Arms Control

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WITH ABSTRACTS
AND ANNOTATIONS

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PREFACE

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Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A. BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

Auerbach, L. andidwig. [WAR AND (AGGRESSION]. Edited by Morton Fried, Marvin Harris and Robert Murphy. Garden City, N.Y., Published for the American Museum of Natural History by the Natural History Press, 1966. xxv, 262 p. $3.95. S.435.

"Contains the expanded text of prepared papers and comments... held on November 30, 1965, in Washington, D.C., during the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association."


An examination of the scientific aspects of war and its causes "by anthropologists of diverse political opinions, specialties, and theoretical orientations." Livingstone's article opens the discussion on a controversial issue by contending that the genetic consequences of nonnuclear warfare are minimal. It is followed by Holloway's thesis that a specific framework must be utilized to analyze man's aggressive drive since the study of lower animals is irrelevant to understanding the aggressiveness of humans. In the following section Alland goes beyond the genetic implications of warfare to explore the effect of war on all facets of public health. The next two parts deal with general and specific models of the functional role of warfare. The final three sections begin with an attempt to explain the causes of war and conclude with discussions of the moral problems of war in the 20th century.


Relates the results of public opinion research on international developments and the danger of war. Of the Poles surveyed, 51 percent believe nuclear war would be the greatest threat to mankind and would bring total destruction of their country. Sixty-seven percent of the Czechoslovaks believe there will never be an all-out confrontation between capitals of socialism; 61 percent think that nuclear weapons will be used should a world war break out, and 80 percent contend there will be no victor in such a war.
Internally it will tend to be highly differentiated externally: that is, a nation is highly differentiated if it will be highly articulated and more relatively central; and that each nation will tend to articulate with nations at a similar level of differentiation. (Abstract applied)

**1386**


Contents. -- Introduction. -- Lenin and capitalism. -- Peace and Soviet policy. -- Friendship and non-aggression pacts: the tools of Soviet imperialist policy. -- The tragedy of Poland. -- The Soviet attack on Finland. -- The Soviet Union occupies the Baltic states. -- Vyshinsky in Bucharest. -- Red terror over Bulgaria. -- The transformation of Hungary. -- The disintegration of Mr. Beneš. -- The two faces of co-existence. -- Communist strategy and tactics according to Stalin. -- Soviet economic and political policies. -- Comment: war and peace. -- Conclusion. -- Bibliography. -- Index.

Examines Lenin's theories of communism and his plan for its gradual implementation. Derzis maintains that communism is not going soft and that its object has remained the same since Lenin: the destruction of the democracies of the Western World. The West must guard against being duped by liberal trends in the Communist world.

**1387**


Discusses the political role of the military in developing countries. The authors supply evidence to highlight the powerful constraints that operate to narrow the role of the military per se as effective agents of political change.

**1388**


Whether or not a "uniting Western Europe" will have any relevance in the coming years will depend on the purpose of the integration and the major problems of the world. The political community is not to become obsolete in the sense of becoming economically subservient to the larger industrial powers. It must develop common economic and political policies that reach far beyond its present or even future objectives. A united Western Europe must make a positive contribution to a resolution of the German reunification question, and, if it extends beyond a customs union into political and economic union, it will have a better chance of reuniting Germany by institutionalizing its economic union with at least some of the East European nations. Given that relations between Eastern and Western Europe will be less strained in the future, during this process of institutionalization Western Europe will probably be able to convince East Germany to 'associate' itself with the European community. This association would in effect give Germany many of the practical advantages of reunification. A European defense community, in which each country views the problems of its own security in similar terms, would not immediately supplant NATO but rather pave the way toward more satisfactory arrangements concerning the withdrawal of American forces. A uniting Western Europe will become an essential part of the process of institutionalizing a rational international economic system. As worldwide economic interdependence grows, interactions between economic and political fields are likely to grow. Therefore, if the United States decides to intervene in other parts of the world to uphold its economic interests, Europe will eventually be affected; and if it is not able to escape the consequences of American actions, "must it not find a way of affecting the taking of the key decisions to become involved?"

**1389**


In this nuclear age people "might as well get used to living without the certainties of either unambiguous war or unfulfilled peace." As long as the superpowers are engaged in a nuclear standoff, detente is severely limited and cannot be literally translated into a relaxation of cold war tensions. Restraint based on a particular balance of weapons is far from stable. However the strategic stalemate between the superpowers and the mutual implications of nuclear combat have encouraged international cooperation in many fields and may eventually compel the Russian dogmatists to relinquish their hostile attitudes to the non-Communist world. While the destructive power of modern weapons, the "latent big-power involvement," and the force of world opinion have made open aggression improbable at any level, indirect aggression still flourishes at the regional level. War is now often begun by proxy and fought for limited and indefinite objectives, making them frustrating to fight and difficult to stop. In Vietnam Americans are currently attempting "to demonstrate that aggression does not pay even when it is disguised." Means is, as long as wars-by infiltration exist, and the avoidance of global war depends on the prudence of the nuclear powers, civilization will face an uncertain future.

**1390**


Throughout its history Russia has revealed a tendency to temper expansionism with realism; yet, at the same time, it has never completely abandoned its quest for world power. Although Russia's current rulers genuinely wish to avoid a nuclear confrontation with the United States, their drive for accommodation with the West is principally "based on a particular balance of warpower"
not on good will. Thus the detente is highly tenuous and could be overturned if the West relaxes its vigilance and more dogmatic and militant leaders come to power in the Soviet Union. Both the moderates and the extremists appear to agree that the Soviet Union should pursue a "foreign policy in the East where it is feasible and involves no risk of direct confrontation with the United States. The extremists are willing to take higher risks than the moderate factions but so far have not gotten the upper hand in Europe, Latin America, or Asia. However, they have succeeded in stirring up trouble and instabilities in the turbulent Middle East. By their militant activities in the Middle East and their buildup of arms, the present Russian leaders have demonstrated their determination to continue traditional Soviet anti-Western policies. As long as Russia remains basically hostile to the non-Communist world, there can be no permanent peace based on mutual cooperation between the two camps. Although the present detente is real, it depends on the firmness of the United States in thwarting the initiatives of the Soviet extremists.


"References": p. 195.

Reports on progress made in describing systematic trends in violence between political groups. The report is in two parts. Part one describes the formulation of an empirical test of two hypotheses: (1) periods of high violence in the international system will be followed by a decrease in the level of violence; and (2) periods of low systemwide violence will be followed by an increase in violence. The second part of the paper speculates about several possible reasons for these patterns. The testing of the hypotheses relies upon Quincy Wright's compilation of conflict statistics covering the period 1490-1960. Factor-analytic techniques are employed in order to observe the fluctuations in the amount of conflict over the 470-year period. (Abstract supplied, modified)


Although there was a time when Europe and the United States coincided, the Vietnamese War, anti-French sentiment, and German unification have separated the two continents to the point where not a single European government has sent soldiers to Vietnam to fight on the American side. Foremost of its history America has opted to stay out of Europe's affairs in the puritanical belief that Europe and America were ill-advised and prone to endless wars but when it defended Europe against Fascism and promoted European unity, "it went against the traditional tradition of 'divide and rule.' It took the result of running up a disastrous rival to its own political leadership and to our enemies." Despite the fact that no other alliances have failed, since alliances do not survive their successes, it would be unrealistic to stress the necessity for a united Europe. A disputed Europe would serve only to create another power vacuum that would lead to disorder and instability. A strong Europe is needed that will be able to deter Russia or a less-powerful Germany without the presence of American troops.


"References": p. 234.

Seventy-two subjects played a Prisoner's Dilemma game against a "dummy" who played either a 50 percent or a 75 percent cooperative strategy on a preplanned and random basis over 10 iterations of the game. Subjects were in one of three message credibility conditions: a promise to cooperate which was sent by the "dummy" on every tenth trial was kept 50 percent, 60 percent, or 50 percent of the time. Difference in strategies did not affect the strategy selections of the subjects. Subjects who received the most highly credible messages cooperated more often on the message trials, were more willing to reciprocate promises, and displayed more "trust" than did subjects in either of the other two credibility conditions. Strategy credibility interactions were found on overall cooperative strategy selections, cooperation on the message trials, and "forgiveness." (Abstract supplied)


This study represents an extension of the Prisoner's Dilemma game paradigm to include those social interaction situations in which the magnitudes of the payoffs which players receive are dependent on the strategy choices which they make. The experiment used eight different sequences of Prisoner's Dilemma games, each containing 12 distinct games. Each sequence was characterized by successive increments or decrements in either the reward, the punishment, or both of these parameters. These parameter changes were made to be contingent upon the responses of the players. The most interesting results obtained in this study relate to the effects of changes in the punishment parameter of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. It was found that when reward is either moderate and fixed or increasing and large, a decreasing severity of punishment produced as much cooperative behavior as did an increasing severity of punishment. A phenomenon which is peculiar to dynamic games was also identified in this study. This has been termed "pseudocooperation" and refers to jointly competitive strategy choices made by the subjects, the outcomes of which are interpreted as being mutually beneficial rather than mutually punishing. (Abstract supplied)


Power is one of the most widely used concepts in the study of international relations. Despite the fact that power has a long history of usage in political philosophy, there is little agreement concerning what the concept actually means. Moreover, considerable difficulty
is encountered in attempting to measure power. These difficulties are such that the concept of power is of only limited utility as a research tool in studying international phenomena. (Abstract supplied)

1966

Examines classical teachings on the problem of permanent peace and world order starting with St. Augustine.

1967

Discusses the need to understand the unity of the European continent and to avoid confrontation. To avoid this danger the Communist world must intensify its own ideological struggle and avoid Western overtures to strengthen Socialist positions and accelerate the disintegration of the imperialist camp. The growing independence of the West European countries from the United States is a positive phenomenon, but attempts to turn Western Europe into an anti-Soviet, imperialistic bloc must be checked. While NATO shows symptoms of a profound crisis, its early extinction is not to be counted upon, because the U.S. political and military leaders regard it as a mainstay of their foreign policy. Under these conditions, the abolition of the two military blocs will not be easy, and the newly expanding relations between Eastern capitalist and Socialist countries must be carefully studied in order to determine the ways in which this cooperation could best be used to strengthen European security.

1968

Partial contents.--The United States between Europe and Asia, by Thomas J. Dodd.--Eastern Europe in the world powers' play of forces, by Philip E. Moesty.--The Moscow-Peking conflict and its effects on Eastern Europe, by Wu Chen-ta'ai.--Thoughts on the subject of German reunification and the European middle, by Willi Brandt.--Germany and the Russian political toward Europe, by Wenzel Jakob.

