SOVIET CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATION NETS

Notes for a History of the Structures of the Intelligence Services of the USSR

by

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Modern historiography has tended to overlook the role of police and intelligence services in the great social movements of history. Yet, since the days of Fouché, this has been a factor that historians ignore at the peril of gross error. Obviously, seminars on this topic would be difficult to conduct.

CONTENTS

Preface 1

I. Introduction 1

II. Patterns of Soviet Strategic Intelligence 7
   A. Secrecy versus Communication 7
   B. Purposes 15
   C. Personnel Recruitment and Attrition 16
   D. Training 26
   E. Networks 30
   F. Communication Methods and Technology 32
   G. East Asia Operations 35
   H. Effectiveness 37

III. Soviet Coordination of the International Communist Movement 41
   A. Informal Networks 42
   B. Cominform 46
   C. Foreign Section, CC, CPSU 54
   D. Bloc Liaison Section, CC, CPSU 61
   E. Politburo Commission for Foreign Affairs 63
   F. Special Section, CC, CPSU 64
   G. Agitprop Section, CC, CPSU 68
   H. Communist Front Groups 69

IV. Comintern (1919-1943) 72
   A. International Liaison Section (OMS) 72
   Table: Membership in Comintern Cells in China, 1929 75
   Chart: Comintern Organization, 1919-1943 79

V. Profintern (1920-1937) 80
   A. International of Seamen and Harbour Workers (ISH) 80
   B. Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) 82
CONTENTS
(continued)

VI. Military Intelligence (GRU) 84
   A. Far Eastern Networks 97
   B. Outer Mongolia 106
   Table: Directors of the GRU, 1920-1962 107
   Chart: Organization of Soviet Military Intelligence 108

VII. Naval Intelligence 109

VIII. State Security (Secret Police) 113
   A. Foreign Administration (INU, formerly INO) 117
   B. Committee of Information (KI) 119
   C. Executive Action Section 120
   D. Far Eastern Networks 127
   E. "Legal" Nets in Japan 130
   Charts: History of the Soviet State Security Agencies 114
           INO Organization, 1941-1953 122
           INO Organization, 1954-1964 123
   Tables: Chiefs of the INU (former INO) KGB 124
           Chiefs of the Executive Action Section, INU, KGB 126

IX. Foreign Ministry (Minindel, formerly Narkomindel) 133
   A. The Foreign Service as Cover for Other Services 136
   B. Special (Tenth) Department 140
   Table: Expulsions of Diplomats for Alleged Espionage, 1947-1961 138

APPENDIX A: Glossary of Intelligence Terms 142
APPENDIX B: Other Cases and Topics of Soviet Strategic Intelligence 158
APPENDIX C: Biographical Directory of Soviet Intelligence Personnel (Separately bound as pp. C-1 through C-127) 177
APPENDIX D: Bibliography 177
This paper was written in conjunction with my studies of Soviet Foreign Correspondents, Soviet Journalists in China, and Guerrilla Communications. Like those other studies, it was sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the U.S. Department of Defense, under contract #920F-9717, monitored by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) under contract AF 49 (638)-1237.

Although prepared only as a private background working paper to the above three sponsored studies and two other manuscripts written while temporarily a graduate student—Soviet and Chinese Clandestine Arms Trade and Submarines as Weapons of Covert Intervention in Limited War—this study is issued to a wider audience as a convenient summary of information that is otherwise generally dated, somewhat obscure, often incorrectly reported, and quite scattered.

In view of the unusual topic of this paper and the fact of its financing by the U.S. Department of Defense, the reader should be informed that it does not in any way represent a commissioned product of the U.S. Government. It was initiated solely as a private reference for my own use in preparing the other papers listed above. Moreover, the research was done entirely on a public (i.e., "unclassified") basis and the manuscript has not been reviewed by any U.S. official.

I acknowledge my indebtedness for helpful discussions and bibliographical references to my colleagues at the Center for International Studies, the late Mr. Alexander G. Korol, Miss Amelia C. Leiss, Professor Uri Ra'anani, and Dr. Robin Remington, and to Mr. Francis Rendall of the British Foreign Office. Above all, however, I must express my great debt to Dr. William R. Harris of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. His generous help in giving criticism, providing a sounding board, and supplying many references from his vast bibliography of intelligence (soon to be published in abridged form by Harvard University.

PREFACE
Press) has added much of value to my work.

The research and final draft was completed three years ago, in December 1966. Since then a large number of important new materials have been published. As only an additional week was available (in September-October 1969) for editing, few additions and corrections could be incorporated.
I. INTRODUCTION

This paper briefly describes the history, organization, operations, and personnel of the clandestine communications networks operated by the Soviet Union. Its general purpose is to provide a conveniently summarized reference work on this subject. Its specific purposes are three-fold: first, to describe and document the links between Moscow and Communist underground and guerrilla movements; second, to array the evidence for direct Soviet channels of communication to such movements; third, to demonstrate the non-monolithic nature of Soviet intelligence, a point that continues to be widely misunderstood, despite the small flood of Soviet memoirs that has emerged since 1956. The monstrous glamour of the state security or "secret police"—under its succession of familiar acronyms: Cheka, OGPU, GPU, NKVD, NKGB, MVD and KGB—has too long obscured the other co-existing organizations that have comprised the Soviet intelligence community. Of particular importance is the GRU, the Army's military intelligence service, which since 1918 has proven a generally effective, widely active, highly professional, and appropriately unobtrusive foreign intelligence service.

This paper is deliberately limited in four ways. First, it is largely limited geographically—to the Far East and Southeast Asia. This was done because an extensive and, in many cases, reliable literature is readily available on Soviet clandestine intelligence, information, and command nets for the other areas of the world. But, for Asia, the documentation remains widely scattered. Thus this present paper constitutes a preliminary contribution to the specific topic of Far

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1 See my Soviet and Chinese Clandestine Arms Aid (draft, 1965).

2 The best single general work despite numerous omissions and errors in dates and biographical identifications is still David J. Dallin, Soviet Espionage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).
Eastern intelligence.¹

Second, it is not concerned with espionage or other secret operations per se. Such operations are described only to the extent they illuminate the clandestine aspects of the following subjects:²

1) Communications links between local Communist organizations and other countries.

2) Sources of arms and other equipment.³

3) Sources of financing.

Third, this paper does not discuss the effectiveness of these clandestine networks in transmitting influence, subversion, or control from their centers in Moscow or Peking to the countries in which they operate.⁴

Fourth, and finally, there is no systematic analytical effort to relate the structural and functional changes in Soviet clandestine organizations to Soviet political policies—domestic or foreign. I

¹Indeed the original draft subtitle was: "With Special Reference to East Asia." Aside from several monographic works on the Sorge network and other specialized topics, the only books to appear on Far Eastern intelligence are two notably bad ones: Kurt Singer's fictionalized Spy Stories from Asia (New York: Funk, 1955) and Ronald Seth's Secret Servants (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957).

²For example, the early Cold War investigations of both the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security Affairs and the House Un-American Affairs Committee elicited vast testimony and documentation bearing on Soviet espionage and intelligence operations in the Far East; but, as these were undertaken with a particular intention of demonstrating Soviet influence on U.S. policy, the quality of evidence on the detailed operations and organization of Soviet secret operations outside the U.S. is generally poor.

³This specific topic is treated separately in my Soviet and Chinese Clandestine Arms Aid (draft, 1965).

⁴The question of such policy control is the central topic in Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953); Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958); and particularly in a superb draft study by Mr. Francis J. Rendall of the British Foreign Office Research Department.
must concede that these political factors were critical in determining the purposes, personnel, style, and effectiveness of these organizations. However, while a comprehensive analysis of this topic awaits its researcher, the separate elements have been excellently expounded by several of the specialists in Soviet affairs cited in this work, particularly R. Conquest, D. Dallin, M. Fainsod, and R. Slusser.

These four intentional limitations on the scope of this paper constitute much of the content and context of the topic. Thus, the very narrow focus of this paper—to describe the channels of clandestinity—should not tempt the reader to conclude from this paper’s demonstration of a remarkable continuity in certain Soviet policy and intelligence channels such as the Central Committee Secretariat, state security, and military intelligence organs, that the purposes and content of these instruments of Communist and Russian power have not undergone dramatic changes. Indeed, some of the often sharp variations are evident in the very papers for which this one serves as a background monograph.¹

This paper is, in one sense, an introduction to the general subject of Soviet strategic intelligence. In another sense—one determined by the specific research in which I have been engaged—it is an introduction to a special problem of the relationship between strategic intelligence and national security, that is, the acquisition for, transmission to, and interpretation of foreign information by the Soviet leadership. There are excellent studies of the attitudes or viewpoint of the Soviet leaders—by N. Leites, R. Bauer, and others. There are also detailed studies of the composition and changes in that leadership—by B. Nicolaevsky, J. Armstrong, Z. Brzezinski, etc. There are studies of Soviet decision-making—by S. Ploss and myself.

¹Namely, the author’s papers: Operation BARBAROSSA, Daily Monitoring of the Western Press, Soviet Foreign Correspondents, Soviet Journalists in China, Guerrilla Communications, Soviet and Chinese Arms Aid, Soviet Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, and Guerrillas in the Spanish Civil War. For publishing details see the Bibliography.
And there are many assessments of Soviet foreign relations and foreign policy—by M. Shulman, W. Griffith, etc., etc. However, there are very few studies of the sources, processing, and quality of the types of information or strategic intelligence used by this élite. Indeed, this type of study is seldom made regarding the foreign policy leadership of any country. ¹ That the general problem of information and national decision making (or policy formation) is deemed important is proved by the mass of detailed studies on particular aspects such as the functions and operations of the mass media, government censorship, and manipulation of news.

In the absence of relevant studies, the tendency is for each student to assume that the channels by which information flows in other governments is similar to that of his own. This same assumption is also often made to some extent even by those national policy leaders with access to classified knowledge of the information processing of their opponents.² It is known that Soviet intelligence chiefs are particularly conditioned to fall into this intellectual trap, entertaining elaborate fantasies about conspiracies directed against them by Western intelligence services. They did so even in the inter-war years when these Western services were all small and generally incompetent.³ Furthermore, their phantasmagoria is supported by an ideology that encourages Soviet intelligence chiefs to believe such self-generated delusions as that Cardinal Spellman was an FBI official.⁴

¹ The two most important exceptions are Harry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), for the U.S., and, for Britain, Donald McLachlan, Room 39: A Study of Naval Intelligence (New York: Atheneum, 1968).


³ Direct evidence is given by Boris Morros, My Ten Years as a Counterspy (New York: Viking Press, 1959).

⁴ Morros (59), 151.
It is hardly coincidence that the Nazi intelligence chiefs held similarly wild myths about the then puny British "Secret Service." And even many Western students and intelligence professionals are not immune to such myth-building about Soviet intelligence.¹

While no other study of the present sort exists—certainly not in the public domain—there is a vast literature containing relevant material. But these data are usually out of date, frequently located in obscure sources, often incorrectly reported, and quite scattered. The essential materials range in format from personal memoirs, through biographical and historical books and articles, to published testimony and the most ephemeral pamphlets. In source, they emanate from scholars, government spokesmen, defectors, plagiarists, and outright forgers. By ideological bias they include Communists, anti-Communists, and anti-anti-Communists; pacifists and cold war advocates; factional propagandists and private moneymakers. The authorships include established names, pseudonyms, anonymos, and forged names. By security classification they range from public to secret, the latter having become the former by formal declassification, officially motivated disclosures, by deliberate "leak," by capture or interception, and by indiscretion. In all, the documentation is voluminous, but for the bibliographer and researcher it is less a mine of rich information than a minefield. As a consequence, covert communications is—understandably—a neglected topic among cautious academic researchers. But as it is an important topic, it deserves attention, however tentative many of the conclusions must remain. In fact, it is possible to be reasonably confident of one's findings. It is almost as feasible today to write a fairly solid account of the Soviet information and intelligence services as it would be to do such a study of the American or of the World War II German, and Japanese, systems. The critical fact is not that such a volume of relevant data exists, but rather that it comes from such a variety of overlapping sources that a high degree of

¹Whaley, Operation BARBAROSSA (69).
verification is possible. Such would not be the case for comparable studies of, for example, the British or Vatican intelligence services.
II. PATTERNS OF SOVIET STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

As with any communication system, the quality and style of Soviet strategic intelligence is a function of its purposes, personnel, training, structure, and technology—to select only one useful set of analytical rubrics. This chapter discusses the material presented in detail in the subsequent chapters in terms of these five categories. Thus this chapter serves as an overview—introduction, main findings, and conclusions—of the paper as a whole.

A. SECRECY VERSUS COMMUNICATION

It is, of course, a tradition of intelligence organizations to observe tight security. By definition, all covert and clandestine field operations require specific modes of secrecy. They can function only so long as their presence, personnel, and operations are not prematurely disclosed to an antagonist. However, it is not at all self-evident that other functions of these organizations (collation, analysis, and reporting of intelligence, training, etc.) suffer from moderately delayed but nearly full public disclosure. Even specific foreign operations, once completed and their personnel dispersed, can in many cases be acknowledged, as in Foot's recent official British history of the World War II S.O.E. There is a paradox here: secret operations require communication. No intelligence organization is known to have achieved an entirely successful balance between these two mutually exclusive requirements. Thus, by their very nature, intelligence operations tend to be self-defeating, at least if we judge their success only in terms of transmitting information to the national decision makers. However, if we view "intelligence communities" merely as isolated, self-serving bureaucratic systems, most are remarkably successful. But this narrowly defined "success" is largely a consequence of the cloak of secrecy that conceals the organization's minor
inefficiencies and outright blunders not only from public gaze but often from the national foreign policy makers as well. There is a way out of this dilemma, as I have shown elsewhere. The technique of stratagem can utilize the inherent inefficiency of conventional security systems to yield a most singularly effective kind of "meta-security." However, as the Russians have been rather unsophisticated in their use of deception, they remain subject to the tyranny of their deep fear of security leaks and enemy espionage.

Societies and their governments can tolerate a substantial proportion of incompetent personnel, inefficient organizations, and counterproductive policies because they are, in fact, quite loosely interconnected systems. Indeed, they more closely resemble mere congeries of systems held together by vaguely sensed "styles" than they do the inflexible, precise organizational flow-charts of personnel officers. It is this wide discrepancy between the real society and its theoretical descriptions that lends flexibility. Nevertheless, some intelligence services have possessed the capability of significantly damaging or modifying their governments' foreign policies. For instance, there is the now well-documented case of the Wehrmacht's Abwehr, which under Admiral Canaris not only worked contrary to the other Nazi intelligence services but effectively sabotaged bits of Hitler's foreign policy. It was precisely the officially sanctioned secrecy and

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2 See my discussions of the concepts "security of options" and "deception security" in my Stratagem (69), Chapter 6.

3 Whaley, Stratagem (69), Chapter II-D, for Soviet deception doctrine.

4 This now commonplace theory was, I think, first propounded by the late dean of American anthropologists, A. L. Kroeber, in his Style and Civilizations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957).

compartmentalization that permitted the organized conspiracies in German intelligence, foreign office, and military circles. And Allen Dulles has described how, as OSS station chief in Switzerland, he independently persisted in negotiating with the Nazis contrary to his explicit orders from Washington.\textsuperscript{1} Much of the recurring debates about and reorganizations in the U.S. and British intelligence services is specifically intended to subordinate to executive authority the somewhat divergent foreign policies of various government departments.\textsuperscript{2}

A special mode of communication exists that is simultaneously secret and open, private and public. This is the so-called "esoteric communication," a most felicitous term coined by Myron Rush to characterize its usage in Communist circles.\textsuperscript{3} Esoteric communications are covert messages that permit members of a group to communicate openly without disclosure of meaning to outsiders. Although esoteric communications occur commonly enough in other societies—as with criminal argot, teenage jargons, and bureaucratic gobbledygock—only the Communists, and some other ideocratic and theocratic organizations, have developed it into an art that permits its systematic use in the mass media as a means of secretly indicating policy changes. Indeed, this is precisely the reason so much of the internal and international Communist policy


\textsuperscript{2}The most closely argued presentation of this view is Blackstock (64).

debates as well as passing of instructions to sub-élites can take place in such public mass media as Pravda, Izvestiya, or the World Marxist Review. Similarly, the informational and directive functions of the former Cominform were thus almost completely expressed through the pages of its newspaper, For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!, to the b.ilement of many Western analysts who imagined that the Cominform incorporated covert communications and subversion networks.

Except for the early years of Dzerzhinsky's Cheka when both fulsome praise and nervous criticism could be publicly expressed about the "Angels of the Revolution," the Soviet state security apparatus operated until 1964 behind a cloak of virtual official secrecy, with almost no admissions of its central rôles in internal transportation, mining, slave labor, and purges, much less any disclosures of its foreign espionage, kidnapping, and assassination activities. Only the top executives and the counter-espionage functions ("combating counter-revolution and sabotage") received official public notice.

Similarly, the Comintern avowed its covert intelligence functions only in its earliest years of revolutionary agitation. Thus, in 1921 the Third World Congress of the Communist International declared that:

The military intelligence service requires practice and special training and knowledge. The same may be said of the secret service work directed against the political police.

Furthermore, the Congress made an unprecedented disclosure that: "The intelligence department is often so badly organized that it generally does more harm than good," and announced a general program for its

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3 Ibid., 113, as cited in U.S. House (56), 132.
improvement:

It is only through long practice that a satisfactory secret service department can be created. For all this specialized revolutionary work, every legal Communist Party must make secret preparation, no matter how small.

Hence all the more unexpected was Stalin's frank acknowledgment at the 18th Party Congress in 1939 that it was the immediate task of the Party:

... surrounded by a capitalist world ... to strengthen our Socialist intelligence [rasvedka] service and systematically help it to defeat and eradicate the enemies of the people.¹

Furthermore, he explicitly extended this notion to foreign fields by noting that:²

As for our army, punitive organs, and intelligence service, their edge is no longer turned to the inside of the country but to the outside, against external enemies.

Stalin even bragged privately to the Central Committee that these Soviet agents were so effective that military victory hinged only on:³

... several spys somewhere on the enemy army staff, or even divisional staff, capable of stealing the operational plan....


²Ibid., 662.

³An unpublished political speech by Stalin to the Central Committee in March 1937 cited in extract in the manual Obshchaya Taktika [General Tactics], Vol. I (Moscow: 1940), p. 27, as translated by Garthoff in Liddell Hert (56), 266.
And again, on 14 August 1942, Stalin made a somewhat enigmatic comment at the lavish, besotted state dinner bidding farewell to Prime Minister Churchill on the occasion of his first visit:

I should like to propose a toast that no one can answer. It is to intelligence officers. They cannot answer, because no one knows who they are, but their work is important.¹

Until recently, aside from these rare admissions, the Communists had never admitted their security organs engaged in foreign operations. Indeed, in 1962, Premier Khrushchev went so far as to give the positive assurance that:²

Espionage is needed by those who prepare for aggression. The Soviet Union is deeply dedicated to the cause of peace. It does not intend to attack anybody. Therefore the Soviet Union has no intention of engaging in espionage.

Even such a normally heralded decoration as the Hero of the Soviet Union medal was awarded privately to Ramón Mercader for driving an ice-axe into Trotsky's brain. While it is not surprising that promotions of undercover agents—such as Wennerstrom's "advancement" from a real Swedish Army Colonel to a simulated GRU Major General—went unannounced in the Soviet Press, it is atypical that promotions of most senior

¹In fact, Stalin's toast was answered to his delight by the swashbuckling U.S. Naval Attaché, Captain Jack Duncan, who, avowing his ONI affiliation, proposed: "If we make mistakes, it is because we know only what you tell us—and that's not much." Henry C. Cassidy, Moscow Dateline, 1941-1943 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), pp. 250-251. As no foreign correspondents were present among the hundred guests, this is a secondhand account by the AP's Moscow correspondent. A detailed personal recollection, confirming Cassidy, by American Ambassador Standley is in William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Chicago: Regnery, 1955), pp. 215-218. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1950), p. 494, confirms only the fact that Stalin did toast the "Intelligence Service." The British C.I.G.S., General Sir Alan Brooke, was too distracted by the vodka to recall such specific details of the evening's conversations. See Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957), pp. 376-378.

²N. S. Khrushchev, speech of June 1962, as quoted by Newman (64), 125.
headquarters intelligence personnel also receive no official public notices. In fact, for the GRU, this anonymity extends up to include the Director himself. (Even the traditionally most covert British Secret Intelligence Service—the former S.I.S. or so-called M.I.6—does not deny this indirect measure of public reward of decorations to its officers.) One would have thought—and naive fellow-travellers and lower-echelon Communists believed—that the Soviet Union subscribed to the homily of U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail." Even the very existence of one major Soviet organization, Military Intelligence (GRU), was never publicly mentioned. The only advantage to be gained from such complete secrecy is the dubious propaganda theme that depicts the external enemy as the sole employer of unsavory tactics.

However, all this has begun to change in the USSR. Beginning in 1964 some of the NKVD's pre-World War II, wartime, and even post-war exploits have been publicized as part of both the de-Stalinization campaign and the effort to repair the damaged "image" of the secret police. The veil has been selectively drawn aside to reveal such varied enterprises as NKVD intervention in the Spanish Civil War, Sorge's GRU espionage in pre-war and wartime Japan, and Colonel Abel's efforts on behalf of the KGB in the U.S. in the 1950s. Even the identities of two prewar GRU Directors (Y. K. Berzin* and S. Uritsky*) have been disclosed—something only now done in Britain with their retiring D.M.I.'s. Fictional glorification of their own counter-espionage has also become the order of the day.¹ And recently we have been treated to unprecedentedly overt invasion of the Western publishing field with the initial

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* The asterisk following a personal name is used throughout to indicate a biographical sketch is in the appended Biographical Directory.

publication in Britain and America of the cautiously edited memoirs of KGB agent "Gordon Lonsdale" who had been arrested in Britain in 1961 as the spy-master in the so-called Naval Secrets case.1 This campaign achieved some sort of apotheosis in December 1965 with the publicized Moscow Chekist film festival.2 Of course, the Russians now attempt to portray their men as agents of peace who would never stoop to those evil means—subversion, blackmail, and assassination—that they allege only their enemies employ. However, once covert operations are admitted at all, the skeptics will be alerted; only the pathologically credulous will continue to accept the reservations.3 Surely, the 1966 "escape" of Blake from Wormwood Scrubs was a blatantly tacit admission of his guilt.4 Even so, such avowals serve to simplify international relations and also, at least in democratic societies, national politics by eliminating one set of largely dysfunctional myths that serve mainly to constrain realistic criticism by and coordination with other departments.


2Izvestiya, 8 December 1965, p. 6, as translated in CDSP, Vol. 17, No. 49, p. 31.

3Similar arguments apply even to Western intelligence services. Thus while ex-CIA Director Allen Dulles has stated that CIA differed from the KGB in that it did not order assassinations, his ex-Deputy Director for Plans, Richard M. Bissell, publicly admitted that zealous operations chiefs—the man in the field—will if pressed sometimes resort to the most extreme measures to assure the success of their missions. See the NBC-TV documentary, "The Science of Spying," premiered on 4 May 1965. Reviewed in NYT, 5 May 1965, p. 95. The recent (August 1969) sensational disclosures of the so-called "Green Berets Murder Case" should crumble the last remaining public naivety about American scruples to engage in assassination.

4The principle would seem to be that of "looking after one's own": if they can't hook them in an exchange (Fowers for "Abel" in 1962 and Wynne for "Lonsdale" in 1964) they do it by crook.
B. PURPOSES

The purpose with which we are here concerned is the transmission of information—specifically secret information—from abroad to the Soviet leadership and the reverse process, transmission of the leaders' instructions and directives abroad. This paper is not concerned with the numerous other functions of Soviet clandestine communications organizations: psychological warfare, guerrilla warfare, political subversion, organizational infiltration, not to mention such varied internal functions of the state security as counter-intelligence, management of convicts, and highway construction. It is enough to point out that most of these functions are not germane to the intelligence function and only serve to distract the senior intelligence officials.¹

When in 1941 the U.S. set out to create strategic intelligence and special operations capabilities, it was patterned on the British model. A more-or-less centralized service was improvised: the office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), renamed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942, that combined intelligence and covert operations in the manner of its British prototypes the Secret Intelligence Service (S.I.S.) and Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.).²

¹See Section H ("Effectiveness") below for a brief discussion of the dysfunctional role of these extraneous, i.e., non-intelligence activities.

²The Office of War Information (OWI) was created out of the COI at the same time. The better memoirs of the OSS are Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa: The O.S.S. and American Espionage (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1946; revised edition, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963); Stanley P. Lovell, Of Spies & Strategems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); and Elizabeth F. MacDonald, Undercover Girl (New York: Macmillan, 1947). The only academic account is the brief section in Ransom (58).
C. PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT AND ATTRITION

Successful intelligence is partly art, partly applied science. In both aspects it requires either skilled practitioners keenly honed in the profession or brilliant amateurs who come to the field already equipped with the types of academic, clerical, political, and psychological skills that comprise this particular branch of the communication field in the social sciences. Even the recent technological innovations in electronic ferreting and computerized data handling have wrought their revolution only in the intermediate levels of intelligence bureaucracies. The imaginative and audacious person is still the most valuable element both at the lowly level of field espionage and, particularly, counter-espionage as well as in the most highly rarified levels of strategic and stratagematic deception.

The secrecy-versus-communication paradox of intelligence is dramatically reflected in the personnel problems of Soviet clandestine communications organizations. Frequent purges (1930, 1937, 1938, 1953-1954, 1963) are undertaken to insure bureaucratic loyalty and tighten security, yet these have as often led to large-scale flight of threatened personnel into the thirsting arms of their competitors. Moreover, the political criteria characteristic of the Stalin purges only reduced the overall efficiency of the purely intelligence function, by substituting unskilled for semi-skilled intelligencers. Stalin's herculean broom swept the offal in!

1. Post-Revolutionary Personnel

With the success of the October Revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks could dispense with the bulk of Czarist intelligence personnel, because the revolutionaries were themselves already skilled in the ways of clandestine communication. Only a few Okhrana experts such as Vladimir

1 See Michael Futrell, Northern Underground: Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Transport and Communications through Scandinavia and Finland, 1863-1917 (London: Faber and Faber, 1963).
Krivosh were retained because of rare linguistic or cryptographic skills.¹

When the Cheka (Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution and Sabotage) was created in January 1918 to fulfill the functions of its title, it was soon evident that it had merely continued the terrorist tradition of the Czarist (and Kerensky's) Okhrana, abandoning only the personnel. While Trotsky and Lenin approved Dzerzhinsky's severe methods, many Bolsheviks complained of the recruitment of "sadists, criminals, and degenerates" and even Lenin admitted there were "strange elements in the Chekist ranks."²

For reasons not fully understood, very high proportions at all ranks of these Old Chekists were Poles or Latvians. Presumably this ethnic bias was merely a result of the initial appointment to the top posts of a Pole (Dzerzhinsky) and two Latvians (Peters, Y. A. Berzin) who then brought in their trusted cronies of underground days. That many were Jews was seemingly only a reflection of their generally high proportion among the Old Bolsheviks.³

The first purge of their new administration came as a response to the abortive uprising of the Left Social Revolutionaries in early July 1918. The SRs were immediately expelled from the key positions in the Government, including all posts held by them in the Cheka where they were particularly strong in the newly formed Cheka military units.⁴

Some shuffling of personnel continued among the Chekists during the 1920s, but these were merely transferred or fired because of proven incompetence in their administrative, police, or intelligence work. Liquidation—the Terror—was vigorously pursued, but directed exclusively

²Gramont (62), 42-46.
⁴Wolin and Slusser (57), 38n.
against avowed counter-revolutionaries. Then in 1929, the first blood of a Party member—a Chekist himself—was drawn when Yakov Blumkin, the notorious assassin of Count Mirbach, was recalled from his post as OGPU Resident in Istanbul, arrested, tried, and executed for his extra-curricular dealings with the recently exiled Trotsky. The charges were true; but applying the death sentence to a comrade was unprecedented. It shocked Communists and Chekists alike. Stalin was at last powerful enough to impose his ideosyncratic solutions. The Revolution had begun to devour its own.

In a fervor of impractical dogmatism, in 1930-1931, virtually all the "non-Party specialists" who formed the skilled staffs in most Soviet organizations (including even the OGPU) were purged, and those abroad recalled. Henceforward, passports were granted only to citizens of unimpeachable proletarian origin or to long-standing CPSU members. A few—mainly those skilled in foreign languages—were kept on in the Moscow OGPU headquarters.


To become dictator Stalin conducted a skillful campaign of undermining and then eliminating all individuals and groups that did or even potentially could oppose him. The successive purges started in the late 1920's against Trotsky and built momentum through the opposition political ranks, and on through those of the Red Army in

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2. Paul Scheffer, Seven Years in Soviet Russia (London and New York: Putnam, 1931), pp. 342-344; and Freda Utley, The Dream We Lost (New York: John Day, 1940). Agabekov (31), 255, noted that at the time of his defection in 1930 the OGPU headquarters staff of 2,500 included 40% non-Communists who filled only the less sensitive posts. Petrov (56), 126-127, 134.

in early 1937.¹

Sandwiched between the politicians and the soldiers came the turn of the NKVD itself. They knew too many of Stalin’s secrets and were insufficiently subservient, so he ordered the purge of his purgers. Stalin began this delicate operation at the top—Yagoda was the first to go. He was quietly replaced as NKVD Commissar on 25 September 1936. Then in March 1937, Yezhov’s inexperienced protégés began replacing Yagoda’s “Old Chekists.”² Petrov confirms this and adds that this purge covered “about 3,000 higher-ranking N.K.V.D. officers, including almost all those who had ever served abroad.”³ Efficiency was ruthlessly sacrificed to political expediency.

Throughout 1937 and 1938 the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was similarly purged of virtually all its Old Bolsheviks and foreign service officers, the newly created openings being filled mainly by the NKVD purgers.⁴

3. Beriya, 1938-1941

Yezhov’s own turn was next. After Beriya succeeded Yezhov in December 1938 he liquidated only “a small group” of his predecessor’s “most intimate colleagues,” according to eye-witness Vladimir Petrov.⁵ This purge also precipitated a number of hasty NKVD defections, including that of General Lushkov who while commanding NKVD border troops in the


²Orlov (53), x-xi, xiii, 212-232.

³Petrov (56), 72, and also 67, 68, 75-79. See also F. Beck (pseud.) and W. Godin (pseud. of K. F. Shteppa), Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1951), pp. 132-147.

⁴Fischer (41), 496.

⁵Petrov (56), 80.
Far East defected to the Japanese in Manchuria. Although the purge within the NKVD sharply dropped in tempo and severity, both surviving and new functioned in an atmosphere of terrorized apprehension that largely paralyzed them on the eve of the Nazi invasion, a point admitted since 1961 even in Soviet spy fiction.

The arrival of Beriya was then (and still is) widely interpreted as signalling the end of the purges, or at least a drastic reduction in their tempo. Except for the inevitable purge of Yezhov's own NKVD stalwarts, the number of arrests, convictions, and executions dropped markedly. In addition, substantial numbers of prisoners with needed skills were released. Among senior military officers these included General (later Marshal) Rokossovsky, Deputy Corps Commander (later General of the Army) Gorbatov, Regimental Commander (later Colonel General) Valentin Penkovsky, and General (later Marshal) Govorov. Even a few "Old Chekists" were readmitted to the NKVD.

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1 Petrov (56), 74-75.

2 Heiman (65).

3 For this reaction reported by a then political prisoner see Alexander Weissberg, The Accused (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951), pp. 418-422.

4 Werth (64), 142, 169, 226, 425; and Erickson (62), 494, 505.

5 A. V. Gorbatov, Years Off My Life (New York: Norton, 1965), pp. 145-154. Gorbatov not only notes that his case was brought up for review in March 1940 and he was finally released and fully reinstated the following March, but notes (p. 150) that in December 1940 at the NKVD Butyrki prison in Moscow, he shared a cell with no less than 40 other political prisoners all undergoing similar review, half of whom had already lost their appeals.

