This study discusses requirements for new and modified doctrinal and organizational concepts for prisoner of war operations during the period 1965-1970. The study proposes modifications and additions to current doctrine for the evacuation, processing and internment of enemy prisoners of war in a theater of operations; it presents concepts for the operation and organization of prisoner of war branch camps and for a Branch United States Prisoner of War Information Center. A small development requirement for a prisoner of war name identification kit is proposed.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This Combat Developments Command Study was prepared in response to paragraph 1420hh, Combat Development Objectives Guide.

It will be used as approved interim doctrinal guidance in the preparation of FM's and TOE's until such time as the TASTA concept is approved by Department of the Army.

Conclusions and recommendations of the study are those of the Commanding General, United States Army Combat Developments Command, and are based upon information gathered and analysis performed primarily by the Combat Developments Command Military Police Agency.
SUMMARY

The purpose of this study is to determine the requirement for and to develop new or modified doctrinal and organizational concepts required for prisoner of war operations during the period 1965-1970.

The study proposes certain modifications and additions to currently approved doctrine for the evacuation, processing, and internment of PW's in a theater of operations and presents concepts for the operation and organization of prisoner of war branch camps and for a Branch United States Prisoner of War Information Center. A small development requirement for a PW name identification kit is proposed.
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SUBJECT: Prisoner of War Operations in a Theater of Operations 
During the Period 1965-1970 (U) (USAMPCDA 61-2 (MPCCD 61-2)).


2. PROBLEM. To develop optimum military police operational and organizational concepts for the handling of prisoners of war in a theater of operations during the period 1965-1970.

3. STUDY GUIDELINES. The study is in consonance with the guidelines provided in paragraph 5, Study Directive (annex A).

4. ASSUMPTIONS.
   a. That the operational and organizational concepts for the field army during the period 1965-1970 will be essentially as outlined in FM 61-100, The Division, and USACGSC Study No. 61-8, Reorganization Objectives, Division, Army, Corps - 1970 (RODAC-70) (U), and for the communications zone as set forth in FM 54-1, The Logistical Command.
   b. That the current missions and functions of the Military Police Corps will remain basically the same during the period 1965-1970.
c. That individual allied forces will intern and administer prisoners of war captured by their respective forces. However, in combined forces, such as a United Nations force, the U. S. element, if comprising the major national force, may be required to accept custody of prisoners of war from other national elements operating under the United Nations Command.

d. That the treatment of prisoners of war by the U. S. will be in accordance with the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.

5. DISCUSSION (Summary).

a. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GFW), establishes basic and mandatory requirements relating to the treatment, control, and administration of FW's. The provisions of the GFW are implemented in AR 35-233, Pay, Allowances, and Deposit of Personal Funds - Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees, and AR 633-50, Prisoners of War - Administration, Employment, and Compensation. Subject matters and details appropriately included in these AR's are therefore omitted from consideration in this study. Attention herein is directed to the development of concepts in those areas in which current doctrine is considered to be lacking or inadequate or to require modification for the 1965-1970 time period.
b. PW's are retained in or evacuated from a theater of operations in accordance with the PW evacuation policy enunciated by Headquarters, Department of the Army, for the theater. Such a policy may provide, alternatively, for complete evacuation, partial evacuation, or no evacuation. Planning responsibilities and factors developed under one evacuation alternative become largely or completely invalid under either of the other two alternatives. Consequently, an evacuation policy to provide firm planning guidance must be weighed, selected, and supported on the basis of those considerations (military, economic, and political) and factors which are pertinent thereto.

c. Current intratheater PW evacuation doctrine is considered adequate with some modifications to facilitate and expedite evacuation by the forward MP custody (brigade level) of PW's, direct evacuation, and the providing of escort guard and receiving capabilities to permit the fullest utilization of all available return transportation. An army PW cage will be required on the basis of one for each major transportation terminal used for PW evacuation. From one to three army PW cages will normally be required per field army. They will be located in the vicinity of the transportation terminals for ease in utilization of transportation.
d. PW reception and processing camps should be established and located to provide for the expeditious reception, processing, and further movement of PW's to permanent PW camps. The most advantageous location for the establishment of such camps will generally be in the vicinity of each major transportation terminal or terminals in BALOG or COMZ rear, except when a separate PW processing capability may be required for PW's retained for labor in the ADLOG area. PW's arriving intermittently or in smaller numbers at other transportation terminals should be transported to the nearest reception camp. From one to a maximum of three such facilities will normally be required per field army supported.

e. Primary reliance for segregating PW's by political ideology or ethnic grouping should be placed on a joint intelligence/military police effort. When required, the services of CID or intelligence polygraph operator specialists may be requested to assist in evaluations of the true status of selected PW's and the validity of certain information received.

f. A requirement exists for the ready and reasonably reliable identification of individual PW's during the course of routine camp operations. Plastic wrist identification bands which could not be removed and exchanged between
PW's without sufficient disfigurement to permit ready de-
tection are believed to offer the most promising solution
to this problem.

g. Under general war conditions a definite requirement for PW
labor in a theater of operations will probably exist. In
the field army area the fluidity of operations, security
considerations, the greatly increased range of tactical
weapons, and logistical implications will virtually negate
PW utilization for labor. To a lesser degree these same
considerations and also probable guerrilla activities
will tend to restrict PW employment in the forward or
ADLOG area of COMZ. The greatest and most feasible
employment of PW's will probably be in the supply complex
in the rear or BALOG area of COMZ. Because of dispersion
of activities and facilities and the absence of large
depots and ports, the primary requirements will probably
be for relatively small PW work forces. The PW branch
camp facilities for such work forces must be austere and
readily transportable. Selection of PW's composing the
work forces must be on the basis of minimum security con-
siderations and of skill qualifications to assure maximum
individual and group proficiency. Because of the consider-
able variation in the number of PW's assigned to individual
branch camps, the development of one or more fixed type
TOE's is not considered feasible; a preferable alternative is the development of appropriate teams for inclusion in TOE 19-500 to provide a flexible but firm basis for the ready development of organizational structures tailored to the individual requirements of each branch camp.

h. Under limited war conditions, the probable availability of indigenous labor, modern packaging techniques, improved transport capabilities and materiel handling procedures, and less critical manpower shortages will result in greatly reduced requirements for PW labor.

i. A requirement exists for the organization of the Branch United States Prisoner of War Information Center (USFWIC(Br)) as a TOE unit. During WW II and the Korean War the functions of the USFWIC(Br) were accomplished by a provisional unit organized, equipped, and manned from theater resources. The increased tempo of modern warfare, PW reporting requirements imposed by Article 122 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, and the more pressing requirements for readily available and detailed PW data necessitate that the theater commander be provided with a unit organized, equipped, and trained for the mission to be performed. ADP and/or EAM equipment will be utilized.
j. Except as considered in the foregoing discussion, the current military police organization, equipment, and command structure for PW operations are considered adequate for the 1965-1970 time period.

6. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Current intratheater PW evacuation doctrine, including the principles of forward MP custody of PW's (brigade level) and maximum utilization of return transportation, will continue to be valid during the 1965-1970 time period.

b. The number and the locations of PW cages in the field army area will correspond to the number and the locations of the major transportation terminals utilized for PW evacuation to COMMZ but should normally not exceed three in number.

c. The number and the locations of PW reception and processing camps in COMMZ should generally correspond to the number and the locations of the transportation terminals in BALOG to which PW's are evacuated in large numbers taking into consideration the possible requirements for a separate processing capability in the ADLOG.

d. A ready means for the routine identification of individual PW's by name and internment serial number is required to facilitate PW camp operations. An SDR to satisfy this requirement should be prepared.
e. Primary utilization of PW labor will be in the logistical complexes located in the COMMZ rear or BALOG area. Individual PW labor forces will be composed of relatively small numbers of minimum security type PW's who are selected on a "best qualified" basis to assure a high degree of proficiency. PW branch camp facilities must be provided and operated on an austere and minimum security basis. When existing facilities are not available, tent shelters should be utilized to permit ready and frequent displacement. A requirement exists for the preparation and inclusion of appropriate administrative and security teams for inclusion in TOE 19-500 to permit the ready development of organizational structures tailored to the individual requirements of each PW branch camp.

f. Limited war situations will generally be characterized by greatly reduced requirements for PW labor.

g. A TOE should be developed for a Branch United States Prisoner of War Information Center.

h. Current military police organization and equipment, except as specifically mentioned herein, are considered adequate for the 1965-1970 time period.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. That the conclusions set forth in paragraph 6 and the concepts presented in annex C be approved as doctrinal
guidance for implementation in theaters of operations and for the preparation of instructional material, training literature, and TOE's.

b. That action be initiated to develop a ready means of individual PW identification.

ANNEXES:  
A--Study Directive  
B--Discussion (General)  
C--Concepts for Prisoner of War Operations in a Theater of Operations During the Period 1965-1970  
D--Bibliography
STUDY DIRECTIVE


TO: President
   U. S. Army Military Police Board
   Fort Gordon, Georgia

1. General - It is desired that a study be undertaken which will develop operational and organizational doctrine, concepts, and procedures required for prisoner of war operations in a theater of operations during the period 1965-1970.

