a role in the final choice. These were: preference for a member of own group; a strategy of achieving maximum joint payoff for all the subjects; and fairness. The latter two remain distinguishable in the second and third sets of choices (between two members of own group and between two members of the other group).

The two conditions (over- and under-estimation, and better and worse accuracy) were introduced in the experiment with the aim of finding a "minimal social condition" in which categorization into two groups would not lead to differential intergroup behavior. The first of these two conditions implied no more than a flimsy perception of similarity between a subject and others who performed in a way similar to himself; the second, concerned with accuracy, added to this a value judgment in terms of "better" or "worse" performance. The expectation was that very little in the way of differential intergroup behavior would be manifest, and that if any was shown at all, it would be in the direction of revealing some first traces of differential behavior in the value judgment condition. It will be remembered that obvious "rational" strategies were available to the subjects: choosing in the fairest possible manner, or choosing in such a way that all of them together would get as much money as possible out of the experiment.

The results turned out to be very highly significant in an unexpected direction. There were no differences between the two conditions, or between the two categories of subjects in each of the conditions. All groups showed in their choices a striking preference for members of their own category. At the same time, in the other two sets of choices offering the possibility of distributing points (and pennies) between two members of own category or between two members of the other category, the means of all the four groups were distributed very closely around the point of maximum fairness.

These findings, confirmed in several experiments, are clear. In a situation devoid of the usual trappings of ingroup membership and of all the vagaries of interacting with an outgroup, the subjects still act in terms of their ingroup membership and of an intergroup categorization. Their actions are unambiguously directed toward favoring the members of their ingroup as against the members of the outgroup. This happens despite the fact that an alternative strategy - acting in terms of the greatest common good - is clearly open to them at a relatively small cost of advantages that would accrue to members of the ingroup. Two further aspects of the findings are even more important. First, the subjects act in this way in a situation in which their own individual benefit is not affected one way or another. And second, when the subjects have a choice between acting in terms of maximum utilitarian advantages to all combined with maximum utilitarian advantage to members of their own group as against having their group win on points at the sacrifice of both these advantages, it is the winning that seems more important to them. It is clear from the analysis of the findings that this is a deliberate strategy adopted from their choices, though they are aware of the existence of the alternative strategies.

This summary of the findings would not be complete without stressing the importance in the determination of choices of the variables of fairness which

was not manipulated in the present experiments. All the choices in the experiments can be conceived as tending to achieve a compromise between fairness and other variables.

The results are interpreted in terms of a "generic" social norm of ingroup-outgroup behavior which guided the subjects' choices. They classified the social situation in which they found themselves as one to which this norm was pertinent, in which social categorization ought to lead to discriminatory intergroup behavior rather than to behavior in terms of alternatives that were offered to them. Alternative interpretations, including the "experimenter effect," expectation of reciprocity, and anticipation of future interaction, have been considered but by and large rejected. A related series of studies have subsequently been conducted at Columbia University by Professor Deutsch and his students. Their studies bear upon the degree to which continuously distributed differences among a group of people interfere with the ingroup-outgroup discrimination effect found by Tajfel and his co-workers. The effects of intergroup differences being perceived as discontinuous and also the creation of such discontinuities when they are socially or psychologically functional are probably fundamental to the study of intergroup relations.

Deutsch's first experiments also grouped the boys according to whether they (allegedly) underestimated or overestimated a quantity. However, no mention was made of "group membership" at the time the payoff decisions were made. Under these conditions, there was no evidence of an ingroup favoritism, even though it could be shown that the youngsters could recall which category each other belongs to (whether under- or over-estimator) when making the allocations between boys in the two categories. With a more evaluative criterion of classification (accurate *vs.* inaccurate), Deutsch finds some evidence of ingroup preference. With more sophisticated subjects (college students), even this favoritism effect disappears.

