This study represents the individual author's effort and does not purport to reflect the policy or views of the Department of the Army, the U.S. Army Materiel Command, or the U.S. Army Logistics Management Center. It was not programmed as a U.S. Army study but, because of the military interest in this subject matter, is published officially by the U.S. Army Logistics Management Center as a research effort of one of its employees while under U.S. Army sponsorship at the University of Virginia in a civilian long-term training program. Publication by the Center makes it available to all interested users of the Defense Documentation Center.
A PARADIGM IN DEFENSE ORGANIZATION:
UNIFICATION OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

PREFACE

Canada is now in the process of implementing a reorganization plan which is intended to result in a greater degree of unification of its military services than has been undertaken by any other developed nation.

This step beyond the frontier of traditional and contemporary military organization will provoke widespread interest in other nations if it is successful in achieving the aims of the Canadians.

This paper (1) reviews the course of the proposal to unify the Canadian Armed Forces, (2) evaluates the wisdom of the decision and the prospects for successful achievement of its aims in Canada, and (3) examines the probable impact upon defense organization in other countries.
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CHAPTER I

EVOLVING CANADIAN DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

During World War II, Canada had three separate military services, each with its own civilian minister and Chief of Staff. This structure meant that the Prime Minister personally had to rule on those matters on which unanimity could not be reached among the three Chiefs of Staff or the three Service Ministers. The country as a whole supported the national effort in WWII; the emergency situation so unified the country that the Prime Minister did not have to use his time arbitrating domestic matters. Therefore, his extra burden of arbitrating among the military services was manageable during the war. Afterwards, as domestic politics became demanding again, the Prime Minister needed a coordinator of the military services.

In 1946, while the US was still debating whether to designate a Secretary of Defense who initially was to have only limited control over the Service Secretaries, Canada proceeded not only to appoint a Minister of National Defense, but also to eliminate its Ministries of Army, Navy, and Air Force. As shown on Figure 1, the Minister of National Defense supervised the three separately-administered services through the three Chief of Staff.
Figure 1. Canada's Defense Organization, 1947-1963.

(NOTE: Defence in Canada is spelled Defence; however, throughout this paper, which was typed in the US, the US spelling is used.)
The three Chiefs of Staff, together with the Chairman of the Defense Research Board, constituted a military advisory body known as the Chiefs of Staff Committee. These same individuals, together with the Minister of National Defense, the Associate Minister, and the Deputy Minister, constituted the Defense Council, an advisory body to the Prime Minister.

A series of separate actions taken by Canada, subsequent indicates the general trend toward closer integration and unification of the military services. In 1947, a decision was made to require all officer cadets at the Services College to complete the last two years of their course together at the Royal Military College. In 1949, a single Judge Advocate General and standardized legal procedures were established. In 1956, medical services of all three services were merged. In 1958, the same action was taken as regards chaplains. Dental and postal services have always been provided by the Army to all services.

These "piece-meal" actions did not satisfy the nation. Defense was one of the specific areas assigned for inquiry to a Royal Commission on Organization in 1960. This Royal Commission submitted its report on the Department of National Defense in January 1963 and included some pointed comments:
There is a growing range of activities of common concern to the services, for which the traditional basis of organization is unsuited. It is increasingly recognized that to maintain three separate organizations for such functions is uneconomic.

It is the opinion of your Commissioners that effective consolidation cannot be based on joint control by the three services with the object of preserving the traditional responsibility of the three Chiefs of Staff for the control and administration of all the Armed Forces. 1

As a result of this report of a Royal Commission, the then Minister of Defense, the Honourable Paul Hellyer, conducted his own study of defense organization. On March 4, 1964, he published the White Paper on Defense which was the basis for accelerated unification of a more fundamental nature than has occurred in other countries:

Following the most careful and thoughtful consideration, the government has decided that there is only one adequate solution. It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defense Staff and a single Defense Staff. This will be the first step toward a single unified defense force for Canada. The integrated control of all aspects of planning and operations should not only produce a more effective and coordinated defense posture for Canada, but should also result in considerable savings. 2

Parliamentary passage of Bill C-90 provided for the substitution, on August 1, 1964, of a single Chief of Defense Staff and discontinuance of the individual service Chiefs of Staffs, as shown on Figure 2. On the Defense Council, the new Chief of the Defense Staff and the Vice Chief of the Defense Staff replaced the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chiefs of Staff. The principal effect of these changes was to discontinue the separate service headquarters and to make the principal staff officers at the consolidated headquarters responsible for all services in the major functional areas of Plans and Operations, Personnel, Comptrollership, and Technical Services.

The new Chief of the Defense Staff was given the responsibility to prepare plans for integration of the field command structure. In April 1965, his plan was announced for the replacement of eleven separate service commands by six integrated functional commands: three of them operational commands (Mobile, Maritime, and Air Defense) and three support commands (Materiel, Training, and Air Transport).

The Mobile Command, which was established on October 1, 1965, placed under a single command the tactical air and land forces. This command also assumed responsibility for administration of the Canadian Brigade Group serving with NATO.
Figure 2. Principal Staff of Canadian Forces Headquarters and the Field Command Structure After Reorganization.
The Maritime Command was activated on January 17, 1966, and included all sea and air maritime forces. This meant a closer relationship of anti-submarine forces previously under separate command of the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force.

The Air Defense Command and the Air Transport Command were not significantly changed.

The Materiel Command, brought into being on August 1st, 1965, is responsible for materiel procurement, warehousing, distribution, and major repair and overhaul for all forces. A major objective of this command is the consolidation and automation of the supply systems formerly serving the military services separately.

The Training Command became effective in January 1966 and assumed responsibility for the individual training of all Canadian Armed Forces personnel. Unit and operational training are under the jurisdiction of the operational commands named above.

The two Canadian elements serving with NATO in Europe (the NATO Air Division and the NATO Brigade Group) were not significantly affected. In effect, they are temporarily detached portions of the Air Defense Command and the Mobile Command, respectively.

The reserves and civil defense (national survival) are administered by 12 regional districts reporting directly to the Deputy Chief
for Reserves at Canadian Forces Headquarters. Reserves of the three services are still categorized as Militia, Naval Reserves, and Air Reserves, but administration of them has been integrated at regional and Headquarters levels.

An integrated Canadian Forces Communications System has been created to coordinate and manage the mixed communications facilities formerly operated independently by the three services.

All of these changes resulted in more streamlined decision-making machinery, organizational consolidation of like functions, and reduction of the number of installations in use for defense purposes. 3

Notwithstanding all of this functional redesignation and consolidation, the Canadian Forces still consisted, by law, of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force. The individuals in the Canadian Forces were identified as members of one of those military services. Thus, in popular terms, the Canadian Forces had been "integrated," but not yet "unified." In keeping with the original intent, expressed in the White Paper, to create a single unified military service.

Bill C-243 was passed by the Parliament in April 1967. This Bill, known as the Canadian Armed Forces Reorganization Act, became effective on February 1, 1968, and gave the Minister of National Defense the legal authority to complete unification. In essence, it paved the way for standardization of rank designation, pay and allowances, and the dress uniform, so that the services will lose their separate identities during the next few years. No exact time has been specified for completion of the job, but in moving second reading of Bill C-243, the then Defense Minister, Paul Hellyer, said it "...will likely take some years but changes will be implemented progressively after proclamation of the bill as soon as each becomes practicable." A recent Canadian Forces publication states:

The main tasks ahead are the completion of the personnel structure, the implementation of the single logistics system, and the introduction of whatever uniform is decided upon as the result of current trials. It is expected the Regular Forces will be fully equipped with a new uniform by 1971, with the Reserves getting the uniform shortly thereafter.  

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Thus it is clear that unification of the Canadian Armed Forces has moved rather rapidly, especially since publication of the White Paper in March 1964. It is now appropriate to turn to an examination of the factors which favored and motivated such change in Canada.
CHAPTER II

FACTORS FAVORING DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN CANADA

A. The Defense Setting.

Canada’s defense organization necessarily must have a relationship to its domestic strength, its political climate, its strategic location, its foreign policies, and to international reality.

As regards domestic strength, the rate of industrialization and economic growth of Canada accelerated greatly during WWII. Although there has been some tapering off of the growth rate, Canada remains essentially strong. In 1961, she was estimated as second only to the US in real gross national product per capita, and in private automobiles in use per million population. She is second only to the Soviet Union in land area, but ranks only twenty-fifth in total population.

