The Military Advisor as Defined by Counterparts

by

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Prefatory Note

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INTRODUCTION

Because of a generally accepted understanding of what constitutes a government in a functional sense, it has become possible to empirically identify conditions associated with changes in foreign governments. The role of the American military representative to the military forces of those governments is much less well defined. There is a need for orderly thinking to determine the concept of a Military Assistance Program (MAP) advisor. Before we can identify the factors that account for successes and failures of advisor efforts, we need to ask "What is an advisor?"

Lack of consensus contributes to the difficulty of attaining a generalized understanding of the advisory role. Criteria are needed to separate, from among advisors' myriad features, those characteristics that seem to make a difference. Disputes about the definition of a mile or a mother either do not arise or are quickly resolved because we have all been taught the same rules to tell the difference between a mile and a yard, or between a mother and a sister. Rules to distinguish between an advisor and a "non-advisor" are more primitive and less generally shared, than is commonly assumed. The need for a set of rules is great in order to determine whether a difference makes a difference. We need to systematically separate important from unimportant characteristics, relevant from irrelevant, significant from trivial, before we can begin to apply scientific techniques to the control, selection, training, and management of military advisors.

RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL APPROACHES

At least two general approaches to the definition of an advisor are possible. A rational approach can yield a definition based on impressions generated by contrasting what seems to be known about the conditions and characteristics of MAP assignments to non-MAP assignments. The second approach takes a rationally derived rule for discriminating between what is and is not an advisor, converts the rule into a set of operations with which to obtain observations that can be tested empirically for relationships to, or ability to discriminate between, personnel who do or do not satisfy the rational definition.

Results based on this approach have yielded a behavioral definition of an advisor from the point of view of a counterpart. The findings, briefly described below, suggest some implications for
people who are likely to become advisors or who are concerned with advisor preparation.

Rational Approach

The rational approach is an appropriate way of referring to mental activities that occur when military personnel are assigned to implement the Military Assistance Program and inquire as to the nature of the assignment. Answers to three related questions have implications for their selection, training, and management. First, what are the essential characteristics and objectives of the Program? Second, how do the conditions under which MAP objectives are sought differ from those of other missions? Third, what do the conditions specific to the Program require of personnel to a degree ordinarily not required?

To undertake a meaningful and comprehensive description of the essential characteristics and objectives of the MAP is to invite dissent because experiences and opinions differ. However, when pared to the bones, this Program, in any given country, is a lengthy multi-tiered, wide-ranging, complicated set of exchanges of tangible goods and intangible services and assets. The basis for the association between individual advisors and counterparts is rooted in the exchange of things and thoughts.

The ultimate objectives of these exchanges are two-fold: First, to increase the capability of the host government to deter those who would force change by violence and, second, to secure the support of the host country for the presence and policies of the United States. Counterparts, while seldom short on ideas concerning what their needs are and plans with regard to the uses for resources, are almost always short with regard to the economic and technological resources required to enhance their security at the individual, organizational, and national levels. Competition for scarce and valued resources and decisions concerning their management—acquisition, development, organization, and use—ensure that differences will emerge between advisors and counterparts. Similar conditions are as characteristic of relationships between counterparts as they are of relationships between non-advisory personnel in both MAP and non-MAP assignments.

In answer to the second question concerning the specific conditions of the MAP advisory role, one factor is outstanding: the absence of a mutually accepted, commonly shared, single authority invested with powers to regulate the differences that emerge. Advisors typically have command-type responsibilities without command authority. Whereas the commander of a U.S. unit can use conventional rewards and penalties to reconcile differences that may emerge between him and those upon whom he depends for the accomplishment of his mission, advisors are without those sticks and carrots.

One important consequence of this difference between MAP and non-MAP kinds of duties is that interactions between MAP advisors and counterparts are less compelled and more optional. Disagreements and disputes concerning who will do what, when, where, and how well,
whether they reflect different opinions, attitudes, values, cultures, or judgments can, when they occur among members who are subject to a common authority, be resolved expeditiously. Within a single military organization, persons seldom have the option of persistently opposing co-workers by simply refusing to work together. When separate authorities have control, the respective subordinate workers enjoy greater freedom when it comes to deciding whether they will continue to work together.