Deutsch also studied the case where the choice involves not an allocation of resources between ingroup and outgroup, but rather a choice of partner to work with on the next task. The evidence to date indicates that these explicitly instrumental choices are guided by highly rational considerations (e.g., underestimators choose overestimators) rather than simple similarity. Deutsch speculates that even the similarity (ingroup) choices found by Tajfel may reflect learned generalizations from situations in which similarity provides a cue or basis for behavioral coordination (i.e., in which similarity choices have instrumental value).

In addition to the report in press by Tajfel, Flament, Billig and Bundy, a paper reporting Tajfel's research will appear in the Scientific American. A Ph.D. dissertation on the topic has also been conducted at Bristol, entitled "Respective functions fo similarity and categorization in intergroup discrimination." Six experiments on intergroup categorization have been conducted in Deutsch's laboratory including two doctoral dissertations.

7. Conceptions of Social Interdependence

The research here has been carried out by Kelley as a result of general discussions within the Working Group. One of the earliest topics of interest

to the Group concerned the layman's conceptions of interpersonal relationships, of interpersonal conflict, his beliefs about possible outcomes of conflict, and his conceptions of various actions and means of influence within conflict situations.

A large-sample survey study on this problem has used the resources of the Survey Research Center at UCLA. The problem investigated grew out of the large bargaining study described earlier, in which it was found that cooperatively oriented people have different beliefs about others than do competitively oriented people. Thus, evidence was found in the bargaining study in support of the "triangle hypothesis" advanced by Kelley and Stahelski (1970). One of the implications of the different world views held by cooperators and competitors was that they would have different beliefs about the potentiality of other people being induced to be "good" (helpful, cooperative, etc.). Cooperators believe that people in general are heterogeneous with respect to cooperativeness, some being basically cooperative and able to be induced to be good. In contrast, competitive people believe that all others are competitive like themselves, and this might well carry the implication that other people cannot be counted upon to be helpful nor can they be easily influenced to be helpful.

The survey study was part of an omnibus study administered to over 1,000 persons in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. In the relevant part of the survey, a determination was made of whether each respondent was inclined to be cooperative or competitive in his interpersonal relations. Additionally, an assessment was made of how readily he was able to think of examples of certain mixed motive relationships involving choice dilemmas for the participants. Then a series of questions was asked to determine such things as his awareness that some people do experience conflict in social dilemma situations, his expectations about the decisions people typically make in dilemma situations, his understanding of the general social consequences of the situation in which people make selfish choices as opposed to the case in which most people make choices out of consideration for the general welfare, his optimism about how readily people could be induced to base their decisions on the general welfare, etc. These questions were based on a series of hypotheses derived more or less strictly from the Kelley and Stahelski observations and argument.

The evidence from the survey does not support the hypothesis that cooperative people have superior cognitive skills with respect to the conceptualization of mixed motive situations involving decision dilemmas. There is no evidence that they are better able to think of examples of such situations and to understand examples given them. However, there is evidence for some of the predicted attitudinal correlates of cooperativeness vs. competitiveness. As compared with the competitors, the cooperative people more strongly hold the view that the world would be better if everyone were helpful. The particular central theme in the survey involved people's attitude toward the causes of smog and what the individual person is able to do about it. Thus, the result just noted meant that cooperators have a better appreciation of the collective consequences of widespread actions taken to avoid the creation of smog. Other evidence indicated that cooperative

people were able to find reasons for taking action to avoid contributing to smog even though other people continue to contribute to it. Thus, the most important characteristic of the cooperative or socially responsible citizen suggested by this study is his ability to find reasons why he himself should continue to act in a responsible manner even though other people are not doing so. These relationships between cooperativeness and attitudes hold up quite well even with sex, education, and income controlled for. It should also be reported that cooperative people were higher on a brief Personal Efficacy Scale, which suggests that cooperativeness is associated with a sense of being able to control one's life through making plans.

