THE WARSAW PACT’S CAMPAIGN FOR “EUROPEAN SECURITY”

A. Ross Johnson

A Report prepared for

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND
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PREFACE

THIS REPORT is a product of The Rand Corporation's continuing study of European security issues and Soviet and East European foreign and military policy for the United States Air Force, under Project Rand. It is intended as a contribution to understanding European political conditions and Soviet policies that may affect United States force deployments in Europe, in particular the prospects for agreement on mutual balanced force reductions in the early 1970s.

By contrast with the several other analyses that have been made of the Soviet Union's campaign to convene a European Security Conference, the present study aims at providing a comprehensive comparative examination (through mid-August 1970) of the policies of all the Warsaw Pact member states in the campaign. Thus, an attempt has been made to trace all relevant sources, non-Soviet as well as Soviet.

In any study of Communist intentions such as this, the use of Marxist-Leninist terminology is unavoidable. Its usage for descriptive purposes does not imply uncritical acceptance of its meaning in the Marxist-Leninist lexicon. The reader will quickly see how little "European security," in the standard Warsaw Pact interpretation of the term, has to do with lasting military security and political legitimacy in Europe.

AN ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE on future security arrangements for Europe was first proposed by the Soviet Union in 1954-1955, as part of its unsuccessful diplomatic effort to block the rearmament of West Germany. The project was revived at the end of 1964, with a related anti-West German purpose: to prevent the formation of a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force including West Germany. In 1966, the conference proposal was transformed into the tool of a broad political and diplomatic campaign to exploit heightened frictions within NATO and reduce American influence in Western Europe in favor of Soviet influence. The campaign was also intended to secure the West's acceptance of the territorial-political and ideological-political status quo in Eastern Europe and to limit the scope for independent action by Rumania and other USSR client states. The Bucharest Declaration of mid-1966 set forth the Warsaw Pact position on European security, notably including a series of proposals for regional arms limitation in Europe.

In 1967, the European security campaign suffered a severe setback as the Soviet leadership was forced to turn its attention first to the crisis within the Warsaw Pact resulting from the pursuit of a new Ostpolitik by West Germany and then to the Middle East crisis. Soviet intentions underlying the campaign did not, however, undergo any fundamental change. At this time, several of the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies launched autonomous initiatives to expand East-West European cooperation, aspects of which -- clearly in the case of Rumania, and more ambiguously in the case of Hungary and Czechoslovakia -- must have been viewed in Moscow as "anti-Soviet." Poland and East Germany, on the other hand, emphasized -- even more than Moscow -- the anti-West German themes of the European security campaign. By mid-1968, when the mounting Czechoslovak crisis led to a freeze on all détente initiatives of the Soviet bloc, no concrete agenda
for a European Security Conference (ESC) had been proposed; nor had the desired "European Security System" been defined. Also, the earlier public Soviet interest in regional arms limitation had evaporated.

Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leadership did not limit itself to purely defensive attempts at reconsolidating its Eastern European empire, but quickly revived the European security campaign. The Budapest Appeal of March 1969 again proposed, in strikingly non-polemical fashion, the convening of an ESC as a step toward all-European cooperation. After pursuing the initiative through the summer of 1969 in bilateral contacts with West European states, Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, meeting in Prague in October 1969, proposed a two-point agenda for an ESC: (1) a multilateral renunciation-of-force agreement (which was not intended, however, to limit the application of the "Brezhnev doctrine") and (2) pan-European economic and scientific-technical collaboration.

In October 1969, a Social Democratic-led government assumed office in Bonn. Its new Ostpolitik forced the Warsaw Pact -- just as in 1966-1967 -- to divert attention from the European security campaign to the narrower problem of policy toward West Germany. Differences within the Warsaw Pact over the desirability of bilateral approaches to Bonn prior to a Warsaw Pact-Bonn arrangement apparently became great enough to necessitate a top-level meeting of Soviet bloc leaders in Moscow in early December 1969. At that meeting, apparently over East German Party leader Ulbricht's strenuous objections, bilateral initiatives -- within rather large limits -- were agreed on. Bilateral dialogues were initiated shortly thereafter between West Germany and in turn the Soviet Union, Poland, and -- after a fashion -- East Germany, the first concrete result of which was the Soviet-West German treaty of August 1970.

The Warsaw Pact European security campaign was hence somewhat overshadowed in late 1969 and early 1970 by negotiations between individual Pact members and West Germany. In June 1970, with the clear prospect of a Soviet-West German non-aggression agreement, and following the articulation of a NATO counter-position on the ESC, the Warsaw Pact sought to give greater momentum to the European security campaign. Meeting in Budapest, Warsaw Pact foreign ministers made at least verbal
concessions to NATO's insistence on full U.S. and Canadian participation in an ESC, on discussion of expanded all-European cultural ties, and on discussion of arms reductions in Europe — although any real change on the latter point, in particular, remained to be demonstrated.

In reviving the European security campaign in March 1969, the Soviet leadership seemed to be motivated by fundamentally the same considerations as in the 1966-1967 phase of that campaign. The Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 obviously gave the Soviet leadership renewed cause for securing Western legitimation of the territorial and, more important, the ideological-political status quo in East Europe; the ideological outlook of the present Soviet leadership leads it to believe that such legitimation would decisively increase the stability of its East European client states. In the meantime, Western "ideological penetration" of Eastern Europe had to be resisted; hence the Soviet bloc's relative lack of interest in expanding East-West European cultural ties. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact had to be militarily strengthened, particularly its internal security function.

At the same time, the course of the European security campaign since 1968 suggests that the Soviet Union is attempting to pursue the same "status quo plus" goals of the past, that its actions are devoted not just to consolidating Soviet influence in Eastern Europe but to expanding that influence in Western Europe at the expense of the United States. The Sino-Soviet conflict may give urgency to Soviet leaders' desire to achieve their "status quo plus" objectives in Europe within a definite period, before China truly becomes a Great Power.

The post-1968 phase of the Warsaw Pact European security campaign differed from previous phases. First, U.S. and Canadian participation in an ESC was publicly accepted in June 1970. Yet this long-postponed and still qualified endorsement has to be viewed as a tactical move. In internal public discussions, no less than in propaganda statements, Soviet and other Warsaw Pact spokesmen have not acknowledged the legitimacy of U.S. interests in Europe or a U.S. role in the desired European security system of the future. Second, the post-1968 campaign strikingly moderated the former explicit anti-West Germanism. This no doubt reflected the more activist Soviet policy toward West Germany also initiated shortly
after the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis. Third, the post-1968 phase showed heightened interest in promoting pan-European economic cooperation. This stemmed from both a recognition of the need for trade and technology from the West and a desire to forestall solid West European economic integration, which Soviet bloc leaders found threatening. Finally, in the latest phase of the European security campaign, in contrast to 1966-1967, the Soviet leadership showed no interest in regional arms limitation, totally ignoring the subject until the June 1970 Budapest foreign ministers meeting. This was because Moscow was conscious of the fragility of the political system in Eastern Europe and saw the need to strengthen the internal security function of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet failure to attempt once again to exploit the issue of American tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe can be explained by the difficulty of separating that issue from the question of conventional forces in Europe.

Intended to advance Soviet political objectives in Eastern and Western Europe, the post-1968 European security campaign, like that of 1966-67, became an instrument that individual Warsaw Pact member states used for the pursuit of autonomous policies. Rumania exploited the campaign to strengthen its independence, as did Poland, in contrast to its position in 1966-67. East Germany unsuccessfully sought to use the campaign to save something of the old all-or-nothing Warsaw Pact stance toward Bonn. In contrast, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria played more passive roles in the campaign, reflecting the special constraints on Hungarian foreign policy, the vassal status of Husak's Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria's continuing slavish pro-Sovietism.
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I. INTRODUCTION

THIS STUDY addresses itself to political-military issues raised for NATO by the Warsaw Pact's "European security" campaign, particularly the proposal to convene a "European Security Conference" (ESC)* that was first made in 1954-1955 and was refurbished and launched anew in the spring of 1969.

Many in the West have been reluctant to take the proposal seriously, since Warsaw Pact suggestions for an ESC agenda exclude the central problems of European security -- the military confrontation in Europe, the German question, including Berlin, and the stability of the USSR's Eastern European client states. Nevertheless, the ESC proposal deserves detailed analysis for several reasons. (1) Warsaw Pact members have promoted it vigorously before a variety of national and international audiences for a year and a half. (2) Though "but a play within the play,\(^1\) the European security campaign has been at the heart of overall recent Warsaw Pact policy towards Western Europe, so that understanding the proposal contributes to appraising Warsaw Pact attitudes toward such issues as the mutual reduction of military forces in Europe, the German question, and the future American role in Europe in general. (3) The ESC proposal bears directly on interstate relations within the Warsaw Pact and illuminates differences on a range of foreign policy issues. Most important, several of the Soviet Union's allies have used the conference proposal to legitimize the pursuit of autonomous foreign policy goals. (4) The conference proposal has been echoed by some in Western Europe although with varying degrees of support. (5) For all its vagueness, the ESC proposal represents a concrete initiative by the Warsaw Pact to shape future European security arrangements at a time

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* Here we use the Warsaw Pact's term, rather than the NATO-preferred "Conference on European Security."

when NATO's assumptions about postwar Europe are increasingly being
called into question. The Soviet Union's attainment of strategic parity
with the United States will have a political effect on Europe no less
than on other parts of the world. One consequence of that parity -- the
exclusion of Soviet missiles targeted on Western Europe from SALT -- has
already disturbed some Europeans. In the United States, reappraisal of
the resources that should be devoted to international as opposed to
domestic priorities has increased the pressure for some reduction of
American troop strength in Europe. On the other hand, there is little
prospect that the Western European members of NATO will be prepared to
expand their conventional forces to offset future U.S. troop reductions.
West Germany, which still views itself as part of a divided nation, over-
took France after 1968 in pursuing an activist foreign policy towards
Eastern Europe. It has concluded a non-aggression treaty with the USSR
and is attempting to normalize relations with the smaller East European
states based on acceptance of present European borders and the existence
of a second German state. Great Britain's preoccupations are increasingly
continental. Some of the barriers to an expansion of East-West European
economic relations have broken down. In short, it seems unlikely that
the European status quo of the 1960s will be perpetuated in the 1970s,
even if it may still appear to some U.S. decisionmakers the best of all
possible arrangements in Europe. In this situation of flux, it is prudent
to examine carefully every relevant initiative of the Warsaw Pact, in
order to be able to assess its possible impact on Europe.

There is no question, of course, of the primary role of the Soviet
Union in the Warsaw Pact's European security campaign. Yet neither the
genesis of the ESC initiative nor its prospects can meaningfully be ap-
praised without comparing the positions of all the members of the Soviet
c bloc. This study examines, for example, the differences within the
Pact on the question of regional arms limitation measures in Europe.
Though the impact of differences within the Warsaw Pact can be exagger-
ated, the author believes that many Western analysts underestimate its
importance.

While this study, then, is comprehensive in scope, it is focused
in content; it does not pretend to deal with the entire issue of security
arrangements for Europe. It deals with European security as seen from one side only, the Warsaw Pact, and through the narrow prism of the ESC proposal. It does not attempt, for example, to examine Warsaw Pact policy towards individual West European states. And as important as the subject is, it does not exhaustively treat Soviet bloc policy towards West Germany, although the key elements of that policy relevant to the European security campaign are necessarily a part of this analysis.

At several points, the study notes how NATO policies have affected the Warsaw Pact European security campaign. Being an analytical study, it does not discuss possible alternative U.S. policies. Where the author has discerned implications for U.S. policy in the campaign, however, he specifies them in the conclusions, beginning on p. 65. The study stresses the continuity of Soviet policy towards Europe, concluding that Moscow has yet to demonstrate its interest in European "stability" that involves a high (even if lower than present) level of American influence in Europe. On the contrary, the USSR has shown a continuing determination to change the balance of power in Europe in the Soviet favor, to achieve what will be termed the "status quo plus." Yet if Soviet policy towards Europe remains inimically purposeful, from the standpoint of American and West European interests, it does not necessarily follow that all goals and instruments of that policy must be regarded as serious threats. It should not be inferred that the author believes that initiatives intended to further Soviet interests in Europe are best dealt with by an automatic and uncompromising rebuff from the West. Each must be judged separately, in terms of whether and how best it can be used to Western advantage -- an "all-European" conference devoted to relatively minor aspects of European "security" included.
II. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE PROPOSAL, 1954-1968

THE PROPOSAL to convene a conference of all European states, as distinct from Great Power conclaves, to settle the continent's political arrangements, was first made an instrument of Soviet diplomacy sixteen years ago. The suggestion, part of a broader initiative on a European settlement, was clearly motivated by the Soviet desire to attempt to reverse the West's decision to rearm West Germany, first within the framework of the abortive European Defense Community and then within the framework of the Paris Agreements and NATO.

At the Berlin Foreign Ministers' Conference in February 1954, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov proposed a general European collective security treaty open to all European states. Recalling Stalin's and Beria's ploys of late 1952 and early 1953 suggesting the creation of a neutralist, armed, reunified Germany, Molotov maintained that this European treaty should be signed by a reunified Germany, which would emerge from confederal arrangements between the Bonn government and the East German Communist regime. (Subsequent all-German elections were vaguely promised.) Molotov's proposed treaty provided for a standing organization in which the United States (as well as China) would have only observer status. The USSR recognized that the United States, as a Great Power and a victor in World War II, had to be temporarily accommodated on European, especially German, matters. But this recognition was overshadowed by the USSR's desire to deny the legitimacy of American interests in Europe, to reduce American influence there, and ultimately to push the United States out of the region. Molotov's proposed treaty, for the first time in the postwar period, embodied this desire in an organizational form.

The West unanimously rejected the Molotov proposal, and as the proposed European Defense Community was being bitterly debated in Western European
parliaments, Soviet diplomacy generated a series of notes, threats, and inducements intended to block the rearment of West Germany. Among these were variants of the all-European conference proposal. In a note of March 31, 1954, for example, attempting to deflate Western objections, the Soviet government proposed a European security conference in which the United States could participate fully, suggested that all-German elections be held sooner rather than later, and proposed that membership in NATO be extended to the USSR. The European Defense Community was vetoed by the French Parliament (for reasons largely unrelated to the Soviet campaign), but the Paris Agreements of October 1954 provided an alternative framework for the rearment of West Germany within the Atlantic community. The Soviet Union reacted to the signing of the Paris Agreements by threatening military countermeasures; when the Agreements nevertheless entered in force in May 1955, the Soviets established the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The USSR made one last major attempt to reverse the effects of the Paris Agreements at the Geneva summit conference in mid-1955, where Soviet Premier Bulganin reintroduced a somewhat watered-down draft of a European security treaty to be adopted by an all-European conference with U.S. participation. Bulganin also proposed a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and verbally endorsed future all-German elections. This proposal, too, was rejected by the West. As the rearment of West Germany began, the USSR's first European security campaign was abandoned. It ended conclusively in 1958, when Khrushchev provoked a new crisis over Berlin and threatened to sign a peace treaty with East Germany alone.

The ESC proposal was revived a decade later, in quite a different international context, by Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki, addressing the United Nations General Assembly in December 1964. Rapacki assumed American participation in such a conference, which he saw as furthering the emergence of a new security system in Europe, one element of which would be the nuclear arms limitations proposed in the earlier Rapacki and Gomulka plans. His suggestion that preparations for an ESC might be carried out by selected representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Pact did imply the exclusion of the United States (but probably also the GDR) from the initial deliberations.
The Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee (PCC) took up Rapacki’s proposal in its meeting in Warsaw on January 19-20, 1965. In a statement proposing a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression pact, the PCC endorsed Rapacki’s ESC proposal (qualified, however, because it did not support U.S. participation or Rapacki’s formula for conference preparations). The PCC statement reaffirmed the Pact’s opposition to NATO’s multilateral nuclear force project (MLF) as amounting to an unacceptable transfer of control over nuclear weapons to West Germany, and threatened unspecified military countermeasures if the MLF were established. Perhaps to counterbalance this threat and gain the political initiative, the PCC simultaneously proclaimed its interest in constructive solutions to the problems of European security. In line with past Polish regional disarmament proposals, it called for a freeze on nuclear weapons in Europe. Holding out hope for a "settlement of the German problem," the Soviet bloc leaders demanded the acceptance of existing borders and "the liquidation of the remnants of World War II." Yet they did not demand recognition of East Germany; from the perspective of 1970, it is striking that they still attempted to exploit the slogan of future German reunification: a West German government gaining control over nuclear weapons would forever have to bear the onus of having foreclosed any prospect of reunification.

The ESC proposal was thus promoted by the Warsaw Pact in early 1965 with the specific purpose of blocking NATO’s establishment of the MLF. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the proposal was not revived later in 1965, as NATO support for the MLF waned (for endogenous reasons). Only in mid-1966, after an interval of more than a year, did the Soviet bloc take up the ESC project and transform it from an instrument to thwart formation of the MLF into part of a broader, more offensive political strategy aimed at Western Europe as a whole.

The ESC proposal next reappeared in an East German government proposal on European security in January 1966, which stressed partial disarmament measures and recognition of the GDR. Intended (like the January 1965 PCC statement) to arouse Western public opinion against a "revanchist" West Germany allegedly still striving to acquire nuclear weapons, the statement called for the "easing of the political atmosphere.
and cooperation of all European states on the basis of equality," after which a European conference would be desirable.

At the 23rd CPSU Congress in the spring of 1966, the ESC project received little more attention. Delivering the Central Committee Report at the Congress, General Secretary Brezhnev called for an "appropriate international conference" to discuss arms reductions and other measures related to European security. He focused on the twin dangers to Europe of the United States and West Germany — "peculiar partners" — each of which sought to use the other to achieve its own narrow aims, in the case of the latter, "revenge-seeking plans," in the case of the United States, "some pretext to continue keeping its troops and war bases in Europe, twenty years after the end of the war, and thereby exert direct influence on the economy and the policies of the West European countries."

Brezhnev invoked the American signature on the Potsdam Agreement to suggest that the United States should play a role in Western Europe of restraining West Germany — although this probably implied no more than a negative role, i.e., refraining from supporting West Germany's military capability and foreign policy. The same invocation of the Potsdam Agreement was made by Foreign Minister Gromyko in his remarks to the 23rd Congress. Gromyko echoed Brezhnev's statement of the desirability of a European conference, suggesting that the main reason for the lack of progress in identifying the "common elements in the interests of specifically European states" was the negative influence of the United States in Western Europe:

The United States of America believes for some reason that Europe cannot do without its presence and guardianship, without American bases on European soil, without American soldiers in the streets of European cities, without American planes in European skies. . . .

