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United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo: 1960-1964

An analysis of political, executive and military control

IN FOUR VOLUMES

Volume 1: Summary and Conclusions

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U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
by Ernest W. Lefever and Wynfred Joshua
of the Foreign Policy Studies Division
of the Brookings Institution
Washington, D.C.
June 30, 1966

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FOREWORD

This volume contains the summary and conclusions of a report prepared by the Brookings Institution for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under contract RS-63. Ernest W. Lefever of the senior staff was the project director and principal author of the report. His research associate was Miss Wynfred Joshua. The study was conducted under the general supervision of H. Field Haviland, Jr., Director of Foreign Policy Studies.

The report is accompanied by two supporting documents. Volume 3 contains 27 appendixes, and Volume 4 is a chronology of developments in the Congo. This summary is identical to Chapter 20 of the report.

Mr. Lefever wrote the report except for Chapters 7-13 which were written by Miss Joshua. Background material was prepared by the following consultants: J. Gérard-Libois of Brussels (Chapter 11); Donald Gordon, University of Alberta (Chapter 12); Thomas Hovet, Jr., New York University (Chapter 13); and Lt. Col. Austin W. Bach, USA, Ret., of Washington (Chapters 14-18) who also served as a special military consultant.

The Brookings Institution is grateful for the constructive comments on the report from an Advisory Committee consisting of Robert E. Osgood, Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of The Johns Hopkins University; Lt. Col. Bach, currently with the Atlantic Research Corporation; Colonel Clarence Nelson, USA, of the U.N. Military Staff Committee; Nathan Pelcovits and William Schaufele of the State Department; Robert E. Asher and Ruth B. Russell of Brookings. Messrs. Osgood and Asher and Miss Russell also served on the Reading Committee.

On behalf of the staff I should like to acknowledge the assistance of a number of persons here and abroad who went beyond the call of duty: Clare H. Timberlake, the first U. S. Ambassador to the Congo; G. McMurtrie Godley, the present Ambassador there; William P. Mahoney, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Ghana; Edward M. Korry, U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia; U.S. Consul Arthur Tienken in Elisabethville; Colonel Knut Raudstein, USA, and Lt. Col. Harold D. Asbury, USA, former Military Attache and Assistant Attache in Leopoldville; Colonel Arthur B. Swan, USAF, formerly of the U.N. Military Staff Committee; General Sean McKeown, Chief of Staff of the Irish Army; Lt. Col. Bjørn Egge of the Norwegian Army; Lt. Col. L. M. K. Skern of the Danish Army; and Herman Noppen, the Cultural and Press Attache of the Belgian Embassy in Washington.

This study depends to a considerable extent upon material gained in background interviews with American officials, representatives of other governments, and present and former members of the U.N. Secretariat. Mr. Lefever interviewed military and civilian officials in a score of states in Asia, Africa, and Europe. Miss Joshua made a field trip to Belgium, France, and Britain. Since most of the interviews were on a non-attribution basis, precise identification of the source is not given in certain footnotes.

The views expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the persons consulted or of the trustees and officers, or other staff members of the Brookings Institution. Nor should they be construed as reflecting the views of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other agency of the United States Government.

Robert D. Calkins
President

June 30, 1966

Introduction

This study of the largest peacekeeping operation ever managed by the secretariat of an international organization has focused on the problems of political, executive, and military control. It has examined the behavior of the international instrument in terms of the changing mandate given it by the member states. It has also examined the behavior of the member states toward the instrument and the peacekeeping operation. The Security Council resolutions on the Congo crisis provide the basic point of reference for evaluating both the integrity and efficiency of the operation.

The Secretary-General, who was authorized to "take the necessary steps" to provide "military assistance" to the Congo, was at the center of the operation. He was responsible for interpreting the mandate, keeping the operation true to the mandate, and maintaining executive and military control. The member states, acting mainly through the Security Council, but also through the General Assembly, were responsible for the ultimate political control of the operation. Their first task was to provide a workable mandate, revising and updating it in response to changing conditions. They were responsible also for giving guidance to the Secretary-General in interpreting and implementing the mandate and for calling him to account if he failed to follow their guidance. The member states had an implied obligation to provide money and manpower to underwrite their political decision to send a peacekeeping mission to the Congo.

In addition to the control problem, the question of effectiveness has been analyzed. To what extent did the Secretary-General achieve the objectives of the mandate? To what extent was inadequate performance the result of deficiencies in executive control, failures by member states to fulfill their obligations or simply technical difficulties? To what extent were any failures or weaknesses in the operation due to factors beyond the control of any internationally authorized, managed, and manned operation of the size and character of the U.N. Force in the Congo?

Addressing these questions, this study has yielded conclusions of both fact and judgment. Since the Congo experience has been so recent and so confused, the ascertaining of basic facts was often difficult.

A major objective of the study has been to identify precedents and pitfalls for possible future peacekeeping operations.

The conclusions, including lessons or guidelines for the future, are presented here under the general categories developed in the study and in the same order of the chapters of the Report. The general conclusions follow.[1]

The Legal Problem

The U.N. peacekeeping operation was legally authorized by the Security Council and materially sustained by a coalition of states, each of which believed that its interests would be better served by supporting a multilateral effort than by other means for dealing with the Congo crisis.[2] The existence of a legal international instrumentality for performing certain functions in the Congo did not suspend internal Congolese politics

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1. For quick reference to major events in the Congo the reader may refer to the one-page chronology on page 82 of the Report or the last page of the Summary Report.

2. This section is related primarily to Chapter 3 of the Report

or international politics, but it did serve as a constraint on unilateral action by outside states and curbed political action on the part of Congolese factions. At the same time, political factions in the Congo and outside governments often attempted to pursue their interests and objectives through the instrumentality of the U.N. peacekeeping force.[3]

1. Assuming that actions of the Security Council and General Assembly which are in accord with the U.N. Charter are legitimate and enjoy a status of legality in international relations, the initial authorization of the peacekeeping presence and subsequent supporting resolutions by the Security Council and General Assembly were legitimate.[4]

2. The UNF was a peaceful settlement action and <u>not</u> an enforcement action under Article 42 of Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter. Implicitly the Congo action was authorized under Article 36 of Chapter VI, which states that the Security Council "at any stage of a dispute" that is "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace" may recommend "appropriate procedures" with a view to "a pacific settlement of the dispute." No finding of aggression was necessary to act under this Article and the Security Council made no such finding.

3. By explicitly invoking Articles 25 and 49 in the August 9, 1960, Security Council resolution all member states of the United Nations were legally obligated to "accept" the decisions of the Council and to assist "in carrying out measures decided upon" by the Council. This did not mean that a state was obligated to comply with any request the Secretary-General might make, since both troop contributions and logistical support were clearly voluntary. In practical terms it meant that Belgium

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3. The particular interests of Congolese factions and states are dealt with below.

4. See pp. 28-34 of the Report. All subsequent page and chapter references are from the Report unless otherwise specified.

was obligated to withdraw its troops and other states were obligated to cooperate with and not obstruct the effort.[5]

4. A state contributing a troop contingent to the U.N. Force was legally obligated to accept the exclusive command and control of the Secretary-General and his Force Commander while the contingent was in the Congo. Since the troops were provided voluntarily, but also in "good faith" for the purposes specified in the resolutions, there was an implied obligation for the donor government not to withdraw them before the agreed termination date, except for compelling reasons of national interest.[6]

5. The U.N. Force entered the Congo and remained there with the consent of the host government. Since the "good faith" of both parties was emphasized from the start, the government could not simply terminate the U.N. mission at will. In practical terms, however, the UNF needed the consent and at least passive cooperation of the government if it was to function effectively.[7]

6. The far-reaching security objectives of the UNF, to be achieved independently or in cooperation with the Congolese Government, were beyond the limited legal authority and military capacity of the Force. In the beginning the UNF was authorized to use military force only in self-defense, but this authority was subsequently broadened by the Security Council to the use of force to "prevent the occurrence of civil war" and to apprehend and detain prohibited foreigners. The explicit constraints on the permissible use of force were somewhat offset by the right of the UNF to "freedom of movement" within the Congo, a right which was never interpreted by the UNF in a broad and unrestricted

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5. See pp. 34-38.