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The defense of Canada is closely linked to the defense of the United States. Any invasion of Canada by a third power would be a threat to the US. This fact is recognized in common Canadian-US membership in NATO, where "an attack on one is considered as an attack on all," and in the Canadian-US North American Air Defense Agreement of 1958. Canada does not produce nuclear weapons but has a nuclear delivery capability.

Canada had a major military role in Europe in both World War I and World War II and currently maintains an Air Division and a Brigade Group in Germany with NATO. She is not a member of the Organization of American States or a participant in the Inter-American Defense System and has not participated in the Vietnam conflict.

Except for the contribution to NATO, the service of Canadian military forces outside Canada's borders since WWII has been under United Nations auspices. A recent study indicates unequivocally the role of Canada in United Nations peacekeeping:

... The peacekeeping nations are led by Canada the first member state to earmark a military unit for UN duty.
... Canada has by all odds the most developed and sophisticated program for UN military service in existence. 4

Canadian officers, soldiers, and observers have served under the United Nations flag in India, Pakistan, Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Egypt, Lebanon, The Congo, Yemen, and Cyprus. Former Prime Minister Lester Pearson of Canada was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in working with Dag Hammarskjöld, UN Secretary-General, in establishing the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt in 1956 and for other UN peacekeeping activities. Lieutenant General E. L. M. Burns of Canada commanded the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East from 1956 to 1959.

Canada, together with the Scandinavian countries, has assumed and maintained the initiative in attempting to provide trained units and personnel for UN peacekeeping duties on short notice.


8George Ignatieff, UN Permanent Representative of Canada, presentation on Peacekeeping to UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, April 4, 1967, as reported in Press Release No. 8 of Canadian Mission to UN.
The White Paper makes clear that United Nations peacekeeping is considered as one of the basic missions of the Canadian Armed Forces for the future.9

B. The Political Climate and The Man of Action.

The Liberal Party in Canada ascended to power in 1963 after a stormy campaign which included heated debate on defense issues. The Liberal leader, Lester Pearson, brought into the Government a team determined to reduce budget deficits of past years and to rationalize defense expenditures.

One of the key members of this team was Paul T. Hellyer who took over the Ministry of National Defense at the age of 39, after having been one of the chief defense critics when the Conservative Party was in power. Having served briefly during WWII as an "other rank" (Canadian for "enlisted") in both the Royal Canadian Air Force (pilot trainee) and the Canadian Army (artillery gunner), he had his own repertory of areas of possible savings from standardization, integration, and merger of activities of the separate services. His civilian background included a rural boyhood, graduation in aeronautical engineering from a Technical Institute, the earning of a pilot's license and a bachelor of arts degree.

the study of voice in the Toronto Conservatory of Music, and Presidency of a home-building firm which grew into one of Canada's largest. His other assets are a physical stature of 6' 3-1/2", the ability and willingness to work 6-1/2 days a week, knowledge of both English and French in bi-lingual Canada, and a McNamara-like yen for making decisions after insisting on knowing "why" and having an array of options with cost-effectiveness ratios. 10

C. Rationale for Unification.

The Canadian Government presented a multi-faceted rationale for the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces, without being meticulously consistent on the order of the various reasons for unifying. Variously, the motivations for the changes have been announced as the needs for economy, for improvement of management and control as related to the policy-formulation and decision-making processes, for greater flexibility in meeting the several missions of the Canadian Forces, and for broadened

career opportunities associated with termination of the former compartmentalization of defense on a tri-service basis. 11

1. Economy.

The argument for economy was presented as "uncontrovertible."

Either the defense budget had to be substantially increased or substantial cost reductions had to be made. Otherwise, funds would simply not be available for the capital expenditures that are essential to effective military forces. 12

The political climate in Canada is such that it is not feasible to increase very much the amount of money being spent on defense. Canada reached a high of approximately $1.9 billion and 7.6% of the gross national product in 1953 defense expenditure, but the Canadian perspective has changed since that time. Canada does not feel directly threatened by the Soviet Union, Red China, or Communism, and would like to hold defense expenditures at the present rate of 4%, or less, of gross national product and 20%, or less, of the annual federal budget. 13

Canada has a history of reliance on volunteer forces. A conscripted force would be cheaper per man, but it would be political suicide for a political party to propose conscription in Canada in peacetime. Unable to reduce the cost-per-man by such a change in personnel policy, the government felt obliged to consider means of reducing the number of men necessary to do the same job.

A projection made in 1961 indicated that, if the defense budget remained fixed, expenditures for operations and maintenance without unification would consume the entire budget, precluding any expenditures for modernization (new equipment) by Fiscal Year 1968-69. This projection is corroborated by a subsequent report that unification and associated measures permitted reductions of military and civilian personnel strengths in defense between Fiscal Years 1963 and 1967 to the extent that the pay, allowances, and salaries of those released would have amounted to $230 million in FY 67.14

Gellner reports that the integration of the formerly separate service communications systems into a single Canadian Forces Communications System eliminated 327 personnel spaces

14 Hellyer Address, op. cit, p. 12.
and saved nearly $1.5 million in payroll and amenities per year, plus a similar amount in facilities operation. He also reports that automation will now be feasible, due to the scale of the integrated system, and that this modernization, made possible only by the merger, will result in additional savings of 500 personnel spaces—a total manpower reduction of 22% from the sum of the separate service requirements. Moreover, the new system is expected to be vastly more efficient.

In a speech in Montreal in the spring of 1967, the Chief of the Defense Staff claimed a saving of over $143 million since integration began.\footnote{15}

Measures which can be cited as achieving economies of that scale are not easy to oppose unless they can be shown to be offset by a reduction of effectiveness.

2. Rational Management.

As shown in Figure 1, the pre-1964 Canadian defense organization provided a Chief of Staff for each of the three services. Each of these had direct access to the Minister of National Defense, as did the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chairman of the Defense Research Board. The Chairman of the Chiefs

of Staff Committee had no veto power, and could not overrule any of the service Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, each service was able to push its own interests and its own equipment programmes at the highest levels in isolation of other requirements and weapons options. Since the Committee required unanimous agreement before it produced any recommendations, each chief of staff exercised a veto on its deliberations. Even when agreement was reached, the implementing decision often bogged down in the mass of different practices and methods within the three services. This "rule by committee" necessarily extended downward. There were over 200 committees at inter-service headquarters level. The result was delay, frustration, and triplification. In the words of Minister Hellyer: "My experience with the system convinced me that a military organisation could not afford to operate in a manner which tended to keep decisions from being made and, once made, from being implemented."

As the first Vice Chief of the Defense Staff put it, an aim of replacing service Chiefs of Staff and their separate headquarters with a single Chief of Defense Staff and a single Canadian Forces Headquarters was:

... to change the emphasis of our top-level decision-making so that policies, plans, and decisions concerning major procurement programs would be decided on the basis of the total Canadian military forces' needs rather than on the narrower needs - and sometimes incompatible needs - of the individual services.\textsuperscript{17}

The Vice Chief went on to report that, instead of having three separate services jockeying for all of the funds which each could justify, military programs would now be based upon rational alignment with anticipated levels of Canadian defense involvement. In essence, Canadian defense would use a system not unlike the McNamara planning-programing-budgeting system, but would go beyond the United States in eliminating traditional service staffs at top levels which are not necessarily congruent with the program structure.\textsuperscript{18}

This integration and unification of the Canadian Armed Forces senior staff is consistent with practices found necessary at the level of task force and theaters-of-operation headquarters.


in WWII when joint staffs were formed under a single commander who directed unified operations.