It was none other than President Franklin Roosevelt who at the Crimea conference declared that American troops would not stay in Europe much more than two years after the war. . . .

Ten times two years have elapsed since then, but the American army is still in Europe and, by all signs, claims permanent status there. But the peoples of Europe are having and will continue to have their say on this score. 9
Later in April, an ESC was proposed again by Gromyko, addressing a press conference in Rome. For Western consumption he suggested that it might deal with the questions of Germany and disarmament. Brezhnev's reference to a European conference at the 23rd CPSU Congress was then reiterated in the Soviet reply of May 17 to the West German "peace note" of March 1966.

Parallel to this activity at the state level, the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council (WPC) had taken up the banner of European security, perhaps partly in reaction to autonomous initiatives by Western European leftists on the fringe of its ranks. In July 1965, for example, a WPC-sponsored "peace congress" in Helsinki endorsed the ESC proposal, and the WPC Presidential Committee mentioned the proposal at a meeting in Sofia in December. In June 1966, shortly before the Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact's PCC, a WPC session in Geneva adopted a "Memorandum on European Security" endorsing the ESC project, which presaged some of the points to be contained in the PCC's Bucharest Declaration.

The Bucharest Declaration

As this brief chronicle suggests, the revival of the ESC proposal in early 1966 did not indicate that a major Soviet bloc initiative relating to European security was in preparation. Yet such an initiative resulted from the June 1966 Bucharest meeting of the PCC. The Bucharest initiative is explicable only in the context of overall Soviet policy toward Europe at that time. With reference to Western Europe, that policy was characterized by an attempt to revive the momentum of the "détentist" policy Khrushchev had developed by 1964, minus, however, the potential risks related to the German question that the deposed Soviet leader had seemed willing to take. It was based on a perceived decline in American influence in Western Europe, mainly as a consequence of Vietnam, and a desire to exploit the resulting heightened friction within the Western alliance. It was also keyed to 1969, the year of expiration of the initial period of the North Atlantic Treaty, when NATO members could first withdraw from the Alliance. Just as in the days of the Geneva conferences, Germany remained at the center of Soviet European
policy. In the meantime, of course, West Germany had become a key member of NATO, and East Germany had made considerable progress towards internal political consolidation and, after 1961, great economic strides. In consequence, Soviet policy now aimed at the incorporation and institutionalization of the division of Germany (not even a limited overcoming of that division) in any European political settlement.

It was this appraisal of the Western European scene in 1966 that led the USSR, while denouncing the American presence in Western Europe — witness Brezhnev’s comments at the 23rd CPSU Congress — and maintaining an inflexible posture toward West Germany — as demonstrated by Moscow’s reply to Bonn’s "peace note" — to praise France’s withdrawal from the NATO military structure and welcome de Gaulle to Moscow in mid-1966; to dispatch Gromyko to visit the Pope and conclude a large deal with Fiat; and to revive the memory of the Popular Front in an appeal for broader cooperation between Communists and non-Communist leftists in Western Europe. At the same time, the USSR showed a clear reluctance to initiate a dialogue with the U.S. on European problems.

The opportunities that Moscow perceived in the Western half of the European continent were accompanied, however, by unwelcome developments in the Eastern half. Beginning late in 1965, the Soviet leadership attempted to increase control over its Eastern European allies through a series of measures intended to enhance both military integration and foreign policy coordination within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Although many details of the ensuing controversy remain unclear, by mid-1966 this effort had largely been rebuffed by several of the Soviet Union’s allies, led by Rumania. To make matters worse from the Soviet point of view, Rumania also insisted on pursuing a policy of "small steps" toward better relations with West Germany, thus not only declining to coordinate its policy with the Warsaw Pact but also taking an independent position on a key substantive issue of Soviet European policy.

Against this background, the European security campaign launched by the Warsaw Pact at Bucharest in June 1966 should be viewed as a carefully restricted Soviet effort simultaneously (1) to fan both anti-Americanism and anti-West Germanism in Western Europe, (2) to foster increased acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe, and (3) to reduce
the limits of independent action by Soviet client states in the region—all of which were believed to be mutually reinforcing. The initiative was controlled, hence lacking in specific substantive proposals to promote Soviet objectives in Western Europe, because the Soviets feared that bolder initiatives could further undermine cohesion in the Soviet bloc.

The foregoing considerations account for the content of the 1966 Bucharest Declaration by the PCC, although Rumania, joined by other Soviet allies, apparently succeeded in modifying some of the language (and in so doing, transformed the initial draft into an inconsistent document). The Declaration denounced the pernicious role of the United States and West Germany in Europe in language taken verbatim from Brezhnev's and Gromyko's speeches to the 23rd CPSU Congress. "There can be no doubt," it stated, "that the aims of U.S. policy in Europe have nothing in common with the vital interests of the European peoples and the tasks of European security." Again threatening unspecified countermeasures should Bonn acquire control over nuclear weapons, the Declaration stated that European peace and security required that Bonn "reckon with the actual state of affairs in Europe" and thus recognize the existence of the GDR, abandon the claim of sole representation, abandon the Hallstein doctrine, recognize existing European borders, and acknowledge that the Munich Agreement of 1938 was invalid at its inception. At the same time, however, in tones suggesting Rumanian influence, the Declaration granted the existence of "healthy" forces in Western Germany, as elsewhere in Western Europe. European security would be enhanced by initiating discussions in which all European states, "large and small" (again, language suggestive of Rumanian influence), would play a role. One possibility would be a "general European conference," which might issue a "general European declaration." As to the content of such a declaration, the Bucharest Declaration limited itself to vague pledges "to settle disputes by peaceful means only," to "hold consultations and exchange information on questions of mutual interest," and "to contribute to the all-around development of economic, scientific-technical, and cultural relations."

Extrapolating from the scattered, rather vague passages in the Bucharest Declaration, it appears that the European security system to
which the Conference was promised to contribute would incorporate respect for the principles of "sovereignty, national independence, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage," in interstate relations, including, specifically, no economic discrimination against any European state. This was qualified, however, by the assertion that the relations between the states of the two different social systems in Europe had to be based on the principles of "peaceful coexistence," i.e., conflict between them would continue, particularly in the ideological sphere. The Declaration spoke of a "German peace settlement" and future German "union" (no longer reunification), but the language made it clear that such a unified Germany could only be a Communist Germany and was, in any case, a distant prospect at best.

Only in proposing partial regional disarmament measures was the Bucharest Declaration more specific in suggesting the components of a European security system. The Declaration proposed the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, or at least the dissolution of the military organizations of the two alliances, including the liquidation of foreign military bases, "withdrawal of all foreign [military] forces from alien territories to within their national frontiers," reduction in the size of the armed forces of the two German states, creation of nuclear free zones, a ban on nuclear bombs carried over the territory of European states, and, once again, prohibition of any West German control over nuclear weapons.

These measures were obviously directed primarily at the American military presence in Europe, even if some of them -- e.g., withdrawal of military forces within national frontiers -- taken at face value, would apply to the USSR as well. Once the American military presence had been removed, the Bucharest Declaration implied, a new European security system could easily be worked out by the European countries themselves, "without outside interference." Yet other portions of the Declaration showed what must be interpreted as calculated ambivalence toward the American role in Europe, based on a recognition that, even under propitious circumstances, the United States could not simply be
pushed out of Western Europe. Even if the U.S. military presence in Europe were reduced as desired, the United States would continue to play a dominant role (albeit, it was hoped, a decreasing one) within the NATO alliance and would remain for the foreseeable future the USSR's only global superpower rival. This explains the Bucharest Declaration's ambivalent treatment of the U.S. role in an ESC; the unclear implication was that such a conference would be, at least at the outset, an exclusively European affair, but that its declaration would be "open to all interested countries," and, more generally, that "countries of other continents as well cannot be indifferent to the direction in which affairs in Europe develop."

The Karlovy Vary Statement

The sequel to the Bucharest Declaration came the following spring, when most of the ruling and nonruling European Communist parties (the Rumanian and Yugoslav Parties being the important exceptions) met at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. The form in which the ESC proposal was restated at Karlovy Vary was influenced by three major intervening developments. First, a heightened appreciation, derived from the French precedent, of the possibilities for the weakening of NATO with the approaching expiration of its initial twenty-year term and second, the opportunity for the USSR, by mounting an anti-NATO campaign in Western Europe, to gain greater influence over the policies of the Western European Communist parties. The third development, a negative one, was the disruptive effect on the Warsaw Pact of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Rumania...

*This ambivalence was restated in an Izvestia commentary which asserted, on the one hand, that the U.S. role in World War II and its economic ties with Europe gave it no right to "interfere" in the settlement of European affairs, yet, on the other hand, that "no one believes the U.S. has no relation to European problems." The Potsdam Agreement was said to have created such a relationship; however, "the USA has not fulfilled the obligations it assumed with respect to the eradication of German militarism and the defense of peace in Europe. . . ."
and West Germany in January 1967, a consequence of the new Ostpolitik of the Kiesinger-Brandt government formed in Bonn in December 1966. Prodded by pressure from East German Party leader Ulbricht and Polish Party leader Gomulka for a unified, tough, all-or-nothing approach to West Germany, the Soviet leadership in early 1967 found it necessary to redefine the bloc's German policy.

Thus, the Statement on European security adopted at the Karlovy Vary meeting read like an "agitation-propaganda" lecture instead of a diplomatic proposal, with shrill passages on West Germany. The hardened line on West Germany could be seen in extra demands made of that country compared with the Bucharest Declaration, including normalization of relations between West Germany and West Berlin as a "separate political entity" and even measures of "democratization," for instance, legalizing the West German Communist Party (KPD). Repeating the standard condemnations of the American role in Europe and stressing the increasing contradictions within the Atlantic alliance on defense and economic matters, the Statement promised that "no effort [would] be spared in order to develop a broad movement of the peace-loving forces of our continent against the extension or any modification of the Atlantic Pact." To this end, it appealed to social democrats and "progressives" in Western Europe to undertake "joint actions" with the Western European Communist parties, whose own national programs (some, of course, quite "reformist") would serve with the Bucharest Declaration as the basis for a new, post-NATO European security system.

Partial disarmament measures proposed in the Karlovy Vary Statement were the same as those in the Bucharest Declaration, with three exceptions: the formula calling for the "withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the European states" was now more clearly limited to non-European, i.e., American troops; the proposal to reduce the armed forces of the two German states was now generalized to proposed "zones of thinned-out or frozen armaments"; and a vague appeal for the creation of "zones of peace" was appended. (Concurrent Soviet statements endorsed nuclear-free zones in Central Europe, Scandinavia, and the Balkans.) The net effect was to make the disarmament proposals more clearly one-sidedly anti-American and anti-NATO, which may be explained in part by
Rumania's absence from the session. This anti-American emphasis was heightened by Brezhnev's demand, in his remarks to the session, that the Sixth Fleet withdraw from the Mediterranean. The appeal for dissolution of the military organizations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, if not the alliances themselves, was also repeated. This proposal became slightly more credible as the network of bilateral treaties among the Warsaw Pact member states was extended to include the GDR. The initiative for this apparently came from East Berlin, as Ulbricht sought a formal commitment of support from all the Warsaw Pact members for the GDR's position vis-à-vis West Germany in the wake of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Rumania and the FRG. But the GDR's inclusion in the network of treaties also created a new, bloc-wide institution that could substitute for the Warsaw Pact in the event, however unlikely, that NATO ever agreed to the simultaneous abolition of the two military alliances.

The Karlovy Vary Statement also repeated the Bucharest Declaration's call for the convening of a European security conference. More specific than the earlier statement, it called for the conclusion "by all European states" (i.e., including the GDR, but clearly excluding the U.S.) of a treaty renouncing the use or threat of force against other countries and interference in their internal affairs. The ESC proposal was now supplemented by endorsement of a European parliamentary conference (originally a Yugoslav suggestion) and a call for a "popular" conference of European "nations." Brezhnev suggested to the conference that improved bilateral relations between East and West European states would contribute greatly to "European security."

But as for the collective security system to which such measures were intended to lead, the Karlovy Vary Statement was even more vague than the Bucharest Declaration, asserting only that states of the different social systems should regularize their relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. This did not imply, however, that in the Soviet view the prospects of pan-European détente leading to a European security system were linked only with changes in the foreign policies of the Western European countries; the desired system also required progress toward greater "democratization" and eventually "socialism" in Western Europe.
After Karlovy Vary

At Bucharest, the Warsaw Pact had presented the ESC project to Western European governments as a serious political initiative; at Karlovy Vary, the proposal was harnessed to an appeal for mass action in Western Europe to increase neutralist sentiment and foster defections from NATO, "a campaign reminiscent of the peace movement of the 1950s -- although not yet approaching the collaboration and compromise of the Popular Front of 1935." In fact, however, the anti-NATO campaign did not reach the proportions of the 1950s peace movement, in part, perhaps, because the attention of the Soviet leadership was quickly diverted to other, more pressing foreign policy issues -- the Six-Day War in the Middle East in mid-1967 and its aftermath and the beginnings of the Czechoslovak crisis in early 1968.

That the Karlovy Vary initiative was not pursued in the second half of 1967 and in 1968 does not mean, however, that the Warsaw Pact had completely dropped the ESC project or that the motivations underlying it had changed. The WPC, for example, continued to raise the banner of European security. Prior to Karlovy Vary, in February 1967, the WPC secretariat had supported a conference of representatives of "European peoples." A meeting of the WPC presidium in Leningrad in October 1967 again endorsed the scheme, resolving to intensify the anti-NATO campaign in Western Europe. The WPC sponsored a meeting in Brussels in May 1968 to organize a nongovernmental, all-European conference, but preparations were interrupted by the Czechoslovak crisis and resumed only in the spring of 1969.

Following the Karlovy Vary meeting, Warsaw Pact member states individually advanced proposals related to European security. These initiatives varied greatly, and some seemed designed to exploit the common Warsaw Pact European security campaign to pursue national foreign policy goals.

Rumania, for example, well before the Bucharest meeting, organized consultations of nine smaller European powers (including Hungary and Bulgaria) -- the so-called Group of Nine -- that resulted in a U.N. General Assembly Resolution of December 1965 appealing in vague terms for improved European relations. Rumania continued to promote European
security to expand its own freedom of maneuver within the Warsaw Pact. In 1966, Rumania, in interpreting the Warsaw Pact European security campaign, stressed the concurrent abolition of both military alliances in Europe, the application of regional disarmament measures to the USSR as well as the United States (the initial Rumanian reservations on the NPT are relevant in this context), and the important role to be played by small states. Indeed, as noted above, at Bucharest Rumania succeeded in partially influencing the common Warsaw Pact stand along these lines. Rumania's decision to accept Bonn's offer of diplomatic relations at the end of 1966 was certainly eased by the Warsaw Pact's Bucharest initiative. The subsequent events of 1967 somewhat overshadowed Rumania's efforts to benefit from the European security campaign. Despite criticism by some of its Warsaw Pact allies in early 1967, Rumania nevertheless continued to pursue an autonomous policy towards West Germany without major penalty from the USSR.31

In Czechoslovakia, toward the end of the Novotny era, some of the intellectual elite began to question the passive role that their country had been playing in the Soviet bloc. As in Rumania, this was expressed in an emphasis on the role of small states in the European security dialogue. In early 1967, one publicist, J. Sedivy, ignoring the Bucharest Declaration, declared quite heretically that the standard Warsaw Pact demands against West Germany could be met only at the end of a long process of pan-European economic and cultural cooperation. Sedivy proposed as part of that process the establishment of a "peace zone" in Central Europe (in which nuclear weapons would be banned, conventional forces reduced, economic cooperation strengthened, etc.) that would incorporate or surround West Germany.32 More typical of Czechoslovak commentaries at this time was a paper of October 1966 by Antonin Snejdarek, then director of the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Prague, which advanced a far more orthodox prescription for European security but stressed the "role of small countries" in both alliances.33 In early 1968, Czechoslovak commentators used this interpretation of the European security campaign to justify the adoption of a less hostile attitude towards West Germany.34

*The subsequent Soviet charges of West German penetration of Czechoslovakia were, of course, groundless.
Following the Karlovy Vary conference, Hungary continued to promote strongly the "Danubian cooperation" theme Party leader Kadar had first raised at the end of 1964. Hungarian spokesmen clearly acknowledged Soviet primacy in the European security campaign, but their effort had autonomous overtones. During this period, Bulgaria promoted an active Balkan policy, but its "Balkan cooperation" proposals, in contrast to Hungarian initiatives, seemed to be totally attuned to Soviet wishes.

Poland vigorously pursued diplomatic contacts in Western Europe, culminating in de Gaulle's visit to Poland in September 1967. Poland's hard line on the German issue, manifested in its total support for the East German leadership, greatly reduced the effectiveness of that effort. But specific Polish proposals about European security continued to be generated. In October 1967, Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki proposed that after the NPT was signed it would be appropriate to consider again establishing a nuclear freeze and then denuclearized zones in Europe. Parallel to this, the equal reduction of conventional forces could be undertaken by national armed forces in "the largest possible area of Europe," following which "foreign" troops stationed in the area could be reduced. In May 1968, the Polish Institute of International Affairs released a major proposal on European security that revived the ESC project in sharply anti-American and anti-West German tones. The agenda of an ESC, to be worked out by the countries concerned, should include "decisive" and not "marginal" issues, e.g., recognition of existing European frontiers, renunciation of force, pan-European economic ties, and regional disarmament. Asserting that the Rapacki and Gomulka plans remained "fully relevant," the proposal also advocated an agreed East-West reduction of conventional armed forces, providing it did not change the military balance in Europe and would be carried out under international control. An ESC would help establish a healthier foundation for a European equilibrium by securing acceptance of common principles of international cooperation and by eliminating "artificial" aspects of the continent's division, i.e., Western nonrecognition of the "post-World War II realities" and Western political and economic discrimination against the Warsaw Pact countries (manifestly not the division of Europe into two different social systems or the division of Germany).
East Germany put forward no corresponding initiatives but continued to give the common Warsaw Pact European security campaign a strong anti-West German emphasis. The new bilateral treaties with the other Warsaw Pact states were regularly justified, for example, as enhancing European security and even as paving the way to the convening of an ESC. An authoritative East German study of these bilateral treaties published in 1968 suggested that a new European security system might be developed through the creation of parallel networks of bilateral treaties linking East and West European states and linking the West European states themselves. Yet even the latter set of suggested treaties was viewed as essentially anti-West German. 41

The USSR, too, undertook no new European security initiatives after Karlovy Vary. At a Soviet bloc conference on European security held in Moscow in April 1968, Soviet spokesmen, headed by N. Inozemtsev, ignored the ESC proposal in calling for an intensified anti-American and anti-West German offensive in Europe. Incorporating the "joint actions" with Western European "progressives" urged at Karlovy Vary, this campaign was to be directed specifically against NATO, Western European economic integration, and Western "bridge-building." Though this conference showed that Soviet motivation for the European security campaign had not changed, two Soviet leaders thereafter confirmed that the Soviet leadership did not place high priority on organizing an ESC at that time, above all because of the mounting Czechoslovak crisis.