6. See pp. 41-44.

7. See pp. 44-47. Other aspects of UNF-host state relation are discussed below.

sense. With the exception of the September 13, 1961, action by the U. N. Troops in Katanga and the occasional use of undue force by U.N. soldiers, the UNF did not initiate the use of military force or otherwise violate the constraints on the permissible use of force.[8]

7. In spite of the vague mandate, the lack of adequate legal precedents, and continuous political pressures inside and outside the Congo, the Secretary-General (both Hammarskjold and Thant) largely succeeded in adhering to the legal principles of the Charter and observing the fundamental intent of the resolutions. Hammarskjold's interpretation of the objectives and constraints of the U.N. mission cannot be faulted on legal grounds. Neither he nor Thant exceeded his legal authority, though each man may have made errors of analysis or judgment. There is, however, no substantial evidence that either sought consciously to serve the special interests of particular governments, international blocs, or Congolese factions.

8, Many of the charges of illegality made by governments against the Secretary-General appear to be rooted in disagreements with his political judgments. There was at most points only a minimal political consensus in the Security Council sufficient to sustain the U.N. effort. Dissenting members, particularly the Soviet Union and France, were often critical of the Secretary-General's interpretation or implementation of the mandate. Nevertheless, neither Hammarskjold nor Thant was ever censured by the Security Council, and none of its members felt strongly enough to veto the enabling resolutions. If the Secretary-General pursued a course in the Congo contrary to the collective intent of the Council, it was the obligation of the members to call him to account. If the resolutions were so ambiguous that the Secretary-General could not act under one paragraph without violating another, the Council should have cleared up the ambiguity or have been prepared to accept the Secretary-General's interpretation of the mandate. In any event, if the Secretary-General exceeded his authority or otherwise violated the mandate, the Security

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8. See pp. 48-51

Council was ultimately accountable for failing to exercise its responsibilities for political control.[9]

Implications for the future: The Congo experience confirms that the Security Council and General Assembly are legally competent organs for authorizing international peaceful settlement operations which are deployed with the consent of the host state or states and which depend upon the voluntary contribution of troop contingents and specialized military units from member states. The Charter and the U.N. system generally have ample authority and procedures to authorize such operations in the future when there is a sufficient political consensus in the Security Council or General Assembly to get the necessary votes and if adequate arrangements for material support can be made. No charter revision is required to authorize peacekeeping missions of this kind.

Certain problems encountered in the Congo affair might be avoided in the future if the first enabling resolution for a peacekeeping effort more clearly identified the Charter articles under which it was being authorized. This would be especially helpful in clarifying the character of the obligation of member states with respect to the effort. Such clarity may not usually be politically possible, or in some cases desirable. Even if it were possible, the obligations could and probably would be challenged by some states, as they were in the Congo case by France and the Soviet Union.

When politically possible the terms of reference with respect to the permissible use of force of a UNF should be more clearly spelled out than in the Congo case, especially the relation of the UNF to members or units of indigenous or foreign military or police establishments in the host state or states.

The Secretary-General's legal guidelines, accepted by the Security Council, the host state, and the states contributing troops, are adequate for future peaceful settlement forces. No such guidelines have

9. See pp. 56 and 57.

been developed for an enforcement action under Article 42 which has never been invoked.

The Secretary-General

The problems of executive control by the Secretary-General, as distinct from those of military control by the Force Commander and political control by the Security Council, have to do with the basic integrity and efficiency of the command structure.[10]

Though the Secretary-General was fully responsible for the operation and accountable only to the Security Council and the General Assembly, throughout the four-year effort he had to remain sensitive to the shifting balance of political forces supporting or opposing the peacekeeping mission. Recognizing this, both Hammarskjold and Thant made a distinction between political advice in general harmony with the Security Council resolutions and political pressures contrary to them. It was this important distinction that enabled them to profit from the former and resist the latter.

1. In spite of an inadequate precedent, the novel situation, and other extenuating circumstances, the Secretary-General maintained reasonably effective executive control throughout the Congo operation. Though the integrity of this control was challenged by political pressures, administrative inefficiency, unqualified personnel, and several specific incidents involving unauthorized initiative in the Congo, it was never seriously eroded.

2. The widespread and persistent administrative inefficiency in the Congo operation can be attributed largely to inherent factors such as the vague mandate, the large number of different national units in the Force, some incompetent civilian and military officers, and the fact

10. This section relates primarily to Chapter 4. Political and military control are discussed below.

that the existing structure of the Secretariat was not equipped to handle a field operation of that size and complexity. This inefficiency led to waste, delay, and unnecessary expense, but it did not seriously compromise the control of the Secretary-General.

3. The few top-ranking U.N. civilian and military officers who failed to perform their functions properly constituted perhaps the most serious threat to the integrity of the operation. The Dayal problem and the O'Brien incident (September 13, 1961) are linked to an apparent lack of objectivity and perspective. The same can probably be said of Khiary, General von Horn, and Linner. All of these men created or permitted problems for the operation which their replacements, confronting virtually the same situation, were able to avoid. Ironically, each of the problem officers was appointed by Hammarskjold who it must be acknowledged, was not always the best judge of character and competence. This weakness was also illustrated by Hammarskjold's asking or permitting his Military Adviser, Brigadier Rikhye, to intrude into the line of command in the Congo. Available evidence suggests that the question of dual loyalty was not present in any of these cases, that none of these men was taking his instructions from his own or any other government.

Implications for the future: The designation of the Secretary-General to administer the Congo operation worked reasonably well, but led to two problems. First, the large and complex task consumed such a large portion of the Secretary-General's energy and of the resources of the entire Organization that some other activities tended to be neglected. Second, inefficiency resulted from the fact that neither the Secretary-General, with his small internationalized staff, nor the Secretariat as a whole is equipped to manage large field operations, especially when sizeable military forces are involved.

This suggests that alternative ways of administering the larger peacekeeping missions should be seriously studied. The executive agent approach is one such alternative. In the Korean operation (which

involved a sanctions force as opposed to a peaceful settlement force) the United States served as the executive agent for the United Nations, providing both political direction and military command. In the much smaller West New Guinea operation, Pakistan provided the 1,500-man Security Force which was administered by the U.N. Temporary Executive Authority under the direction of the Secretary-General. The United States and Canada made a composite air unit available to support the Force.

Under certain political circumstances in the future, the Security Council might designate an acceptable government to police a truce, patrol a border, or keep the peace in a specified area in accordance with the objectives and constraints defined by the Council. The Secretary-General could be designated to monitor the performance of the executive agent in behalf of the Security Council. Single-government administration of such an effort, while not free of difficulties, would introduce a degree of efficiency not possible when personnel of many states are involved in planning and administration.

A variation of the executive agent approach would be the designation of a politically acceptable government for one major function of a mission. Washington, for example, might be given the sole responsibility for logistical support in some future mission.

To work effectively a government serving as an executive agent would obviously have to be acceptable politically, not only to the host state, but also to other interested states. To be responsible and impartial it would have to operate under the political guidance of the Security Council or the General Assembly, with the Secretary-General or some other designated agent playing a monitoring role.

The Host State

The relationship between the United Nations and the host state, more specifically between the Secretary-General and the top leaders of

the Leopoldville Government, was greatly complicated by chaos and confusion in the Congo.[11] The Central Government was always weak and at times two competing factions claimed to be the legitimate government. During the four years there were four different governments, two of which the Secretary-General did not regard as fully legitimate. The Central Government was seriously challenged by three different secessionist movements--Katanga, Stanleyville, and South Kasai.

Drawing heavily on the simpler UNEF experience in which there was no serious disorder within Egypt, the host state, Hammarskjold formulated three basic rules to govern the relations between the U.N. Force and the Government, rules endorsed by the Security Council and the Congolese Government.