Papers read in September 1966 at the fourth international conference on central and East European problems. Dodd stresses the importance of NATO in the struggle for permanent peace in Europe. Moesty points out the limitations of the process of disintegration within the Soviet bloc and defines the role of East European nations in present world politics. Wu Chen-ta'ai considers the Sino-Soviet feud instrumental in increasing tendencies toward polycentrism within the European Soviet bloc. Jakob sees in the economic potential of Western Europe and in tendencies toward freedom in Eastern Europe building blocks for the establishment of a viable future counterbalance to Soviet power in Europe. Brandt considers German reunification a prerequisite to a durable peace in Europe.

1969

Although some people do not accept the United States as an Asian power, it would be unrealistic to assume that the West and Asia are mutually exclusive entities. In fact Westerners have been as much a part of Asian history and culture as the indigenous populations. From Hay's "open door" policy and Bryan's "nonrecognition doctrine" to Wilson's championing of the Open Door, the notion of a nation's sphere of influence is an important aspect of world politics. The Imperialist bloc, the United States between Europe and Asia, 1908: 6-44, P&GP RR

The United States, as the principal force of aggression in the world, has been the chief obstacle to peace. In establishing its military bloc the United States seeks to obtain "extra hands" with which to secure the mercenary interests of US industrial and financial monopolies." It is also the chief sponsor of the arms race in nations affiliated with these military blocs. The Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have launched an active struggle against US imperialism. And, because the world balance of forces, including Russia's powerful defensive capacity, is being tipped increasingly in favor of the Socialist world, the Western imperialists are reconsidering the viability of their military blocs, as evidenced by France's withdrawal from NATO. Military bloc policies run counter to peace, and only with their disintegration can economic, political, and cultural relations be promoted between countries.

1969

In the belief that Washington's move to stem the outflow of dollars that March indicated its intention to scale down overseas commitments, many West Europeans advocated the need to join together to protect mutual interests and "guard against irrationality in Washington." During the-money crisis at the European Continental bloc found that through cooperation it could put a good deal of pressure upon the United States. Even Great Britain is beginning to move away from the chaotic "America of Mr. Johnson and his cronies."
I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

...despite the traditions of Anglo-American solidarity and the fact that Britain's cliques for entry into the Common Market are still very high in the Western world, Britain would now gamble on future acceptance into the European economic bloc rather than shut herself out completely by joining the projected North Atlantic free trade area. Notwithstanding the trend toward an independent Europe, the Atlantic alliance will probably remain intact. While hardly anyone in Western Europe believes that the Soviet Union is a military bloc rather than shut themselves out completely that conflict theorists reorient themselves from rational to nonrational, or emotional, models of conflict and coalition behavior. One such nonrational theory may be based on the social-psychological notion of balance and dissonance. Such a theory is presented, demonstrated in some simple interpersonal conflict examples, and then applied to the more complex conflict-coalition system characteristic of tribal segmentary-lineage political systems. Finally, the nonrational model is extended to describe the interpretation of levels of conflict, support, and accompanying affective sentiments. (Abstract supplied)


An historical and analytic study of the structure and dynamics of alliances. Liska is committed to "a conventional-traditional continuity in international relations." The fundamental principles governing international behavior have not been altered by the technological revolution, trends toward integration, nationalism and secession, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The signposts in international relations are "still historical precedents and cardinal principles of politics."
Nevertheless a broad nomnaxiomatic theory would provide the decisionmaker with a method of orienting himself within "a precisely described and well-ordered web of interesting possibilities," which in turn would enable him to ask the right questions in his situation and provide him with some of the critical tools for answering them. Game theory will become a reality-distorting mirror, however, if it is not used in conjunction with the results of historical and empirical research and experience with practical affairs.

1607


Discusses the role of science in China today and the struggle between those who advocate "grassroots technology" and those who favor advanced research. The struggle covers a wide spectrum of scientific and technological polices, from military research to educational policies, and is bound to affect the quality of science and "impose constraints on the type of scientific activity which will be feasible in China's immediate future," although some notable accomplishments, including a major expedition to Mount Everest, have been registered.

1608


Attitudes of 320 college freshmen toward 50 identical actions taken recently by the U.S. and Soviet Russia were factor analyzed. For both U.S. and Russian Bees, a similar first factor of warlike or hostile actions emerged, but the three smaller factors for the two nations showed little overlap. As predicted, a double standard was clearly evident, the U.S. actions almost always being rated favorably while the identical Russian actions were usually evaluated unfavorably. The double standard was most extreme for warlike and competitive actions, relatively small for conciliatory behavior, and almost absent on items involving free dissemination of information. A two-sided presentation of information produced more neutral attitudes, particularly less favorable attitudes toward U.S. warlike actions and disapproving actions toward other nations. (Abstract supplied)

1609


An ecological approach to the study of power. Current theory conceives of power as a kind of influence that one actor in a social relationship exerts directly upon another. Petersen proposes that this simple linear interaction scheme be replaced by an ecological model that stresses the relationship of the actor to his environment and the changes that occur in it. With this approach, Petersen hopes to simplify and broaden the power concept and "establish a principle of distribution of values in a social context."

1610


Concurs with the thesis advanced by Konrad Lorenz in his book On Aggression (annotated as Item 932 in v. 2, no. 3, of this bibliography) that human aggression is a true instinct shared by man with the lower animals. Radomalski, a psychoanalyst, suggests that for the understanding of some kinds of human relationships the concept of instinctual aggression may be as fundamental as that of sexuality. He is skeptical, however, of Lorenz' recommendations for the control of this instinct, which, in its political and military manifestations now endangers the survival of the human species.

1611


A multistage Prisoner's Dilemma (MPD) game is presented as a paradigm for a special class of interdependent mixed-motive conflicts. The MPD game is composed of several PD subgames (conflicts) which are interconnected in the sense that each joint decision determines, in addition to the payoff for each player, the next subgame (conflict) to be played. Several experiments are reported, using both male and female players. The results show that players are aware of the delicate strategic considerations involved in the game and are affected by the strategy employed by the other player. When the game is perceived as an individual decision task, the percentage of cooperative behavior increases. A normative model for the MPD game is presented. Its failure to account for the observed results is discussed briefly. (Abstract supplied)

1612


Twenty-four subjects were required to make Anticipation type decisions in a simulated tactical situation. On each trial, the tactical situation required a choice between two targets which could be of the same or different value. The targets also varied from trial to trial with regard to their vulnerability to attack. The subjects participated in pairs—one as an attacker, the other as defender. Despite sizable discrepancies in the mix of strategies employed in particular situations, the patterns of the subjects' responses were similar to those dictated by game theoretic considerations. In general the attackers were better able to predict their opponents' behavior. However, neither group was able to capitalize on the non-optimum behavior of their opponents. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1613


A conversation with Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav Communist hero and author of The New Class and Conversations With Stalin. Djilas now describes himself as a democratic Socialist, a stance not to be confused with either social democracy in the Western sense or Marxism. He predicts the rapid demise of all
I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

ideologies, including that "first truly complete ideology," Marxism, and the development of Communist politics into open and democratic societies. He also discusses the present and future role of American technology in world affairs, which he expects to be enormous, and gives a sympathetic appraisal of Mao Tse-tung's current attempts to break the power of the Chinese Party bureaucracy.


"References": p. 221.

1415 Interpersonal conflict arising from cognitive differences was studied in decisionmaking dyads. Specifically, subjects holding opposing beliefs about the determinants of minority status were paired in a task which required that they predict the future status of minority citizens in hypothetical nations. As expected, it was found that (1) the amount of conflict between subjects' initial predictions was inversely related to subsequent compromise; (2) the amount of compromise by one subject was inversely related to the amount of compromise by the other; and (3) the amount of belief change evidenced during the task was directly related to prior public compromise. (Abstract supplied)


Attempts "to develop information about the tendency of revolutions, regardless of their ideological origins, to pass through certain relatively distinct stages" and "to identify the implications of the process in the context of current and future formulation of foreign policy by the United States." The committee heard testimony on the sociology of revolution, American attitudes toward revolution, and the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions. Most of the testimony suggested that American policymakers do not comprehend basic revolutionary dynamics and hence fail to recognize the limitations that exist on their capacity to influence the course of indigenous revolutionary movements.


The Soviet renegades have recently stepped up their counter-revolutionary collaboration with the U.S. imperialists. Dowing to the wishes of their imperialist masters, the Soviet revisionist thugs agreed to inaugurate a direct New York to Moscow flight for American and Russian airliners and have signed a comprehensive cultural agreement that throws the "door wide open" to the peddling of "U.S. civilization." The reactionary American Government has gladly welcomed the Soviet betrayal and lavished praise upon the traitors for their open attitudes to the West. A recent so-called Soviet fashion show in Washington, D.C., displayed an abundance of Western bourgeois styles, which indicates that even in matters of clothing the Soviet renegade clique has "degenerated into a servile tool of U.S. imperialism."

B. FOREIGN POLICIES


The vast American commitments in the world are based on the assumption that "peace can only be kept by standing ready to meet challenge." This assumption has been put into question by the Vietnam War. There the United States--"discharging a minor commitment"--ran into serious trouble not because it had no business in Asia but because it looked for a purely military solution to politicomilitary problems. A Communist insurgency is ascribed to unbridled American initiatives, often made on the spur of the moment. Editorially, the United States tried to project American technology in world affairs, which he expects to be enormous, and gives a sympathetic appraisal of Mao Tse-tung's current attempts to break the power of the Chinese Party bureaucracy.

ARMs CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

The strain in U.S.-European relations does not derive from a divisive European nationalism but "reflects some basic changes in the international situation that are historical processes in general." America, in the midst of transition to a technocratic society, the Atlantic alliance is fading, and Asia is becoming theopolitical focus of America's foreign policy at a time when the Soviet threat to Western Europe is rapidly diminishing. The emergence of a technocratic society is fostering instability in the world and increasing the need for a new security system that would include Eastern Europe and Russia, the technology gap must be closed through common efforts in such fields as science and education, and a common defense effort must be launched that would include a European ABM system and long-range striking forces possessing global mobility. However, even these efforts will not mollify the fundamental disparity between America's and Europe's international political objectives.

1420 Castro, José de, and Maurice Guenier. MANIFESTO FOR THE THIRD WORLD. Cross currents, v. 18, winter 1966: 1-16.

Calls for a major worldwide cooperative effort to solve the economic problems of the underdeveloped nations. The authors criticize current aid programs as contradictory, wasteful, and inadequate and point out that inequities in international trade more than offset the contributions made to backward nations through foreign aid. They insist the leaders of the Third World itself for their misuses of economic resources, failure to carry out needed reforms, emphasis on prestige, display, and bureaucracy, and lack of creative imagination and initiative. Only through regional organizations (preferably on a continental scale), the globe pooling of intellectual resources, and the restructuring of trade relations between advanced and backward countries can the Third World solve the economic problems that confront it.


Bibliographies: p. 222.

Partial contents. --China and the West. --Congress and U.S. Far East policy. --"China lobbies" on both sides. --Leading figures in U.S. - Far East developments. --Index.

Discusses U.S. foreign policy toward Asia and includes a chronology of events on U.S.-Far Eastern affairs.