6 Oleg Penkovskiy [Penkovsky, in my orthography], The Penkovskiy Papers (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 29, notes that V. A. Penkovsky was in prison from 1937 through 1939.

7 Werth (64), 142, 169.

8 Penkovskiy (65). Also Petrov (56), 140, 176, mentions NKVD cryptographer, Roman Vladimirovich Krivosh, and the former NKVD Resident in Harbin, Razin.
However, some executions continued right up to the German invasion on 22 June 1941. For example, only two weeks before the invasion, Lieutenant General Smushkevich, the Chief of the Red Air Force and former Commander of the Soviet aviation mission to Loyalist Spain, was executed.¹

Khrushchev, unwilling to grant even a single earned point to Stalin in his "Secret Speech," implied that the amnesty of officers did not come until after the German invasion.² However, as Khrushchev's list of four such amnestied commanders includes at least one (Gorbatov) whose own memoirs reveal his reinstatement to have occurred three months before the war, doubt is immediately cast on Khrushchev's allegations regarding the others named.³

4. World War II Amnesties, 1941-1942

The Wehrmacht invaded the USSR on 22 June 1941. Stalin, misinterpreting the many warnings from his own and foreign intelligence services, was caught by surprise.⁴ Being also unprepared, Stalin was forced to mobilize all available human resources for the desperate defense. Consequently, he permitted the quiet but rapid reinstatement of many of the surviving purge victims who possessed specialized skills. Thus many more Red Army officers were released from prison. Even some Old Chekists were quietly rehabilitated, such as Dmitry Medvedev who was fetched from "retirement" to rejoin the NKVD in the first week of the war.⁵

¹ Ehrenburg (63), 152, 269.
² Khrushchev in Wolfe (57), 176, mentioning Rokossovsky, Gorbatov, Meretskov, and Podlas [a Lt. Gen. killed in 1942].
³ Other imprisoned senior officers whose release date is unknown include the present Marshal of Artillery N. D. Yakovlev, and Lt. Gen. of Artillery, Volkotrubenko. Penkovskiy (65), 317.
⁵ Armstrong (64), 48, 67-68.
The wartime amnesties were somewhat offset in the first weeks after the German invasion by numerous executions and imprisonments on charges of either losing control of troops or having left the country unprepared for war.1 Those executed included such Spanish Civil War veterans as tank General Dmitri Pavlov and aviation Generals Andrei Denisov and Pavel Rychagov.2

5. Post-World War II Purge Renewals, 1945-1953

By 1948—coincident with and perhaps a consequence of the new Cold War posture with its stress on "vigilance"—Stalin had once again begun to purge the ranks of Party and bureaucracy. Unfortunately the details are still not known with certainty, particularly as they affected the intelligence services.3 However, it does seem that many persons in the entourage of Zhdanov were executed in that period. Even the distinguished Soviet diplomat Ivan Maisky was arrested in 1951 as a British agent.4


Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 led immediately and directly to a series of drastic purges, but mainly limited to the Party and security service. Stalin's personal secretariat including its powerful chief, Pcskrebyshev, literally disappeared overnight.5

The liquidation of MVD chief Beriya in June 1953 was followed

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1For example, Werth (64), 154, 389, 425, mentions the demotions of Lt. Gen. Kozlov, and Vice Commissar of Defense Mekhils.

2See my Soviet Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (draft, 1965).

3Some inconclusive material and discussion is in Wolin and Slusser (57).

4Deriabin and Gibney (59), 249.

5Armstrong (61), 238-264; Wolin and Slusser (57), 21-31.
by a purge of the organization. Moreover, it was accompanied by a flurry of defections and unsuccessful attempts among MVD officers abroad to escape anticipated extension of the purge in the MVD that was then raging inside Russia. Among those who defected for this basic reason of sheer survival (one can safely discount most of the tasteless moral or religious rationalizations offered by these persons or their ghostwriters) included Yury Rastvorov in Japan (24 January), Peter Derisbin in Austria (15 February), Nikolai Khokhlov in West Germany (18 February), and Vladimir Petrov in Australia (3 April), all in 1954. This wave of defections also included some men in the parallel Satellite services such as Lieutenant Colonel Swiatlo of the Polish Ministry of Security who turned up in West Berlin in December 1953.

Around 22 October 1962 when the KGB arrested GRU Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Penkovsky it was established that this voluntary British agent-in-place had passed to British and American intelligence both massive strategic intelligence and detailed information on the personnel, structure, and operations of GRU (and, to some degree, KGB) overseas nets, both "legal" and "illegal." Major personnel changes came in 1963, as a direct consequence of this compromising of parts of its espionage nets as well as apparently an indirect result of tightening the massively lax security arrangements. According to Frank Gibney and Edward Crankshaw these changes amounted to a purge of the GRU, involving at least the transfer and public denunciation of the GRU Director, General Ivan Serov, and the replacement of some 300 Soviet agents abroad.

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1 Armstrong (61), 238-264; Wolin and Slusser (57), 21-31.
2 For the post-Berlin purge of the MGB-KGB see Petrov (56), 250-254; and Morris (59).
3 Dulles (63), 141-142. I have added Khokhlov to Dulles' three examples. Dates given are those of actual defection, not the date they were "surfaced"—i.e., when their defection was publicly disclosed—which was often only months later as in the case of Khokhlov who did not surface until 22 April 1954 at a VOA press conference in Bonn.
particularly Soviet military attachés. ¹

Following Khrushchev's denunciation in 1956 of Stalin's purges, large numbers of surviving political prisoners were released and many of these persons—as well as some who died in prison or were executed—have been publicly "rehabilitated." This public acknowledgment of the innocence of specified individuals has proceeded slowly and with great caution because of the political implications involved in such rectification of recent Party history. Nevertheless a surprising number of former "unpersons" long thought dead have emerged from their special limbo. Included among these was the famed GRU Resident in Switzerland, Alexander Rado, * who had headed the most brilliantly successful intelligence network of World War II. Purged and imprisoned in 1945, he quietly reappeared in Hungary and soon died in retirement. And, more recently, the posthumously rehabilitated have included a growing number of intelligence officers, including the other two most successful ones: Richard Sorge* (rehabilitated in 1964) and Leopold Trepper² ("La Grand Chef," surfaced in Warsaw in 1965). Now, beginning in 1965, the Russian press even extends lauditory praises to some of its still active intelligence officers for their recent foreign espionage: Konon Molody, Col. Rudolf Abel, etc.


Khrushchev's successors busied themselves with a major—indeed drastic—reorganization of the Party and Ministerial administrative structures, destroying his highly decentralized, astonishingly duplicative

¹Gibney and Crankshaw in Penkovskiy (65), viii, 2, 3, 70. This remarkable statistic seems to have been given Gibney by his U.S. intelligence source. I have been unable to verify it.

pattern of local bureaus. This did not seem to represent a political purge of the personnel occupying these positions, only a reorganization for administrative purposes, although a careful check of demotions or disappearances among Khrushchev protégés might well yield evidence that this reorganization also masked a de facto purge.

The specific purging that occurred immediately following Khrushchev's removal seems to have affected only his immediate family: wife, daughter Rada, and son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei. Over the subsequent months a number of top editors were reassigned, probably because of their close relationship with Adzhubei in his leading position in journalism. Otherwise those personnel changes in the Party, Army, and intelligence services that have occurred can be plausibly accounted for by normal processes of recruitment, promotion, transfer, and attrition. (There is an excessive tendency of Western analysts—particularly the "Kremlinologists"—to ascribe sinister political significance to all job shifts. Actually, many such shifts prove to have more prosaic causes such as health or—as under Khrushchev—special "trouble-shooting" assignments in nominally inferior (but actually high priority) assignments that, if successfully performed, led to sudden transfer to much higher posts.

The current (1968-69) Soviet purge—although still only imperfectly understood in the West—has not extended to the intelligence services. Even the Military Intelligence (GRU) personnel have seemingly not yet become involved, despite the purge sweeping other segments of the Army, particularly the Reserve.

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1 See my Soviet Foreign Correspondents (draft, 1965).

2 Information from the late Herbert Ritvo, based on his systematic analyses of demotions, promotions, and transfers of Khrushchev's protégés.
D. TRAINING

Most regular Soviet intelligence personnel undergo special training. This was true even during the most exigent periods of the Nazi invasion. The few exceptions cover either some senior chiefs brought in from outside for political reasons or some junior technicians recruited for their special skills.

1. Military Diplomatic Academy

The senior GRU training center for specialists in foreign intelligence is the postgraduate Military Diplomatic Academy in Moscow. It has been in continuous operation since at least 1948. Although primarily a school for GRU personnel it has also graduated KGB officers from at least as early as 1950. Each graduating class numbers approximately 100; and of the graduating class of 1961, 30 to 40 per cent were assigned directly to the KGB, by special decision of the CC/CPSU.

The academy's regular program is a general three-year course in military intelligence with moderate specialization in the major foreign languages. Classes graduate in July. In addition, the academy offers six- and nine-months refresher courses. Heads of the Military Diplomatic Academy have included:


*On the Military Diplomatic Academy see Penkovskiy (65), 31, 50, 51-52, 53n, 72-73, 75, 80, 91-92, 102-103, 291, 358. Penkovskiy was a student—with rank of Colonel—at the academy from 1949 until his graduation in 1953 and later was briefly (in 1960) a member of its Mandate Commission, the selection committee for incoming students of the academy.

Penkovskiy (65), 92, 291.

Penkovskiy (65), 52, 72.

Penkovskiy (65), 71, 72, 89, 92.
2. **International Relations Institute**

The International Relations Institute is the main school of the Foreign Ministry. It has been operating since at least 1950. It is located in Moscow in an unmarked, massive building at Metrostroyevskaya 53, the corner of Krymskaya Square, which formerly housed a Czarist military cadet school.

This university-level institute trains not only cadre for the diplomatic service but for all other organizations engaged in foreign operations. The CC, KGB, and Ministry of Higher Education are all involved in the institute's administration, although the Director is appointed by the Foreign Ministry.

The normal program is a rigorous six-year course including comprehensive specialization in the culture and language of one country. Its faculty and curriculum is one of the best in the USSR. Since the major reorganization of 1954, the institute is organized into two divisions, the Western and the Eastern. The Eastern Division offers full area programs on India and Pakistan, the Arabic-speaking countries, Afghanistan, China, Sinkiang, etc., and beginning in 1959 in some African areas and languages.

In the late 1950's, the student body of 2,000 included nearly 200 foreigners, from all the Communist countries, but mainly the Asian ones. Of the Russian students, nearly 30 per cent were intelligence people—mainly KGB and all Party members and older (middle and late 30's) than the average of other students. The only institution in the West comparable in size and curriculum to the Eastern Division is the superb School of Oriental and African Studies (S.O.A.S.) of London University, particularly now that the latter has begun to emphasize contemporary

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1 For the International Relations Institute see Aleksandr Kaznacheev, *Inside a Soviet Embassy* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961), pp. 28-36, 42, 119-121. Kaznacheev graduated this school in 1957 after the usual course, but his information is up-to-date as of 1959.
While no intelligence subjects are given per se, there is a major four-year military affairs program and—under the guise of amateur sports—picked groups receive special training in small arms, parachuting, flying, and radio.

Given the slight but noticeable tendency for Soviet citizens to shift careers somewhat, it is not surprising to find that around 1954 the senior TASS staff in Moscow included a dozen graduates of the International Relations Institute.  

3. Higher Diplomatic School

The Higher Diplomatic School is the Foreign Ministry's institution for training senior diplomats. Located in Moscow, it gives a two-year course. But it is reputed to be rather inferior in its quality, the graduates acquiring little new grasp of foreign affairs or languages. The Director (since at least August 1961) is V. Z. Lebedev.

4. Mr. Hutton's "School for Spies"

It is widely believed by Western Sovietologists, political journalists, and writers of spy fiction that the Russians operate a unique training school for Illegals at Vinnitsa in the Ukraine. This school purportedly consists of a series of carefully simulated foreign villages—British, American, etc.—inhabited by defectors and experienced Russian

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1S.O.A.S. further resembles the International Relations Institute in that it regularly doubles as a language and area training school for its own nationals' intelligence officers, as my fellow S.O.A.S. Junior Common Room graduate schoolmate, Konon Molody (alias "Gordon Lonsdale") rightly pointed out. See Lonsdale (65), 93, 97, 101-103, 113.

2Irving R. Levine, Main Street, U.S.S.R. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), p. 190, where the school is called the "Institute of International Affairs."

Illegals. There the agent trainee can thoroughly familiarize himself with the physical, cultural, and linguistic environment of his intended target country. However, as far as I can determine, this school only existed briefly on a Hollywood back lot to provide the set and subject for one of Jack Webb's "True" television "documentary" dramas.

The immediate stimulus for this ideal school is a book appropriately titled Soviet Spy School, published in 1961 by the pseudonymous British political journalist and spy-buff, Mr. J. Bernard Hutton. 1

5. Other Schools

In addition to those schools already mentioned, a large number of others provide the sorts of special courses in languages, cultures, politics, military, intelligence, security, and technology that prepare espionage, intelligence, guerrilla, and communications personnel for foreign operations. Those of these other special schools that have been recently identified are given in the following list.


b) The Special Interpreters' Department of the Moscow Foreign Language Institute. 3 Open, ? - 1957-1959- ? Provides foreign language training for some junior officers of the GRU and MID.

c) The Special School of Economics, Moscow State University. 4 Open ? - 1957-1959- ? Trains some MID personnel.

1 Also the article by the Swedish Sovietologist, Major Per Lindstrom, [Contact with the army] (Sweden: April 1959), as described in "Iowa in the Ukraine," Time, Vol. 73, No. 17 (27 April 1959), p. 20.

2 Kaznacheev (62), 42 n.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.
E. NETWORKS

The Government and Communist Party of the Soviet Union has, since the 1920's, maintained several parallel channels of communication with Communist underground and guerrilla movements in the Far East and Southeast Asia, as indeed throughout the world. Furthermore, some of these channels were used for the monitoring, coordination, and control of Soviet satellite governments, beginning with Outer Mongolia in the 1920's. These channels existed under various names, under several covers, and with overlapping—even competing—functions, but all are characterized by their secret and illegal operations, by their simultaneous existence in any given country, and—in the typical manner of clandestine networks—by their fragmentation into small cells operating in relative isolation, even ignorance, of other cells controlled from their "centers" in Moscow.

The several agencies of Soviet clandestine activities abroad that are discussed in the following chapters apparently are the only major ones that have been so engaged. This is not to say that these particular agencies have not on occasion made free use of the facilities of other Soviet departments. Indeed, all Soviet Government and Party agencies and Communist front-groups abroad have been so used in the past and some still are, although in a less frequent and less frequent basis. This was accomplished both by temporarily borrowing facilities from these open and legal organizations or by infiltrating their staffs with NKVD, GRU, or OMS agents. In these cases, it is only fair to note that the officials of the open organizations seldom had little more than the most vague notions of the identities, affiliations, or activities of the agents using their organizations as façades for clandestine missions. For example, there is extensive documentation for such infiltration and free use of the official TASS news agency,¹ various labor, peace,

¹See my Soviet Foreign Correspondents (draft, 1965), for GRU, NKVD, and Comintern infiltration of TASS.
literary and cultural front groups, and even of the Soviet Government trading corporations such as Arcos in England and Amtorg in the U.S., as well as in the embassies and consular branches of the Soviet foreign office. Indeed, in one sense pointed out by Alexander Dallin, all such groups are treated as instruments of Soviet foreign policy; and we can go further by observing that even the Soviet foreign office itself has often been merely one of the lesser instruments of this policy.

The many standard histories of Soviet international relations and foreign policy that overlook this point and rely only on "respectable" official intergovernmental and foreign office documents thus often necessarily reach quite misleading conclusions about the nature and goals of Soviet foreign policy. This approach characterizes all writings by Communists and fellow-travellers who, of course, wittingly purvey only the publicly revealed Soviet interpretation; but it also infects the writings of many non-Communist scholars who, in their perhaps sound rejection of a "police theory of history," prematurely reject as unrespectable the extensive and cross-verified body of literature upon which the partisans of police or conspiratorial theories draw. For

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1 Alexander Dallin, "The Use of International Movements," in Ivo J. Lederer (editor), Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 311-349. Although the specific functions and organizations have changed over the years, the broader generalizations still apply. Recent Soviet and East European Communist diplomatic defectors such as Kaznacheev, Monat, and Penkovsky have confirmed this. And FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover in closed testimony on 4 March 1965 (released 17 May 1965) before a Congressional subcommittee stated that a fifth of Soviet students in the U.S., half the Soviet journalists, and half the Russians of the UN were in or working with the KGB. David Wise dispatch from Washington, D.C., New York Herald Tribune, 18 May 1965, p. 1, supplies details omitted from The New York Times' story. Assuming the FBI estimate to be correct, Director Hoover should have stressed the fact that this not only marks a substantial percentage drop from the later Stalin period (1937-1953) but also that most of these persons are now merely collaborating with Soviet intelligence and are not—as before—professional Chekists.

2 E.g., Israel Epstein, Anna Louise Strong, Harriet L. Moore.

3 E.g., Owen Lattimore, K. M. Pannikar.

4 E.g., Ralph de Toledano, Charles A. Willoughby, the later writings of Freda Utley, Stefan Possony, some recent papers by Karl Wittfogel, and Chalmers Johnson.
example, little can be learned about Soviet disarmament and non-intervention policies in the 1920's or 1930's solely from examination of their negotiations at Rapallo and Geneva. Similarly, even the closest scanning of the official diplomatic documentation taken alone reveals only a superficial, incomplete, and quite misleading outline of the Soviet relationship with China from the Russian Revolution to the present day. In both these cases, the official record has been largely a calculated gloss under which more fundamental policies of the Soviet state were secretly pursued by means and through agencies other than its foreign office. After all, the Bolshevik revolution was itself a conspiracy; and, excepting perhaps only Lenin and Stalin, the entire history of the transfer of political power in the Soviet Union must be described—if not explained—by conspiracy as tested in the roll-call of the fallen giants: Trotsky, Kirov, Tukhachevsky, Yagoda, Bukharin, Yezhov, Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin, Zhukov, Khrushchev.

F. COMMUNICATION METHODS AND TECHNOLOGY

Clandestine networks employ a variety of methods to effect communication. Although theoretically all regular bureaucratic and commercial communications means are available, the need for secrecy requires either specially adapted means or covert use of regular public or official channels. As I have described these means and discussed their limitations elsewhere, only a brief summary follows.

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1See, for example, my Soviet and Chinese Clandestine Arms Aid (draft, 1965).

2Barton Whaley, Guerrilla Communications (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T., Center for International Studies, March 1967, multilithed). See also Seth (63), 86-197.
The use of couriers for transmitting verbal or written messages is common intelligence practice. It is an often slow but fairly secure medium, particularly if certain elementary security techniques are observed: the **parol** (passwords), "cut-outs," "live-drops," etc. (See Appendix A—Glossary.)

Radio—with its evident advantage of speed—was rapidly brought into use by the Soviet intelligence services. However, great difficulties were experienced by even the most highly trained agents in getting their sets operational in the field at least down to World War II. That this was not through any peculiarly Russian "backwardness" is proved by the German Abwehr's similar technical frustrations in setting up radio communications for its first branch in Shanghai in 1940.

It was only toward the end of World War II that a number of radical technological advancements greatly improved covert radio communications. The most important of these was the development by Schellenberg's SD of the high-speed automatic radiotelegraph using magnetic tape. By enabling clandestine radio transmitters to greatly

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1 See my Guerrilla Communications (67). For such intermediaries as "cut-outs" and "live-drops" see particularly Penkovskiy (65), 131-132.


shorten their transmission times, this technique markedly reduced the ability of the opponent's radio-direction-finding (RDF) police to locate ("fix") the transmitter. This technique became quite standard among intelligence services after the war, the KGB having adopted it at least as early as 1960.¹ Curiously, though, there is evidence that they were a bit slow to introduce this technique operationally. Thus the Greek Communist Party underground radio net operated by the Vavoudes group from 1946 until its exposure in 1951 did not possess such equipment, despite the facts that it a) was engaged in transmissions to Bucharest (and the MGB?) of considerable strictly military intelligence in addition to its information to the Greek CP-in-exile; b) used at least one brand new Russian-built transmitter in addition to a jumble of British S.O.E. and American sets; and c) specifically discussed with Bucharest plans to use such an automatic Morse sender.² Although electronic and computer-aided counter-communications techniques presumably keep pace with modern communications technology, radio still provides Soviet intelligence nets with a happy balancing among the needs of security, speed, and clarity of messages.³

¹This was the Russian-made high-speed transmitter operated outside Ruislip airbase by "Kroger" (Cohen) at the time of his arrest in 1961. This set could send 240-300 five-letter groups (i.e., code words) per minute in Morse, reaching and receiving Moscow 1,740 miles away. Arthur Tietjen, Soviet Spy Ring (New York: McCann, 1961), pp. 98-99, 125-126; and John Bulloch and Henry Miller, Spy Ring: The Full Story of the Naval Secrets Case (London: Secker & Warburg, 1961), pp. 39-40, 185, 221, 223 with photos of the equipment. Although the Russians may have acquired this device from the several SD scientists and technicians captured at the war's end, the real "secret" of the device is its concept, not its engineering.


³See the "Príkhodka Lecture" in Fenkovskiy (65), 132-133.
G. EAST ASIAN OPERATIONS

East Asia—the Far East and Southeast Asia—has held a special place in Czarist and Soviet intelligence as it has in their diplomacy, economy, military strategy, and imperialist (or revolutionary) pten-
sions. It is traditional in Western academic, diplomatic, military, and intelligence practice to treat East Asia as a rather distinct career field, patterning bureaucracies to fit this particular view. Hence the U.S. Department of States' Office of Research and Analysis for Far East and the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, covering East and Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. The same is generally true of Soviet practice. Hence their Foreign Ministry, Army, and the Foreign Intelligence division of the state security service have generally all adopted the Western bourgeoisie practice of functional division of labor along regional lines. Only occasionally does one find organ-
izational structure modified to fit the ideological status of target countries or geographical regions as in the case of ideological dis-
tinctions maintained among countries in the organizational structuring of the foreign desks of the Central Committee Secretariat.

The first geographic priority in Soviet intelligence attention was Europe until this was replaced by the United States after World War II. East Asia has always occupied second, or sometimes third, place. However, its relatively high priority—as compared to Africa, Latin America, or even the Middle East and South Asia—has been due to several special circumstances. The Bolsheviks inherited parts of the Czarist imperialist involvement: military actions against the Chinese during the Boxer Rebellion, war with Japan in 1905, economic and territorial treaty commitments in Manchuria, etc. One of the earliest Soviet experiences was having suffered the humiliation of military occupation of her Pacific provinces by the Pacific Naval powers, Japan and the United States. And, finally, the already strategic border area of Manchuria was heavily infiltrated by anti-Bolshevik conspiratorial
groups of Russian émigrés, encouraged by Japan and China.\(^1\)

One result of the widening Sino-Soviet split is that the Soviet intelligence is no longer able to keep such a direct watch through Russian officials, advisers, students, and visitors. The Peking Embassy staff has been pared down recently and several consulates have been closed by the Chinese: all advisers—scientific, technical, military, and cultural—were recalled in 1960;\(^2\) the number of students has fallen; and Sino-Soviet "friendship" delegations are now very rare.\(^3\) Not only are there now few such persons available for informative debriefings by Soviet intelligence personnel, but the conditions the Chinese authorities place upon their freedom of movement are at least as severe as those applied to other foreigners.

The specific individual networks controlled by the various Soviet clandestine agencies described in this paper are the only ones known publicly (by 1967) to have operated in East Asia, but are probably only a small fraction of the actual cells that have operated there. However, even these few examples prove quite typical of covert Soviet networks operated in other regions and, indeed, almost encompass the full array of types known to operate elsewhere.

These others include only such minor organizations as Arcos and Amtorg, the Soviet governmental trade organizations that were set up, respectively, in Britain in the 1920's and the U.S. in the 1930's. Such organizations were not independent intelligence services, but merely provided cover for the GRU or the Cheka. However, the degree to which they were staffed by regular intelligence personnel makes it clear that at times they were little more than a cell in one of the major intelligence networks.

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\(^3\)For statistics on the earlier situation see Herbert Passin, *China's Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Praeger, 1963).
H. EFFECTIVENESS

By 1921 the Bolsheviks already possessed the world's largest intelligence "community." They had record numbers of internal security police, foreign intelligence personnel at the Moscow "Center," and agents abroad. They have maintained these records ever since, despite close competition from the burgeoning services of the Japanese in the 1930's, the German Nazi's in the early 1940's, the Americans in the mid-1940's, and the Americans and East and West Germans since the 1950's. The costs—human, technological, administrative, and monetary—are prodigal. What does the Soviet system profit from this vast enterprise? This question has seldom been asked and never systematically examined. At present, only a few of its aspects will be tentatively explored.

There are two traditions that evaluate the effectiveness of Soviet strategic intelligence. The main one sees a vast network for espionage, massively infiltrated into the democratic élites and successfully pilfering its political, military, and technological secrets. This tradition ranks them as the world's most effective intelligence system. It is a view propounded by most intelligence buffs such as Cookridge and Lucas, professionals such as J. Edgar Hoover, ex-Communists such as Hutton, and recently by the Soviet press itself. However, sheer size, cost and volume of operations is not a sufficient basis for inferring effectiveness. Indeed, several critics of modern strategic intelligence services argue that their very size—coupled with the compartmentalization imposed by the demands for security—guarantees their inefficiency.¹

However, to judge strategic intelligence—or perhaps any—organizations by such standards is seldom very meaningful and never quite fair. As we have already noted, such organizations normally serve several purposes, and because these purposes are often counterproductive, the effectiveness of these organizations should properly be measured

¹These critics range from such a responsible one as Blackstock (64), through such irresponsibles as Wise and Ross (64), to a cipher such as Joesten (63).
against their varied purposes. If this is done, a rather different evaluation results.

The Soviet intelligence services serve various ends: ideological, political, bureaucratic, and—possibly least of all—strategic intelligence. Each of these will now be examined briefly.

1. Ideological Purposes

Marxist-Leninist theory depicts a world in conflict; two antagonistic international classes embrace in mortal struggle manifested as a series of civil wars. The protagonist—the proletariat, or rather its leading element, the Communist Party—must be ever vigilant against being deceived by its enemy. Consequently, to avoid surprise, the Party must keep well informed of the foe’s aggressive schemes. Moreover, information is also needed to alert the Party to tactical opportunities for advancing its own cause. However, this strongly felt need to keep informed applies equally to all Party members with the consequence that “intelligence” becomes a pervasive function, not limited to the professional intelligence services.

2. Internal Security Purposes

A very special category of intelligence goals is that concerned with internal security. Unlike espionage, this goal is publicly avowed. Indeed, counterintelligence and political security have been formalized and institutionalized almost as long as intelligence itself. The functional dichotomy is clearly recognized in the profession’s own cant that divides intelligence into “intelligence” and “counter-intelligence.” (Russ., razvedka-kontrarazvedka) or “positive intelligence” and “negative intelligence.”

Most governments—rather wisely, it seems—make counterintelligence the prerogative or organizations specialized in internal security.

affairs. Hence the American FBI and CIC, the British Special Branch and M.I.5, and the French Direction de la Sûreté Nationale. This was also the primary function of the Czarist Third Section and, later, the Okhrana. All these agencies have enjoyed remarkable success in the penetration of national subversive groups and foreign espionage networks. In the Soviet Union, however, the counterintelligence function is combined with intelligence in the state security apparatus. Although intelligence and counterintelligence are divided between two departments (INU and KRU, respectively), the almost pathological Soviet preoccupation with secrecy means that the security function predominates, at the expense of fully effective intelligence.

3. Bureaucratic Purposes

In terms of parochial organizational or bureaucratic goals—most intelligence groups are remarkably successful. This is as true of the Soviet KGB and GRU as it is of the American FBI, CIA, and DIA, the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst, the French Sûreté and Deuxième Bureau, or the British M.I.5 and M.I.6. The notable subjective success of these organizations is seen in their durability (the KGB and GRU are nearly a half century old), the access to central political power they provide their personnel (particularly the KGB and the Nazi Gestapo), the relative job security (Gen. Berzin headed the GRU for 17 years, Beria the state security for 15), the public prestige given their overt personnel (KGB only), the various psychopathological rewards inherent in elite secret societies (well-documented for all Soviet services).

To the extent that any organization expends its human, fiscal, and material resources on goals of its own political aggrandizement and

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1. Thus almost one of five members of the American Communist Party is an FBI informant.

2. See my *Stratagem* (69), Chapter 6, Part C ("The Economics of Stratagem"), for a critique of the general ineffectiveness of conventional security measures.
financial gain, its other goals, particularly its professed goal will suffer. This problem of dysfunction or conflicting functions is particularly true of all intelligence services, because they can more effectively conceal these trade-offs among their several real and professed functions under the guise of self-serving security regulations.

4. Strategic Intelligence Purposes

The main ostensible purpose of national intelligence communities is the collection, evaluation and interpretation of strategic intelligence and, finally, its transmission to the foreign policy decision-makers. Although this is only one of several purposes served by such organizations, their success in fulfilling this particular role does have some significance in the overall national security picture. Intelligence achieves this end by being one of many inputs of information for the policy makers.
III. SOVIET COORDINATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Although the Comintern was not finally and formally dissolved until 1943, it had been moribund since the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939. From then until the 1950's most analyses of international Communist affairs by both scholars and ex-Comintern officials presumed--contrary to Communist denials—that there existed a successor to the Comintern. For example, the two former Comintern officials who wrote in 1947 under the collective name of "Ypsilon" categorically believed that the Comintern was not dissolved at all, merely going underground.\(^1\) Others such as Kintner accepted this but interpreted the Cominform as its re-emergence from the underground.\(^2\) Alternatively, the ex-GRU junior code clerk, Igor Gouzenko, thought the GRU had "taken over the old chores of the Comintern."\(^3\) Still others believed the Comintern had been truly dissolved, but only to be later reconstituted in the Cominform, either fully as Colonel Miksche thought\(^4\) or in somewhat less rigid but still global form as at least one U.S. intelligence group believed.\(^5\)

\(^{1}\)"Ypsilon" (47). This was also the dogmatic conclusion of Alfred Kohlberg and Isaac Don Levine in their indiscriminately anti-Communist magazine, Plain Talk (1946-1948), and of the founder of the CPUSA (and member of the ECCI), Benjamin Gitlow, The Whole of Their Lives (New York: Scribner's, 1948), pp. 356-360.

\(^{2}\)Kintner (50), 56, 77-78.

\(^{3}\)Gouzenko (48), 119-131, who assumed this from his observation that the GRU's foreign operations suddenly expanded in March 1943. However, he himself noted that a similar expansion also occurred in NKVD and Naval Intelligence.


\(^{5}\)Evron M. Kirkpatrick (editor), Target the World (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 4, 11, for an official U.S. study by "anonymous government social scientists and research workers," presumably a euphemism for CIA.
In fact, the Comintern was abolished and there was no successor organization. Those of its several functions that Stalin chose to retain were merely taken over by existing Soviet organizations. For example, the International Section of the CC/CPSU took over the vital interparty liaison function, passing Politburo directives on policy, making or confirming local foreign CP appointments, and arranging interparty conferences, operating through the corresponding International Sections in each of the separate parties.

A. INFORMAL NETWORKS

The dissolution of the Comintern did not mean that the scattered Communist parties were set adrift without any central policy coordination or information feedback. These functions were maintained in two main ways: one traditional-ideological, the other organizational.