1) The UNF is present with the consent of the host state, but as long as the Force is authorized by the Security Council the Congolese Government is obligated to cooperate with it.

2) The UNF should cooperate with the host government, but should not become the instrument of the government. It should be an independent instrument, accountable only to the Secretary-General.

3) The UNF should be impartial. It should not "be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."

The conclusions with respect to these three rules may be summarized as follows:

1. The requirement for host state consent for the presence of the UNF caused little trouble. Though Prime Minister Lumumba demanded that the UNF, or at least white U.N. troops, quit the Congo, and other Congolese leaders occasionally criticized some U.N. policies or UNF actions, these demands and criticisms had little effect on the operations of the Force and no effect on its duration. Such protests were never formally presented to the Security Council.

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11. This section is related primarily to Chapters 5 and 6.

Host state consent for the presence of the UNF implied host state cooperation with the UNF for the achievement of the objectives identified in the mandate. The record on cooperation is uneven. The relation between the Government and U.N. authorities ranged from hostility (including occasional clashes between Congolese and UNF troops) to active cooperation.[12] In general, however, the UNF performed its duties without either interference from the Government or active cooperation with it.

The relation between the UNF and the ANC presented the most serious problem. The persistent tension and hostility that characterized this relationship was due partly to the vague mandate and partly to Congolese resistance to U.N. efforts to disarm, retrain, or organize the ANC. In a sense, the UNF was intended to replace both the Belgian troops and the Congolese Army, but it lacked any explicit authority to expel the former or disarm the latter.[13]

During much of this period undisciplined units of the ANC, which had abruptly lost its Belgian officer corps in July 1960, were a source of disorder rather than order. The UNF had an implicit mandate to help discipline and retrain the Army, but U.N. efforts toward this end were stoutly resisted by General Mobutu and the Government generally as an infringement on Congolese sovereignty. As the situation unfolded, Congolese authorities expressed the desire to employ European military advisers, training officers, and technicians under normal bilateral military assistance arrangements. Further, the Congolese preferred Belgian officers above all others. Hammarskjold and Dayal, on the other hand, were opposed to the utilization of Belgian officers. The U. N. Command made several attempts to establish an officer training school with a multinational staff, but the Congolese would not cooperate. In

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12. Military clashes between the UNF and the ANC are discussed in Chapter 17.

13. The problem of Belgian forces in the Congo is duscussed in Chapter 11.

April 1961 Hammarskjold finally acknowledged the right of the Congolese Government to hire Belgian nationals, and in 1963 Leopoldville entered into a formal bilateral military agreement with Brussels for training officers and advisors. It also made military aid agreements with the United States, Italy, and Israel.

2. In those areas where it did cooperate with the host government, the UNF generally did so without compromising its integrity and independence. Hammarskjold effectively resisted Lumumba's demand that the UNF invade secessionist Katanga since such action would have violated the constraints against the initiation of military force. When the UNF, at the request of Prime Minister Adoula, assisted in consolidating Leopoldville's position in Stanleyville by arresting Gizenga, the UNF was in a literal sense acting as an instrument of the host government. But with its mandate to help maintain order and to protect the territorial integrity of the Congo, the modest police assistance in this case was compatible with the U.N. mandate.

The most dramatic and controversial problem arose in connection with O'Brien's attempt to end Katangan secession by force on September 13, 1961. He used arrest warrants prepared by the Leopoldville Government as the legal basis for attempting to apprehend and detain Katangan ministers, and a U.N. plane was used to transport a Government party to Elisabethville to take control of the province. Tacitly acknowledging that such collaboration with Leopoldville was a violation of U. N. independence, U. N. authorities in the two subsequent clashes with Katanga avoided both the fact and appearance of collaboration with the Central Government.

3. Given the deep and persistent domestic political struggle within the Congo, it was impossible for the UNF to avoid becoming involved in internal affairs. The U.N. presence in important respects did "influence the outcome" of internal conflicts. The net impact of the mission was clearly to support the fortunes of the Central

Government over the rival centers in Stanleyville, Katanga, and South Kasai. The U.N. effort helped to tip the scales in favor of the moderates over the extremists and in favor of those seeking a more unified state over those supporting a loose confederation. To a considerable extent these two internal objectives found expression, implicitly or explicitly, in the Security Council resolutions.

To acknowledge that the UNF had a significant impact upon the internal situation does not mean that U.N. authorities chose sides. Both Hammarskjold and Thant attempted to be as impartial under the difficult circumstances, but the resolutions themselves took sides. On the Katanga question, they were strongly anti-Tshombe, and Hammarskjold was less partial than the Security Council. Laying aside the question of the political wisdom of the three clashes between the UNF and Katanga or the merits of the dispute between Elisabethville and Leopoldville, there were ample legal grounds for the three military actions, except for certain aspects of the September 13 operation, and the unnecessary use of force by some U.N. troops in the first two clashes.

As a whole, the UNF maintained its integrity. It was not captured, subverted, used, or even misled by the host government. It was, however, frequently criticized by governments and Congolese factions for taking sides, but often in such a way that the conflicting views cancelled each other out.

Implications for the future: The Congo experience suggests that a peacekeeping force ought not be sent into a host state rent by civil disorder and conflict unless it is operating under fairly specific terms of reference with respect to the internal situation. Further, the peacekeeping operation should be accompanied by an effort to achieve a political settlement of the dispute which occasioned the authorization of a UNF in the first place.

The need for such guidelines was dramatically illustrated by the confusion and tension caused by the presence of three independent

and sizeable military establishments on Congolese soil during the early months of the U.N. mission. The ANC numbered some 25,000 men and was in the process of ousting its 1,100 Belgian officers. By mid-July 1960 Belgian forces including paratroopers, numbered about 10,000. The UNF had grown to 16,000 by the end of August. There were no designated zones of occupation and no demilitarized zones. The relationship between the three military forces was not defined. It is vitally important that the relationship of any future UNF to indigenous or foreign military and police forces in the host state be clarified in advance to the extent that this is politically possible. Neutral or demilitarized zones should be established before the UNF arrives or as soon thereafter as feasible. The U.N. troops deployed in Cyprus and the Gaga Strip are there under conditions that approximate the requirements of this guideline, though there has been some dispute over the application of the mandate in Cyprus.

Permanent Members of the Security Council

The Congo operation was created and sustained politically by the Security Council. (On September 20, 1960, the General Assembly endorsed the previous Council resolutions. The Assembly provided financial support for the operation.)[14]

Only one permanent member of the Council, the United States, supported the U.N. mission consistently. After the fall of Lumumba, the Soviet Union was almost consistently opposed to the mission, though in the Council it either supported or abstained on subsequent resolutions. The French position ranged from indifference to opposition. Britain gave selective support. Nationalist China voted for the mission in the Security Council but did not take an active part in the protracted Congo debates.

The operation was possible in spite of Soviet and Franch opposition, because neither felt strongly enough to veto the authorizing

14. This section is related primarily to Chapters 7-10.

resolutions in the face of clear Afro-Asian support for them. Under these circumstances, Washington became the tacit leader of a working coalition of Western and Afro-Asian states supporting the effort, a coalition built upon a common view that the United Nations ought to do something and made possible by the unwillingness of the opposing big powers to press their position. The operation continued even though the Soviet Union and France refused to pay any of their assessed portion of the Congo peacekeeping costs.

Conclusions with respect to the role of the big four members of the Security Council may be summarized as follows:

1. United States: Without the assurance of American political and financial support the U.N. operation could not have been undertaken and probably would not have been authorized. Without the massive U.S. airlift, the operation could not have been launched nearly as quickly as it was. Without continued U.S. political and material support the mission could not have been sustained. Washington has provided or will provide 41.5 percent of the total cost of the operation which was $411 million.[15] During the four years the United States transported 118,091 troops and 18,569 tons of cargo into or out of the Congo, and airlifted 1,991 troops and 3,642 tons of cargo within the Congo. This means that Washington provided approximately two-thirds of the total transportation of troops into and out of the Congo.