This is of vital consequence to personnel assigned to implement the MAP for several reasons. First, the kinds of changes they seek to effect depend on counterparts. Advisors in one Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) report that, on the average, about 50% of the work associated with the changes sought was done by their co-workers in the indigenous force. Second, the most important changes advisors seek, on the average, take between six and nine months to accomplish. During that time, advisors met with their principal counterparts, on the average, around two to three times a week. Third, progress toward effecting the changes advisors seek is, on the average, retarded by about three months. Most obstacles are ascribed to the counterparts; the largest single category consists of differences concerning values, motives, and attitudes.

Attention to the greater voluntary nature of advisor-counterpart interactions is warranted because, in general, objectives of the MAP cannot be realized if advisors or counterparts are, in effect, "drop outs" from the Program. Willingness to continue working together is the sine qua non of it. Thus, the answer proposed to the third question, is that conditions specific to the MAP require of personnel the motivations, knowledge, skills, and other characteristics that elicit from counterparts a willingness to continue to work with advisors.

**Empirical Approach**

The empirical approach to defining this role requires, first, the development of a method to obtain estimates of the willingness of counterparts to continue working with specific advisors. Second, it requires development of methods of collecting information descriptive of the personnel. Third, it requires statistical procedures appropriate to identifying significant relationships between the two sets of information. A pilot study, using this rule to define an advisor, was conducted using information provided by members of the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAAG) and their counterparts in the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). The following is necessarily an abbreviated account of part of the study, a portion of the findings, and some of the implications. Three technical reports describe the research in detail.

Proficient Advisor-Counterpart Transaction (PACT) Scores

From an experimental point of view, the most convincing kind of observation that might have been made to identify advisory effects of members of K1AG would have been to offer counterparts, without penalty, an opportunity to terminate their particular association. However, operational requirements forced us to obtain substitute estimates by means of the responses of counterparts to items in a dichotomously scored checklist. Most of the items were declarative statements about the advisor, either complimentary or uncomplimentary, from which inferences could be made. Each counterpart rated only that member of K1AG who had previously identified him as the one member of ROKA with whom and through whom he sought to make his most important changes. We call these ratings PACT scores to suggest that they reflect at least one significant aspect of Proficient Advisor-Counterpart Transactions. Total scores are taken as an estimate of the counterpart's willingness to continue working with the advisor.

Additional data, descriptive of the members of K1AG who had been rated by counterparts, were collected with regard to (a) selected biographical characteristics, (b) certain characteristics of their job-related interactions, and (c) characteristics of social interactions with the specific counterpart and other foreign nationals. Also, counterparts described (a) the advisor in terms of his personal traits, (b) the types of his behaviors of which they approved or disapproved, and (c) their impressions of what the member of K1AG seemed primarily concerned about in their associations. Relationships between these characteristics and PACT scores permit an empirically based definition of their conception of a MAP supervisor.

COUNTERPARTS' CONCEPTION OF AN ADVISOR

From among the multitude of characteristics of advisors tested for relationship, two general categories stand out. The first consists of counterparts' descriptions of the personal traits of those in K1AG who succeeded in establishing an advisory relation to them, and the second consists of a limited number of relatively specific types of acts that are expected from them.

Personal Characteristics

The personal traits that appear to make the greatest difference to counterparts coalesce to form a single statistical factor. Those traits are associated with the counterparts' impressions of how trustworthy the person is, how enthusiastically he acts toward them, how competently he performs his job, how harmoniously he gets along with them, and how thoughtful and sincere he appears to be.
Crucial Role Behaviors

The relatively specific kinds of behaviors that appear to make the most difference to counterparts can be summarized by a single theme. They want to continue working with U.S. Military personnel who will support them in a wide variety of ways. Chief among those ways is the procurement of materials, supplies, and equipment. In the eyes of counterparts, a U.S. military person becomes an advisor when he advocates his counterpart's requests and recommendations when they are staffed by the advisory group. The American becomes an advisor when he supports his counterpart in satisfying requests that have been levied on him by the counterpart's superior officer, and when he keeps his counterpart informed on the status of requests, plans, and work in progress. He becomes an advisor when he displays an interest in becoming knowledgeable about the counterpart's language, history, economy, customs, and the feelings of the people with whom he is interacting.