The Canadian single-service concept considers as an anachronism the old tradition where armies fought armies, navies fought navies, and air forces fought air forces. The original report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization made the point by stating:

Operationally, the anti-submarine forces of the Royal Canadian Air Force bear a much more distant relationship to the Air Division in Europe or the air defense forces under NORAD than to the anti-submarine forces of the Royal Canadian Navy; both elements operate in the North Atlantic, under the command of SACLANT.19

3. Force Flexibility.

The spectrum of escalation for which Canadian forces must be prepared range from the provision of UN observer team members, through limited war, to nuclear holocaust. Air Marshal Sharp stated that flexibility of this sort requires (1) a wide range of modern equipment which Canada could not afford without the overhead savings from unification, and (2) common unified

management at the lowest levels in order to encourage fast
decision-making, quick reaction, and optimum exploitation of
available resources. 20

Hellyer's address to the House of Commons cited
the profound influence of scientific and technological advances on
weapons and delivery systems, as well as on the traditional lines
of distinction among the military services. In this connection,
one of his best examples of the difficulty of arbitrating inter-
service conflicts and avoiding duplication or triplification is the
use of helicopters in all three armed services for reconnaissance,
weapons platforms, and transport purposes. 21

One writer states that the reason for unification most
publicized by Hellyer abroad is the future use of a compact, highly-
mobile, unified Canadian force in UN peacekeeping operations of
the kind that have won international respect for Canada in the Gaza
Strip, the Congo, Kashmir, and more recently, in Cyprus. 22

This same writer brings out another reason for unifi-
cation which fits under the heading of flexibility. He feels that

20 Sharp, op. cit., p. 27.
22 Harbron, op. cit., p. 17.
many Canadians are rankled because their country, so intimately involved with the United States in economic as well as military affairs, has been too prone to adhere fairly closely to US patterns of defense organization. Unification in Canada far beyond that in the United States should give Canada more feeling of independence. That Canada would be motivated somewhat by that aspect, even though understandably not cited in the White Paper, is plausible when one considers the WWII situation wherein the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force sometimes were rather closely identified with the British Royal Navy and the British Royal Air Force. In the future, with land, sea, and air elements of the Canadian Armed Forces identified only as regiments, ships, and squadrons and supervised by a unified Defense staff, the US and UK will be a little less prone to plan on "appendaging" contributions from Canada to their own services for emergency operations. At the same time, Canada will have at its disposal versatile forces capable of (1) defending the Canadian homeland, (2) participating in NATO and NORAD in accordance with Canadian commitments, and (3) meeting UN peacekeeping requirements.

\[23\] Ibid.

As has been noted, Canada is the second largest nation in the world geographically, but ranks only twenty-fifth in population. Manpower has been in critical short-supply in Canada, recruiting is difficult, and there is a strong historical objection to conscription. 24

In spite of this manpower shortage, there was no thorough effort to make maximum use of manpower available to the separate services of the Department of National Defense prior to 1966. The skills required of personnel of the separate services, according to their separate personnel classification systems, then totalled 346. With integration, skill requirements were screened down to 98, only 28 of which were unique to one of the services. The remaining 70 skills were applicable to two, or all three, of the services. 25

The new unified personnel structures for officers and men opened to personnel of all ranks a wider stream of opportunities for the development and employment of their skills. The


single, unified service will permit them to advance across old services barriers and so provide greater avenues for service and greater opportunities for personal advancement.

The new unified personnel skill structure will rationalize the process of determining personnel skill requirements and the adoption of recruitment and training policies to meet these requirements on a defense-wide basis. This was a logical response to the problem cited in the report of the Royal Commission:

The chronic scarcity of many of the skills involved cannot be ignored. The traditional pattern also aggravates the rigidities in the defense establishment resulting from collective arrangements. It has meant, for example, that in finding signallers for the Congo at short notice, the Canadian Army could look only to its own resources in the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, having no access to the large reservoir of communications personnel in the other two services.  

It seems quite likely that this new control over personnel requirements and utilization contributed to the scaling down of Canadian Armed Forces personnel strength. When Mr. Hellyer took over the defense portfolio in April 1963, this strength stood at 123,370. Extrapolation places the strength as of this writing down to 105,000 or less.  

26 Royal Commission, op. cit., p. 68.

In summary, the Government which came to power in Canada in 1963 ascended with a mandate for change in defense administration. The dynamic new Minister of National Defense had the full support of the Prime Minister and lost little time in developing a plan designed to achieve economy and versatility, while appealing both to a nationalistic spirit and to an international ideal. All of these factors were to be challenged eventually.
CHAPTER III

FACTORS OPPOSING CHANGE

A. The Difficulty of Being First:

No other developed nation with a substantial number of military planes, ships, and regiments has unified the management of its armed forces as Canada has committed to do. This is not to say that all developed countries have separate armies, navies, and air forces. Switzerland, for example, has no navy and its defense strategy makes it logical that its air capability is managed as a branch of the Swiss Army. The same is true of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bolivia, and others.

The unique aspect of the Canadian experience is the fact that she is a technologically advanced nation which developed modern army, naval, and air forces, gave them what has become the traditionally autonomous status, and is now taking the further step of unifying them into a single service. The difficult aspect of this new step is that, during the autonomous stage, the separate services naturally developed constituencies which don't want the services to lose their independence and separate identities. In other countries where the further step in unification has been considered, these constituencies, both within the service ranks and
outside the services, have been strong enough to prevent the
taking of the step to which Canada is now committed.

While stating that Canada had to try it and that her
guarantee of security by the US permits her to try it, Gellner
also states that being first is not easy for Canada.

One reason for opposition is typically Canadian. It stems from the type of inferiority complex which Canadians have in military affairs. They do not doubt the fighting prowess of their men, but they are dubious about the qualifications of their leaders as military thinkers. This attitude is, no doubt, a throwback from the years during which Canadian strategy was made in London and later in Washington. It is shown in the questions that are being asked: Why do we have to be the first to try? Are we really capable of being first?  

Aside from the internal reservations about taking this revolutionary step, Canada is quite aware of the interest of other countries--not always encouraging. The Vice Chief of the Canadian Defense Staff characterizes this interest as ranging from "idle curiosity" to "a degree of alarm." He also refers to an admission of one foreign military attaché in Ottawa

that his instructions were to report only the failures of the
unification program - not its successes! 29

B. Vested Interests.

1. Political.

Because the Liberal Party, as the Opposition, was
critical of the defense policies and practices of the Conservative
Government prior to the 1963 election, quite naturally the Con-
servative Opposition kept a critical watch over the defense activi-
ties of the Liberal Government. Due to the fact that Canadian in-
dustry generally regarded the policies announced in the White
Paper as realistic 30 and the initial acceptance of integration of
the service functions and service headquarters by military per-
sonnel, the Opposition initially had little real basis for criticism
of Mr.nellyer's plan. However, subsequently a series of early
retirements of senior officers, some of them perhaps related to
unification announcements and others perhaps not, resulted in
allegations from John Diefenbaker, Leader of the Opposition, and
from two former Defense Ministers, Gordon Churchill and Douglas

29 Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, RCAF, "Reorganization of the
30 "How Unification Will Affect Canadian Industry," Armed
Forces Management, Vol 10, No. 9, (Jun 64), pp. 71-77; and "The
Impact of Unification on Industry," Armed Forces Management,
Harkness, that a serious morale problem had been created by the handling of defense matters by the Government, i.e., the Liberal Party. 31

2. Service Personnel.

The most vocal opponents of unification in Canada were senior officers, especially those retired or retiring. Their criticism was two-pronged: (1) Canadian policy and strategic capabilities were being unwisely changed by an administrator under the rubric of administrative reorganization and (2) the administrative changes themselves go too far, are unnecessarily disruptive, and destroy traditions essential to maintenance of adequate military might.

Senior Naval officers saw at the heart of the controversy the policy question as to whether the successor elements to the Royal Canadian Navy will become merely a supporting arm (sea transport and perhaps some limited shelling capability to assist in land battles near the shore), or retain in first priority what it has considered as its principal mission -- anti-submarine

warfare. The White Paper promised that Canada would "maintain a relatively constant improvement of maritime anti-submarine capability," but it also indicated that further study would be given to the maritime mission. The unwillingness of the Government to delay integration and unification until completion of these studies, the discontinuance of the position of Chief of the Naval Staff at the seat of government, the relatively heavy emphasis in reorganization speeches and literature on a conventionally-armed mobile force caused apprehension about the future of the Royal Canadian Navy. The choice of an Air Marshal as the first Chief of the Defense Staff and a Canadian Army General as the Vice Chief of Operations, followed by the selection of an Army General for the top position and an Air Marshal in the Vice Chief position, also undoubtedly alarmed senior Naval officers.