Strong and consistent American support was rooted in the fact that Washington supported the objectives of the U.N. mission and believed the U.N. option was the best one under the circumstances. By virtue of its power and active involvement Washington had more influence over the operation than any other state, but the United Nations was not simply an instrument of the State Department.

In terms of the U.S. objective for the Congo--a united state

15. The financial aspects are discussed below.

with a moderate government representing all major factions and capable of sustaining mutually beneficial relations with Western states--the U.N. effort proved to be reasonably effective. The mission also contributed to stability in Central Africa and helped to impose rules that helped obstruct Soviet efforts to capture the Lumumba-Gizenga faction and install it as the legitimate government. The UNF did not and could not reasonably be expected to achieve the creation of a responsible Congolese army or a strong government. Nor did it prevent the increasingly serious rebel movements of late 1963 and early 1964, or the exploitation of this disorder by Moscow, Peking, and certain militant African states.

The fact that the U.N. mission helped to accomplish common objectives of the United States and other western powers does not necessarily mean that these interests might not have been equally or even better served by more direct means such as American bilateral assistance.

2. Soviet Union: At the outset Moscow saw the U.N. operation as a way of confusing or undermining the position of the West in the Congo and of advancing its own support of a Lumumba regime congenial to the purposes of the Soviet bloc. Quickly moving events in the Congo soon changed Moscow's initial support to hostility which expressed itself in virtually complete non-support of the operation and in a violent attack on the person and office of the Secretary-General.

Soviet leaders were unable to persuade the Security Council to accept their view of what should be done in the Congo, but their opposition placed some restraint upon Council resolutions and the actions of the Secretary-General. Their political opposition and financial noncooperation did not succeed in stopping the operation or even in significantly altering its course.

The net impact of the mission on Soviet interests in the Congo and Africa generally was negative. The UNF succeeded in frustrating Moscow's unilateral military support of Lumumba. The Soviet attack

on the Secretary-General prompted the Afro-Asians, whom Moscow was trying to woo, to come to Hammarskjold's defense and to reject the troika proposal.

3. France: The attitude of Paris toward the U.N. mission ranged from aloofness to opposition. As such it placed a constraint upon the operation without seriously altering its character. France's refusal to pay its assessment contributed to the financial crisis of the Organization. Occasionally French action amounted to minor obstruction of the U.N. effort, e.g. prohibiting U.N. planes from flying over French territory and the tacit permission for certain French officials in the Congo and at home to engage in pro-Tshombe activities. The covert military support of the Katanga regime from certain French Government quarters was a distinct violation of the U.N. mandate. Ironically, officially expressed French interests were served by the UNF to the extent that it helped to frustrate Soviet ambitions in the Congo and to restore stability to Central Africa.

4. Britain: London supported the U.N. operation in principle and paid its financial assessment. But Britain objected to the use of military means to effect the political settlement of internal disputes in the Congo. This was particularly true of Katanga which had close economic ties with the Rhodesian Federation. Thus, the British both helped and restrained the Secretary-General. Britain never endorsed Tshombe's secession and its officials in Katanga had a moderating influence on him. The broad British interests in the Congo and Africa, not significantly different from American and French interests, were served by the U.N. mission.

Implications for the future: The Congo effort makes it clear that a peacekeeping effort authorized by the Security Council does not require the unanimous support of its permanent members. The operation was sustained by a working coalition, led by the United States, which provided political support (the requisite votes in the

Security Council or the General Assembly) and material support in the form of men and money. Therefore, an effective and substantial UNF can be mounted and carried out if one major power strongly favors it, if there is a supporting coalition of smaller states, and if no opposing permanent members feel strongly enough to veto the enabling resolution. This would occur only when a vital interest of a permanent member was not at stake.

The Former Metropolitan Power

Belgium had a profound political, economic, and emotional stake in the restoration of order in the newly independent Congo.[16] It had an immediate interest in protecting the lives of some 87,000 Belgian citizens living there. Brussels wanted to prove to itself and to the world that it was not irresponsible in abruptly granting independence. Though the Communist and many Afro-Asian states held that Belgium was largely responsible for the Congo crisis, and though the first Security Council resolution called for the withdrawal of the Belgian troops that were attempting to restore order, Brussels from the beginning gave its support in principle to the U.N. peacekeeping effort.

Relations between Brussels and U.N. authorities were often strained because of the complex network of Belgian interests in the Congo, particularly in Katanga, and because of Hammarskjold's and Dayal's policy of excluding much-needed Belgian nationals from service in the Congo, a policy subsequently modified. Brussels speedily withdrew its troops from the Congo, except for Katanga. It was not until September 1961 that Belgian officers were finally recalled from the breakaway province where they had been assisting in the training and command of Tshombe's gendarmerie.

The seeming contradictions in Belgian policy can be understood in the light of her two major and sometimes conflicting objectives. The first was to support a strong and moderate government

16. This section is related primarily to Chapter 11.

in Leopoldville. And the second was to support Katanga as a going concern whether or not the rest of the Congo would fall apart. The Belgian Government never endorsed the secession of Katanga as such and did not recognize diplomatically Tshombe's "independent" state.

Consequently, Brussels supported some UNF policies and opposed others. With the advent of the Spaak government, Belgium became increasingly cooperative with U.N. authorities and in late 1962 adopted a policy of active collaboration with the Organization's policy toward Katanga. In May 1965 Belgium made an agreement with Secretary-General Thant which involved Belgian claims against the United Nations amounting to $1.5 million and Belgium's assessed portion of the Congo effort. As a result Brussels has paid fully her share.

In spite of the tense 1960-1961 period, the U.N. operation as a whole tended to serve Belgian interests in a viable Congo with a united and moderate Central Government.

Implications for the future: The Secretary-General's policy of opposing the full utilization of competent and knowledgable Belgian nationals was understandable in the first hectic days, given the pressures and demands of the Afro-Asians. But the prolongation of this policy when there were many qualified Belgians willing to serve, when the Congolese wanted them, and when they were desperately needed was a serious error. Apparently this policy was rooted in the assumption that Belgians were somehow politically or morally disqualified. It was also a reflection of an "anti-colonial" bias of some members of the Secretariat, many leaders of the Afro-Asian states, and some Western leaders. In the future, any U.N. operation should make full use of experts of any nationality who are qualified and prepared to make a constructive contribution if such persons are acceptable to the host government. Further, the Secretary-General should encourage their use by the government.

The States Providing Military Personnel

More than 93,000 men from 35 states served in the UNF, contributing a total of 675,000 man-months.[17] The bulk of the manpower (82.4 percent) came from 19 Afro-Asian states. Most of the specialized units and personnel came from 13 Western states (including New Zealand), ten of which were allied with the United States. Communist Yugoslavia provided 91 man-months during the first few months. The thirty-fourth donor state was the Congo itself which made available an ANC battalion to the UNF for 18 months, providing 12,953 man-months.

The Afro-Asian states fell into two broad political groups on the Congo question--the moderates (typified by Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, and Tunisia) and the militants (typified by Ghana and Guinea). All these states were interested in the successful decolonization of the Congo, and all believed, at least in the beginning, that the United Nations could play a constructive role. But they differed on what successful decolonization meant and how it was to be achieved. The militant states tended to be more "anti-colonialist," and especially anti-Belgian, and urged the UNF to use military force against secessionist Katanga. The moderates were prepared to accept continued and substantial Western and Belgian influence and investment in an independent Congo, and supported Hammarskjold's approach to Katanga. The differences between these two groups tended to subside after Katangan secession was ended.[18]

The interests and contribution of the Afro-Asian and Western donor states may be summarized as follows:

1. Every state contributing military personnel was motivated by multiple considerations. In the first place, it was reluctant to turn down a request for assistance, often stated in urgent

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17. See Volume 3, Appendix H, Charts B and E.