An incidental result of this survey was further confirmation of the triangle hypothesis. Over the entire sample of 1014 respondents, there was found to be a clear triangular relationship between the respondents' cooperativeness-competitiveness score and their judgment of how cooperative the typical person is. As prior evidence has indicated, cooperative persons tend to believe others to be heterogeneous with respect to their cooperativeness vs. competitiveness whereas competitive persons tend to see others as being homogeneously competitive like themselves.

8. Reactions to Prior Help.

Typically the resolution of conflict requires the establishment of reciprocity behavior between the parties in conflict. That is, a downward spiral in tension and hostility is produced by one person making concessions to or otherwise helping the other and then receiving concessions or help in return. Therefore, the study of reciprocity behavior and of the conditions under which reciprocity norms become evoked is of central importance to the analysis of conflict resolution and tension reduction. The problem of reciprocity has been studied by Lanzetta and his colleagues in the context of the reactions to help received from another person. The results of this work are reported in Wilke and Lanzetta (1970, in press) and in Lanzetta and Wilke (unpublished).

In the experimental procedure, subjects worked in pairs but in separate rooms. They assumed the roles of managers of the shipping department in different companies having the responsibility for using carriers to ship various cargoes consigned to their company. For most cargoes adequate resources were available for completing the shipment but on a critical set of occasions, a given subject had inadequate resources. In these critical cases, the subjects could lend each other a transport means and this was permitted even if by doing so they could not complete their own shipment. Through the experimenter's intervention, each subject received a standardized sequence of offers to lend or not lend resources on the critical occasions. Also by the experimenter's intervention, during the early part of the interaction, the subject found himself short of transportation facilities and the other person then offered him, on a fixed number of these occasions, the necessary help. Later in the interaction, the situations were reversed, with the other person being short of means and the subject having it within his capability to help him. The central dependent variable was the help offered by the subject to the other person when the latter showed himself to be short of transportation resources during the second half of the interaction.

The results of the several experiments suggest first that the amount of help giving is proportional to the degree of prior help received even over a wide range of levels of prior help, ranging from 20% help to 80% help. Secondly, subjects given progressively increasing help responded on the average with less help than subjects who were exposed to a decrease in the help received. This finding relates to the earlier work on the sequence of consideration of bargaining contracts. The findings however are quite different and undoubtedly reflect different processes. In the case described earlier, the initial bargaining contracts received seem to provide a comparison level in the light of which subsequent contracts are more attractive. Thus, the reactions are more favorable in response to the ascending sequence than to the descending one. However, in the Wilke and Lanzetta work, it is the initial help received that seems to be more important. Subjects respond with more reciprocation of help if they have received a large amount at the outset than if they have received a small amount.

Thirdly, the results suggest that subjects reciprocate help more when the other person is more dependent upon them than when he is less so. Similarly, the subjects provide less help themselves when they have high need for the resources than when they have low need.

9. Magnitude of Conflict.

Research factors affecting the perceived magnitude of conflict has been conducted by Shure using a new research procedure, referred to as SCENQUEST. The SCENQUEST approach, based on a combination of standard techniques, affords the laboratory investigator a convenient, low-cost means of collecting data on a wide variety of situations that require control and standardization of antecedent events. The experimental subject is given a synopsis of the events and decisions made by two interacting parties up to a given point. The subject reads the scenario from the point of view of one party and is then asked to respond as if he were in the situation with the history as it is given and in the designated party's place. He records his response on a questionnaire form or answers questions offered by an interviewer.