Addressing the Supreme Soviet in June 1968, Foreign Minister Gromyko limited himself to passing references to the Bucharest and Karlovy Vary proposals, and Kosygin, speaking at a press conference in Stockholm on July 13, 1968, reckoned that it would take one to two years to prepare for a conference. The Soviet government Memorandum on disarmament of July 1, 1968, suggested further that, in contrast to Poland, the Soviet Union was no longer interested in proposing, even for propaganda purposes, partial disarmament in Europe.

Thus, the Warsaw Pact's ESC project, revived at the end of 1964 in the service of a quite specific aim of Soviet-bloc German policy, was in 1966 transformed into a tool of a much broader, essentially anti-American strategy in Western Europe. The threat to the Warsaw Pact of
the Rumanian-West German rapprochement in early 1967 and extra-European developments that year greatly limited the utility of the campaign for the USSR and thus for the Warsaw Pact as a whole. Soviet perceptions underlying the campaign did not, however, undergo any fundamental change. At the same time, Soviet allies individually launched autonomous initiatives related to European security, certain aspects of which, clearly in the Rumanian case, and more ambiguously in the Czechoslovak and Hungarian, must have appeared to Moscow as "anti-Soviet." Poland and the GDR, on the other hand, emphasized the anti-West German themes of the European security campaign. The desired European security system was never defined. Nor was a concrete agenda for an ESC ever proposed within the Pact. Initially, it was intended at least to raise central military issues of European security for discussion, but by mid-1968, with the mounting crisis in Czechoslovakia, the Soviets had clearly lost interest even in that.
III. THE BUDAPEST APPEAL

AUGUST 21, 1968 will remain a significant date in postwar European history. Yet it is clear that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia did not herald a major discontinuity in Soviet policy toward Europe: the Soviets did not, as expected by many observers, become exclusively inward-looking, preoccupied with consolidating the Soviet empire and abandoning policy initiatives toward Western Europe out of fear of political and ideological contamination of Eastern Europe.

In the first few months after the invasion, Soviet bloc policy towards Western Europe was put on ice, as Warsaw Pact spokesmen hammered away at the theme of Western subversion of Czechoslovakia ("creeping counterrevolution") and as the Soviet bloc was, on the other hand, confronted with a partial Western boycott of cultural exchanges and a "pause" in political discussions, for instance, in initiating the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Yet there were signals even then that the basic framework of Soviet European policy remained intact, the "European security" campaign included. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in mid-October, for example, several Soviet bloc representatives appealed for European détente, specifically mentioning the proposed EDC.47

As 1969 began, Soviet bloc spokesmen renewed such appeals with some urgency and concreteness as — it is clear in retrospect -- preparatory staff work for the March meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee proceeded. In February, for example, one Soviet commentator, while rejecting various Western concepts of "Europe" (with the partial exception of Gaullist "Europeanism"), called for an East-West dialogue not burdened by Western attempts at "bridge-building." Another, invoking the precedents of Bucharest and Karlovy Vary, insisted that the time had come for the European leaders to sit down at a common
The new Polish foreign minister, Stefan Jedrychowski, likewise called for political dialogue to be resumed with Western Europe, declaring that the ESC proposal was "extremely timely," and his deputy, Adam Kruczkowski, added that widespread acceptance of the NPT would permit discussion of additional concrete measures of regional disarmament at an ESC. Indeed, at this point, Poland showed the greatest interest of all the Warsaw Pact member states except Rumania in resuming a dialogue with Western Europe, which reflected the beginning of a general reevaluation of its policy toward Europe.

What turned out to be the Budapest Appeal, the most conciliatory proposal for an ESC to that time, was formulated by the Warsaw Pact deputy foreign ministers, working from a Hungarian draft. That the formulation took a "long period" suggests that there was contention on some issues. Preliminary diplomatic soundings in some western countries were encouraging (in early March the Finnish Foreign Minister reportedly expressed Finland's willingness to host an ESC), and the final document was prepared. The PCC met in Budapest on March 17, reportedly five hours late. The delay suggests last-minute difficulties in arriving at a unified stand; they probably were related to the reported unsuccessful Soviet attempt to have the PCC condemn Communist China following the Sino-Soviet Ussuri River border clash or to the military measures, reportedly also a subject of dispute, adopted in Budapest.

The Budapest "Appeal" on "European security," as finally issued at the meeting, called on "all European states to unite their efforts for the consolidation of European peace and security." At its heart was a renewed call for the convening of a European Security Conference:

... there are no compelling reasons whatever to postpone the convocation of an all-European conference. Such a conference would be in the interests of all the European

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These measures, under consideration within the Pact since the Sofia meeting of the PCC in March 1968, included the establishment of a Committee of Ministers of Defense and a new statute on the Pact's joint armed forces and command. A Military Council was apparently also established in Budapest. The function of the new organs remains unclear, just as the question of whether the Soviets were able to forge greater military integration in the Warsaw Pact remains to be answered.
states. It would afford an opportunity for finding together the ways and means to eradicate the division of Europe into armed groupings and to implement peaceful cooperation among European states and peoples.

A "[preliminary] meeting at the earliest possible date of the representatives of all interested European states" was suggested to lay the groundwork and fix the agenda for an ESC. The Appeal called on the European states to strengthen their economic, political, and cultural relations on the basis of "respect for the independence and sovereignty of states," to "refrain from any actions that might poison the atmosphere in relations among states," and to settle disputed problems through negotiations, not through the threat or use of force. It listed three "basic prerequisites" of European security: "the inviolability of the existing boundaries in Europe, including the Oder-Neisse border and the border between the GDR and the German Federal Republic"; "recognition of the existence of the GDR and the German Federal Republic"; and renunciation by Bonn of possession of nuclear weapons in any form. (As for West Berlin, the statement declared simply that it "has a special status and does not belong to West Germany.") Fulfillment of these conditions would allow the establishment of "a European security system," in turn permitting all-European cooperation on "great projects" on economic and environmental matters.

Thus, the Budapest Appeal vigorously revived the ESC project while maintaining silence on the question of U.S. participation and leaving open the date, agenda, and site. Compared with the tone of the Bucharest and Karlovy Vary documents, the language of the Budapest Appeal is mild, which one Hungarian commentary interpreted explicitly as a concession to the West.\(^{56}\) Though the Appeal's condemnation of "forces" in Europe that "deploy more divisions and rocks on the basis of new military programs drawn up for decades ahead" and "those" who have "refused to draw the proper conclusions from World War II" obviously applied to the United States and West Germany, for the first time in such a Warsaw Pact document the target of these attacks was not explicit. Even more surprising, perhaps, was the omission of any criticism of NATO on the eve of the expiration of its initial twenty-year term. In listing the so-called basic prerequisites of European security, the Warsaw Pact still
made specific demands of the FRG, but they were more restrained than in the recent past. Finally, the language of the Budapest Appeal appears milder than that of its precursors because it had less substance than the Bucharest and Karlovy Vary documents. Lacking specific proposals, including specific regional arms control measures, the Budapest Appeal called in the most general terms for the construction of a "European security system," and made no attempt to give it any real content or to justify the proposed ESC as a useful building block.

The Soft Sell

After the March 1969 Budapest meeting, the Warsaw Pact was partially successful in beginning a dialogue with the West on a European Security Conference. Yet the first Soviet initiative after Budapest seemed hardly designed to promote European détente. A Soviet government note of April 9, keyed to the semiannual meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Washington, sharply attacked the Atlantic Alliance, singling out the United States and West Germany as responsible for tension in Europe and restating the full list of alleged "prerequisites" for European security -- the old Karlovy Vary list -- largely directed against Bonn. (This harsh note supports the interpretation that the non-polemical character of the Budapest Appeal is attributable to a compromise within the Warsaw Pact.) The Soviet note made it easier for the NATO foreign ministers to ignore the Budapest Appeal's ESC proposal in its final communiqué of the April session, which proposed instead patient, step-by-step negotiations on the major European issues.

Simultaneously, however, Hungarian diplomatic representatives presented the milder Budapest document to twenty-eight European states (as well as to the U.N. Secretary-General and the governing mayor of West Berlin), and other Soviet bloc diplomats sought support for the conference

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*The previously voiced demand for renunciation of the Munich Agreement was now left out entirely, and -- shortly after a mini-crisis over West Berlin -- the "special status" of that city was merely affirmed.
in the West. Austria and Finland were approached to host a conference. On May 5, 1969, the Finnish government responded. In a note to all European states, the United States, Canada, and the U.N. Secretary-General, Helsinki cited its neutral position on the German question and offered to host a preparatory conference and later the ESC itself, as well as to encourage consultations on the matter. The note left open the issue of United States participation, suggesting vaguely that "all states whose participation is necessary for achieving a solution to European security problems" should be allowed to take part in the discussions.

Two weeks later, on May 20-21, the deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states met in East Berlin to discuss matters related to European security. The session apparently considered what response to give to the Finnish note; later each Pact member state sent a written reply to Helsinki (the contents of which were published) welcoming the initiative and urging the speedy convening of a preparatory conference.

The East Berlin meeting probably also dealt with another matter -- East Germany's interests vis-a-vis Bonn. On May 17, Polish Party leader Gomulka had publicly proposed an agreement with West Germany recognizing the Oder-Neisse as Poland's definitive western border. Gomulka's speech had a broader significance in showing Poland to be more nationally self-assertive on the German question than it had been and in downplaying the interests of the East German leadership. Earlier in the year, the USSR also had resumed overtures to Bonn, which caused some nervousness in East Berlin (and Warsaw) about Moscow's precise intentions. It may be speculated that the Ulbricht leadership was responsible for convening the session in East Berlin, only three days after Gomulka's speech, in order to urge its allies to continue to defend without wavering the GDR's interests vis-a-vis West Germany. If this was indeed the case, the meeting serves as an early demonstration of the nexus between the European security campaign and Soviet bloc policy toward West Germany.
The Prague and Moscow Meetings

In fall 1969, apparently encouraged by contacts with West European states, fearing that the upcoming NATO deputy foreign ministers meeting might reduce the receptiveness of some of these states to the ESC project, and in any case wishing to impart new momentum to the proposal, the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers met in Prague on October 30-31. The Declaration they adopted reaffirmed the Budapest Appeal, citing its "wide and positive reception" by the European states; endorsed Finland's offer of May 5; and went on to propose two specific points for the ESC agenda:

1. The creation of security in Europe, renunciation of the use of force and the threat of force in relations between European states.*

2. Widening commercial, economic, technical, and scientific [note: not cultural] relations between the European states on the basis of equality, with the aim of fostering political cooperation.

Consideration of these issues at an ESC could prepare the way for later discussion of other matters; other subjects might be put on the agenda of an initial meeting, which "could be" convened in Helsinki in the first half of 1970. The question of United States and Canadian participation was again left open; the Declaration affirmed that "all questions connected with the preparation and holding of an all-European conference -- whether they concern the agenda, the participants, or the convening of the conference -- can be solved if goodwill and sincere efforts for mutual understanding are manifest." A preparatory conference was no longer explicitly mentioned, but "interested states" were urged to discuss the Prague proposals on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis.

The Prague meeting reportedly also drafted two documents elaborating on the prospective agenda points and charged the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry with circulating them in Western Europe. The first document, according to press reports, was a draft renunciation-of-force agreement.

*This was a compromise formulation, intended to bridge different views within the Warsaw Pact on "renunciation of force" agreements. The Polish delegation reportedly urged that a third agenda point covering regional arms control measures be proposed, but this was not accepted.
It insisted on the Soviet right to intervene in West Germany under the so-called "enemy states" articles of the U.N. charter and on the validity of all prior international agreements, i.e., the Warsaw Pact and the parallel network of bilateral treaties. The second document, according to the same press reports, was a pledge to refrain from economic discrimination of any kind in Europe. If accurate, these reports suggest that the "Prague agenda" was not as innocuous as it might first have appeared. The reference to the "enemy states" clause was consistent with the Soviet position in its bilateral contacts with Bonn on a renunciation-of-force agreement, which had been broken off in mid-1968. The USSR could hardly have expected Western European governments ever to accept such a formulation; Moscow could have included it in the Warsaw Pact's draft European agreement to restate its maximum position prior to the forthcoming resumption of bilateral talks with Bonn. If so, Moscow intended it as a signal to the FRG rather than a statement of position on the ESC. The reference to the validity of prior international agreements meant, by extrapolation, the "Brezhnev doctrine"; a "pan-European" renunciation-of-force agreement was not considered applicable to the "friendly assistance" of some Warsaw Pact member states to suppress "counterrevolution" in others.

Besides advancing the ESC project, the Prague meeting was devoted to appraising the new SPD-FDP government in Bonn (with the CDU-CSU in opposition for the first time), formed in the wake of the September 1969 West German elections. It is clear that no agreed view of the matter emerged at Prague. In light of subsequent developments, it may be speculated that East German Foreign Minister Winzer urged the continuation of an unmitigated hard line toward Bonn, while, in different ways, the foreign ministers of Rumania, Poland, and more cautiously, the USSR itself suggested that the West German political landscape revealed new positive features and potential opportunities that, if they were to be exploited, required a change of approach. In any case, just as in 1966, the formation of a new government in Bonn had an immediate impact on the Warsaw Pact's European security campaign. The promise of a more active eastern policy by West Germany impelled the Warsaw Pact to review its German policy. In consequence, the ESC project was somewhat overshadowed,
even while it served as a vehicle for the expression of differences of views within the Warsaw Pact on policy towards West Germany. Following the Prague meeting, a clear division appeared between the GDR and the other Warsaw Pact member states on the utility of bilateral contacts with Western European states in advancing the ESC project and the efficacy of future bilateral renunciation-of-force agreements. In both cases, the real issue was the desirability of bilateral overtures, even exploratory ones, to Bonn.

It was probably the magnitude of these differences on policy towards West Germany that necessitated an extraordinary meeting of top Warsaw Pact party and state leaders in Moscow on December 3 and 4. (The gathering was not treated as a formal Warsaw Pact PCC meeting.) The statement issued at its conclusion noted the "extensive international support" allegedly given to the proposed ESC. But it made no new proposals; moreover, its preoccupation with West German developments left no doubt that they had been the focus of discussion. On the one hand, the Statement called on all states to establish "equal relations with the GDR on the basis of international law" (amounting to de jure recognition). This was an escalation from the Budapest Appeal (which referred only to recognition of the existence of the GDR, which in effect had been granted by the new West German government), that Ulbricht had long demanded. On the other hand, this demand was not presented as a precondition for anything, and the new West German government and West German society were depicted more positively than in any past Warsaw Pact document.

At the Moscow meeting, the USSR must have secured at least verbal agreement that Warsaw Pact members consult each other on policy towards West Germany, although it seems doubtful that any precise, explicit limitations on permissible bilateralism were set. In any case, Ulbricht's reported major goal at the meeting was frustrated; although East Germany

*The Moscow Statement did reiterate the 1966 Bucharest Declaration's principles of proper relations among states ("equality, noninterference in internal affairs, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of existing borders"), some or all of which had been omitted in the Karlovy Vary, Budapest, and Prague documents. This suggests a Rumanian influence.
had sought to use the ESC project to inhibit bilateral talks with West Germany, the vague wording of the Moscow communiqué was in fact permissive of bilateral as well as multilateral contracts, as events immediately showed. The initiation of bilateral Soviet conversations with West Germany was announced immediately after the Moscow meeting and that of Polish-West German talks later in December, the former to discuss a prospective renunciation-of-force agreement, and the latter, a similar agreement and recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. The imminence of those talks in turn led the GDR to undertake a major bilateral initiative of its own toward Bonn, proposing a treaty to formalize total legitimization of East Germany as an independent state under international law.

These bilateral contacts with Bonn overshadowed for several months Warsaw Pact diplomatic contacts with West European states on the ESC project, but the latter did continue. In late January 1970, Warsaw Pact deputy foreign ministers met in Sofia, reportedly to discuss problems of European security, including the proposed ESC. Again, however, the Sofia meeting was probably devoted more to the coordination of Warsaw Pact policy towards West Germany than to the ESC project. Only in June 1970, when bilateral West German-Soviet and West German-Polish agreements seemed within reach and after two meetings between Brandt and East German Premier Stoph, did the Warsaw Pact again turn its full attention to the ESC.

Mobilization of Western Public Opinion

Parallel to the diplomatic and declamatory initiatives traced above, the Warsaw Pact followed up the Budapest Appeal with efforts to favorably influence Western European public opinion toward the European security campaign -- a toned-down revival of the Karlovy Vary approach (see pp. 13 ff., above).

In mid-1969, the European security campaign was revived within the World Peace Council, and the preparations for a public conference on

*Subsequent Warsaw Pact commentaries again explicitly endorsed bilateral preparations for an ESC.
"European security," begun after the Karlovy Vary meeting but halted because of the Czechoslovak crisis, were resumed. The conference finally met at the end of November 1969 in Vienna, under the sponsorship of M. Landilliotte, Chairman of the Belgium-Soviet Friendship Society. The pro-Soviet character of the conference was evident from its communiqué, which demanded recognition of all existing European frontiers and international legal recognition of the GDR by all states; appealed vaguely for an end to the division of Europe into military groupings; called on all states to ratify the NPT without reservation; and appealed for pan-European economic cooperation without discrimination.

The Vienna conference -- deprecated by a Yugoslav leader as "a largely manifestational gathering of the ideologically like-minded" -- was explicitly interpreted in Warsaw Pact commentaries as aiming to mobilize Western European public opinion for the European security campaign. As the Moscow New Times saw it, the Western European governments and parliaments were under pressure to continue the Cold War and the arms race. "That pressure can be neutralized only by the force of public opinion, by the counterpressure of the masses." The convening of numerous specialized all-European gatherings, including an all-European conference of trade unions and an all-European parliamentary conference, was proposed with this goal in view.