18. The role of the Afro-Asian states is discussed in Chapter 13.

terms, from the Secretary-General. Most states believed they should do something to help the United Nations because they regarded it as a useful organization. Many states, particularly the Afro-Asians, welcomed the experience and training for their units that UNF service would provide. The new states were often eager to show off their armed forces abroad as a symbol of their sovereignty. In political terms, most of them believed U.N. intervention would assist in successful decolonization, help maintain peace in Central Africa, and deter an East-West clash in the Congo.

2. The behavior of most of the Afro-Asian states suggests that they were more interested in decolonization (meaning primarily the ejection of the Belgians and the integration of Katanga) than in restoring order to the Congo as such. This was particularly true of the militant states, most of which withdrew their forces when the UNF failed to back Lumumba's demand to invade Katanga. But even the moderates lost interest in the Congo mission after Katanga was integrated. And none of them showed much concern about the challenges to the authority of the Central Government or to the territorial integrity of the country from Stanleyville in 1960 and 1961 or about the rebel movements of late 1963 and 1964, primarily because these threats were not "colonialist" in nature.

3. The Western donor states had a broader interest in law and order.[19] They were concerned about all challenges to a viable central government, including all secessionist movements, the subversive activities of the Lumumba faction, the unreliability of the ANC, the unilateral intervention on the part of the Soviet Union and some African states, and the Chinese-encouraged rebel movements in 1963-64. The more moderate Afro-Asian states had a somewhat greater appreciation for this spectrum of dangers than the militant ones.

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19. In Chapter 12 the role of Canada is analyzed to illustrate the interests and contributions of the Western states.

4. Providing 82.4 percent of the manpower, the military contribution of the Afro-Asian states was vital. Most important were the units of India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ghana which accounted for 61.2 percent of the total Force. Their contribution in man-months follows:

1. India . . .	142,704	4. Tunisia . . .	48,368
2. Ethiopia .	119,226	5. Ghana	39,203
3. Nigeria . .	63,617		

5. The political contribution of the Afro-Asian troops are also important because military personnel from the great powers were excluded and because non-Europeans were generally considered politically more acceptable than Europeans. Secretary-General Hammarskjold was sensitive to the racial factor, but as events unfolded it became clear that in general the acceptability of troop units or specialized personnel to the Congolese Government or people bore little relationship to their racial background. Though Lumumba called for the expulsion of white U.N. troops, even he was not consistently racist. In most circumstances Congolese authorities tended to respect European troops and officers more than their own or other African troops.

6. The Western units and specialized personnel made a significant technical contribution to the UNF. This is illustrated by the provision of communications support for the over-all operation from Canada and electrical and mechanical engineers from the Scandanavian states.[20]

7. The military personnel from all states, with rare individual exceptions, were loyal to the U.N. Command when they were in the Congo. The national contingents did not take orders from their governments, though on several occasions some militant governments threatened to give such orders. Even when Ghana was opposed to UNF policy, the Ghanaian unit remained loyal to the UNF. The opposition to the UNF on the part of most militant states expressed itself first in the threat and then in the actual withdrawal of their units,

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20. See Chapter 12.

rather than in an attempt to use their units independently in the Congo. This withdrawal temporarily jeopardized the mission, but the slack was taken up by India's decision to send a large contingent.

8. The U.N. operation served the interests of all states that sought stability in Africa and wanted Congolese independence to succeed. The operation contributed to a unified Congo with a moderate government, thus disappointing the militant Afro-Asian states that sought a stridently nationalist government.

Implications for the future: When certain donor governments became convinced that the UNF was not serving their interests, they withdrew their units. This fact, as well as the behavior of the governments that supported the operation, suggests that states will contribute troops to a U.N. peacekeeping effort only when they believe it serves their objectives. This self-interest motivation should be taken into account in any future plans and expectations, recognizing that some states define their national interests more broadly than others. No government has shown the disposition to make troops available automatically to the United Nations for any future emergency. All governments making special arrangements for stand-by units have stated reservations to this effect.

The Congo experience demonstrated that the political acceptability of troops on the part of the host state is not narrowly related to racial or geographical factors. Acceptability is rather related to the extent to which the donor state and the host state share a common interest in settling the crisis in accordance with the terms of reference established by the Security Council. The troops of a friendly state committed to the U.N. mandate tend to be politically acceptable to the host state, especially when such troops are loyal to the U.N. Command and observe the constraints placed upon them. This is not to say that geographical and racial considerations will not come into play in future missions.

The problem of political acceptability of troops to the Security Council or General Assembly is quite another matter. In this larger setting, political considerations which transcend the immediate crisis in a particular state must be taken into account. In the Congo crisis U.S. troops would have been acceptable to the Congolese Government, but not to the Security Council. In some future situation military support units or even troops from America or Russia may be acceptable to both the Security Council and the states most directly involved.

Military Problems

Recruiting and Maintaining the Force and the Role of National Contingents[21]

1. The initial recruitment of national contingents was less difficult than the maintenance of adequate force levels. In the early months Hammarskjold was able to meet his force level target and his political requirements for "African solidarity" and "universality." The Force was predominantly African, but there was significant representation from Europe and Asia. In general, the UNF depended upon the Afro-Asian states for manpower and upon the Western states for specialized support units.

2. The initial recruiting success was not based upon a common understanding among donor states of what the UNF should do, but rather upon a shared and largely spontaneous belief that something should be done. After the troops were in the Congo, political differences among the contributing states came to the surface. By mid-1961 all governments (except Ghana) having serious policy differences with the Secretary-General over the proper role of the UNF had withdrawn their troops. This pullout of the more militant states confronted the UNF with a replacement problem, but the replacements resulted in a numerically more stable and technically more competent Force.

21. This section is related primarily to Chapters 14 and 18.

3. The UNF after the Casablanca pullout was more reliable politically than the initial Force. The more militant states with a specific interest in internal politics in the Congo had been largely eliminated. The more moderate states with a broader understanding of the U.N. mandate proved to be the mainstay of the UNF.

4. There is no evidence that any of the national contingents subverted or attempted to subvert the U.N. effort, or deliberately supported any of the factions challenging the Central Government. This is true even of the units of the militant states before their withdrawal. National contingents, it is true, reacted differently toward the Stanleyville faction, but this may be ascribed largely to different circumstances.

5. Though some national contingents had direct communications with their home governments, there is no evidence that the contingent commander took operational instructions from his government which conflicted with U.N. policies. There was, of course, consultation between U.N. authorities and contingent commanders in Leopoldville, but the unit commanders were loyal to the U.N. Command.

6. Some of the larger contingents had a slight policy influence on the operations of the UNF, but this influence was motivated only marginally by national political considerations. The clearest example of this is the role of the Indian Brigade in Katanga. The Indian officer corps and the Indian Sector Commander in Elisabethville as military men were unhappy about the inconclusive results of Rounds One and Two, in which UNF efforts to arrest prohibited personnel and to extend "freedom of movement" in Katanga were aborted because of external political pressures. They were anxious to finish the job. The essentially nonpolitical pressures in the Indian Brigade were an important factor in the development of contingency plans for Round Three and for the timing of this operation. Any pressure the Indians may have exerted in this direction was in harmony with the U.N. mandate.

7. The general effectiveness of the UNF improved as the number of national contingents decreased and as the size of the contingents became larger. The Force was least effective when it most nearly reflected Hammarskjold's original criterion, including his stipulation that the major elements were "in the first place" to be drawn from Africa. It reached its maximum effectiveness (during Round Three) when its major components were supplied by countries outside Africa (India, Sweden, and Ireland.) This suggests that in many conflicts distant troops are more acceptable than those from nearby states.