2. Objective and Scope - a. To examine, evaluate and determine the policies, procedures, and organizational concepts required for the evacuation, custody, control, and administration of prisoners of war in a theater of operations during the period 1965-1970.

   b. The study will consider the implications of mass enemy capture or surrender and custody - control problems posed by uncooperative PW.
PMGO


3. References:
   a. Letters:
      (1) Letter, HQ, USCONARC, dated 30 Dec 60, subject: "Combat Development Study Program" (U).
      (3) Letter, Vice Chief of Staff, dated 16 Dec 60, subject: "Reorganization of Infantry and Armored Divisions and Creation of a Mechanized Division" (U).
      (5) Letter, PMGO, dated 15 Apr 60, subject: "Military Police Board Study Nr 60-6, Prisoner of War Publication."
   b. Studies:
      (1) Study, Visualization of a Theater of Operations, ARWC 60-2 (para. 120, CDOG).
      (2) Study, Control and Administration of PW in the Theater Administrative Zone, USACGSC.

(3) Study, Subsistence and Food Service for the Army in the Field (U) (QMCCD Project 56-2).


c. Other background material:

(1) FM 19-40, Handling Prisoners of War.


(3) FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations; Operations.

(4) FM 100-10, Field Service Regulations; Administration.


(6) FM 101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual; Staff Organization and Procedure.

(7) FM 101-10, Staff Officers' Field Manual; Organization, Technical and Logistical Data.

(8) DA Pamphlet 27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare.


(11) Draft AR ____, POW - Administration.

(12) AR 10-5, Organization and Functions.

4. Assumptions - a. For the 1965-1970 time frame the field army organizational structure, tactical and administrative support concepts and procedures will be in consonance with the guidance reflected in reference 3a(2), (3), and (4).

b. The support organization for the field army will be an evolutionary structure based on the present communications zone contained in FM 101-10.

c. The United States will continue to abide by the provisions of international law and the custom of nations relative to the humanitarian treatment of PW.

d. The United States will remain committed to observe the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention governing treatment of prisoners of war.

e. The United States will remain opposed to the forcible repatriation of PW.

5. Guidance - This study will include, but is not limited to, the following:

   a. Objectives: Analyze current and proposed concepts of PW operations to --

      (1) Determine changes necessary to modernize processing techniques, operational procedures, and/or organizational concepts to meet the anticipated PW requirement during the period 1965-1970.

      (2) Determine --

           (a) Whether a change in numbers of skilled personnel will be required to control fanatical, communist indoctrinated PW.

           (b) If so, whether the number required is greater or lesser.

           (c) The amount of the increase or decrease in numbers.

      (3) Propose a sound policy position for the rapid evacuation, custody, and control of PW from time of capture in the division area until they are interned or evacuated from the theater, considering such factors as --

           (a) Organic transportation vs. the use of returning empty trucks.
COPY

PMGO 8 March 1961


(b) The receipt of PW at echelons below division level as opposed to pickup at the division cage.

(c) PW enclosure hardware requirements, such as signal communications, data handling equipment, and riot control equipment. Emphasis will be placed on the use of equipment presently in existence or under development.

(4) Determine the feasibility of organizing mobile branch camps composed of carefully screened, skilled PW for specialized, critical occupations; e.g., railroad and highway construction and maintenance.

(5) Determine requirements for Army type cages, by location and numbers, to accommodate mass enemy capture or surrender within the limitations imposed by time and distance factors.

(6) Determine most suitable locations for camps/cages to facilitate the processing, evacuation, custody, control, and security of PW.

(7) Determine if a requirement may exist for processing prisoners of war in multiple locations. This study should consider the desirability of transporting processing personnel and equipment to the prisoners as opposed to funneling all prisoners through one processing center that might not be located on the axis of evacuation.

(8) Analyze current evacuation policies to determine the advantages of retaining PW in theater of operations vs evacuation to CONUS.
FMGO


(9) Determine if presently programmed PW enclosures, and camp plans are too elaborate, too expensive and too immobile to fulfill the requirements for flexibility in a theater of operations during the period 1965-1970.

(10) Analyze current policies on use, treatment, discipline, education, and voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war and recommend changes in policy for the 1965-1970 period if appropriate.

b. General - The factors listed above are not all inclusive but do illustrate the scope and magnitude of the PW problem. In some instances your research may indicate that certain of these areas should be reserved for additional study as separate projects. Your recommendations in this respect are encouraged.

6. Administration - a. The draft study will be coordinated with the following and such other agencies as may be considered appropriate:

(1) US Army Infantry School.
(2) US Army Armor School.
(3) US Army Command and General Staff College.
(4) US Army Medical Service Combat Development Group.
(5) US Army Civil Affairs School.
(6) US Army Special Warfare School.
(7) US Army Transportation Corps Combat Development Group.
PMGO


(8) Chief of Chemical Officer, US Army.
(9) Chief Signal Officer, US Army.
(11) Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army.
(12) US Army Intelligence Center.
(13) Quartermaster General, US Army.
(14) US Army Logistics Management Center.

b. Suspense dates:
   (1) Draft to CD agencies for coordination, 1 August 1962.
   (2) Coordinated study to OPMG, 1 November 1962.

c. Distribution:
   (1) The Provost Marshal General - 75 copies.
   (2) Note: Distribution of completed report to Headquarters, U. S. Continental Army Command and to all Combat Development Agencies will be made by Office of The Provost Marshal General.

d. This project is assigned MFCCD 61-2 and has been recommended for inclusion in chapter 14, para. 1420h.; CDOG.

7. This communication is effective until 31 December 1962 unless sooner rescinded or superseded.

FOR THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL:

/s/ Edwin W. Weissman

/t/ EDWIN W. WEISSMAN
Colonel, MPC
Acting Deputy The Provost Marshal General

Copies furnished:
H Dist (except USARPAC, USARCARIB, and USAREUR)
LIST OF COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES
(HQ USCONARC DISTRIBUTION H)

H1 USCONARC COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES

USAADS (5) Commandant, US Army Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas, ATTN: Combat Developments Division
USAARMS (7) Commandant, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, ATTN: Combat Developments
USAAMS (3) Commandant, US Army Artillery and Missile School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, ATTN: Combat Development Department
USAAVNS (2) Commandant, US Army Aviation School, Fort Rucker, Alabama, ATTN: Combat Developments
CDEC (3) Commanding General, US Army Combat Development Experimentation Center, Fort Ord, California
USACGSC (5) Commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, ATTN: Combat Developments
USAIS (3) Commandant, US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, ATTN: Combat Developments
USASWS (2) Commandant, US Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, ATTN: Combat Developments
OSWD (2) Director of Special Weapons Developments, United States Continental Army Command, Fort Bliss, Texas

H2 DA COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES

AGCCD (3) President, The Adjutant General's Board, US Army, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indianapolis 16, Indiana, ATTN: AGTZ
CHAPCD (2) President, US Army Chaplain Board, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
COPY

QMLCD (4)  Chief Chemical Officer, US Army, Building T-7, Gravelly Point, Washington 25, D. C., ATTN: Combat Development Division

TCCD (2)  Commanding Officer, US Army Transportation Combat Development Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia

CECD (3)  Commandant, US Army Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, ATTN: ESSY-T

FINCD (2)  President, Finance Corps Field Service Board, Finance School, US Army, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indianapolis 16, Indiana

USAINTC (2)  Commanding General, US Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: US Army Intelligence Board

ORDCCD (5)  President, US Army Ordnance Board, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

MPCCD (2)  The Provost Marshal General, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C., ATTN: Plans and Operations Division

QMCCD (2)  President, The Quartermaster Board, US Army, Fort Lee, Virginia

SIGCCD (3)  Chief Signal Officer, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C., ATTN: Research and Development Division, CD

AMSCD (2)  Commanding Officer, US Army Medical Service, Combat Development Group, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington 12, D. C.

USALMC (2)  Commandant, US Army Logistics Management Center, Fort Lee, Virginia, ATTN: Log Research and Doctrine Dept

ASA (2)  Deputy President, US Army Security Agency Board, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington 12, Virginia

H3  OTHER AGENCIES AND OVERSEA COMMANDS:


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<tr>
<td>ARADCOM</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Army, Pacific, APO 958, San Francisco, California</td>
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<tr>
<td>(CD Agency)</td>
<td>Commanding General, US Army, Caribbean, Fort Amador, Canal Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>USARPAC (2)</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe, APO 403, New York, New York, ATTN: O&amp;CD Section, O&amp;T Branch, G3</td>
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<tr>
<td>USARCARIB (2)</td>
<td>Director, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, 6935 Arlington Road, Bethesda, Maryland, Washington 14, D. C.</td>
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ANNEX B
DISCUSSION (GENERAL)

1. Purpose

The purpose of this annex is to review current military police doctrine and organization for adequacy and applicability to PW operations in a theater of operations during the period 1965-1970. Considerations set forth herein will provide the basis for the retention or modification of currently approved doctrine and the development of new concepts.

2. Current Status of PW Regulations and Doctrinal Guidance

a. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW), prescribes in considerable detail the rights, privileges, and protection to be accorded PW's by a capturing power. Implementing regulations for this convention are contained in AR 633-50, Prisoners of War - Administration, Employment, and Compensation, and AR 35-233, Pay, Allowances, and Deposit of Personal Funds - Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees. Subject matters covered in these regulations and therefore not considered in this study include but are not limited to policies and procedures governing pay, allowances, and fund deposits of PW's; disposition of personal effects; medical attention and hygiene;
social, intellectual, and religious activities; public relations; canteens; correspondence; disciplinary and penal sanctions and proceedings; death and burial; transfers; repatriation of sick and wounded; retained personnel; daily strength report; authorized and unauthorized types of work; hours of work; compensation; deposit of personal funds; final settlement of accounts; etc.

b. Doctrinal guidance (as developed in USACGSC Study Project, "Control and Administration of Prisoners of War in a Theater Administrative Zone (1958)") setting forth basic doctrine, procedures, and techniques designed to assist the commander and operating personnel and to facilitate the handling of PW's in the field will be contained in a current revision of FM 19-40, Handling Prisoners of War.