If it is accepted that a counterpart must be willing to associate with a member of an advisory group in order for that person to become, in the eyes of a counterpart, an advisor, then it can be said that U.S. personnel cease being viewed as advisors when they behave in ways that suggest, correctly or not, that they are limiting the degree to which counterparts can control use of the Military Assistance Program. They cease being advisors when they behave in ways that suggest, erroneously or not, that they have failed to discriminate differences between what is customary in the two military organizations, or having done so, expect the counterpart to adopt the American way. They cease being advisors when they behave in ways that imply that information derived from counterpart sources is less trustworthy than that originating from American sources. These are the kinds of characteristics and behaviors we often find having an influence on the willingness of counterparts to work with advisors. They are, in that sense, characteristics that define the advisor role from the point of view of the counterpart.

IMPLICATIONS

Examination of the personal traits and role behaviors counterparts implicitly use to define an "advisor" brings us back to the characteristic of the Program that initially brought them into contact—exchanges. An old French concept epitomizes what is an advisor from the perspective of counterparts: noblesse oblige—from him to whom it appears much has been given, much is expected. Power and position obligate the person to use his resources honorably, generously, and responsibly in his transactions with those whom fate has treated less favorably. Mindful of this, personnel assigned to implement the MAP must also, in their interactions with counterparts, act in ways that do not diminish their power and position. To preserve their individual, organizational, and national positions they must seek both to maximize their bargaining positions and optimize the uses of the resources for which they have management responsibilities.
Between points of view of the American and his counterpart, stretches a barely visible tightrope that both must somehow learn to walk together. The voluntary and optional nature of their associations, plus the inevitability of differences between them, suggest that imaginative use of interpersonal **quid pro quos** may help to reconcile many of those differences and help both to get in step and thereby maintain the balance required to move ahead. Departures from static positions held by either member concerning who will do what, when, where, and how well, can then occur.

Clues to the kinds of actions and, just as important, inactions, that personnel assigned to the MAP can use to induce cooperation and promote the willingness of counterparts to continue working with them are to be found in their counterparts' conception of the advisory role and the conditions under which they interact. Given the absence of a single institutionalized authority capable of regulating their interactions, advisors can, to some extent, compensate for this by **personalizing** their relations to counterparts. Counterparts' sense of well-being can be, in part, either enhanced or diminished by advisors. Opportunities to exert this kind of influence may well depend upon how trustworthy, enthusiastic, competent, harmonious, thoughtful, and sincere the advisor is perceived to be. Establishment of this image with counterparts may then provide occasions to give or withhold from them the personal kinds of support they seek. Therein lies the opportunity and means by which it can become possible for advisors to reward the expressions of those attitudes, beliefs, and motives that contribute to the formation of a working relationship conducive to the accomplishment of the mission of increasing both the military capability of the indigenous force and gaining their support for the presence and policies of the United States.

The effective use of interpersonal **quid pro quos** requires that personnel assigned to implement the MAP be granted a degree of autonomy that enables them to deal flexibly with counterparts. Flexibility is needed with regard to selecting the counterpart with whom he can work most effectively. Flexibility is needed with regard to deciding which of the several kinds of support, favored by the counterpart, will be given. Flexibility is needed with regard to the timing and scheduling of those events. While the programming of any international or country-wide program cannot be tailored completely to the needs of individual advisors and counterparts, all possible recognition should be given to those needs, and provision for them incorporated into the basic Program.
An attempt to define the characteristics of successful Military Assistance Program advisors has been made as part of a research effort which has the ultimate aim of applying scientific techniques to the selection, training, and management of advisors. Data describing the work of advisors have been collected from both advisors and their counterparts. This paper mainly discusses the characteristics and behaviors of the successful advisor as viewed by counterparts.
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