A first SCENQUEST study explores a number of determinants of the perceived size of conflict in the opening phase of an experimental bargaining situation. Variables identified for analysis include size of stakes in the bargaining, divisibility of issues into separable bargaining units, amount of opportunity for exchange of bargaining offers within a negotiation encounter, number of negotiation encounters, and degree of inequality of trial outcomes (relatively equal to vs. highly unequal potential division). A 2⁵ experimental design explores the effects of these variables singly and in combination on a set of 57 dependent measures and 26 derived measures. These measures include assessment of the effects of the independent variables on earning goals, strategic and tactical planning, and on self and other bargainer perceptions. Data collection for 480 subjects has been completed and some sample findings include the following:

1. Incentive Effects. Both the subject's general orientation toward the negotiation situation and his strategic decisions were significantly influenced

by whether he anticipated bargaining for real or imaginary money outcomes. When stakes were to be imaginary, the subject characterized both himself and the other bargainer as more competitive, and anticipated that he would bargain more competitively (with a lower perceived probability of realizing his earnings goal) than in real money conditions. These results are consistent with those obtained in the "international" study from respondents actually participating in a bargaining interaction.

2. Unequal Trial Outcomes and Potential for Equalizing Overall Bargaining Outcomes. Where subjects believed they were to bargain for real money stakes, characterization of themselves and their adversaries on semantic differential items differed significantly as a function of the variable "inequality of trial outcome." Where trial outcome differences would be large, subjects rated themselves and their adversary significantly lower on all five items associated with the evaluative factor---i.e., as less trustworthy, less peaceful, less moral, less fair, and less generous---than where relatively equal division of outcomes could be achieved through negotiation. Subjects also rated themselves higher on two of five dynamism factor items (more active and more unyielding) and also, more competitive, when trial outcome inequality was large than when it was small. The number of anticipated trials (1 or 10) was important in determining whether inequality of trial outcome could be equalized. (Equality could be achieved in the ten-trial condition if subjects agreed to "take turns" in opting for the larger outcome; of course, this was not possible in the one-trial condition.) Accordingly, subjects characterized themselves as more competitive in the one-trial than in the ten-trial conditions when playing for real money.

In contrast to the above findings, it is of interest that in response to questions regarding tactics and strategy, the subject took into account more closely the actual strategic contingencies of the situation, determined by the combination of both the trial and the inequality of trial outcome variables. Thus, when required to set an earnings goal, to estimate the proportion of outcome that he expected the other bargainer and he would earn; and to specify the contracts he would propose, the subject's response was a function of both the trial variable (he intended to bargain "harder" in the one-trial condition than in the ten-trial condition) and of the inequality variable (he intended to bargain "harder" when inequality was high) so long as the outcome at stake was real money.

When the subject was to bargain for imaginary money, however, his strategic plans were primarily based on his "affective" orientation to the situation, rather than on the strategic contingencies.

A second SCENQUEST study on socio-economic, ethnicity, and familiarity factors in bargaining has been incorporated as part of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area Survey conducted by the UCLA Survey Research Center. At the closing phase of a structured interview, the respondent is told the following:

"Here is a final set of questions I think you will enjoy. I am going to describe a situation to you, and I want you to imagine what you would do in this situation. Here it is.

"You have been looking at used cars for a number of weeks and have finally found one that is exactly what you want. The car dealer, Mr. Lopez, a Mexican-American, happens to live in your neighborhood, and you have chatted with him a number of times at the neighborhood food market. After some bargaining over the selling price a spoken agreement is finally reached which includes the cost of repainting the car with a special two-tone color of your choosing. You make a sizeable cash down payment and state that you will return in two days with the rest of the money. You obtain the additional amount as a personal bank loan, and two days later return to pick up the car. When he looks at your check, Mr. Lopez tells you that there seems to be a misunderstanding, that you forgot to include the various taxes. You tell him that you understood that the agreed price included all taxes, and you are somewhat upset. You check your down payment receipt and find that it is not clear as to whether the additional taxes were included in the amount that you thought was the total price. You don't want to pay any more, in fact, you cannot really afford to pay any more. The car has already cost you more than you intended to spend."

After the respondent describes the dealer and himself on a number of semantic differential scales, he is read this additional information:

"He says he is sorry about the mistake, but he cannot return your deposit as he has already spent much of it on the special paint job that you requested. You suspect, however, that you might be able to convince the dealer to give up some or all of the additional money for taxes if you try."