By the late 1930's Communism was Stalinism in the sense that the more-or-less general policy ("the general line") and subsidiary day-to-day policies now originated with or, at least, were approved by the dictator. These policies were then disseminated to all Communists abroad through a series of overlapping overt and covert Comintern, foreign office, wire service, intelligence, and "front" group channels to a large number of specific Communist and fellow-travelling media: newspapers, journals, memoranda, and word-of-mouth. The policy messages got through with little distortion and much redundancy. The individual Communist became adept at interpreting even the most esoteric communications. Because the overriding requirement of discipline demanded that all communications be unquestioningly accepted, the Communist was one who acquiesced in this then monolithic system. Those who demurred immediately became ex-Communists, socially as well as administratively. By the time the Comintern was abolished, the international Communist movement had become a sort of traditional folk, or Gemeinschaft culture insofar as it was a closely integrated and superbly conditioned social grouping sharing a single ideology and accepting a norm of obedience to an authority
whose dictates were diffused swiftly through both formal and informal communication channels.¹

When the Comintern was dissolved in 1943 after a quarter century of operation, its clandestine functions and many surviving covert agents were probably absorbed by the NKGÇ² and its overt inter-Party liaison functions were taken over by the international sections within each party.³ This arrangement was modified only during the decade inter-regnum (1947-1956) of the Cominform, which took over a small part of the burden of policy dissemination not only for the formal members composed of the major European Communist parties but for other Communist parties as well, as described in the following section.

Highly tentative efforts by Khrushchev in late 1956 and 1957 (and seemingly again in April 1964 on the eve of his fall) to recreate some sort of formal International along Comintern lines foundered on the various rising "polycentric," "national Communist," or "revisionist" oppositions of the Polish, Yugoslav, Italian, Rumanian, Albanian, and Chinese Communist parties.⁴ Henceforward, the CPSU has had to

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¹See Marion J. Levy, Jr., "A Revision of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft Categories," in Harry Eckstein (editor), Internal War (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 233-266. A similar line of argument, but specifically concerned with Soviet control of the post-war East European Communist states, is given by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 111-124. However, Brzezinski arbitrarily includes among his "informal devices" of control such things as Soviet control of senior appointments, the assignment of Soviet "advisers" to Government officials, and the liaison links between the Soviet and the other Communist Parties. But the fact that these are covert devices and channels does not in itself make them any less "formal" than constitutional myths. The analogy with gemeinschaft culture is further weakened by the absence of familial networks in the Communist system with all that family implies for trust, infiltration, loyalty, etc.

²This is also the view of Cookridge (55), 293.

³On the various overt successor organizations see Ebon (48), 456-462; Nollau (61), 211-321; and Kirkpatrick (56), pp. 13-35, etc.

⁴Dallin (61), 454-459, gives the best documented account of this earlier Khrushchevian effort. See also Nollau (61), 290-295; and Clews (64), 73.
reconcile itself to exercising what limited control it retains through its International Section. However, indicative of the possibility that the issue may still be alive is the effort of the CPSU in 1965 to link its hoped-for international conference of Communist parties with the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the 7th Comintern Congress.\footnote{See particularly Suslov and Rumyantsev speeches of 4 October 1965, Pravda, 5 October 1965, p. 3, as translated in excerpts in CDSP, Vol. 17, No. 40, pp. 22-24.}

Following an abortive suggestion by Khrushchev and oblique requests by some European Communist leaders, a successor to the Cominform’s journal—if not to the Cominform itself—was founded in August 1958 and began publication in September in 16 languages in then ultra-orthodox Czechoslovakia. This was the monthly Problems of Peace and Socialism (published as the World Marxist Review in English editions in London at the CPGB headquarters and in Canada). Until today, this journal serves as the leading publication of the Moscow-oriented and fence-sitting Communist parties, the Chinese edition being discontinued in January 1963 and the Korean edition soon following it into limbo. Although the names of the editors have not been published it is known that the initial chief Editor was A. M. Rumyantsev, a Russian and the former editor of the principal CPSU theoretical journal, Kommunist. Dallin claims that the Chief Editor is "subordinated, of course, to Mikhail Suslov of the Soviet Presidium." By 1962 the WMR was being published in 33 countries in 25 languages.\footnote{Clews (64), 72-74, 162, 280-281; Dallin (61), 458-459; Nollau (61), 319-321; World Marxist Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Toronto: January 1963), p. 2.}

After the abolition of the Comintern and Cominform, the combination of policy conformity with Moscow and the sheer habit of accepting Moscow as the Center preserved the continuity of the liaison links between the CPSU and its numerous satellite Communist parties throughout the world. With the aggressive growth since 1960 of an independent
Chinese Communist policy, the inter-Party liaison network developed two main nodes—Moscow and Peking. However this is not a simple network because the concurrent drift toward first polycentrism, then pluralism has led to a situation in which considerable direct communications now occur between the other national parties without clearing through either Moscow or Peking.¹

Viewed in this light, the partial revival of the International as the Cominform represented a much less dramatic innovation than often represented. Indeed, we can view the post-Purge Comintern, the Cominform, and present-day inter-party conferences such as the 1960 Moscow meeting of the 81 parties as being, in one very limited sense, virtually public forums; while basic policy decision-making and day-by-day inter-Party liaison is conducted in an entirely covert manner by a highly centralized organization possessing a marked degree of continuity. The unique quality introduced since Stalin's death is that Moscow (much less Peking) is no longer in a position to command unswerving obedience from other Communist parties,² even through its clandestine links. Under Khrushchev and his successors the traditional claims of monolithic unity of "proletarian internationalism" have degenerated to publicly aired charges of slander and betrayal.³

To summarize this liaison network development in terms of graphic communications models we could say that the change has been from a "wheel"


model in which Moscow formed the single node, toward an "iadic" or "random" network in which each Party is in direct contact with all other Parties. This last anarchically extreme network form has, of course, not been reached; what exists now is a network biased by the existence of two major nodes, each with its own shifting cluster of partly independent and partly bound parties.

B. COMINFORM (1947-1956)  

The Bureau of Information of the Communist and Workers' Parties—the so-called Cominform—was founded in September 1947 by Stalin and Zhdanov as a transmission belt for Soviet foreign policy. In this sense it resembles the Comintern in its final five years and sharply differs

1 Unfortunately, no comprehensive study of the Cominform has yet been published. The only general account, by Nollau (61), 211-256, is marred by several misleading omissions. A revealing but self-serving account is Dedijer (53), pp. 290-299 and index. See also Bernard S. Morris, "The Cominform: A Five-Year Perspective," World Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (April 1953), pp. 360-376. For a recent 10-item annotated bibliography see Hammond (65), 1004-1006.

2 "Info iuro" was the semi-official abbreviation used in Communist circles, "Cominform" being mainly though not exclusively the anti-Communist's term.

3 A current but unconvincing theory that the Cominform was the personal creation of Zhdanov against the cautious opposition by Stalin as part of Zhdanov's alleged campaign to simultaneously reestablish policies of Party supremacy and world revolution was advanced by Franz Borkenau, European Communism (London: Faber, 1953) and accepted by Ernst Halperin, The Triumphant Heretic: Tito's Struggle Against Stalin (London: Heinemann, 1958), pp. 56-59, 76-77; and A. Dallin (62), 331-332. However, subsequent analyses—based closely on the disclosures of Dedijer and Reale—tend to discount the theory of a rebellious Zhdanov. See, for example, Armstrong (63), 193. Two key elements in the theory have been the "convenient" timing of Zhdanov's death on 31 August 1948 and Stalin's subsequent allegation that it was caused by medical murder. However, this was—rumor and speculation to the contrary—almost certainly a natural death as stated by the Swedish cancer specialist, Professor Berven, who had examined Zhdanov six months before his death and diagnosed a terminal cancer. For the Berven Interview in The Hindu (Madras, 16 January 1953)
from the original Comintern as a policy-making and operational body. The formal membership was limited to the USSR, the East European satellites (except East Germany, Albania, and the soon-to-be ousted Yugoslavia), and the two major West European Communist parties of France and Italy. The governing board was composed of two representatives appointed by the Central Committees of each of the nine participating parties.

At the outset it must be made quite clear that the only sense in which the Cominform was a successor of the Comintern was that both organizations published the official journals of the international parties: *International Press Correspondence* (later, *World News and Views*) and *Kommunisticheski Internatsional* by the Comintern, and *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* by the Cominform. The charges by Mischke, Borkenau, Seton-Watson, Heilbrunn, Hutton, and others that it also inherited specific control or clandestine functions are now known to be false inferences based, in part, on the authors' credulous acceptance of faked documents and, in part, on their reading too much militancy into Zhdanov's speech at the Cominform's founding meeting. A few others still clung so firmly to their romantic belief in the continued (but covert) existence of the defunct Comintern that when faced with the founding of the Cominform they generated the most remarkable fantasies. Thus Benjamin Gitlow asserted with his typical stubborn courage that the "Cominform is a branch of the Comintern. It represents the reconstitution of the Western European Bureau of the Comintern." 1

Aside from publishing, the only Cominform activities were its occasional meetings. Apparently there were only some five or six formal

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1 Gitlow (48), 357. And Cookridge (55), 42, 52, 254, thought it was a European bureau directed by Zhdanov in bitter competition with Beriya.

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convocations of the membership,\(^1\) although there is considerable confusion in the literature.\(^2\)

### COMINFORM MEETINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Soviet Delegates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 22-23 Sep 1947</td>
<td>Poland (Wiliza Gora)</td>
<td>Founding meeting</td>
<td>Zhdanov, Malenkov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. c. 15 Dec 1947</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Publication organization</td>
<td>Yudin, Gregorian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ? -27 Jun 1948</td>
<td>Rumania (Bucharest)</td>
<td>Expulsion of Tito</td>
<td>Zhdanov, Malenkov, Suslov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. late Nov 1949</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Attacks on Tito</td>
<td>Suslov, Yudin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sep 1950</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Propaganda and economic questions</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Originally headquartered in Belgrade, the Cominform and its journal was transferred to Bucharest during early July 1948 as a consequence of Yugoslavia's expulsion the previous month.\(^3\) Henceforward its main purpose and preoccupations were with Stalin's efforts to unseat Tito. Its failure to do so ended its usefulness; and, in April 1956,


\(^2\)For example, Nollau (61) (but compare his p. 231) errs in stating that there were only two meetings after the founding meeting, and Armstrong (61), 218, and Clews (64), 74, in saying only three.

\(^3\)New York Times, 3 July 1948, p. 2.
the Cominform was formally dissolved by Khrushchev, as one of his concessions to obtain rapprochement with Yugoslavia.

Although the question is somewhat moot, apparently the Cominform was intended to undertake information coordination functions for all Communist parties, as well as for the formal East European and major West European members.\(^1\) The fact that the Cominform's journal, For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy! was published in some 19 languages (starting 1 November 1947 with four and growing to 19 by 1952) indicates its intended international role. It not only appeared in the languages of all the member states, and those of the non-member Communist states (Albanian, Chinese, German, Korean) but also those of the major Communist parties not in power (Arabic, Dutch, English, Japanese, Spanish, Swedish).\(^2\) However, the oft-stated charges\(^3\) seem false that formal organizational links existed with the WFTU Liaison Bureau founded in Peking in 1949, much less that this latter body constituted any sort of "Far Eastern Cominform."\(^4\)

In any case, actual direction of the Cominform was assigned to the Secretariat of the CC, CPSU, and probably specifically to its mysterious International Section described in the following section. The principal initial functionary of the Cominform, in his capacity as Chief Editor of its publications, was the philosopher (and alleged

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\(^1\)On alleged direct Cominform influence in Asia see Cecil H. Sharpley, The Great Delusion (London: Heinemann, 1952), pp. 109-111. Nollau (61), 232-233, argues that this influence was only through the acceptance as directives by foreign Communist parties of material presented in the Cominform publications, citing cases of the Indian CP in 1947 and the Japanese CP in 1950.

\(^2\)Czechoslovakia was covered by both Czech and Slovak editions. The Serbo-Croat edition was dropped together with Tito.

\(^3\)For example, by Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev: The History of World Communism (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 328.

secret policeman, Pavel Yudin. He was not only in direct and continuing communication with Moscow via radiotelephone and teleprinter links but all page proofs of its leading publication, For a Lasting Peace; For a People's Democracy!, were flown to Moscow for pre-censorship and editing personally by Stalin and Zhdanov (later Molotov). Yudin's successor was his fellow-philosopher and long-time colleague, M. B. Mitin.

Charges still echo that the Cominform inherited the clandestine functions of the Comintern. These are now known to be the fantasies of persons—mainly former Comintern internationalists—who could not accept the fact that Stalin had purposely destroyed this movement in 1939. For example, Borkenau—himself a former minor Comintern official—presumed that the Cominform was the old Comintern resurrected by Stalin to be the "highest command post" of international Communism, falsely attributing to it the direction of both the intense labor unrest and strikes in Western Europe in autumn 1947 and the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. 2 Weissner similarly believed in the "re-establishment of the Communist International in the shape of a Cominform," attributing this however to the initiative of Zhdanov rather than Stalin. 3 Even the astute David Dallin was deceived concerning clandestine Cominform activities. 4

While much of the mistaken exaltation of Cominform power by Western Sovietologists was the result of honest preconceptions, their

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1 Dedijer (53), 297-299. See also Nollau (61), 228-231.

2 Borkenau (53), 520-521, 529, 532. A biased view of Borkenau's own bias is R. H. S. Crossman, "The Ex-Communist: F. Borkenau," in his The Charm of Politics (New York: Harper, 1958), pp. 200-205. In fact, the Czech coup was locally directed by Valerian Zorin, then not only a Deputy Foreign Minister but probably a Chief of the KI, who was sent out from Moscow specifically for this task. Nollau (61), 214, 247.


4 Dallin (55), 335, 494, attributing both the training of espionage agents and maintenance of the Comintern files to the Cominform.
analyses were made more difficult by the ready manufacture of faked documentation, some of which was too uncritically accepted by eager academic theorists and Western intelligence analysts. A prime example is the infamous "Protocol M," which was first published in summary on 14 January 1948 in the West Berlin newspaper Der Kurier. This document described the "Communist Information Center (Cominform)" as, among other things, being responsible for coordinating subversion in Western Germany. The British Labour Government investigated this document; and on 19 April 1948 Minister of State Hector McNeil reported to the House of Commons that a German employee had admitted to the forgery. Remarkably, McNeil went on to say that, although "Protocol M" was probably a forgery, there were "strong indications" to believe it had been "compiled from authoritative Communist sources." In retrospect it seems the best of Western—or at least British—intelligence suffered from judgmental errors similar to those simultaneously clouding the analyses of academic scholars, political journalists, and defectors. Despite this exposé "Protocol M" was again offered to the public eight years later by Dr. Heilbrunn. It took the dissolution of the Cominform itself to still this myth, for myth it was, containing no elements of Cominform reality.

The "Protocol M" syndrome was evident in increasingly elaborate fabrications and delusions. In 1950 two of America's foremost retired...
naval intelligence officers, Admiral Zacharias and Ladislas Farago, described an elaborate and sinister "Cominform Military General Staff." This body was categorically presented as headed by the Hungarian General Mihály Farkas, headquartered in Budapest at 5 Akadémia Utca (across from and overflowing into the Academy of Sciences), and comprising the "greatest single coalition army ever assembled in peacetime under a single command authority." These details were explicitly provided for in an addendum to the alleged secret protocol, "now fully implemented," to the 1947 Cominform pact. Zacharias and Farago do not specify how they came into possession of this protocol and its addendum, but note that French Interior Minister Jules Moch also had a copy. Curiously, but only coincidentally, all of this does sound rather like the membership, "joint command" organization, and coordinated planning and operations of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), which was however not formed until May 1955, five years later. The authors also believed that these same Budapest headquarters housed a "Cominform School," giving an intensive two-year military-political training in revolutionary and underground warfare.

Lieutenant Colonel Miksche—a Czech artillery officer in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War, Free French intelligence officer during World War II, and postwar Czech military attaché—went still further, attributing to the Cominform all former Comintern

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1 Rear Admiral Ellis H. Zacharias in collaboration with Ladislas Farago, Behind Closed Doors: The Secret History of the Cold War (New York: Putnam's, 1950), pp. 161-164, 188-190. The authors received a photostat of the "original" document in August 1948 in unspecified circumstances that convinced them of its authenticity and of their pro-Tito transmitters, "actual participants of the [Cominform] meeting."

2 As the preliminary design of the WTO goes back to 1953 at the earliest, there is no possibility that these early forgeries were based even on draft material. See Remington (65), Chapter IV ("The Warsaw Treaty ... ").

3 In this case Zacharias and Farago (50), 96-98, 343, specify their source as an anonymous "young Hungarian who had graduated from the famous school" in 1949 and immediately defected.
clandestine functions (intelligence, forged documents, agent training, courier nets, directing civil wars and subversion, etc.) that were, in fact, the prerogative of the state security apparatus (the then KI). Miksche even specified an elaborately detailed organization complete with a secret Central Committee and five departments, including a super-secret "Military Department" with a 349-man staff. Miksche based his account on a secret document whose provenance and bona fides he would not reveal.1 There has never subsequently appeared any independent confirmation of any of Miksche's details, although former FBI Special Agent Spolansky published similar material around the same time.2 One can only hope that the conscientious Czech soldier, Miksche, was not too much out of pocket for his gullibility.

Dr. Heilbrunn, too, thought that the Cominform "probably" was responsible for screening prospective foreign Communists for the regular Soviet intelligence services. He also believed that the infamous Protocol M forgery was compiled from authentic Communist sources, albeit conceding that the document itself was questionable.3

1 Miksche (52), 347-349. Nollau (61), 248-249, expresses a suitably skeptical view of Miksche's fantasy.

2 Jacob Spolansky, The Communist Trail in America (New York: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 101-108. Spolansky was a specialist on Communist subversion for the FBI from 1919 until he entered private consulting in the 1930's. Spolansky locates his mythical 700-man organization outside Bucharest, says it was operated by "the Russian Intelligence Service" (Spolansky, like most other writers, is constantly garbling the GRU and NKVD). Spolansky says that the Military Affairs Section (one of the five sections of his "Comintern") under Soviet General Fedor [actually, Sidor] A. Kovpak had a staff of 400 and was divided into six subdivisions of which Subsection A was for "recruiting for the International Brigade, a supermilitary structure owing allegiance to the Cominform" and a Subsection D dealing with "arms and ammunition for 'guerilla' bands." Typically, Spolansky says that he "cannot, for obvious reasons, reveal exactly how this crucial information was elicited." Actually, Major General Sidor [sic] A. Kovpak had at 63 already retired from military service, having commanded Soviet guerrillas in both the Civil War and WW II.

3 Heilbrunn (56), 83-85.
J. Bernard Hutton also recently (1962) credited the Cominform with having continued the clandestine work of the Comintern.\(^1\) However, he does recognize that it has been the inter-party liaison groups--centered in the Central Committee Secretariat in each of the several parties, as described below--that have gradually taken over these functions. The pseudonymous Mr. Hutton, a Czech Comintern worker until he defected in 1938, claims to have secret contacts behind the Iron Curtain that enable him to purvey up-to-date "inside" information on Soviet espionage. His material is always sensational but seldom substantiated.

C. FOREIGN SECTION, CC, CPSU

The central function of the Communist International (Comintern) had been, in Trotsky's and Kamenev's phrase, to serve as the "General Staff of the World Revolution."\(^2\) Specifically, it was its senior echelon, the Executive Committee (ECCI), that carried this rôle. It is this firm belief about the Comintern, shared by most former Comintern members and Old Bolsheviks and by many students of international communism, that accounts for much of the speculation—pro and con—about the effects of the dissolution of the Comintern and, later, of the Cominform. In fact, the whole debate has largely overlooked one important organization that provided seemingly almost unbroken administrative and, sometimes, policy continuity in inter-Party liaison from well before the Revolution down to the present day. This body is the Foreign Section (or International Department) of the CPSU, located since at least the late 1920's in the


\(^2\)The original call for creation of such a "general staff" came in 1872 from Friedrich Sorge, then in New York as Secretary-General of the First International and grandfather of the famed Soviet Military Intelligence agent, Richard Sorge.
Secretariat of the Central Committee.

It was originally called the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, the pre-revolutionary forerunner of the CPSU, from at least as early as 1908 when it was controlled by the Menshevik wing.

The Central Committee Secretariat involvement in inter-Party liaison also played a significant part in Stalin's early thrust toward supreme power. Avtorkhanov, a former member of this body, alleges that after the defeat of the Trotsky and Zinoviev factions in 1927, Stalin sought to consolidate and extend his position in two main ways: First, by arranging the transfer of the power of appointment and recall of all senior Party and Government posts from the CC Orgburo (in which he was only one of many members) to the CC Secretariat (where since 1922 he was General Secretary and commanded a majority of votes). Second, by the


expansion of his personal Secretariat\(^1\) that included his private Foreign Section\(^2\) headed allegedly by the noted Hungarian economist, Eugene Varga. Stalin's Secretariat vanished—with much of its personnel—instantaneously with Stalin's death on 5 March 1953. From that point on, the regular Secretariat of the CC, CPSU, monopolized these functions.\(^3\)

The CC Secretariat foreign section monopolized direct control over the Presidium of the Executive Committee (ECCI) of the Comintern.\(^4\)

The CC "Foreign Section" also prepared the background memoranda on international affairs for the attention of the Politburo, having access as it did to intelligence sources beyond those available to the

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\(^1\)Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 101-112, 260-261, 301. Avtorkhanov (who earlier wrote under the pseudonym of "Alexander Uralov") is a native Chechen-Ingush who served in the Press Bureau of the CC Secretariat from 1930 until 1934. He defected in 1943 and now (1956) works in West Germany. The successive chiefs of Stalin's private secretariat were I. P. Tovstukha (1921-1922), Bretanovsky (mid-1920's?), and A. N. Poskrebyshev (? -1928-1953). See also Barmine (45), 260-262, who personally knew many of Stalin's private secretaries in the 1930's. Also Wolin and Slusser (57), 376. Shapiro (60), 255, 274, 314-317, also makes this point regarding Stalin's use of his strength in the Secretariat. See also Wolfe (57), 175, 177, 219, 221, 223; and Krivitsky (39), xiv, who says Stetsky was chief secretary in 1936.

\(^2\)Avtorkhanov (59), 104. According to Shapiro (60), 395, 403, 447, 545, this section existed at least as early as 1924.

\(^3\)There is surely a parallel case to Stalin's rise in that Khrushchev's defeat of the "anti-Party" faction in 1957 coincided with the packing of the Presidium with CC Secretariat Secretaries as pointed out by Herbert Ritvo in an unpublished background paper for RFE dated 7 July 1958. Wolfe (57), 177, suggests—quite incorrectly, I think—that Khrushchev also had his own private secretariat, headed by A. B. Aristov.

\(^4\)Thus Avtorkhanov (59), 145, 150, states that Stalin's peremptory instructions in 1928 to the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee to direct the leadership (Zentrale) of the German Communist Party (KPD) to reverse itself by reinstating Thaelmann as leader and summoning the "compromisers" (Ewert, Eberlein, and Eisler) to Moscow was issued by him in the name of the CC Secretariat.
During the mid-1930's, the foreign section chief was no less than the famed Karl Radek, who was concurrently foreign editor of Izvestiya. At that time, he and his staffs comprised some of the most knowledgeable and travelled Russian experts on foreign affairs. This expertise was largely lost when his subordinates followed Radek to prison in January 1937. However, Radek was rumored to have been replaced in this post by Litvinov after the latter's resignation as Foreign Commissar in May 1938, thereby restoring a measure of competence to this section.

Barmine—who was then Soviet Chargé d'Affairs in Athens—mentions dealing on a matter of Balkan politics with the "foreign bureau of the Central Committee of the Party" in January 1937, clearly indicating that this bureau was senior to the nominally cognizant German and Balkan Department of the Foreign Commissariat and having direct access to the Politburo.

During and after the dissolution of the Comintern and its ECCI, the inter-Party liaison function was taken over in toto by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Indeed, the Spanish Politburo-in-exile was informed by Manuilsky

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1 Fainsod (1st edition, 1953, only), 282, citing an unnamed "highly placed informant familiar with the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs under Litvinov in the late thirties." Independent confirmation of this briefing function is supplied by Fischer (41), 434.

2 Fischer (41), 434; Orlov (53), 196.

3 Barmine (45), 262, reporting rumors reaching him after his defection.

4 Barmine (45), 309.

5 David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961), pp. 4, 25, 43-44, 454-455, 462-463. Dallin, however, probably erred in ascribing to the International Section all former OMS functions: "providing couriers, issuing orders, money, and arms, and making appointments." Nollau (61), 294, 318-319, recognizes the liaison function of this particular section, but seems to assume that inter-party control and liaison is a personal matter between individual CC, CPSU delegates and the foreign CPs. This implied overlooking of a formal secretariat for interparty relations is most improbable.
in May 1943 that it should maintain liaison through Dimitrov "who will be seated in the Foreign Section of the Bolshevik Party."¹

That the CC International Section continued in operation in the period between the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 and the creation of the Cominform in 1947 is attested by Igor Gouzenko.² Gouzenko reports that this section was then headed by Georgi Malenkov* and controlled selection of key personnel assignments in the Foreign Commissariat.³ It has been alleged that in 1944, the Foreign Section was the specific body that selected the top personnel of the newly forming satellite régimes from among the Communist émigrés then in the USSR.⁴ This is quite plausible, but I am not aware of any authority for this claim.

An unprecedented public disclosure of the internal workings of the CC Secretariat appeared in the official Report of the July-August 1957 Italian Communist Party Delegation to the USSR. On this occasion, in July, the Deputy Head of the Party Organs Section for the Union Republics, F. K. Yakovlev, mentioned the bare fact of the existence of the Foreign Section ("la sezione <<esteri>>") in ticking off the list

¹Jesús Hernández, Le Grande Trahison (Paris: Passquelle Éditeurs, 1953), pp. 248-249. Jesús Hernández Tomás was himself a member of the ECCI and Spanish Politburo until his expulsion in late 1943. He soon left Moscow to form a "Titoist" faction.

²Report of the Canadian Royal Commission (46), 27, 647. Gouzenko was only a minor GRU cipher clerk at its Moscow headquarters from April 1942 until July 1943, two months after the abolition of the Comintern, and was then in Canada until his defection in 1945. Hence his information regarding high level operations represents, at best, rumor. A. Dallin (62), 330, accepts the existence of the CC foreign section during this period without question.

³Nemzer (50), 83, errs in stating that Barmine verifies Gouzenko regarding Foreign Ministry personnel selection.

⁴Leonhard (58), 246, 253-255, etc., proves that at least the East German régime was created in and by the CPSU. However, the claim by one scholar (as I recall, it was David Dallin) that Leonhard attributed the personnel selection of the East German régime (and all other satellites as well) to the Foreign Section is in error.
of sections of the CC Secretariat.\textsuperscript{1}

The International Section, covering the non-bloc Communist Parties, survived the Central Committee Secretariat reorganization in 1948; although Fainsod incorrectly dates its creation from this late date. Similarly, under Khrushchev sometime between the dissolution in April 1956 of the Cominform and 1960, there was created the Section for Liaison with Communist and Worker's Parties of the Socialist Countries.\textsuperscript{2}

Of all the dozens of Central Committee bureaus, commissions, committees, and sections, these two operate in the highest degree of secrecy. And their officials are conventionally identified—even in their official obituaries—only as working in "a [unspecified] section of the CC, CPSU."\textsuperscript{3}

The International Section, CC, CPSU, was organized along the

\textsuperscript{1}That seemingly rather naive questions about structure and function of the CC Secretariat departments were put by the Delegation Chairman, no less than the then Deputy Secretary-General of the Italian CP, Luigi Longo, implies marked ignorance or uncertainty about such matters even among the most senior member of the most important foreign Communist parties. If Longo's questions were not merely rhetorical, we have here proof of how so little mention of the structure, personnel, and operations of this organization has occurred. Secrecy is, after all, partly a function of the number of initial knowers; the more the knowers, the greater chance of intentional or indiscreet leaks. The interview with Yakovlev appears in the official account of this visit, Problemi e Realtà dell'URSS (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1958), pp. 44-58. Extracts of the relevant portions are given in an English translation as an appendix in Conquest (61), 464-465, who translates the section's title as the "Foreign Affairs' Department."

\textsuperscript{2}For the successive reorganizations of the CC Secretariat foreign liaison see Fainsod (63), 199-201; and Shapiro (60), 509. Fainsod (p. 200) calls the "new" section the "Foreign Section (INO)."

\textsuperscript{3}Directory of Soviet Officials, Vol. I (November 1963), p. I-A6. This excellent series of biographical reference aids identified itself until 1962 as a publication of the Division of Biographic Information, Bureau of Intelligence Research, U.S. Department of State. Thereafter it has been distributed by the GPO without attribution. The anonymity of these Secretariat sections is also noted in passing by Conquest (61), 39; and Nemzer (50), 82-83.
lines of a large foreign office. Reporting directly to Stalin (and after his death, presumably to the Presidium), its successive Chiefs were probably Shcherbakov (1943-1945), possibly Malenkov, Zhdanov, perhaps Kirichenko (1958?) and most recently Ponomarev. Suslov has been identified as monitoring the West European parties and Kuusinen with those of Scandinavia and Germany. The fact that all these men were members of the Presidium or Central Committee in their own right contributes to difficulties of identifying their lower echelon responsibilities, which tend to pass unnoticed.

The most recently reported Deputy Chiefs of the International Section are V. G. Korionov, P. P. Shevlyagin, and V. P. Tereshkin.

Do foreign Communist parties have their own organization corresponding to the Foreign Department of the CC Secretariat of the CPSU? Apparently so, at least for some parties during certain periods. Furthermore, these bodies apparently had the same name and similar organizational settings within the foreign parties. Thus, between 1931 and its liquidation in 1938, even the miniscule underground Estonian Communist Party Central Committee had its Foreign Bureau (located in the USSR) whose function it was to maintain liaison with the Comintern as well as help train party cadres. Similarly, the Yugoslav Communist Party CC had its own International Section in March 1949. And as recently as January 1957, the Central Committee Secretariat of the German Communist Party (SED)

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1Dallin (61), 43. The Directory of Soviet Officials, Vol. I (1960), p. 4, calls this section the "Foreign Affairs Section (Mezhdunarodnyy otdel)."


3Head of this section was then Veljko Vlahović (1914- ) who has consistently been identified with international affairs. Leonhard (58), 421.
contained a section for Foreign Policy and International Liaison. This section is responsible for liaison between the SED and all foreign Communist parties, both arranging for and being represented on the SED delegations at all inter-party occasions. It also guides and controls the East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

D. BLOC LIAISON SECTION, CC, CPSU

The Section for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries handled the relations of the CPSU with the counterpart parties in the former bloc countries in Eastern Europe (including Albania), East Asia, and— I presume— Cuba. Yuri Andropov is the most recently identified Chief of this Section, although in 1962 an official Soviet publication referred to him in past tense as head of an unidentified CC Secretariat section. The Deputy Chiefs have been identified as I. N. Medvedev and L. N. Tolkunov, now the Chief Editor of Pravda.

\[1\] Abteilung Aussenpolitik und Internationale Verbindungen. The Section Chief (with special responsibility for foreign policy) from 1953 until at least 1957 was Peter Florin, concurrently a Candidate Member of the CC and former Chief of the Section for the USSR and People's Democracies in the Foreign Ministry. The Deputy Section Chief (with special responsibility for international liaison) in 1957 was Greta Keilson, a long-time aparatchik. Its house organ is the bi-monthly Aus der internationalen Arbeiterbewegung. Carola Stern, Porträt einer bolschewistischen Partei (Köln: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1957), pp. 341-342.