Bibliographical references included in "Notes" (p. 553-559).


Arguments that liberal elements in American society have abandoned traditional national interest criteria in formulating foreign policy in favor of "certain abstract ideas about the way the world ought to be in some ideal future." By pursuing policies in time with their idealistic concepts, the liberals have failed to stop the Communist menace and have surrendered "the globe to an enemy whose true character Liberalism refuses to acknowledge." After reviewing the "disasters" of liberal diplomacy during the past two decades Evans suggests policymakers stop fooling themselves and face up to the realities of the cold war by mobilizing America's vast resources to strengthen the free world against Communist aggression.


Contents. --Foreword. --Nazism, behind the swastika. --The "good Germans." --"Germany's burden of her past." --Berlin, beleaguered par. --On the other side of the wall: --Realization possible? The Christian Democrat. --Willy Brandt and the Social Democrat. --Erich Mende and the Free Democratic Party. --The world's most free economy. --No Red unions here. --Where Luther talks with Peter. --Cultural life. --Germany and the rest of the world. --Index.

Discusses Germany's future role in the international community and recounts the history of the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazism. The authors note that, although the Hitler regime will be a blot on German history for all time, West Germany today is making a valuable contribution to the stability of Western Europe. Consequently, it is unlikely that West Germany will fall victim to the horrors that buried the Weimar Republic.

1424 Gregory, Gene. SOVIET EYES ON TOKYO. Far Eastern economic review, v. 60, May 9, 1968: 304-305. HC411.F19, v. 60

An increase in Russian trade, aid, and diplomatic activities in Asia could signal a decisive turning point in the Soviet Union's position in the Far East. Its successful economic and political penetration into Asia is less a result of a more aggressive and realistic policy than an extraordinary consistency of luck combined with an uncanny ability to profit from the misfortunes and ineptitude of others. "Russia's greatest success has been with Japan; trade between the two countries has leaped from $40 million in 1958 to $450 million in


I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

1957. Relations with Tokyo are becoming vital as Great Britain withdraws from Southeast Asia, and Japan is bound to play an important role in any effort to checkmate China. Another reason for the increased trade is that Russia would like to weaken the economic links between Japan and the United States, and, barring sudden Russian intervention in the Vietnam War, one can expect only a gradual strengthening of the Soviet position in Asia.


Slav Rev.
Translated from Pravda, June 28, 1968.
Slav Rev.

Reviews Soviet foreign policy in relation to the problems of German reunification, arms control and disarmament, European security, cliente, the Middle East, and Vietnam. Gromyko notes that since the end of World War II Russia has taken the lead in the search for viable disarmament measures but that they have been consistently disapproved by the United States and its allies.


HC411. FI, v. 12

Based in part on an address by Arthur Goldberg before the National Press Club and comments by Morton H. Halperin, head of the Pentagon's Policy Planning Office.

The United States will be more discriminating in the future about its overseas involvements. When the Vietnam War ends, it is not likely to undertake similar interventions elsewhere, despite its commitments to some Southeast Asia countries. More likely Washington will seek a modus vivendi with Red China to bring about a realization of tensions in that area. If U.S. military involvement becomes necessary, the defense burden will have to be shouldered by the country seeking help. In addition America will stay out of countries that are undergoing internal revolutions and local wars between nations not bound to security agreements with the United States.


U3, W39, v. 12

The core of the foreign policy problem of Federal Germany is: security or risk? The governmental big coalition in Bonn is confronted with this question. New advancements in the policy towards the East are-without new agreement formulations with Western countries, the USA included-incomplete solutions. There is no doubt, relaxation is the substance of most profound importance to Federal Germany's foreign policy. It would mean greater flexibility and renunciation of too rigid doctrines which are blocking change in the "status quo." The reformers as well as the conservatives present a number of political formulas which vacillate between European limitations and Atlantic cooperation, disarmament and establishment of European atomic forces. However, all this will not change the situation as long as the Eastern and Western power blocs stick to their old policies. (Abstract supplied, modified)


AP: H575, 1968

Vietnam, though a blow to American pride and prestige, is not a defeat. Nevertheless, it is certain to be called such by unreconciled hawks who will make that word an angry railing cry and source of deep division in U.S. politics. The American people have had a misleading historical experience with warfare. While Europeans have learned to live with minor setbacks and limited successes, the United States has met only victories, and this has led to the illusion of American omnipotence. It is not quite true that the United States has never had to suffer the frustrations of weakness. The Founding Fathers had to endure humiliations from the British, the French, and even the Barbary pirate kingdoms. But the illusion of omnipotence got its start with Jackson's victory in New Orleans, and the 19th century followed with easy successes over weak opponents in the Western Hemisphere. The protection afforded by geography and the British Fleet during this period reinforced the myth of invincibility, and World Wars I and II did nothing to dispel it. It was in Korea that the United States first had to face the reality of stalemate and compromise, but Americans ignored the lessons of that war and blamed the outcome on a sell-out. Vietnam is a more dreadful Korea. This time Americans must not fail to learn that there are no final cures for the world's ills and that the United States is not all-powerful. They must learn that the struggle with the Communist bloc is not a moral crusade and that it cannot be won by only a superseded. The ability of Americans to overcome their feelings of guilt and failure about Vietnam and to learn these lessons well will be a true test of their political maturity.


HC232. A33, v. 58

Address "Before the Overseas Press Club at New York, N.Y., on April 23, 1968."

World War II released the great flood of demands for emancipation now being pressed by underprivileged groups in the United States and throughout the world. The problem is to find ways to satisfy these legitimate aspirations within a framework of domestic and international order. At the present juncture in world affairs, the United States is faced with three major tasks. First, it must continue through its commitments to the United Nations and to regional organizations to do its part in maintaining international security while concurrently exploiting every opportunity to develop closer more peaceful relations with those states that now threaten the peace. Second, it must find ways to establish effective control over weapons of mass destruction. Third, it must apply its energies and resources to redefining the world and misery that still afflict the great majority of mankind. Recent critics of U.S. policy have overemphasized its negative aspects. American power has a positive and essential contribution to make in deterring aggression and in assisting the rest of mankind to achieve its peaceful and constructive goals.

327
ARMs CONTROL & disarmament

1430 
DDE.29.2333

Appraises West German foreign policy and outlines Jaspers's role in today's world. Jaspers advocates recognition by the German Federal Republic of the Polish-German boundary along the Oder-Neisse and contends that it is in the German and European interest to rely on the alliance with the United States. In addition the Federal Republic should "pursue an all-out policy of peace, not just in words but in confidence-inspiring action."

1431 
APL.2.L547, v. 66.

U.S.-Soviet relations need a new name. The term cold war is no longer used, and detente does not square with the nuclear arms race, the two countries' involvement on opposite sides in Vietnam, and Ulbricht's new pressure on Western traffic with Berlin. Perhaps detente should be translated, as Harlan Cleveland suggests, as "a continuation of tension by other means." For, while areas of agreement are multiplying, differences between the two superpowers, especially in Europe, remain large. The U.S.-Soviet military balance is stable in retrospect only--the fear of a new Russian breakthrough in weapons research is a source of congressional worry "about the adequacy of our own weapons research appropriations" and makes President Johnson proceed cautiously in "acquiring great hope for an early agreement on arms control or a 'missile freeze.'" America's Vietnam involvement has caused the global strategic picture to shift somewhat in Russia's favor, though not in communism's favor. Splits in multinational communities are now serious in Eastern Europe, but the internal difficulties of Russian Communists may probably inhibit a more adventurous Soviet foreign strategy, thus vindicating the American policy of containment. Because Soviet Imperialism today is implemented by commercial credits, arms sales, and cultural and technical aid agreements rather than conspiracy, the United States finds conducting a diplomacy of "peaceful coexistence" easier and safer against a Russia seeking "status, influence and prosperity" than one whose purpose is fomenting subversion.

1432 
DDE.29.23


Urges the American people to be patient in the face of grave world problems and continue to work together to solve these problems. The President emphasizes the difficulty in concluding a durable peace in such troubled areas as Vietnam and the Middle East and points out the importance of building patterns of international cooperation to achieve a lasting peace. He notes that despite the turmoil of the past year, the United States and the Soviet Union have succeeded in negotiating a treaty to bar nuclear weapons from outer space, a civil air agreement, a new consular treaty, and an agreement to assist astronauts downed in either country. Thus while many areas of disagreement still exist between the superpowers, there were improvements in relations between the two countries indicate that progress is possible. By developing new programs of cooperation in such areas as biological undersea exploration, and satellite communications the United States and the Soviet Union can continue "to bridge the gulf that has separated them for a quarter of a century." The President concludes by requesting his fellow citizens to display fortitude and understanding along the slow and tedious path to world order.

1433 
DDE.29.235, v. 16.

Submited to the Bundestag, Mar. 11, 1968.

Defines in general terms the Federal Republic's policy toward Eastern Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and German reunification. Kiesinger stresses Bonn's efforts toward East-West defense and the importance of mutual renunciation of force by the Federal Republic and East European nations. He points at the importance of interests between America and Western Europe in Western Europe security and European unification. But he rejects the idea of a "united Western Europe" within the framework of the Atlantic Imperium as most likely to perpetuate the division of Germany and Europe and to "increase the danger of a major world conflict." To be really useful in reducing tensions the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty must, in the opinion of the Federal Government, "meet the interests of all those who are expected to sign it."

1434 
DDE.29.219, v. 15.

Two major concerns of De Gaulle's foreign policy converge on the issue of the Vietnam War: his desire to return France to the front rank among the world's powers and his hope of preserving the cultural work of France's colonial past. To these must be added considerations of realpolitik that indicate that there can be no military solution to the war and suggest the need to associate Communist China with any settlement. Despite this, Galtier's Vietnam policy differed little from that of the United States until August 1965, when De Gaulle publicly announced a radical break. One international event explains this sudden about face: the signing of the test ban treaty in April. In De Gaulle's view, this treaty symbolized the predominance of the two superpowers and the wish of the United States to perpetuate French military inferiority. In July 1967, De Gaulle escalated his attack by announcing a doctrine of political pathology which ascribed all the world's major ills to U.S. Vietnam policy. This extreme statement must have been motivated by De Gaulle's desire to reinforce his former position in world affairs. The attack also may have been an expression of pique against superior American power. But De Gaulle does seem genuinely fearful that the Vietnam War has created a new climate of violence that increases the
danger of general war. This view deserves respect even though the impracticality and righteousness of its author makes it difficult.


The primary objective of De Gaulle’s state visit to Romania was to convert the “disillusioned” without inviting the wrath of Moscow, but the attitude of the Russians made this a very difficult task. What De Gaulle must watch for during his return to the more liberal East European countries is the “protective” policy of the Soviet Union toward its European satellites; Russia has already been embarrassed by the liberal upheaval in Czechoslovakia, and if De Gaulle wishes to promote a political détente in Europe, his timing will have to be perfect and his methods indirect.