One of the earliest naval retirements attributable directly to unification was that of Rear Admiral M. G. Stirling, Flag Officer, Pacific, who told Defense Minister Hellyer directly

that he could not agree with the wisdom of the unification decision and therefore would no longer serve. 33

In a subsequent, more heated case, Rear Admiral William Landymore, the first chief of the new Maritime Command, became the cause célèbre of the effort to block unification. After initially going along with the government's reorganization program, he was fired about six months later, following an audience which he requested and received with the Prime Minister over the heads of the Chief of the Defense Staff and the Minister of Defense. 34

A few retired Royal Air Force officers were also quite critical of the reorganization and associated decisions. From a policy standpoint, they were concerned over the Government decision not to purchase new replacement strike-aircraft for its Air Division in Europe and to purchase instead a plane designed for direct support of Canadian ground forces. Air Marshal Cameron complains that, when the reorganization is complete, Canada's air forces will be "split" in three distinct parts: a tactical element dominated by Army thinking for the support of mobile

33 Ryan, op. cit., p. 64.
34 Harbron, op. cit., p. 85.
battalions, a maritime element dominated by Navy concepts, and an air transport element in a supporting role.  

This argument, like many of the points raised in a debate of this nature, finds many followers already prejudiced by prior experience and training to a certain concept. At the same time, in the military service there are always younger men less dedicated to a specific idea and anxious to be promoted as replacements for those who retire in a state of confusion over change. Among those already retired, there sometimes are men who were not content with the system they knew, at least not for all time, and enter the discussion on the side of reform. For example, a 26-year veteran of the Royal Canadian Air Force, whose service rank is unidentified in his article, asks "so what?" in rebuttal to Cameron's complaint that Canada's air force will be "split." Emmott sees such a "split" as appropriate for Canadian interests and disagrees with Cameron's implication that airpower is a concept which should be developed as a separate doctrine in Canadian defense.  


3. Associations.

Service associations in Canada, especially the Navy League of Canada, the Naval Officers' Associations of Canada, the Royal Canadian Naval Association, and the Air Force Officers' Association, became active in opposing the Government's unification proposals. Whether their interest was spontaneous at the individual member level or was kindled by retiring Admirals and association leadership is not clearly established. However, it came about, the organization of this opposition in presenting their case at Defense Committee hearings in the House of Commons was quite professional. 37

Augmenting the efforts of the regular service associations was the new Tri-Services Identities Organization (TRIO) which was organized by retired navy, air force, and army officers specifically to oppose unification of the services. 38 However, their best efforts, as aided by the Opposition Party, were insufficient to win many compromises in the Defense Committee Hearings and the Parliamentary Debate leading up to passage of Bill C-243 which was the last major political and legalistic hurdle for implementation of the unification plan.


38 Harbron, op. cit., p. 79.
THE STRATEGY AND POLITICS OF PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL

A. The Government's Approach.

The Government's approach to unification in Canada was to:

a. Prepare a general plan, based upon extensive studies of Canada's defense requirements and capabilities.

b. Proceed with preliminary actions which assumed that any Parliamentary approvals required would be forthcoming.

c. Discuss defense issues openly, anticipating the arguments which the opposition would use against government programs.

d. Remain flexible and pragmatic in the implementation phase.

The general plan was the White Paper. This paper traced the development of Canadian defense policy since 1945, outlined considerations affecting future policy, reviewed the recommendations of the Royal Commission regarding service integration, stated the need for a single Chief of Defense Staff "as a first step toward a single unified defense force for Canada," presented the general
outlines of Canadian force requirements for 1964-1974, promised continuing study of certain matters such as maritime and reserve requirements, and pledged flexibility and mutability as a keynote.

The White Paper was a lucid, succinct, balanced statement of Canadian defense requirements, using terms understandable and generally palatable to the public. It had so much good in it that there was the temptation to accept it all, including the brief reference to the ultimate goal of a single, completely unified force. If the paper had expounded detail on "how" the unified service would be achieved, this would have crystallized opposition at an early stage by providing a target which the opposition could have tried to counter on a point-by-point basis. On the other hand, although not stating the means of achievement, the White Paper was not exactly a "pig-in-a-poke" because it did state unequivocally that the ultimate goal is unification.

The Government's tactics provided for open discussion of Canadian defense and defense organization. Thus, the White Paper was unclassified and had no classified portion or counterpart. This is quite contrary to the common practice adopted in recent years in the US to classify working papers on reorganization proposals. The reasons for classification in the US include the
aspect of precluding advance warning to the potential opposition which would permit them to prepare a more effective rebuttal. 1

The White Paper took advantage of the fact that there was rather widespread acceptance of the need for reduction of the "administrative tail" in defense in 1964. It was easy enough for the new Government to convince the taxpayer that some changes were needed by citing such facts as (1) the cost per man of maintaining the Canadian Forces had reached the highest in the world, (2) the Canadian Forces maintained 200 military bands at an annual cost of $6.3 million, (3) the number of senior officers in the Canadian Forces was the same in peacetime as it had been during WWII when the peak total strength of the Canadian Forces was five times as great. 2 Although Canada had taken some steps to curb rising overhead costs by "integrating" service support, such as the medical and chaplains services, she was falling behind the United States in certain areas of possible integration, e.g.


wholesale supply of common items to all services by a single Defense agency. Canada chose not only to "catch up" but to tie to the catching-up process additional changes which would "leapfrog" Canada beyond the United States and other nations.

Certain actions consistent with the general objectives and stated policies in the White Paper were within the authority of the Minister of National Defense and he proceeded to take decisions on them. For example, he adopted a new defense programming system, applied defense-wide a common cataloging system for military supplies, and initiated a study of personnel trade classifications within all services. However, that portion of the defense reorganization representing fundamental change in the governmental structure required Parliamentary approval.

Mr. Hellyer was far-sighted in initiating action to establish the Parliamentary bi-partisan Special Committee on Defense which had its first meeting on June 27th, 1963, just two months after designation of the new Minister of National Defense. The activities of this Committee, subsequently converted to a Standing

Committee, undoubtedly have contributed to a Parliament better informed on defense matters, including the integration and unification issues.


The Government chose to clear the defense reorganization with the House of Commons in two stages — the first stage to provide for the single Chief of the Defense Staff charged with the control and administration of all Canadian Forces (Bill C-90) and the second stage to merge the three services into a single service (Bill C-243). The merits of this two-stage plan were that (1) the first bill had obvious and appealing economic advantages, and (2) passage of the first bill permitted the Minister of Defense to place in key integrated positions officers on whom he presumably could depend to help him prepare for the second stage.

The Minister of National Defense proposed the first bill (C-90) to the Parliament in the spring of 1964 and, while it was being considered, had a planning group, made up of senior officials of each of the services, preparing for the establishment of the single Canadian Forces Headquarters. Hearings on this bill were conducted by the Special Committee on Defense in May 1964 and

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the bill was debated in a full session of the House of Commons on July 6th and 7th, 1964. The bill passed "on division" (Canadian for "lack of unanimity") on July 7th, 1964. The hearings and debates adhered rather closely to party discipline, the Liberals supporting the bill and the Conservatives opposing it. The Minister of National Defense testified at the hearings and participated in the debates. His concurrent status as a Minister of the Government and a Member of Parliament gave him a strong position in the discussions and the party discipline in the Canadian political system resulted in strong vocal support for this position from other Liberal Members of Parliament.

The principal probing of the Opposition on Bill C-90 was an attempt to get the Minister to say whether the main objective was to improve effectiveness or to achieve savings. Mr. Hellyer astutely refused to get trapped. He took the safe position that the changes were intended only "To get the maximum amount of effective forces in the highest state of readiness for the least amount of money." The Opposition also attempted to get the Minister to

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say from what source the advice to reorganize came, referring implicitly to the fact that the Royal Commission had not recommended replacement of the Service Chiefs of Staff with a single Chief of the Defense Staff. The Minister responded only very generally, assuming complete responsibility for the proposals, stating that he had used his own intellect after talking with many persons and reading extensively, and suggesting that other Members of Parliament do the same before they vote on the bill.

Bill C-90 passed relatively easily and quickly. This was not surprising in view of the circumstances in which the Liberal Party came to power, the general mood of the country for economy in defense, and the Parliamentary form of government wherein the Prime Minister and his Cabinet normally control legislation and perform the executive functions of the government. The legislative and executive aspects of Bill C-90 were so well integrated by the Government that the principal officers of the new Canadian Forces Headquarters assumed their new positions on August 1st, 1964, only fifteen days after Royal Assent on the bill was gained.