Table 1: CC Secretariat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Departments</th>
<th>Secretaries</th>
<th>Staff (Full-Time)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1917-1919]</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Sverdlov working alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Secretary: Krestinsky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>6+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>6+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>plus 120 guards and messengers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>767</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>10?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>3-4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>plus 11 departments specifically for Union Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1,300-1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Avtorkhanov (66); Fainsod (63); Directory of Soviet Officials (1963); and Shapiro (55).
E. POLITBURO COMMISSION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

To further complicate matters, we now know that even the Politburo itself was formally structured into topically specialized Commissions, at least during the late period of Stalin's rule. The central direction of interstate relations and supervision of the Foreign Commissariat was in the hands of the "Politburo subcommittee on foreign affairs," according to an unnamed informant of Fainsod. This same informant stated that in the late 1930's this "subcommittee" was chaired by Molotov, with Zhdanov handling Comintern and—until his death in 1948—Cominform affairs and Mikoyan supervising foreign trade matters.¹ Final authoritative confirmation of the existence of such a body was given by Khrushchev in his de-Stalinization speech to the 20th Party Congress in 1956. Complaining that it was Stalin's strategy to disorganize the Politburo by creation and reshuffling of various committees of its members, Khrushchev then quoted a two-point Politburo resolution of 3 October 1946:²

Stalin's Proposal:

1. The Political Bureau Commission for Foreign Affairs ("Sextet") is to concern itself in the future, in addition to foreign affairs, also with matters of internal construction and domestic policy.

2. The Sextet is to add to its roster the Chairman of the State Commission of Economic Planning of the U.S.S.R., Comrade Voznesensky, and is to be known as a Septet.

Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee, J. Stalin.

¹Fainsod (1st ed., 1953, only), 282, citing a "highly placed informant familiar with the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs under Litvinov in the late thirties." It is unfortunate that Fainsod omits this information from his revised edition, because it uniquely gives independent verification of Khrushchev's subsequent revelations about the Politburo Commissions.

²For a text of the "Secret Speech" see Bertram D. Wolfe, Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost (New York: Praeger, 1957), particularly p. 242, for this passage. For commentary on the "Sextet-Septet" see Conquest (62), 84, who speculates that on its reorganization in 1946 the Septet "must almost certainly" have been composed of Molotov, Zhdanov, Beria, Bulganin, and Molotov, in addition to Stalin and Voznesensky. See also Nollau (61), 227-228.
F. SPECIAL SECTION, CC, CPSU

To return to those Central Committee Secretariat offices whose authority or activities extend beyond Soviet frontiers, we must consider the little-known section dealing with foreign intelligence and espionage. This section was originally created by 1920 as merely a repository for the secret Party and State archives and Party membership card-index. It was called, appropriately, the Secret Section until the Secretariat reorganization in 1929 whence it has been called the Special Section. However, at Stalin's initiative, the change of name brought with it greatly expanded functions to include the compilation of secret dossiers on all Party officials and supervision of the secret police. The Special Section acquired its own network of spies and couriers to fulfill these new duties. As with the Secretariat's International and Bloc Liaison sections, neither the Special Section nor its personnel are ever identified, much less described, in official public Soviet documents. However, it is known that this body forms the direct control link between the Politburo and the secret police, presumably including the KGB's (and perhaps the GRU's) foreign operations.

The Special Section was variously headed since 1929 by I. P. Tovstukha (until his death in 1935), and A. N. Poskrabyshev, with the young Malenkov as his deputy (until about 1930 when transferred to head

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1 Avtorkhanov (59), 16, 103-107, 109, 164, 301; Wolin and Slusser (57), 16, 48, 385; Shapiro (60), 403, 447n; Fainsod (63), 192, 194, 197, 199, 200; and Shapiro (55), 265.

2 Indeed, it was not until the 17th Party Congress in January-February 1934, after Stalin's initial power grab, that even the Party members themselves were officially notified of its existence; although the Special Section was then already five years old. Avtorkhanov (59), 104. It was this delay in the formal announcement that explains the confusion in dating by Wolin and Slusser (57), 376.

3 KGB appointments and promotions are controlled by the CC Secretariat through another of its organs, the Administrative Organs Section (the former Cadres Section). Fainsod (63), 454-455, 461.
Despite the ad hoc origins of Stalin's Special Section as a key agency of his personal grasping for power over the state security organs, there were precedents. Furthermore, these precedents were surely known to the young Georgian theological student. Two other aspiring Russian despots pioneered this path: Ivan the Terrible—through his private Oprichnina—and Nicholas I—through his equally infamous Third Section of His Majesty's Private Imperial Chancery founded in 1827 near the beginning of his long reign.

The most recent reference to this body is from Captain Ruslanov, an émigré who came to the West in 1949. He reports:

Through the Special Sector [Osobyi Sektor] Stalin directed the foreign Communist parties, received all reports on the work of the military and political intelligence services abroad, gave his directives to ambassadors, guided the fifth columns and issued instructions to them. . . . Foreign policy was made in the Kremlin by Stalin and transmitted downward through the Special Sector. The activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the foreign department of the M.G.B., the military intelligence and the Cominform were coordinated in the Special Sector.

However the vaguely identified Captain Ruslanov should not be accepted on faith, as does Professor Tucker who is misled into equating Ruslanov's "Special Sector" with Stalin's private secretariat discussed above.

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1 Avtorkhanov (59), 103, 105. Tovstukha was a former chief and Poskrebyshchev concurrently chief of Stalin's personal secretariat. Barmine (45), 260; Wolin and Slusser (57), 385; Bajanov (30), 24, 32, 151.


Furthermore, Tucker also accepts Rusianov's explicit allegation that the Central Committee did not have an International Section during those same years (apparently, from the mid-1930's until at least 1947).  

Because the clandestine information and security services of the Communist states have been patterned on those of the Soviet Union, we should expect to find some clues to the Soviet CC Special Section in satellite practice. And, indeed, this was the case, at least for Poland and East Germany. Until at least December 1953, the Polish Central Committee Secretariat included a "Special Sector" that also controlled all personnel changes and all problems of political indoctrination for the Ministry of Security. However, unlike Soviet practice, all operational activities of this Polish Ministry were exclusively and directly subordinated to the Politburo.  

Also in East Germany, the German Communist Party (SED) CC Secretariat has maintained an "S" Section (Abteilung S [for Sicherheit, "security", or perhaps Spezial]) until at least as recently as January 1957. This section is an outgrowth of the earlier Defense of People's Property Section (Abteilung Schutz des Volkseigentums). It is divided into Sectors (Sektoren) for the Army, People's Police, State Security, Combat Groups, and the Institute for Sport and Industry (GSI).  

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1Tucker in Lederer (62), 186, repeated without change in Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 45-46, 157-158. Wolfe (57), 175, 177, also seems to confuse the Special Section with Stalin's private secretariat. Barrine (45), 260-261, who personally knew many of the personnel involved, is quite explicit in noting that these were separate organizations, although many of the leading personnel overlapped and the various functional undersecretaries could tap directly into the corresponding department of the CC Secretariat.

2"The Swiatlo Story," News From Behind the Iron Curtain, Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 1955), pp. 22-23. Lieutenant Colonel Jozef Swiatlo was a Deputy Chief of the 10th Bureau (investigation and protection of Party officials) of the Polish Ministry of Security until he defected in Berlin in December 1953.

3Stern (57), 342. This section is (1957) directly responsible to Ulbricht, apparently in his capacity as First Secretary of the Central Committee. The Chief of Section in 1957 was General Gustav Röbelen, a former Spanish Civil War veteran; and his Deputy Chief was Walter Borning.
Because no section of the CC Secretariat has been identified since Stalin's death with the name of the Special Section, it may be questioned whether it still exists. This possibility might appear to find some support in view of the apparently effective subordination to the Party of the power of the secret police since its post-Beria reorganization as the KGB in 1954. However, surely the CP would not abdicate this means of assuring its continued control over the KGB, however docile the latter might be at the moment. Furthermore, its continued existence in East Germany suggests its continuation in the USSR.

Whether or not the Special Section still exists under that or some other name, the CC still exercises substantial control over all security and intelligence services through its other sections. That is, while I am unable to determine which, if any, section of the Secretariat is the current intermediary for transmission of operational orders from and reports to the CC, the CC does exercise administrative control through several Secretariat channels. This information we have from GRU Colonel Penkovsky as recently as 1962. Paramount among these Secretariat control groups is the powerful Administrative Department, headed until his accidental death in 1964 by KGB Major-General N. R. Mironov.*

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*Penkovskiy (65), 68-69, 284-285.

On the Administrative Department of the CC Secretariat see Penkovskiy (65), 68, 284-285, who calls it both "Administrative Section" and "Administrative Organs Department." See also Avtorkhanov (66).
G. AGITPROP SECTION, CC, CPSU

Brief mention should also be made of the famed Propaganda and Agitation (Agitprop) for Union Republics Section of the Central Committee Secretariat; although it is not strictly speaking clandestine, operating as a moderately well-publicized body.

Since its creation in 1920, the Secretariat Agitprop department has undergone several changes in both title (most recently, November 1962-1965, as the Commission on Ideology) and (temporary) organizational ties with other offices of the Secretariat. However, it—and its counterparts in all the foreign Communist parties—are traditionally called "Agitprop." As a result of the July 1948 Secretariat reorganization, the Agitprop Administration (upravlenie) was retitled a Department (otdel) and its subsections were retitled from Departments (otdel) to Sectors (sektor). In November 1962 it was formally retitled the Commission on Ideology. Most recently (1965), it is once again the Propaganda and Agitation Department.

Basically, the Secretariat Agitprop Section is concerned with policy control of the Communist press. Thus its activities are mainly occupied with internal distribution to the public of news and propaganda, both domestic and foreign. However, as it also controls the official news services (such as TASS, Novosti, and Radio Moscow's foreign broadcasts) that distribute news abroad, Agitprop must divert some energy to these foreign channels. In principle, this is mainly


2 Inkeles (58), 30n, 32.
a monitoring and censorship function rather than a policy-making one
with regard to the foreign channels, involving close liaison with other
organs (such as the Foreign Affairs Ministry or Foreign Trade Ministry)
to ensure that all approved news but no unauthorized information
get disseminated abroad. Thus, regarding Agitprop's foreign rôle, it is
merely a two-way transmission belt for overt news and information.

Within Agitprop, the specific subsection concerned with foreign
news handling is the Central Press Sector, which until 1928 had been
a separate section (otdel).

The successive heads of Agitprop have been A. I. Krinitsky
(1879–1926), Ya. S. Stetsky, (1929-1937), Andrei Zhdanov (1939-1940?),
Georgi Aleksandrov (c. 1940-1947), Mikhail Suslov (1947-1955?), F. V.
Konstantinov (1955-1958), Leonid Ilichev (1958-1965) and, since 1965,
Vladimir Stepanov.

The body within Agitprop specifically charged with disseminating
Soviet propaganda abroad is the Soviet Information Bureau (SIB), known
as the Sovinformburo. From its headquarters on Zhdanova Street (at least
in 1957) this huge organization directs an extensive network for foreign
agitation propaganda including the local output from Embassies. The
Sovinformburo is the Soviet rough functional counterpart of the USIA- USIS,
although each would no doubt think this comparison distasteful.

H. COMMUNIST FRONT GROUPS

An organizational adjunct of nearly all Communist movements is
the "front" group or, in Communist parlance, "mass organization."
These range from comprehensive political alliances of political parties and factions such as the Popular Front governments in France and Spain in the 1930's and the National Liberation Front (the so-called "Viet Cong") in South Vietnam in the 1960's, through federated politicized occupational groups such as the present World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and International Union of Journalists (IUJ) or the topically confederate World Peace Council (WPC), to ad hoc committees of individuals formed for influencing or propagandizing highly specific issues such as the Noulens Defense Committee or the Spanish Milk Fund.\(^2\)

The master of this last type of improvised group was the brilliant German Communist propagandist, Willi Münzenberg,\(^*\) who from 1915 until his expulsion by the Party and Comintern in 1937 founded, organized, stage-managed, or inspired still-uncounted dozens of local and international demonstrations, congresses, committees, newspaper and book publishing houses, and film companies. Even if he did not quite invent the "front" and the "fellow traveller," these instruments of international communism were moulded to their present form by him. He was the master organizer of committees and petitions of leftist and liberal intellectuals. He was the first head of the Communist Youth International, founder of the International Workers Aid, League Against Imperialism, Colonial Information Bureau, World Committee Against War and Fascism, Committee for War Relief for Republican Spain, etc., etc. His multifaceted enterprises were backed by OMS financing. Despite his astonishingly broad—and invariably successful—contributions to the Comintern, his highly personal and independent style of working was intolerable to the Stalinists, leading to his expulsion from the Comintern in 1937 and, probably, to his murder in France in 1940, an event that bears several of the earmarks of the NKVD's Department of Special Tasks. Fortunately,


\(^2\) For the more recently active front groups see Clews (64), 88-101, 140-144, 285-296; and Kirkpatrick (56), 29-35, 125-156.
considerable reliable information about Münzenberg's organizational techniques is known from his former associates Gustav Regler, Arthur Koestler, Margarete Buber-Neumann, Louis Fischer, and Kurt Kersten, and from his widow, Babette Gross.

Although the numerous front groups were established mainly to serve political or agitational purposes, some also combined clandestine activities, at least in the past. For example, the International Red Aid (best known by its Russian acronym, MOPR) was created in Moscow in 1922 by the Comintern--nominally by the Association of Old Bolsheviks--as an "independent relief organization not connected with the parties." Initially aiding political exiles in Russia, by 1927 it had begun to establish national and regional branches throughout the world, providing charitable medical and legal relief to victims of and refugees from Fascism and Capitalism, particularly from Germany and Spain in the 1930's. However, the MOPR also made full and effective use of its international network to conceal and smuggle Comintern agents and escapees. For example, the Paris branch office was involved in 1936 in the selection and transportation of volunteers for the Spanish Civil War. In such activities the MOPR maintained close liaison with illegal sections of the local Communist parties and the Comintern. The MOPR was succeeded after WW II by various local front groups such as the Civil Rights Congress (formerly International Labor Defense, the MOPR American branch founded in 1925) in the United States and the Central Council for the Protection of Democratic Rights in West Germany.1

1The MOPR (Mezdunarodnaya Organizatsiya Pomoshchi Bortsam Revoliutsii) should not be confused with the similar "front," Internationalen Arbeitshilfe (International Workers Aid) or Mezdunarodnaya Rabochaya Pomoshch ("Mezhrabpom") founded by Münzenberg in 1921 in Berlin. For the general history of the MOPR see Nollau (61), 154-156; Eudin and Fisher (57), 31-32; Leonard (58), index; Ebon (48), 285, 459; Willoughby (52), 260, 264, 283, 291-293, 296, 305-308; and Gitlow (40), index. For an 18-item bibliography of the MOPR (and, inadvertently, the Mezhrabpom) see L. R. Smith in Hammond (65), 1002-1003; and, for an 86-item bibliography see Witold S. Sworakowski, The Communist International and Its Front Organizations (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1965), pp. 440-452. The MOPR was still in existence as late as 1942 when its CC evacuated to Ufa from besieged Moscow.
The Third (Communist) International, or Comintern, existed from its enthusiastic but perhaps somewhat premature founding in Moscow by Lenin and Zinoviev in March 1919 until its purging by Stalin in the late 1930's and eventual formal dissolution on 15 May 1943. During these years it served the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) as its principal instrument for the direction and coordination of the several national Communist parties. The open legal portions of the national parties were directed by the open part of the Executive Committee (ECCI) and other constitutional Comintern bodies; the illegal and underground portions were directed by their corresponding covert sections in the Comintern apparatus.¹

A. INTERNATIONAL LIAISON SECTION (OMS)

A major part of the Comintern was its Section for international Liaison (OMS). It was founded in 1921 to end the previously disorganized and wasteful transmission of Russian financial support to foreign

Communist parties. It was subordinate to the Comintern's Orgburo (Organization Bureau) directed by Osip Pyatnitsky, the original Chief of the OMS, who continued to take a direct personal interest in OMS activities. This efficient apparatus operated throughout the world performing such varied essential services for the Comintern as running its underground courier service; smuggling propaganda, men, money and arms; preparing false passports; and quartering visiting Communists at the Hotel Lux in Moscow.

In the summer of 1932 the OGPU infiltrated itself into controlling positions in the Comintern under the guise of conducting espionage; and, finally, by 1938 the clandestine communications net of the OMS was transferred to the Foreign Department (INU) of the NKVD.

Head of the OMS from about 1930 until removed with his boss-predecessor, Pyatnitsky, in 1936 during Stalin's general purge of the Old Bolsheviks from the top Comintern posts was Jacob Mirov-Abramov.

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3 Ypsilon (47), pp. 234-235, 422. "Jan Valtin," Out of the Night (New York: Alliance, 1941), p. 708, states that the NKVD and Comintern organisations "had by 1937 become thoroughly interlocked." This infiltration is confirmed by Krivitsky (39), 53, 63-64.
He was succeeded by one of the NKVD purgers, Shorkin.  

According to Richard Sorge's memoirs—obtained under duress by the Japanese police in 1942—he was summoned to Moscow in 1925 to aid in the expansion of the so-called "Comintern Intelligence Division" that he characterizes as one of the "three major sections that formed the basis for concrete organizational and political leadership" for the Comintern. Sorge is explicit that this body was part of the ECCI's Orgburo, and it was very probably the OMS itself to which he referred.

In any event he gives detailed information concerning the ECCI's international intelligence operations. Among other matters Sorge makes clear that because Pyatnitsky had a smooth working relationship with his "close friend," General Berzin, Chief of Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU), there was some transfer of personnel from OMS to GRU. Sorge's own transfer to the GRU in 1929 is a case in point.  

According to a document dated 20 January 1929, allegedly a report from the Comintern bureau at Harbin to Comintern headquarters in Moscow, the Comintern was currently operating the following "cells" in China:

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1Nollau (61), 181. I am unable to otherwise identify this person.

2Sorge in Willoughby (52), 146-148, 173. See comments by Johnson (64), 72-73. Sorge was attached to this so-called "Comintern Intelligence Division" from January 1925 until late summer 1929. He states that this division had several successive Chiefs including Kuusinen, all Communists with years of foreign experience.

3For photo and translated text of telegram (in Russian) which the Chinese Harbin police claimed to have seized in their raid of 27 May 1929 on the local Soviet Consulate-General, see International Relations Committee, The Sino-Russian Crisis (Nanking: n.d. [1927]), pp. 67, 70, 72. The cited statistics are taken from the Russian photocopy, the English translator being faulty. North (53), 123, accepts the general authenticity of the documents seized at the Harbin Consulate.
Table 1: **Membership in Comintern Cells in China, 1929**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>No. Russians</th>
<th>No. Chinese</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHINA PROPER</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANCHURIA</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukden</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirin</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Members</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>183</strong></td>
<td><strong>230</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Current plans were to strengthen these groups by sending in an additional 250 Russians, 600 Chinese, and 200 Koreans.

According to "Comrade Y" (Hugh Eberlein) who in 1930 was sent by Pyatnitsky to China to investigate the OMS operations there, the OMS organization of China at the time disposed independently of large sums of money and employed numerous agents to maintain contact with the CCP underground. The head of this major organization was a Finnish Communist ("Comrade L") who had created a flourishing import business in luxury goods from Europe in Shanghai and Peking as an effective and highly profitable façade. Eberlein found "L" to be thoroughly disillusioned but a practical Communist who having built this business on OMS funds was simply treating the $100,000 annual profit as his own, the OMS aspect of his business retaining the original capital and receiving 10% annual interest from "Comrade L." In addition, the salaries and expenses of the local OMS agents—who were the company's salesmen—were charged half to the OMS fund and half to the business account. Although Eberlein's audit verified this story, he amicably but immediately removed the OMS operations from L's control, the latter retaining the import business and many of his "salesmen."¹

¹*Ypsilon (47), 135-137.*
"Comrade L" had opened this OMS net in China under its import cover in, or shortly before, 1928 when Freda Utley—then acting as an ad hoc Comintern courier—brought sealed instructions from Moscow via Siberia to him in Shanghai where she knew him as "Herr Doktor Haber."¹ Two days following her "live drop" Miss Utley was permitted to enjoy a social evening with some of the Comintern agents in Shanghai—a remarkable lapse in security from the approved Soviet clandestine practice. These persons she has identified only as "Americans and Germans, or German-speaking Europeans," except for Mr. and Mrs. "Hilaire Noulens."² It appears that during her brief stop in Shanghai—possibly during the above cellar soirée—Miss Utley was given additional secret Comintern documents to deliver to Japan. Her account of this episode is interesting not only because of its unique information about this Shanghai Comintern cell but because her own rôle typifies one major class of Soviet courier: the legitimate through-traveller. Miss Utley was travelling on her original British passport with quite legitimate research student status and as a freelancer for the Manchester Guardian.

By 1937 the Foreign Division (INO) of the NKVD took over all the underground communications nets of the OMS, including their Far Eastern operations; and the Comintern’s Far Eastern Secretariat was dissolved in that or the following year.³

¹Freda Utley, Last Chance in China (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), pp. 25-27. Miss Utley explicitly recognizes her "Haber" in the detailed description of "Comrade L" given by Eberlein. Miss Utley was travelling on her way to Japan to join her Soviet husband who was there for the Foreign Trade Commissariat. In an earlier book she describes her Comintern mission to Shanghai in greater detail but identifies "Haber" only as "a gentleman with a German name." Utley (40), 21-23.

²Ypsilon (47), 422; Valtin (41), 708. As the "Ypsilon" authors left the Comintern at unspecified dates, their information is possibly based on indirect evidence. Valtin-Krebs, however, remained in until December 1937 and personally observed this shift. "Ypsilon" adds, on unstated evidence, that political control over the Chinese Communists was now handled directly by the Soviet state apparatus and, quite implausibly, that the Chinese Reds were "made subordinate" to the General Staff of the Far Eastern Army under General Grigori Sitenov based at Khabarovsky.
The so-called (Far) Eastern Secretariat was the office of the Comintern in Moscow initially concerned with the direction of Far Eastern affairs covering Japan, Korea, China, India, Indonesia, and several other countries of the region. The head of this office in the early 1930's was Pavel Mif.*

A separate Eastern Bureau, the so-called Dalburo, also was established by the Comintern in Moscow. Dalburo maintained a branch headquarters in Shanghai to facilitate liaison among the CPs of China, Japan, and Southeast Asia. Dalburo's rapidly changing chiefs included Grigory Voitinsky, "James," and Yakov Yanson. From 1921 until he left Shanghai in 1923, the Dalburo was headed by Henryk Sneevliet* ("Marin," "Ma-lin").

The "Noulens," posing as a Belgian couple, were for a time the principal Comintern agents in the Far East where they ran the Dalburo from Shanghai. The "Noulens" were, in fact, the Swiss Comintern agents Paul and Gertrude Ruegg* whose false papers and identity had been created by the passport section of the German Communist Party. The couple arrived in China in 1930 to take up their Comintern duties there. They were arrested in June 1931 in Shanghai, tried in Nanking, and convicted to jail. The police evidence at their trial showed that

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2 For the Dalburo see Dallin (48), 106, 109, 379; and McLane (58), 12n, 40n.

3 Nollau (60), 138, 142.

4 Dallin (48), pp. 106-108, manages to garble their nationality ("Austria"), name ("Joseph Noulens") and date of arrest ("1932"). McLane (58), pp. 12n, 40n, takes their cover as "Belgians" at face value and also garbles the name as "Paul Noulens." Freda Utley who met the Noulens in Shanghai after their release in 1937 says: "They were warned to see no one. They were obviously terrified. . . . They feared to be liquidated if they returned to Russia. They knew too
the total Comintern financial aid to East Asia (not just China) did not exceed U.S. $15,000 per month. According to the recent memoirs of a then member of the CC/CCP secretariat, the bulk of these Comintern funds were earmarked for labor-union activities.

Evidently the Comintern managed a quick recovery from the Shanghai raids. According to Edgar Snow, this Shanghai Comintern "advisory committee" operated at least until the autumn of 1933 during which time it was of "great value in keeping the [Chinese] Reds informed on important political and military developments of the enemy." Snow adds that this Shanghai office's radio link with the Chinese Soviet at Juichin was the sole Comintern contact during the Juichin period, except for occasional couriers, until the arrival of the German Comintern agent "Li Teh" (Otto Braun) in 1933.

much. Poor devils. I left full of pity for these two white-faced derelicts of an age in Comintern history long past. They had left one prison only to fear incarceration in another. Rejected by everyone, they were too broken in spirit to save themselves and start a new life." Utley (47), 26-27. De Toledano (52), 44, 63, incorrectly states that Mr. Noulens-Ruegg was "eventually executed" by the Chinese Nationalist authorities.

1 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 379. Snow comments this was a "trifle" compared with foreign monies poured into China for "Christian propaganda" or the U.S. Government's $50 million Wheat Loan in 1933 which supported the Nationalists' anti-Communist military campaigns.

2 Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 184, citing the pseudonymous Li Ang (real name: Chu Hsin-fan) who subsequently left the Party and published his memoirs in 1942. Li Ang explicitly notes that the bulk of the CCP's operating fund was supplied by the rural Chinese Soviet governments. Li Ang was executed by the KMT in 1945. On Li Ang see Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China, 1924--1927 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 185, 197, 214.

3 Snow (38), 381, based at least in part on his interviews at Pao-an in 1936 with Braun and Chinese Communist leaders. McLane (58), 12n, 40n, is seemingly wrong in stating that the FEB network in China was broken by the arrest of Noulens-Ruegg.
Comintern Organization: 1919-1943

WORLD CONGRESSES

POLITBURO

CC/CPUSSR

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(ECCI)

SECRETARIAT

PRESIDUIM

ORGANIZATION SECTION

(CORBURO)

CADE SECTION

TRAINING SECTION

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

1920's

MILITARY SECTION

1920's

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SECTION (OMS)

STATISTICS AND

INFORMATION SECTION

AGITATION AND

PROPAGANDA

SECTION

FINANCE

SECTION

ADMINISTRATION

AND

CORRESPONDENCE

SECTION

PASSPORT SECTION

coordination of training section

other sections

LENIN SCHOOL

(Moscow)

closed 1938
V. PROFINTERN (1920-1937)

The Red Trade Union International, or Profintern, was founded in Moscow in July 1920. It was an affiliate of the Comintern and was headed by S. Lozovsky until dissolved in 1937. Concurrently it was a member of the Comintern Executive Committee (ECCI). As indicated by its title, the Profintern handled international trade union matters and spawned (with close Comintern collaboration) a number of other organizations concerned with labor matters. Among those that were active in the countries lining the Pacific Rim were the International of Seamen and Harbour Workers (ISH) and the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS). The Profintern was abolished in 1937 as a consequence of the introduction of the "popular front" policy.

A. INTERNATIONAL OF SEAMEN AND HARBOUR WORKERS (ISH)

Drawing upon the seamen's clubs that the Profintern had created since August 1921 in all major world ports, the International of Seamen and Harbour Workers (ISH) was founded in October 1930 for the purpose of organizing strikes, supplying maritime courier networks, and providing a clandestine "travel agency" service to Comintern agents. Initially

1Originally titled the International Council of Revolutionary Trade Unions, its name was changed at its first congress in Moscow in July 1921, hence the confusion over the date of founding. For the Profintern see McKenzie (64), 30, 68, 268; Ebon (48), 222-223, 279-280, 301, 367, 394, 401, 457; Eudin and Fisher (57), index; and Bol.Sov.Ents., 2nd ed., Vol. 23 (Moscow: 1953), p. 275. Albert Resis gives a 64-item bibliography on the Profintern in Hammond (65), 983-985.

headquartered in Hamburg and headed by Albert Walter until his arrest and defection to the Gestapo in 1933. He was quickly replaced by Ernst Wollweber who soon became most famous for directing maritime sabotage. Headquarters were then transferred first to Copenhagen and thence to Paris where the ISH was disbanded in 1936.¹

This body was partially revived in July 1949 as the International Association of Dockers and Seamen under the auspices of the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), itself founded in 1945 as one of the major "front" organizations.² However, if the WFTU acquired any of the covert functions of the ISH, I am unaware of it.³ Scholars' allegations that the now dormant WFTU Liaison Bureau founded in Peking in 1949 was some sort of "fa: Eastern Cominform" are quite improbable.

This is not to say that the old ISH functions of international maritime sabotage, espionage, and smuggling have ended. There is convincing evidence of well-organized, large-scale sabotage of merchant

¹On the ISH see Nollau (61), 149-150, 164-165, 167; Kennedy (57), 142; Valtin (41), pp. 306-320, 338, 488, 609-610, 562-663. "Jan Valtin" (1904-1951), the pen name of Richard Julius Herman Krebs, was a member of the ISH Politburo from 1931 until his arrest by the Gestapo in 1933. He left the Gestapo prisons in 1937 as a double-agent secretly remaining loyal to the Comintern-NKVD net he joined in Copenhagen until his defection in 1937. Came to U.S. in 1938. In U.S. Army in WW II as a combat reporter in the South Pacific. He died of natural causes: pneumonia. His best-selling (700,000 copies) autobiography, partly ghosted by Isaac Don Levine, is generally accurate except for occasional factual errors and considerable fictionalizing of biographical elements.

²The WFTU headquarters have been in Prague since their expulsion from Vienna in 1956. On the WFTU see Otto Pick and Andrew Wiseman, "Moscow and the WFTU," Problems of Communism, Vol. 8, No. 3 (June-July 1959), pp. 55-59. For a 33-item bibliography by Morton Schwartz on the WFTU see Hammond (65), pp. 1022-1026.

³On the contrary, it is suspected that the main efforts in maritime sabotage and smuggling in the early post-war period were the work of the master saboteur, Wollweber, former ISH Chairman, who had reorganized his semi-independent maritime intelligence organization in East Germany. Dallin (55), 370-372.
ships dealing with Russia's enemies, particularly during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), World War II (1941-1945), and the Korean War (1950-1953). What is uncertain is which specific clandestine Soviet organizations were involved. It is known that Wollweber was active on the maritime front during the Spanish Civil War. However, contrary to widely publicized allegations, he was not active against Nazi Germany during World War II, having been imprisoned in Sweden in 1940 (during the truce of the Hitler-Stalin Pact) and not released until 1944. Even the organization in Scandinavia was only able to continue its operations until 1941 when the entire network had been discovered. The Communists also conducted extensive sabotage and smuggling during the Korean War, but it seems to be largely rumor that attributes this to a Wollweber-directed organization located in East Germany.

It may be that these functions devolved upon the separate Communist parties. Certainly many had the capability. For example, the Australian Communist Party handled much of its own foreign smuggling of couriers and personnel through its Control and Security Commission, at least during the 1940's. Most of their couriers were merchant seamen, although air hostesses were occasionally used.

B. PAN-PACIFIC TRADE UNION SECRETARIAT (PPTUS)

The Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) was founded in mid-1927 at a conference in Hankow. Although nominally created by the

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1 Dallin (55), 127-132, 370-372. An appalling example of an undocumented jumble of carelessly presented fact, unacknowledged myth, and irresponsible speculation is Kurt Singer, Spy Omnibus (Minneapolis: Denison, 1962), pp. 11-26, 124-150, who manages to garble nearly every fact of Wollweber's biography. Singer even categorically states (p. 26) the implausible "fact" that after his purge in East Germany in 1958 Wollweber was brought to Moscow by Khrushchev, awarded the Order of Lenin, and promoted to be "chief of all satellite intelligence offices, the commander-in-chief and inspector-general of the spy-services of every Soviet-controlled country."

2 Sharpley (52), 86-92.
Profintern, the Comintern served at least as midwife. Covering the pacific Basin, its heads (Secretaries) were Earl Browder, * from its founding until replaced in 1929 by Gerhard Eisler, * who in turn was replaced by Arthur Ewert * and finally by Eugene Dennis. * The headquarters of the PPTUS were in Shanghai.

There was very close liaison in China between the Profintern's PPTUS and the Comintern's FEB, even to the extent of virtual interpenetration of personnel. To this degree General Willoughby's account is correct. However, this interrelationship cannot have been entirely tranquil, because at this time there were the most sharp ideological and personal differences between the top leadership of the Profintern and Comintern. Lozovsky was at loggerheads with Bukharin and supported the Fosterite faction of the CPUSA (including Browder) against Bukharin's proteges such as Ebert. 2 Their differences were paralleled among their respective staffs.