In the name of “aid and trade” the Soviet Union has launched a massive new front, rivaling its penetration of the Middle East, to establish mastery over the vital reaches of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Chief beneficiary of this aid and trade is India, which has become increasingly belligerent toward its neighbors, especially Pakistan. The giant subcontinent is not only totally dependent on Russia for maintenance and growth of its military hardware but is also negotiating the leasing of two naval bases to the Soviet Union in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These facts are disturbing Western leaders. It remains to be seen what effect they will have on India’s domestic problems; Russian political and economic penetration have certainly not made these problems any more soluble.


Translated from Izvestia, June 12, 1968. [Slav] Rm

Public opinion in the United States today favors better Soviet-U.S. relations. No candidate in the U.S. presidential election campaign can afford a tough anti-Soviet position. People are aware that “Soviet aggressiveness is a myth.” The Soviet Union is primarily concerned to follow closely the Communist Party’s general line in “creating the most favorable conditions for successful Communist construction in the U.S.S.R.,” and facilitating progress, all over the world, and views favorably every initiative towards peace in the U.S.R. by “realistically thinking” bourgeois political and governmental. The United States, on the other hand, indulges only in bombastic declarations that are not followed by practical deeds. The President’s assurance that the Vietnam War and the Middle East crises have not affected prospects for peace are false. The present U.S. policy is incompatible with peace. It even freezes cultural Soviet-U.S. relations. Although Russia is prepared to develop normal businesslike relations with the United States, it cannot be indifferent to U.S. policy toward other countries. A policy of armed intervention can only meet with rebuff. Peace and security cannot be achieved by good wishes alone but by constructive, practical deeds.


The security of East Asia is vital to the United States, and the future of Europe depends on the events that are now taking place in this part of the world. China is capitalizing on racial rivalries and challenging the revolt of Asia against the United States. And America is losing its foothold in Southeast Asia: the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization is deteriorating; relations between Tokyo and Peking, on the basis of trade potential, are likely to improve; and the Chinese Nationalists are important without the support of the United States. The lack of an Asian regional security system and of cohesion among its Asian allies will force the United States to abandon the fight against Chinese expansionism.


U.S. policy in Asia has been hampered not so much by blind anticommuism as by the historical obsession with China’s expansionist propensities. Continuance of China is "intellectually inadmissible and historically naive as the basis of America’s Asian policy." The humiliation of negotiating with a country whose size has taught the United States that the error of Vietnam should not be repeated. However, "no more Vietnams" must not become a new foreign policy in itself. A happy medium must be struck between those who see all revolutions as Communist inspired and those who advocate a Fortress America. Indeed, a logical policy would recognize that some countries can develop stable non-Communist governments and that others, no matter what the United States does, cannot.


The experience of war with the Soviet Union in 1939-40 taught the Finns to expect no help from the West in settling their differences with the Russians and convinced them of the feasibility of maintaining a strong national defense of their own. From their relations with Germany in World War II they learned that advances with Great Powers limit their freedom and that Finnish geography and terrain make it possible to escape becoming a major theater of conflict. After the war Finland chose neutrality rather than alignment with either the East or West, though they were realistic enough to accept formalization of their special relationship to the Soviet Union in 1948. Since then the Finns have directed their efforts toward making their neutrality credible, particularly to the Soviet Union. The Finns’ concern is to assure that Finland is not used to stage an attack on the U.S.S.R., and this coincides...
with Finland's own wish to remain neutral. The Finns recognize that their neutrality will be credible only if they possess an adequate defensive shield of their own and so maintain a small but effective military establishment. They have attempted to change their environment as well as adapt to it. They strongly support the United Nations and proposals for arms control agreements in the Nordic region. On the other hand they have rejected a Nordic defense pact on the reasonable ground that they do not want to upset their currently satisfactory relations with the Soviet Union.

1441 Pick, Otto, and Roger Tilford. GAULISM BEYOND THE RHINE. International journal, v. 23, spring 1965:
234-243.

West Germany continues to refer to Gaullist France on all major foreign policy matters. The explanation for this is simple: the economic success of the Common Market has made its members unwilling to jeopardize the organization by opposing De Gaulle on political questions. Nevertheless, Gaullist policy presents Germany with agonizing choices affecting its security. With the further erosion of NATO, the Federal Republic must either go nuclear, come to terms with the Soviet Union, or put itself under the protection of the French forces de frappe. Each of these alternatives has serious drawbacks. The influence of Gaullism on German domestic policy is also significant. The Gaullist Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands is morbidly anti-American and a champion of a racial and cultural version of German nationalism. As one foreign policy demand is German reuniification based on extensive revisions of the frontier with Poland. The Gaullisten of the Christlich-Sosiale Union are more moderate but also more influential since they are members of the Grand Coalition. The influence of these two parties, bolstered by the Gaullist example, has made German nationalism respectable again and brought about a definite shift to the right in German politics. The stability of the Adenauer years was due to a unique set of circumstances, and German democracy did not put down deep roots. It is not surprising that De Gaulle's authoritarian stance for party politics finds a sympathetic audience in Germany, where today there is a growing disenchantment with parliamentary democracy.

1442 Rosenfeld, Stephen S. MOSCOW'S FRENCH AFFAIR. Interplay of European/American affairs, v. 1, May 1968: 8-16.

De Gaulle's "Europe of fatherlands" is less a general political strategy than a "sentimental conception of tactical convenience for him." There can be no parallel disengagement of the superpowers—which is the basis of De Gaulle's strategy to reconstitute the unity of Europe—because Russia is part of Europe, while the United States is tied to the Continent through "food, habit, treaty and the cosmopolitan quality that goes with great power." Indeed, the Russians have grave doubts as to the efficacy of Gaullism. They are uneasy about the improvement of Franco-German relations and not unaware that Gaullist nationalism is contagious and may spread to Eastern Europe. Consequently, Russia is unwilling to accept France as an ally. France can disturb the United States, harass NATO, and support Russian causes such as the Vietnam War; but it cannot add to the security of the Soviet Union, resolve the division of Europe, or tame Germany in the way the Russians demand. The division and vulnerability of

Germany and the need to prevent political misunderstandings precludes any quick Russian takeover in Europe, even after the withdrawal of American troops.


APL: A63, v. 15
Translated from Literarno gazeta, Moscow, News

There are signs that relations between West Germany and China are becoming closer. Economic interchange between the two countries is increasing, and West Germany is aiding China's military development and its nuclear arsenal by manufacturing weapons of mass destruction and exporting them to the People's Republic. As the structure of NATO begins to crumble, the revanchist leaders in West Germany, who had hoped for a nuclear showdown between the superpowers and who relied on China to become the third great thermonuclear power, must rethink West Germany's position in the alliance. They realize the enmity of people and disarray talks, which would eliminate the obstacles in the path of European union. They fear an end to the Vietnam War and are becoming increasingly aware that, as the peace talks progress, West Germany is becoming progressively isolated from the Western political scene. China, likewise an isolated country with a dismal record in attaining security, is searching for a viable one with other countries. A NATO collapse could lead to a Bonn-Peking alliance under Franz Josef Strauss and Mao Tse-tung.


"Address made before the Manchester, N.H., Chamber of Commerce on March 22," 1968.
Defends current administration policy in the Vietnam War. Rostow stresses the continuity of the present policy with that put into effect by President Truman after World War II and followed by every administration since then. American policy is based on the conviction that U.S. security is dependent on international stability and that stability can be assured only if Americans are willing to commit themselves to the defense of weaker states threatened by Communist aggression. In the recent past, Americans have been willing to assume the burdens imposed by these commitments, but now that the Vietnam War has made honoring our pledges more costly, many are calling for a retreat into a new isolationism. Isolation, however, is impossible in the modern world. President Johnson has made many reasonable efforts to find a formula for a negotiated settlement to the conflict or a reduction of the level of violence, but the North Vietnamese want neither. With the exception of those who call for outright surrender or massive escalation, no critic of the administration has proposed a solution substantially different from the present policy of firmness and restraint.


JXX32, A33, v. 50
I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

"Address made before the Commonwealth Club of California at San Francisco, Calif., on May 3," 1968.

Rostow. Eugene V. THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY, PARTNERS IN WORLD SECURITY. In U.S. Dept. of State, Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Apr. 29, 1968: 563-566.

"Address made before the American-Turkish Society" in New York on Apr. 4, 1968.

Reinforces Turkish-American friendship and mutual defense arrangements. Rostow dismantle charges that American concern with problems at home and in Southeast Asia will provide a decline of interest in NATO or a retreat into isolationism. A successful attack on domestic problems can only strengthen American influence abroad, and present American resources--while not unlimited--are sufficient to deal with issues on the homefront and meet our commitments abroad, both in Asia and in Europe. Furthermore, the real lesson of the Vietnam War is that regional security arrangements with U.S. participation are more essential than ever to the peace and survival of the free world.

Rusk, Dean. THE BUSINESS OF BUILDING A PEACE. In U.S. Dept. of State, Department of State bulletin, v. 58, May 6, 1968: 579-583.

Address "made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington, D. C., on Apr. 17," 1968.

Defends postwar U.S. foreign policy. The paramount objective of this policy has always been to establish and maintain an effective system of collective security. When very early the Soviet veto paralyzed the Security Council of the United Nations, the United States turned to regional security arrangements. The value of these defensive pacts lies in their effectiveness in deterring aggression. Their effectiveness is directly a matter of credibility, and the latter is precisely what is being called into question in Vietnam. This concern with security does not mean that the United States opposes change. On the contrary, the record of recent Soviet-U.S. relations in such areas as arms control and East-West trade shows that the United States is willing to accept and in fact seeks to promote change. The record is equally clear with respect to the problems raised by technological change and the need of the developing nations for foreign assistance.


"Address made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington, D. C., on Apr. 17," 1968.

Sreens that military blocs have become an anachronism and calls for their disappearance and for "mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty and equality of states." Romania attaches special value to its bilateral relations with other countries.


Evaluates West Germany's new policy of detente with the Soviet bloc. Sommer reviews apparently the course of Bonn's relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and East Germany during the last stages of the Grand Coalition. The new Ostpolitik is a genuine change of course for the Federal Republic. In summation, "reunification through détente," is a complete about-face from the Adenauer years, when reunification was held to be prerequisite to any relaxation of tensions with the Eastern regimes. So far Bonn has met with more rebuffs than successes because the Communist states continue to be skeptical of the good faith of the West German initiatives. Progress will come only when the specter of revanchism has been laid to rest and the Communist leaders recognize that Bonn is sincere in its search for "peace and amicable understanding" with the East.