Moscow continued to view the Western European Communist parties as essential in creating a political climate favorable to the Warsaw Pact's European security campaign in Western Europe. This had been demonstrated at the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties, which the USSR succeeded in convening, after innumerable delays, in June 1969, as part of an effort to bolster its authority over Peking within the Communist movement. There, many of the "agit-prop" themes of the Karlovy Vary document were reasserted. West Germany was denounced in harsh terms, and the "sovereign rights" of the European peoples were defended against "interference from the USA." In contrast with the Warsaw Pact's European security diplomatic campaign, the proposed ESC received rather pro forma endorsement; the conference (like the Karlovy Vary meeting) stressed instead the role of Communist parties in promoting a "broad conference of European peoples," for which the November 1969 Vienna conference presumably would serve as a stepping stone.
The importance placed by the Soviet leadership on such a "popular" conference and on the activities of the Western European Communist parties in the European security campaign in general was demonstrated once again by the secretive meeting of twenty-eight European Communist parties in Moscow on January 14-15, 1970. The surprise of the meeting was the participation of two Yugoslav Party representatives, who came, however, not because they suddenly subscribed to Soviet conceptions of the desirable future of Europe, but to argue for their own (much more genuinely pan-European) conceptions, for which they counted on support from the Rumanian and several Western European parties. Yugoslav participation had the effect of diluting the intended secrecy of the gathering; the speech of D. Belovski, the chief Yugoslav representative (the only speech published), indicated that the main topic of discussion in Moscow was a future congress of European "peoples" -- a large-scale repetition of the Vienna conference -- as the "popular" complement to a governmental ESC. The nature of the congress advocated by the Soviet-dominated majority at the Moscow meeting can be surmised from the objections raised by Belovski, who insisted that such a congress, unlike the November Vienna meeting, should be broadly based, attracting representatives of varied ideological outlooks and issuing no propagandistic "conclusions." This view was reportedly endorsed by the British, Italian, Swedish, Spanish, Norwegian (and, it may be assumed, the Rumanian) parties.

Efforts to convene a large-scale sequel to the Vienna conference were continued in 1970. Warsaw Pact sources began to emphasize the importance of the broad character of such a meeting; Radio Prague went so far as to suggest that it would be broader than the Popular Front movement of the 1930s. Even if they could make the effort, however, it is highly doubtful that the Western European Communists would encounter today a corresponding receptiveness among non-Communist leftists.

The Substance of the ESC Proposal, Early 1970

Examination of the many unofficial Warsaw Pact interpretations of the European security campaign sheds additional light on its substance as of early 1970.
For the United States and all Western European governments (with the partial exception of France), it was either pointless or dangerous to discuss new security arrangements for Europe without assuming the unconditional participation of the United States, the Western superpower upon which the postwar European balance of power has rested. Yet, as was true of the Warsaw Pact’s pre-1969 European security initiatives, the Budapest Appeal was addressed only to European states, clearly implying that European security was only their concern. Between March and October 1969, the prevailing Warsaw Pact declaratory position was that articulated by Kosygin in June 1968: American participation in an ESC was a matter for the European states themselves to decide, perhaps at a preparatory conference which the United States would not attend. In the words of the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, “The European countries themselves should discuss this point and consider on which questions and to what extent these non-European countries could take part.”

Simultaneously, however, there were Warsaw Pact signals that U.S. participation in an ESC was not an impossibility. These often took the form of the factual reporting of Western European statements that assumed U.S. participation. Occasionally, the possibility of U.S. participation was directly granted. Even then, however, an effort was made to distinguish the status of the United States from that of the European states. As a Czechoslovak publicist put it, “there is obviously a difference between the self-evident participation of the European states — the GDR as well as the German Federal Republic — and the question of the participation of the overseas states.”

All this does not mean that the Warsaw Pact ever seriously expected that a conference dealing with the security of Europe could be convened without the participation of the United States; rather, it seems to have been simultaneously a deliberately obscure position intended to promote the image of Europe as a region distinct from North America (yet stretching to Vladivostok) and a statement of a maximum position which, under the most favorable circumstances, might permit the convening of a preparatory conference without U.S. attendance.

As Soviet bloc representatives promoted the ESC in the spring and summer of 1969, however, they encountered solid insistence by Western
Europeans on American (as well as Canadian) participation in any such conference. It was perhaps the consistency of this response that explains why the Prague foreign ministers conference in late October affirmed that the U.S. participation issue "can be solved," and why Warsaw Pact commentaries even went so far as to make "no objection" to American participation. Now the question was often posed, however, whether the United States was really interested.\textsuperscript{91}

Still, this shift did not fully satisfy NATO, which sought from the Warsaw Pact formal, explicit recognition that (as stated in the communique of the December 1969 meeting of the NATO foreign ministers) the United States would "of course" participate in any ESC.\textsuperscript{92} This united position again evidently led the Warsaw Pact to take another public step toward accepting full U.S. participation. Addressing a press conference in Moscow on January 13, 1970, V. Zamiatin, head of the press department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, indicated that the Soviet Union had taken "a favorable attitude" toward U.S. participation and that this view had been expressed in Washington by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in November 1969.\textsuperscript{93} Later, though the participation of the United States was welcomed, it was apparent that the U.S. would be treated as an outsider.\textsuperscript{94}

The Agenda and Procedural Matters

The prospective multilateral renunciation-of-force agreement, first proposed in the 1967 Karlovy Vary Statement, was a refurbishment of an old Soviet project, a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, broadened, in the two-point agenda proposed by the Prague foreign ministers conference, to include the neutral European states. Like prospective bilateral agreements between West Germany and individual Warsaw Pact states, that agreement represented but a vessel to be filled; apart from the reported draft prepared at Prague, few additional public clues were given as to its intended substance. Soviet spokesmen did repeatedly reject NATO’s insistence that any pan-European pledge on non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states apply, "whatever their political or social system"; the Soviets held the Brezhnev Doctrine of the "mutual assistance" of socialist states to be inviolable.\textsuperscript{95}
The second agenda point proposed at the Prague meeting, pan-European economic cooperation, had always been one element of the European security campaign, but greater emphasis was placed on economic "pan-Europeanism" in 1969-70 than before.96 The standard themes of expanded trade and scientific-technical cooperation were now supplemented by the blandishment of dramatic Europe-wide infrastructural projects. Western Europe was promised that all-European economic cooperation would foster political cooperation with the East and enable greater economic independence from the United States, allowing Western Europe to overcome the "technological gap."97 This aspect of the European security campaign was stressed by Soviet bloc representatives in the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, an institution in which the Warsaw Pact placed great hopes for helping along pan-European economic cooperation once East Germany was admitted to membership.98

Spokesmen in the USSR's client states took pains to claim that the Prague agenda reflected Western desires as expressed in preliminary diplomatic contacts, but was not to be considered a closed list; the Warsaw Pact's "list" of possible topics for discussion was allegedly as long as that suggested by NATO, and Warsaw Pact spokesmen promised that all NATO counter-suggestions would be studied.99 Yet both the USSR and its clients were careful to exclude the German issue, including Berlin, as a subject of discussion at an ESC. They usually justified the exclusion by saying that the problem was too "big" and "complex" and that, in any case, it fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Potsdam signatory powers100 -- the latter contention reinforced by Soviet participation in the Four Power talks on Berlin that began in the spring of 1970. At the same time, of course, the USSR, Poland, and East Germany pursued bilateral political talks with Bonn.

In contrast to their unity in excluding the German issue, Warsaw Pact states differed significantly over whether regional arms control and disarmament measures should be discussed at an ESC or at other forums. Poland was apparently the chief proponent within the Warsaw Pact of discussing the matter at an initial ESC, and seems to have actively lobbied in Warsaw Pact councils to this end. Having suggested even prior to the March 1969 Budapest conference that the earlier Polish proposals for
regional disarmament measures in Europe retained their relevance, Poland placed new stress on the issue following the Budapest Appeal through its delegate to the U.N. Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. 101 This prospective third agenda point for an ESC was subsequently incorporated in a Polish draft European security treaty which, however -- as publicly described by Polish officials -- limited itself to pledges of "mutually agreed," "partial," "regional" disarmament measures in Europe. 102 Interpretations of this section of the draft treaty were little more revealing; Polish officials publicly were unwilling to go further than to reassert the continued relevance of the Rapacki and Gomulka plans for a nuclear weapons freeze or a denuclearized zone in Central Europe and to speak of the desirability of a regional complement to the NPT. 103 The proposals on reduction of conventional forces in the unofficial Polish European security memorandum of May 1968 now were passed over in silence. Even though the Polish proposals were not accepted at the Prague meeting, Polish spokesmen nevertheless continued to emphasize the importance of regional arms control and disarmament for European security. 104 In so doing, they generally refrained from linking the issue with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the USSR. 105

Rumania generally avoided public discussion of specific additional agenda points for an ESC, but in Warsaw Pact councils it stressed, even more strongly than Poland, the importance to European security of regional disarmament measures relating to conventional forces as well as nuclear weapons. The initial official Rumanian endorsement of the Budapest Appeal, a joint resolution of the State Council and the Council of Ministers, invoked the disarmament proposals in the 1966 Bucharest Declaration and declared that the proper climate for convening an ESC would be created by putting an end to all demonstrations of force, "including military maneuvers on foreign territory or at the frontiers of foreign states."106 During 1969, Rumanian spokesmen explicitly and repeatedly renewed all the disarmament proposals of the Bucharest Declaration, including a regional limitation on nuclear weapons, the liquidation of foreign military bases, and the withdrawal of all armed forces stationed in Europe to within their national frontiers. 107 In 1970, these proposals were incorporated in a major Rumanian initiative (which also called for
a limitation on national defense budgets) at the Geneva meetings of the
U.N. Committee on Disarmament.

As for other Warsaw Pact states, up to mid-1970, the GDR endorsed
discussion of regional disarmament at an ESC until the Prague meeting,
but not thereafter; it later proposed bilateral disarmament measures
in its draft treaty with West Germany. Hungarian paid lip service to
the subject both before and after Prague, but Soviet (along with
Czechoslovak and Bulgarian) spokesmen almost totally ignored the subject.
This suggests that, prior to the Prague meeting, the USSR, though clearly
not interested in the discussion of regional disarmament at an ESC, had
not yet adopted the negative position it assumed at Prague. After the
Prague meeting, the standard Soviet position was that discussion of
disarmament measures did not belong on the agenda of an ESC, but rather
should be discussed at the U.N. Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.
Nevertheless, at that forum, the USSR displayed a conspicuous lack of
interest in regional disarmament. At the same time, the USSR did not
enforce a total prohibition on raising the subject by other Warsaw Pact
member states.

These differences notwithstanding, the Warsaw Pact was united in
publicly deprecating Western suggestions for an agreement on the mutual,
balanced reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe -- the sub-
ject, along with the German issue, of greatest interest to NATO in nego-
tiations with the Soviet bloc on the future of Europe. The Soviet posi-
tion was that NATO, especially the United States, had raised the issue
to torpedo the ESC project and other pan-European arrangements. When
the Soviets took it at all seriously, they dismissed the suggestion of
negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR) as "too complex"
for consideration at an ESC and, in any case, a matter of concern only
to the two military alliances that had to be related to larger disarma-
ment issues. In general, however, the Soviets considered the very
concept of a "balanced" reduction of forces politically meaningless --
"after all, the Americans came to Europe, and not the other way around"
-- and they rejected the suggestion of such negotiations as either "pure
bluff" or a "trick" intended to compensate for pending unilateral re-
duction of U.S. forces in Europe due to domestic political and balance-
of-payment considerations.

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Poland, in advocating discussion of regional disarmament measures at an ESC, was clearly not proposing discussion of mutual (let alone balanced) reduction of military forces. Taking issue with The New York Times in April 1969, a prominent Polish commentator maintained that the only Soviet equivalent to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe would be the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Boston. At the time of the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels in December 1969, Polish commentators insisted that NATO was not ready seriously to discuss its own proposal of a balanced reduction of forces (interpreted then to mean proportional reduction of conventional forces and limitation of tactical nuclear weapons) and that, in any case, the proposal was "exclusively calculated to have a propaganda effect." Similar views were expressed in other Warsaw Pact countries; not even Rumania, while in fact advocating withdrawal of both U.S. forces from Western Europe and Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, showed any public receptivity to the NATO MBFR concept. Only in June 1970 did the Warsaw Pact publicly seem to grant that the subject of troop reductions in Europe might be related to improvements in the continent's security arrangements; the significance of that apparent shift of position is appraised below.

Regarding procedural matters, Warsaw Pact comments on the timing of the proposed ESC after the Budapest Appeal were rather indefinite; according to Aleksander Dubcek (then still head of the Czechoslovak Party), the conference would meet "later or later." Later, there were indications that a gestation period of a year or a year and a half was envisaged. The Prague foreign ministers conference suggested that an ESC "could" meet in the first half of 1970. After NATO showed its coolness toward the project in December, Soviet bloc spokesmen again became more vague on the timing, suggesting in the spring of 1970 that an ESC could still be held in 1970, but that many obstacles would have to be overcome. The Warsaw Pact's proposed timetable for an ESC seemed to be a function of its perception of the receptiveness in the West to the European security campaign.

Until shortly before the Prague foreign ministers conference, most sources endorsed the idea of a preparatory conference suggested in the Budapest Appeal. In May 1969, reviving Rapacki's suggestion of December
1964, Poland apparently proposed a preparatory conference restricted to
six or three states, but this proposal -- which surely would have meant
the exclusion of both the United States and East Germany -- was withdrawn. At Prague, no mention was made of a preparatory conference; subsequently, the emphasis (except by East Germany) was on bilateral preparatory con-
tacts. The significance of this for Warsaw Pact policy toward the new
West German government has been indicated above.

As for the intended outcome of an ESC, the Prague meeting reportedly endorsed two draft agreements on renunciation of force and economic coopera-
tion as suitable products of an ESC. Poland had expected the ESC to produce
a more formal and comprehensive European Security Treaty.* Soon after
the Budapest meeting the Polish Foreign Ministry apparently worked out
a draft treaty, circulated it among European governments, and presented
it to the Prague foreign ministers conference in October, which evidently
did not accept it. As described by Foreign Minister Jedrychowski and
Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz, the draft Polish treaty contained three
main chapters: (1) A renunciation-of-force agreement coupled with pledges
to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of
all other states; to recognize existing state frontiers in Europe; to
refrain from interference in the internal affairs of any other state;
and to settle any disputes exclusively by political means. A passage
approving of the role of the neutral states in European affairs was ap-
parently also contemplated. (2) An appeal for the development of economic,
scientific, technological and cultural relations on the basis of non-
discrimination. (3) Partial regional disarmament measures (see pp.
33f.). Aside from its comprehensiveness, this Polish draft treaty thus differed
from the drafts reportedly endorsed at Prague in advocating discussion
of regional disarmament measures and improved cultural relations.

Towards a "European Security System"

After the ESC project was revived at the March 1969 Budapest meeting,
it was usually treated in the West as a one-shot affair. In fact, however,

* East German and Hungarian sources originally also made vague re-
ferences to the adoption of a "treaty" by an ESC, but the USSR and its other
allies did not speculate on the form of an ESC's outcome.
although initially the Warsaw Pact sources concentrated on a single ESC, the Warsaw Pact always regarded it as only one part of the broader European security campaign, as a useful way to initiate "a broad front of political and economic dialogue" on European issues. In early 1970, as the Warsaw Pact perceived its emphasis on a single ESC to be counterproductive, the campaign changed to reflect the larger process that the ESC was intended to symbolize. Now it was granted that an initial ESC should be followed by all-European conferences which in time could be institutionalized in a regional organization. One authoritative Polish spokesman wrote that such an institutionalized ESC would necessarily develop its own organs, a secretariat or European Security Council.

It was thought in the Warsaw Pact that an institutionalized ESC would contribute to the emergence of a new arrangement of interstate relations in Europe, a "European security system." Although Soviet bloc leaders, publicists, and theoreticians alike were quick to criticize the various models of a future Europe elaborated by Western international relations theorists, they refrained from giving much insight to the desired content of their "system." Their goal, it was made clear, was not to tinker with the military balance in Europe but rather to supersede the confrontation of Soviet and American military forces in Europe with new, all-European political arrangements. It was also made clear that such a system presupposed Western legitimization of the Eastern European "status quo" -- the "postwar realities" -- including full satisfaction by West Germany of the long-standing demands relating to European borders, East Germany, and the status of Berlin. If the military confrontation in Europe was viewed as artificial, the "social and political" division of the continent was "historically irreversible." Occasionally, Soviet bloc spokesmen referred to a mechanism -- the institutionalized ESC, supplemented perhaps by an interlocking network of pan-European bilateral and multilateral treaties -- to insure the equilibrium of the system. Yet while it was promised that such a system would guarantee the "rightful demands of all European countries," the fragmentary interpretations of how the equilibrating mechanism would operate expressed concern only for the stability of the "socialist states"
On the other hand, it was suggested that until the present "bloc" division of Europe were overcome, such a security system could contain a dynamic West Germany in the 1970s and should include a greater number of neutral states (these would have to be defectors from NATO, since "socialist neutrality" was viewed as an impossibility). An East German expert cautioned, further, that such a system would not mean an idyll of class peace, but merely would permit the struggle between the two social systems in Europe to be waged peacefully. Apart from these vague hints, however, the projected "European security system" remained an empty vessel. Propagandistically, this lack of substance was no doubt intentional: the system was, after all, a matter for Europeans to decide.

Budapest Again: The June 1970 Memorandum

Fifteen months after the issuing of the Budapest Appeal, the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers returned to the Hungarian capital to launch a new initiative in the European security campaign. A month previously, the NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Rome, had (in a compromise formulation) announced their willingness, "in so far as progress is recorded" in ongoing talks on Germany, Berlin, and other issues, "to explore when it will be possible to convene a conference, or a series of conferences on European security and cooperation." In a separate declaration, the NATO ministers except the one from France suggested "exploratory talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, with special reference to the Central Region," specifying further that such reductions should include "stationed and indigenous forces and their weapons systems in the area concerned." The initial, perhaps reflex, response of the Warsaw Pact member states to the NATO announcement from Rome was strongly negative, calling the MBFR proposal a "ruse," a "propaganda trick," and a "moth-eaten idea." Later, the response was slightly more positive; the USSR and some of its allies, while still roundly condemning the NATO position, allowed that it revealed both the need of the NATO alliance to come to terms with
public support in Western Europe for an ESC and the influence of the more realistic views of France and smaller NATO member states.\textsuperscript{139}

Though the Warsaw Pact could thus interpret the Rome NATO meeting as indicating that its ESC project was gaining ground, it was confronted with the strong restatement -- at the Rome meeting, as in bilateral contacts in the months before it -- of the NATO view that an East-West European dialogue could not ignore the military dimension of European security, the German issue, or the barriers raised by the Soviet bloc to the free movement of men and ideas throughout Europe. Hence, if the perceived momentum that the European security campaign had gathered was not to be lost, the Warsaw Pact would have to make at least verbal concessions to the NATO viewpoint. At the same time, progress toward limited agreements in at least the Soviet and Polish bilateral talks with Bonn allowed Warsaw Pact leaders to devote more attention to European security initiatives. In this new climate it may be speculated, aspects of the formerly deviant Rumanian and Polish positions were now accepted by the Soviet Union and endorsed as common Warsaw Pact policy.