Unfortunately, Bill C-243 did not have the same smooth sailing. Much had happened in connection with implementation of Bill C-90 before the new bill to legalize complete unification was proposed to Parliament in November 1966. Contrary to some glowing reports on the "complete acceptance" of defense reorganization in Canada, considerable resistance developed to the ultimate goal of complete unification and to the way the Minister of Defense handled the implementation of Bill C-243. There were several natural sources of this resistance:

1. The political Opposition, stung by the criticism, express and implied, of its own failure to hold down or reduce overhead costs while it was in power, was watching closely for indications that promised economies were not actually being achieved or were being more than offset by reduced defense readiness. If the Government could show economies in certain areas, it was difficult to disprove that there had not been an

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adverse impact in other respects. For example, when the Government asserted that it had in fact reduced the number of military personnel on the Canadian payroll, the Opposition would claim that the 1966 pay increase for all of the forces was necessary primarily to offset deteriorating morale. If the Government could show some reversal of the former trend of an increasing ratio of operations and maintenance costs to capital expenditures for new equipment, the Opposition could charge that the reversal was not as great as the Government had promised and that new equipment may not have maximum value if the morale and professionalism of the people who are to operate the equipment is lowered by loss of service-identity and lack of visibility over their future careers.

2. A lesser total number of senior "headquarters officers" was required under the new more streamlined administrative organization. This reduction was one of the economy goals of consolidation of the separate Army, Navy, and Air Force Headquarters into a single Canadian Forces Headquarters with a single Defense staff. However, achievement of the goal was possible only by selecting certain officers over others for the fewer key positions available. It was quite natural to select for continued service those who showed the greatest enthusiasm for and loyalty
to the changes in the offing because it would be their task to share the responsibility to develop the details and to supervise the implementation. Some of those, who retired prematurely because of non-selection and at a lesser rank than they might have hoped for under the three separate service administrations, fired volleys of criticism upon retirement. Others became active in service associations critical of unification.

3. Several senior officers initially selected as key people on the new team became disillusioned or disgruntled with the new regime for various reasons. Some complained of overwork in connection with making all of the studies which Hellyer demanded and implementing all of the divisions which the Minister made. Others came into disfavor with the Minister of National Defense for "foot dragging." An Associate Editor of the Winnipeg Free Press reported that Lieutenant General Moncel, Lieutenant General Fleury, and Vice Admiral Dyer, three of the five principal staff officers of Canadian Forces Headquarters, were asked to turn in their resignations when they advised Minister Hellyer to slow down the unification program. The Opposition found it

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easy to draw testimony from such officials who were or had become critical of unification. 10

4. Several of the service associations, dominated by retired officers, combined their efforts in opposing passage of Bill C-243. Their strategy was to get a halt called on further integration and unification pending the review of the entire matter by a new Royal Commission which they proposed and for which they had some recommendations as to membership. They failed in this effort, although the try was quite thorough-going.

During the testimony of the representatives of the service associations, Liberal Members of Parliament suggested that certain recently retired senior officers had visited selected districts of the service associations with the objective of fomenting resistance to the unification bill. The pro-Government Members of Parliament also attempted, with a degree of success, to establish that only a very few association leaders had a hand in formulating and preparing the briefs which were presented on behalf of the associations. The proceedings brought out that copies of the briefs had been distributed widely throughout the

10 Minutes of Standing Committee on Defense, Bill C-243, op. cit.
local districts and chapters of the associations and that wide support was assumed on the basis of feedback from local leadership.

The Government position on the final unification bill was well presented in Parliament by both the Minister and the Associate Minister of National Defense. Perhaps unfortunately, there were occasional references to defense deficiencies which had existed prior to 1963 while the Conservatives were in power and which were now allegedly being corrected. This brought on acrimonious retorts.

One of the most pro-government and incisive briefs presented during the hearings of the Standing Committee on National Defense was that of a businessman in non-defense industry:

We are talking about reaction to change. Human beings react against change; change removes the comfort people enjoy and the stability in which they like to bask. Often people who are most against change are those who are afraid their weaknesses will be discovered. Reaction to change, in my view, is the root of the criticism of unification of the Canadian Armed Forces. ¹¹

The same witness chided the Opposition to accept the changes as natural, referring to Toynbee's findings in *Change and Habit* that the forces of technology will not be stopped and that technology is a unifying force.  

Finally, on April 25th, 1967, after the largest Parliamentary session in Canada's history, the debate on unification of the Canadian Armed Forces came to an end. The vote in the House of Commons was 127 in favor and 73 opposed, corresponding to the division of seats between the Liberals and Conservatives at the time.

The Government had won with only one noteworthy compromise. In the early literature it appeared that the Government had planned to use one set of rank titles for its officers and that officers manning ships would be called Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major, etc. As passed, the final bill prescribes a common rank structure for personnel serving in any environment (land, sea, 

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12 Ibid., p. 1286.


and air) but authorizes the Governor in Council to prescribe the conditions under which certain traditional environment-related titles may be used. The Government implemented this portion of the Act to permit use of traditional sea-going titles, such as Admiral, Commodore, Captain, and Petty Officer on-board ship and when associating with Naval personnel of other countries.

In retrospect, in spite of the energies of the Opposition and the efforts of the determined testimony of individuals for themselves and for associations opposed to unification, the final outcome in the House of Commons could not really have been in doubt. The Minister of National Defense had done his homework and had the support of his Party which was in power and still popular with the people. Although there was not a nation-wide referendum on unification, the Government had a mandate to economize in defense administration and had developed a coherent plan which strong leadership had been able to sell as a package on the basis that taking the final step of complete unification was essential in order to realize the full benefits of the other essential steps.
CHAPTER V

THE AFTERMATH OF PARLIAMENTARY ACTION
AND PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION IN CANADA

After the House of Commons voted favorably to amend the National Defense Act and thereby cleared the way for implementation of unification of the armed forces as proposed by the Government, controversy subsided. The debate had been thorough and resolution of the debate had been accomplished by democratic means.

In June 1967, Armed Forces Management reported:

All in all, it appears that Paul Hellyer is making good his contentions that unification could provide a better fighting force while at the same time effecting badly needed economies. If the signpost reads correctly, Canada is on the downhill run toward unification. ¹

Although difficult to measure, there is little doubt that there have been significant savings. Hellyer asserted that the first two years of consolidation cut defense costs by $143 million and he estimated that the savings would amount to $150 million per year.

when the full benefits were realized. This latter figure is nearly ten percent of the Canadian defense budget.

It was a keynote of Hellyer's plan to redress the balance between hardware and housekeeping expenditures. One of his assertions in this regard has been confirmed. He said that, unless some action were taken to reduce personnel strengths, payroll and supporting operations costs in Fiscal Year 1967 would equal the entire defense budget of Fiscal Year 1963. Given the increased per capita costs which have occurred, this would have been so.

During the period 1963-64 to 1968, military personnel have been reduced by about 18% and civilian personnel by about 12%. These reductions were made possible in significant part by unification and consolidation of the armed forces. These reductions and other related savings in the operations and maintenance budget permitted the continued funding of significant new equipment without a significant increase in the Canadian defense budget. Capital equipment expenditures for FY 68 approximated those of FY 64. The projection for the future looks even more favorable as regards increased capital expenditures for construction and procurement.

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3 Canada, Department of National Defense, Director of Information Services, Report D 1350-500/R(DIS), July 12, 1968.
new equipment from funds which would otherwise have gone to operating costs under the system of separately-administered services.\(^4\)

It should be expected that there will be a lag of perhaps five years before net savings accrue when a nation takes the steps to integrate and unify its armed forces as Canada has done. It takes time to implement the changes and the implementation itself usually costs money initially. For example, there are closing costs associated with the vacating of bases by the forces. Reorganizations often involve a great deal of administrative work for which overtime may have to be paid to civilian employees. There likely will be increased transportation costs in connection with relocation of personnel and equipment. There may be many relatively obscure costs such as charges on changing of telephones and posting of new signs. The costs of design of new uniforms will be significant. The merged organization may result in operations, such as the administration of payrolls and personnel assignments, on such a large scale that they would warrant automation where it was not justified on the former separate operations. Preparation for such automation may involve increased new equipment costs and installation expenses which will be felt long before the long-range pay-off from automation.

All of these costs, associated with reorganization, will tend to offset the direct savings from the merger for awhile.

Another factor partially offsetting savings from any source is the rising cost, per unit, of manpower and equipment in Canada, as in other nations with growing economies.