8. Invidious comparisons have been made between different national contingents with respect to their general state of discipline, including black marketing activities and "atrocities." There was considerable black marketing among U.N. personnel, but it was not confined to the units responsible for internal supply, or to military personnel. Such problems are inevitable and often widespread when troops in a foreign country have access to scarce items, especially when the civilian economy is seriously disrupted. There were some serious infractions of discipline committed by U.N. troops in Katanga, obviously by members of the national units located there. The fact that there may have been unusual provocation does not excuse this breach of discipline. In the interests of perspective, it should be noted that some atrocities were committed by the Katangan side and by irresponsible ANC units outside of Katanga and that the number of infractions of discipline on the U.N. side was small.[22]

Command and Control of the Force[23]

9. Just as the Congo operation as a whole did not escape the executive control of the Secretary-General, there was never any significant loss of control over the UNF by the Force Commander or by the lower command echelons. Civilian supremacy was preserved. The integrity

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22. See Chapter 3, pp. 51-52.

23. This section is related primarily to Chapters 15 and 18.

of the command and control system was challenged but never breached. At the Leopoldville headquarters the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General did in the early days improperly impose himself into the chain of command, but this situation was rectified before any serious damage was done, and he thereafter remained only an occasional irritant rather than an obstacle in the command system.[24]

10. The most significant negative aspect of the U.N. Command system was the potential for abuse it offered, primarily because of the large number of national units represented. The multinational headquarters staff was given to informal rather than formal lines of communication. The field command structure was of an essentially single-nation character, each contingent serving under a commander of the same nationality. Under these circumstances, especially in the hectic early days, national units could have exploited the situation for purposes contrary to the U.N. mandate. That they did not strike out on their own is evidence of their loyalty to the U.N. Command, a loyalty based upon the recognition that there were compelling reasons of national interest for them to observe the terms of their contract with the Secretary-General. If the states most critical of Hammarskjold's policies had kept their troops in the Congo instead of pulling them out, the likelihood of insubordination might have been substantially greater.

11. Within the Leopoldville headquarters staff no single state or group of states captured the key policy-making positions. None exerted undue influence.

12. The principal weakness in the control system was in the Leopoldville headquarters where staff work, particularly staff coordination, was generally conceded to have been poor. The main reason for this was the assumed political necessity of assigning officers from the various donor states to the headquarters. The result was

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24. See Chapter 4, pp. 69-71, and Chapter 15.

a wide difference in individual competence, complicated by language problems and different staff procedures. This weakness was partially rectified by the allocation of key staff positions to states which could provide competent personnel.

13. As a whole, the command structure, and the supporting communications and intelligence systems, left a great deal to be desired when compared to what a competent national army could offer, but the essential fact is that the system worked reasonably well.

Logistical Support of the Force[25]

14. The major internal logistical problems of the Congo operation were rooted in the multinational character of the UNF and the political constraints against the use of skilled logistical support units from major powers.

15. It is inappropriate to apply rigorous cost-effectiveness standards to the Congo operation because of the large number of non-economic factors involved, but even under these unusual circumstances, qualified logistics personnel operating under a system of movement priorities and regulations could have effected substantial savings.

16. The lack of standardization of equipment and vehicles caused a major problem. This problem resulted from the variety brought in by the contingents and from subsequent nonstandard procurement. Uncertainty about the duration of the UNF made it difficult to tackle the problem effectively, though some progress was made in 1962 and 1963.

17. As far as external supply was concerned, there was an overdependence on airlift which resulted in unnecessarily high costs. Though there were extenuating circumstances, more careful planning would have resulted in substantially lower costs. The same is true with respect to internal transportation.

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25. This section is related primarily to Chapters 16 and 18.

18. The most efficient and reliable airlift to and from the Congo appears to have been that provided by the U.S. Air Force. Although the contractural cost of U.S. airlift was higher than that of some private contractors, it was more reliable and hence more economical in the long run. Without American logistical support, including sealift, the Congo operation would have been virtually impossible.

19. The many weaknesses in the logistical system do not appear to have had a seriously adverse effect upon the direction or character of the operation as a whole. Nor did these weaknesses lead to the loss of military or executive control. This positive result was in part fortuitous--the UNF was never put to the test of serious and sustained combat, a situation which might have occurred in Katanga.

Deployment and Operations of the Force[26]

Serving as a temporary substitute for the ANC, the U.N. Force had four major functions: 1) maintain law and order, 2) prevent tribal conflict and civil war, 3) maintain the territorial integrity of the Congo, and 4) prevent external intervention. The U.N. peacekeeping mission had a fifth function, transforming the ANC into a reliable force for law and order, but this function was not the responsibility of the U.N. Force as such.[27] In performing all its tasks, the UNF had in the first instance to defend itself. It also had to protect the personnel and installations of the various U.N. civilian activities in the Congo. In evaluating the performance of the UNF it is not appropriate to invoke standards suitable for an integrated force of comparable size operating under the command of a single government. The unique mission, the multinational composition of the Force, and

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26. This section is related primarily to Chapters 17 and 18. The larger political context is dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6.

27. The problem of retraining the ANC is summarized above [pp. 403-404].

the unusual political constraints under which it operated must be taken into account when judging how well the UNF performed its four tasks.

20. Maintaining law and order: The UNF was responsible for law and order throughout the vast area of the Congo, including Katanga where the major task was to eliminate prohibited foreigners and help restore the province to the political control of Leopoldville. At no place outside of Katanga could order be taken for granted. In addition to tribal and political conflict, the ANC units, deprived of a professional officer corps, were a constant source of disorder. Twice as many U.N. troops were killed by Leopoldville ANC soldiers, Stanleyville ANC soldiers, and anti-Tshombe tribal elements in Katanga than the 40 U.N. soldiers who died in the three clashes between the UNF and Katanga forces.[28] There was hostility between the U.N. Command and the Central Government.

Despite these circumstances, the UNF during its first three years succeeded in maintaining minimal order and actually improved the general situation somewhat. This modest improvement was due in a great measure to the political and economic efforts of friendly governments and U.N. civilian officials as well as the psychological impact of UNF presence. After July 1963 the U.N. force level dropped rapidly and the UNF was unable to prevent the rising rebel movements of late 1963 and 1964 which by mid-1964 constituted a threat to law and order and to the authority of Leopoldville as serious, or perhaps more serious, than the crisis which provoked U.N. intervention in 1960.

21. Preventing tribal conflict and civil war: The UNF

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28. According to U.N. Records 235 members of the UNF died in the Congo, 34 of natural causes, 75 by accident, and 126 in action. Forty were killed in the three Katanga actions and 86 in other clashes. See Report by the Secretary-General on the Withdrawal of the United Nations Force in the Congo (S/578, June 29, 1964), Annex VII, p. 1.

undertook a number of actions, including the setting up of neutral zones, to prevent tribal conflict and war between rival political factions and regions. Though there was considerable fighting during the four-year period, no full-scale civil war erupted. This suggests that the UNF had a positive effect. It is not possible, however, to ascribe to the UNF a decisive influence because, as in the case of law and order generally, there were many other forces working to prevent open conflict. It should be noted here that the UNF, in spite of pressure, did not join either the Leopoldville or the Stanleyville forces in a civil war against Katanga.

22. Maintaining the territorial integrity of the Congo: Here, perhaps, the UNF made its clearest contribution. Through its operations, combined with political and conciliatory efforts on the part of interested governments, none of the three secessionist movements succeeded. Nor did any of the dissenting political factions capture the Central Government. In Round Three the UNF succeeded in ending the secession of Katanga, the most serious separatist challenge to Leopoldville.

23. Preventing external intervention: This function involved eliminating prohibited foreigners and deterring outside intervention. Belgian troops, except for a small number of officers and other ranks retained in Katanga, left the Congo by September 1960. Those who stayed on in Katanga left a year later. In August and September 1961 the UNF rounded up prohibited foreign personnel of several nationalities, thus expediting their departure. When the Soviet Union was preparing to use its aircraft and ground vehicles in the Congo in behalf of Lumumba against the Central Government, the U.N. Representative in Leopoldville closed the airports, thus frustrating the Soviet design. The UNF was powerless to deter or contain the rebel movements of 1963-64, which to some extent were encouraged, influenced, and supported by Communist China. In sum, the U. N.

operation, backed by repeated resolutions from the Security Council, largely succeeded in eliminating the "Belgian factor" and in frustrating Soviet intervention, but it did not prevent the rebel movements of 1963 and 1964. This was not a military failure of the UNF, which was then being rapidly phased out, but a product of many internal and external political factors.