3. DA PW Evacuation Policy

a. A DA policy for the evacuation of PW's from any given theater of operations may provide, alternatively, for complete evacuation, partial evacuation, or no evacuation. Dependent upon the evacuation alternative selected, the responsibility of the theater commander for the extended internment of the PW population will range from complete to partial to essentially no responsibility. The impact of the PW evacuation policy on the nature and scope of both DA and theater PW planning is evident. Invalid and misleading planning guidance is the inevitable result of an invalid PW evacuation policy.
Considered in terms of personnel and logistical support for from hundreds of thousands to several millions of PW's, the magnitude of the total impact of PW's on DA and theater planning is considerable. The greatest assurance of firm and valid PW evacuation policies necessitates the prior weighing and evaluation of the several basic considerations (military, economic, and political) which are attendant upon the enunciation of a realistic and specific PW evacuation policy for any given theater.

b. Considerations and concepts presented in this study have particular application to situations under which all or a significant portion of the PW population is retained in the theater of operations.

4. Intratheater Evacuation

a. Current concepts and doctrine for PW evacuation within the theater of operations provide for the forward MP custody of PW's, their prompt evacuation utilizing returning empty transportation, collection at division for further evacuation to army, and collection at army for further evacuation to COMZ. Division evacuates from brigade, army evacuates from division, and COMZ evacuates from army. Basically, but with some minor modification and changes in emphasis, these concepts will continue to be valid during the 1965-1970 time period.
b. Military police acceptance of PW custody at the brigade level as opposed to the division level is necessitated by the tactical employment of the brigade as a self-contained and semi-independent combat element of the division. Retention of this forward custody principle is considered essential to the minimum diversion of combat troops from their primary mission and the performance of a necessary service to the combat commander.

c. Returning empty transportation, if effectively utilized, will accommodate normal PW evacuation requirements and will minimize such special transportation requirements as may be imposed by mass captures. The alternative to the utilization of return transportation is the forward dispatching of empty transportation for the evacuation of PW's. Such an unnecessary expenditure of personnel and equipment cannot be justified or supported on other than a very limited and exceptional basis.

d. Motor transport will constitute the primary mode of transportation for the evacuation of PW's within the field army area with sufficient air transport available for the evacuation of selected PW's. For evacuation from field army to COMMZ, available transportation may include any one or a combination of air, rail, motor, or water transport. Air and rail transport are generally to be preferred as affording the most rapid means of evacuation and, in terms of personnel and logistical support requirements, as being the most economical.
e. While current PW evacuation doctrine will remain basically valid, tactical and logistical concepts for the 1965-1970 time period will necessitate some modification of present PW evacuation procedures.

(1) Evacuation channels must be more flexible and responsive. Not all returning transportation from brigade will be routed to or through division but may proceed directly to logistical support elements located in the army service area or COMMZ. Procedures and techniques must provide for the utilization of such transportation by the direct evacuation of PW's from brigade to army or COMMZ and the bypassing of division and/or army. Primarily, this will involve the dispatch, either direct or through division, of army MP escort guards to the brigade for the accomplishment of such evacuations. Division military police capabilities are limited to evacuation from brigade to division only. Selected PW's will continue to be evacuated through division/corps for interrogation purposes.

(2) The concept of dispersion of combat and of combat support units and activities and their frequent displacements will make more difficult the providing of escort guards on a timely and as required basis. Techniques must be developed to give the greatest assurance to the brigade, division,
and army commanders of a ready and continuing escort guard capability for the prompt evacuation of PW's. Consideration may be given to the prior dispatch of escort guards to the brigade and division collecting points and to the army cages to establish and maintain a ready and continuing escort guard capability for PW evacuation. The number of escort guards to comprise such a reserve will vary according to such factors as distance, mode of transportation, and tactical considerations.

(3) Military police support capabilities for PW operations, particularly at division level, are sharply limited. Procedures must be developed to provide PW escort guards on an austere but as required basis with a minimum diversion of combat and other personnel from their primary missions. Maximum utilization of physically able
military personnel returning to the rear will be required.

(4) Intelligence interrogation procedures in the combat zone, while remaining responsive to the requirements of the commander for intelligence information, must be geared to a flexible and fast-moving evacuation system so as not to materially delay the rapid evacuation of PW's on other than a selected and individual basis.

(5) PW reception and evacuation operations in the army area must be more flexible. Capabilities must be established at, or in the vicinity of, each transportation terminal to provide for the reception, temporary retention, and further evacuation of PW's. For major rail and air terminals a continuing PW receiving and evacuating capability will be required. For smaller or less frequently used terminals, the receiving and evacuating capability must be provided on an intermittent but responsive basis. Essentially, this necessitates a greater fragmentation or dispersion of operations by the military police escort guard companies responsible for the custody and evacuation of PW's in the army area. As in the division area, close working coordination with the transportation representative will be essential.
(6) By prior planning and reconnaissance, a current list must be established and maintained of those existing facilities which may be reserved or diverted from other usage for the temporary internment in the army service area of large numbers of PW's such as would be attendant upon circumstances involving mass captures or surrenders of enemy personnel. Existing facilities located in the vicinity of an MSR or transportation terminal and which will require minimum engineer effort for occupancy should be utilized to the fullest extent possible. An adequate local water supply is essential.

(7) PW reception and evacuation operations in COMMZ will pose a greater flexibility requirement similar to that presented in the army area.

5. PW Reception and Processing Camps

a. The PW reception and processing camp is a PW camp located in COMMZ which has been designated and established for the reception and administrative processing of PW's and to which a Military Police Prisoner of War Processing Company (TOE 19-237) or element thereof has been attached. PW's evacuated from the field army are processed through this facility prior to assignment to a PW camp for permanent or extended internment. Primary processing actions include the preparation of a basic personnel record and fingerprint card for each PW; the assignment of an internment serial number; and
individual classification according to categories; i.e., officers, noncommissioned officers, privates, retained personnel, or civilians, and within categories by sex, nationality, language, and political conviction. This classification data provides the basic information upon which the assignment of PW's to appropriate camps is effected.

b. For economy of personnel and facilities and for efficiency of operations, only the very minimum number of PW camps should be established and designated for the reception and processing of PW's. Generally, the number and the locations of such camps will correspond with the number and the locations of the transportation terminals in BALOG to which or through which PW's are evacuated in significant numbers. Under circumstances whereby PW's, although arriving in significant numbers at two or more widely separated transportation terminals, are to be interned in camps located in a common locale, a single PW reception and processing camp centrally located within the internment locale may well be preferable to the establishment of a processing camp at each of two or more terminals. If strategically located, one or two and normally not more than three PW reception and processing camps should be required per field army supported.

c. Should a significant PW labor requirement develop in the ADLOG area, a PW processing capability in this area may be required to preclude the necessity of returning the PW's to ADLOG from BALOG.
Dependent upon the number of FW's required for labor in the ADLOG area and the duration of the requirement, such a processing capability may be provided for by the dispatch, on either a temporary or permanent basis, of one or more platoons of a military police PW processing company.

6. **PW Political Classification**

Current doctrine reflecting FW experience in Korea provides for the classification of FW's according to their attitudes and political sympathies with the objective of assigning opposed groups to separate camps. A positive method, involving essentially a mindreading capability, for readily determining individual attitudes of large numbers of FW's will not be available in the foreseeable future. The most promising potential in this regard is believed to be the introduction of a coordinated MP/intelligence screening effort together with the utilization, when required, of polygraph equipment operated by trained personnel for verifying the validity of certain information given by the FW.

7. **PW Identification Band**

A ready and reliable means for the routine identification of FW's is needed but is not currently provided for. Such an identification means is necessary for the normal FW camp administration involving the identity of FW's for routine purposes, i.e., work rosters, minor disciplinary actions, sick call, etc. The proposed identification band would supplement but not replace the fingerprint system of
identification which would continue to be used under circumstances requiring the positive and unquestioned identification of individual PW's. The fingerprint identification system while providing for positive individual identification is, under present procedures, relatively time consuming. The primary requirement of an identification band would be that once attached to an individual it could not be removed and attached to another PW without sufficient disfigurement to permit ready detection by alert but casual inspection.

8. **PW Internment Locale**

Current doctrine does not provide guidance for the selection of a PW internment locale in a theater of operations. The particular significance in this regard is that the ill-advised selection of an internment locale may unnecessarily require a subsequent displacement of tens and hundreds of thousands of PW's from one locale to another. This is an exceedingly expensive operation which would significantly detract, and probably at a most critical time, from the capabilities of the TALOC commander to support the field army commander. Basic guidance in this area reflecting past experience and the probable operational environment in the 1965-1970 time period should be developed for use by the commander in the field.