Canada picked a good time to effect this significant defense organizational change. Her armed forces had grown from about 4,000 in 1939 to about 120,000 in 1945. This resulted in many officers being eligible for regular retirement at the very time when there was a need to reduce the total number of personnel, especially those least loyal to the new changes. If it takes a whole new military generation to get the full benefits of the reorganization, as both the first and the current Chief of the Defense Staff have said, the rapid retirements of the old generation were helping the unification program by moving up a younger generation faster. In addition to the regular retirements, several senior officers chose to retire prematurely. This also helped to achieve unification goals. One of the former problems was that there was an excess in the top ranks which contributed to high overhead costs and made consolidation of administration difficult. It is possible that the average

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5 "How Sharp is Paul Hellyer's Perception?" Armed Forces Management, Vol. 11, No. 9, (Jun 65), p. 41.

of those retiring early was not among the most progressive and flexible officers most desirable for continued service.

One writer, who was formerly the Education Advisor to the Royal Canadian Air Force College and is now with the University of Toronto, feels that there was a problem older than the unification controversy as regards the officer ranks of Canada. In his words, "Today's irony is the spectacle of ex-ministers and retired ancient militarists furiously condemning Mr. Hellyer for a state of chaos they themselves were busy creating while he was still a back-bencher." He goes on to condemn the absence of a tradition of thoughtful inquiry into basic assumptions of military existence. Again in his words,

The successful Canadian officer is usually one who is industrious without questioning the purpose of his industry. Knowing his competence will not be measured objectively, he realizes he can best gain favourable attention by an appearance of vigour and decisiveness and by aping the mannerisms of his seniors. 7

If this indictment has any merit, then the unification program may indeed be of value to Canada. The early retirement of some of the officers responsible for perpetuation of the situation he describes should "make room" for younger men capable of building a more contemporary and futuristic professional ethic for the

Canadian Armed Forces. The fundamental structural change in defense organization is more likely to result in an environment which encourages further innovation.

One of the reasons such a significant change as unification was accepted eagerly by many was that Canada really needed to rid itself of some anachronisms. For example, in the field of Air Force rank titles, there were "wing commanders" who did not command wings, "group captains" without groups, "squadron leaders" who had never been in squadrons, and "pilot officers" who were strictly navigators. As another example, each of the three services had its own method of saluting. These situations are being corrected in the new changes.

The original proponent of the unification program did not stay in his post to supervise the final phases of his plan. Mr. Hellyer was designated as Minister of Transport in September 1967 and a new Minister of National Defense, committed to pursue implementation of Hellyer's programs, was appointed. Hellyer remains strong and influential in Canadian politics. In fact, the Ministry of Transport was considered as a promotion for him because, unlike Defense, it is ranked as a "senior" cabinet post in Canada. He was also given the additional and related function in

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8 In fact, it was announced by Canadian Forces Headquarters News Release AFN-129-68 on July 31st, 1968, that Headquarters, Materiel Command, is to be amalgamated with the Chief of Technical Services Branch at Canadian Forces Headquarters.
the spring of 1968 of serving as Commissioner of Urban Housing.

In effect, he has become the Number Two man in Canadian Government because he took over as Acting Prime Minister while the Prime Minister was travelling and campaigning in the spring of 1968. He was re-elected to the Parliament on June 25th, 1968, and, at his present age of 44, he can be expected to stay around and help see to it that the unification program, which remains identified with his name, succeeds.

Little was said about national defense in the 1968 election campaign in Canada and what was said was rather superficial. Both Mr. Trudeau of the Liberal Party and Mr. Stanfield of the Conservative Party alluded to the possibility sometime in the future of a reduction or termination of Canadian troops on permanent duty with NATO in Europe and to strengthening of continental defenses of North America, but neither has been very specific. In the two lesser parties, both Mr. Douglas of the New Democratic Party and Mr. Caouette of the Creditistes talked generally about world disarmament, or even unilateral Canadian disarmament, with retention only of a UN peacekeeping capability. The fact that national defense was not a significant issue in the campaign is interpreted to mean general satisfaction with the handling of defense by the government, including general acceptance of
unification plans and results being achieved. The retention of
the Liberal Party in power with an increased majority in Parliament
is further assurance that the unification of the Canadian Armed
Forces will be pursued to completion.

As a strong indicator that the members of the forces them-

selves have accepted unification, in the June 25th, 1968, election,
the Liberal Party, proponent of unification, got 59.43% of the
military vote, while the Conservative Party, whose leaders
opposed unification in the Parliamentary debates, got only 30.56%
of the military vote.  

9 John Gellner, "Election '68 - The Leaders' Weak Attacks

10 Anthony Westell, "Loyalty Retained Despite Unification,"
The Toronto Globe and Mail, July 1, 1968.
CHAPTER VI

THE MEANING AND MERIT OF THE CHANGES

The following review summarizes the principal features of the two major steps in the Canadian Armed Forces unification process and distills the asserted effects, favorable and unfavorable, of these changes. The counter-comment following each statement of unfavorable effect shows the author's judgment on the merit of these changes for Canada.

Change No. 1 (generally called "integration"): The Chiefs of Staff and the separate headquarters for each service were discontinued and replaced by a single Chief of Defense Staff and a single integrated Defense Staff. Field commands, to which units and installations were assigned and which are responsible for training and operations in areas of specialty, were organized on a functional basis and include the Mobile, Air Defense, Maritime, Air Transport, Training, and Materiel Commands. All military personnel of Canada remained in one of the three services.

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<th>Favorable effect</th>
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<td>Economy results from the consolidation of three Headquarters into one.</td>
<td>Central Hq has to depend more upon field command Hq (Mobile, Maritime, and Air Defense) for land, sea, and air advocacy and expertise. Economy at the top may be offset by diseconomy below.</td>
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Counter-comment to the above "unfavorable effect": This delegation of responsibility for "advocacy" and "expertise" should prove
to be advantageous in the long run. Too much advocacy of uncoordinated separate service views at a too-high level was a problem which Canada chose to solve. It appears that, given an almost-unlimited budget and a large and steadily-expanding economy, a nation, such as the US, can probably increase the quality and quantity of its major weapons systems most rapidly with a defense organization consisting of separate semi-autonomous military services. With such an organizational arrangement, each service naturally would be so over-awed with its own role that it would try to be prepared to overcome the enemy "practically all by itself." Furthermore, each service likely would develop the necessary constituencies to insure the provision of resources for a sufficient quantity of arms for such a dominant role and an extensive research and development program directed toward modernization. The separately administered R&D programs could be coordinated enough to benefit from each other's information, ideas, and innovations, but there would not be a single, limited R&D budget which would have to be controlled to avoid duplication and conserve resources. This reduction of scale to avoid duplication also reduces the probability of advancement of weapons technology by serendipity. However, this approach is not the economical route which Canada wishes to follow.
Favorable effect

Arbitration of differences among land, sea, and air doctrines, plans and programs can be accomplished by the Chief of the Defense Staff or lower level, based upon a functional perspective. This reduces strife at the higher levels and permits more rational planning and decision-making.

Unfavorable effect

The Minister of Defense will no longer have the benefit of direct advice from three senior officers knowledgeable in, and responsible for, all aspects of land, sea, and air operations. Specialist advisers on land, sea, and air operations are included on the operations staff and specialist advisers on land, sea, and air vehicles and weaponry development and maintenance are included on the equipment engineering staff, but these officers are junior to their function-oriented chiefs and to the operations commanders in the field. Their influence will, therefore, be inadequate at central Hq.

Counter-comment to the above "unfavorable effect": The Minister of Defense should not necessarily get involved in all of the recommendations which would come from separate senior officers interested exclusively in a single service. He has a "right" to demand a "systems analysis" approach and to have final recommendations from a functionally-oriented staff of Defense-wide perspective. No one really challenges the fact that modern warfare by a technologically-developed nation is not any longer conducted in segments exclusively

Army, Navy, and Air Force.
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<th><strong>Favorable effect</strong></th>
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<td>Function rationalization of the field command structure places &quot;like operations&quot; together and encourages more efficient use of resources.</td>
<td>Assignment of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel together in the same command is confusing and breaks down unity within that command. Commanders usually show preference for their own service elements or are too fair to the other elements in order to prove their &quot;objectivity.&quot; Either way, balance and unity are elusive.</td>
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Counter-comment to the above "unfavorable effect": This effect is realistic and understandable but it justifies moving on to implementation of Change No. 2 rather than refuting the favorable effects of Change No. 1.