Browder's group in China comprised his secretary-confidential messenger-first wife, Kitty Harris, * and a New York Communist named Cosgrove * who was soon made the scapegoat to spare Browder blame for having compromised his operations in China. 3

For three months in 1933 Steve Nelson * served under Ebert in Shanghai. 4

1 On the PPTUS see Willoughby (52), 160, 271, 276, 281-282, 291, 302-307; Gitlow (40), index; Ralph de Toledano, Spies, Dupes, and Diplomats (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1952), pp. 43-44; Nollau (51), 141, 148.

2 Gitlow (40), 450-458.

3 Gitlow (40), 329-330, 537-538.

4 Smolansky (51), 156-158.
VI. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (GRU)

Soviet military intelligence has with few exceptions since the founding of the Red Army in 1918 been organized under the Main Intelligence Administration (GRU, Glavnoye Razvedovatelnoye Upravleniye) attached directly to the General Staff. As such, it exercised throughout, centralized direction of the intelligence operations of the Soviet ground and air services, and until 1940 of the Navy as well.¹

When founded in 1918 it was called the Registration Administration (Registrup) of the Red Army. The specific title GRU dates from at least as early as the major Red Army reorganization of 12 July 1926. During this later period it was successively designated for administrative purposes as the General Staff's Second Bureau, Fourth Department, Seventh Department, and finally Main (or Chief) Intelligence Administration. Unlike the practice in the state security organization, these changes of title signalled neither changes in function nor purges of personnel but merely reflected organizational restructuring of the Army as a whole.²

This section is lengthy and detailed for two reasons. First, there exists considerable public information about GRU operations in East Asia. Indeed, far more information is available about the GRU there than about the KGB. Second, it seems advisable to clear up once and for all the general confusion that exists among intelligence buffs (and once existed even among top U.S. professionals) between the GRU and

¹For Naval Intelligence, which emerged from the GRU as a separate agency in 1940, see next chapter.

the NKVD-KGB. To this end, I have departed somewhat from my practice in the other sections, by including substantially more details of leadership and internal organization. The common practice that overlooks the GRU or, rather, lumps it indiscriminately with the KGB derives, in part, from the circumstance that the GRU has been a secret organization whose very existence was never admitted by the USSR until 1964, while the KGB and its precursors has always been an acknowledged organization, some of whose operations and chief officers are officially publicized.

In common with all national military intelligence organizations, the GRU conducts the collection and evaluation of military field intelligence. In addition, it conducts extensive foreign espionage. The GRU does this in both close competition and considerable duplication with the Foreign Administration (INU) of the KGB (which conducts perhaps three-fourths of all Soviet foreign intelligence activities) as it once competed—though on an amicable basis—also with Comintern intelligence. Among the more notable and well described GRU nets were those in the United States under Colonel Boris Bykov in the 1940’s, in Canada under Colonel Nikolai Zabotin in the mid-1940’s, the vast so-called "Rote Kapelle" that covered all Western Europe during World War II, in Switzerland in the early 1940’s under the highly effective but incautious

1Garthoff (56), 266-269.


4Much has been written on this network—probably the largest in espionage history—and the fantastic "radio war" played by the Nazi counter-intelligence services that enabled them to discover and turn against the GRU about 64 of their own transmitters. The only comprehensive account is Perrault (69). Other more-or-less detailed and reliable accounts are: Leverkuehn (54), 37, 116-117, 175-183; Dallin (55), 234-272; Schellenberg (56), 277-286; and Boveri (63), 250-258.
Alexander Ra.öI and his principal contact, Rudolf Rüssler, and their magnificent source at the very heart of the Nazi high command, in Shanghai and later Tokyo under the brilliant and effective Richard Sorge in the 30’s and 40’s, the "atom spies" Allan Nunn May, Fuchs, Pontecorvo, and the Rosenbergs, and most recently, the Swedish Colonel (and GRU simulated Brigadier General) Stig Wennerström, arrested in 1963. Lesser GRU agents have included Judith Coplin in the late 1940’s and the Petr Maslennikov net broken in the U.S. in 1963. One of these latter minor agents, Fritiof Enbom, the Swede whose arrest in 1952 led to a celebrated trial, was a rare case of an NKVD recruit later transferred rather than liquidated.

1Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1949). Additional details are given by Dallin (55), 182-233, Jon Kimche, Spying for Peace (Second edition, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), pp. 91-92, who asserts his real name was Alexander Radolfi. See also Ronald Seth, The Art of Spying (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), pp. 50-53 with recent photo of Foote. Radolfi was one of several presumed liquidated Soviet agents who were amnestied from Siberian prisons after Khrushchev’s 20th Party Congress speech of 1956. He turned up in Budapest where his wife, Helen, rejoined him. Radolfi was a Professor of Geography at the University of Budapest until his recent death. Lewis (65), 255.

2For much new material and interpretation specifically on Rudolf Rüssler (1897-1958) see Kimche (52), 89-94, 106; Dallin (55), 193-198, 326-329; Boveri (63), 322-334; and Wilhelm Ritter von Schramm, "Der Fall Rudolf Rüssler," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 12 October 1966, pp. 3-22.

3This long-sought, elusive man has only recently been identified as Dr. Wilhelm Scheidt (1912-1954), Hitler’s own military historian. Small wonder Radolfi was able to forward such completely authentic and current intelligence as the detailed Wehrmacht order-of-battle. Schramm (66), 12. But for an argument against the Scheidt identification see Karl-Heinz Janssen, "Ein Hauch von Spionage," Politik, 15 November 1965, p. 5.

4See section D, below.

5Dallin (55), index.

The general overlooking of the GRU by intelligence buffs and professionals as well as their frequent outright confusion of this rather specialized body with its principal competitor, the KGB, is quite inexcusable in view of the fortunate fact that in addition to the above accounts of specific GRU operations we have four detailed and publicly available general descriptions of the GRU by three defectors, one captured master spy, and one double-agent. When these personal accounts are coupled with the above specific cases, a comprehensive history of the GRU can be reconstructed. The earliest GRU defector was Brigadier General Walter Krivitsky who fled his post as a GRU Resident in Western Europe in 1938. Next was Ismail Ege, GRU Lieutenant Colonel at the time of his defection in Turkey in 1942. Then Sorge gave a more or less genuine confession to his Japanese captors. When the Englishman, Alexander Foote, defected in 1947 he wrote his superb case history of the Rado ring in Switzerland. Most recently we have the controversial (but, in my judgment, entirely authentic—only misrepresented) Penkovsky documents. In addition, there are a fair number of more

1 Enbom was recruited and directed by the NKVD from 1941 until 1946 when transferred to the GRU where he remained until arrested in 1952. Petrov (56), 204-205, uniquely discloses the specific NKVD and GRU affiliations of Enbom. An otherwise detailed account is Noel-Baker (55), 202-234. A good account of the case's dramatic effect on the Swedish polity is William L. Shirer, The Challenge of Scandinavia (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), pp. 134-138.


4 Vladimir Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965). Aside from irresponsibly snide reporting in most major Western newspapers and journals, the only effort at serious critical analysis of this major work to have appeared by the end of
fragmentary and often confused accounts by foreigners who have been recruited abroad as low-level agents. These include Whitaker Chambers, Noel Field, Hede Massing, Arthur Koestler, and Max Klausen. Finally, occasionally useful materials on the GRU are included by some of the defectors from the parallel and sometimes overlapping state security and Comintern networks: Agabekov, Bentley, etc.

Given this rich body of raw data, it is surprising that no systematic studies have yet appeared on the GRU. Only one book has even given adequate weighting to the GRU, but it is too carelessly compiled and inadequately documented to serve as a starting point for research.¹

It is an interesting comment on relationships between the Soviet military intelligence and state security services that the counterintelligence operations within the Soviet armed forces are not conducted by the Ministry of Defense but rather by a branch of the state security police, now the KGB.² This arrangement is, of course, quite contrary to

₁Cookridge (55), particularly pp. (in U.S. edition), 64-65.

²Originally under the Cheka, military counter-intelligence was assigned to the Army's own Revolutionary War Council only from 21 February 1919 until 12 July 1926 when it reverted to the successive state security apparatuses. Prior to World War II the military counterintelligence units were called Special Sections (Osobyе Otdely, or O0), then from 1943 to 1946 they were professionally known as SMERSH, and, thence, Chief Administration for Counterintelligence (GUKR) in the MGB-KGB. The GUKR personnel are on detached duty with the military—have regular military titles and rank and uniforms—but are responsible only to the state security. See Vyacheslav P. Artemiev, "OKR: State Security in the Soviet Armed Forces," Military Review, Vol. 43, No. 9 (September 1963), pp. 21-31; Wolin and Slusser (57), 126-131; Leonard Schapiro, "The Birth of the Red Army," in Liddell-Hart (56), 29; Garthoff (56), 271-272; Harold J. Berman and Miroslav Kerner, Soviet Military Law and
the almost universal practice in other national intelligence services
where counter-intelligence is usually a function of either a specialized
agency—as with the U.S. FBI or the British Home Office’s Special
Branch—or of an internal branch of the separate intelligence organiza-
tions, as with the U.S. Army’s own Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC),
the British Army’s MI-5 (now DI-5), the West German Militärischer
Abschirddienst and Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, and the French
Sûreté.¹

According to General Walter Krivitsky, then GRU Resident in
Western Europe (operating under deep cover as an Austrian art dealer
in The Hague), the GRU defended its independence against the gradually
expanding functions and power of the secret police until late 1936 or
1937 when the NKVD finally took clear precedence at the expense of
certain functions of the GRU.² For example, it was late in this period

¹By way of comparison with their Soviet counterparts, the more
detailed accounts of Western intelligence services that attempt some
serious analysis of their organizational structure and functional
patterns include the following works. The reader is strongly cautioned,
however, that all such accounts contain major errors of commission or
omission or both. Sanche de Gramont, The Secret War (New York: Putnam’s,
1962); Joachim Joestin, They Call It Intelligence (New York: Abelard-
Schuman, 1963); and David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Espionage Estab-

²W. G. Krivitsky, In Stalin’s Secret Service (New York and London:
Harper, 1939), p. 141; Dallin (55), 6–7; Chambers (52), 316–318, 399;
Eissberg (51), 273; and Agabekov (31), 275. This situation is now at last
confirmed by Soviet sources, but curiously only through the medium of fiction.
In 1963 two novels of espionage (by Colonel Alexei Sobolev and a Colonel
Alexander Fedotov, respectively) appeared that accuse Stalin and Beria of
having crippled the GRU by diverting funds, personnel, and equipment to
the state security apparatus and attribute the fact that the GRU functioned
at all to the improvisation and esprit of its personnel. Heiman (65),
54–56.
that the NKVD managed to wrest control of Soviet international clandestine arms trade from the GRU, which had monopolized this trade since 1933.1

General Y. K. Berzin* was Chief of the GRU for 15 years, from 1920 until April 1935 when temporarily replaced by his Deputy Chief, General S. P. Uritsky.* Under the nom de guerre of “Grishin,” Berzin personally directed the 500 to 2000-man Soviet military advisory and technical mission in Spain from 27 August 1936 until his recall to Moscow in June 1937.2 GRU General Yan Karlovich Berzin has been widely confused with the Old Bolshevik diplomat, Yan Antonovich Berzin, an understandable error in view of the fact that the GRU general’s patronymic was unpublished until his official rehabilitation in 1964.3

Prominent among Berzin’s staff were Semen Firin, his aide in 1922 and reportedly Chief of the Second Section in 1935. And Major-General Terian* ("Tairov") was Deputy Chief from 1929 until at least as late as 1935.

As indicated, General Semen P. Uritsky* took over from Berzin as Acting Chief of the GRU in April 1935. He held this title until at least 14 September 1936 and remained on either as Acting or full Chief until June 1937 when Berzin returned. He was arrested on 1 November 1937 and was executed soon afterwards.

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1See my Soviet and Chinese Clandestine Arms Aid (draft, 1965) for the GRU and NKVD roles in this activity.

2For Berzin’s career in Spain see my Soviet Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (draft, 1965).

3Those who make this error are the U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in its study of the IPR, E. H. Carr (1955, p. 318), Hugh Thomas (1961, p. 262), and Chalmers Johnson (1964, p. 68). A recent book has also hopelessly confused Y. K. Berzin with the Chief of the Main Political Administration—the top political commissar. Professor Latham manages to get every fact wrong in one sentence: "... General Ian B. Gamarnik, executed along with Tukachevsky, headed Soviet Military Intelligence, and also maintained contact with the Communist Right-wing Opposition, at least outside of Russia." Earl Latham, The Communist Controversy in Washington (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 82n. On Gamarnik see Erickson (62), index.
During this time, the Deputy Chief was Aleksandr Karin, until his arrest in the spring of 1937 and immediate execution.

By this point in 1937 the NKVD-directed purges had struck hard and deep into the Red Army and its GRU. Orlov goes so far as to state that following the execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky on 12 June 1937, Stalin assigned the GRU to Yezhov and his NKVD. Although our knowledge of the internal personnel, organization, and responsibilities of the GRU is not detailed during this period, Orlov's statement is surely a marked exaggeration. However, the NKVD did extend its power still further at this time to include some measure of domination over the GRU; and it is even quite probable that it replaced key personnel with its own appointees as it is known to have been doing with the Foreign Ministry, the TASS Agency, and other key offices that constituted the channels of domestic and foreign information and communications.

When Uritsky was purged, he was succeeded as GRU Director by one Proskurov, an obscure person.

The GRU Director from July 1940 until at least the German invasion in June and probably until sometime in 1942 was Lieutenant General Filipp Golikov. The month after the German attack—in his other capacity as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff—Golikov made his celebrated flight to Washington to open negotiations for lend-lease arms. Golikov's Deputy Chief was an otherwise indistinctly identified Major General Panfilov.

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1 Orlov (53), 238
2 Ege (53), 1023.
3 Ege (53), 1014, 1016, 1017, 1023, 1027, where he is identified only as Lieutenant General Golikov. Also W. F. Flicke, Agenten Funken nach Moskau (Kreuzlingen: 1954), pp. 47-61, as cited by Farago (54), 160. Although Flicke's account is highly fictionalized it contains much authentic documentation gained during his service in the Abwahr's radio counter espionage section. In his novel on the Rado network Flicke merely identifies the "Director" as a "General Golikov."
4 Ege (53), 1006.
Galikov was succeeded—or at least closely followed—by a "Major-General Bolshakov" who was identified in this GRU post sometime around late 1942.¹

In March 1943 the GRU came again into its own and underwent a major reorganization that led to rapid expansion of its foreign intelligence activities. At that time the Main Intelligence Administration was divided into two separate organizations: "Tactical Intelligence," which continued to handle conventional military intelligence operations in the zone of combat, and "Strategic Intelligence," which comprised the foreign operations. It was at this time that—in addition to the old headquarters building on the square at Kropotkin Gate—the entire office block at Znamensky 19 was occupied. Znamensky 19 became headquarters and provided a thin cover name subsequently famed as synonymous with the GRU in its foreign communications. The newly reorganized GRU strategic intelligence rapidly enlarged in size to include approximately 5,000 persons in Moscow headquarters alone. At the same time the Director's office was authorized advancement to the rank of Lieutenant General. Branch headquarters were established at Batum for work against Turkey, at Khabarovsky (for Far Eastern countries?), Ufa, Kiev, and Odessa. At that time the major divisions of the GRU were the Information Branch under a Major-General Khlopov employing hundreds of specialists to process the material received from agents and public sources abroad, the General Branch which processed all technical and scientific intelligence collected by the Information Branch, and the Special Communications Branch which handled all telegraph communications with foreign posts.²

¹Gouzenko (47), 213-214.

²GRU also took over direct administration of a number of schools related to foreign and strategic intelligence including two military institutes of foreign languages in Moscow and Tiflis, the Higher School of the Red Army (the so-called Intelligence Academy), and numerous specialized intelligence schools. Gouzenko (48), 120-123, who was a junior cipher clerk at the GRU Moscow headquarters from April 1942 until assigned to Canada in July 1943.
The Special Tasks Branch headed by a Colonel Golubev handled both "dry affairs" (infiltration and exfiltration of agents across frontiers) and "wet affairs," liquidation of GRU defectors, a task formerly reserved to the NKVD.¹

Alexander Foote described an anonymous GRU Director as serving from at least as early as March 1945 until purged and disappeared--at least from the GRU--around May 1946 as a direct consequence of the exposure of Colonel Zabotin's GRU network in Canada, brought down by the defection of Lieutenant Gouzenko in September 1945. The fact that this anonymous Director was a Lieutenant-General and had a private line to Stalin's office as well as right of direct personal access to Stalin without appointment indicates the relatively senior and independent position of the GRU at that time.²

An unnamed officer succeeded Ivan Ilyichev's purge around May 1946. This new director was still occupying this post at least as late as March 1947.³

An instructive error—or so I suppose it to be—concerning the identity of the GRU Director at this time has been widely diffused and persistently believed. Ilyichev was repeatedly identified in this rôle by Gouzenko. However in the 1946 report of the Canadian Royal Commission, Gouzenko was misunderstood as identifying a "Colonel-General Kouznetsov" in 1946.

¹Otdel Spetsialnikh Zadanii. This section was particularly busy with "wet" work in China between April 1942 and June 1943 when Gouzenko was handling this telegraphic traffic and, for example, saw a telegram addressed to China ordering the execution of GRU agent "Kim" and his replacement by one "Ignat." Gouzenko (48), 62-63, 67.

²Foote (49), 203-208, 223-229, 232, who met him in Moscow in 1945, describes this anonymous officer as being then a charming, intelligent intellectual with "Georgian" features in his early 40's who was fluent in English (with occasional lapses into American), French, and German and favored exceptionally gaudy (American?) neckties.

³Foote (49), 232-237, describes him on the basis of a meeting in 1946 as a short and squat man, possibly a Georgian but with pronounced Mongoloid features, having a drab personality, and seemingly possessing a foreign language proficiency only in German.
as GRU Chief in August 1945. A careful reading of the relevant passage makes it seem that Gouzenko was referring to the well-known Fedor Fedorovich Kuznetsov, Deputy Head and then Head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army from 1945 until 1957. However, the Royal Commission's error was repeated in the otherwise careful analysis of the case by Colonel Richard Hirsch of U.S. Army G-2. The error was next repeated in a book by the former Deputy Head of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Zacharias, drawing upon the Royal Commission Report. David Dallin, drawing both on the Royal Commission's and Colonel Hirsch's error, lists "Feodor Kuznetsov" as GRU chief in 1944 [sic]. And most recently Ladislas Farago, wartime Chief of Research and Planning for the U.S. Navy Special Warfare Branch, has stated that "General Kuznetsov" had been GRU Chief in 1941 [sic], probably drawing on his earlier collaborative error with Admiral Zacharias. But most recently Farago described "Colonel General Fyedor Fyedorovich [as] Director of Military Intelligence" in 1945 [sic]. Such are the results of careless use of thin evidence.2

In 1947 the GRU was temporarily combined with the TNO into the specially created KI (Committee of Information) which was chaired by a succession of senior foreign service officials--initially Molotov--

1Fedor Fedorovich Kuznetsov (1904— ) had been in the Red Army, mainly in political posts since the 1920's. He was Deputy Head of the Main Political Administration, 1945-1948, then its Head (1949-1954), and finally again its Deputy Head (1954-1957). Since 1958 he has been a Member of the Military Council and Head of the Political Administration of the USSR Northern Command. Cookridge (55), 64, asserts—seemingly on the authority of his generally misinformed private sources—that Col. Gen. F. F. Kuznetsov headed the GRU's "separate department dealing with strategic and field intelligence" sometime around 1954. Kuznetsov's general biography is in Crowley (68), 341, which makes no reference to posts in intelligence.

2Royal Commission Report (46), 541, 556; Hirsch (47), 52; Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias in collaboration with Ladislas Farago, Behind Closed Doors: The Secret History of the Cold War (New York: Putnam's, 1950), p. 341, referring to "General Kuznetsov"; Dallin (55), 287; Farago (54), 34, 164; and Ladislas Farago, Burn After Reading (New York: Walker, 1961), pp. 137-139.
with INO officials heading the various departments. The experiment quickly proved unsatisfactory; and, in consequence, the GRU files and personnel reverted to the Army in the middle of the following year.¹

Little is known of the personnel or activities of the GRU during the decade following its reestablishment in 1948. When Stig Wennerström, the Swedish Air Attaché in Moscow was formally recruited in the GRU in late 1948 he claims to have then met the Chief, an otherwise undescribed Soviet general.²

In any case, we do know that this officer was replaced in 1950 by General M. V. Zakharov who served about one year.³ He was immediately succeeded by Lieutenant General M. A. Shalin who served from around 1951 to 1956.⁴

According to the unconfirmed testimony of a Soviet Navy defector,⁵ the GRU Director sometime in the mid-1950's was Admiral Vasili Yakovlev. There is also the unsupported claim of a British journalist⁶ that the GRU Director sometime just before 1955 was General of the Army S. M. Shumenko, an unlikely claim in view of the fact that he was still being chastised (by military and political demotion) as a consequence of his public and presumably political involvement on the subsequently

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¹Petrov (56), 210-211. For a more complete accounting of the short-lived K! see Chapter VIII, Section B, below.

²Ronblüm (65), 80-82; Whiteside (66).

³Penkovskiy (65), 69-70.

⁴Penkovskiy (65), 70.

⁵"Testimony of Captain Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov," Hearings, House Un-American Activities Committee, 14 September 1960, pp. 1915-1916. Since 1949 Captain (3rd Class) Artamonov was a Soviet Navy line officer serving on destroyers. He defected to the West in June 1959 while in Gdynia, Poland, training Indonesian sailors in the operations of his destroyers.

"wrong" side in the "Doctors' Plot" in 1953. Then in 1965 with the publication of The Penkovskiy Papers came the apparently definitive identification of Lieutenant General Shtemenko as having been GRU Director for a few months in 1956-1957. ¹ His successor, again according to Penkovsky, was Shalin who had been reassigned for the period 1957 until the end of 1958.²

Most recently identified (1959-1962) Chief of the GRU was General Ivan Serov, the well-known former Chairman of the state security apparatus (KGB). Harrison Salisbury refers to Serov as "Deputy Chief of Staff" of the General Staff, a position that is consistent with this reported assignment as GRU Chief, and correctly believed his transfer to the Ministry of Defense in 1958 immediately following his leaving the KGB marked his takeover as GRU Chief.³ In early 1963 Allen Dulles confirmed that Serov had, in fact, been GRU chief after 1958. In May 1963 General Serov was reported by Moscow "diplomatic sources" to have been suspended from his post as Deputy Chief of Staff⁴ and probably demoted, suggesting that he simultaneously would have been dropped from his alleged GRU post.⁵ His replacement seems unquestionably due

¹Penkovskiy (65), 70.
²Penkovskiy (65), 70.
³Harrison Salisbury, To Moscow and Beyond (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 27. Salisbury discounts the speculation in Moscow at the time that Serov's removal from the KGB marked a reduction of Army influence in the KGB. He considers it more likely that Serov is not an Army man but rather a "security man who spent most of his career in Army security and has returned to this function." If anything, Salisbury understates his case.
⁴Dulles (63), 86.
⁵New York Times, 10 May 1963, p. 7, a UPI dispatch dated Moscow, 9 May 1963, noting that he had not been present at Kremlin receptions for over six months. A curious rumor that even earlier, on 3 May 1962, the Soviet Supreme Court had stripped him of his rank and decorations for his Stalinist deportations and executions was reported by a junior British police officer, C. V. Hearn, Russian Assignment: A Policeman Looks at Crime in the USSR (London: Hale, 1962), p. 39.
to his close personal relationship with and direct responsibility for Oleg Penkovskiy whose exposure in October 1962 proved one of the greatest blows to the GRU.¹

I have been unable, despite considerable effort, to identify the current Director of the GRU. Normally he would be one of the several Deputy Chiefs of Staff, but none of the known officeholders seem to be in that special rôle.

A. GRU FAR EASTERN NETWORKS

The GRU has been active in the Far East from at least the mid-1920's. As with the state security, the GRU generally operates both "legal" and "illegal" networks in each country abroad. In addition, each of these types may have more than one net operating independently of the others, all reporting directly to the "Center" in Moscow.²

The pseudonominous Captain Eugene Pick was a GRU agent in China with the Consulate in Harbin from 1923 to 1924 when he was attached to Gaien's staff in Canton.³ It is also known that sometime in the late 1920's Wilhelm Zaisser --who thirty years later became chief of the East German state security apparatus--had toured Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asia for the GRU in the disguise of a German businessman claiming affiliation with the militant nationalist "Stahlhelm"

¹Frank Gibney in Penkovskiy (65), 3, who says that Serov was first "transferred, then publicly demoted."

²Fox example, GRU "legal" Resident in Canada in the mid-1940's, Colonel Za'otin, inadvertently learned of another GRU net operating parallel to his. Report of the Royal Commission (46), 21; Gouzenko (48), 211.

³Pick (27). Pick--or "Mr. Dick" as he was later known to Evans Carlson of U.S. Naval Intelligence--defected in 1927 but apparently rejoined the Soviet intelligence service in China in the early 1930's.
organization. In Manchuria he was reported to have been well-connected, including a personal friendship with Henry Pu-Yi—the Japanese' puppet Emperor of Manchuria—until his return to Germany in 1931.  

1. Lehman Net, Shanghai, 1929-1930

The earliest documented GRU espionage network in China was the net that was established in Shanghai sometime around 1929 by a German GRU agent, "Lehman," who had been sent out from Moscow. As Sorge authoritatively describes it as "technical, preparatory, and experimental," it may well be the first such GRU net in China proper or, at least, the first one reestablished since the Soviet activities there were forced entirely underground after the split with the KMT in 1927. By 1930, "Lehman" had succeeded in opening radio communication with Moscow, but failed in his assignment to reach Canton (thereby implying the existence of a GRU net there as well). "Lehman" turned his radio and his subordinates, Klausen* and Mishin, over to Sorge's net when he returned to Moscow in January 1930.

2. Froelich Net, Shanghai, c. 1930-1931

Completely unconnected with the Sorge net, except by chance meeting, was another GRU group in Shanghai headed by GRU Major General Froelich (alias "Theo"). Although its radio technician, Lieutenant Colonel Feldmann,* had succeeded in establishing radio communications with Moscow, this three-man group had been unable to fulfill its primary mission to make connection with and collect intelligence on the Chinese Red Army.  Consequently the net was ordered dissolved, all three

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1. Dallin (55), index; Justin (63), 178; Stern (57), index; Stern (65), index.


3. Willoughby (52), 189, 271.

4. De Toledano (52), 44, carelessly misreads Sorge's memoirs in claiming that Froelich's net had succeeded in establishing communications with the Chinese Red Army.
members leaving Shanghai in 1931, Froelich joining the "Ott-Gloemberg" net in Harbin.

3. "Ott-Gloemberg" Net, Harbin, 1929-1932

This group was sent out to Harbin by the GRU primarily to conduct military espionage in Manchuria but also to collect some political intelligence. During 1929 Klausen was brevited to this group to set up its radio transceiver in the safe residence of the American Vice Consul, Tycho L. Lilliestrom. It served the Lehmann and Sorge rings in Shanghai as a "letter-drop" through which the latter rings could send mail to and receive money from Moscow. However, it had no administrative connection with the Sorge group. The chief of this net was "Ott"* (or "Gloemberg"), who was soon joined by Major General Froelich after the latter had closed out his GRU net in Shanghai in 1931. Both men returned to Moscow in 1932.

4. Sorge Net, Shanghai, 1930-1932

The GRU network operated by Richard Sorge* in the Far East between 1930 and his arrest in 1941 is the most famous and successful of all known Soviet intelligence nets. And its Japanese phase from 1933 on, summarized in Section 6 below, is the most completely documented and analyzed such enterprise. However, Sorge's initial GRU operations in China are much less studied, although ample documentation is available, particularly in Japanese archives.2

When Sorge first arrived in China in January 1930, he was already an experienced Soviet agent. He arrived in company with "two

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1Willoughby (52), 42, 188-189, 238-240; de Toledano (52), 44, 46-47.

2The principal references on Sorge's Shanghai period are Chalmers Johnson, An Instance of Treason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 66-68, 74-87; Willoughby (52), 30-45, 176-187; Deakin and Storry (66), 64-94; and de Toledano (52), 42-63.
foreign co-workers" from the GRU: his deputy, "Alex", * and his radio
operator, Seber Weingarten.* Sorge then set about developing his
network of agents. He did this entirely by extending his personal
acquaintances, recruiting those he judged to be most trustworthy and
promising. For security reasons he avoided even contact with—much
less recruitment of—Chinese Communists and Russians. Sorge based his
acquaintanceship network on the American fellow-travelling journalist,
Miss Agnes Smedley, "the only person living in China known to me as a
possible contact," having "heard about her" while in Europe. Sorge was
fortunate that this contact did not compromise his operation, because
Smedley was already an outspoken leftist under local police surveillance.

When Sorge was recalled to Moscow in December 1932, his group
contained at least a dozen regular members (5 Japanese, 3 Chinese,
2 Germans, 1 American, 1 Estonian, plus numerous collaborators), and
its operations encompassed most of China. This group was passed
intact to Sorge's military affairs expert, "Paul," as described in the
next section.

5. "Paul"—Funakoshi Net, Shanghai, 1932–1942

According to Sorge, he was succeeded in December 1932 by "Paul."*
Although I do not know when "Paul" left this net, it is known that it
continued until at least 1942 when the Japanese police arrested
Funakoshi,* whom Sorge had originally recruited in March 1932 and passed
to "Paul."

In an incredible display of inadequate intelligence analysis
(considering the superb data at hand or readily obtained) MacArthur's
G-2 equated Sorge's "Paul" with the later CRUSA* ds Eugene Dennis,*
largely on the coincidence that Dennis' Comintern pseudonym in China
involved the same first name, "Paul Walsh." This identification is

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1de Toledano (52), 60–61; Willoughby (52), 81–82, 120, 281;
impossible, as Dennis-Walsh did not arrive in Shanghai until around 1 December 1933. The usually careful Chalmers Johnson is properly skeptical of this identification, but unfortunately does treat it as a possibility. Although he cites no source, de Toledano is plausible in categorically stating that "Paul" was an Estonian with the Red Army rank equivalent of major general.

6. Sorge Net ("Operation Ramsay"), Tokyo, 1933-1941

Sorge arrived in Japan on 6 September 1933 to build a key new intelligence net that General Berzin designated "Operation Ramsay," after Sorge's alias on that assignment.

One example of the confused speculation that occurs regarding Soviet intelligence operations is the virtually impossible suggestion by the late distinguished Kremlinologist, Boris Nicolaevsky, that Sorge's immediate superior was S. A. Goglidze in his capacity as NKVD [sic!] chief for the Soviet Far East following his assignment there in late 1939 or 1940. Nicolaevsky even states categorically that: "From then on, the control of Soviet agents in Korea, Japan, China, and the Pacific countries in general was in Goglidze's hands." However, the only tie between Sorge's GRU network and Siberia was his merely technological radio link to GRU headquarters in Moscow via a powerful transmitter suspected by Sorge and his radioman to be somewhere in the Soviet Far East. Furthermore, there has never been any evidence

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1 The most detailed accounts include Deakin and Storey (66), 95-351; Johnson (64), 1-20, 87-178; Schellenberg (56), 158-165; Willoughby (52), 45-132, 191-242; and Hans-Otto Meissner, The Man with Three Faces (New York: Rinehart, 1955). See also Pravda 4 September 1964. A hitherto unnoticed but detailed, personal recollection of Sorge as a newspaperman in Japan is by the 1937-1940 Chief of the Tokyo AP Bureau, Relman Morin, East Wind Rising (New York: Knopf, 1960), pp. 304-314.