The foregoing may explain the shift in the Warsaw Pact's public posture on several features of the ESC proposal at the June 1970 Budapest foreign ministers meeting. Both the communiqué and the Memorandum on European security adopted there sought to give urgency to the need for convening an ESC, maintaining that while bilateral contacts would continue, it was time to pass on to multilateral preparatory meetings at which all interested states should participate.\textsuperscript{140}

At the same time, concessions were made to NATO viewpoints.\textsuperscript{141} First, the Warsaw Pact finally ceased its public fudging on U.S. and Canadian participation in an ESC: both states "can take part." Second, the topic of expanding pan-European cultural ties (as well as collective measures to improve Europe's physical environment) was now appended to the proposals for increasing pan-European economic and scientific cooperation contained in the second point of the Prague agenda. Third, earlier Rumanian and Polish suggestions for permanent regional institutions were now incorporated in a proposal to establish a permanent European security commission, although it was emphasized that this could occur only at, not prior to, an ESC.\textsuperscript{142} Soviet interpretations continued
explicitly to anticipate a whole series of European-wide conferences. \textsuperscript{144} Fourth, and potentially most significant, the Memorandum stated that such a permanent organ could consider "reducing foreign armed forces on the territory of the European states."

These concessions to the NATO viewpoint were significant, but their importance should not be overrated. Other key elements of the European security campaign remained unchanged. The Warsaw Pact still aimed at furthering its objectives in Western Europe by manipulating West European public opinion; it still hoped to convene a popular "congress of European nations."\textsuperscript{145} The notion of a future European security system remained without substance. The proposed permanent European security organ likewise followed logically from the Warsaw Pact's view of the European security campaign as a long-term political effort.

Though, as was described above, the Warsaw Pact succumbed, under the pressure of nearly unanimous Western European opinion, to giving formal public acceptance of U.S. and Canadian participation in an ESC, the wording of both the June 1970 Memorandum and Warsaw Pact commentaries on it implied that acceptance was grudging. The proposed ESC continued to be described as an instrument of anti-American goals, and an authoritative Soviet bloc spokesman had yet to view U.S. participation in an ESC as emanating from its necessary role in a future European security system.\textsuperscript{146} The new stand on the development of European cultural ties, too, occurred under the pressure of a firm Western position. But it is doubtful that the gap between NATO and Warsaw Pact positions narrowed very much, for that would have implied acceptance by the Soviet bloc, not just of more "cultural exchanges," but of greater freedom for the circulation of men, information, and ideas throughout the continent.

Given the Warsaw Pact's adamant refusal prior to the June 1970 Budapest meeting to allow consideration of regional arms control measures in any form, the fourth concession to the NATO viewpoint suggests that the Soviet leadership -- pressured by Rumania and Poland -- found itself very much on the defensive with reference to the European security campaign after the NATO Rome meeting. At this writing, it is too early to offer a full interpretation of this shift in position. Yet there are
several reasons for extreme caution in interpreting the shift as a signal that the Warsaw Pact was seriously interested in exploring mutual balanced force reductions in Europe. The June 1970 Budapest Memorandum agreed to discussions on troop reductions only after, not at, an ESC. And "troop reductions" were clearly distinguished from the MBFR concept; Soviet and other East European commentators scoffed at NATO's asymmetrical models for mutual force reductions and emphasized that the June 1970 Memorandum referred only to foreign, not indigenous, armed forces. Most important, it was not at all clear that the armed forces of the USSR, a "European" power, were meant to be included in the category of "foreign" troops.

* The formula of the 1970 Memorandum was not like that of the 1966 Bucharest Declaration ("withdrawal of all military forces to within national frontiers," which, taken at face value, clearly applied to Soviet troops) but was like that of the strongly anti-American 1967 Karlovy Vary Statement (with the difference that the 1970 version spoke of the "reduction" instead of the "withdrawal" of foreign troops). If the "territory of the European states" was taken to mean "Europe," then Soviet troops were not necessarily "foreign." Subsequent Warsaw Pact commentaries on the 1970 Memorandum supported this interpretation; authoritative Rumanian commentaries continued to use the 1966 formula, and less authoritative commentaries from the USSR and its "hard-line" allies specified reducing "foreign" troops in "Europe."
IV. "EUROPEAN SECURITY": WARSAW PACT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND INTERNAL POLITICS

THIS SECTION explores the motives of the Warsaw Pact in pursuing a European Security Conference, as part of its European security campaign, and the cohesive and divisive effects of that campaign on the Warsaw Pact.

Soviet Objectives

The motives underlying the ESC project were chiefly related to European problems, not Asian ones. It has been asserted that the European security campaign represented a Soviet attempt to stabilize its Western flank so that it might be able to concentrate on the "Chinese danger" in the immediate future. This argument is not tenable mainly because Europe is simply too important to the Soviet Union for Soviet policy toward Europe to be viewed as a dependent variable. In any case, the Sino-Soviet conflict did not restrain the USSR from involving itself in a major way, for the first time in its history, in the Middle East. It is difficult to argue that the Sino-Soviet conflict has simultaneously exerted a major inhibiting influence on Soviet actions in Europe. However, a different linkage between the Chinese challenge and Soviet European policy could be postulated. Faced with the prospect of adjusting to a tri-polar world in the 1980s, the Soviet leadership may feel a special urgency about achieving its aims in Europe in the 1970s. This does not imply "concessions"; quite the contrary. Any "rotten compromises" in Europe today could become fatal liabilities to the USSR in the more complex international arena of tomorrow.
What, then, are the specifically European determinants of the pan-European strategy revived by the Soviet Union so soon after the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 caused the Warsaw Pact to mount a hysterical campaign against the dangers of Western-inspired counterrevolution in Eastern Europe? One factor, surely, was the Soviet desire to polish its tarnished image after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and to gain the political initiative in Western Europe after being thrown on the defensive in 1968. Hence the only apparent absurdity of a proposal of an all-European renunciation-of-force agreement by an alliance, five members of which had only six months before occupied a sixth member. Western participation in such an agreement so soon after Czechoslovakia, especially one that could be interpreted as sanctifying the Brezhnev Doctrine, could be used by the Warsaw Pact to justify its claim that it did not "intervene" in Czechoslovak affairs in 1968. This could serve as an international complement to the enforced formal reversal of the position of a multitude of Czechoslovak institutions on the matter in 1969-70.

More important, however, was the aim of preventing new "Czecho-slovakias." The leaders (and a large segment of the political elites) of the Warsaw Pact member states (except Rumania) were convinced that Czechoslovakia in 1968, far from having attempted to democratize "socialism" in line with the national aspirations of the Czech and Slovak peoples, had suffered another attack of Western-inspired counterrevolution, no matter how nonviolent in form. In the light of this conviction, the European security campaign revived in 1969 may be seen as an attempt to prevent a recurrence of the Czechoslovak crisis by obtaining formal Western acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the status quo in Eastern Europe.

The "status quo" -- the "results of World War II" in Communist parlance -- is an ideological notion. The USSR and its East European allies remain vitally interested, to be sure, in formal Western (and especially West German) acceptance of the postwar European borders and recognition of the East German state and regime. (The latter aim is to be furthered by the full-fledged participation of the GDR in an ESC and in the proposed multilateral renunciation-of-force agreement.) An
ESC is also intended to make Western Europe more willing to accept the other standard territorial-political "prerequisites of European security" -- recognition of borders, recognition of the invalidity of the Munich Agreement of 1938 ab initio, and recognition of the separate status of West Berlin. But the ultimate aim is to secure formal Western acceptance of the legitimacy of the current Communist political system in Eastern Europe and thus to rule out repetition of such upheavals as the East German uprising of 1953, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and the "Czechoslovak Spring" of 1968. This cause-effect relationship is not rhetorical; it remains a premise of the Soviet and East European Communist leaderships that significant "anti-socialist" forces cannot develop in a Communist country without outside support. Nor is it a question of an unintended Western spillover effect; counterrevolution, whether violent or "creeping," can only be consciously Western-inspired and supported. Sincere Western acceptance of the ideological-political status quo would thus mean that future anti-regime currents in any of the Warsaw Pact member states would be of manageable proportions.

In the meantime, the "subversive" aspects of Western culture have to be neutralized. Hence the lack of interest, in promoting pan-Europeanism, in encouraging East-West European cultural ties. The Prague agenda excluded the expansion of European cultural relations. Warsaw Pact commentators also regularly denied the validity of an "all-European culture" and warned that Western culture "is also ideology," which, though it cannot be rejected outright, must be approached with special vigilance, with "an appropriate filter system." The June 1970 Memorandum's willingness to discuss the expansion of European cultural ties seemed a bow to NATO's views, but it did not signify a real change of outlook. Also, as discussed below, the Warsaw Pact itself has become more important by virtue of its function of preserving Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Hence the absence of earlier appeals for dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the 1969 version of the European security campaign. Revival of the ESC project at Budapest could also have served as a political pendant to the military decisions adopted there, a sign of the Warsaw Pact's continued "peaceful" and "defensive" nature.
Yet in seeking Western legitimization of the ideological-political status quo in Eastern Europe, the Soviets intend not only to halt disruptive external influences in its Eastern European client states. Europe remains divided at the Elbe, but Soviet policy towards Europe cannot so neatly be divided into "defensive Eastern" and "offensive Western" components. The Soviets also intend for Western legitimization of the Eastern European status quo to impinge on the Atlantic relationship between Western Europe and the United States, strengthening Western Europeans' perception of the strength of "socialism" and Soviet power in "Europe." This would reinforce more "offensive" foreign policy efforts to expand Soviet political influence while reducing American influence in the Western half of the European continent, with the aim of significantly shifting the global balance of power in the Soviet favor.

The Soviet Union's pursuit of these long-standing goals in Europe was affected in 1969-70 by two new developments. On the negative side, from Moscow's point of view, the invasion of Czechoslovakia temporarily reduced divisive strains within NATO and ended the possibility of defections from that alliance in 1969. The Budapest Appeal was explicitly intended to reverse that development. On the positive side, Moscow could view its goals in Europe as being furthered indirectly by the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, perceived as formal American acknowledgment that the USSR had "caught up" with the United States in strategic weapons. The Soviet-American talks may further the aim of the European security campaign to undermine the Atlantic community of interests by causing Western Europeans to question the reliability

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Substantiation of these assertions is not possible within the scope of this study, but they are supported by the pre-1968 history of the Warsaw Pact European security campaign, as recounted in Section II, and by the record of the recent phase of that campaign, discussed in Section III: e.g., the initial silence on and then reluctant and qualified public acceptance of U.S. participation in an ESC; the silence on the U.S. role in the desired European security system; and the continued barrage of anti-NATO and anti-American interpretations of the ESC project. As it was put on one occasion for a Soviet audience, "The idea of an all-European conference contains a great number of positive factors that would improve matters in Europe and would rid many [West] European countries ... of American influence." Although the theme is played down, the Soviets are convinced that Western European states will find it necessary for their security to change their political systems toward "socialism."
of the American nuclear deterrent and thus be more inclined to look to Moscow for new security arrangements. At the same time, it cannot be excluded that in the future Soviet leaders may attempt to exploit the new global strategic relationship to effect desired political changes in Western Europe by direct military pressure.\textsuperscript{155}

It is true that in the present phase of the European security campaign anti-Americanism has been softened. The German issue was excluded from the proposed ESC agenda by invoking the Potsdam Agreement while Four Power talks on Berlin were being pursued. Yet it would be a misleading projection of Western assumptions (and a false representation of Moscow's view of the German "threat") to deduce that Soviet leaders believe that Soviet interests require a modicum of stability in Europe (especially, the "leasing" of West Germany) that only a high level of U.S. influence can assure.\textsuperscript{**} No doubt Moscow appreciates the role the United States plays in moderating certain crises, e.g., in Berlin, where in any case U.S. authority is a fact of life. That Warsaw Pact statesmen frequently invoke the Potsdam Agreement cannot be interpreted, however, as an acknowledgment of common Four Power responsibility for resolution of the German issue and thus legitimation of a long-term American role in Europe. Today, as in the past, when the Potsdam Agreement is cited, the usual emphasis is not on the responsibilities of the signatory powers but on their obligations to carry out sociopolitical changes in postwar Germany -- obligations held to have been long since carried out in East Germany, with its transformation into a "socialist" state, but still unfulfilled in West Germany.\textsuperscript{157} Potsdam thus offered a credible

\textsuperscript{*} Especially since the main Soviet strategic threat to Western Europe, the IR and MLBMs on the western borders of the USSR, had to be excluded from the deliberations.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{**} As Pierre Hassner has written, "For twenty years the Soviets have ... regarded Western frameworks and organizations, not as safeguards against Germany but as vehicles for her influence.... The world would surely be a safer place if America's political rivals regarded the American presence as a desirable means of protecting them against other, less powerful rivals. The trouble is that they don't." A Czech publicist recently refuted the "leasing" thesis.\textsuperscript{136}
excuse for excluding the German issue from the proposed LSC while simultaneously reasserting the Soviet position and freeing the USSR to exploit bilateral contacts with West Germany to advance its own solution of the German problem.

Because recent Soviet policy toward West Germany is closely linked to the post-1968 European security campaign, a brief digression is in order here to outline that policy. As the Czechoslovak crisis developed in the spring of 1968, Soviet relations with West Germany worsened; existing contacts were broken off and Bonn was considered the fomenter of "counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia. But soon after August 21, the Soviets renewed and expanded contacts, which puzzled those elsewhere in Eastern Europe, as in the West, as to Soviet motives. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko sought out Foreign Minister Brandt at the U.N. in October 1968; at the end of the year Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin returned to Bonn and called for better relations; Tsarapkin took the unusual step of briefing the West German government on the March 1969 Sino-Soviet border clash; Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev visited Bonn to initiate negotiations for an agreement on a large-scale natural gas pipeline (concluded in February 1970); leaders of the Free Democratic and Social Democratic parties visited Moscow; and Gromyko adopted a more conciliatory public position on Berlin. On the ideological level, the Soviets partly disavowed the Comintern's denunciation of social democracy in the early 1930s as "social fascism." Most important, contacts were renewed on a renunciation-of-force agreement. These contacts, which led to an extended series of diplomatic conversations in Moscow in spring 1970, resulted in a bilateral non-aggression treaty that was signed by Brandt and Kosygin in Moscow on August 12, 1970. In the treaty, the FRG symbolically renounced the use of force in international relations and (with a nod to residual Allied rights in the matter) recognized postwar territorial boundaries (but not, de jure, the East German regime). The USSR implicitly abandoned its residual right to intervene in West German affairs under the "enemy states" clause of the U.N. Charter and tacitly acknowledged that the question of German self-determination had not necessarily been settled for all time.
These developments indicated an activist Soviet posture towards West Germany last seen (and then, inconclusively) only in the final days of Khrushchev's rule. Both times the more offensive policy was presumably intended not only to influence West Germany to acknowledge the territorial-political status quo in Eastern Europe, but also to increase Soviet political influence in West Germany at the expense of U.S. influence. One sign of the latter was the Soviet revival of the "Rapallo" gambit, hinting that it was the USSR, not the United States, that could help West Germany become a "peaceful big power" in Europe in the 1970s. This did, however, remain subordinate to the Soviet effort to influence the West German attitude towards East Europe. Should Moscow seriously attempt to replace the United States as the dominant superpower influence in West Germany, the chances of success seem slim indeed. Quite apart from West Germany's Western orientation, with the successful consolidation of East Germany, the USSR would seem to have lost the trump it once -- in 1952-1953 -- might have been willing to play. The enforced liquidation of a full-fledged Communist ally is probably not, in the absence of a total transformation of the Soviet political system, an option for any Soviet leadership, no matter what the stakes from the perspective of Realpolitik. On the other hand, even marginal concessions to West Germany on, say, the Polish Western border, would have the most serious disruptive repercussions within the Soviet orbit. Yet this does not exclude the present or a future Soviet leadership's trying to square the circle.