Change No. 2 (often called "unification" as a step beyond integration, but unification is also used more generally to refer to the whole process from the first vestiges of formal coordination on to this final stage of reorganization. The three separate military services are merged into a single defense force - the Canadian Armed Forces. Military personnel are not members of the Army, Navy, or Air Force; they are members of the Canadian Armed Forces. Some of them will still work on or operate land vehicles, ships, or planes and they will be trained in such specialties. They will still be identified with a skill or profession and with a team or crew but their larger identity will be changed from the three separate services to a single service. Canadian Forces Headquarters and the field command structure remain as organized under Change No. 1.
Favorable effects

Improves the chances of getting full benefits from Change No. 1 because all personnel will now be working all of the time for the same single defense force and because loyalty will be concentrated in defense of country, in crew or team, and in profession or skill instead of in three military services arbitrarily grouped on the basis of land, sea, and air. It contributes to national unity to have all members of the defense forces sharing the same loyalties.

Unfavorable effects

Loss of tradition and full-time identity with one of three military services which have proved their worth in past wars and have been a rallying point in times of stress. The individual no longer has at the seat-of-government level a senior boss with whom he identifies on a service basis. It is more difficult for him to identify with a boss of broader perspective, i.e., the Minister of Defense or the Chief of the Defense Staff.

Counter-comment to the above "unfavorable effect": This "effect" is believed to be more applicable to the past than to the future. It is believed that the trend, in progressive countries like Canada where the educational-level of the population is increasing, is toward increased identification with and loyalty to: (a) the nation itself, (b) the individual's actual profession or specific skill (especially if he is a technically-trained person such as a civil engineer, a communication specialist, or a hospital administrator), and (c) the crew or team members with whom he has close personal association. In such countries, there is a waning of the relevance of identification with an individual military service which has no unique claim on the individual's specific talents and is actually a rather arbitrary "in-between" element as regards who the
individual is really serving.

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<td>Maximum attention can be given to preparation for an external enemy if intra-defense rivalries are minimized.</td>
<td>Elimination of the diversity, pluralism, and healthy competition formerly existing with three separate services will result in a loss of stimulus and initiative.</td>
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Counter-comment to the above "unfavorable effect": The proponents of unification felt that there was too much diversity and pluralism with three separate services and that it was timely for Canada to counter the centrifugal tendencies and influences by a re-identification of organizational membership. Canada as a nation appears to need greater unity, rather than greater diversity. The single armed service concept can be a contributing instrument in this regard.

As regards initiative and motivation within the forces, the fact that the old Defense Council met only four times in 29 months prior to reorganization and that the reconstituted Defense Council met over 90 times during the 29 months following reorganization tends to dispute the argument that the former arrangement was dynamic and that the new organization will be apathetic. Supplementing the reconstituted Defense Council, a new Canadian Forces Council meets monthly and brings together not only the principal staff heads but also the six field commanders of the Canadian Forces. It is quite
possible that more sound ideas will reach decision levels under the new arrangements than under the old arrangements when the service chiefs were screening agents.
CHAPTER VIII

EXTERNAL IMPACT OF THE CANADIAN PARADIGM

A. Criteria for Unification in Other Nations.

From a review of the Canadian experience, it appears that integration and unification of the military services would be economically desirable for any nation which now has a relatively substantial administrative headquarters for each of its three military services.

There may be other factors which would make it undesirable for certain nations to unify their services at a certain time. One of the principal considerations would be the effect on the continuity of national security. There would be some disruption and at least temporary reduction of war readiness. Nations which have threatening neighbors or whose security otherwise would be jeopardized by a reduction of readiness for an extended period probably would not desire to make the conversion.

Some nations may be so committed in collective defense arrangements, regional or other, that unification would be undesirable for them. For example, during World War II when the three Canadian military services worked very closely with their counterparts in the British Forces, it undoubtedly was advantageous.
that there was similarity of organization. Likewise, the defense arrangements between New Zealand and Australia may be so close that New Zealand would not find it desirable to integrate and unify its services except upon concurrent action by Australia.

Nations which are trying to build up their land, sea, and air forces quickly may find it undesirable to unify during the build-up process (even though delay until later would make unification more difficult because of tradition and the constituencies which would have developed). The reason that such nations might find it undesirable to unify their forces during the stage of build-up of their forces is that maximum autonomy of each service to plan its own growth, seek necessary financial support, and make arrangements for assistance from its counterpart in an already developed country would likely result in the most rapid build-up.

In the Canadian case, contributory to the general situation favoring unification was the fact that the country historically has relied on volunteers for all three services. Canada plans to continue this practice and apparently sees merit in recruiting: first, for the Canadian Armed Forces as an organization and, second, for specific skills which may or may not have a peculiar land, sea, or air exclusiveness. Certain other countries which historically have used their armies for the administration of a universal
conscription system may well prefer continuation of quite separately administered volunteer navies and air forces. Such nations may feel that their three separate services are so different in character that neither a close merger at the top for management purposes nor a single service identity at the recruiting level would be beneficial as regards their national interests as a whole.

Nations most likely to integrate and unify their armed forces are those without powerful lobbies. Because unification is a controversial matter, emotionally-charged, and defying deep-rooted traditions, powerful lobbies could be expected to be able to delay for long periods, or perhaps block altogether, unification attempts on the part of governments.

It can also be expected that nations most likely to integrate and unify their armed forces are those where there is the greatest tradition of civilian control over the military. Integration and unification are measures most often desired by civilian authorities because of potential economies and the improvement of rationality.

1 The reference here is to "objective civilian control" as defined by Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 83. It also assumes that the civilian group in control will not keep the three military services separate in order deliberately to deny them political power which could result from increased unity.
for management purposes. In those countries where there is a strong tradition of military leadership in the political realm, these same military leaders are likely to adhere to the tradition, in which they were trained, of separate military services.

It is likely that integration and unification will be most demanded in those nations in which the government role in providing social needs (such as education, urban planning, and medical insurance) is most recognized. This conclusion is based upon the priority which such nations would tend to give to the need for economies in defense in order to make maximum funds available for social purposes.

The leadership (officers) of the military services tend to be somewhat conservative politically because it is the role of the military services to defend the status quo government and also because military officers usually have certain fringe benefits which would lose their relative value in a liberal reform situation. Given the result that they are somewhat conservative politically, this mitigates against progressive organizational change. The relevance here is that one could expect military services unification, as being effected in Canada, would be most likely to occur in those countries where social reform has already occurred so that military personnel, active and retired, would less likely be committed to a conservative political position.
Finally, it appears that unification is most likely to come about in nations with the Parliamentary form of government and during an era when the Party in power is broadly popular. Under such circumstances, the essential close coordination between legislation and execution is promoted and party discipline reduces the effectiveness of the Opposition and attempted lobbying.

In summary, the nations for which armed forces unification would be most attractive and likely to come about are those which (1) are relatively unthreatened (2) maintain forces not simply supplements to the respective forces of larger nations in collective defense arrangements (3) are not in a stage of rapid forces build-up through assistance from counterpart services in other nations (4) tend to change their policies on a rational basis rather than as a response to vested interests (5) have a strong democratic tradition of civilian control over the military (6) permit domestic needs to compete strongly with defense for available funds, and (7) have a Parliamentary form of government.

B. Application of the Criteria.

It is now appropriate to determine which countries appear to meet these criteria, or at least to isolate those countries with a sufficient number of the essential pre-conditions that they must be considered as among the first likely to follow the precedent set by Canada.
The countries, in addition to Canada, in which it is considered that most of the pre-conditions exist to make unification potentially attractive and feasible are: Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Africa, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. As shown in Table I, they have significant defense budgets and three separate military services of sufficient size that three competing defense bureaucracies may well exist, or potentially will develop, unless their forces are unified.

Norway and Denmark have security under NATO but nevertheless enjoy sufficient independence and initiative that they might well convert to unification. The smaller size of their forces reduces the potential economic gain below that in Canada. Sweden has most of the pre-conditions, although she places much emphasis on independent defenses and may find the traditional structure best for her continued emphasis on modernization of equipment and for her extensive Army reserve forces arrangements. Finland is a distinct possibility, although she may be hesitant, because of her physical location, to risk the disruption of transition to a single service concept. Also, because of the disparity in numbers of personnel in her three military services, the economic advantage of unification in Finland may not be great.
TABLE I

MILITARY MANPOWER AND DEFENSE BUDGETS OF SELECTED NATIONS WITH SEVERAL OF THE PRECONDITIONS FOR ARMED FORCES UNIFICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Army Manpower</th>
<th>Navy Manpower</th>
<th>Air Force Manpower</th>
<th>Defense Budget Million $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>48,581</td>
<td>20,789</td>
<td>51,411</td>
<td>1,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>11,400</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>34,400</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>23,700</td>
<td>16,700</td>
<td>17,200</td>
<td>765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>5,559</td>
<td>3,035</td>
<td>4,338</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>185,130</td>
<td>39,948</td>
<td>44,909</td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table is intended only to show that these "middle power" nations have significant numbers of personnel in each of three military services and that they have significant defense budgets. It is not intended to present comprehensive data on total military strengths because it does not show forces engaged in part-time training. For example, while the Swedish Army has only 10,000 regulars on duty, 55,000 regulars are on indefinite leave and 500,000 reservists are receiving part-time training.