9. **PW Security**

a. The PW camp as currently organized, equipped, and manned (TOE 19-256) is considered adequate for the control of uncooperative PW's when interned in 4000-man enclosures of the type provided for
This type of PW enclosure was found to be very effective for the internment of fanatical, Communist-indoctrinated PW's in Korea. Also, the capability of military police personnel to quickly and effectively quell PW riots has been immeasurably increased by the development and issue of a family of irritant agent dispersers (C2, FM 19-15) and by the further development of the irritant agent CS which has been approved for use in the dispersers. In view of these new and very effective capabilities, the establishment of further requirements for the development of specialized equipment and/or materiel for PW control is not considered warranted; however, there should be a continuing evaluation of technological advances and of newly developed items of equipment and/or products which appear to have potentials in this regard.

b. While as great a degree of security, as is afforded by the 4000-man enclosures referred to above, is not normally required for cooperative PW's, it must be remembered that even such PW's may not always be docile and subservient to control measures and regulations. In the final analysis, it is the theater commander who must determine, on the basis of pertinent circumstances and considerations, the degree to which the security of individual PW camps may be lessened, either by a reduction in the number of security personnel or by less stringent construction requirements.

c. PW branch camps are established in response to temporary and limited requirements for PW labor at removed work sites. In the past,
the branch camp overhead and security personnel have been provided by
the development of provisional units. Doctrinal guidance relating
to their establishment and operation is almost completely lacking.
Because of the considerable variation in the numbers of PW's assigned
to individual branch camps, the preparation of one or several fixed
type TOE's is not considered feasible; a preferable alternative is
the development of appropriate teams for inclusion in TOE 19-500 to
provide a flexible but firm basis for the ready development of organi-
zational structures tailored to the individual requirements of each
branch camp. As a matter of doctrinal guidance it should be estab-
lished that branch camps are operated on an austere and minimum
security basis. To operate them on other than this basis, would
impose such a personnel and logistical burden as to essentially
negate the sole purpose for which they are established; namely, the
exploitation on favorable terms of the PW labor potential for urgent
work requirements (see also subparagraph 10b). As a consequence,
the physical security in a branch camp may be limited to that pro-
vided for by the construction of a single perimeter barbed wire
fence. The security guard force must be similarly provided for on
an austere basis. In recognition of the probable necessity of
operating under blackout conditions and in the interest of providing
an effective alert type security with a minimum of personnel, the
utilization of dismounted patrol dog teams is believed to be desir-
able, economical, and feasible.
10. **PW Utilization**

a. During WW II, PW labor contributed significantly to the war effort in CONUS and in the European and Mediterranean theaters of operations. Factors contributing to effective PW utilization were critical U. S. military and civilian manpower shortages, relatively stabilized communications zone environments, a wide variety of available PW skills, and cooperative PW attitudes with an almost complete absence of violently opposed factions. In the Korean War, PW labor contributed virtually nothing to the war effort primarily by reason of the absence of a truly critical manpower labor shortage in Korea. Had such a labor requirement existed, prior separation of the anti- and pro-Communist factions would have been a mandatory pre-requisite to the effective utilization of the anti-Communist PW's.

b. Evaluated in the light of past experience (a above) and of considerations applicable under general (conventional and nuclear) war, it is believed doubtful that PW labor will play as significant a role in a 1965-1970 theater of operations as was true in WW II. This conclusion is based on the following considerations applicable to the 1965-1970 time period:

1. Greater dispersion of support facilities and activities.
2. Probability of guerrilla activity. If prevalent, PW security requirements will be greatly increased.
(3) Necessity for identifying and separating uncooperative from cooperative PW's. This will delay the development of an effective PW work force.

(4) Improved packaging methods, modern equipment for the unloading and loading of supplies and equipment, and improved transport capabilities will reduce requirements for manual labor.

Notwithstanding the above, it is believed that a definite, if lesser, requirement for PW labor will exist in the rear area of the COMMZ and can be met. Important requirements will probably exist for the employment at dispersed locations of relatively small numbers (50 to 500) of highly qualified, minimum security risk, and mobile type PW work forces. The utilization of small PW work forces in this manner is believed to be practicable but only if a very minimum of personnel is required for their security and a high rate of individual and group proficiency is assured. The selection and assignment of PW's on this basis will necessitate thorough individual PW screening and classification.

c. Conditions attendant upon a limited war are believed to be such as to practically eliminate serious consideration of the extensive utilization of PW labor. Probable availability of indigenous labor, modern packaging techniques and equipment for handling supplies and materiel, improved transport capabilities and techniques, and the less critical manpower shortages under limited war operations
will, as a minimum, result in a greatly reduced utilization of PW labor. Such actual requirements as may arise can probably be satisfied with a minimum number of selected PW's.

11. **Branch United States Prisoner of War Information Center**

   a. The Branch United States Prisoner of War Information Center (USPWIC(Br)) is defined in Cl, AR 320-5, as "an official center of information established in a theater of operations to carry out, as prescribed, the functions of the United States Prisoner of War Information Center. It consists of a center headquarters and two bureaus: a Branch American Prisoner of War Information Bureau and a Branch Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau." Essentially, the USPWIC(Br) provides a central agency within the theater for the receipt, processing, dissemination, and transmittal of required information relating to enemy PW's interned in the theater and to American PW's about whom information is received from theater sources. During WW II and the Korean War, the functions of the USPWIC(Br) were accomplished by a provisional unit which was organized, equipped, and manned from theater resources. The increased tempo of modern warfare; the obligation placed on the United States by Article 122 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, for expediting the reporting of PW's; the more pressing requirements of the commander for readily available and detailed PW data; and the availability of improved mechanical equipment for receiving and processing data clearly indicate the
necessity for providing the theater commander with a unit organized, trained, and equipped in CONUS for the mission to be performed.

b. A concept of the mission, organization, and operations of the USFWIC(Br) is proposed in annex C.

12. **Organization and Equipment**

Except as considered in the foregoing discussion, current military police organization and equipment are considered to be sufficiently flexible and adequate for PW operations in the 1965-1970 time period.
Section I. GENERAL

1. Purpose and Scope

a. This annex sets forth doctrinal concepts for PW operations in a theater of operations.

b. The concepts set forth herein provide guidance to all military personnel concerned with the collection, treatment, evacuation, processing, internment, administration, control, and employment of PW's in a theater of operations.

c. The concepts presented are applicable for the 1965-1970 period in situations short of war, limited war, or general war. These concepts are equally applicable to a large, extensively developed theater such as may be established on the Eurasian land mass; to the less elaborate structure of a small independent force in an underdeveloped locale; to variations in the scale of use of mass destruction weapons; and to theaters in which the enemy possesses the capability for guerrilla operations, deep armored or airmobile thrusts, infiltration, and nuclear attacks in rear areas. The details of implementation require adjustments according to available facilities and workload.
2. **Objectives**

The primary objectives sought in the handling of PW's in a theater of operations include --

a. Acquisition of maximum and timely intelligence information.

b. Minimum diversion of personnel, supplies, and equipment from combat and combat support activities.

c. Absolute control.

d. Retention and development of attitudes and convictions which are in consonance with our ideals of individual liberty, justice, and freedom.

3. **Principles**

The objectives sought in the handling of PW's are attained by application of the following principles:

a. Provision of opportunity for intelligence interrogation.

b. Minimum processing in the combat zone.

c. Rapid and direct evacuation to the rear.

d. Maximum utilization of returning transportation.

e. Retention in the COMMZ supply complex of minimum required number of PW's for essential labor.

f. Internment of FW population in areas which optimize minimum security requirements, minimum logistical effort, and maximum effective utilization.

g. Humane treatment.

h. Firm discipline.
i. By example, promote respect and understanding.

4. General Protection of PW's

a. The provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, are applicable to PW's from the time of their capture until their final release or repatriation. Implementing regulations for this Convention are AR 35-233 and AR 633-50.

b. Under all circumstances, PW's are to receive humane treatment without distinction founded on race, color, religious belief, or other similar criteria. PW's may not be murdered, mutilated, tortured, or degraded nor may they be punished for alleged criminal acts without a previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court which has accorded them those judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable to a fair trial. It should be remembered that individuals, as well as capturing nations, are responsible for acts which are committed against PW's in violation of the GPW.

c. PW's are entitled to respect for their persons and their honor as human beings. They are to be protected against all acts of violence, insults, public curiosity, and reprisals of any kind. They are not to be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experimentation which is not required incident to normal medical, dental, or hospital treatment for the proper care of PW's.
d. No form of coercion may be inflicted on PW's to obtain from them information of any kind. Those who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

5. Uncontested Control

From the moment of capture and throughout their internment, PW's must be firmly impressed with the fact that further active resistance and refusals or failures to obey lawful orders will not be tolerated. Rigid discipline, humane but firm handling, and prompt enforcement of punitive actions when required are essential elements to the uncontested control of PW's.

Section II. COMBAT ZONE

6. General

a. Throughout the combat zone, the handling of PW's by military police is characterized by the following requirements and conditions:

   (1) Forward MP custody of PW's from combat troops.
   (2) Humane but firm control.
   (3) Maximum utilization of returning empty transportation.
   (4) Minimum essential field processing.
   (5) Austerity of personnel, facilities, and transportation for PW evacuation.
   (6) Wide dispersion and frequent displacement of PW collecting points.
b. Initial responsibility for the custody and further evacuation of PW's is usually accepted by military police at the brigade level. Physically able military troops returning to the rear are utilized as PW escort guards to the maximum extent possible.

c. Returning empty transportation is utilized for the evacuation of PW's. The close and continuing coordination between the provost marshal and the transportation officer is an essential element of such utilization. Primary reliance for evacuation within the combat zone in a general war situation must be placed upon ground vehicular transportation. For some limited war situations primary evacuation of PW's may be by air transport. Rail and air will comprise the major and preferred means of transportation from the combat zone to COMZ.

d. The individual processing of PW's in the combat zone is generally restricted to that field processing which is essential by reason of security, control, intelligence, and humanitarian considerations. Field processing actions include individual searches; medical classification, such as walking or nonwalking wounded or sick; and the intelligence interrogation of selected PW's.

e. The intelligence interrogation of selected PW's in the combat zone is a responsibility of the intelligence officer who is assisted by IPW (interrogation prisoner of war) teams. The system of PW
intelligence parallels that of PW evacuation. Except in the most forward areas of the combat zone, the interrogation of selected PW's takes precedence over their rapid evacuation, and special evacuation arrangements for priority movements of selected PW's for intelligence purposes may be necessary. Military police communicate with PW's only for the purpose of giving those commands and instructions which are necessary for the field processing (exclusive of interrogation) and handling of PW's in the combat zone.

f. The control of PW's is exercised through the issuance and firm enforcement of necessary instructions. Instructions to PW's relating to their control during evacuation should be as brief as possible and care must be taken to assure that they are clearly understood by the PW's. Warning should be given of the serious consequences which may result from violations of such instructions.