Though the USSR does not, in any case, welcome American influence in Western Europe as a counterweight to West German ambitions, it seems equally reluctant to accept a united Western Europe as a counterweight to the United States. Soviet antipathy toward Western European integration has grown and has had a major influence on the post-1968 phase of the European security campaign. At first, after the formation of the EEC, the Soviet bloc dismissed the effort as an economically insignificant instrument by which the United States sought to perpetuate its political domination of Western Europe. "Life itself" soon caused that simplistic view to be abandoned, however, and in the early 1960s the economic achievements of the EEC began reluctantly to be granted.
At the same time, Western Europe's greater self-assertiveness within NATO and in the world at large led the Soviet bloc to believe that the EEC had begun to exacerbate "inter-imperialist contradictions" -- between the United States and Western Europe and within Western Europe, with the appraisal of the balance of these contradictions fluctuating with the events of the day and yet always somewhat ambiguous. 161

Thus did the Soviets appraise Western European economic integration through the 1960s. At the Moscow conference on European security in April 1968, for example, views were divided on the extent to which Western Europe occupied a separate position within the "imperialist camp," but even those participants (like N. Inozemtsev) who maintained that Europe had indeed become more independent of the United States also pointed to the negative content of this "imperialist, anti-socialist, and anti-democratic . . . Europeanism," which sought to detach Eastern Europe from the USSR with the slogan "Europe from Brest to Brest." 162

In 1969, however, Soviet bloc elites grew increasingly concerned about efforts at Western European integration. Their alarm was engendered by three developments. First, the Czechoslovak crisis had produced a heightened sensitivity to the attraction of Western Europe for broad segments of the population in the Eastern European countries. Second, the rate of economic growth in the Warsaw Pact member states slowed, and the technology gap between the Warsaw Pact states and the advanced Western industrial states widened. Eastern European and Soviet elites became more aware of the need to overcome the barriers created by the EEC in order to expand trade with Western Europe (machinery exports in particular) and to obtain Western credits and access to Western technology. 163 Third, Western European economic integration itself increased momentum in the wake of de Gaulle's retirement. As the separate European communities (the EEC, the Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom) were merged into the European Communities (EC), prospects heightened for the admission of Great Britain and other new members; agreement was reached on common agricultural policies; and the accrual of joint revenues to the EC was projected for 1971. Limitations on bilateral trade agreements between members and nonmembers were agreed upon, with the achievement of a common commercial policy toward nonmembers having state plans a future possibility. 164
In 1969, therefore, the Soviet Union, especially, began to place greater emphasis on the role of the EC in reconciling national conflicts at the state level than on its role in increasing "inter-imperialist contradictions" in Europe. In the words of one Soviet specialist, "It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of the EEC as a mechanism for coordinating the policies of the six [member] states on an ever-broader circle of questions." The danger of West German domination of the EC was still routinely asserted, but even at the more propagandistic level, it was frequently maintained that Bonn's ambitions might be frustrated -- for example, by the entry of Great Britain. More important, the Soviet bloc elites considered the negative consequences of the consolidation of "Little Europe" for Soviet bloc economies too great for much satisfaction to be taken in parallel difficulties created for the United States and other Western countries. The discriminatory economic measures of the EC against the Soviet bloc were viewed not only as adverse currently, having contributed to the slowdown in the growth of East-West European trade in recent years, but also bound to become more painful in the future. The Soviet leadership apparently feared that unless EC fortunes could somehow be reversed, the desired economic interchange with Western Europe would be unattainable without political concessions that Moscow found impermissible but that some East European states might be seduced into making. Negotiations on a trade agreement between the EC and Yugoslavia -- later successfully concluded -- were cited as a dangerous precedent:

... even with the existing geographical dimensions of the European Communities and the present degree of coordination of the foreign economic policies of the member states, steps are being taken with the aim of gradually, "selectively" drawing the socialist states of Eastern Europe one by one into the sphere of influence of the EEC.167

Long-term bilateral economic agreements with Western European states -- for example, recent Polish-French and Polish-Italian long-term trade agreements -- were intended to block the trend toward multilateralism

* Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria had reportedly taken a less dogmatic stance than the USSR on relations with the EC.166
in Western Europe in dealing with the East. The European security campaign, focusing on a proposed ESC to discuss "all-European" economic relations, was intended to reinforce that effort, to reduce EC discrimination toward Eastern Europe while retarding the momentum toward a more integrated Western Europe by holding out to the West Europeans the promise of mutually beneficial economic cooperation with the East. * Simultaneously, the USSR sought directly to prevent expansion of the EC, warning Austria anew that any formal connection would constitute a violation of its neutrality and reportedly forcing Finland to withdraw consideration of joining the proposed Nordic Economic Union (NORDEK) because of the prospects for NORDEK association with the EC. 

After 1968, the Soviet bloc also began to take more seriously the possibility of a "European caucus" or related forms of Western European military integration within NATO. Experts in the Warsaw Pact differed over whether the United States would continue to control such a military grouping, whether West Germany could dominate it, or whether the grouping might turn out to be at odds with the United States. Even those who foresaw the latter, however, were averse to Western European military integration. This is consistent with the present Soviet bloc approach to Western European integration generally. Theoretical discussions downplay "capitalist contradictions," and more propagandistic treatments emphasize "the myth of the third force" in Western Europe: between "pan-Europeanism" and "Atlanticism" there is no middle ground. In so disparaging "Little Europe," however, in dismissing its potential as a counterweight to the United States, the USSR's main global rival, Warsaw Pact spokesmen have only revealed their increasing concern over Western Europe's disruptive economic and political impact on Eastern Europe.

Unity and Conflict in the Warsaw Pact

The above helps to explain the Soviet rationale in reviving the European security campaign in 1969, but the Warsaw Pact states did not...
equally subscribe to that rationale. The most obvious exception is Romania, which, under the leadership of Gheorghiu-Dej and then Ceausescu, carefully cultivated an independence in foreign policy from the early 1960s.\footnote{173} Romania's unique position in the Warsaw Pact was strikingly demonstrated in 1968, when Romania strongly supported the Dubcek leadership in Czechoslovakia and refused to join the pressure campaign against and then the military invasion of that country.\footnote{174} But the Romanian leadership's aims with reference to the ESC project are not totally incompatible with those of the USSR. Romania, too, has an interest in formal Western (especially West German) acceptance of present European boundaries and the division of Germany. (With its autonomous position within the Warsaw Pact still under challenge from Moscow, however, it clearly does not subscribe to the Soviet conception of the ideological-political status quo.) Romania, too, would welcome the reduction or perhaps even elimination of the U.S. military presence from Western Europe, not because it fully shares Soviet political objectives in that region, but probably because it views the Soviet Union's definition of its vital interests in Eastern Europe as conditioned by the American military presence in Western Europe. Romania, too, has become more concerned about the effect of the EC on its economic relations with the West.

Granted this conditional unity of interests, since 1966 Romania sought to utilize the European security campaign for its own purposes, to exploit the resulting détente atmosphere to expand its freedom of action within the Warsaw Pact and independently develop ties with Western Europe. Its most striking success in the initial stage of that effort (see p. 16) was the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn in the aftermath of the Bucharest meeting. That Romanian effort -- overshadowed in 1967-1968 -- was revived and expanded "after Czechoslovakia."

At the declaratory level, the Romanian leadership formulated a unique analysis of European security, employing a distinct terminology, whose most significant component is the assertion that European security and the ESC project are a process.\footnote{175} Refusing to limit the question of European security to the Warsaw Pact ESC project, Romanian spokesmen insisted from the outset on the importance of a series of all-European
meetings and placed high value on the multiplication of East-West contacts for their own sake, on "the largest possible number of . . . conversations, exchanges of opinion, and conferences." As in the past, stress was placed on the important contribution of small European states, especially small "socialist" states. After the March 1969 Budapest meeting, moreover, Rumanian spokesmen were more receptive to U.S. participation in an ESC. They alone continued to endorse the Bucharest Declaration's call for the concomitant dissolution of the two military alliances in Europe. Rumanian interpretations of a multilateral renunciation-of-force agreement had a clear edge; such an instrument should be "not merely formal in character" but part of a system of "clear engagements" and "concrete measures" offering "each state the full guarantee that it is protected from any danger of aggression or from other acts of the use or threat of force." By the same token, the importance of national sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs for any reason were emphasized -- a derivation, in fact, of the Rumanian effort to assert the inviolability of these principles within the Warsaw Pact. Rumania also opposed the selectivity of the Soviet European security campaign and disputed one of its premises by denying that socialist society in Eastern Europe was so weak that it need fear Western efforts at "ideological subversion" -- no matter how nefarious in intent.

Along with this deviant declaratory posture, Rumania took a number of autonomous initiatives to influence the European security campaign. At the diplomatic level, it expanded contacts with West European states, under the pretext of preparing for an ESC. In mid-1969, it attempted to revive the "Club of Ten" (as the "Club of Nine" had become with the addition of the Netherlands) at the U.N. and proposed the establishment of a European Security Commission prior to an ESC. Both projects seem to have made little headway. As indicated in Section III, it also advocated a moratorium on military exercises in Europe prior to an ESC and in the spring of 1970 proposed regional disarmament measures clearly intended to reduce the possibility of a "Czechoslovak"-type suppression of Rumanian autonomy.

*While citing the Soviet, Polish, and East German bilateral talks with Bonn as retrospective justification of its earlier normalization of relations with West Germany.*
During his state visit to France in June, Ceausescu reportedly suggested that the proposed permanent European security organ monitor all military maneuvers in Europe. Even after the June 1970 Budapest Memorandum, with its vague offer to discuss in the future the reduction of "foreign" armed forces in Europe, Romanian spokesmen continued to call for the withdrawal of all armed forces to within national frontiers. 184

Rumania also organized in Bucharest a series of conferences of foreign policy experts and other public figures which -- unlike the pro-Soviet Vienna conference of November 1969 -- permitted the expression of a diversity of views and issued no propagandistic declarations. 185 In a note to the U.N. of June 13, 1970, the Rumanian government appealed for expanded Balkan cooperation. 186 While they did not provoke open Soviet condemnation, 187 these Rumanian efforts may well have contributed to the apparent worsening of Soviet-Rumanian relations in the spring of 1970, although amity has been somewhat restored with the belated renewal of the Soviet-Rumanian friendship treaty in June 1970.

Rumania's behavior in the European security campaign was so conspicuous after March 1969 as to make the Ceausescu leadership's purposes generally understood. It is less well appreciated, however, that other Soviet allies in the Warsaw Pact have attempted, though in significantly different ways and degrees, to harness the European security campaign to their own foreign policy objectives. In the case of Poland, the development of Polish foreign policy through 1968 and Poland's earlier approach to the European security question would have suggested that the Gomulka leadership would favor, along with Ulbricht, increasing the anti-West German elements of the ESC project. In fact, however, the reverse was true; in 1969-70 Poland attempted to use the Warsaw Pact's European security campaign to expand its own freedom of maneuver within the Warsaw Pact somewhat like Rumania.

This applies especially to Poland's policy towards West Germany. As noted above, in a major address on May 17, 1969, Gomulka proposed a border treaty with West Germany embodying recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's permanent western border. 188 Although such recognition had been a long-standing Polish and Warsaw Pact demand, Gomulka's initiative of May 1969 inaugurated a new phase in Polish-West German relations.
The proposal was preceded by a reappraisal by some of the Polish elite of the West German policy and society that estimated the strength of "sober" and "realistic-thinking" forces in West Germany (not to be confused with Communist and pro-Communist "progressives") as much higher than in the recent past. The mere fact that a proposal was made to West Germany was noteworthy; since the late 1950s, and particularly since the mid-1960s, Polish policy toward West Germany had been almost exclusively defensive and reactive. Most important, the content of Gomulka's proposal signified a partial decoupling of Polish national interests from the interests of other Warsaw Pact member states, especially East Germany. (In the 1960s, and particularly since early 1967, Gomulka had subordinated Poland's interest in West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse to Ulbricht's demands for West German recognition of East Germany. 189)

This shift must not be misinterpreted; the new emphasis on Polish national interests in 1969 did not mean that the Polish leadership was "selling out" the GDR. The stability of East Germany remained of fundamental importance to the Polish leadership, as it does, for example, to the Rumanian and even Yugoslav leaderships -- although perhaps the key immediate question for East-West European relations is whether such stability is compatible with less rigid East German foreign and domestic policies. But the pendulum of Poland's policy toward West Germany did swing back toward the post-1956 position; the piecemeal improvement of relations between Bonn and the Warsaw Pact member states was encouraged, rather than subjected to an East German veto, with Poland's efforts focused primarily on gaining recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary. **

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* A key difference was that in 1956 Poland seemed willing to normalize relations with Bonn before formal recognition of the Oder-Neisse border; in 1970, in talks with Bonn, Poland insisted on West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse before any improvement in relations.

** The occasional effort in Poland and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc to explain the differences on the German question as a better distribution of roles 190 cannot be taken seriously, if for no other reason than that the East German leadership viewed such a "distribution of roles" as betrayal of its interests. The protests in Warsaw Pact media against Western "invention" of differences on the German issue indicated that differences in fact existed.
In its initial months, this new approach toward West Germany left the Polish leadership open to the charge of breaching common Warsaw Pact positions. Poland countered by invoking the common interest in the ESC. Were not preliminary overtures necessary if Bonn were ever to be brought to an all-European conference table? Thus, Gomułka, in proposing the border treaty with West Germany, linked it directly with the ESC proposal. Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz, explaining the initiative to the Polish parliament in June, maintained that it had been made "on the basis of the Budapest Appeal, in the name of European security, and not only in the name of directly Polish interests." Again, in early 1970, Gomułka reiterated that the border treaty proposal was to be viewed as part of the East-West European "dialogue" to prepare for an ESC.

In the fall of 1969, as the Warsaw Pact began to reexamine policy toward West Germany and authorized (at the December 1969 Moscow meeting) preliminary bilateral contacts with Bonn, it became less important (although still useful) for Poland to justify its initiatives toward Bonn by reference to the ESC. But internally, as some in the Polish Party apparat doubted the wisdom of the new policy towards West Germany, the Party leadership found it useful to cite the linkage of the ESC and the new policy to show the hard-line doubters in the Party that Poland was only keeping in step with the rest of the Warsaw Pact in its contacts with Bonn.

In a broader sense, however, in 1970 the ESC project remained important for the Polish leadership. The shift in Poland's policy toward West Germany in early 1969 was only the most striking manifestation of a larger shift in Polish foreign policy toward greater national self-assertiveness — a shift that the European security campaign helped sanction. This shift originated in an internal crisis in the Polish Party in 1968 in which Gomułka thwarted a major challenge to his leadership by hard-liners within the Party by allowing a number of younger leaders to rise to important positions. These younger men, though not a homogeneous group, exerted considerable influence over the determination of policy. Most important domestically was their role in the initiation of the most serious attempt at economic reform undertaken since 1956. Of greater importance for this discussion, however, was their role in
foreign policy, the (still-disputed) rejection of Gomulka's slavishly pro-Soviet "internationalism" of the recent past and the emergence of autonomous tendencies in the "Rumanian syndrome."

In advocating a new foreign policy orientation, the younger Polish Party leaders were confronted by two troublesome developments. First, 1968 brought an economic crisis of such serious proportions as to make Western credits and technology seem much more necessary than before.\textsuperscript{195} Second, the resumption of Soviet soundings in Bonn, following the sharp decline in Poland's image in Western Europe as a consequence of the events of 1968 (first the purge campaign, with its anti-Semitic manifestations, and then participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia) led some in the Polish elite to feel a sense of international "isolation" and to fear that, in resuming contact with Bonn in the pursuit of its own larger European interests, the USSR might disregard Poland's vital national interests.\textsuperscript{196} The unlikelihood of such a development notwithstanding, for Polish Communists, no less than for the Polish nation at large, the prospect of Soviet-German cooperation of any kind (still symbolized pejoratively by "Rapallo") was extremely unsettling. This was reflected in the insistence of Polish leaders that the future European security system avoid the gaps of Rapallo, no less than Locarno, that had marred the Versailles settlement.\textsuperscript{197} Thus, when Soviet spokesmen commended the "Rapallo" heritage to West Germany, extreme discomfort was felt in Warsaw.

Poland's new foreign policy orientation was manifested in a number of ways. Its exponents argued that Poland would need to adopt "qualitatively different," more offensive foreign policy goals in the 1970s, because, in the new Europe of the 1970s, "the problem of individual nations and states [within the blocs] will arise anew" and "no one will be as concerned for our interests as we ourselves."\textsuperscript{198} Such statements reflect primarily on Poland's relations with the USSR; moreover, direct criticism of the views of Soviet "experts" in the Polish press (appearing for the first time since the October 1956 period) related not only to policy towards Germany ("Rapallo" especially), but to other matters as well.\textsuperscript{199} Poland's relations with the GDR, especially close since early 1967, deteriorated as a consequence both of the shift in Poland's policy toward West Germany and the GDR's independent refusal to aid Poland's
new efforts at intensive industrial development within Comecon. In mid-1969, the Polish Party displayed a renewed tolerance towards Rumanian policies and -- directly related to the new Polish economic reform -- began to show a surprising sympathy for Hungary's internal economic and political experimentation.

As for Poland's policy toward the rest of Western Europe, the new posture toward West Germany was accompanied by a revived diplomatic offensive, directed especially at France and the Low Countries, that promised to be more effective than détente efforts of the past precisely because of the modulation of its extreme anti-West Germanism. As part of its diplomatic offensive, Poland advocated early in 1969 a revival of the ESC project and subsequently, while vigorously supporting the European security campaign, undertook other autonomous initiatives toward Western Europe (see pp. 34 and 37, above). Poland's proposed European Security Treaty, incorporating regional arms limitations, represented a revival of the search for autonomy of post-1956 Polish diplomacy. It was intended to increase Poland's political weight within the Warsaw Pact while initiating an East-West European dialogue that might mediate the political division of Europe.

The Polish leadership shared many of the USSR's objectives in the European security campaign -- more than did Rumania, for example. On one point it was more orthodox than the USSR or even the GDR, seeking to use the European security campaign to silence the Western centers of "ideological diversion," especially Radio Free Europe. In general, however, Poland used the European security campaign to aid its effort toward greater foreign policy autonomy.

East Germany sharply contrasts with both Rumania and Poland in its approach to the Warsaw Pact European security campaign. The Ulbricht leadership initially opposed the March 1969 Budapest initiative. It feared that an ESC would be counterproductive unless the GDR's maximum demands on West Germany were met first, for it quite accurately foresaw that the East-West dialogue on the ESC project stood to undermine the posture of total hostility toward the FRG that the Warsaw Pact (sans Rumania) had assumed early in 1967. Addressing the East German National Front on March 22, 1969, Ulbricht declared:
Regarding the preparation of a conference on European security, the essential contribution to the preparation of such a conference would have to come from the leadership of the country [the FRG] which is the only one in Europe so far to raise and to maintain demands for border alterations. The first steps would have to be taken by those who demand alterations of the status quo, that is, alterations of borders, of the balance of forces in Europe, and so forth. If the Bonn government renounces these demands, which aim at the hegemony of West German imperialism in Europe, if it renounces territorial demands, as other countries have done, if it is willing to negotiate on the basis of equality, preparations for the European conference can proceed favorably.\textsuperscript{504}

Within only a few days, however, Ulbricht began to modify this opposition to an ESC, reportedly as a result of a secret meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow toward the end of March.\textsuperscript{205} Whatever the explanation, on March 31 the East German State Council declared that it "welcomed" the Budapest proposal to convene an all-European conference calling on West Germany to support the ESC "without any preconditions," the State Council declared that such a conference, in which the FRG and the GDR would be equally represented, "could make it easier for the two German states to establish contractual agreements." At the same time, however, Foreign Minister Winzer and Prime Minister Stoph, in their remarks to the session, took pains to repeat the long-standing demand that West Germany fulfill East Germany's maximum set of preconditions for European security. This suggested that though the East German leaders had to withdraw some preconditions to the convening of an ESC, they remained unenthusiastic, to say the least, about the project.\textsuperscript{206}

Moreover, even this qualified endorsement of the ESC project was apparently hotly disputed within the East German leadership. The Politburo report to the Tenth Plenum of the East German Communist Party at the end of April, delivered by hard-liner Ernst Honecker, in effect urged that the ESC proposal be exploited propagandistically by the Soviet bloc only to emphasize Bonn's refusal to recognize East Germany \textit{de jure} -- the prerequisite, in Honecker's view, for negotiations of any sort between the Warsaw Pact member states and Bonn. "In this connection, \textit{we need not expressly emphasize} that [an ESC] could also make it easier for the two German states to arrive at contractual arrangements in the interests
of peace and security" -- precisely what the State Council session of March 31 had stressed. Yet Honecker seemed to be implicitly contradicted by Ulbricht himself, who, in closing remarks to the Plenum, affirmed East German interest in a European détente that would "open the path to a normalization of relations between the GDR and the West German Federal Republic." Honecker's view was not restated, and Ulbricht and other East German spokesmen repeatedly employed the more conciliatory language of the March 31 State Council session. By mid-1969 then, although Western reports continued to suggest that the Ulbricht leadership was uncomfortable with Soviet insistence on an early ESC, the GDR's public posture was to endorse the ESC project while condemning the FRG for "raising preconditions," for attempting to insist on normalizing inter-German relations on its terms prior to an ESC.