2 Nicolaevsky (65), 122-123. Although this section is a reprint of an article in the émigré Novoye Russkoye Slovo of 27 December 1953, Nicolaevsky's 1964 annotation implies that this was his final judgment. For Goglidze's general career see Wolin and Slusser (57), index. Goglidze was executed on 23 December 1953 as a Beria henchman.
that any GRU, NKVD, or Comintern agents operating in Far Eastern
countries have had chain-of-command ties (as opposed to mere communica-
tions channels) passing through Siberia.  

7. Other GRU Agents

In addition to these agents and networks that are known from
local reports to have been active in the Far East, a number of other
individuals were known to their contacts in Europe to have included a
tour in the Far East. Unfortunately, the sources seldom give little
more than the most vague details so that it is impossible to be certain
precisely what they did, when they were there, or even if they may not
already be known to us under other names. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile
briefly mentioning these persons if only to prove the frequent allega-
tion that the espionage networks that are exposed such as the Sorge ring
are indeed only a fraction of those operating at any given moment.

The famed "General Honoré Muraille" (alias "Henri," "Paul
Albaret," "Paul Boissonas," etc., etc.) was chief of one of the major
and most successful GRU networks in France from about 1927 until his
arrest, trial, and conviction in April 1931. On completing his term in
1934 he was deported to the USSR where he disappeared, rumored in 1938
to have gone insane (or, like "Kamo," feigned insanity) during the
purge. About all that is known of his background is that he was born
in Russia around 1885, became an Old Bolshevik revolutionary activist
with a long Czarist prison record, travelled throughout the world and
in the mid-1920's had been sent on several intelligence missions to
China.  

1 Except that at least up to 1929 when he defected, Agabekov
(31), 276, states that the Vladivostok OGPU branch directed operations
in Harbin. And possibly for regular GRU field combat intelligence
and the Comintern links to the FEB in Vladivostok around 1930.

2 Dallin (55), 42; Nollau (61), index.
Fritz Burde* was chief of a major GRU network in Germany until transferred in 1932 to China for a brief tour. Johann Liebers,* another German Communist, was deputy of Wilhelm Banick (Burde's successor in his GRU net in Germany) until he too was transferred to China in 1935, conceivably to join Burde.¹

Nicholas Dozenberg,* a senior veteran GRU officer, had been assigned to intelligence work in Tientsin in late 1933 or early 1934 where he admitted before the Dies Committee in 1940 to have established in the British concession a photographic equipment business, the Amasia Sales Company, that served as cover for "other" Soviet agents. He remained there until early 1937 when he returned to Moscow after being relieved by Joseph Freund,* an Austrian.

Rudolf Hamburger* was a veteran German Communist and GRU agent in various countries, including Poland and China where his career ended in his arrest by the Chinese Nationalists sometime in the late 1930's.

A famous Soviet enterprise of the late 1920's and early 1930's that backfired with the most damaging consequences for the GRU was the counterfeiting of $100 denomination U.S. Federal Reserve banknotes. During 1929 and 1930 and again in 1932 about $10 million worth of these notes were circulated throughout the world by the GRU working with various criminal gangs. According to Krivitsky, this operation was originally and primarily intended for China, where it was believed large-scale distribution of the counterfeit bills would prove relatively easy. This primitive and risky scheme was a favorite project of Stalin. The bogus notes were superbly printed in Moscow by the OGPU from special paper reportedly acquired by Tilton's GRU network in the U.S. The second effort, in 1932, to place these same bills into circulation in the U.S. led to the exposure of the main GRU net there (headed by Dallant-Dozenberg) and the temporary transformation of all GRU operations in the U.S. to "sleeper" status (as with Colonel Bykov's groups in New York

¹Dallin (55), 83-84.
and Washington, D.C.) or their transfer to the OGPU.¹

With this rising Soviet interest in Japanese affairs that accompanied the latter's heightened aggressiveness, the Soviet intelligence agencies sought to expand their surveillance of Japan. The Sorge ring was the GRU's most notable achievement. But all the GRU's efforts were not as successful and, indeed, experienced at least one known total failure. This involved an attempt in 1934–1936 to introduce a network via the United States. For this purpose, the American Feature Writers Syndicate was founded in New York City by Maxim Lieber (Trotzky's U.S. literary agent, alias "Paul"), "Charles F. Chase" (John Sherman, alias "Don"), and "Lloyd Cantwell" (Whittaker Chambers). Chambers alleged that Sherman was then sent off as their "Tokyo correspondent." Although considerable funds were apparently forwarded by courier from the GRU apparatus in New York via the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat branch in San Francisco, and at least one promising agent sent, Hideo Noda (a relative of Prince Konoye and promising Japanese American painter who had joined the CP/USA). Sherman was unable to accomplish anything beyond filing a few feature stories and winning the Tokyo Y.M.C.A. handball championship. The group was ordered dissolved in early 1936 and Sherman allegedly returned to the U.S. via London and Moscow. This group was also unsuccessful in its efforts to open any contacts with the Chinese Communists.²

¹Krivitsky (39), 116-138, particularly pp. 125, 126, 130, 136 for the China aspect; New York Times, 24 February 1933; and Nathaniel Weyl, The Battle Against Disloyalty (New York: Crowell, 1951). According to the noted German lawyer, Dr. Alphonse Sack, in the New York Times of 30 January 1930: "during the recent trouble in China, $2,500,000 in counterfeit pound and dollar notes from the [Soviet State Printing Establishment] was circulated in China by Soviet agents." Krivitsky was misinformed that the paper was genuine; it was merely an excellent imitation.

²Chambers (52), 364-369, 388-389, 437. Sherman took the Fifth Amendment when queried on these allegations by the HUAC in 1952. Noda also came to the U.S., but subsequently returned to Japan where he died of a "cerebral tumor" according to his New York Times obituary.
Leon Minster* was a Soviet (probably GRU) agent in Shanghai in 1934-1935, operating out of the Ellem Radio Equipment Shop as a convenient cover both for his radio transmissions to Moscow and for giving wireless training to other Caucasian Soviet agents.

In April 1942 Gouzenko learned of the existence of a GRU radio network in Harbin through messages received regarding the clandestine transfer of a set within that city.¹ A member of this (or another) radio-directed net in Harbin at the same time was one improvident and trivial agent named "Albert."²

Gouzenko identifies a Colonel Muilnikov* as one of the original organizers of the GRU in China.³

The high quality of GRU intelligence regarding the Japanese Kwantung Army during 1944 and 1945 is attested to by the U.S. Army officers who received this information directly from the CP in refin for U.S. intelligence on Japan. These exchanges continued from 9 June 1944 on a frequent basis in Moscow between Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, head of G-2's Japanese Order of Battle Section, and GRU Far Eastern experts. These latter provided Col. Pettigrew with superb quality and up-to-date intelligence of Japanese troop disposition and movements in Manchuria, obtained firsthand by Soviet-Japanese troop contact and by agent infiltrators.⁴

That the GRU continues to operate in East Asia after the post-Stalin reorganizations is seen from the account of a junior Foreign Ministry official who defected in 1959 from the Soviet Embassy in Burma.⁵ And Penkovsky extends our knowledge of GRU operations in China to 1962.⁶

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¹Gouzenko (48), 65.
²Gouzenko (48), 109.
³Gouzenko (48), 111-115.
⁴Deane (47), 238-239.
⁵Kaznacheev (62), 179-182, 243-244, covering GRU operations in Burma from mid-1957 until June 1959.
⁶Penkovskiy (65), 72, 73.
B. OUTER MONGOLIA

The GRU also operated in Outer Mongolia during at least the late 1930's, for we know that Nikolai Zabotin --later famous for his connection in Canada with the post-war Allan Nunn May atomic espionage case-- was chief of the GRU "Intelligence Center" in Mongolia at the time of the battle of Khalkin Gol (1939), although it is not clear whether Zabotin was in regular combat intelligence or in foreign espionage.¹

¹Gouzenko (48), 183.
Table 2: Directors of the GRU*, 1920-1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directors</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berzin, Gen. Yan Karlovich</td>
<td>Dec 1920- Apr 1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uritsky, Gen. Semen Petrovich</td>
<td>Apr 1935- Jun 1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berzin, Gen. Yan Karlovich</td>
<td>June 1937- end 1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proskurov, _</td>
<td>end 1937- ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuznetsov, Col. Gen. Fedor Fedorovich</td>
<td>1943? - 1945?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous general (N.V. Slavin?)</td>
<td>late 1948- ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakharov, Gen. Matvey Vasilyevich</td>
<td>1950- 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serov, Gen. Ivan Aleksandrovich</td>
<td>Jan 1959- end 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1963- present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Prior to 1924, the GRU was known as the Registrup (Registration Administration).

Notes: "Beldin" is a commonly met U.S. Army G-2 misreading of Berzin. Adm. Vasili Yakovlev has been incorrectly identified as a past GRU Director in the mid-1950's.
GRU Organization, 1926-1953

Stalin

- Defense Ministry
  - General Staff
  - Main Directorate of the Red Army
  - Revvoen. SSSR

Department 1
  - Operations

Department 2
  - Organization-Mobilization

Department 3
  - Military Communications

Department 4
  - Military Intelligence

Naval Intelligence
1940-1960

1st Division
  - Operations

2nd Division

3rd Division

4th Division

1st Section
  - Western Europe

2nd Section
  - Middle East

3rd Section
  - America, Far East, India

4th Section
  - Technical Intelligence

5th Section
  - Terror, Sabotage, Kidnapping

6th Section
  - False Documentation, New Techniques of Espionage

7th Section
  - Frontier Districts

8th Section
  - Codes and Ciphers

*Excepting perhaps 1947-mid 1948, when the GRU was absorbed into the KI (Committee of Information).
VII. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

It is, I believe, proper to rather summarily dismiss Soviet Naval Intelligence for the purposes of this study. There are four reasons for this. First, little is known about this organization, and what there is strongly suggests it has played only a minor role as a communication channel for strategic intelligence. Second, nothing is known about its activities, if any, in the Far East. Third, it is not even known whether it still operates foreign intelligence networks. Finally, it has reportedly ceased to exist as a separate service.

Naval Intelligence has never been a major part of the Russian or Soviet intelligence community. I presume this was because the navy itself was a minor service branch in Russia, with only a weak voice in military or political affairs in contrast with traditionally major naval powers such as Britain, the United States, and Japan whose naval intelligence services were equal or superior to their other secret services. With the gradual introduction of centralized intelligence after World War II, the formerly major British, American, and Japanese services have been subordinated in a manner comparable to Soviet practice. Soviet naval officers with high ambition in intelligence (or politics) must—as Hitler's Admiral Canaris—seek

---

1 The Soviet Navy's world-wide electronic trawler surveillance of NATO and U.S. navies is in the nature of tactical field intelligence and not germane to our purpose here.

2 For British Naval Intelligence see McLachlan (68). For the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) see Zacharias (46), Wohlstetter (62), Yardley (31), and Ransom (58). For the Japanese Naval Intelligence see Zacharias (46), 199, etc.; but avoid or use with great caution the uncritical and sensational book by Ronald Seth, Secret Servants: A History of Japanese Espionage (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957).

3 For the effects on the place of naval intelligence resulting from the introduction of more centralized intelligence in the U.S. see Ransom (58). For the comparable change in Britain see McLachlan (66).
their goal through military rather than naval intelligence.

Naval Intelligence had been a part of the GRU until 1940 when it emerged as a separate organization presumably also directly under the General Staff. Apparently it operated on this basis through World War II, and shared in the expansion of foreign intelligence operations that occurred also in the NKVD and GRU.

One revealing measure of the relatively impoverished quality of Soviet Naval Intelligence came as a result of the U.S.-Soviet exchanges of combat intelligence on the Japanese Imperial Navy that began on 29 February 1944. These exchanges took place in Moscow between Rear Admiral Clarence E. Olsen, chief of the Navy Division of the U.S. Military Mission, and representatives of the Soviet Naval Staff. These latter were highly cooperative, probably because they had not the prestige and power of the Army and were therefore willing to humiliate themselves to obtain clearly valuable information from the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, and although Stalin had already decided to attack Japan as soon as the Wehrmacht was defeated, Olsen found that because of the severely limited Soviet Naval Intelligence facilities, little new information was obtained by the Americans.

It was still—or again—enjoying independent existence as late as 1951 when a Royal Swedish Navy civilian engineer was arrested after almost a year of successful naval espionage in Sweden. NKVD agent Vladimir Petrov, then handling personnel surveillance at the Stockholm Embassy, personally knew both the First Secretary, Konstantin Vinogradov, and the TASS correspondent, Viktor Anissimov, to have been

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1 Dallin (55), 5.
2 Deriabin and Gibrey (59), 66n; Gouzenko (48), 106, 120.
3 See also Hirsch (47), 84, where mention is made of Gouzenko's charges of Soviet naval officers operating in the U.S. and Canada in 1944 under cover in Soviet commercial offices.
4 Deane (47), 237-238.
officers of Soviet Naval Intelligence as early as 1947. Both men were later publicly implicated with the Swedish Navy engineer, Andersson. That this moderately successful Swedish case is the only publicized espionage operation by Soviet Naval Intelligence, suggests that that organization did not operate on any extensive scale. Sweden seems to have been a major target as the Ambassador appointed in 1949 was a senior officer of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Rodionov.

According to Penkovsky, writing in 1961, the "Naval Intelligence Directorate" had recently ceased to exist as one of the eight principal divisions ("directorates") of the GRU, only "a small section or group remains for the co-ordination of intelligence on the naval forces." This is rather confusing. It seems to imply that strategic Naval Intelligence had again ceased to be an independent agency sometime in the 1950's. In any case, Penkovsky makes it quite clear that a substantial proportion of naval officers are assigned as both GRU "legal residents" abroad and as GRU headquarters staff officials.

It should be noted that Naval Counterintelligence was apparently always a special section of the state security, not of the Navy or the GRU.

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1 Anissimov had been a TASS correspondent in Stockholm since 1945. He was Ernst Hilding Andersson's "Control" since 31 December 1946 until he returned to Moscow on 20 April 1951 when Andersson was turned over to Gergii Stetsenko, Anissimov's successor at the TASS Stockholm Bureau. Finally, on 21 September 1951, Andersson was arrested by the Swedish police. Petrov (55), 204, where however the year of Andersson's arrest is wrong; Francis Noel-Baker, The Spy Web (London: Butchworth, 1954), pp. 158-162, 192, who, however, incorrectly links this net to the MVD; Kruglak (62), 198-203.

2 Petrov (55), 333.

3 Penkovskiy (65), 71, 183.

4 Penkovskiy (65), 70, 71, 183, 194.

5 Deriabin and Gibney (59), 66-67, 146, 152. Deriabin himself served in this section in 1945-1946, when it was headed by a Lieutenant General.
Finally, it should be noted that while Soviet Naval Intelligence is a small secret service apparently concerned only with naval affairs—rather like the U.S., British, and Italian naval intelligence services—it does not monopolize the collection of such intelligence. Indeed, it seems that it has always taken second or third place to the state security and perhaps to the GRU as well. As early as the late 1920's, naval espionage was handled by these other intelligence services. And more recently, from at least as early as 1959 until their arrest in 1961 in the so-called "Naval Secrets Case," the espionage network operated in England by "Gordon Lonsdale" (Konon Molody) was importantly—but probably not exclusively—engaged in effective penetration of the Admiralty Underwater Weapons Establishment at Portland. Nevertheless, at least one monograph fancifully takes Molody's activities at Portland as proof that he was "an officer in the Russian Naval Intelligence Service," whatever that is. In fact, Molody was a KGB man.

\[1\] Dallin (55), 393, 402.


\[3\] Bulloch and Miller (61), 8, 114-115, 175.
VIII. STATE SECURITY (SECRET POLICE) 1

The Soviet secret police came formally into being in 1917 just six weeks after the October Revolution. 2 It is the principal agency of state security. As such it was initially only (and even now mainly) charged with prevention of counter-revolution as indicated by its founding title, the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage or, as commonly known by its acronym, the Cheka. This basic coercive organ of the Soviet state exists today as the Committee for State Security (KGB). Since its founding this organization has undergone drastic purges in personnel, extensive readjustments in function, and major changes in power, which often have been signaled by its numerous changes of name. But whether called Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, MVD, MGB, or KGB, it has remained fundamentally the same organization.

The following summarizes the state security's complex organizational history in a convenient reference form. Such a table is useful because of the practice of most writers to anachronistically apply whichever is the currently common name of the state security agency regardless of the period being discussed, resulting often in chronological confusion. 3

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2 Indeed, as Soviet authors themselves now stress, the Bolshevik's internal security police goes back before the Cheka to the Revolution itself. This preliminary organization was the Military Revolutionary Council, or rather a special section of it headed by Dzerzhinski. Wolin and Slusser (57), 3, 31n, 76, 372.

3 I, however, use the acronym appropriate for each period, employing the generic terms "state security" or "secret police" only when referring to a period covering several changes of its name.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>OFFICIAL NAME</th>
<th>DATES (New Style)</th>
<th>DIRECTOR</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheka</td>
<td>Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution and Sabotage (Vserossiyskaya Chrezvy-chaynaya Komisya po Borbes Kontr-revolutsey i Sabotazhem)</td>
<td>20 Dec 1917 - 6 Oct 1922, 8 Feb 1922</td>
<td>Commissar: F. E. Dzerzhinski (also VChka and Vechka, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, the centralized administration of the Cheka)</td>
<td>The official name underwent some slight changes, such as adding &quot;misconduct in office.&quot; Agents of the Cheka are commonly referred to as &quot;Checkists.&quot; At first headquartered in Petrograd, it moved to Moscow and the Lyublanka in Mar 1918.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPU</td>
<td>State Political Administration (Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenye)</td>
<td>6 or 8 Feb 1922 - Jul 1923</td>
<td>Commissar: Dzerzhinski, with G.G. Yagoda as deputy.</td>
<td>Nominally subordinate to the NKVD or People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Still headquartered at the Lyublanka in Moscow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUGB/NKVD</td>
<td>Main Administration of State Security (Glavnoye Upravlenye Gosudarstvennoye Bezopasnosti) of the (All Union) People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennikh Byel)</td>
<td>10 Jul 1934-3 Feb 1941</td>
<td>Commissar: Yagoda until replaced 25 Sep 1936 by N.I. Yezhov who was in turn replaced by L.P. Beriya on 8 Dec 1938.</td>
<td>The OGPU was merely absorbed by the NKVD as the GUGB (Main Administration of State Security). Yezhov officially replaced Yagoda only on 28 Jan 1937 and the latter was not formally arrested until Apr 1937.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: History of the Soviet State Security Agencies
(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>OFFICIAL NAME</th>
<th>DATES (New Style)</th>
<th>DIRECTOR</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NKGB</td>
<td>People's Commissariat of State Security (Narodny Komissariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti)</td>
<td>3 Feb 1941-20 Jul 1941</td>
<td>Commissar: V.N. Merkulov</td>
<td>Created as an independent commissariat out of the GUGB/NKVD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVD</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del)</td>
<td>c. 15 Mar 1946</td>
<td>Minister: S.N. Kruglov</td>
<td>A mere formal change of name to Ministries from Commissariats. The MGB monopolizing the secret police functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KI</td>
<td>Committee of Information (Komitet Informatsii)</td>
<td>1947 - late 1951</td>
<td>Successively chaired by Molotov, Vyshinski, Malik, and Zorin, but not necessarily in that order.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: History of the Soviet State Security Agencies (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>OFFICIAL NAME</th>
<th>DATES (New Style)</th>
<th>DIRECTOR</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MVD</td>
<td>(Republic) Ministries of Internal Affairs</td>
<td>Jan 1960 - Aug 1962</td>
<td>Minister (for RSFSR only): V.S. Tikunov, appointed Jun 1961.</td>
<td>All-Union ministry abolished. Replaced by these decentralized republic MVDs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOP</td>
<td>(Republic) Ministries for Safeguarding Public Order (Ministerstvo Okhrany Obshchestvennogo Poryadka)</td>
<td>30 Aug 1962 - present</td>
<td>Minister (for RSFSR only): V.S. Tikunov</td>
<td>The renamed republic MVDs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. THE FOREIGN ADMINISTRATION (INU, formerly INO)\(^1\)

The Soviet state security organization—through its successive incarnations—was, as under the Czars, primarily concerned with internal Russian affairs. Its overseas operations were the responsibility of only one of its branches. It is often overlooked that the state security's primary—and, indeed, initially exclusive—foreign intelligence role was in counterintelligence or so-called negative intelligence, directed toward the penetration, surveillance, and subversion of anti-régime exile movements. This was true of Nicholas I's Third Section and its successor, the Okhrana, which were basically internal security police.\(^2\) Strategic intelligence—"positive" intelligence—was as we have seen generally the prerogative of other organizations: the Foreign Ministry under the Czars and the Red Army General Staff under the Bolsheviks. Under the Cheka—which was organized as a number of "sections"—this was the Fourteenth Section.\(^3\) This section was known also by the curious nickname of "Orientalists," probably in recognition of the thin thread of continuity with its imperial predecessor, the so-called Asiatic Department which was in fact the Czarist Foreign Ministry's ecumenical, centralized unit for both "positive" foreign intelligence and covert operations abroad.\(^4\) The Cheka's Fourteenth Section was under the successive direction of two veteran Bolsheviks, Yakov Davtian\(^*\) and Meyer Trilisser.\(^*\) Since 1922, under the GPU, OGPU, and NKVD this group was renamed the Foreign Division (INO).\(^5\) Initially it was under Trilisser's continuing direction until he was succeeded around 1934 by A. Artuzov,\(^*\) Abram Slutsky\(^*\) in 1935, and finally Aleksandr Shpigelglas\(^*\) in 1938.

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1For a general account see Wolin and Slusser (57), 138-143, 167.
2On the foreign counterintelligence functions of the Third Section and Okhrana see Monas (61); and Rowan (37), 368-386, 697nl.
3That is, XIV Otdeleniya. Agabekov (31), 12.
4For the Czarist Asiatic Department see Blackstock (66), 217.
5That is, Inostranniy Otdel.
From 1941 on, under the NKGB, MGB, and KGB, this group continued as the Foreign Administration (INU)\(^1\) during which time it conducted perhaps three-fourths of all Soviet intelligence activities abroad.\(^2\) Deputy Chiefs during that period included Boris Berman.*

Noted MVD-KGB agents have included Jacob Golos (died in U.S. in 1943), Burgess and Maclean (fled to USSR in 1951); Col. "Rudolf Abel" (arrested in U.S. in 1957); Lt. Col. Yuri Rastvorov (defected in Tokyo in 1954); Capt. Nikolai Khokhlov (defected in Germany in 1954); Boris Morros (turned FBI double-agent in U.S. in 1947 and "surfaced" in 1957); Vladimir Petrov (defected in Australia in 1954); "Jack Sobel" (Abram Sobelevicius, arrested in U.S. in 1957); "Gordon Lonsdale" (Konon Molody, arrested in Britain in 1961); George Blake\(^3\) (arrested in Britain in 1961, escaped 1966) and H. A. R. Philby (defected to Moscow from Beirut in 1963).

Our next glimpse of INU's leadership came during World War II. This occurred in December 1943 when OSS chief, Major General William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, visited Moscow to arrange official establishment of an OSS liaison office there and an NKVD bureau in Washington. Donovan was handed on by Mo.stov to direct personal negotiations with the head of INO, Lieutenant General P. M. Fitin,\(^4\) and his head of the section conducting subversive activities in enemy countries, Major General A. P. Ossipov,\(^5\) to whom Donovan "fully and frankly" described the OSS organization, techniques, and technological devices.\(^4\) President

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\(^1\)That is, Inostrannoye Upravleniye.

\(^2\)Garthoff (56), 266-269.

\(^3\)A remarkable account is Philip Deane, "The Spy Who Jumped Over the Geranium Pot," The (Toronto) Globe and Mail 31 October 1966, p. 7; and 1 November 1966, p. 7.

\(^4\)John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York: Viking, 1947), pp. 50-63. Brigadier General Deane, head of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow since October 1943, was present with Charles E. Bohlen at this Moscow meeting and then alone at several subsequent ones in 1944.

Bentley (51), 259-260, cites similar details that she alleges came from Duncan Lee of OSS. On Hoover's opposition to an NKVD mission in Washington
Roosevelt—on J. Edgar Hoover's urging—personally vetoed the proposal for having an official NKVD office in Washington in 1944, but close OSS-NKVD liaison continued through General Deane in Moscow and through the OSS office in London.

B. THE COMMITTEE OF INFORMATION (KI), 1947-1951

In 1947 the INO was administratively and physically combined with the GRU into the newly created Komitet Informatsii (KI, Committee of Information) to centralize all secret foreign intelligence operations. The KI was set up in the former headquarters building of the recently defunct Comintern in Moscow's suburb of Rostokino. The INU and GRU files and staffs were combined, but with the ex-MGB officials heading all departments. Intended as a truly central strategic intelligence service, the KI was directed by a committee of senior foreign service chiefs subordinated directly to the Government (or Party?). However, this arrangement soon proved administratively and politically inadequate and in mid-1948 the GRU reverted to Army control, reportedly at the insistence of Marshal Bulganin. Finally, the KI simply ceased to exist when late in 1951 its remaining component, the former INU, reverted to the MGB. While the KI was in existence it was under the successive chairmanship of senior foreign service officials: initially Molotov, followed by Vyshinski, Malik, Zorin, and others but not necessarily in that order.1

As of July 1952 the Head and Deputy Heads of the reconstituted INU were identified by Deriabin as Lt. Gen. S. R. Savchenko* and Lt. Gen. P. V. Fedotov* respectively. Lieutenant General V. S. Ryasnoi* was head of

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1Petrov (56), 121, 210-211, 219; Wolin and Slusser (57), 26, 55, 60; and the Report of the Australian Royal Commission (55), 431-432. Penkovskiy (65) confirms that Molotov and Vyshinski had been KI Chiefs and states that Malik was a Chief or Deputy Chief.
the INU for three months around early 1953. In July 1953 Maj. Gen. A. S. Panyushkin became Head. Since his transfer sometime before 1961 to the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat to head the section handling assignments abroad, I have not found even any speculation or rumors as to whom his successor(s) might be.

C. EXECUTIVE ACTION SECTION

A major overseas activity of the state security organization since at least as early as 1926 has been the execution of the death sentences decreed by Soviet authorities. This function has been a formal monopoly of that body; although various individual Comintern, military intelligence, and state security services abroad have—when faced with an exigent situation—occasionally been forced to carry out their own executions on an ad hoc basis.


2 Valtin (41) cites some Comintern cases in the 1920s and early 1930’s. Khokhlov (59), 196, 313-314, reveals that this was also true of the kidnap-assassination operations against the Russian nationalist émigré NTS in Germany in the 1950’s. Only two executions have been specifically charged to the GRU. One is the death by beating in New York City in 1934 of Valentine Markin ("Oscar," "Herman"), a former GRU officer who on a brief return to Moscow in 1933 denounced the GRU operations to Molotov. He was transferred to the NKVD and returned to New York. Krivitsky is alleged by Whittaker Chambers to have corrected other versions
In December 1936 N. I. Yezhov, then newly appointed Director of the GUB/NKVP, created the Administration of Special Tasks under his personal direction to carry out sensitive assignments abroad that could not be entrusted to the old Chekists who had served under Yagoda. Within this office were established the "Special Mobile Groups" to dispatch specially trained terrorists in greatest secrecy and under non-Soviet passports to assassinate foreign Trotskyists and Soviet defectors.¹ These groups operated anywhere in the world where ordered and were directly responsible for numerous assassinations (and abductions): of Ukrainian nationalist leader, General Simon Petlura in Paris in 1926, of Reiss in Switzerland in 1937, of Trotsky in Mexico in 1940,² probably of Krivitsky in Washington, D.C., in 1941, and of Carlo Tresca on Fifth Avenue in 1943, to name only the more notorious cases. That this rather public technique is still³ standard procedure with Communist intelligence services may be seen in the assassinations in Vienna of two Ukrainian OUN émigré leaders—Lev Rebet and Stepan Bandera—in Munich in 1957 and 1959 by revealing that GRU Director Berzin had him followed by two GRL assassins who escaped the GRU by killing him. Chambers (52), 316-318. Chambers' version is implied in Krivitsky (39), 171, and confirmed by Levine who was present at this conversation. See Isaac Don Levine, "The Inside Story of Our Soviet Underworld," Plain Talk, Vol. 2, No. 12 (September 1948), p. 12. The second was in 1942 or 1943 when the GRU Chief in China was ordered to liquidate his agent "Kim." Gouzenko (48), 62. However, Penkovskiy (65), 76, states that the GRU is now formally responsible for executing its own unwanted agents.¹

¹Orlov (53), xi-xii, 208, 223, 226-228. The element of secrecy surrounding the creation and operations of these special units is indicated by the fact that even such an intimate insider as Aleksandr Orlov, then NKVD Resident for Western Europe and Spain only first learned of their existence from NKVD Deputy Director Slutsky when visited by him in Paris in February 1937.


TABLE: INU Organization, 1941-1953

- POLITBURO
  - CENTRAL COMMITTEE
    - CPSU
  - PRIME MINISTER
  - SPECIAL SECTION
    - CC SECRETARIAT
      - MVD/XI
  - INU
    - U.S.-West Europe Section
    - Other geographical sections
      - U.S.
      - Other
    - SPEISBURO (1st Bureau)
TABLE: INU Organization, 1951-1961

PRESIDIOUM
CC, CPSU

USSR Council of Ministers

SPECIAL SECTION
CC Secretariat

KGB
(Committee of State Security)

Central Secretariat

1st MAIN DIRECTORATE
(internal counter-intelligence)

INU

2nd MAIN DIRECTORATE
(external intelligence)

GUPO
MAIN DIRECTORATE
OF BORDER TROOPS

3rd MAIN DIRECTORATE
(armed forces
counter-intelligence)

GUPO

SPETSBURO
9th Department (now
"Executive Action Section")

CENTRAL-SOUTH ASIA SECTION
(India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Persia)

Etc.
Table 4: Chiefs of the INU (former INO), KGB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEFS</th>
<th>DATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Davtian, Yakov</td>
<td>c. 1918 - 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trilisser, Meyer</td>
<td>1920 - c. 1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artuzov, A. Kh.</td>
<td>c. 1934 - 1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slutsky, Abram</td>
<td>1935-1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shpigulglas, Aleksandr</td>
<td>1938- c. 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>c. 1939 - c. 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitin, Lt. Gen. P. M.</td>
<td>? -December 1943- ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>c. 1944 - c. 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>c. 1961 - present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B.: Maj. Gen. V. M. Zubilin, the Deputy Chief of INU, KGB (c. 1947-Nov 1947-1948) is incorrectly identified as Chief for that period by Morros (55).

Lt. Gen. V. V. Fedotov, the Deputy Chief of INU, KGB (1948-May 1949-1949) was mistaken as Chief for that period by Morros (59).

V. G. Dekanovsov, the former Deputy Foreign Minister, is probably incorrectly identified as INU, KGB Chief at the time of his execution as a Beria man in 1953. Cookridge (55), 53.
by KGB agent Bogdan Stashinsky,\(^1\) the murder in a Vienna jail by poison in 1962 of the Hungarian AVH lieutenant, Bela Lapusnyik, immediately after his defection,\(^2\) and by the persistent KGB efforts to trace Igor Gouzenko as recently as 1961 or 1962,\(^3\) and the order to kidnap or kill the senior chemist Mikhail Klochko who defected in Canada in 1961.\(^4\)

Former CIA Director, Allen Dulles, has identified the most recent Chief of this section (now called the Executive Action Section)\(^5\) as General Nikolai Rodin.