7. Capturing Troops

a. Capturing troops disarm and search PW's for weapons and for documents of particular intelligence value. PW's from whom personal documents of intelligence value are taken, if any, are given a receipt therefor.

b. Except for the taking of weapons and of documents as set forth in a above, personal effects are not taken from PW's except on the orders of an officer and then only under exceptional circumstances. When this occurs, a property register must be maintained and signed receipts given to PW's for items of personal property taken from them.

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c. PW's are segregated insofar as possible and are delivered to the forward PW collecting points by the combat troops. The early segregation of PW's by rank must be stressed. The simple segregation by rank will also serve to segregate by ideology because the higher ranks will be more completely indoctrinated in the ideologies of their home country and if allowed to remain in close proximity to the lower ranks will have an opportunity to exert a controlling influence on them to the detriment of subsequent intelligence interrogation.

8. Brigade

a. A division forward PW collecting point is established in the brigade trains area. A partially fenced-in or enclosed area that facilitates the maximum security of PW's with a minimum number of guards is chosen if available. In the absence of such facilities, the limits of the collecting point should be visibly defined and the PW's required to remain within the defined area.

b. The operation of the forward PW collecting point is an included responsibility of the division military police platoon operating in support of the brigade. If it is not within the capability of the platoon to completely man the collecting point and also perform other required military police functions, the necessary personnel augmentation to operate the collecting point must be requested by the platoon leader from his next higher commander.
c. As a normal practice, PW's are evacuated from brigade to the division rear PW collecting point. When, however, returning transportation bypasses the division rear PW collecting point and proceeds directly from brigade to the army service area or to COMMZ, direct PW evacuation thereto is effected.

d. PW escort guards for the evacuation of PW's from brigade to division are provided by the division military police company. PW escort guards for the direct evacuation of PW's from brigade to army or COMMZ are provided by army. Physically able military personnel returning to the rear are utilized to the fullest extent possible.

9. **Division**

a. The division rear PW collecting point is established in the division rear area. The selection of a specific site for the location of the collecting point within the division rear area is governed by the availability of existing facilities for the retention of PW's and accessibility to the transportation terminal.

b. The division provost marshal is responsible for the operation of the division rear PW collecting point located in the division rear area and for the providing of PW escort guards for the evacuation of PW's from committed brigades. A platoon of the division military police company discharges this function when evacuation is to the division rear PW collecting point.
c. PW escort guards for the direct evacuation of PW's from the
division collecting points to army or to COMMZ are provided by army.
For the direct evacuation of PW's from the division forward PW
collecting points to army or COMMZ, army escort guards may, in
coordination with the division PM, be provided by direct dispatch
from army to brigade.

d. When mass PW captures are being effected, requirements for
additional PW escort guards and transportation are placed upon army.

10. Army Corps

a. A corps PW cage is established for the temporary retention
and intelligence interrogation of selected PW's. Normally, PW
evacuation channels are from the division rear or forward collecting
points to the army PW cage, bypassing corps.

b. Operation of the corps PW cage is a responsibility of the
military police company (TOE 19-37) assigned to corps.

c. PW's captured in the corps area are delivered to the corps
PW cage and are evacuated therefrom together with any other PW's by
army military police to the army PW cage.

11. Independent Corps

a. If a corps operates independently, the evacuation of PW's
through the corps cage is a normal procedure. The operation of the
corps PW cage under such conditions closely parallels that of the
army PW cage.
b. During the early stages of an operation by an independent corps, evacuation of PW's may be effected directly from the division collecting point to a PW camp in corps rear or to a logistical base operating in support of the independent corps. Under such circumstances the corps cage may not be required. As the corps area expands and distance factors preclude such direct evacuation, the corps cage may be established.

c. PW operations will remain a theater army type function with responsibility for PW camp operations delegated to the TALOC or comparable command operating in support of the independent corps.

12. Army

a. The FASCOM commander is responsible for the operation of army PW cage(s) and for the providing of required PW escort guard support to supported divisions and corps for the evacuation of PW's.

b. The expeditious evacuation of PW's is provided for by the prior dispatch of escort guards (Military Police Escort Guard Company, TOE 19-47) to establish a ready reserve of army escort guards at each of the supported divisions. This reserve evacuation capability is maintained by the dispatch of additional escort guards on a continuing or as required basis. When distances or conditions are such as to preclude movement of PW's from the division PW collecting point to the army PW cage within an 8- to 10-hour period, it may be necessary to establish temporary holding facilities along the evacuation route. Whenever possible, available existing facilities are utilized.
c. An army PW cage or PW holding capability is established in the vicinity of each major air/rail terminal in the army area to permit the fullest utilization of such transportation for the further evacuation of PW's to COMMZ. In the absence of sufficient air/rail transportation, evacuation is effected by other available transportation (supply trucks or water) and the PW cages are located accordingly. Normally, not more than three PW cages will be established in the army area, less when possible.

d. Operation of the army PW cage(s) is a function of the military police escort guard company (TOE 19-47). PW cages are established and operated on an austere basis and are designed to provide only those facilities and services which are essential to the security and welfare of the PW's pending their further evacuation to COMMZ. PW's are individually searched for weapons and a closer examination of documents in their possession may be made by intelligence personnel. Intelligence interrogation of PW's is selective. Segregation of PW's is maintained by nationality, sex, and according to their status as officers, enlisted men, civilians, and such other categories as may be prescribed by the commander. Food and water and shelter from the elements are provided. Sanitary measures may include the delousing of each PW and, if feasible, the disinfestation of clothing. PW's suspected of having communicable diseases are isolated for examination by a medical officer. If necessary, clothing is issued to individual PW's. PW's are evacuated from the army cage to COMMZ.
with the least possible delay. The FASCOM commander is responsible for arranging and coordinating all transportation requirements and for the providing of rations, if required, for the movement.

e. Under conditions involving mass captures or surrenders, the army cage facilities and capabilities of the assigned military police units will be inadequate. Prior and current planning and reconnaissance should provide for the selection of the most suitable facility in the army service area which is available for the temporary internment of large numbers of PW's. As a minimum, such a facility should be located in the proximity of an MSR and preferably near a major transportation terminal, have an adequate water supply, and have sufficient shelter to provide at least the minimum required protection from the elements. Perimeter fences and security personnel will be provided on a minimum basis. If possible, the military police or other military units to be temporarily diverted to PW security under such circumstances should be predetermined. The ready availability within the army service area of essential messing and sanitary equipment and supplies should be assured.

f. When circumstances warrant, a complete PW processing capability may be provided for in the army area by assignment of a military police PW processing company or elements thereof.
13. **Evacuation Responsibilities**

   a. **COMMZ** has overall responsibility for the prompt evacuation of PW's from the supported field army. This responsibility includes the providing of escort guards; the establishment and operation, as required, of temporary intransit holding facilities for overnight stops; and the establishment and operation of a PW camp(s) designated for the reception and administrative processing of all PW's evacuated to COMMZ from the army PW cage(s) or from elsewhere in the combat zone.

   b. The military police PW command (TOE 19-256) located in BALOG is normally responsible for the providing and dispatching of escort guard personnel from assigned military police escort guard companies (TOE 19-47). These companies are normally attached for duty with the PW camp(s) designated to receive and process PW's.

   c. Nonwalking wounded and sick PW's are evacuated through medical channels.

   d. The prompt and fully coordinated evacuation of PW's from the army cage(s) is facilitated by --

      (1) The prior dispatch of escort guards to the PW cage(s) to assure, within capabilities, a continuing availability of escort guards at the PW cage(s) for the evacuation of PW's.

      (2) The attachment of a liaison officer(s) from the receiving camp(s) in COMMZ to the sending army PW cage(s).
14. **PW Reception, Processing, Classification, and Assignment**

a. PW camps located in COMMZ are designated by the TALOG commander for the centralized reception and for the physical, medical, and administrative processing of PW's evacuated from the combat zone. Dependent upon the size of the COMMZ and the number of evacuation terminals, one or more camps may be so designated. For centralization of activities and efficiency of operations, the very minimum number of reception camps are established. The most advantageous location for the establishment of such camps will generally be in the vicinity of each major transportation terminal or terminals in COMMZ. However, under circumstances whereby all PW camps are located in a common locale, a single PW reception and processing camp strategically located within the internment locale may be preferable to the establishment of a processing camp at each of two or more terminals. Under other circumstances which involve the utilization of significant numbers of PW's in the ADLOG area, the providing of a PW reception and processing capability in ADLOG may be indicated. PW's arriving intermittently or in lesser numbers at other than the major transportation terminals are transported to the nearest reception camp. From one to a maximum of three such camps will normally be required per field army supported.
b. A PW reception camp differs from other PW camps in the following major respects:

(1) The attachment of a Military Police Prisoner of War Processing Company or element(s) thereof (TOE 19-237) to accomplish the administrative processing of each PW.

(2) The attachment of a Military Police Escort Guard Company(s) (TOE 19-47) to evacuate PW's from army and to escort PW transfers to assigned PW camps on completion of PW processing.