Since NATO in a response to Soviet policy, any discussion of its future must take into account Russia's approach to relations with the West. The overriding concern of the czars was to secure their empire against intrusions from Western Europe through participation in the European balance of power and extension of Russia's western frontier. The early Soviet leaders tried to substitute world revolution for great power politics but soon had to revive traditional diplomatic methods. Between the wars the effectiveness of this diplomacy was limited, but victory in World War II permitted Russia to push its frontiers westward and establish friendly states in Eastern Europe. Its hope of playing the dominant role in Western Europe was frustrated, however, when its military activity and ideological aggressiveness united the West and raised East-West tensions almost to the breaking point. To extricate itself from this situation the Soviet Union has tried three different tactics. The first approach, brinkmanship, is really worthless since every confrontation confirms the superiority of American power. A second approach has been to call for dissolution of separate military alliances and formation of a general concert of Europe. The Russians have been more consistent in following this policy, but it is doubtful that they actually want to see it realized. A third alternative is to recognize that regional organizations play a positive role in the search for security and that détente is possible precisely because these organizations have created the requisite stability. Even the Soviet Union stands to benefit from the continuance of NATO and the Common Market since they keep Germany subordinated.
to higher political values, restrict the proliferation of decision centers controlling nuclear weapons, and restrain West European states from using their more powerful economies to dominate Eastern Europe. Unfortunately the Soviet Union remains blind to these benefits because of the fragility of its own East Euro-
pean system and the rigidity of Communist ideology.

1451

Stirnai, Mayis. [THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN SECUI-
RITY: A LETTER FROM HUNGARY] K probléome
szérszékel bezposamost: pláno zv Vengrii. Miszemvai
ekonomika i mezhdunarndnyo otnoshenia, no. 6, 1969;
81-83.

The foreign policy of Hungary, as a Socialist state
and member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO),
while supporting the principle of peaceful coexistence
and promoting cooperation that would lead to social
progress, seeks a reduction of tensions, East-West
diastente, and a new concept of a united Europe in which
large and small states would be equal. Hungary joins
the other Socialist states in the desire to prevent any
renewal of NATO or its modernization when the North
Atlantic Treaty expires and recommends acceptance of
the Bucharest Conference's proposal for a simultaneous
disbanding of NATO and WTO. The reconstitutisation
of Western Germany, its attempts to gain nuclear weapons,
and its tolerance of growing revanchist tendencies are
all considered a threat by Hungary. The existence of
two German states is today a fact, which may help—not hinder—German reunification. But German
reunification requires the recognition of East Germany
as a sovereign state, renunciation of nuclear weapons
by both Germanies, normalization of relations between
the two German states, improved relations between
NATO and WTO member states, and general avoidance
of aggressive acts that endanger peace in Europe.

Although a normalization of relations with the capitalist
states, including the United States, is basically accept-
able, it can succeed only if the sovereignty and the spe-
cial path to socialism chosen by individual European
countries, particularly Hungary, is respected. Hun-
gary welcomes the loosening of West European ties
with the United States and improvement of relations
with Eastern Europe and is trying to establish friendly
relations with noncapitalist and capitalist countries in the
Danube Basin. Hungary recommends the convoca-
tion of a conference on European security to be
attended by all European states, as well as a meeting
of the members of parliaments to discuss constructive
ways for easing tensions, and establishment of a sys-
tem of collective security based on an agreement
between these countries.

1452

Thompson, David. PRESIDENT DE GAULLE AND THE
MEGAPOLIS CORDILL. International Journal, v. 23, spring
1968: 111-220.

De Gaulle's foreign policy is formulated within a frame-
work of "geopolitical determinism and historical fatal-
ism," but its content derives from De Gaulle's own ver-
does of Eastern Europe is the fallacy. To meet these
problems Canada will strengthen its international ties,
review its military role in NATO and the North Ameri-
can Defense Command, participate in social and eco-
nomic development programs in underdeveloped areas,
recognize mainland China, and establish a new and
more effective aid agency, the Canadian International
Development Agency. One of the most important
problems is Africa. Unless it is recognized and

foremost of asserting French independence. So far the
policy has a self-defeating and led to the isolation of
France in international as well as enemies. Some argue
that De Gaulle's antagonistic policy toward Britain is
based on an irrational love-hate attitude toward the
British and that the latest trend toward in their
relations with France until the general has departed.
This is a facile argument on which to found a foreign
policy. Britain should recognize that it is in its inter-
est to have a strong and stable France, even if it is a
Gaullists one. It should recognize too that the lesser
organization De Gaulle built imposed on Europe benefits
by making participation in continental affairs much easier. For the long run, of course, British pol-
icy should be to integrate the United Kingdom into
those who represent the new forces in France and
who are certain to inherit the French state from the
Gaullists.

1453

Thomson, Hugh. DE GAULLE AND THE PARTIES.

De Gaulle condemns French political parties for
dividing the nation and playing petty politics. In his
view this divisiveness and irresponsibility can be
suppressed only by endowing the state with the author-
ity and continuity of a strong and impartial executive. In
1958 he enshrined these ideas in the constitution of the
Fifth Republic and set to work to heal national dis-
tensions. External commitments—principally the Empire
and NATO—were the major sources of disharmony.

De Gaulle liquidated the Empire, and, with the thaw in
the cold war, began his disassociation from NATO. He
turned French energies to a liberal aid program to
ex-colonies and the creation of the force de frappe.
The initial outcome of his success in stabilizing French
political life was a resurgence of confidence in that party
fragments he had hoped to eradicate, but here the new
constitutinal structure. The popular election of the
President not only gives him independent power, but
forces the political parties to move toward the
center and unite into two broad groupings—Gaullists and
Leftists—in order to contend for the office. The
Gaullist constitution promotes these developments but
De Gaulle's reorientation of French foreign policy
makes them possible in the first place.

1454

Trudeau, Pierre. A NEW LOOK AT THE WORLD. In
Canada, Dept. of External Affairs: Information Divi-
sion. Canadian weekly bulletin, v. 23, June 5, 1968:
1-30,

De Gaulle's foreign policy is formulated within a frame-
work of "geopolitical determinism and historical fatal-
ism," but its content derives from De Gaulle's own ver-
does of Eastern Europe is the fallacy. To meet these
problems Canada will strengthen its international ties,
review its military role in NATO and the North Ameri-
can Defense Command, participate in social and eco-
nomic development programs in underdeveloped areas,
recognize mainland China, and establish a new and
more effective aid agency, the Canadian International
Development Agency. One of the most important
problems is Africa. Unless it is recognized and

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accepted into the international community the other problems will be difficult to resolve.

Although he denied the inevitability of war as between the two nations, the Under Secretary concludes that it is only realistic to expect any improvement in relations to be a slow process and one over which the United States has limited influence.

Comments on a few of the misunderstandings and misconceptions regarding the evolution of U.S. policy toward both mainland China and the Chinese Republic or Taiwan, Katzenbach claims that, although the United States has made repeated efforts to avoid hostile relations and to maintain contact with Communist China, Communist authorities have rejected its proposals and purposely followed an anti-U.S. policy. While maintaining that the question of United States-Chinese Communist relations cannot be considered apart from the relationship between the United States and the Republic of China, Katzenbach contends that if and when the Chinese Communists desire improved relations the United States will be willing to respond.

Address by Under Secretary Nicholas Katzenbach before the National Press Club on May 21, 1968.

THE UNITED STATES AND RED CHINA, In U.S. Dept. of State, Department of State Newsletter, no. 88, July 1968, p. 6-9.

The United States and Red China: The United States has made repeated efforts to avoid hostile relations and to maintain contact with Communist China, Communist authorities have rejected its proposals and purposely followed an anti-U.S. policy. While maintaining that the question of United States-Chinese Communist relations cannot be considered apart from the relationship between the United States and the Republic of China, Katzenbach contends that if and when the Chinese Communists desire improved relations the United States will be willing to respond. Although he denied the inevitability of war as between the two nations, the Under Secretary concludes that it is only realistic to expect any improvement in relations to be a slow process and one over which the United States has limited influence.


Traces Sino-American relations on the basis of extensive, mostly unpublished material, with special attention to U.S. policy toward China. Zhdanov tries to demonstrate how the Americans exploited the contradiction policy of the Mao Tse-tung group for their purposes in the Vietnam War and to intensify international tensions.
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A. MODERN WAR


Warns against overstatements of the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Korean regime and Red China appears to temper Soviet and Chinese tendencies toward military adventurism.

Chaney, Otto P. THE AGONY OF SOVIET MILITARY HISTORIANS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Military review, v. 46, June 1966: 24-28. 20723.095, v. 46

Under Stalin and Khrushchev, Soviet military historiography was more concerned with cataloging the wartime role of the Communist Party and its top leadership than in accurately recounting historical events. Since Khrushchev's fall, a more objective trend in the writing of military history has appeared. The 1965 publication of a new one-volume history of the Great Patriotic War is a landmark in this respect. This work was met with a laudatory review in Izvestia and has been followed by the release of a number of frank and sometimes controversial memoirs by major military commanders, such as Marshal Zhukov. Publication of these memoirs has in turn provoked a flood of critical reviews and articles on various aspects of the World War II fighting in Russia. The practical implications of this reassessment have been recognized by the Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Defense Minister, Marshal Gogoradze. As he stated in 1965, "an incorrect factual picture of military phenomena or events inevitably leads to erroneous theoretical conclusions and as a consequence to unsubstantiated practical recommendations."


The solution of a general deterrence model for two-sided battles between heterogeneous forces is obtained under the assumption that (1) interaction between the two sides takes place by an exchange of volleys, (2) the participating units follow a prescribed attack pattern rather than adapting to behavior to the situation, and (3) target survival is stochastically independent of the actions of other fire units. (Abstract supplied)


Total nuclear war, with its unrestricted use of nuclear weapons, is not the only possible form of nuclear conflict. An important criterion for classification of nuclear wars in violence—what kinds of nuclear weapons are to be used, in what volume they will be used, and against what sort of targets. The determinant for all these limitations is the economy of the means for making the enemy defenseless. Rendering him defenseless, not his extinction, is the war’s military goal. Since thermonuclear weapons are designed to obliterate the enemy, thermonuclear war fails to qualify as a rational means to that end. However, the use of nuclear weapons within the limits of a chosen or accepted type of war should be left in military hands. The decision on the type of war and on the war itself must be political. Hence, the importance of a clear delineation of the kinds of nuclear war. The geographical scope in which nuclear weapons are to be employed is the most decisive factor for discrimination between tactical and strategic nuclear wars. The goal of tactical nuclear war is to render the enemy
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

defenseless on the battlefield, not in his hinterland. Employment of atomic weapons in strategic nuclear war is limited in support to the military campaign. Nuclear air war constitutes an important part, or even possibly a separate type of strategic nuclear war. The limitations of strategic nuclear war would restrict the theater of a Soviet-Western nuclear war to Europe leaving the United States and the areas east of the Urals outside the theater. The vulnerability of air strips would greatly impede the landing of American forces in Western Europe; thus American big lift operations would hardly compensate for the proposed withdrawals of U.S. troops from Europe. Total nuclear war serves no rational purpose, but the enormity of human nature nevertheless makes it possible. Its conduct belongs to technicians and economists; the military play only a marginal role.