24. The principal cause of UNF inefficiency was its heterogeneous composition and uneven quality, and the chief cause of these weaknesses was the assumed political necessity for wide national representation. Taking these factors into account, along with the uncertain mandate and the tensions between the UNF and Leopoldville, the performance of the Force as a whole was good.

Implications for the Future: All the major military weaknesses and limitations of the UNF were rooted in political constraints, and to a considerable extent are inherent in any internationally authorized force composed of units from many states. Hence, great improvement in readiness, command and control, and efficiency cannot be expected in the future without significant changes in the political factors surrounding the establishment of a U.N. mission. Assuming the persistence of the general pattern of international conflict and accommodation which has prevailed since World War II, with the obvious constraints this places upon what the Security Council and the General Assembly can do, the Congo experience suggests a number of ways to improve the performance of future peacekeeping missions involving significant military forces. The following observations focus on efficiency, recognizing that a U.N. peacekeeping effort should be judged primarily on how well it fulfills its political purpose and only secondarily by its military efficiency. It is possible for a UNF to be politically effective without being highly efficient.

Since the efficiency of the Congo mission suffered in part because of the virtual absence of prior planning, a distinction should be made between readiness and operational efficiency.

Readiness is the capacity to deploy a fully-equipped UNF efficiently and on short notice. Operational efficiency has to do with the material cost of carrying out a mission. A state of readiness on the part of the U.N. Secretariat would contribute to a more speedy response after a mission is authorized and would help to deter certain small breaches of the peace. Many of the measures for enhancing readiness and efficiency summarized below have been advocated by governments such as the United States, Canada, Pritain, and the Scandinavian states.[29]

1. Since the establishment of a sizeable permanent U. N. force is out of the question for the forseeable future, [30] the United Nations will have to rely on improvisation in the years ahead. The quality of this improvisation can be improved modestly by a degree of prior planning on the part of the Secretariat and interested member states. It should be noted, however, that improvisation has the

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29. For detailed suggestions, see Institute for Defense Analyses, National Armaments and International Force (IDA, Final Report R-101, Study DAIS, 1963), pp. xi-xx and 51-74.

There is a remarkable consensus among U.N. officials, statesmen, and military officers who have served in peacekeeping missions, and scholars of the problem on the next steps to be taken. This consensus was expressed at an off-the-record International Conference on United Nations Security Forces held in Oslo, Norway, February 21-22, 1964, which included sixty participants from fifteen countries. The views expressed at the Ottawa Peacekeeping Conference, November 2-6, 1964, were in substantial accord with those of the Oslo Conference. The Canadian Conference, called by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, was restricted to official delegates from governments which had provided troops for peacekeeping efforts.

30. The idea of a standing military force of any size has been consistently opposed by ranking U.N. officials and virtually all governments. The political infeasibility of such a force does not necessarily mean that a small permanent observation corps would be impossible to create. A permanent U.N. peace observation corps has been recommended by a report prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, published as David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).

significant virtues of flexibility and responsiveness -- virtues that should not be sacrificed by the wrong kind of prior planning. Each U.N. peacekeeping mission has been unique. In terms of men, equipment, and weapons the requirements have varied greatly and would have been difficult to anticipate in specific terms. Stockpiles of almost any kind tend to obsolesce quickly. Further, the ad hoc character of peacekeeping missions to date has not prevented them from being reasonably successful.

2. One major way of enhancing readiness and operational efficiency would be to designate a competent government to serve as the executive agent of the United Nations for a specific peacekeeping mission.[31] Assuming that such a government would be politically acceptable to the host state and other interested states, this approach would eliminate much of the inefficiency inherent in an operation involving military personnel from many states. The international character of a peacekeeping mission derives primarily from the authority of the international mandate, not from the number of states sending personnel.

3. When the executive agent approach is not politically feasible, the Secretary-General should attempt to keep the number of participating states to a minimum and to utilize the services of governments best qualified to perform the necessary functions. His range of choice will obviously be limited by political considerations. It is significant that the Security Council never instructed the Secretary-General on how the UNF should be made up. It was Hammarskjold who insisted that the UNF must have very broad national representation. In retrospect, the operation might well have been more efficient, and just as acceptable politically, if troop and support units had been limited to ten or fewer states rather than the 34 that did participate.

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31. This idea is discussed above. [pp. 400-402]

4. Generally the size of military units in a U.N. force should be larger rather than smaller. A brigade, including all the necessary support services, is the optimum size for efficient operation. The Indian Brigade in Katanga, for example, had the necessary combat and service infrastructure to function for a sustained period under isolated conditions. Battalions and smaller units may be used efficiently if they are augmented by support elements, if they are integrated into larger self-sustaining contingents, or if they provide some special technical service such as the Canadian communications unit did in the Congo.

5. The Congo mission demonstrates that multinational units do not perform as efficiently as single-nation units. This applies to mixed infantry battalions as well as to smaller mixed support units. If the UNF is multinational, the headquarters staff probably has to be multinational. The inevitable inefficiency of a multinational staff can be mitigated somewhat by filling the key positions with qualified personnel who speak the same language and share the same general military tradition.

6. Under present political conditions and for pragmatic reasons, English is recommended as the official working language of any sizable U.N. operation. All key officers, including all contingent commanders should be required to pass an oral and written English test before assignment. This test should be comprehensive and not confined to military terminology. Second languages may be necessary.

7. In future U.N. missions, the Secretary-General should be prepared to face the intelligence problem more directly than was the case in the Congo where the euphemism "military information" was used. The Congo operation suffered from this inhibition as well as from the lack of qualified intelligence personnel. In a multinational UNF the gathering and use of intelligence is obviously more difficult than in a single-nation operation.

8. For reasons of sovereignty, pride, and national tradition, states will rarely if ever transfer to a multinational command the responsibility of imposing punitive sanctions on members of their own military establishment serving in a UNF. In all serious disciplinary cases in the Congo the man involved was turned over to his national contingent commander to be dealt with according to the laws and customs of his state. Nevertheless, the U.N. Secretariat could attempt to develop a minimal code of military discipline in consultation with past donor states for the moral and symbolic effect it might have. At the very least, any future donor state should agree in advance to deal with severe cases of indiscipline, crime, or insubordination involving one of its nationals in a UNF according to its national code. The U.N. Command should retain the right to repatriate any soldier or officer found guilty of a serious violation of military discipline.

9. The United Nations is not expected to engage in "psychological warfare," but it should be in a position to interpret the purpose and policies of any peacekeeping mission to the public in the immediate area of operations as well as to the world at large. The Congo operation suffered because of fair to poor public information program. This problem can be corrected only by a full recognition of the importance of public information and the employment of qualified specialists.

10. Turning to the question of readiness, the capability of the United Nations to move quickly would be enhanced by further "earmarking" of units and other military capabilities by member states. About a dozen countries have indicated to the Secretary-General their intention of providing certain capabilities in support of future peacekeeping operations. Washington has repeatedly expressed its intention to make available logistical support, reserving the right to judge each U.N. request for assistance in terms of its national interests. All other "earmarking" governments have stated the same reservation. Earmarking does not require that the unit or capability

be segregated from the regular military establishment of the potential contributing state, but in some cases, such as the Scandinavian Brigade, the units will receive some special training and indoctrination for possible U.N. service. The Congo experience demonstrates that special indoctrination, while desirable, is not an essential prerequisite for effective performance. Far more important is the quality of the unit and the willingness of the troops and officers to take orders from the U.N. Command, including orders which define the constraints under which the UNF is operating. Any good soldier can make an effective contribution to a mission if he has the necessary equipment and obeys his superiors, assuming his superiors are loyal to the mandate and make wise decisions for implementing it.