(3) With the exception of a limited number of PW's selected for retention as permanent party personnel, all PW's received are further transferred to other PW camps in COMMZ or are evacuated from COMMZ following completion of their processing.

c. PW reception camp operations include the reception; segregation; physical, medical, and administrative processing; and further transfer of PW's to other camps. Newly arrived PW's are segregated from earlier arrivals. Further segregation by designated categories is effected insofar as possible pending completion of processing and assignment to a permanent PW camp. Physical and medical processing actions include haircuts, chemical dusting, immunizations, physical inspections, and issuance of clean clothing, toilet articles, mess equipment, and blankets. The administrative processing of PW's is accomplished by personnel of a military police
processing company (TOE 19-237) in accordance with procedures prescribed in AR 633-50. These processing actions include the preparation for each FW of a personnel record, a fingerprint card, a wrist identity tag, an identity card (if required), and the assignment of an internment serial number.

d. During the course of their administrative processing, the status of each FW is officially established and recorded according to the category to which he belongs such as officer, noncommissioned officer, private, retained personnel, or civilian; and by sex, nationality, and language. FW's who refuse to reveal their military or civilian status are appropriately classified to permit their segregation and later identification. Further categorization may be necessary for security and management purposes. This may entail segregation of FW's by political ideology or ethnic groupings. Screening of the FW will be a continuing process with primary reliance being placed on a joint intelligence/military police effort. In the latter stages of the screening process, CID or intelligence polygraph operator specialists may provide valuable assistance in evaluating the true attitude of selected FW's and for verifying the validity of information given by them.

15. Assignment and Segregation

FW's of opposed ideologies are assigned to separate FW camps. Subject to the foregoing, other categories of FW's (officer, enlisted; male, female; civilian; nationality; language; etc.)
may be interned in separate camps or they may be interned in the
same camp provided their segregation by assignment to separate
compounds or enclosures is maintained.

16. **PW Internment Locale(s)**

Probably the most significant and critical aspect of the theater
PW planning will relate to the selection of a locale(s) for the
establishment of camps in which the PW population or a major portion
thereof is to be interned. Failure to fully consider and correctly
evaluate all pertinent factors may, as a minimum, impose an unnecessary
increase in the logistical and personnel effort required to support
the PW internment program. Under more serious circumstances the
unwise selection of a PW internment locale(s) may necessitate the
complete displacement of the entire PW population at a time when
the extensive effort required to effect such a displacement can be
least afforded. Among the more significant of the factors to be
considered in the selection of a PW internment locale are --

a. Whether PW's interned in the locale being considered will
pose a potentially serious threat to the logistical support
operations should the tactical situation become critical.

b. The prevalence and boldness, actual or potential, of
guerrilla activity in the area.

c. The attitude of the local civilian population.

d. The attitude of the PW's, i.e., friendly and cooperative
or actively hostile and uncooperative.
e. Terrain considerations as related to camp construction and as they may facilitate or inhibit the probability of successful escapes.

f. Distance from source of logistical support and modes of transportation required and available for the transport of personnel, supplies, and equipment.

g. Availability of facilities and water.

17. **PW Internment Camps**

a. PW internment facilities located in COMMZ are referred to either as prisoner of war camps or as prisoner of war branch camps. A PW camp is an installation of a semipermanent nature established for the internment and complete administration of PW's. A PW branch camp is a subsidiary camp operated under the supervision and administration of the PW camp of which it is a branch. It is established in response to a definite PW labor requirement. The use of existing facilities, supplemented as required by tent shelter, provides for economy and mobility. Each branch camp is organized and equipped to facilitate accomplishment of the particular work need for which it is established.

b. Prior planning for PW camp construction is sufficiently projected into the future to provide for the timely selection and development of specific camp sites, the procurement of construction materials, and the accomplishment of actual construction.
As an objective, PW camp construction should be planned and accomplished to maintain a standby capability for the acceptance of additional PW's.

c. Selection of specific location sites for individual PW camps should reflect, as appropriate, a consideration of the following:

(1) The presence or absence of swamps, mosquitoes and malarial conditions, or other factors including water drainage that would affect human health.

(2) Existence of an adequate and satisfactory source of water supply to include a consideration of the amounts required for drinking, personal sanitation, and disposal of sewage.

(3) The availability of an electric power supply. Restriction of the use of generators to a standby or emergency source of electricity is to be preferred.

(4) Requirements for transportation facilities particularly as relate to the logistical support of the camp. Transportation requirements for rapid evacuation may be a consideration.

(5) Distances to work areas or sites if employment is outside the camp.

(6) Removal from immediate proximity to probable target areas.
The availability of suitable existing facilities to avoid unnecessary construction.

The local availability of construction materials. Construction specifications and material requirements for FW camps and branch camps of varying sizes established in a theater of operations are contained in TM 5-302 and TM 5-303. To the maximum extent possible, however, locally available materials should be utilized for the construction of all FW housing, messing, and sanitation facilities.

18. **FW Camp Administration**

a. Regulations governing the administration, employment, and compensation of PWs are prescribed in detail in AR 633-50, Prisoners of War - Administration, Employment, and Compensation; and in AR 35-233, Pay, Allowances, and Deposit of Personal Funds - Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.

b. The administrative processing of PWs is accomplished at a designated FW reception and processing camp(s) prior to their assignment to a permanent FW camp (par. 14).

c. Upon completion of administrative processing, FW strength accountability and individual data reporting will be accomplished by means of a strength report prepared and transmitted daily by each FW camp to a Branch United States Prisoner of War Information Center located in the theater. This branch information center will
then be responsible for the preparation and providing of PW statistical data, rosters, and such other administrative type information as may be required by the theater commander and subordinate command elements; by Headquarters, Department of the Army; and by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

19. **FW Camp Operations**

a. **Security.**

(1) Uncooperative FW's are interned in FW camps composed of one or more of the 4000-man FW enclosures provided for in TM 5-302. Cooperative FW's may, at the discretion of the theater commander, be interned in camps of a lesser security type construction but which satisfy the following minimum requirements:

(a) A double barbed wire fence around the perimeter of each of the one or more enclosures composing the FW camp.

1. Angle arms with several strands of barbed wire at the top of the outside perimeter fence.

2. A 12-foot lane, free of any vegetation or shrubbery, between the inside and outside perimeter fences.

(b) Towers located on the perimeter of each enclosure and constructed to conform with the following requirements:

1. Sufficiently high to permit unobstructed observation.
2. Placed immediately outside the wall or, in the case of a double fence, in such a manner as to permit an unobstructed view above the entire lane between fences.

3. Low enough to provide adequate field of fire.

4. Spaced to secure optimum observation. During adverse weather conditions, it may be necessary to augment security by placing fixed guard posts between towers on the outside of the fence.

5. Platforms sufficiently wide to mount crew-served automatic weapons.

(c) Adequate lighting facilities throughout the camp and especially around the perimeter of each enclosure to meet the following requirements:

1. Sufficient lighting on fences or walls at night to permit the ready detection of PW's attempting to escape.

2. Sufficient lighting at inner strategic points to permit expeditious handling of any sudden contingencies which may arise.


4. All light bulbs and reflectors protected against breakage by a wire mesh covering, where necessary.
5. Lights on fences or walls focused or shaded in such a manner as not to interfere with the vision of tower guards.

(d) Patrol roads constructed adjacent to the outside of the perimeter wall or fence for vehicular or foot patrols.

(e) Communications, preferably by telephone, between the towers and main camp headquarters.

(f) The division of each enclosure into compounds.

This will --

1. Facilitate rollcalls and/or counting PW's.

2. Insure greater security in event of riot or disorder.

3. Insure more easily manageable groups.

(2) Basic loads of riot control agents should be reviewed for adequacy in camps in which uncooperative PW's are interned. Provisions should be made for the expeditious delivery of replacement or supplemental issues from a strategic storage point or points in the theater.

(3) Courses of instruction and training appropriate for administrative and security personnel are developed and vigorously implemented in each PW camp. Riot control plans are developed in detail and maximum proficiency, individual and group, is assured by the conduct of regular and intensive training.
(4) An informant net extending into each enclosure and compound is established in each PW camp. The reliability of PW informants may be verified by lie detector examination techniques. The mechanics of collecting information and processing it into useful intelligence is based on principles of military intelligence.

(5) A vigorous and continuing program is conducted in each PW camp to identify and segregate enemy agents, leaders, and agitators.

(6) Rules, regulations, instructions, and announcements to be observed and obeyed by PW's are published and posted in each PW compound. Compliance with the provisions of such directives is fully and firmly enforced.

(7) Camp commanders take positive action to establish those daily or periodic routines which are conducive to good PW discipline, security, and control to include --

(a) The conduct of inspections of PW quarters, facilities, and activities on a daily or other regularly scheduled basis.

(b) The holding of rollcall formations not less than twice daily.
(c) The conduct of periodic, unannounced, and systematic searches of compound and enclosure areas and facilities to detect evidence of tunneling and to discover caches of food, clothing, maps, and money or other valuables that might be of assistance to a PW in effecting an escape and avoiding apprehension.

(d) The periodic examination of PW wrist identification bands to detect efforts to switch identities.

(e) The publication and posting of standing orders governing the holding of daily formations, daily fatigue details, fire drills, and air raid drills and announcing the hours for religious services, recreational activities, and operation of camp facilities.

b. Intelligence.

(1) The first objective of the PW camp intelligence system is the procurement of information whereby individual PW's may be accurately classified as cooperative or uncooperative. Successful accomplishment of this objective will greatly minimize the overall security and control problem by permitting the early segregation of the "hard-core" uncooperative PW's in maximum security type PW camps.
(2) Further and continuing requirements are placed on the FW camp intelligence system for timely information relating to planned riots, demonstrations or mass escapes, identification of ringleaders, and detection of means by which FW's communicate between camps and with agencies outside the camps.