1462

Reviews the development of strategic thought since World War I. Lauersen considers modern forms of total war and the Communist threat to the West both from the Soviet Union and Red China. Only consolidation of Western Europe and European-African unity can save the West from Communist domination. For the time being, however, the disproportion in forces between the West, the Soviet Union, and Red China keeps that danger at bay.

1463

References: p. 507-508.

A penetrator, P, attempts to cross a linear barrier patrolled by a searcher, S. S receives intermittent reports of P's position, P1, P2, Pn, but P knows only that S is somewhere on the barrier. After receiving reports P1, time t may elapse before the next report P2 may reveal that S is unable to intercept P even if the received continuous information theretore. S attempts to select a position (S) that maximizes t, while P attempts to choose a course 0 that minimizes t. If the searcher is faster than the penetrator (speed ratios A:L), values of A and (S) that produce maximum t are deduced. However, maximum t, minimum t, and P is obliged to use a mixed strategy in order to obtain the maximum. If the barrier is finite, contours of constant maximum t are segments of conic sections. If A:L, S should modify the maximum t strategy when P is close to the barrier. An indication is given of the frequency with which reports are needed as P approaches the barrier. (Abstract supplied)

1464

Bibliographical footnotes.


1465


Outlines naval warfare since ancient times. Neukirchen considers Soviet naval strategy and the only guarantee of today's freedom of the seas.

1466

Develops a set of Lanchester-type equations modeling small force guerrilla engagements that are typical of the early stages of insurgency. These equations include the effects of supporting weapons and the discipline or morale of the troops involved. The novelty of this treatment from the mathematical point of view is the use of time-dependent weapon-efficiency coefficients. Although the models and theory are not adequate to predict the outcome of an insurgency, they should prove useful for examining the credibility of casualty claims associated with such conflict. In addition, the models provide useful insight regarding the important attack parameters of guerrilla warfare. In some cases, notably those concerning Afghanistan, the theory suggests new military hardware that in the past has been difficult to justify on analytical grounds. (Abstract supplied, modified)
B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1468 [ATOMIC ENERGY: ULTRACENTRIFUGE; BAN BRO- 
eclet, Wolfgang. [DEPENDENCE OF NAVAL WAR- 
Jaguar reconnaissance version. A description of the v.

1474 Candlin, A. H. STRATEGIC POTENTIAL OF THE 

1475 Breyer, S. [NEW SHIPS OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL 
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1476 Steinort, Wolfgang. [DEPENDENCE OF NAVAL WAR- 
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1477 Dresher, Frank A. EMPHASIS GROWS ON MILITARY 
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1478 [ATOMIC ENERGY: ULTRACENTRIFUGE; BAN BRO- 
Kugel, Z. ATOMIC ENERGY: ULTRACENTRIFUGE. 

1479 [BAC/BREGUET JAGUAR; TACTICAL COMBAT AIR- 

1480 BAC/BREGUET JAGUAR; TACTICAL COMBAT AIR- 
BAC/Breguet Jaguar. This programme includes the building and 

1481 Breyer, S. [NEW SHIPS OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL 
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1482 Dresher, Frank A. EMPHASIS GROWS ON MILITARY 
and their adaptability to various types of waterways, the 

1483 Dutta, J. S. OH SAY, YOU CAN SEE; AIR FORCE AND 
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1484 Beaumont, Roger. A. THE POTENTIAL OF AIR-CUSHION 
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1486 Means, Roger. A. THE POTENTIAL OF AIR-CUSHION 
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1487 Feinhorst, Wolfgang. [DEPENDENCE OF NAVAL WAR- 
because their seaworthiness in adverse weather conditions 

1488 [ATOMIC ENERGY: ULTRACENTRIFUGE; BAN BRO- 
the effects of weather conditions on naval communica- 

1489 [ATOMIC ENERGY: ULTRACENTRIFUGE; BAN BRO- 
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1538 Beauford, J. A. THE POTENTIAL OF AIR-CUSHION 
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1539 Feinhorst, Wolfgang. [DEPENDENCE OF NAVAL WAR- 
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H. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

UL.125, v. 12

The "Arbeitsgemeinschaft Entwicklungsgurte Eld" was established in Munich in 1958 . . . to develop a vertical take-off aircraft . . . While VJ 101 CX-1, a vertical take-off aircraft, achieved horizontal supersonic flight for the first time in the world, the 3-2 model accomplished a first . . . by flying through the entire transition phase with afterburner engines. Since the transformation of EWR into a . . . limited liability company the Bilkow group holds a 50% share in this company. Later on the EWR became a partner of the Republic Aviation Division of Fairchild-Hiller Corp. on the basis of a bilateral government agreement between Federal Germany and the USA . . . to develop the advanced aircraft weapon system AVS. In the present report authentic cost figures of the AVS project are published for the first time. After termination of the System Definition Phase, the . . . project was stopped by agreement of both countries. The present main task of EWR is to design the NKF weapon system (NKF stands for "Neue Kampfliegzeug") in partnership with Bilkow and VFW. The system is destined to serve as a successor of P-104 G and FIAT G.91. (Abstract supplied, modified)


Discusses the Civil Engineering Branch of the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, which formulates research and development programs to support the requirements of the Air Force civil engineer. The major operating sections of the Branch include protective structures, facilities technology, experimental, and special projects. The Civil Engineering Branch may one day help fill the critical need for a central point for coordination and direction of these Air Force programs.


Describes the present state of French nuclear weapons technology and the probable composition of French strategic forces through the mid-1970s. Detonation of a hydrogen bomb and several enriched uranium nuclear warheads in tests this summer will be a major step forward for the French, but pressing problems may force them to postpone any further improvements. Probably a compromise will be worked out: full planned deployment of second and third generation strategic weapons systems but postponement of improved tactical weapons until the early 1970s.


Surveys the antitank weapons of 10 countries, from Australia's Malkara, the largest antitank missile, to Japan's most advanced missile, the MAT (TAT-M-I). U.S. antitank missiles described are the TOW, Dragon, and Shillelagh.

UAT.435


Examines the strategic implications of modern technology and reports the growth and development of Soviet scientific and technological capabilities. The study emphasizes that "for the Soviets, political defense does not mean a scientific and technological defense in military affairs." American policymakers must not be deceived by the philosophy of a technological plateau, because the Soviet Union has given no indication that it will discontinue its drive for strategic supremacy in the coming decades. In order to meet the Soviet threat the United States "must continue to build an expanding base of technology that can both advance our own capabilities for new systems and reduce reaction time when a new weapon actually appears in the arsenal of the potential enemy."

1781 Hsia, Roland. THE LONG MARCH OF CHINESE SCIENCE. Science journal, v. 4, Apr. 1968: 78-84. Illus. QL.557, v. 4

While Communist China is in many respects a scientifically underdeveloped country, in the opinion of four French scientists who recently toured many Chinese facilities, the latter are bound by their devotion to Chairman Mao and concentrate on "blaze new trails" and develop totally new techniques. All four French scientists agreed that whether this will happen remains to be seen; they emphasized that China has come a long way and has not yet been deterred by the obstacles along the difficult road to scientific success.


An appraisal of the strength and role of the Norwegian Navy. Hegland discusses at length the moderniz-
1488

**How Silent, How Deep, Will Future Subs Run?**

*Business Week, no. 2055, June 26, 1966, 85, 86. HC431, B57, 1965*

Revels a Pentagon controversy "over the shape and performance of U.S. nuclear subs yet to come."

Whereas Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover is pushing for development of radially improved attack submarines, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, John S. Foster, is willing to settle for evolutionary changes in design. The final decision will depend largely on estimates of Soviet technology. However, Rickover has already won considerable congressional support even though his proposal would mean expenditures of $800 million per sub compared to the $35 million for Foster's Sturgeon-class sub.

1489

**The Future of Armour.**


Describes the systems and potential role in future strategic forces of the Jaguar airplane. The Jaguar was developed through Franco-British cooperation and describes the systems and potential role in future strategic forces of the Jaguar airplane. The Jaguar was developed through Franco-British cooperation and has laid the foundation for possible future collaboration at various decisionmaking levels in weapons procurement.

1490

**Interview with Robert W. Walls, Commander, Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center (TARC), Shaw Air Force Base, concerning the development and needs of U.S. aerial reconnaissance.**


Interview with Robert W. Walls, Commander, Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center (TARC), Shaw Air Force Base, concerning the development and needs of U.S. aerial reconnaissance. Until TARC's establishment in 1959, the Department of Defense had no agency to coordinate tactical development. In 1967 TARC incorporated into its mission tactical electronic warfare support, which exploits enemy vulnerability to electronic warfare operations. Walls notes that without TARC it would be difficult to determine where the threat exists in time of conflict and in emergencies. He concludes that industry is not addressing the total systems concept in tactical reconnaissance; e.g., instant processing and transmission of the target image to a point or instant relay of target analysis to ground units that need reconnaissance intelligence.

1491

**King, Harry K. The Mighty USS New Jersey Joins the Navy.**


Because of the offensive power of its 16-inch main battery and the defensive strength of its 19-inch armor, the U.S.S. New Jersey has been recommissioned and assigned to shore bombardment missions off Vietnam. The Vietnam War has revealed a continuing need for smaller caliber gunfire support vessels; missiles lack the firepower, accuracy, and economy of naval gunfire. At present the range of the Navy's big guns cannot match that of many missiles, but research promises the possibility of firing a 16-inch shell as much as 100 miles. Misgivings have been expressed about the austere conditions under which the New Jersey will have to operate, particularly its reduced crew size. Others are worried that the North Vietnamese, for reasons of prestige, will stop at nothing to destroy the ship. Styx missiles, reportedly to be installed along the North Vietnam coast, pose a definite threat, though presumably the New Jersey will be equipped with electronic countermeasures. The New Jersey is only a stopgap; new vessels will be needed to provide future gunfire support capability. A step in the right direction is the FY 1969 preliminary budgeting for a gunfire support ship, which will combine the accuracy and destructiveness of big guns with the saturation capability of rockets.

1492

**London, Michael P. Advanced Strategic Missiles.**

*Space/aeronautics, v. 19, June 1966: 59-69. TLS45, AT60, v. 40*

Discusses a wide range of techniques for assuring the survivability and penetrability of U.S. offensive missile forces. Since an ICBM must be able to survive a hostile environment in order to succeed as a deterrent, U.S. military experts are increasingly concerned with improving missile defenses. While most experts do not go to the extreme of advocating ABM deployment for missile protection, they are examining methods for hardening ICBM launch sites, concealing the missiles during flight, and overcoming the enemy's terminal defenses.