11. As states indicate their intention to provide military support for a future mission, the Secretary-General can compile what might be called a "capability inventory," from which he can draw when a mission is authorized, if the potential donor politically supports the mission. The larger the "capability inventory" the more political options the Secretary-General would have.

12. The establishment within the Office of the Secretary-General of a modest Military Advisory Staff of perhaps six to ten competent officers would enhance both readiness and operational efficiency, but the prospects of achieving this staff increase are very slim due to the opposition of the Soviet Union, France, and other members.[32] Should the political situation eventually permit the creation of a modest

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32. As of March 1966, for example, the Military Adviser, Major General Rikhye who had held the post since 1960, was serving as the UNEF Commander, and his New York staff consisted of two officers--a Canadian Army colonel, who had been serving as the U.N. military representative in the Dominican Republic since the summer of 1965, and a Finnish Army major who was actually on duty in the otherwise empty Office of the Military Adviser.

Advisory Staff, such a staff could perform a number of important tasks, including information gathering, operational planning, the compiling of a "capability inventory," and the preparation of regulations and manuals to standardize future U.N. operations.[33] The manuals, for example, should deal with general military doctrine, discipline, administration, command, and control, and the unusual political constraints of a U.N. peacekeeping mission, as well as with logistics, intelligence, communications, and other customary military problems. The writing of competent manuals is a formidable task and should probably be assigned to experts outside the U.N. Secretariat. Their preparation need not await the creation of a more adequate Military Staff. Canada might prepare the manual on communications, the United States the one on air transport, the World Health Organization the one on preventative medicine, and so on.

13. None of the above measures designed to enhance readiness or operational efficiency, or all of them together, will have more than a marginal effect on the probability of a U.N. mission being authorized in any future crisis. Whether the Security Council or the General Assembly will authorize a UNF will be determined by the interplay of power and interest among member states at the time.

Financial Problems[34]

The Congo effort was the most costly operation ever managed by the U.N. Secretariat. Political differences over the purpose of

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33. It is not difficult for any military staff officer to identify functions appropriate for a small U.N. Military Advisory Staff. If the Staff is large, the task is even easier. The problem is to achieve sufficient political consensus among U.N. members to permit the establishment of even a small permanent staff.

34. This section is related primarily to Chapter 19. See also Appendix Z in Volume 3.

the mission resulted in the refusal of the Soviet Union[35] and France to pay their shares of assessed costs. Their refusal precipitated a financial crisis for the Organization and ignited a protracted debate over the application of Article 19 for peacekeeping operations.

1. Averaging more than $100 million a year, the total operation cost $411,200,000. On June 30, 1964, the day the last soldier left the Congo, the Organization still owed about $104 million for the mission. A year later there were still unpaid obligations of about $48 million--almost $25 million was owed to governments and $23 million to other U.N. accounts.

2. Of the total costs, the United States has paid or will pay $170,722,802 or 41.52 percent; this includes the U.S. share of the bond issue repayment. Of this total, $43,396,608 was a voluntary contribution in addition to Washington's assessed share.

3. Twelve other governments (eight of them U.S. allies) contributed voluntarily a total of $2,644,029.

4. The United Nations was obligated to reimburse governments providing troops only for the "extra and extraordinary costs" incurred. Specifically, the U.N. obligation included reimbursement for the regular overseas allowance of every man and officer in accordance with the laws of the contributing state. The Organization paid in addition a U.N. daily allowance of $1.30 to every man and officer in the UNF, regardless of nationality. Several governments, notably Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, required also U.N. reimbursement for the basic salary of all personnel serving in the UNF.

5. Different economic levels and laws of the contributing states led to drastic differences in pay for men serving in the Congo.

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35. The Soviet Union did, however, contribute $1.5 million to the Congo effort in the form of initial airlift for which it did not request U.N. reimbursement.

The average monthly salary of a member of the Swedish contingent was about $270 and the average monthly allowance was about $120, or a total of $390. This stood in sharp contrast to the average monthly income of $33 for an Indian in the UNF. This disparity in income for performing the same function had an adverse effect on the morale of the low income soldiers. Unable to alter the basic disparity, the U.N. daily allowance of $1.30 tended to equalize the remuneration in the field. Equalization in the Congo was further advanced by an agreement with many contributing states not to make the salary or overseas allowance available to their troops while in the Congo.

6. There was even greater disparity in direct U.N. costs for troops. For the average Swede, the Organization paid $390 compared to $8 for the average Indian, since India, like most contributing states, did not require U.N. reimbursement for salary. Later India was paid somewhat more, but a very wide gap remained.

7. The U.N. obligation to reimburse contributing states for lost or depreciated supplies and equipment taken to the Congo has resulted in a protracted series of claims negotiations. As of September 30, 1965, there were unsettled claims from donor states involving approximately $18 million. As of June 30, 1965, the United Nations still owed Washington $4,577,000 for services and equipment.

8. Through most of the Congo operation the political decisions were made by the Security Council and the financial decisions were made by the General Assembly. The costs have been financed by a combination of assessment, a bond issue, and voluntary contributions.

9. The United States, which will have paid 41.52 percent of the Congo costs, had greater influence over the operation than any other state, but this influence fell far short of control. U. S. influence was less the result of its strong financial support, than of its active political support of which its financial assistance was a symbol. The degree of financial support or non-support of a state was usually a

barometer of political support. This was particularly true of the major powers. France and the Soviet Union opposed the mission and have refused to pay anything for it.

Implications for the Future

1. The pragmatic approach to financing the Congo peacekeeping operation reflected two basic principles that are difficult to reconcile--the principle of collective responsibility and the principle of respecting and safeguarding the interests of member states. The United States, which adheres to both principles, adopted the pragmatic approach in 1965. The combination of various kinds of voluntary support appears to be the accepted solution among U.N. members for the foreseeable future. This means that the burden of financing will fall on the governments supporting, or at least not opposing, a particular U.N. mission. If there is sufficient political consensus to authorize a UNF, the problem of financial support will focus on an equitable plan for sharing costs among the non-opponents.

2. The nonpayment of a particular state--whether recognized as a right, an excusable exception, or an unfortunate breach of the principle of collective responsibility--is in fact an important safeguard for a dissenting state, so long as no efforts to compel payment are taken. In a voluntary international organization no government should be compelled to help finance an operation it believes to be against its vital interests.

3. Though the financial problem is fundamentally a political problem, the capacity of the United Nations to underwrite peacekeeping operations could be enhanced by any or all of three measures that could be legally adopted by the General Assembly:

a) Include in the U.N. budget, as a regular expenditure for Secretariat services, support for a modest increase in the present Military Advisory Staff. The Soviet Union and some other states would doubtless oppose this measure.

b. Create by regular assessment or by voluntary contribution a fund of perhaps $50 million, to be available only for the immediate needs of an authorized UNF. This proposal would probably receive considerably more opposition than the provision of funds for an enlarged Military Advisory Staff.

c. Maintaining within the General Assembly a special finance committee to consider various ways to underwrite present and future peacekeeping costs.

4. The Congo experience suggests that the Secretary-General should attempt to obtain the services of all national contingents on substantially the same financial basis, preferably each government providing its troops without direct reimbursement for either salary or overseas allowance. The state would pay its men and officers according to its own laws. The United Nations should underwrite all other costs. Donor states should have a right to claim some credit toward their peacekeeping assessment for any troop contribution, but in no case should a state be permitted to profit financially at the expense of the Organization.

5. Recognizing that in any multinational force including troops from developed and underdeveloped states there will be great differences in remuneration, the United Nations should continue and strengthen its efforts to equalize spending money in the field.

Concluding Note

It should be emphasized that the foregoing summary is a necessarily over-simplified picture of the analysis and findings developed in the first 19 chapters of the Report.

Though this study focused almost exclusively on the Congo peacekeeping operation which came to an end on June 30, 1964, occasional references have been made to subsequent U.N. developments in the peacekeeping field. All these developments, whether in New York or in Cypros, have reinforced the conclusions drawn in the first instance from the Congo experience.

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