The respondent is then asked a number of questions which will reveal how intensely he would bargain in that situation, and the influence tactics he would employ. Two variables are manipulated. 1) The effect of same versus different ethnicity on respondents' bargaining plans are systematically varied. (The scenario describes the dealer as a Negro, a Jew, a White American or as noted in the above example). 2) The effect of neighborhood familiarity or distance of the dealer.

The data should reveal a great deal about the perceptions of bargaining behavior of different subgroups in the sample to the situation and variables manipulated. Virtually no data of this kind has been systematically collected. Furthermore, if this technique of using experimentally manipulated variables in surveys proves of value, it will open up a relatively untapped domain for data collection and hypothesis testing to augment those collected in the laboratory. Data is obtained from a representative sample of more than 1000 Los Angeles County households by professionally trained interviewers. However, an error in sampling made by the Survey Research Center in an earlier survey required that new data be recollected in the fall of 1971. Work on this project will resume when the new data are obtained.

IV. DERIVATIVES OF THE WORKING GROUP'S ACTIVITIES

In the summary above of the research and theoretical activities directly supported within the Working Group, it was noted that the activities of individual members were also often affected by the Working Group's discussions and projects. This section provides a brief summary of some of these derivative effects of the Working Group, not noted elsewhere.

Inasmuch as the composition of the Working Group made it relatively easy and natural to replicate conflict studies in different laboratories and different nations, it was the continuing concern of the Group to be clear about the purposes of such comparisons and the methodological problems involved in them. The repeated discussions of these purposes and problems stimulated several members to focus particularly upon them. The most concrete result here is represented by Claude Faucheux's recent monograph, entitled "Cross-cultural Research in Social Psychology." This monograph was prepared under a National Science Foundation grant by way of the Transnational Committee on Social Psychology of the Social Science Research Council, but the thinking represented in the monograph clearly reflects Faucheux's reactions to some of the issues encountered in the Working Group's research. The monograph contains a very provocative discussion of the purposes of comparative research, whether it is to test the generality of theories or to reveal cultural differences. He makes a strong case for the necessity of having a "theory of culture" before it is possible to conduct productive comparative research. He also makes a strong case for bringing together scientists from different backgrounds and nations who, on the one hand, have common goals and talk the same language (the patois of their common discipline) but who are, on the other hand, experts on their differing cultures. A similar reflective paper on research methodology, much stimulated by the Working Group's activities, is planned by Gerald Shure. Our experiences have led him to a reappraisal of the role of induction in experimental research and he plans to consider this matter at length in a paper soon to be prepared.

At a different level, theoretical ideas exchanged in the Group inevitably affected other members' research. We have already noted the manner in which the triangle hypothesis was picked up for further investigation by Flament and Erika Apfelbaum. Our research results, usually not expected, regarding differential conceptions or representations of the interaction situation, provided a continuing input of ideas to Flament and Moscovici who have long been interested in this "representational" problem.

A theoretical debate within the Working Group, concerning the interpretation of the ingroup-outgroup effect obtained by Tajfel, has led Deutsch to initiate tests of a particular hypothesis in this area. The hypothesis is that similarity vs. dissimilarity in intergroup relations has its affective consequence by way of the cues it provides as to the structure of interdependence existing between the persons. Thus similarity may provide a cue from which the individual anticipates an implicit reciprocal coordination with another person.

At a somewhat different level, the experimental procedures and ideas have been adopted for a variety of different purposes by students and colleagues of

Working Group members. For example, several of the students of Professor Nuttin evolved theses projects related to the procedures and methods used in the Working Group. Finally, it may be noted that many of the individual members' ideas were greatly sharpened and moved towards implementation by the discussions of the Working Group. An example here is work on mediation conducted by Pruitt and Johnson (1970).

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