In fall 1969, the East German regime came out much more in favor of the ESC proposal. This shift was an indirect consequence of the September elections in the FRG, which brought the Brandt-Schell government to power in October. Its accession led Moscow and Warsaw to reappraise their policy toward West Germany and increased the possibility that a dialogue on limited bilateral agreements might isolate the Ulbricht leadership in the Soviet bloc. Unable to prevent a shift in that policy, East Germany sought to minimize its repercussions by attempting to confine contacts with Bonn to the multilateral framework of the ESC project. East Berlin could justify its tactical shift with the argument that the early convening of an ESC, in which the GDR would participate without being relegated to the second-class status it (and the FRG) had had to accept at the 1958 Geneva conference, would enhance the GDR's international prestige.

Authoritative East German pronouncements expressed the shift to stronger support for the ESC project. An article by Foreign Minister Winzer in Einheit called for the "rapid preparation and successful conduct" of an ESC, and urged that a multilateral arrangement -- a collective security treaty -- rather than bilateral agreements be adopted there. At the Prague foreign ministers conference, as noted above, Winzer apparently promoted the ESC in order to limit bilateral contacts between East European countries and the FRG. Interviewed after the Prague meeting,
Winzer first expressed his conviction that "preparation and implementation of the security conference creates new possibilities for the general and equal incorporation of the GDR in all-European relations." He later remarked on the necessity that any future East-West European arrangement be multilateral and expressed doubts about the usefulness of strictly bilateral renunciation-of-force agreements. In a subsequent interview, the Foreign Minister was even more explicit, saying that a multilateral renunciation-of-force agreement was all the more important because Bonn was attempting to use a bilateral renunciation-of-force agreement as a "political instrument" against the GDR. Though this explicitly referred to a future GDR-FRG bilateral agreement, Winzer implied that bilateral agreements between Bonn and other Eastern European countries, including the USSR, could similarly harm East German interests.

Despite Ulbricht's apparent opposition, the Moscow conference of Soviet bloc leaders in early December 1969 approved bilateral contacts with Bonn to discuss bilateral renunciation-of-force declarations. Attempting to salvage what it could, the East German leadership tried to forestall bilateral dialogues by pressing for the ESC. The Twelfth Plenum of the East German Communist Party, convened after the Moscow meeting, again endorsed the early convening of an ESC with "no preconditions." Addressing the Plenum, Ulbricht deprecated Bonn's pursuit of bilateral renunciation-of-force negotiations with Moscow. He restated the East German position toward Bonn and the ESC project at his international press conference on January 19, 1970.

At the same time, confronted with the prospect of Soviet and Polish talks with Bonn, East Germany undertook a bilateral initiative of its own, proposing a draft treaty in which West Germany would give de jure recognition to the German Democratic Republic. The GDR sought to obtain West German acquiescence at the top level meetings between Stoph and Brandt in Erfurt and Kassel. Just as the GDR had made any improvement in inter-German relations dependent on full de jure recognition by West Germany, so it now sought to assure maximum political support from the USSR and its other Warsaw Pact allies in their bilateral dealings with Bonn by making de jure recognition the acid test of West Germany's Ostpolitik. Without de jure recognition, in Foreign Minister Winzer's
words, Bonn "cannot lay claim to any right of cooperation" with any Soviet bloc country\textsuperscript{217} -- a warning to the latter as much as to the former.

Yet the Soviet-West German treaty signed in August 1970 did not incorporate such \textit{de jure} recognition, forcing the Ulbricht leadership once again to reappraise its position. East German spokesmen now somewhat plaintively affirmed that the treaty could have a beneficial influence on inter-German relations, rather than \textit{vice versa}, just as could the speedy convening of an ESC. Simultaneously, the Ulbricht leadership had to acknowledge -- ten months after its Warsaw Pact allies -- that the formation of the Brandt government in West Germany did signify a "positive" change.\textsuperscript{218} As of this writing, the repercussions of this \textit{volte face}, representing a major political defeat for the Ulbricht leadership in intra-Warsaw Pact politics, remained to be felt; any GDR shift toward greater flexibility with respect to Bonn promised to be reluctant and halting.

The Hungarian regime widely promoted the Warsaw Pact's European security campaign in 1969-70; its diplomats were perhaps the most active Warsaw Pact advocates of the project in the West. Yet unlike Rumania and Poland (and, in a contrary sense, the GDR), Hungary limited itself to the common Warsaw Pact framework of the campaign. Most conspicuously, it failed to revive seriously its pre-1968 "Danubian cooperation" scheme.\textsuperscript{219} On the contrary, Hungarian spokesmen condemned the theory that small nations have a special role to play in the European dialogue -- on one occasion, quite defensively.\textsuperscript{220} This, however, should come as no great surprise. Whatever the objective ramifications of some of its past European initiatives, the Hungarian regime (particularly Party leader Jós Kadar) has never sought to improve relations with Western Europe at the expense of its ties with Moscow.

It might nevertheless be inferred that the Hungarian leadership has not taken full advantage of the opportunities the present European security campaign presents for foreign policy initiatives. Yet today Hungarian foreign policy \textit{vis-à-vis} Western Europe is operating under two special constraints. First, in late 1966 and early 1967, the Hungarian leadership responded with considerable interest to the offer of
the Kiesinger-Brandt government to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany "without preconditions," but had to abandon this interest when the USSR ruled against that means of normalizing ties with Bonn. Its fingers having been slightly burned in 1967, the Hungarian regime was disinclined in 1969 and the first half of 1970 to undertake independent initiatives toward West Germany, even under the guise of preparations for an ESC. In the spring of 1970, Hungary and West Germany agreed to expand the visa-issuing powers of their trade missions and began high-level talks on a new long-term economic agreement—but only long after the USSR, Poland, and the GDR had taken their own bilateral initiatives on the German question.

Second, and probably more important, in contrast to 1966-1967, Hungary is today attempting to carry out the most far-reaching economic reform in Eastern Europe (except, of course, Yugoslavia). While on balance the USSR accepts Hungary's experiment, that acceptance is both conditional and revocable. Given this potential source of serious Soviet-Hungarian conflict, the Kadar leadership is understandably reluctant to pursue any foreign policy initiatives that might exacerbate its relations with the USSR unnecessarily. Whereas in Poland, a serious new attempt at economic reform accompanied and probably strengthened a sense of national self-assertiveness, in Hungary, economic reform has limited the regime's freedom of foreign policy maneuver.

The roles of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia in the European security campaign have been less assertive. The Bulgarian leadership's calls for "Balkan cooperation" (always formulated so as to be completely acceptable to the USSR) have been formalistic and half-hearted. This is because the Zhivkov leadership has allied itself too closely to the Soviet Union to contemplate independent foreign policy initiatives. Czechoslovakia is, of course, quite different from Bulgaria, but it has behaved similarly in foreign policy. In the spring of 1969, with Dubcek still at the head of the Party and the press still relatively free, unorthodox interpretations of the European security campaign were occasionally voiced, including emphasis on the special role of small powers so common in 1968. Today, such theories are anathema. For the Husak leadership -- still under attack by the domestic "ultras," uncertain of full support from the Soviet leadership, and faced with the bitter if
passive opposition of the population and much of the intellectual elite -- foreign policy is made in Moscow.*

Conclusions: Continuity and Change in the European Security Campaign

Pierre Hassner has noted the paradox that "today, the search for a European security system has nothing to do with any direct search for security. . . . The search for a new system can be based only on political objectives."228 This certainly applies to the pursuit of "European security" by the Warsaw Pact, whose ideologues are explicit about the "socio-political" as well as the "international political" dimensions of the campaign.229

The evidence presented in this study suggests that the post-1968 version of the Warsaw Pact’s European security campaign is based on the same "status quo plus" goals pursued in the past -- consolidation of Soviet influence in East Europe and extension of that influence to Western Europe at the expense of the United States. The Soviet ability successfully to pursue both objectives simultaneously is still very much in question. The fact remains that the Soviet leadership does not have a fundamental interest in the stabilization of the present European status quo. It is the strategic objective of "status quo plus," more than diplomatic tactics or internal disagreements, that seems to account for the minimum of substance in the European security campaign and the lack of concrete, specific suggestions about the desired European security system. There is indeed little point in the theoretical construction of an equilibrating mechanism if the existing European system is in disequilibrium because of the presence of an alien element -- the United States.

Though the fundamental premises of Soviet policy toward Europe have not undergone any real transformation in the past few years, the post-1968

*In December 1969, Husak did urge, on behalf of Czechoslovakia, West German annulment of the 1938 Munich Agreement, but he did so with clear acknowledgment of the GDR’s right of veto over Warsaw Pact policy towards West Germany.227 In June 1970, Prague and Bonn initiated a new long-term economic and scientific agreement.
version of the European security campaign has shown new elements. The heightened emphasis on all-European economic cooperation seems to reflect a greater awareness (in part a consequence of the more advanced stage of economic development) of the need for Western trade and technology, coupled with a fear that the price will include unacceptable political concessions. The qualified endorsement of U.S. participation in the proposed ESC must be explained as tactical, for the USSR has yet to recognize the legitimacy of American interests in Europe. The parallel moderation of criticism of West German "revanchism" may be explained partly by similar tactical considerations -- the effort to exclude West Germany from détente initiatives having been so counterproductive in Western Europe in the past. But primarily it is a consequence of the Warsaw Pact's shift to a more activist foreign policy toward West Germany "after Czechoslovakia" -- which, indeed, somewhat overshadowed the European security campaign in late 1969 and early 1970. On the other hand, in the post-1968 phase of the European security campaign, German "union" (let alone "unification") was no longer mentioned as a Warsaw Pact propaganda slogan. This could be interpreted as an indication of the successful consolidation of East Germany.

Paradoxically, heightened Soviet doubts about the viability of the existing political systems in Eastern Europe seem to have been one reason for the exclusion of regional disarmament from the post-1968 phase of the European security campaign, in contrast to that of 1966-1967. The expectation that the United States would unilaterally reduce its military presence in Western Europe was doubtless a second reason. Today, Soviet foreign policy does not assume that the American "imperialists" will gracefully withdraw from their overseas commitments, no matter how strong the economic and internal political pressures. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership does seem to be counting on a significant unilateral reduction in the American presence in Europe in the next few years, even without a Soviet quid pro quo. It nevertheless seemed to be in the Soviet self-interest of reinforcing pressures for a reduction in U.S. forces in Europe at least to appear somewhat more receptive to NATO's suggestions for mutual balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe. Yet the fact that only in June 1970 did the Warsaw Pact alter its totally negative
position on the subject and make a bow to the NATO stand is probably best explained by the much greater importance placed on the internal security function of the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe, as of the Warsaw Pact as a whole, "after Czechoslovakia."

Like the U.S. external security guarantee to Western Europe, the internal security function of Soviet forces in East Europe cannot be appraised exclusively in terms of military capabilities — the forces required, say, to execute a Czechoslovak-like invasion of Rumania — but must be considered in political terms. The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated to the West that the Soviet leadership had at its disposal an effective military instrument and would not shrink from using it to safeguard its interests in Eastern Europe. Soviet leaders learned from the Czechoslovak crisis how fragile were the political systems in Eastern Europe that were acceptable in Moscow.

As of mid-1970, Czechoslovakia itself was still in the process of "reconsolidation," the loyalty of its armed forces uncertain. The Rumanian deviation continued, unchecked. Disturbing tendencies were perceived in Hungary and, by then, doubtless in Poland as well. The Soviets responded to this perceived weakness of "socialism" in Eastern Europe mainly by reemphasizing the importance of the Warsaw Pact, attempting to integrate further its national armies, and placing greater stress on its internal security function than at any time since 1956. To have made any reduction in the Soviet military presence in East Europe would have undercut this effort; a Western quid pro quo would, at least in the short run, be irrelevant.

Still, these considerations do not fully explain the Soviet lack of interest prior to June 1970 in championing regional disarmament measures of any kind in the European security campaign. Having insisted on excluding the IR-MRBMs, the main instruments of the Soviet strategic threat to Western Europe, from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the United States, the USSR might have been expected to attempt, by raising the issue of nuclear weapons in Central Europe in the European security context, to increase public pressure in Western Europe for limitation or reduction of the American tactical nuclear capability. Both Rumania and Poland suggested the relevance of that issue, yet the
USSR still failed to take it up. Perhaps this, too, can be explained by the conciliatory tactics characteristic of the European security campaign. Since similar proposals in the past were not very productive in the West, renewing them might interfere with the achievement of the more modest, short-term pan-European goals. Perhaps the Soviet leadership appreciated, better than in the past, the difficulty of isolating the nuclear element from regional disarmament as a whole. Or perhaps it feared to raise the matter because, if taken up by the West, it would only focus attention on the fact that tactical nuclear missile units are an organic part of Soviet army formations, outside as well as within the USSR.  

Intended to further Soviet political objectives toward Western Europe and North America, the post-1968 phase of the Warsaw Pact European security campaign became, as in 1966-1967, a vehicle for the pursuit of individual state interests within the Warsaw Pact -- as, indeed, détente initiatives of the Soviet bloc have almost inevitably become. The Rumanian leadership exploited the campaign, undertaking autonomous initiatives to strengthen and expand its independence. The most significant change in this regard since 1966-1967 was the emergence of a similar tendency in Poland. This isolated the East German leadership as the hard-line obstructionists within the Warsaw Pact; after first totally rejecting the new phase of the European security campaign, Ulbricht sought to use it (with a notable lack of success) to salvage something of the old, all-or-nothing posture toward Bonn. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria refrained from attempting to derive particularist advantages from the European security campaign. In the first two cases, this passivity represented a change from their behavior in the previous phase of the campaign, reflecting the special constraints on current Hungarian foreign policy and the vassal status of Husak’s Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria continued to demonstrate its slavish pro-Sovietism. This pattern is not to be explained by the traditional “security” consideration of proximity to the “German threat,” but only by the specific course of internal affairs and development of relations with the USSR by each of the East European states.

To judge the probable effects in the West of the Warsaw Pact’s European security campaign involves an estimate of the Warsaw Pact’s
intentions in pursuing it and the prospects for their successful realization. The former, examined in this study, have been found to be highly inimical to U.S. and West European interests. Consideration of the latter, beyond the scope of this study, would involve an appraisal of the strength of West European governments and societies in the coming decade of probably reduced American international commitments.

Yet it is also essential to understand the repercussions of the campaign within the Warsaw Pact itself. No simple relationship can be postulated between what Moscow might view as the "successful" outcome of the campaign (initially, say, an ESC following the June 1970 agenda) and internal political change -- whether "consolidation" or "erosion" of the existing political systems -- in the Eastern European states. Western acceptance of the Eastern European ideological-political status quo as irreversible and even right would undoubtedly demoralize elements in the Eastern European societies seeking evolutionary political change. Yet it seems highly questionable that an ESC of the version desired by the Warsaw Pact leaders would, in itself, be interpreted in Eastern Europe as Western legitimization of this kind. On the other hand, such a pan-European gathering need not encourage and embolden those forces in Eastern Europe looking to Western Europe, not for political support, but for at least models of a modern industrial state. Perpetuation of almost any type of pan-European dialogue would, however, very likely have precisely that effect.

It also seems clear that continuation of the European security campaign and related détente measures stand to reinforce the autonomous tendencies in foreign policy analyzed in this study and hence increase divisive tensions within the Warsaw Pact. Within rather large limits, this is a development to be welcomed and, to whatever extent possible, encouraged.

As long as Europe remains artificially divided, discontinuities in European developments must be expected. Quite apart from Western intentions and actions, it has generally been the unsettling effects in Eastern Europe of détente Soviet overtures toward Western Europe that have led the Soviet leaders to restrict or abandon them; Soviet "status quo plus" policies have repeatedly confronted the Soviet leadership.
with a threat to the maintenance of the status quo. In the 1970s, the United States and Western Europe must be prepared for the repetition of such cycles, of Soviet offensives toward Western Europe giving way to defensive reconsolidation.
NOTES

Abbreviations

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADN</td>
<td>East German News Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>French Press Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agerpres</td>
<td>Romanian Press Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTA</td>
<td>Bulgarian Telegraph Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSEP</td>
<td>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTK</td>
<td>Czechoslovak Press Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>West German Press Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEMO</td>
<td>Mirovaiia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTI</td>
<td>Hungarian Telegraph Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Polish Press Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFE</td>
<td>Radio Free Europe</td>
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<td>RFER</td>
<td>Radio Free Europe Research</td>
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<td>Tanjug</td>
<td>Yugoslav Telegraph Service</td>
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<td>TASS</td>
<td>Soviet Union Telegraph Agency</td>
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4. PAP, December 14, 1964. (Many references such as this to Soviet bloc sources are cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service or U.S. and British Embassy translations.)

5. For the details of these Polish proposals, see Charles R. Planck, Sicherheit in Europa (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1968), pp. 113-155.
17. The absence of such formulations in the Karlovy Vary statement of 1967, to which Rumania did not subscribe, again suggests Rumania's influence on their appearance in the Bucharest Declaration. See text, p. 13.


22. TASS, April 24, 1967.


24. TASS, April 24, 1967.

25. While the Karlovy Vary statement was silent on this point, the linkage was affirmed repeatedly in the course of the proceedings. See, for example, Polish Party leader Gomulka's prediction of "the full victory of the socialist system on our continent" (Radio Warsaw, April 24, 1967); also Pravda, April 30, 1967.