(3) The mechanics of collecting information and processing it into useful intelligence at FW camps is based on the principles of military intelligence. Trained counterintelligence personnel, assigned or attached to the FW camp under the operational control of the camp commander can provide a more responsive intelligence system to prevent the overlap of functions, introduce an informant net, and provide for coordinated intelligence exploitation of FW's. Methods of obtaining intelligence information relative to clandestine FW activities include --

(a) The providing of opportunities for FW's to volunteer information of intelligence value and the offering of protection from reprisal by removal or transfer to safe facilities.

(b) Periodic and unannounced compound searches and patrols.
(c) Individual search of all FW's on departure from and return to the camp enclosure.

(d) Alertness to detect --

1. Any unusual activities, especially before holidays or celebrations.

2. Messages being passed at distribution points for food and supplies, the enclosure dispensary, and hospitals.

3. Messages being passed between groups of FW's on labor details.

4. Messages being passed to or from local civilians while FW's are on labor details.

5. Messages being signaled from one compound to another.

(e) Training of security personnel in the techniques and importance of observing, recognizing, and reporting information which may be of intelligence value.

(f) Employment of lie detector sets under appropriate circumstances.

(g) The development of a reliable FW intelligence net extending to each FW compound.
In compounds where cooperative PW's are interned, special intelligence apparatus will not be needed, provided ordinary sources of information are tapped continually and assessed sensitively. Such sources include regular administrative communications, observations, reports of military administrative and security personnel, criminal investigation data, disciplinary reports, and statements of grievance.

Planting of agitators among PW's may be accomplished by the enemy. The enemy may order members of its armed forces to be captured and to act as agitators. The true identity of such individuals as officers or highly trained agents may be concealed by false identification papers.

Communications are a necessary element of widespread and concerted PW disturbances. PW's usually foment disturbances in accordance with orders received from their leaders. The PW leaders, through clandestine methods, pass on information to their own government intelligence agencies.

PW organization, aggressive leadership, detailed planning, and absolute secrecy at the camp, enclosure, and compound levels are further essential elements.
of Communist PW inspired disturbances. Effective countermeasures are dependent upon reliable and timely intelligence information.

c. Education.

(1) Appropriately oriented and closely controlled programs of education are encouraged for all receptive PW's. The objective of the programs is to promote a clearer understanding of our way of life and to imbue a true respect and desire for the principles and ideals on which our form of government is based. The most effective accomplishment of this objective is through the development of a well-rounded education program, devoid of obvious propaganda and indoctrination efforts. A major problem will be to gear the intellectual level of the program to the several educational and cultural levels represented in the PW camps to maintain active interest.

(2) PW's are encouraged and assisted in the organization and conduct of classes on an elementary level in such courses as reading, writing, geography, mathematics, language, music, art, history, and literature.

(3) PW's may select from their number qualified teachers and instructors, subject to the approval of the camp commander.
(4) Continuing vigilance is exercised to assure that the education program is not subverted to the fostering of unfavorable ideologies, political leanings, or the promotion of activities which in any way may constitute a threat to camp security.

(5) Facilities, equipment, and materials to permit PW's to engage in intellectual and recreational activities are made available in all PW camps provided they are not subverted to the development of attitudes or actions which constitute a threat to the camp security.

(6) Subject to security considerations and conduct under stringent security regulations and precautions, vocational training projects, which may include carpentry, tinsmithing, blacksmithing, masonry, shoe repairing, tailoring, barbering, ceramics, and agriculture, are supported and encouraged.

d. Religious Activities.

(1) PW's are permitted to enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious duties, including attendance at the services of their faiths, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary routine prescribed.

(2) Adequate facilities for religious services are provided.
(3) Spiritual leadership is provided in accordance with Chapter V (Articles 34-38) of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.

(4) The religious activities program is coordinated and supervised by the appropriate U. S. Army Staff Chaplain.

20. **PW Branch Camps - Organization and Operations**

A proposed concept for the organization and operation of such camps is set forth in appendix 1 (page 76).

21. **Prisoner of War Utilization**

   a. PW's will constitute a large potential source of manpower for the theater commander. The extent to which the labor potential of this manpower may be most fully realized will be conditioned by a number of considerations. Several of the more significant considerations attendant upon PW utilization in a theater of operations are set forth below.

   (1) **Employment restrictions.** Specific conditions governing the employment of PW's are prescribed in AR 633-50. The restrictions and prohibitions imposed on the utilization of PW's for labor by these regulations include but are not limited to --

   (a) A proviso that PW's may volunteer but may not be compelled to transport or handle stores or to engage in
public works and building operations which have a military character or purpose.

(b) A provision that a PW may not be employed on a job considered to be injurious to his health or dangerous because of the inherent nature of the work, the particular conditions under which it is performed, or the individual’s physical unfitness or lack of technical skill.

(c) A prohibition against the assignment of PW’s to labor that would be looked upon as humiliating or degrading for a member of the United States Armed Forces.

(d) A prohibition against retention or the employment of PW’s in an area where they may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone.

(2) Logistical support. The practicable utilization of PW’s is governed, in part, by the logistical effort required to make them available for the labor to be performed.

(a) Construction requirements.

(b) Anticipated duration of work requirement.

(c) Number of PW’s required.

(d) Distance PW supplies and equipment must be transported.

(e) Distance to nearest adequate hospital facilities.
(3) **Personnel requirements.** Factors influencing requirements for security and work supervisory personnel include --

(a) Attitude of indigenous population, friendly or hostile.

(b) Prevalence and aggressiveness of guerrilla activity.

(c) Terrain (wooded, hilly, etc.) and locale (populated, undeveloped) considerations.

(d) The type of work to be performed and the size, number, and dispersion of the individual work details provided by the branch camp.

(4) **Labor essentiality.** Evaluation by the commander must not fail to relate the essentiality of the work to be performed to the personnel and logistical effort required to provide the PW labor. Generally, a significant increase in this effort for the sole purpose of providing PW labor assumes an absence of qualified indigenous labor and a determination by the commander that military personnel are not available or that their employment would be less advantageous.

(5) **Nuclear or CBR warfare.** The serious threat of nuclear or CBR warfare should virtually eliminate serious consideration of PW utilization except in the very rear areas of the COMMZ. The heavy individual protective clothing and equipment requirements in addition to
other support considerations would serve to nullify the real value of any work performed. During and for some time after actual and large scale nuclear or CBR operations, the primary and probably exclusive concern of even the most cooperative PW's will be one of survival.

b Generally, conditions favoring the greatest utilization of PW's will exist in the rear area of a COMMZ. The increased range of tactical weapons, the frequent displacement of units and facilities, and the heavy logistical implications virtually negate the utilization of PW's in the army area. In ADLOG heavy PW logistical support requirements on a per capita basis will continue to be an inhibiting factor as will security personnel requirements, particularly if guerrilla activity is prevalent. Significant PW utilization in this area will probably be of an absolute minimal nature to perform vitally essential work for which no other manpower source is available. The greatest potential for the employment of PW's will exist in the supply complex of the COMMZ rear or BALOG. It is in this area that the most stable and favorable environment for PW utilization will exist, but even in this area PW utilization will be subject to certain restricting influences as noted in a above.
c. Important requirements may exist for the employment at dispersed locations of relatively small numbers of highly qualified, minimum security, and mobile type work forces. Accurate and readily available individual PW personnel data is maintained to permit the ready selection and assignment of PW's on a "best-qualified" basis. Tools, protective clothing, and equipment are provided as required. Although existing facilities are used whenever available, each PW branch camp should be equipped to operate in tents when mobility or frequent displacements are factors.

d. Except under circumstances of critical manpower shortages, little significant utilization of PW's for essential work is visualized in limited war situations.

e. PW's will be utilized to the fullest extent possible, under all circumstances, for the construction, maintenance, and administration of PW camps.

22. Branch United States Prisoner of War Information Center

A Branch United States Prisoner of War Information Center, organized as a TOE unit, is assigned on the basis of one per theater of operations. This unit will provide, within the theater of operations, for the centralized receipt, preparation,
and dissemination of POW statistical accounting and reporting data; the individual identification of all interned POW's; POW postal directory and locator service; and for the receipt and disposition of personal valuables and documents of deceased, repatriated, released, or escaped POW's. Requirements for information and data, not required by Headquarters, Department of the Army, but desired by the theater commander, are prescribed by theater regulations. A concept of the mission, organization, and operation of this unit in a theater of operations is set forth in appendix 2 (page 82).
APPENDIX I TO ANNEX C

A CONCEPT OF PRISONER OF WAR BRANCH CAMP ORGANIZATION

AND OPERATIONS IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS

1. General

PW branch camps will be established in response to specific requirements for PW labor at areas or locations removed beyond a reasonable daily travel distance from the nearest PW camp. They are located near or within the immediate vicinity of the supply or other facility being supported. They will be operated on an austere basis utilizing existing facilities when available; otherwise, tent shelter will be provided to permit ready dismantlement and displacement to a new work location. When required, a single barbed wire perimeter fence not less than six feet in height will be constructed. Requirements for administrative and security personnel will be minimal. Assigned PW's will be skilled in the work to be performed and will have been screened and selected on the basis of their pro-United States sympathies and cooperative attitudes.

2. Organization

a. PW branch camps will be organized under TOE 19-500. The organization of each branch camp will be tailored according to the size of the camp by the selection of the appropriate type administrative team and the required number of dismounted patrol dog teams.
and/or security guard teams. Proposed additions to TOE 19-500 to support this organizational concept are set forth in tab A. Mess personnel and equipment for the operation of a PW mess will be provided for as authorized in TOE 29-500, except that qualified PW personnel will be substituted for U. S. Army personnel.

b. Development of an appropriate organization for each branch camp, to include the requisitioning and procuring of required personnel and equipment, selection of qualified PW's, and movement to the work location, will be the responsibility of the parent PW camp.