There were few publicly reported cases of NKVD Mobile Groups, per se, operating in the Far East; but then, there were only two major defections there: On 13 June 1938 General (3rd Grade) G. S. Lushkov, newly appointed Chief of NKVD for the Far East Provinces, slipped across the Russo-Manchurian border into the welcome protection of the Japanese Military Intelligence.\(^6\) And in 1954 MVD Lieutenant Colonel Rastvorov defected in Tokyo.\(^7\) However, the assassination of Soviet

\(^{1}\)Dulles (63), 87; and Murder International, Inc. (65), 81-168.
\(^{3}\)Robert Glenn Thompson with Harold H. Martin, "I Spied for the Russians," Pt. 2, Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 238, No. 11 (5 June 1965), pp. 44, 46. Martin, a U.S. Airforce intelligence clerk in Germany was recruited by the KGB in 1957. After his discharge and return to the U.S., one of his unsuccessful assignments in 1961 or 1962 was to go to Canada to trace Gouzenko, the GRU cipher clerk who had defected there fifteen years before.
\(^{4}\)Penkovskiy (65), 283, 289-291.
\(^{5}\)Dulles (53), 88.
\(^{6}\)Although Genrikh Samoilovich Lushkov was one of the most senior Soviet defectors, his publicly available story has never received other than passing mention. Among the gaz-bied accounts in the world's press at the time, only The Times (London) managed to supply some accurately reported details. Johnson (64), 148-149: 247; Orlov testimony; Orlov (53), 219, and Lushkov's own account.
\(^{7}\)For Rastvorov see Section E below.
intelligence agent and former French Politburo member, "Cremet," in Macao in 1936 was reportedly an NKVD operation, and the "blown" Foulers lived on in China apparently fearful of NKVD reprisal until his eventual repatriation around 1938.

Table 5: Chiefs of the Executive Action Section, INU, KGB.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEFS</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Studnikov, Col. L. I.</td>
<td>1953-1954</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Aleksei Alekseevich&quot;</td>
<td>?-late Nov 1959-4 Dec 1959-?</td>
<td>Stashinsky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodin, General Nikolai B.</td>
<td>c. 1962- present?</td>
<td>Dulles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(aka &quot;Korovin&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Previous titles, subordinations, and dates:

- Spetsburo No. 1, KGB (?-1948-1953)
- 9th Section (Otdel), INU, MGB (1953-1954-?)
- 13th Department, INU, KGB (?-c. 1959-?)
- Executive Action Section, INU, KGB (?-1962-present?)
D. FAR EASTERN NETWORKS

As indicated in the sections on the Comintern and GRU, the number of Soviet networks and agents "blown" (i.e., exposed) in any one country are generally thought to represent only a small fraction of those operating there at any particular time. One reason that little has been published about state security operations in the Far East is that, except for the "legal" networks operated directly from the Soviet embassies, no instances have come to general public attention of exposed "illegal" State Security agents or networks. However, we do in fact know of many NKVD-MVD agents—both "illegals" and "legals"—whose careers ended in exposure in Europe who had served at one time or another in the Far East. As in the section on the GRU, we will briefly mention these as proof that the part of the Soviet state security espionage iceberg visible in East Asia is, indeed, only a small part of the whole.

The earliest reported Soviet state security agent in the Far East, and the only one identified by name in Outer Mongolia, was no less than Yakob Blumkin, the youthful assassin in 1918 of German Ambassador to Moscow, Count Mirbach. At that earlier time Blumkin was in the Left Social Revolutionary Party. Then, after commanding guerrilla forces against the Whites in the Ukraine (1918), he was admitted to the Communist Party and the GPU Foreign Department. Subsequently he served on GPU assignments in the Caucasus and, in 1920-1921, in Persia as a Member of the Central Committee of the Persian Communist Party. Then—after a short course in 1921-1922 at the General Staff College in Moscow—he was, according to Bazhanov, made Chief of the GPU in Outer Mongolia and Chief Adviser to its army. Finally, while serving as Chief Resident ("illegal") in Constantinople, he was executed in 1929 for smuggling a letter from Trotsky in Turkey to Trotskyists in Russia.1

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1Bajanov (30), 166-170; and Agabekov (31), 216.
The OGPU "legal" Rezident in Harbin at the time of the Chinese police raid on the Soviet Consulate in April 1929 was Leonid Eitingor. Compromised, he was recalled to Moscow. His subsequent career carried him to Paris (where as "Sakhov" he worked in the Embassy), Madrid (where as "General Kotov" and "Comrade Pablo" he was deputy commander of all Spanish Loyalist guerrillas), Mexico (where as "General Leonov" he directed the assassination of Trotsky), and again in Moscow during WW II where as Lieutenant General Eitingon he was a deputy commander of all Soviet Partisans.¹

The OGPU "legal" Rezident in Shanghai at the time of the Chinese police search of the premises in 1928 was Minsky.² Revealed by a leak in his own staff, Minsky was charged with espionage by the Chinese who declared him persona non grata, forcing his return to Moscow.³

On the outbreak of the brief Sino-Russian border war in Manchuria in 1929, the OGPU sent Ilya Gert to Manchuria, "illegal" Rezident in Harbin. Gert travelled to his post via the U.S. and Japan, furnished with a forged Persian passport under the name "Ishakoff." Gert's mission was to engage in systematic railway sabotage in case of continued hostilities.⁴

Another OGPU agent sent to China on the same occasion in 1929 was one Fortunatov, son of the Chief of the Far East Sector.⁵

Jean Cremet, a member of the French Politburo since 1926, who unknown to his Party and Comintern colleagues had been an NKVD (or possibly GRU) agent since 1924, was exposed for military espionage by French counterintelligence in 1927 but escaped to Moscow where he

¹On Eitingon's mission in Manchuria see Agabekov (31), 180, 207-8, 238-9, 244-5.
²Agabekov (31), 184, 207, 221.
³Agabekov (31), 179-182, 214.
⁴Agabekov (31), 179, 181.
continued to work for the French Section of the NKVD under the cover of the Cooperative Section of the Comintern. Then, in 1936, he was sent off to China, ostensibly on a secret mission for the NKVD (or possibly GRU) but was, in fact, liquidated by the NKVD on his arrival at Macao.¹

Such an elaborate means for liquidating unwanted Communist agents was not unprecedented. In 1929 efforts were made to induce Julian Gorkin, a prominent but independent leader of the Spanish and Latin American Section of the Comintern, to accept assignment in Shanghai. As he recalls:²

The proposal came from Moscow directly. Perhaps I would have accepted but fortunately I learned in time from a very good friend in the apparatus what was being prepared for me. The plan was to "liquidate" me but in a place as far removed as possible from my centre of activity and all my comrades. China, very turbulent at the time, was the ideal place for the realization of their plan.

Richard Stahlmar,³ ("Arthur Illner"), a German Communist who, as a brutal strongman of the "Arms Apparat" of the K., underground in Germany around 1930 won such approval that he was sent for special schooling in Moscow at the International Military School whence he was dispatched first as an NKVD agent to China in the mid-1920's and next to Spain where as "Illner" he was reportedly involved in the NKVD kidnap-liquidation work. ³

Sometime in the mid-1930's, the NKVD Chief Resident in Harbin was one Razin, who subsequently enjoyed a longer, though somewhat shaky, life in Macao. "Cremef" was not, as might be supposed, the famed August Gurlasky (1902-1937), alias "August Kleine."

Dallin (55), 66 and Index, citing his "D papers" for Cremet's end in Macao. "Cremef" was not, as might be supposed, the famed August Gurlasky (1902-1937), alias "August Kleine."

Gorkin (59), 88, who also (p. 87) describes an earlier (1925) plan to get him to Malaga, Spain, for quiet liquidation.

Dallin (55), 90-91.
career in espionage service in Europe. 1

Erna Eifler * (alias "Rosita," "Gerda Sommer") was a veteran German Communist who had served the NKVD in China and Holland in the 1930's and ended in a Nazi prison in October 1942, having been one of a small number of German agents whom the NKVD had parachuted into Germany earlier that year. 2

Vladimir Rogov was Chief of the TASS Bureau in Nationalist China from sometime in late 1937 until early 1942. It has been alleged by several writers (including Healy) that he was the chief NKVD Resident there. However the evidence seems entirely circumstantial. The main indicator is that the TASS China Bureau had an unusually large number of correspondents (12) for the amount of newswire copy filed and most seemed to be serving more as military observers at the front. Moreover, Colonel Ege's testimony makes it clear that Rogov was, in fact, with the GRU. 3

E. "LEGAL" NETS IN JAPAN

With the end of World War II, Soviet Government offices again became active in Japan, with over 250 Russian nationals assigned to the diplomatic mission alone. Of these, many were engaged in intelligence collection, a task greatly aided both by Russia's position as one of the Occupying Powers and by the large Japanese Communist organization. However, Russia's failure to ratify the Peace Treaty with Japan led to close Japanese police surveillance of the official mission, to

1Petrov (56), 175 and index.
2Dallir (55), 264–265.
3For a detailed account of Rogov's TASS bureau in China see my Soviet Journalists in China (draft, 1965), Chapter I.I.
the point that by 1954 the number of official Soviet personnel had fallen to only 30 and their activities—both consular and clandestine—being markedly curtailed, although several Japanese nationals had been arrested during and after the Korean War for sending radio messages to Moscow (technically for "currency violation" as Japan had no anti-espionage laws).¹

When in the late 1940's Anatoly Gromov turned up in Japan as head of the Soviet Trade Mission, there was no reason to suppose that he was not repeating his performance as an MVD "legal" resident as he had earlier done in the U.S.²

The last major public disclosure of Soviet intelligence activities in Japan came over a decade ago³ with the defection of MVD Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Rastvorov⁴ who, under legal cover as a member of the Soviet diplomatic mission, ran an espionage ring of nearly 50 Japanese agents. Unfortunately, Rastvorov's one published article on Soviet activities in Japan was heavily censored, giving little more than personal gossip.⁴ However, from subsequent arrests by the Japanese police it is known that Rastvorov's net had recruited at least three officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, including the chief of the Soviet desk in the European and American Affairs Bureau, Nobunori Higurashi.⁵

¹ A brief summary of Soviet intelligence in Japan (and Rastvorov's defection) is "Case of Russia's 'Missing Diplomat': What U.S. Knows About Red Spies in Asia," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 36 (12 February 1954), pp. 28-30. This notes that "some analysts say there are at least half a dozen [Soviet] intelligence collecting agencies" among the 400,000 Korean residents in Japan; and Japanese officials believe there are at least two Chinese Communist rings operating in Japan, reporting to Peking which passes it to Moscow.

² Bentley (51), 252-255, 266-268, 299-301.

³ Others have been publicized since this section was written.


⁵ Nobunori was arrested on 14 August 1954, the same day Rastvorov was publicly surfaced in Washington. Two weeks later he was officially alleged to have confessed and immediately committed suicide by flinging himself from his interrogators' window. Joesten (63), 260.
It is a safe assumption that the Soviet security service continues to operate in East Asia, although no more recent information is known to me than the revelations by Kazhachev (who defected from the Soviet Embassy in Burma in 1959) and Penkovsky (in 1962).

One function of the Soviet state security service that we know is no longer performed in China (and North Vietnam, if indeed it ever was) and, perhaps, North Korea, is their role as advisers in intelligence and security matters to the local Communist Governments. This special type of technical assistance was rendered to Korea from 1945 until at least shortly after the Korean War.¹ We know it was also provided to the Chinese Communists from shortly after their takeover in 1949 until the withdrawal of all Soviet advisers in 1961.² For example, Colonel I. A. Raina, in INU Deputy Chief, was sent to China in this capacity sometime around 1953.³

¹See my Soviet Intervention in the Korean War (draft, 1965).
³Deriabin and Gibney (59), 181–182; Petrov (56), 272.
IX. FOREIGN MINISTRY

An essential function of all foreign offices is the reporting of international political developments. It is an integral part of diplomacy and often even of mere consular affairs. It is so much a routine part of these that it is often not even thought of as a major element in strategic intelligence. By the antique tradition of "diplomatic immunity," ambassadors and their staffs openly collect intelligence and are guaranteed the privacy of their persons and their communications. This situation exists even when—as with the U.S. Department of State in the 1930's—a small foreign diplomatic service is too small or too naive to support its own specialized intelligence research staff. Other governments early recognized the intimate relationship between possession of strategic intelligence and the conduct of foreign affairs; and their foreign offices developed large, permanent, integral intelligence services. This has been true since the last century of Britain and France. It was also the case under the Czars, whose foreign ministry seemingly was its principal organ for the collection of foreign intelligence as well as the conduct of covert operations.

The destruction of the intelligence function of the foreign office was a likelihood in a government led by Lenin; it was inevitable in a foreign office created by Trotsky. When, in October 1917, Leon Trotsky was appointed Commissar of the Bolshevik's brand new Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, he declared: "I will issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world and then shut up shop." He


2 Blackstock (66), 217.
argued that the Revolution had little need of "diplomacy at that
time."\(^1\) However within weeks he was negotiating the Treaty of Brest
Litovsk with Germany and other delicate inter-governmental affairs
with British, French, and American representatives. The Foreign
Commissariat had become a permanent institution; and when next March
Trotsky was succeeded by his deputy, Chicherin, that aristocrat-turned-
revolutionary set about the gradual rebuilding of a conventional
diplomatic service.\(^2\) But there was just enough break with the past
that the foreign intelligence function had been discarded, to be
picked up by the Cheka.\(^3\)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID=Ministerstvo Inostrannykh
Del, or so-called Minindel) was, until March 1946, called the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel). The central fact distin-
guishing it from conventional foreign offices, is that it does not
make foreign policy even in the narrow sense permitted by the day-to-day
administration of foreign relations. Government foreign policy has
been made—at least since the late 1930's—by the Party, specifically
in its Politburo (sometime Presidium) and its Central Committee
Secretariat. As was once observed by a French Ambassador: to the Court
of Czar Nicholas II, the foreign minister \(\text{à la russe}\) is one who does
not have charge of foreign policy but only of diplomacy, functioning
only to adapt the latter to the former.\(^4\)

\(^1\) Leon Trotsky, My Life (New York: Scribners, 1931), p. 341.

\(^2\) For Chicherin's biography see Fischer (41), 140-147; and Theodore
H. Von Laue, "Soviet Diplomacy: G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for
Foreign Affairs, 1918-1934," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.),
pp. 234-281.

\(^3\) somewhat similar case occurred in Nazi Germany where the intel-
ligence, espionage, and security personnel of Ribbentrop's Foreign
Ministry were replaced and directed by Himmler's SS. This was done
mainly because the regular diplomatic officials had proved untrustworthy.
Seabury (54), 126.

\(^4\) Robert M. Slusser, "The Role of the Foreign Ministry," in Ivo J.
Lederer (editor), Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven and London: Yale
Briefly, during the first postwar years of the creation of the Soviet satellite empire in East Europe and North Korea, the Soviet ambassadors did enjoy an unprecedented measure of prestige and real personal power. Indeed, these envoys were virtual proconsuls or viceroys, not diplomats, and some—such as Popov who was Ambassador to Poland from 1953 to 1954 or T. F. Shtykov in North Korea—were not even members of the CC/CPSU. This anomalous situation was ended following the July 1955 CC Plenum where Khrushchev attacked it and managed to restore Party control.

In addition to providing "cover" for GRU and KGB agents as described below, the Soviet Foreign Ministry also has its own intelligence function. However, this is not an espionage function. It consists of two operations: First, it relies heavily on conventional consular reporting to the home office, mainly political reporting. Second, it produces studies, briefings, etc., prepared in the ministerial secretariat. This latter operation is comparable to the products of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the U.S. Department of State.

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2 Kaznacheev (62), 80-88, gives a detailed description—as of 1959—of each of the several types of embassy reports.

3 Penkovskiy (63), 66; Kaznacheev (62), 82.
A. THE FOREIGN SERVICE AS COVER FOR OTHER SERVICES

It is difficult to judge the quality of Soviet diplomatic or consular reporting. This is a function of the quality of both administrative procedures and personnel. Efficiency was not improved by the rudin, for precedence between the foreign and security services, particularly after about 1921 when the GPU acquired the right to assign its agents to Foreign Commissariat posts abroad as cover. Competition between these two major organizations were not only over the function of foreign reporting to the Central Committee, but also over basic questions of foreign policy.

As already noted, the KGB and GRU heavily infiltrate the overseas embassies and consular offices of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and do so to an extent not normally employed by other nations. We are fortunately now less naive than U.S. Secretary of State Stimson when in 1929 he dissolved the Department's small but superb cryptoanalytic section—then the only one functioning in the U.S.—on the grounds that "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail." If Stimson were correct, then few "gentlemen" were numbered among his official contacts. Most foreign missions—including all operated by major powers—conceal covert intelligence collection personnel in their staffs in addition to

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1 On their general feuding see Agabekov (31), 14, 111, 269–271.
2 Agabekov (31), 269.
3 Agabekov (31), 269.
4 That Stimson was in fact ignorant of the behavior of his foreign counterparts and not merely trying to set some sort of good example is indicated by his curious belief that: "In 1940 and after, the world was no longer in a condition to be able to act on the principle of mutual trust that had guided him as Secretary of State. . . . " Thus, believing that other countries had changed, Stimson, as Secretary of War in 1942, approved the recently renewed cryptographic work but "never retraced" his earlier act. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper, 1948), pp. 188, 454–455; and Yardley (31), 10, 370–372. See the comments by Dulles (63), 71, 76; and Zacharias (46), 9–10.
such tacitly accepted more-or-less overt intelligence officers as military attachés. The Soviet Union, however, goes a bit further than most in that occasionally their chief of mission has been himself a KGB or GRU officer, as in the following cases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>AMBASSADOR TO/WHEN</th>
<th>CONCURRENT INTELLIGENCE POST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dekanov, V. G.</td>
<td>Germany, 1940-1941</td>
<td>NKVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panyushkin, A. S.</td>
<td>China, 1939-1944</td>
<td>MVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austria (High Commissioner), 1953-1955</td>
<td>GRU Lt. Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kudryavtsev, S. M.</td>
<td>Cuba, 1960-1962</td>
<td>KGB Chief Legal Resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(pseud of Shitov)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umansky, K.</td>
<td>U.S., 1939-1941</td>
<td>NKVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodionov, K. K., Rear-Adm.</td>
<td>Mexico, 1941-1945</td>
<td>Naval Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tikhvinsky, S. L.</td>
<td>Japan (Head, Soviet Mission in Tokyo, later Minister, Soviet Embassy), 1956-1957</td>
<td>KGB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Alfred Vagts, *The Military Attaché* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). It seems quite rare, even given the disillusioned exigencies of the Cold War, for non-Soviet governments to assign intelligence officers as chiefs of missions. According to "Christopher Felix," the British did so in one strategic ad hoc consulate in Greece during the Civil War where the entire staff were S.I.S. (i.e., so-called MI-6) agents using H.M. Consulate only as cover. Felix (63), 92-93. And it is certain that whatever his formal organizational affiliation, the part played by the late U.S. Ambassador Puerifoy in Guatemala in 1954 was not that of a diplomat.

2 Penkovskiy (65), 68.
As with most nations, their embassies and consulates serve the Soviet Union as the principal cover for "legal" networks. Although this is well known to all counterintelligence services and inevitably accounts for the overwhelming bulk of exposed networks and direct linkage in the public press of the "blown" agents and their employers, the advantages seemingly overbalance the higher risks. The diplomatic post provides not only rapid and secure communications with the center, but also confers a welcome diplomatic immunity on the Reziden; if not on his local recruits who are indeed in the most readily exposed position of any agent. The following table will suggest the dimensions of this question, although it should be recognized that some cases may represent political or propaganda retaliation and are not necessarily actual counts of uncovered agents.

Table 6: Expulsions of Diplomats for Alleged Espionage, 1947-1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home Country of Diplomat</th>
<th>Country Expelled From</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number Expelled</th>
<th>Notes/Refs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1946-1961</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Gramont (62), 503-506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1947-1961</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Gramont (62), 505-506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gramont (62), 421-422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In general, see Gramont (62), 505-507, 405-452. For Soviet military attachés see Vagts (67), 224-241.
Commissar Litvinov more-or-less successfully resisted NKVD influence in his Narkomindel for several years after taking office in 1930, although he could not keep NKVD agents out of the minor embassy and consular posts. Then the Great Purge struck the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs with particular viciousness. Almost all its Old Bolsheviks and sophisticated cosmopolitans in the Moscow headquarters were sent off to imprisonment or execution. All its officials posted abroad were ordered home on one pretext or another and were immediately arrested on their return. Only Commissar Litvinov, his assistant, Stein, and Ambassadors Maisky, Suritz, and Kollontay escaped, aside from three wisely cautious officials who defected abroad. These suddenly emptied ranks in the Narkomindel were commonly filled by the purgers with their own NKVD officials, although some Red Army (GRU?) men were assigned as well. Thus did the NKVD gain complete control over the Narkomindel and its puppet-Commissar, Litvinov.

In the present—or at least in a recent Khrushchevian—period the degree of infiltration—both in numbers and control—of the Soviet embassies and consulates by KGB and GRU offices is almost total. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs exists as such virtually only in Moscow. Penkovsky plausibly estimates the following rough breakdown of staff in embassy posts for 1961:

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1. Fischer (41), 496.

2. These were:
   1. A. G. Barmine, Chargé d'Affairs (and GRU Resident and TASS correspondent) in Athens, defected in November 1937.
   2. F. F. Raskolnikov, Minister in Sofia, defected in April 1938.
   3. Lev Gelfand (Leon Helfand), Chargé d'Affairs in Rome, defected July 1940.

And even the regular foreign ministry people are commonly co-opted for ad hoc intelligence assignments by the locally assigned KGB and GRU officers. The situation in Soviet consulates is even more dramatic: almost all staff being KGB officers, with only one or two GRU men and an occasional specialist from the Foreign Ministry itself. Indeed, the Ambassador himself is not only sometimes an active or past professional intelligence officer but his primary responsibility is in all cases not to the Foreign Ministry but to the Central Committee. The only reason that any regular diplomatic personnel seem to be tolerated is that they alone know protocol and diplomatic procedures.¹

Even the UN Secretariat contains Soviet "legals." Four have been identified as GRU agents: Kirill Doronkin * who was asked to leave in 1959, Igor Melekh * who was arrested in 1960, Petr Maslennikov, * Aleksei Galkin, * and Ivan Egorov. * The last three were observed by the FBI in joint espionage operations, Maslennikov and Galkin left quickly in early May 1963 and Egorov was immediately arrested but soon exchanged for two U.S. prisoners.²

B. SPECIAL (TENTH) DEPARTMENT³

As with other diplomatic services, the Soviet Foreign Ministry has its own integral security service. This, however, resembles the

¹Penkovskiy (65), 65, 67-68, 84. Penkovsky's general statistics are verified by Kaznacheev (62), 79-80, in terms of the Soviet Embassy in Burma in 1957-1959 when the staff of 16 diplomats and 20 technicians included two-thirds in intelligence.

²Pierre J. Huss and George Carpozi, Jr., Red Spies in the UN (New York: Coward-McCann, 1965).

³Kaznacheev (62), 89, 179, 184-187.
U.S. system rather than the British in that it is concerned only with maintaining secure communications and does not engage in "positive" intelligence collection. The main difference between the Soviet and U.S. system is that the former is under dual subordination--to the state security (KGB) as well as the Foreign Ministry.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry's semi-autonomous security organization is now (at least in 1957-1959) called the Tenth Department, or "Special Department" (Osobyj Otdel). Its head (in 1959) was KGB Major General Zherbtsov and, indeed, most of its personnel were also KGB. For its communications codes it apparently works closely with the KGB's Special Service (i.e., communications) Directorate. The Tenth Department operates the diplomatic courier service and also a small special technical service group within each Embassy to protect the security of Embassy files and communications.

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1Deriabin and Gibney (59), 95-96.

2This was even true at least as early as 1922 when Konstantin Umansky first took up these duties under cover of his position as a TASS correspondent. Krivitsky (39), 38.
APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF INTELLIGENCE TERMS

This is a dictionary of administrative and operational terms of Soviet intelligence. Some terms peculiar to espionage, per se, are included to assist identification of the specific network to which individuals may belong. Some earlier books have included more-or-less comprehensive glossaries. However, this is the first--albeit quite tentative--effort to compile such a dictionary along systematic lexicographic and etymological lines.

As part of their regular training, Soviet intelligence officers are "forbidden to use special Soviet intelligence terminology in briefing . . . agents" (much less any details of operations or organization). This is rather like the "need to know" principle in American security practice. Fortunately, this rule is often overlooked in practice, thereby enabling us to sometimes identify the particular Soviet organization for which a defected agent has worked.

To a marked degree the parlance of intelligence is international in its vocabulary and usage. In this regard it is not unlike the internationalized vocabularies of diplomacy, the military arts, and of the sciences. Furthermore, the reasons for its diffusion across national bureaucratic and international boundaries is presumably the same as for these other languages: namely, a desire for emulation and a need for communication. There is a tendency for functionally similar organizations--including intelligence services--to emulate the organizational, operational, and other styles of their more prestigious colleagues. They seek thereby to gain status or to

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1For example, Crokridge (55), 297-302, who gives 46 terms including however a number of common political ones such as "Fascism" and "Dialectical Materialism."

2"Prikhodko Lecture" in Fenkovskiy (65), 155.
increase efficiency in their profession. One of the more easily
diffused outward symbols of professional "in-ness" is the professional
language itself. In the case of science and the arts it is publicly
available; but, even in the case of such initially secret languages
as those associated with intelligence, their terms are eventually
discovered by the opponent's counter-intelligence through intercereptions,
infiltrations, defections, and even occasional indiscretions. Indeed,
a fair amount of "secret" information is passed deliberately through
cooperative liaison among allied services and even between competing
services on a tit-for-tat basis or as part of their disinformation
campaigns.

It is a bit difficult to find suitably naive sources of inform-
ants to draw on for examples of lexographic usage. Except perhaps
for such early books as those by Agabekov and Bessedovsky, most
defectors' books contain intelligence parlance that may well be
modified for any of three reasons:

1. The author will likely have had his technical
   vocabulary contaminated by exposure to the Western
equivalents. His interrogations by Western
officials and readings of other defector literature
   can bring a quick linguistic sophistication.

2. His ghost-writer (if any) may elaborate or simplify
   special terminology.

3. His editor (or ghost-writer) may change terminology
   for the "convenience" of the popular reader, substi-
tuting more commonly known terms, etc.

The following Soviet defector memoirs (arrayed chronologically)
have been scanned for references:

- Bessedovsky (31)
- Agabekov (31)
- Barmine (39); Barmine (45)
- Krivitsky [with Boris Shub and I. D. Levine] (39)
agent

A secret agent. In general intelligence and popular usage, a person authorized to obtain or assist in obtaining information for intelligence or counter-intelligence.

EXAMPLES: 1) Agent: Col. Stig Wennerström, the Swedish Military Attaché in Washington, D.C., was also an agent of the GRU.

2) Double Agent (q.v.): Boris Morros, a minor Hollywood producer, was an NKVD agent since 1936; then in 1947 he was "doubled" by the FBI, henceforward informing to them on his ostensible NKVD chiefs.

3) Triple Agent (q.v.): George Blake is said by Philip Deane to be still a British agent whom the KGB only think they have "doubled."

N.B.: This term is not used by Communist organizations. Specifically excluded in Comintern which used "International Political Instructor" (? -1929- ?).

REF: Valtin (41), 199.
JD (62), 5.
apparat (Rus., "apparatus" < Ger., Apparat)

A communist apparatus or organization. It may mean the Party itself, the Party's underground (1923-1934) or specific sections of the latter (e.g., the S-Apparat in Germany, 1920-1930, handling espionage).

REF: Vaťin (41), 45, 47, 164, 199.

apparatchik (Rus., pl.: apparatchiki)

A member of an apparatus; hence a bureaucrat, particularly in the CP.

A general CP term also used in the Soviet secret services.

REF: Avtorkhanov (66), 18, 152, 371.

"blown"

A British S.I.S. term of pre-WW II origin.

SEE: "uncovered"

"Center, the"

Traditional name of the State Security headquarters in Moscow.

REF: Deriabiv and Gibney (59), 186.
Morros (59), 202, 205, 226, 229, 232, 234.

central intelligence

Coordinated or integrated strategic intelligence.

REF: Ransom (58).
Farago (54), 40-41.

"Chekist"

1) Originally, any member of the Cheka (1917-1922).

2) Subsequently, through the various changes of the name of that secret police organization, any member of the State Security, in general usage in the Soviet public, Soviet Press, and specifically the state security (?-1938-1944-?; -1965-present).
3) a colloquial term used by the state security personnel and by the general public and in the Soviet press.

4) The term "Old Chekisty" refers to those state security personnel who served prior to the Yezhovschina (or Great Purge) of 1937.

REF: Deriabin and Gibney (59), 61.
Granovsky (55/62), 54, 73, 96, 101, 117, 164, 184, 193, 216.
Petrov (56), 74.

"chickenfeed"
False, worthless, or already compromised information, used as disinformation (q.v.).
= Spielmaterial (Ger., "play materials"), in German intelligence parlance.

REF: Joesten (63), 143.

clandestine (adj.)
Hidden but not disguised; secret but not covert. Any overt person, organization, or operation that depends on circumstances for momentary concealment.

COMPARE: covert, secret.

REF: Felix (63), 27-32.
JD (62), 46.

"clean" (Russ., чистый)
Free of police surveillance or suspicion.
NKVD (? -1951- ?) parlance.
ANTONYM: "spitting blood" (q.v.)

REF: Morros (59), 157.

communications intelligence (COMINT)
U.S. term for technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients.

counter-espionage

The "penetration" of other intelligence organizations in order to impede, neutralize, or destroy their effectiveness from within.

COMPARE: counter-intelligence
Cf.: espionage

counter-intelligence, counterintelligence

The countering of intelligence activities in order to impede, neutralize, or destroy their effectiveness. Distinct from counter-espionage (q.v.) in that it does not involve the physical penetration of the other intelligence organization.

SYNONYM: "negative intelligence"
ANTONYM: intelligence

NOTE: Organizations whose assigned mission is exclusively intelligence include: FBI, U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), the British Metropolitan Police ("Scotland Yard") Special Branch, the British D.I.5 (formerly M.I.5), the West German Army's Militärlicher Abschirddienst, the West German Sicherungsgruppe des Bundeskriminalamts, and the French Direction de la Sûreté Nationale.

REF: Faragc (54), 39.
Rancou (58), 13.

"cover" (n.)

A disguise used to conceal the purpose of a person or organization. Cover may be "shallow" (as with an agent disguised as a military attaché) or "deep" (as with an "illegal" or "sleeper" agent).

A technical term in general international use by secret services and among writers of espionage fiction.

Cp.: "legend"
Cf: "deep cover"

REF: Felix (63), 27-32.
Deriabin and Gibney (59), 73, 245-247.
Morros (59), 66.
covert (adj.)
Disguised but not hidden. Any closed and invisible secret person, organization, or activity that depends on disguise (i.e., contrived "cove") to conceal itself. No effort is made to hide the covert entity itself, only its purpose or real nature is hidden.
E.G.: a secret agent, a "front" organization, a Q-boat.
ANTONYM: overt (q.v.)
REF: Felix (63), 27-32.
JD (62), 60.

"cut out" (n.)
General U.S. intelligence term for a human intermediary in a chain of transmission of information. The Russian term is "live drop" (q.v.).
SYN: agent de liaison, "live drop".

"dead drop" (Rus., tainik)
A hiding place where an agent can leave a packet to be later recovered by another agent without the need of direct human contact.
Cf: dubok
Antonym: "live drop"
Penkovskiy (65), 271, 272.

"deep cover," "deep-cover"
The cover (q.v.) of an "illegal" (q.v.) agent or operation.
REF: Deriabin and Gibney (59), 195, 208, 209.

"Director, the"
GRU code-word for its chief, ? -12 Jul 1945- ?
REF: Canadian Royal Commission (46).
Gouzenko (48), 123.
disinformation (ι Rus., dezinformatsii, ι Ger.)
False but plausible information concocted in one intelligence service and fed to another for purposes of deception.
Originally a WW I term, having first been applied to the Disinformation Service of the German General Staff. The Cheka adopted the term and technique in the early 1920's and it has been in use by state security and, since at least 1937, by the GRU. Now common in U.S. intelligence parlance as well.
REF: Krivitsky (39), 234-240.