Like Canada, the Scandinavian countries take great pride in their United Nations peacekeeping forces record and emphasize this role in their planning and training.

Brazil and Argentina have three separate forces large enough that they might find savings in unification, although both probably will find it difficult to break away from tradition and from the United States defense organizational pattern. Australia has several of the essential pre-conditions and may go ahead with conversion sometime in the future, her relations with the US and the UK notwithstanding. New Zealand is a country where most of the pre-conditions exist, although her small size reduces the incentives and she would be somewhat inclined to adhere to organization which she finds suitable in maintaining her defense relationships with Australia and the US. Japan is a possibility for armed forces unification, although there may be some reluctance there based upon the close US-Japanese defense arrangements. South Africa is sufficiently isolated that she might make the change, although she may be unwilling to disrupt her organization under present conditions.

Yugoslavia is also sufficiently independent that conversion would be feasible; however, her Army is so much larger than her Navy and Air Force that no inter-service competition
for resources may be felt. Also, she may be reluctant to tamper with her defenses and internal loyalties. Unification of the armed forces of Rumania could become a manifestation of Rumania's latent desires to increase her independence from the USSR.

This list is admittedly speculative. There are over 100 other countries with armed forces and it is possible that one or more of them will precede any on the list of twelve (exclusive of Canada) in unifying its armed forces. The following indicates examples of the rationale of exclusion of the others from this list of twelve:

The US and USSR are not likely to adopt the Canadian pattern in the near future because of their mutual confrontation and consequent unwillingness to disrupt their defenses for a transition period. The huge size of their forces, the continuing arms race, and the vested interests under the present system, are also factors which make it less likely that these superpowers will convert. Mainland China is not likely to unify for the same general reasons, plus the fact that her Army is so much larger than her Navy and Air Force and relies largely on conscription.

Quite naturally, the developed nations of Western Europe which have been closely associated with Canada in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be among those most
interested in the Canadian experiment. In spite of this interest, only Denmark and Norway, of the NATO members, appear as likely candidates for armed forces unification within the next few years. Although economic pressures and the Canadian venture within the Commonwealth undoubtedly will cause the United Kingdom to consider unification recurrently, the UK issued its own White Paper, as recently as 1963, reaffirming its intent to retain the separateness of its three military services. France, of course, is unpredictable, but it seems improbable that she will be tempted to take a step representing both an imitation of a Commonwealth nation and a significant departure from her own military organizational traditions. The other nations of Western Europe, variously members of complex and changing regional international organizations such as NATO, the Western European Union, and the European Common Market, are believed likely to "wait and see" what happens to these international regional arrangements (security, economic, social, and political) and to the potential of a further East-West detente, before making unilateral moves toward national armed forces unification.

Certain countries have a close relationship to larger powers which are generally emulated as regards defense organization. Examples: The Warsaw-Pact nations (excluding possibly
Rumania), Nationalist China, the Koreas, the Phillipines, Thailand, etc.

Certain countries are too tradition-bound to make armed forces unification seem likely. Examples: Mexico, Chile, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, etc.

Certain countries do not now have three services because of their geographic positions, i.e. no access to the sea. Examples: Switzerland, Austria, Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Afghanistan.

Other countries have such an imbalance in personnel strengths among their services that merger would not significantly reduce overhead or improve effectiveness. Examples: Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Cuba, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Sudan, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, Tunisia, Burma, Cameroun, Columbia, Congo, Costa Rica, etc.

Israel, for example, uses conscription for its Army and has such an active reserve supporting the Army that it probably would not wish to risk the disruption of these effective arrangements under present conditions.

Many countries have forces too small to constitute a significant savings regardless of how organized. For example:
Chad, Ceylon, Burundi, the Central African Republic, etc.

Others have no significant military capability. Examples:

Iceland, Western Samoa, Monaco, Malta, Bhutan, Andorra,

Trinidad, etc.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

Canada's decision to unify its armed forces is a far-sighted one which is likely, in the long run, to achieve its stated aims, as well as (1) give Canada more control over its own forces, (2) increase Canada's pride in her role as an innovator, and (3) contribute to the psychological and political unity of Canada.

The Canadian example should be attractive to other "middle-power" nations which have (1) three separately-administered military services each constituting a significant overhead burden, (2) a security situation which permits them to tamper with defense organization, (3) sufficient independence that they are not prone to emulate defense organization of larger allied powers, and (4) forms of government which permit rational change.

The United States is not now ready to unify its forces, as Canada is doing, due to its own political setting, defense organizational history, international involvements, and lack of opportunity to drop its guard long enough to experiment with its defenses.

Judging from the experience of getting the National Security Act of 1947 passed, one is tempted to state that it is inconceivable that the United States will ever unify its forces as Canada is now...
doing. On the other hand, one has only to reflect on the rapidity of other changes in defense matters to see the possibility of a change in attitude and environment which would cause the US to convert to a single unified defense force. For example, who would have predicted in May 1945 that ten years later Germany would be an armed ally in a defense compact against a bloc of nations led by the USSR, a former ally of the US in WWII? Or, who would have predicted in 1958 that ten years later the US and the USSR jointly would propose a nuclear non-proliferation treaty in the United Nations? Or, who would have predicted in 1958 that the US would get a Secretary of Defense in January 1961 who would gain as much control over the US military services as Mr. McNamara held for over seven years? Or, who would have predicted at any time before it happened that the US would get involved in a civil war and revolution in Vietnam which it could not win within two years after over half a million US troops arrived in the combat area? From these few examples of rapid and drastic change and considering the apparent recognition now by a large element in the US that it cannot police the world and has great requirements for use of public resources within its own borders, it seems possible that even in the US there can be, sometime in the future, such a demand for economy and efficiency...
in defense administration that the US would follow Canada's precedent.

Having concluded that armed forces unification will be good for Canada and possibly for adoption within certain other countries, one might then ask whether it is good for the world as a whole, or for humanity, that Canada has pioneered this move. One way to look at this matter is that unification of the Canadian Armed Forces is a nationalistic measure. Clearly, there is an intent to make the Canadian Armed Forces more uniquely Canadian in name, in spirit, and in appearance. Those who decry nationalism as a tragic ideology and lament recent signs of a possible resurgence of nationalism in the world might well indict unification of the Canadian Armed Forces as a small manifestation of their larger fears. On the other hand, in the specific case of Canada, defense forces have been idealistic peacekeepers for the United Nations and it is clear that the intent in Canada is to give continuing or increased emphasis to that role for the Canadian Armed Forces of the future.

In continuation of this suggestion that the Canadian Armed Forces unification is "good for the world," it should be recognized that, in this respect, the Canadian Ministry of Defense has become a kind of world laboratory for the development and
testing of an advanced defense organizational concept. With the nations of the world paying so much for defense, people everywhere should be grateful that one nation has had the opportunity and the will to experiment with possible means of reducing defense costs.
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E. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES


"Why the Rush?" The Telegram, September 8, 1966.
A PARADIGM IN DEFENSE ORGANIZATION: UNIFICATION OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

Richard G. Ross

November 1968

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Distribution of this document is unlimited.

Canada is now in the process of implementing a reorganization plan which is intended to result in a greater degree of unification of its military services than has been undertaken by any other developed nation.

This step beyond the frontier of traditional and contemporary military organization will prove widespread interest in other nations if it is successful in achieving the aims of the Canadians.

This paper (1) reviews the course of the proposal to unify the Canadian Armed Forces, (2) evaluates the wisdom of the decision and the prospects for successful achievement of its aims in Canada, and (3) examines the probable impact upon defense organization in other countries.

(NOTE: This study is published officially by the U. S. Army Logistics Management Center as a research effort of one of its employees while under U. S. Army sponsorship at the University of Virginia in a civilian long-term training program.)
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