30. See Meier, Der Budapester Appell, p. 9.


41. HNisch et al., Sozialistische Freundschafts- und Beistandsverträge, p. 84.

42. With the exception of a reported overture to Austria in March 1968. See The New York Times, April 11, 1968.

43. Reported in MEMO, July and August 1968, and in condensed form in International Affairs (Moscow), June and July 1968.

44. TASS, June 27, 1968.

45. TASS, July 13, 1968. He suggested that U.S. participation was a matter for the Europeans to decide.

46. TASS, July 1, 1969. The memorandum did endorse the dismantling of foreign military bases, suggesting that the U.N. Committee on Disarmament meeting in Geneva examine the matter, and referred to "regional disarmament," singling out, however, only the Middle East.

47. E.g., Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko (TASS, October 3, 1968) and Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz (Trybuna Ludu, October 17, 1968). See also Gromyko's plea for European détente during a press conference in Budapest (MTI, November 18, 1968) and the appeal of a Polish publicist that the Warsaw Pact keep the initiative on European security (I. Krasicki, in Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, November 1968).


50. In an address to the Austrian Foreign Affairs Society (Radio Free Europe Vienna news bureau report, March 5, 1969).

51. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Marko, interviewed on Czechoslovak Television, March 20, 1969. For admission of "differences in views in the bosom of the socialist commonwealth on assessment of certain aspects of the international situation," see K. Malczynski, in Trybuna Ludu, March 19, 1969. These were extended to "issues of principle" by Hungarian Party Secretary Z. Komocsin, addressing the Parliament in September (Nepszabadag, September 25, 1969). Polish Politburo member Jaszczuk later stressed Poland's active role in shaping the document (Trybuna Ludu, May 5, 1969), and a Rumanian commentary expressed satisfaction that "opinions of each country [were] taken into consideration" (Mitec, in Scinteia, March 20, 1969).

52. Interview with Jan Marko on Prague Television, March 20, 1969.


57. TASS, April 9, 1969.


59. MTI, April 25, 1969. DPA (April 1, 1969) reported, for example, that Soviet Ambassador Taraspin had raised the issue in a conversation with Willy Brandt.

60. Foreign Minister Waldheim related at a press conference on April 28 that Hungary, the USSR, Poland, and Bulgaria had approached Austria on the matter (RFE Vienna news bureau report, April 29, 1969).


66. Izvestiia (November 20, 1969) held that such an agreement would not affect the "bilateral and group obligations of states, provided they are not aggressive tendencies." (Emphasis supplied.)

67. The "official report" on the session failed to include the usual claim of unanimity of views (CTK, October 31, 1969), and a Czech newspaper reported that the foreign ministers "were not unanimous in their assessment of the intentions of the new Bonn coalition under Willy Brandt" (Mlada Fronta, November 4, 1969). See also the Ascherson dispatch in the Observer, November 2, 1969; Die Welt, October 31, 1969; Reuter dispatch from Prague, Los Angeles Times, October 31, 1969.

68. The East German position is examined in Section IV. The other Warsaw Pact members upheld bilateral initiatives; see, for example, for the USSR, Maevskii, in Pravda, December 1, 1969; for Poland, R. Markiewicz, in Sprawy Międzynarodowe, December 1969 (signed to the press November 29, 1969); for Rumania, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers, Agerpres, November 13, 1969.

69. The Western press reported rumors that Ulbricht arrived in Moscow prior to the meeting to oppose bilateral contacts with Bonn. See Dorothy Miller, "Ulbricht and the Moscow Summit," RFER, December 3, 1969.

70. TASS, December 4, 1969.

71. Ulbricht later spoke of a "sober [contentious] discussion" on German policy at the session (Neues Deutschland, January 20, 1970).

72. The "Main Document" of the international Communist conference in Moscow in June 1969 had demanded the "recognition under international law" of the GDR (TASS, June 18, 1969).

73. See the Pravda editorial of December 6, 1969, and the Izvestiia editorial of January 15, 1970, stressing such coordination. Following the Moscow meeting, no clear definition of an acceptable minimum of bloc-wide support for Ulbricht emerged, although all the states concerned may have agreed not to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn pending the conclusion of a Soviet-West German agreement on the renunciation of force.

75. MTI, January 27, 1970.

76. For treatment of the Karlovy Vary approach as still applicable, see A. Gavrilov, in MEMO, July 1969.

77. At a WPC-sponsored peace rally in East Berlin in June 1969. See the report of its European security commission, Neues Deutschland, June 25, 1969. A "Resolution on European Security" issued by the WPC Presidium in April 1970 declared that the ESC project should be used to pressure Western European governments to abandon NATO and recognize East Germany (Pravda, April 7, 1970).


79. Kommunist (Belgrade), January 22, 1970.


82. TASS communiqué, January 16, 1970. The Dutch, Austrian, Icelandic, Luxembourg, and Albanian parties were not represented.


85. Czechoslovak leader E. Erban indicated that it would meet in the latter half of 1970 "in a West European capital" (CTK, April 9, 1970). A "Committee for European Security" was organized in East Germany in April to promote such a gathering (Horizont, No. 14, 1970); and a similar committee was formed in Czechoslovakia in June (CTK, June 10, 1970).


87. Mikhail Mirnovsky, in Tribune (London), June 27, 1969. This was the position repeatedly voiced by Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev during a visit to Vienna in April 1969 (interview in
Wiener Zeitung, April 10, 1969; interview on Radio Vienna, April 11, 1969; interview on West German Radio reported by Reuter, April 13, 1969). A similar opinion was expressed by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Marko (Oslo news conference, reported by UPI, June 17, 1969) and by Ulbricht (Flemish Radio interview, reported by DPA, June 27, 1969). Following a visit to Moscow in July, Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel reported that this was the Soviet position (DPA, July 28, 1969).

88. E.g., Pravda, April 20, 1969, reporting Austria's interest in a conference open to "all interested countries"; TASS, September 9, 1969, reporting a Norwegian peace group's appeal embracing U.S. participation; East German Foreign Minister Winzer's reference to Finland and Austria's views that a conference should be open to "all interested states" (ADN, May 7, 1969).

89. E.g., Jan Marko's press conference in Luxembourg, where he maintained that the question of U.S. participation was not an insurmountable obstacle (Reuter, May 31, 1969); Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister F. Puja's interview in Wiener Zeitung, May 20, 1969, maintaining that there was no obstacle to eventual U.S. participation; Hungarian Premier Fock, at a press conference in Vienna, where he said that the United States and Canada might participate since their armed forces were in Europe (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 31, 1969).


91. For the view that the Prague conference had "left the door open" to U.S. participation, see O. Vyborny on Prague Television, November 4, 1969; J. Stano, in Rude Pravo, December 1, 1969; Slowo Polskiego, November 1, 1969. Other representative views were that the issue "in no way can be considered insoluble" (Observer, in New Times, November 26, 1969); that no Eastern European country "decisively opposed" U.S. participation, but the extent of the latter's interest was questionable (K. Malczynski, in Trybuna Ludu, November 9, 1969 and December 3, 1969). The communiqué issued upon the conclusion of Danish Foreign Minister Hartling's visit to Moscow in late 1969 suggested that "all interested countries participate from the very beginning" in an ESC (Pravda, December 2, 1969). Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen reported that, during a visit to the USSR in November, he had encountered Soviet willingness to accept U.S. participation (The New York Times, December 14, 1969).


The point was made in various ways. Ulbricht repeated that it was for the "Europeans" to decide the issue (Neue Deutschland, January 22, 1970). Soviet spokesmen used the "no objection" formula (I. Zavialov, in New Times, February 17, 1970). A key Bulgarian editorial held that NATO's "request" for U.S. and Canadian participation "could be accepted" (Rabotnichesko Delo, March 14, 1970). Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter welcomed U.S. participation (address to the Hungarian National Assembly, MTI, March 4, 1970), but compared its "interest" with that of African states (address to the Belgian Royal Institute of International Affairs, Magyar Hirlap, February 26, 1970). On the other hand, the United States was taken to task for opposing an ESC (A. B. Khlebnikov, in SSHA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiia, March 1970). One Hungarian commentator did maintain that U.S. participation derived not only from the U.S. military presence in Europe, but also from the Potsdam Agreement (Magyar Hirlap, January 25, 1970).

V. Matveev, in International Affairs, February-March 1970.


D. Mel'nikov, in New Times, January 27, 1970; Pravda, January 18, 1970; Izvestiia, December 10, 1969. An East German expert noted that "the special responsibilities and obligations of the signatory-states of the Potsdam Agreement of course cannot be transferred to the participants in an ESC" (H. Barth, in Horizont, No. 5, 1970).

See Trybuna Ludu, March 19, 1969; M. Dobrosielski, in Sprawy Wsadowarodowe, April 1969 (signed to the press April 1, 1969), p. 109; and the sources cited in note 125. For the Polish position at the Geneva U.N. Committee on Disarmament meetings,
102. See the sources cited in note 125.


105. A rare exception was the view of Polish military analyst W. Wieczorek, who, looking toward "European" arms control agreements, nevertheless implied that an agreement on freezing "strategic and tactical" nuclear weapons in Central Europe should be reached at the outset of SALT. This would allegedly not affect the balance of power in Europe: Soviet "strategic superiority in Europe" was a myth since most of the Polaris fleet was stationed close to the European shores of the Atlantic. ("Arms Control and Disarmament," Polish Perspectives, December 1969.)


111. Soviet "experts" did occasionally suggest the continued relevance of earlier proposals for partial measures of regional
disarmament. See Aboltin, in Mezhdunarodnyi ezhegodnik, 1969, p. 40 (signed to the press on October 17, 1969); Kniazhinskii, Politicheskaiia strategia antikommunizma, p. 279 (signed to the press on September 2, 1969).


113. Zamlatin press conference, TASS, January 13, 1970; Radio Moscow roundtable, December 7, 1969; Maevskii, in Pravda, December 1, 1969; Radio Moscow roundtable, December 14, 1969. This view was reportedly repeated by Gromyko to Danish Foreign Minister Hartlung during his visit to Moscow in late November 1969 (Strick dispatch from Brussels, Suddeutsche Zeitung, December 5, 1969).


116. Z. Broniarek, in Trybuna Ludu, December 7, 1969; Zolnier Wolnoci, December 2, 1969. After the original Reykjavik "signal" on the issue, a Polish analyst suggested it was not made in good faith, since improvement in technology and balance of payments difficulties would dictate a unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Europe (W. Wieczorek, in Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, January 1969).


that it was still an open question whether the ESC should conclude a treaty or merely a joint announcement ("e.j.," in Prace, July 23, 1969). The only known endorsement of a treaty by a Soviet source was a passing reference by Iu. Matiukhin, in Sovetskaiia Rossia, August 26, 1969.

123. As reported by V. Teslic, in Borba, October 21, 1969.


130. E. Nevoseltsev, in International Affairs, July 1970.


134. R. Wojna, in Zycie Warszawy, June 28-29, 1970; Kniazhinskii, Politicheskata strategia antikommunismata, p. 280. Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter was frank enough on one occasion to praise Soviet-Finnish relations as a model for socialist-capitalist relations in general (Magyar Nemzet, September 20, 1969).

136. E.g., S. Zykov and M. Mikhaylov, in Izvestia, March 27, 1969.


140. Full texts in Pravda, June 24 and 27, 1970. The Memorandum was circulated to NATO and neutral European governments prior to publication.

141. This again excluded a smaller preparatory committee, reflecting Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter's rejection, earlier in June, of a proposal by the Danish Parliament that parliamentary representatives of the "Group of Ten" discuss preparations for an ESC (Oslo press conference, Hungarian Situation Report No. 22, RFER, June 9, 1970).

142. These concessions were explicitly interpreted as such. See the weekly roundtable discussion on Radio Moscow, June 28, 1970.

143. The proposed commission was explicitly distinguished from British proposals relating to a European security commission on this ground (roundtable discussion on Radio Moscow, June 28, 1970). Endorsement of such a permanent organ (as well as the professed willingness to expand cultural ties) was hinted by Brezhnev in his June 12 electoral speech (TASS, June 12, 1970). During an official visit to France in early June, Ceausescu also advocated the establishment of such an organ (I. Fintinaru, in Scintea, July 7, 1970; M. Tatu, in Le Monde (Weekly), July 8, 1970).

144. E.g., K. Lavrov, in Izvestia, July 3, 1970.

145. See the roundtable discussion among West European leftists in Izvestia, July 11, 1970.

146. See Kosygin's electoral speech, Radio Moscow, June 10, 1970; M. Rakowski, in Polityka, June 27, 1970. A deviant Polish view (perhaps representative of the new elements in the leadership) did maintain that both superpowers would be "endorsers,


150. For a comprehensive treatment, see both parts of Wolfe's Soviet Power and Europe, 1965-1969.


152. For a frank statement of this aim, see the interview with F. Visvader, Slovak Party expert on international affairs, Smena, June 5, 1969.


159. See "r.r.g.," "The Second Thaw in Soviet-West German Relations," and "Continued Improvement in Soviet-West German Relations,"

160. See especially the interview with Soviet Academician D. Mel'nikov, in Der Spiegel, January 19, 1970.


162. MEMO, July 1968 (esp. p. 105) and August 1968. See especially the difference of views of V. Gantman and M. Maksimova on the weight of "Europeanism." A similar mixed appraisal by a Polish academician is to be found in A. Kwilecki, Idea zjednoczenia Europy (Posnan, 1969, signed to the press January 14, 1969).


166. Le Monde, March 5, 1970.

168. See Zagadnienia i Materialy, June 3-16, 1970, for an interpretation to this effect directed at Polish Party activists.


171. The account of one Warsaw Pact discussion of the challenge of Western European military integration (held in October 1968) is in Przeglad Zachodni, No. 1-2, 1969, translated in Polish Press Survey No. 2215, RFER, July 23, 1969. A fuller account was published as T. Grabowski and Z. Nowak (eds.), Integracja ekonomica Europy Zachodniej i jej aspecty polityczno-militarne (Poznan, 1969). See also Iu. Zhukov, in Pravda, June 26, 1970. The agreement between Britain, Holland, and West Germany on construction of a uranium centrifuge was roundly denounced as a step in this direction (e.g., V. Borisov, in New Times, March 17, 1970).


176. E.g., A. Vela, in Lumea, April 3, 1969; speech of Prime Minister Maurer, Scinteia, April 12, 1969.


183. The Rumanian Ambassador to Sweden specifically included Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia in the proposed withdrawal of forces within national frontiers. See Rumanian Situation Report No. 75, RPER, August 29, 1969.


187. Die Welt, October 11, 1969, reported that the USSR and East Germany had privately criticized the Rumanian interpretation of the European security campaign.

188. Trybuna Ludu, May 18, 1969. For analysis and extensive documentation, see A. Ross Johnson, "A New Phase in Polish-West German Relations," RPER, June 20, July 3, and August 14, 1969.

189. For the background, see A. Ross Johnson, "A Survey of Poland's Relations with West Germany, 1956-1967."

190. I. Krasicki, in Zycie Literackie, December 14, 1969. See also R. Wojna's assertion that "full unanimity of views existed on the German question" (Zycie Warszawy, February 15, 1970).

191. Trybuna Ludu, June 29, 1969; emphasis supplied.


197. "Rapallo" was, understandably, less frequently mentioned in print. But see note 199.


201. See Polish Situation Reports Nos. 63, 64, and 66, RFER, August 8, August 13, and August 22, 1969, respectively.


207. Neue Deutschland, April 28, 1969. Emphasis supplied. This passage was omitted in the version of the speech published in Pravda (Moscow) on May 15, 1969.


209. Ulbricht, in Neue Deutschland, May 9, 1969; interview with Deputy Defense Minister H. Kessler, in Horizont, as reported by ADN, May 7, 1969.


211. Issue of September-October, 1969.


213. Horizont, No. 46 (November), 1969.


218. The revised view was first hinted at by Ulbricht himself at the 13th Plenum of the East German Communist Party (Neue Deutschland, June 16, 1970) and fully articulated by the East German leader in a speech in Rostock on July 16.
219. The Hungarian Foreign Minister did maintain that the scheme was still valid (Magyar Nemzet, January 6 and February 20, 1970). See Andras, "'European Security' and the Security of Europe," p. 47.

220. See Magyar Nemzet, October 3, 1969, criticizing Finnish President Kekkonen on the issue; Z. Komocsin, in Tarsadalmi Szemle, November 1969, quoted in Andras, "'European Security' and the Security of Europe," p. 33; Deputy Foreign Minister F. Puja, in Nepozabadsag, April 4, 1970, arguing that a small country's foreign policy must not be judged by the number or spectacular nature of its initiatives.


222. Andras, "'European Security' and the Security of Europe," pp. 21-22. Even these half steps were sufficient, however, to provoke a nervous East German warning against autonomous acts. See Dorothy Miller, GDR Situation Report No. 3, RFER, February 13, 1970.

223. The conditional character of this acceptance was reflected in the report of a Hungarian commentator that "several theses and conceptions" of the reform had been questioned "at home and abroad" (J. Dolgos, Radio Budapest, September 28, 1968) and that of Premier Fock, addressing the National Assembly, who indicated that "others feel that we have already gone too far [with economic reform]" (Nepozabadsag, March 5, 1970). For extensive documentation of the public Soviet attitude, see William F. Robinson, "Hungary's NEM: A Documentary of Soviet Views and Magyar Hopes," RFER, May 30, 1969. For the NEM itself, see "B.R.," "Hungary's New Economic Mechanism: Problems and Progress," RFER, Part I, August 8, 1969, Part II, November 6, 1969; Harry G. Shaffer, "Progress in Hungary," Problems of Communism, January-February 1970.


230. See the many statements timed with the 15th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact in May 1970, e.g., Iakubovski, in Zivot Strany, No. 10, May 11, 1970.

A European Security Conference (ESC) was first proposed by the USSR in 1954-1955 as part of an effort to block the rearmament of West Germany. In 1969-1970, just as in the 1966-1967 phase of the ESC campaign, the Soviet leadership seemed to be motivated by the desire to gain political and diplomatic leverage to consolidate its control over Eastern Europe, to exploit frictions within NATO, and reduce American influence in Western Europe. However, the ESC proposal became an instrument that individual Warsaw Pact member states used for the pursuit of autonomous policies. Romania and Poland exploited the campaign to strengthen their independence. East Germany unsuccessfully sought to use it to preserve something of the old unyielding Warsaw Pact stance toward Bonn. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria played more passive roles in the campaign. Professed Soviet interest in regional disarmament has declined, as a consequence of the enhanced internal security role of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.
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