1493

**Lynn, Norman. [General Dynamics F-111—A Situation Report]**


No other US aircraft programme has been the butt of so much controversy as the General Dynamics F-111 superonic two-man, all-weather, multi-purpose weapon system—the world's first production aircraft with variable sweep wings. Our progress report on the F-III views the status of the programme. The F-111 missions, the major contracts covering the programme, the programme objectives as well as the criticism which chiefly centers around the F-111B Navy.
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT


History of the Navy's fast deployment logistic (FDL) ship project. Established in 1965, the project was based on the need for a seapower force for rapid deployment of troops and supplies. The Navy applied initial package, multiyear procurement concepts to the FDL in order to stimulate the modernization of U. S. shipbuilding facilities and techniques, lower the average cost of ships, encourage standardization in ship components, and increase industry's contribution to ship design and construction methods. Concerned that the FDL would encourage the United States to assume the role of world policeman and that it would be operated in competition with the merchant marine, Congress did not appropriate funds for the project for FY 1968. However, the Defense Department still agreed there is a need for the FDL program and plans to reembrace it in its FY 1969 budget request.


Gauges the threat of the Soviet Navy's surface-to-surface missiles (SSM's). They are an inexpensive and superior substitute for aircraft carriers. Since the U. S. Navy's SSM defenses are adequate, scarce funds are better spent in strengthening the fleet air arm than in bolstering fleet defenses or developing a U. S. SSM.


From 1964 to 1967 China conducted seven nuclear tests (the sixth was of a hydrogen bomb). Peking is now striving to produce smaller hydrogen bombs and long-range ballistic missiles, instead of bombers and medium-range missiles, in order to establish a nuclear parity with Russia and the United States. China has a gaseous diffusion plant at Lushow, with an annual capacity of over 100 kg. of uranium-235; the 100, 000 kw. Pebble Reactor, fueled with uranium and producing 10 kg. of plutonium per year, mainly for research; the Yumen atomic energy plant, producing about 200 kg. of plutonium-239 annually; and the Halian plant, which concentrates on the development of nuclear bombs. At present China has about 360 kg. of uranium-235--enough to produce 50 to 80 uranium atomic bombs, and the Yumen plant's capacity is estimated by American experts at 200 kg., which is enough for 20 to 30 plutonium bombs. The Americans expect China to possess 100 hydrogen bombs by 1970. In addition China has a substantial number of missile-producing plants and three testing grounds. The Western Ningxia Testing Center is the largest; it includes an assembly shop, hangar, test station, control station, six test positions, and tracking and logistic facilities and is probably preparing for the testing of long-range missile and launching facilities. In 1967 Secretary McNamara estimated that China would be able to test-fire an intercontinental missile by the end of 1967 or early 1968 and will possess a postion-class nuclear warheads and intercontinental missiles by 1970. Evidently China is going all out to develop these weapons.


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ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Text of the Pugwash Conference paper prepared by
C. P. Barnaby, F. Calogero, L. Prawitz, and Deloitte.

Analyzes the possible effects of the development and
deployment of the superpower ADM systems. In the
opinion of the authors the ADM will start a new arms
race, cancel progress already made in the area of
arms control, and dim prospects for disarmament.

1968

REACTORS OF THE WORLD. In International Atomic
QC770.14955, v. 10
This is an amendment to the list published in v. 10,
of the Bulletin. See Item no. 1033, v. 4, no. 3,
of this bibliography.

Lists nuclear power reactors operating or under
construction. It states belonging to the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Name, location, type, net output, and
criticality date are given for each reactor.

1969

Scholin, Allan R. A MISSILE AND SPACE GALLERY.
Air Force and Space Digest, v. 51, June 1969: 27-38,
75-76, 81-82, 87-98.
U633.A65, v. 51
Lists the booster systems and missile and space
vehicles deployed or under development by the U.S.
Air Force, Army, and Navy. Each weapon is catego-
rized by branch of service and followed by a descrip-
tion of its general characteristics, status, and contrac-
tors.

1969

Spence, Rodric K. THE ROVER NUCLEAR ROCKET
Q1.S73, v. 160
Outlines the progress and underlying concepts of the
Rover nuclear rocket research and development pro-
gram, which was begun in 1955. Although the basic
principles of nuclear rocket engines are relatively
simple, difficulties in the area of materials develop-
ment, reactor design and analysis, neutronics, instru-
mentation and controls, and reactor testing must be
overcome before an operational model can be construc-
ted. Under the guidance of the Space Nuclear Propul-
sion Office (a joint office of the National Aeronautics
and Space Agency and the Atomic Energy Agency) many
of the problems have been overcome, and ground tests
will begin sometime this year on the real engine
configuration. However, experts predict it will still
be many years before the development of an operat-
ional nuclear rocket stage is completed.

1969

Starbird, Alfred D. THE SENTINEL ANTI-BALLISTIC
MISSILE PROGRAM. Signal, v. 22, July 1968: 32-33,
U5.L65, v. 22
Address by General Starbird, Sentinel System Manag-
er, at the Armed Forces Communications and Elec-
tronics Association convention.

Discusses earlier ballistic missile defense systems,
beginning with the initial Nike-Zeus program in 1958,
and the six Sentinel subsystems, including the Sprint
and Spartan missiles and perimeter acquisition radar
network. General Starbird concludes that the U. S. bal-
listic missile defense research and development effort
will always be prepared to counter any enemy innova-
tion in offensive missile capability.

1500

Stone, Irving. WHAT’S AHEAD FOR US DETERRENT
FORCES. Air Force and Space Digest, v. 51, June
1969: 12-17, 21, 32-33.
U633.A65, v. 51
Of the many new developments currently under con-
sideration for strengthening U. S. deterrence forces,
supercritical silos are receiving the most immediate
emphasis. The silos are among a variety of missile
based methods analyzed for the Defense Department by
the STRAT-X Committee, composed of representatives
from the military, industry, the Rand Corporation, and
the Institute for Defense Analyses. The silo would
be 3 to 5 years to install and would be designed to
accommodate both the Minuteman III and any completely
new ICBM’s that might be developed. To withstand
greater blast pressures than the present Minuteman
silos, they would be larger (about 125 feet long and 18
feet in diameter) and would be housed in hard-rock
areas. Although the new launch facility would not be
designed for any specific missile, it would probably
become a prominent factor in the design of new genera-
tion missiles in regard to size, range, and accuracy.
The new silo is also an important factor in the Air
Force study of whether future missiles should be “self-
ejected” (full thrust would be delayed until the missile
is 50 to 75 feet above the silo) or “hot launched” in the
conventional manner. In addition to fixed land-based
missile systems, the Defense Department is studying
mobile land-based systems and fixed and mobile under-
water missile bases. Although the Pentagon is actively
working on countermeasures to the Soviet fractional
orbital bombardment system, it has no immediate
plans to construct a space-based system for the United
States.

1501

Terschabitsch, Stefan. [NAVAL ARMAMENTS AS
REFLECTED IN THE NEW FLEET MANUALS] Mar-
time Pustung im Spiegel neuer Flottenhandbücher.
Y3.M53, v. 65
Reports on changes made in 1967 in the weapons sys-
tems of 24 navies. The data are based on Weyer’s
Flottenhandbuch 1969, by G. Albrecht; June’s Fli-
tung Schiff 1967-68, by W. V. D. Blackman; and Lex

1503

Thomson, Egbert. [SUBMARINES IN THE EAST AND
WEST] UI-Boote in Ost und West. Wehrkunde, v. 17,
Apr. 1968: 212-216.
U3.W396, v. 17
Analyzes the development of U. S. and Soviet subma-
rines into strategic weapons systems. Thomson
reports on the strength and composition of the submarine
fleets of these two nations plus Great Britain, France,
Sweden, the Netherlands, Japan, and the German
Federal Republic. In the area of nuclear-powered
submarines the United States has a decisive lead over the
Soviet Union.

1503

U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM, 1967-68.
Hearings, Ninetieth Congress, first and second sea-

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The U.S. NAVY IS STUDYING A DEFENSE AGAINST THE SOVIET MISSILE "STYX." L'Us Navy study activities are an active parade in missile-sounding "Styx." Air & space, v. 6, May 11, 1968: 18. P&GP BR

The destruction of the Israeli destroyer Eilath by a Styx surface-to-surface missile has influenced the U.S. Navy's missile defense program. Already the Navy has come up with the Sparrow, a surface-to-air missile; the nav Shillelagh, a modified version of the antitank missile; the Tartar; Sidewinder; and a new version of the Phoenix air-to-air missile. These missiles are part of a Navy program to ensure the safety of ships by detecting and destroying incoming enemy weapons.


Discusses Air Force plans to develop for tactical support operations a light intratheater transport (LIT) aircraft that will have a range of about 500 nautical miles, a cruise speed of between 350 and 400 miles, and either V/STOL or STOL capabilities. According to the task specifications worked out by a number of Defense and industry studies, the LIT will be able to supply all standard Army equipment up to the battalion level, except for tanks, and accommodate about 50 fully equipped combat troops. A V/STOL aircraft would be more expensive to develop than one with just STOL capabilities, its proponents point out, but it would be far more versatile and invaluable in rugged terrain.


Because of the large number of vessels involved, replacement of America's World War II vintage destroyer fleet presents the Navy with substantial problems. Three types of new vessels in the destroyer family are needed: small, unsophisticated vessels for antisubmarine warfare; mid-missile-equipped destroyers for attack carrier escort, and nuclear-powered, missile-equipped vessels combining great staying power with the characteristics of the conventional destroyer. Ships of the first type are being replaced satisfactorily by present construction programs. To provide vessels of the second type, the DX-DXG program was proposed in 1966, and this is to be followed by a DXGN program for ships of the third category. The DX-DXG program applies the contract-defintion-total package procurement approach to the construction of naval vessels for the first time. This approach supplements Navy expertise with industrial ingenuity by bringing the contractor into the design phase of the program. The first aim is to reduce the number of ship classes and standardize design within classes to take advantage of large-quantity production of identical ships by a single contractor. This approach is also expected to produce a better integrated weapons system with lower maintenance costs and greater ease of subsequent modernization as well as increased combat effectiveness. Overall, the program promises a major breakthrough in lowering the procurement and operation costs of naval vessels.


Outlines the Navy's deep ocean technology (DOT) projects planned for FY 1969, which include a construction system for sea floor engineering, a titanium hull for Alvin submarines, power sources for fixed-bath site systems, advanced vehicle power sources, a variable ballast trim system, a deep submergence vehicle rescue system, and optical-acoustic imaging systems. Current projects to be extended are the development of electric drive systems for underwater vehicles, tandem propulsion systems, a manned submarine capable of operating at 20,000 feet, and a support platform to operate at 5,000 feet. The last three items are considered focal projects that will provide the means of developing the technological base for future deep ocean warfare systems. Since none of these DOT projects are directed toward specific weapon systems developments, focal systems are needed to permit the progression of new technology concepts.