3. Operations

a. Responsibilities. Each PW branch camp will operate under the administrative supervision of a parent PW camp.

(1) The parent PW camp will --

(a) Exercise administrative control over and provide administrative support to each of its branch camps.

(b) Provide or arrange for veterinary service, refresher training, and replacements for security dogs.

(2) The using installation or facility commander will --

(a) Provide guards and technical supervisors for PW work details.

(b) Provide required logistical support.

(c) Provide medical dispensary service and chaplain assistance.
(d) Establish and maintain an "on-call" security alert force to provide assistance to the PW branch camp commander if required.

(e) Be responsible for the control and security of PW's while they are on work details.

(f) Be responsible for the procurement of materials in the construction and maintenance of the branch camp as specified by the commander of the parent camp.

(3) The PW branch camp commander will --

(a) Be responsible for PW administration and, while within the branch camp, for their security and control.

(b) Provide work details on a timely basis.

(c) Supervise PW employment to assure compliance with the provisions of AR 633-50.

b. Security. Branch camp security will be provided for by the assignment of the required number of dismounted patrol dog teams and security guard teams. These teams will operate only during hours of darkness and normally alternate on a 1-, 2-, or 4-hour basis dependent on weather conditions. When operating within the confines of the perimeter fence, the dog handler will be unarmed. During hours of daylight one guard will normally be stationed on an as required basis in a strategically located and sufficiently elevated tower.
### PROPOSED FUNCTIONAL TEAMS, PRISONER OF WAR

**BRANCH CAMP FACILITIES, TOE 19-500**

1. **Team **

   **Prisoner of War Branch Camp Administrative Overhead**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PW Br Camp Cmd</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Sgt</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Supv</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Supply Sp</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Truck Driver</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   **5**

   **Capability:** Providing command and administrative control for a prisoner of war branch camp.

   **Basis of Allocation:** One per prisoner of war branch camp with a minimum capacity of fifty to a maximum of two hundred and fifty prisoners of war.

2. **Team **

   **Prisoner of War Branch Camp Administrative Overhead**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PW Br Camp Cmd</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Sgt</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Sgt</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Supv</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk Typist</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Truck Driver</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   **2**

---

79
Security Guard E 1
Supply Clerk E 1

Capability: Providing command and administrative control for a prisoner of war branch camp.

Basis of Allocation: One per prisoner of war branch camp with a minimum capacity of two hundred and fifty-one to a maximum of five hundred prisoners of war.

3. Team ___ Dismounted Patrol Dog Team
   Sr Security Guard E 1
   1

Capability: Providing dog patrol assistance for one post for 8 hours.

Basis of Allocation: One per sentry post.

4. Team ___ Security Guard Team
   Detachment Sgt E 1
   Sr Security Guard E 1
   Security Guard E 2
   4

Capability: Providing security guard services for the overall security of the branch camp.

Basis of Allocation: Two per team ___ or four per team ___.
5. Team __ Animal Care Team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detachment Sgt</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vet Animal Sp</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vet Animal Asst</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Truck Driver</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capability: Providing training, care, and treatment for fifty or more dogs.

Basis of Allocation: One team per fifty dogs (team __) or major fraction thereof.
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C

A CONCEPT OF THE MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND OPERATIONS OF
A BRANCH UNITED STATES PRISONER OF WAR INFORMATION CENTER

1. General

a. Mission. The unit mission is to provide a central agency in a theater of operations for the receipt, processing, dissemination, and transmittal of required information relating to enemy prisoners of war interned in the theater and American prisoners of war about whom information is received from theater sources.

b. Organization. The unit is composed of a company headquarters and a center headquarters. The center headquarters consists of an administrative division, a branch enemy prisoner of war information bureau composed of a bureau chief and five branches, and a branch American prisoner of war information bureau (tab A).

c. Concept of Operations. The USPWIC(Br) is established and located in the theater of operations to discharge national responsibility imposed by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, and to provide a centralized PW information service to the theater commander. In the discharge of the national responsibilities of the United States, the USPWIC(Br) operates as a branch of the United States Prisoner of War Information Center in CONUS and transmits required data, reports, and records as
prescribed by Department of the Army regulations. As an information service agency to the theater commander, it provides such additional information and services as are required by the theater commander. Although assigned to the theater command, it will normally be located adjacent to the PW command in BALOG and will be placed under the operational control of the PW command. The USPWIC(Br) has automatic data processing and/or electrical accounting equipment to permit it to receive PW data by transceivers from each PW camp, to maintain and record such data on punched cards, and to disseminate or transmit the data in the format desired by Headquarters, Department of the Army, and by operating elements in the theater, including the PW command and the PW camps as primary users.

2. Administrative Division

The administrative division of the USPWIC(Br) consists of a division chief and two operating branches: an office services branch and a machine processing branch. It performs certain administrative functions and services to relieve other operating elements of the center headquarters of the routine internal administrative workload.

a. The office services branch processes and distributes incoming correspondence; procures and distributes office supplies, publications, and blank forms; and maintains a central center file for general correspondence and classified documents.
b. The machine processing branch prepares and maintains punched card records from which PW reports and rosters and summary data are reproduced, prepares locator and directory punch cards, identifies suspense-type items, and maintains its EAM.

3. Branch Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau (EPWIB(Br))

The branch EPWIB is composed of the bureau chief and five operating branches: a PW actions branch, a PW records branch, a PW postal directory branch, a PW fingerprint classification branch, and a PW property branch. It is responsible for the handling of all enemy PW administrative matters within the center except for the machine reproduction of PW rosters, data, and information.

a. The PW actions branch receives and prepares replies to all inquiries from individuals and agencies concerning PW's; compiles statistics; directs preparation of and dispatches special and routine PW rosters, reports, and statistical data; and maintains an office correspondence file.

b. The PW records branch receives and processes all PW reports and records and establishes an individual file for each PW processed and interned in the theater. Primary processing actions include the review of each PW basic personnel record for completeness and accuracy, the preparation of individual PW record folders, and subsequent updating actions on the basis of daily changes from each camp submitted by transceiver from each camp to the machine
processing branch. Included in the individual files is all official and unofficial correspondence received or dispatched which relates to individual PW's. Upon repatriation, release, death, or escape, all individual PW records maintained by the PW camps are forwarded for inclusion in the EPWIb(Br) files. Individual files are also maintained for the tiling of information concerning identified "killed-in-action" enemy personnel. Close coordination is maintained with the PW actions branch with respect to the preparation and dispatch to the United States Prisoner of War Information Center in CONUS of all inactive files (repatriated, released, deceased, escaped, or internationally transferred PW's) and the preparation and retention of appropriate disposition records.

c. The PW fingerprint classification branch receives two fingerprint cards for each PW processed in the theater and is responsible for classifying and recording the fingerprint impressions which appear thereon; the central fingerprint file maintained by the branch is searched to determine whether the PW has been previously processed and if so the PW records branch is notified. If the PW has not been previously processed the proper fingerprint classification is entered on the two fingerprint classification cards, one of which is placed in the central fingerprint file and the other transmitted to the PW actions branch to accompany published orders directing transfer or
assignment of the subject PW to a permanent internment camp. The branch also provides centralized PW identification service for all PW camps in the theater.

d. The PW property branch accepts custody from PW camps of personal valuables, including money and documents of importance to next of kin of deceased or escaped PW's or which were not returned to repatriated or released PW's. Personal valuables and documents of enemy personnel "killed-in-action" are also accepted. Administrative actions include property documentation, preparation of letters of transmittal, shipments of property to the United States Prisoner of War Information Center or, through the intermediary of the International Committee of the Red Cross, to the Power on which the PW depended, and the maintenance of appropriate records of disposition.

e. The PW postal branch receives, directorizes, and dispatches all incoming PW mail consigned to it. Such mail will generally include letters and packages addressed to camps from which the PW's have been transferred; addressed to deceased, escaped, repatriated, or released PW's; or on which the address is partially illegible.

4. **Branch American Prisoner of War Information Bureau**

This bureau provides a central agency within the theater of operations for the reception, collection, recording, and dissemination of information concerning United States Army, Navy, and Air Force
personnel in enemy custody. Sources of information include G-2, enemy propaganda broadcasts, letters received by theater personnel, and prisoner of war information bureaus operated by allied forces. Information so received is documented and disseminated, as appropriate, to The Adjutant General of the Army and to his counterpart in the Navy and in the Air Force. The collected information is also furnished to the COMMZ and theater army commanders for record purposes and forwarding through personnel channels to Department of the Army for information and/or action. Information concerning allied personnel in enemy custody is transmitted to the prisoner of war information agency of the Power concerned.
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION (SCHEMATIC) FOR A BRANCH
UNITED STATES PRISONER OF WAR INFORMATION CENTER

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
BRANCH UNITED STATES PRISONER OF WAR
INFORMATION CENTER

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

CENTER HEADQUARTERS

ADMINISTRATION DIVISION

BRANCH ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR INFORMATION BUREAU

BRANCH AMERICAN PRISONER OF WAR INFORMATION BUREAU

OFFICE SERVICES BRANCH

MACHINE PROCESSING BRANCH

PW ACTIONS BRANCH

PW RECORDS BRANCH

PW FINGERPRINT CLASSIFICATION BR

PW PROPERTY BRANCH

PW POSTAL BRANCH
ANNEX D

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