"double agent," "double-agent,"
An agent who works simultaneously on behalf of two competing intelligence services.
"To double," v., to secure another's agent as one's own; or, in British parlance, "to turn around;" or, in German parlance (in WW II), Umdrehen. General technical term of international espionage.
E.G.: Boris Morros, ostensibly a minor Hollywood producer. Also the numerous GRU agents in Germany and West Europe doubled during WW II by the Abwehr in its "Rote Kapelle" Radio Game.
REF: Deriabin and Gibney (59), 254-255.
Seth (63), 299-312, uses the term "double-cpy."
Dallin (55), 171.

"drop" (n.)
See: dubok

"dry affair:" (Rus., sukhoi dela)
Infiltration and exfiltration of agents across national frontiers.
A technical term in GRU (ι-c.1942-?) and probably also state security parlance.
Cp: "wet affairs."
REF: Gouzenko (48), 62-63.
dubok (also transliterated dybok) (n., Rus., "oaklet," a small oak-tree).
A "drop," cache, hiding place.
May be either a "dead drop" (q.v.) or a "live drop" (q.v.).
REF: Gouzenko (48), 108.

espioag?
That portion of intelligence activities that contravenes the laws of the targeted state or the law of nations. To be distinguished from "intelligence," which comprises both legal and illegal activities. To be contrasted with "inspection," which connotes legal information gathering.

"Illegal, an"
A deep-cover agent.
Cp.: "legal"
REF: Penkovskiy (65), 74-80, 274.
Deriabin and Gibney (59), 181, 186.

intelligence
Communicated information. Specifically informatic, communicated by secret information organizations.

N.B.: Professional intelligence units (e.g., U.S. Army G-2 and ONI) insist that "intelligence" be defined as "evaluated information," that is, information whose credibility, meaning, and importance has been systematically appraised. However, this is a prescriptive definition and clearly does not conform to usage by either professionals or non-professionals.
Cp.: razvedka for the Russian approximation.
Cp.: central intelligence.
Cp.: strategic intelligence.
ANTONYM: counterintelligence.

REF: Ransom (58), 6-7.
Thayer (59), 161, for an authoritative but realistic definition by a former head of VOA.
JD (62), 114, for the prescriptive definition approved by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and, more-or-less, by NATO.
Farago (54), 6-8, 39, for a deluded theoretical definition by a former U.S. naval intelligence officer.
"Legal, a"

A Soviet secret agent whose cover is as an official (i.e., legal) representative of his government, usually granted diplomatic immunity. Most are in the Soviet Embassy as secretaries and military attachés, or in trade missions, or with the TASS agency as correspondents. Thus there can be "Legal" agents or rezidenturas only in countries where the Soviet Government has official representatives.

A "legal" espionage group is one whose directing agents operate openly as citizens of their own country with thin cover as official representatives—usually carrying diplomatic immunity—as military or commercial attachés. Contrary to usual U.S. and British practice, most Soviet "legal" agents operate abroad under pseudonyms to prevent their opponents from either identifying them as agents or recognizing their special skills or style. Notable exceptions in the state security have been Panyushkin and Gaikins, both of whom used their real names on foreign assignments.

Cp.: "illegal."

REF: Penkovskiy (65), 75, 81.
Deriabin and Gibney (59), 181n, 186.

"legend", (Rus., legenda)

The more-or-less detailed and fictitious autobiography supplied to an agent or Resident as part of his cover.

A technical term of state security (?-1941-?; ?-1952-1954-?) and GRU (?-1939-1943-?).

REF: Deriabin and Gibney (59), 203, 207, 208, 256.
Granovsky (55/62), 157, 193.
Gouzenko (48), 174-176.
Ege (53), 1018-1019, 1020, 1047.

"live drop" (n.)

GRU (?-1960-1961-?) and KGB term.
SEE: "dubok"
ANONYM: "dead drop"
SYNONYM: "cut-out," agent de liaison.

REF: Prikhodko lecture in Penkovskiy (65), 131-132.
"music," "musician"

Radio transmitters and radio operators.

GRU code terms used in communications with apparently all their networks abroad, specifically in Harbin (c. 1942), and Switzerland (WW II).

REF: Gouzenko (48), 65, refers to Harbin, c. 1942.
Foote (49).

"nash" (poss. pron.; Rus., "ours")

A Communist underground term for a fellow Communist in U.S. (? -1937- ?)

A state security term for an agent (? -1949- ?).

REF: Chambers (52), 308.
Bentley (51), 88.
Morros (59), 125.

"neighbors" (Rus., sosedi)

The state security organization.

The standard covert and colloquial term used by the GRU (? -1939-1943- ?; -1961-1962- ?), and Comintern since the 1920's. Term first noted in this sense in the Arcos Raid documents in 1927.

Penkovskiy (65), 65, 73, 90, 176, 272, 278, for GRU refs of 1961-1962.
Bentley (51), 157, told by Jacob Golos, her NKVD chief in U.S., in 1941 that her first apparat had been a "Military Intelligence" one referred to as the "neighbors."
Gouzenko (48), 191-192.
Ege (53), 1052-1953.

"Okhrana" (< Rus., Okhranka, "guard")

Originally the Czarist secret police (Okhrannoye Otdeyelenye) established in 1881, this is now the colloquial KGB term for its Guards Directorate, the special state security unit that guards the Kremlin and its approaches.

KGB term.

REF: Deriabin and Gibney (59), 114n.
"Old Chekist"
SEE: "Chekist"

overt (adj.)
Any open and visible person, organization, or activity that is what it explicitly or tacitly avows itself to be. Although being overt, it may keep secrets or conduct secret operations. E.g., the U.S. Navy, FBI, and even the CIA and KGB have many overt personnel and functions.
ANTONYM: covert (q.v.)
REF: Felix (63), 25-32.

"papermill" (n.)
An outlet for disinformation (q.v.) or carefully disguised "black" propaganda, particularly in book form. Such papermills are controlled, sponsored, fed or assisted by intelligence.

"parol" (< French, parole, "word" or "promise")
A countersign or password. State security term (?-1949-1953-?).
REF: Morros (59), 103, 119, 126, 177, 204, 211.

"penetration"
The infiltration of one's own agent (a "penetrator") as a trusted employee in another's organization.
A technical term in espionage, ?-1954-?
REF: Deriabin and Gibney (59), 204, 254, 262.

"police," "secret police," "secret political police," "police state."
Exclusively Western terms, or terms applied--always with approbrium--by Communists to non-socialist bodies. Because the Bolsheviks define the "police" (Rus., politsiia) as "the state organization for maintaining the existing bourgeois order" they treat it as "prerevolutionary and foreign." Therefore "police" cannot exist in a socialist society, and the term was dropped from usage after 1917. Of course, the institution does exist in the USSR, but is called "militia."
Monas (61), 22-23.
рýздвtdka (n., Rus., "intelligence")

This is the standard Russian word for "intelligence." However, it is much broader in its connotations than its English translation, razveda encompassing reconnaissance as well as the collection and processing of information, and the institutions for these processes.

Cp.: Intelligence

REF: Garthoff in Lidiel Hart (56), 265.

Rezident (Rus., "resident")

A Soviet intelligence chief posted abroad in command of a network. The Rezident may operate under either "legal" or "illegal" cover; indeed, the term is even applied to GRU (and KGB?) covert chiefs within the USSR.


REF: Penkovskiy (65), 68, 274.
Deriabin and Gibney (59), 177n.

Rezidentura (Rus., "residency")

An overseas agent network ("legal" or "illegal") directed by a Rezident.


Cf.: Rezident

REF: Penkovskiy (65), 274.
Deriabin and Gibney (59), 177n.

"roof"

SEE: "yafke"

"safe house"

SEE: "yafke"

"secret" (Rus., тайны, sekretны)

In Soviet usage this term is seldom applied to their own clandestine organizations. The euphemism "special" is usually substituted. Thus, the Special Section (Osobyе отдeл) of the CC/CPSU.

Cf.: "dead drop"
secret operations
A generic term comprising different forms of secrecy: both clandestine and covert operations.
REF: Felix (63), 25-32.

"shoe," " shoemaker"
A forged passport and its fabricator.
REF: Gouzenko (46).

"sleeper"
A deep-cover agent ("sleeper agent") or net ("sleeper apparatus") developed and maintained on an inactive basis until activated in a crisis such as war.
Technical term of GRU (? -1938- ?) and probably of state security.
REF: Chambers (52), 405.

"spitting blood" (Rus., kharkat krovio)
Under police surveillance.
NKVD (? - 1951-1952- ?) parlance.
ANTONYM: "clean" (q.v.)
REF: Morros (59), 151-152, 161.

strategic intelligence
Information pertaining to intentions, plans, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign nations, which is used by national planners. Sometimes called "national intelligence." Contrasted, somewhat artificially, with "tactical intelligence" or combat intelligence.
REF: JD (62), 204, for the somewhat different official U.S. military definition.
Ransom (58), 7, 12.

"surface" (v.i.)
To make overt that which was overt. Specifically, to disclose the identity and mission of a secret agent.
tactical intelligence

Information affecting the decision-making for combat planning and operations, hence also sometimes called "operational" or "combat" intelligence

Cp.: strategic intelligence.

REF: Ransom (58), 12-13.

Techniker (Ger., "technician," "technical worker")
The lowest rank of operatives in an underground.

Technical term in GRU (? -1932-1934- ?).

REF: Chambers (52), 300.

"three-letter organization(s)"
The CIA and/or FBI in Soviet state security (?) parlance (? -1949-1951- ?).

REF: Morros (59), 104, 169, 236, quoting conversation of Jack Soble and, seemingly "Vitaly."

"uncovered" (adj.) (Rus., ?).
The state of an agent's cover being inadvertently penetrated and his true affiliation, purpose, or identity having been disclosed. Equals "blown" in Western (originally, British) intelligence parlance.

A GRU (?) -1944- ?) term.

NOTE: If an agent's cover is disclosed inadvertently, it (or he) is said to be "uncovered" or "blown." If the disclosure is deliberate, he is said to have been "surfaced" (q.v.).

REF: Gouzenko (48), 175.

"в темноте" (Rus. phrase: "in the dark")

Unwitting. Used to describe locally recruited espionage agents of state security who are not fully informed of the nature of their assignment and/or affiliation, that is, an "unwitting agent" in U.S. intelligence parlance.

An MVD term (? -1952- ?).

REF: Deriabin and Gibney (59), 180n.
"wet affairs" (Rus., mokryye dela)

Assassinations by the state security, specifically the executions abroad of Soviet nefectors and others condemned to death by judicial processes.

A technical term of the KGB. GRU (? -1937- ? -1942-1943- ?), etc.

Cp.: "dry affairs"

NOTE: Deriabin and Gibney (59), 187, 193, says that the MGB Spetsburo term for terror (kidnapping and assassination) operations is "big operations."

However, Deriabin's only such activity was in June 1952 in connection with the kidnapping of Dr. Walter Linse in West Berlin conducted while Deriabin was in the Austro-German Section, INU, MGB, which carried out this action on its own.

REF: Khokhlov (59).
Barmine (45), 18: "Russian expression for a plot involving murder."

"yafke" (n., Rus.)

A secure room or building for meeting or hiding one's agents. In Western intelligence parlance, a "safe house."

A technical term of the GRU (? -1932-1934- ?).

REF: Chambers (52).
Gouzenko (48).
Elsewhere I have presented a detailed case study of a specific Soviet strategic intelligence operation: the unsuccessful effort to divine Hitler's plan to attack the Soviet Union in 1941. Other cases could have been fruitfully examined, although the amount and quality of publicly available information is very much less.

This annex merely lists some of these other intelligence cases and, for each, gives either a preliminary account or a convenient bibliographical reference. While the purpose of this chapter is merely to point a direction for further research, nevertheless a general—if tentative—conclusion is implicit. Namely, the factors identified as significant in the BARBAROSSA case are not unique. All recur scattered among these other cases, although no other single case illustrates the full range of these factors.

The cases—and topics—considered in this annex are:


*2. Italian Covert Submarine Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 1937-1938.

3. Japan's Decision to Attack Southeast Asia Rather than Russia, 1941.


5. Penetration of Foreign Policy Elites.


*See my draft paper of this title.
Other major Soviet strategic intelligence operations that could be profitably added include those associated with:

** 11. Deception Operations.

There are, of course, many other significant cases; but too little public information is available to yield conclusions about them.


On 25 November 1936, amid considerable publicity, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in Berlin. It was a brief, non-committal, propagandistic document that only restated the signatories' well-known detestation of Communism. No mention was made of the USSR. Its only significance lay in its publication, which constituted a public commitment to a single joint goal by the two signatories. However, this innocuous pact masked a rather more sinister "Secret Additional Agreement" that was the true product of the 15 months of private negotiations between Hans von Raumer—representing Hitler's ad hoc foreign office, the Buero Ribbentrop—and Major General H. Oshima, the then Japanese Military Attaché—representing the Japanese

* See my draft paper of this title.

** See my Stratagem (69) for several cases of Soviet wartime military deception. For Soviet and East European peacetime political deception operations see Dr. Lawrence M. Martin's forthcoming study tentatively titled Department D.
military. It is characteristic of the German and Japanese diplomacy of the day that their respective Foreign Offices were not party to the negotiations. The secret addendum was virtually a political-military alliance directed specifically against the Soviet Union and pointedly—and realistically—made only passing mention of international Communism.¹

The secret Ribbentrop–Oshima negotiations had begun—rather hesitantly—in May or June 1935.² Soviet Military Intelligence—the crack GRU—seemingly sniffed something in the wind for sometime around late August the GRU Acting Director, General Semen Uritsky, warned Richard Sorge to be particularly alert for evidence of improvement in Japanese-German relations. Sorge—who was in Moscow on brief leave from his superb GRU network in Japan—recalled years later that although:³

... it was still too soon to predict how far the slow improvement in relations would go, Moscow was convinced that a rapprochement was taking place, and, moreover, that it was directed chiefly against the Soviet Union.

In any event, some specific indications of these secret negotiations had come to the attention of a GRU agent in Germany in late September or early October. The GRU Resident in Western Europe, Krivitsky*, was given charge of this top priority case. By the end of the year the channels and general trend of the continuing

¹The complete text of the secret addendum is in DGFP, Ser. D, I (49), 734n. For commentary see DeWitt C. Pcole, "Light on Nazi Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 1 (October 1946), pp. 136-138; and Beloff (49), 169-174. See also Ribbentrop (54), 209; and Weizsäcker (51), 116, 201. The most detailed account is in Ernst L. Presseisen, Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy, 1933-1941 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1958), pp. 83-123.

²Presseisen (58), 83.

³Deakin and Storry (66), 161-162. See also Willoughby (52), 69, 104, 201, 204-205.
negotiations were known and reports were regularly sent up to Stalin himself. In late December 1936 rumors of the negotiations began to appear in the West European press. These rumors were thought by Krivitsky to have been planted by Russian intelligence (probably the NKVD) in an effort to disrupt, or at least smoke out, the negotiations by exposure to publicity. On 10 January Premier Molotov even made public reference to these (self-generated) rumors in a report to the Central Executive Committee. Berlin and Tokyo promptly--two days later--issued categorical denials and tightened their security. Rumors continued while the GRU increased its search for hard evidence.

Then, in March, Sorge began to submit independent verification to the GRU. He was ferreting this from the German Embassy in Tokyo. Indeed, this was not such a poor source of intelligence despite the fact that the German Foreign Office remained officially in the dark until that spring when Ribbentrop briefed the partly witting Ambassador Herbert von Dirksen (on home leave from Japan) and gave him permission to inform his Foreign Office. However, the Embassy was not solely dependent on Berlin for such information. The Tokyo Embassy (i.e., Ambassador Dirksen and Military Attaché Eugene Ott) had already been informed by the Japanese Army General Staff of the bare fact that negotiations were indeed underway in Berlin between Oshima and Ribbentrop (with Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the Chief of German military intelligence). General Ott immediately informed Sorge who passed this

1 The relevant extract from Molotov's speech is in Degas, III (53), 156.
2 Krivitsky (39), 15-20. General Krivitsky was probably right, for TASS was busily circulating such information—attributed to London or other foreign news sources—as early as a dispatch dated c. 27 December 1935. See DGFP, Ser. C, Vol. IV (62), 936; and Presseisen (58), 99.
3 Presseisen (58), 85, 97-99, 111; and Dirksen (52), 170-171, 176. Dirksen was on leave in Germany from 9 April until August 1936. He returned to Japan on 9 November.
news to GRU headquarters in Moscow.¹

Sorge received some confirmation and additional details later that spring during the visit of Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Hack who had been involved in the negotiations from the first. Hack confided to Sorge and urged the need for absolute secrecy. But he even disclosed that as Soviet agents were now known to have the residences of Ribbentrop, Canaris, and Ōshima under surveillance, he—Hack, as a private businessman—was acting "secretly" as go-between. Again Sorge informed Moscow and with sardonic delight later bragged to his Japanese interrogators that Hack was henceforward added to the surveillance as had the earlier ones.² (Actually, as seen, the surveillance had been instituted by Krivitsky prior to Sorge's disclosures, which never constituted more than independent verification.)

At last, in late July 1936, the GRU office in Berlin acquired photocopies of the complete file of coded messages exchanged between General Ōshima in Berlin and the Japanese military in Tokyo. These photocopies were stolen from the files of the German intelligence office (probably the Sicherheitsdienst) that had itself intercepted them and which had been successfully infiltrated by the GRU, thus assuring a continuing supply of future intercepts. This packet of materials was brought on 8 August by courier to Holland. There, GRU Resident Krivitsky had them decoded and translated with the aid

¹Deakin and Storry (66), 182, who inexplicitly choose to query Sorge's assertions at this point. Yet Sorge's version is both inherently plausible and, in part, independently corroborated. Furthermore, as the story had already been disclosed in 1939 in Krivitsky's widely read book, the main motive for Sorge's frequent "adamantine deceit" vis-à-vis his Japanese police interrogators had been removed in this instance.

²Deakin and Storry (66), 182-183, who seem unaware of the relevance of Krivitsky's long-available disclosures. See also Willoughby (52), 69, where Hac's name is mistransliterated "Haak." For a semi-fictionalized biography of Sorge by a former Embassy colleague of Sorge, containing many additional but unsubstantiated details, see Hans-Otto Heissner, The Man With Three Faces (New York: Rinehart, 1956), pp. 86-93.
of the previously acquired Japanese (army?) codebook and a Japanese linguist. This material was promptly flown by courier to Paris whence it was radioed to GRU headquarters in Moscow. The subsequent developments down to and including the final texts all reached the Kremlin through the same efficient channel.

These extraordinary disclosures permitted the Soviet Government to counter the public signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1936. Three days after the signing, Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov disclosed the whole affair at an extraordinary public session of the Congress of Soviets.1

Incidentally, the NKVD made its own effort—clumsy and unsuccessful—to acquire the text of this agreement by stealing it from the Japanese courier on the eastbound Berlin-Moscow Nord Express.2

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2Thayer (59), 153-154, where however the timing is somewhat ambiguous. The incident could refer to the Tripartite Pact negotiated in early 1941.
2. Italian Covert Submarine Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 1937-1938.¹

¹This subject is discussed and documented in detail in my paper, Submarines as Weapons of Covert Intervention (draft, 1967).
3. Japan's Decision to Attack Southeast Asia Rather than
Russia, 1941.

Russia's Far Eastern Army comprised some 40 divisions
deployed on the Manchurian and Outer Mongolian frontiers at the time
of the German invasion on 22 June 1941. Despite the sudden, urgent,
and profound need to reinforce his c-umbling European front, Stalin
was reluctant to reduce this crack, semi-independent force as long
as Japan threatened an invasion. The million-man Japanese Kwangtung
Army, deployed in the adjacent Manchurian salient, posed a threat
that could not be ignored. Only twice—at the most critical moments
of Russia's Great Patriotic War—did Stalin risk drawing upon the Far
Eastern Army.\footnote{There was some tapping of this resource beginning in March 1941
when westward movement of troops along the Trans-Siberian Railway was
observed by foreign travellers. These troops were drawn from the
strategic reserve in the Urals as well as from the Far East. Although
the volume of this early traffic is unreported, it does seem to have
been small enough to permit immediate replacement of the Far Eastern
Army through local recruitment. Erickson (62), 753n54; Deakin and
Storry (66), 253, for a note contributed by Erickson; Johnson (64),
159; Higgins (66), 103; and John Scott, Duel for Europe: Stalin versus
The first occasion was the Battle of Moscow in 1941;
the second, two years later, at Stalingrad. In this first instance,
at least, it is known that a Soviet intelligence service—once again,
the dependable GRU—made a significant contribution to a realization
that the Far Eastern deterrent force could be tapped without undue
risk of Japanese attack.

The Wehrmacht's "final" offensive against Moscow began on
30 September 1941, three months after the initial invasion. Generally
speaking, the Battle of Moscow had three phases:

1) 30 September 1941—end October: First German Offensive
2) 17 November—5 December: Second German Offensive
3) 6 December—Spring 1942: Russian Counter-Offensive
Richard Sorge and his GRU team in Japan were explicitly assigned, as their main task, the detection of any Japanese aggressive intentions toward Russia. He proved highly accurate in reporting the various shifts in Japanese policy on the questions of peace or war and, if the latter, its direction: against Russia or against the U.S. and Britain.¹

By 10 October, when General Zhukov received command of the whole front, the first line reserves were committed; but reinforcements had been dispatched from the Far East and Central Asia. For example, the 93rd Division then on the Mongolian Manchurian frontier was ordered West in September.² On 12 or 13 October the decision was reached to evacuate the Government from Moscow and this decision was published on the 16th. Immediately afterwards General Rokossovsky threw in his last, untrained reserves simultaneously with the first trickle of crack Siberian units as fast as they detrained. These helped temporarily stall the already tiring German drive. On 17 November the German tactical field intelligence reported the first contact with troops from Siberia and the continuing arrival of more by rail at Ryazan and Kolomna.³ According to Schellenberg, this information enabled Stalin to transfer fresh Siberian divisions to the Moscow front in time for the winter counter-offensive that checked the Wehrmacht's advance.⁴

¹Deakin and Storry (66), 231-247; Johnson (64), 154, 157-159.
²Deriabin and Cibney (59), 44-45. Petr Deriabin was then a battalion Komsomol secretary in this division.
³For the numbers and timing of movement of the Siberian reinforcements see Werth (64), 231, 236, 1027; Erickson (62), 599, 618, 631-632; Heinz Guerian, Panzer Leader (New York: Dutton, 1952), p. 248; and Albert Kesselring, A Soldier's Story (New York: Morrow, 1954), pp. 106, 107, 109. See also Stalin's disclosures to Eden at their meetings in Moscow in December 1941. Eden (65), 294, 300-301.
⁴Schellenberg (56), 162, 226-227.
In sum, we have here a nice example of adequate intelligence collection and its prompt forwarding to the center, accurate appraisal of its meaning by the center, and even an appropriate and timely decision based on this. But such cases are known to be rare. Even here, where everything fell into the right place at the right time, matters could easily have been different. There was much evidence supporting the hypothesis that Japan would join Germany by attacking Russia. This view was, for example, tenaciously held by the head of U.S. Navy War Plans, Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, as late as November 1941 when he finally conceded that the mass redeployment of Japanese forces toward the south indicated otherwise.¹ And Sorge himself had momentary second doubts about his July estimate on discovering the large Japanese troop movements to the Manchurian border.² Thus the Soviet intelligence process vis-à-vis their data could easily have led to the same sort of muddle that they had faced on 22 June and that the U.S. would soon repeat on the infamous 7th of December.

¹Wohlstetter (62), 392.
²Deakin and Storry (66), 236-239.

The victors of World War II met at Potsdam in conquered Germany on 17 July 1944. The Britons and Americans were most reluctant to reveal their great joint secret, the atomic bomb, which had just proved itself at Almagordo the day before. They did not intend to share this new weapon with the Russians. Moreover, the Anglo-American allies assumed its disclosure would lead to uncomfortable demands for and refusals of access to detailed information, yet they wished to avoid later Soviet reproaches that they had been told nothing. Consequently President Truman decided on an off-handed disclosure. Thus, on the 24th following the break-up of the last day's formal Big Three session, Truman merely ambled over alone to Generalissimo Stalin and "casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force." The only other person within hearing was Stalin's imperfect translator, V. N. Pavlov, who rendered some sort of version. Stalin responded with equal casualness, "That's fine, I hope you make good use of it against the Japanese." Nothing more. The dreaded moment had passed.¹

Was Stalin's savoir-faire at Potsdam the result of incomprehension due to a faulty translation? Or did he simply not grasp the implications in Truman's remark? Neither. None of the Americans or Britons present then realized that Stalin already knew far more of the matter than they would have willingly disclosed.

Unknown to German or U.S. intelligence, Soviet scientists had been pushing their own atomic bomb research project since June 1942. Consequently it should be assumed that Stalin was quite aware of the quantitatively and qualitatively different nature of this weapon. Moreover, as the Russians themselves have now revealed, they were already "in possession of information that both Germany and the United States were engaged in secret experiments which might lead to the creation of a new superpowerful weapon."  

Stalin was assuredly aware from his intelligence of these foreign efforts, and from his own scientists of the implications of such a weapon.

Soviet atomic espionage is a general topic rather than a specific case. However, as its many separate case components are linked in a continuing operation, it may be examined as a single "case."

Western "Cold War" literature concentrated much of its attention on the Soviet intelligence efforts to gain atomic secrets. The flood of East-West polemic, internal political party squabbling, and bureaucratic in-fighting produced volumes of detailed information on Soviet atomic espionage but no single scholarly monograph. On the one hand, the facts abundantly and clearly verify the major effort made by the Russians in this direction. Stalin and his successors have unquestionably deemed this topic to be the principal concern of their strategic intelligence and the Soviet intelligence services have been responsive to this requirement. But it is far more difficult to assess the value or results of this preoccupation. Western assessments have ranged widely. Thus Federal Judge Irving R. Kaufman in 1951 in sentencing the Rosenbergs to death for their efforts on behalf

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2 The best single summary is still in Dallin (55), 453-492.
of the NKVD, believed they had done no less than:¹

caused ... the Communist aggression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding fifty thousand and who knows but that millions more of innocent people may pay the price of your treason. Indeed, by your betrayal you undoubtedly have altered the course of history to the disadvantage of our country.

Others believed, with better evidence, that the atomic "secrets" supplied the Russians had at most a marginal effect in speeding up their development of nuclear technology.

5. Penetration of Foreign Policy Elites

The supreme type of operation of an intelligence service is the placing of its agents inside the opponents' bureaucracies as actual members of it. This provides a perfect "cover" or excuse for the agent's having access to the opponent's communications. This agent-in-place provides the most certain, direct, continuing, and tamper-proof monitoring of secret communications, generally superior—at least until the 1960's—even to the most advanced electronic listening contrivances. All intelligence services practice this, but penetration is a Russian specialty, a tradition from Czarist days.

The apex of this élite career in intelligence is reached when the agent-in-place is himself one of the opponent's policy makers, able secretly to sabotage or even redirect national policy. Examples range from the incredible Colonel Alfred Redl, Chief of the Austro-Hungarian military intelligence who had been "doubled" by Czarist

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1 Dulles (63), 110-114.
3 Thus the Italian major-doco of the British Embassy in Rome also patriotically served his nation's intelligence for several years before WW II. Similarly Elyesa Banza ("Cicero") the Albanian valet of the British Ambassador in World War II in Ankara systematically rifled his safe for the Nazi SD. And GRU Colonel Penkovsky passed Soviet atomic and missile intelligence to the British S.I.S. and American CIA in the early 1960's.
4 Hence the employee (apparently a German with a Russian wife) who regularly rifled the most secret political files in the German Embassy until his recall in 1937. And also the Russian charwoman in the Hungarian Embassy who recovered the Ambassador's drafts from the wastebasket, also in the 1930's. Hilger and Meyer (53), 281-282.
5 To be distinguished from the more-or-less overt sympathizer, ally, or protégé à la Major Vidkun Quisling, the Norwegian namesake of this sordid practice of international Realpolitik.
intelligence, through the much exaggerated Rebel "fifth column" in Loyalist Madrid in the Spanish Civil War, to the almost non-existent world-wide Nazi "fifth column" during World War II, and the (entirely fictitious) "Trotskyite center" in the Kremlin until 1938. However, such mass conspiracies of treason are much more common in political propaganda than in politics. Indeed, they usually turn out to be only just less psychopathological fantasies than the Jewish International Conspiracy or Salem witches. Thus, the McCarthyist view from the fifth decade of the Institute of Pacific Relations as puppet-master of America's Far Eastern Policy turns out to have been a rather ineffectual combination of a few Soviet agents, domestic Communists, fellow travellers, and many serious scholars, at most reinforcing some already existing nuances and trends in the U.S. policy.

In theory, of course, by planting enough "sleepers" in the enemy's bureaucracy, one could reasonably expect that some would eventually move upward to high policy ranks. Again, while commonplace in spy fiction, such "Manchurian Candidates" are quite rare in political intrigue. But the effort is made, and some do exist. Thus NKVD-KGB agent Harold "Kim" Philby, son of the famed Arabicist, had advanced far enough in the British S.I.S. prior to his escape to Russia in 1963 that Philby was observed more closely as a potential Director of S.I.S. itself than for signs of treason.

This type of wholesale activity was a most promising means in the days of the Comintern when the various Communist parties systematically maintained their underground sections of secret members.

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1 Robert B. Asprey, The Panther's Feast (New York: Putnam's, 1959).

Yet, the high promise was unfulfilled. The only country where such an effort is known to have shown even incipient success was the U.S. But even there and despite two decades of effort, the proportion and level of infiltration was low, even if we count Hiss much less Lattimore as covert agents.
6. Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

In 1962 Khrushchev decided to place some of his medium range atomic missiles (MRBM's) and Il-28 medium bombers in Cuba alongside some four regiments of infantry with their short range tactical missiles and some ground-to-air anti-aircraft missiles that had already arrived in August. While these latter were purely defense in nature, the MRBM's and Il-28's--by their very capabilities--represented a direct threat to the U.S.

The first MRBM's are now believed by U.S. intelligence to have been landed on 8 September and Il-28's were in Cuba at least as early as 28 September.

The entire operation was conducted with maximum secrecy.

While we are in a tenuous realm of speculation in assessing Khrushchev's motives, it seems almost probable that his decision represented a serious intelligence failure by himself, as senior decision-maker, and presumably by his intelligence chiefs and other senior advisors as well. On this reading they had failed to achieve an adequate estimate of U.S. willingness to take risks.

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1There is an extensive bibliography. See particularly the books by Elie Abel, Robert F. Kennedy, Arthur M. Schlesinger, and Theodore Sorensen.

7. Conclusions

These known major Soviet strategic intelligence successes (including the failures) form an impressive record, one that compares favorably with the known achievements of the other leading national intelligence communities. And there are presumably other Soviet successes that remain undisclosed. However, there are good reasons to believe that most Soviet capabilities and operations to the mid-1950s are known. This is assured by the critical cross-verification provided by the many defectors, frequent public disclosures by rival intelligence services, occasional public trials, and rare official admissions.

In any event, this list of successes proves that the Soviet Government can fairly claim to be served by a moderately effective intelligence community.
APPENDIX C: BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

NOTE: This 127 page biographical appendix is under separate cover.
APPENDIX D: BIBLIOGRAPHY

Introductory Note

This bibliography covers only those books and articles cited in this study.

I had originally intended to supply a fully annotated and comprehensive bibliography of Soviet intelligence. Such a bibliography would have had three values. First, it would be the first publically available monographic reference of the subject. Second, it would have enabled the reader to have my detailed assessment of the sources used, thereby allowing him to better judge my critical use of data taken from those sources. Third, it would have alerted the reader to further sources, should he wish to pursue further any of the topics that have been only tentatively explored by me here. Unfortunately, the exigencies of final production did not allow me to incorporate this material from my draft card indices.

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