C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES


Outlines the tasks and organizational structure of the Aerospace Defense Command (ADC). As the U.S. Air Force component of the North American Air Defense Command, the ADC employs a staff of over 90,000 and is divided into 13 air divisions and one aerospace defense division. ADC is responsible for the vast radar network that shields the North American Continent and operates four types of fighter interception aircraft. With its efficient training methods and computer-automated control centers, the ADC is well equipped to carry on its important mission and is constantly striving to improve its capabilities to meet future commitments.

341
ARMSTRONG, O. UNDER THE GUISE OF TALKS ABOUT THE DEFEAT OF THE VIETNAM WAR, SALONIKA, JUNE 6, 1968. SLAV. RM.

The threat to the NATO flanks is the gate under which the American imperialists are striving to unite other governments—including those in Latin America and the Pacific—into an aggressive military bloc. Under the cloak of the threat the Western leaders are increasing military bases around Europe and are beginning to construct a communications center north of Norway. A missile ground control center has already been completed on the island of Crete. The threat talk by the U.S. imperialists is designed to link their European partners "tighter to their chariot" and has served to mislead the public and complicate the struggle for international peace.


Points out that Great Britain's present defense policy aims at a gradual withdrawal of British forces from East of Suez through 1971 and concentration of its forces in Europe.


The Danish decision to join NATO can be attributed more to a absence of any real alternatives than to a genuine predilection for regional security arrangements. The question now is whether Denmark should quit the alliance after 1969. Its security Policy Study Group has attempted to structure the current debate on this issue and focusing attention on three areas of discussion: the probable impact of technological change on Denmark's security problems, the nature of the security threat, and the defense options available. The effects of technological change are somewhat contradictory but their true impact is not likely to be assessed only by relating them to Soviet policy. The significance of Soviet political strategy of Danish control of the Baltic approaches is quite obvious. The place occupied by Denmark in Soviet war plans is less clear since this depends on whether the Soviet leaders are anticipating a short or long war in Europe. A Scandinavian defense alliance is one alternative to membership in NATO, but the chances of it being adopted are nil. A second alternative—isolated neutrality—is equally unrealistic. The only option remaining is continued membership in NATO. This could take one of two forms. The alliance could be continued without any explicit new engagement, but this would be impractical and dangerous. The other possibility is a new 20-year commitment. To keep the commitment from looking like a hostile act against the Soviet Union, it would have to be coupled with recognition of the German Democratic Republic and the Oder-Neisse Line. Unfortunately tendencies toward deintegration in NATO and neoisolat-
The strategic environment

The prospects for European unity are contingent upon whether Great Britain and France will modify their nuclear defense policies. As long as the two countries aspire to be the guarantors of a European security system, it will be difficult for Germany to accept any restrictions on its freedom of action from which two economically inferior neighbors are exempt. Although Great Britain, disillusioned with the "special relationship" and concerned with the problem of chaos in the Third World, might decide to reduce its nuclear arsenal, France is less likely to give up plans to increase its independent nuclear force. Although the French Cabinet is divided as to the feasibility of a global nuclear strategy, there seems little doubt that France could build a nuclear force over the next 27 years that would have a worldwide range. An attack on France's missile bases would cause enormous casualties, owing to its dense and evenly spread population. Therefore, France must seek a missile base outside its own country - that is, if France relies on missile-firing submarines, it will be at the mercy of any advances in detection achieved by the superpowers. In addition, planning France's nuclear strategy will be difficult because it has no "preferred enemy." The targeting of missiles requires detailed topographical information and the solution of reconnaissance and communications problems. Furthermore, it must be expected that, given a French long-range nuclear capability, a fraction of American strategic forces would eventually be targeted on France. Should the alliance's policy succeed, France would turn itself into a Vauban fortress and shut itself off from the rest of the international community.

The United States must decide whether it should maintain its nuclear monopoly in the interests of NATO solidarity or allow its allies to control nuclear weapons or share in decision-making. It has been unwilling to do the former, since this would negate the strategy of "controlled response" and deprive America of flexibility in its reactions to political crises and Communist threats. Multilateral control would, in effect, be giving France, England, and Italy a black list to use nuclear weapons whenever they wished. However, many Europeans have grown skeptical of American strategy. They feel that the emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons and conventional forces may cause the Russians to believe they could attack with impunity, thereby weakening the credibility of a deterrent. Likewise the American concept of a "pause" before the use of nuclear weapons is viewed as a disadvantage that encourages Russian aggression. Furthermore, the Russians themselves might launch a tactical nuclear strike against highly vulnerable and concentrated conventional forces in central Europe and shatter or at least neutralize them. Europeans are seeking to deter a nuclear attack with more nuclear weapons rather than with U.S.-sponsored conventional forces, while the United States resists not so much the augmentation of national nuclear forces. These forces could be used to trigger an American strike - a factor that Russian strategists have not overlooked. An effective alliance strategy will require French-American cooperation, since France could invalidate U.S. strategic concepts by independently deploying nuclear weapons.
In addition, the idea of a NATO nuclear force along the lines of the MLP must be abandoned, and coordinated nuclear planning must take place within the Joint Strategic Targeting Group and the newly established special committee of NATO Defense Ministers.

1520

The role of ground forces as the principal instrument of ultimate decision has declined in the 20th century. But despite the U.S. military-technological revolution, ground forces continue to play a variety of roles, e.g., in graduated deterrence, limited war, and counter-surprise. While the United States is moving away from the doctrine of massive retaliation and is accepting the concept of prevention of total war, ground forces continue to play a major role in Chinese and Russian strategy. However, the unpopularity of the Vietnam War and the threat from China's numerically superior army may force the United States into reliance on strategic offensive weapons and naval power unless it is prepared to use nuclear weapons. If this happens the United States could eliminate the draft, reduce the size of the armed forces, and create a professional military service, which would come at a high price. The United States is not in Asia at least in Latin America.

1531

A report by the National Republican Committee on National Strategy, published on April 19, 1968, noted that flexible responses and gradualism could transform a skirmish into total war because they emphasize prudent deliberation instead of initiative and resolution in anticipation of a second strike. The report further observed that, applied to Vietnam, those strategies have produced disastrous results. The author of those strategies, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, has had such an iron grip on decisions in the war that many generals in the field have been handcuffed in their decision-making. In addition the North Vietnamese have profited from the Secretary's strategy of gradualism; since the last third of 1967 they have improved their surface-to-surface installations, increased by 25 percent their anti-aircraft forces, and augmented their radar alert system. The United States must take the initiative in nuclear strategy. It must prepare to use any force necessary to attain its stated objectives and to convince those who are looking for trouble that it will use this force.

1522

The secondary importance attached to West German territorial and civil defense was consistent with NATO's massive retaliatory strategy. But the new strategy of flexible responses adopted in 1967 by the NATO Ministerial Council requires the immediate upgrading of those defenses. This strategy rests largely on the principle of crisis management, which would not be practicable without strong Western European conventional forces. But legal, financial, and political objections to a buildup of conventional forces are being raised in West Germany, especially the argument that they would hinder East-West détente. Yet tangible prerequisites for détente are still missing. Only on the basis of its own strength can the West, and the German Federal Republic, hope to achieve relaxation of tensions and a lasting peace in Europe.

1523

Commentary on the plan, to be carried out under the third defense buildup program. Although there are no official plans for producing nuclear weapons during the defense buildup, Socialist Dietman Yenosuke Narazaki revealed to the House of Representatives budgetary committee that the Defense Agency is planning development studies of antiballistic aircraft, radar, equipped early warning planes, radio-controlled reconnaissance planes, and a variety of short-range guided missiles. According to Narazaki many of the contemplated research projects go far beyond Japan's self-defense requirements and show an obvious trend toward nuclear armament.

1524

Socialist Dietman Yenosuke Narazaki has told members of the Lower House Budget Committee that he possesses documents revealing Defense Agency plans for a technical research development program in relation to the third defense buildup, which could lead to Japan's nuclear armament. He announced his intention to seek more information on the program and severely criticized the San no government for its apparent intention to violate the nonnuclearization principles. According to Narazaki, Defense Agency plans for 1967 through 1970 call for studies of antiballistic missiles, homing equipment for surface-to-air missiles, electronic countermeasures, ultralow altitude radar, and high-performance air-to-ground missiles. Furthermore, the agency intends to examine the utility of chemical and biological weapons. Because of Narazaki's shocking disclosures, defense problems are expected to receive a good deal of attention during the current session of the Diet.

1525

"Translated from Rheinischer Merkur, Cologne."

Newsp

Discusses the increasing influence and size of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Navy is challenging U.S. naval supremacy around the world: it has the largest fishing and submarine fleets in the world; it is building aircraft carriers; and concomitant with its planned long-distance naval warplanes, it is constructing a nuclear defense network that includes defensive antiballistic missiles and offensive fractional orbital bombardment systems. The author concludes
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

that these combined operations are capable of "neutralizing the United States as the protective and deterrent power of the West.""}

1529


U653, A65, v. 51

Reports on the current status of Arab air forces and their prospects for the future. Although most of the equipment that was destroyed in the Arab-Israeli War has been replaced, the air forces still are handicapped by the lack of training and control that caused their disastrous performance in the June 1967 war. Unless the "reborn" Arab air arms are manned by Soviet pilots, which is highly improbable, they will not be prepared for aggressive action against Israel until well into the next decade.

1527


RC:II, F16, v. 60

To affect economies to offset the cost of the Vietnam War, the Department of Defense has recommended that Taiwan withdraw from the Quemeny and Matsu island complexes. However, it probably won't do so because of the value of the offshore islands: they are used as electronic monitoring points and they pin down a large number of Chinese troops, reinforce Taiwan's morale, and provide early warning of an amphibious or air attack. The United States cannot force Taiwan to withdraw because of that country's housing economic situation; it could finance its own defense for 2 years. The offshore islands have dropped out of the international spotlight since the last air raid against them in 1960, mainly as a result of China's internal problems. However, if these islands are abandoned, China may raise them as a welcome diversion from internal trials and tribulations.

1528


Translated from Pravda, Apr. 22, 1968.

议论 rm

Discusses the types of arms to be replaced and allocation of funds in the Bundeswehr's rearmament plan. This reactionary plan may increase Bonn's prestige among its NATO partners and strengthen West German attempts to prevent the conclusion of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and disarmament for the revision of post-war European borders.

1529


U653, G565

Partial contents. --From the Kalser to Hitler. --The striking power of aggression. --In NATO's first echelon.

History of the Luftwaffe's combat operations during World War I and II and of its development after World War II with American backing into a serious threat to peace. The imperialist warmongers are impelled to utilize the Luftwaffe for a nuclear attack against the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist countries, but they will find the invincible power of the Warsaw Treaty Organization an obstacle.

1530

Haaland, Per. WHY DENMARK SHOULD STAY IN NATO. NATO letter, v. 16, Apr. 1968: 2-5.

D845, A44, v. 16

Advocates continued NATO membership for Denmark despite recent criticisms of the alliance. Haaland argues that NATO is still essential to European security and is capable of continuing to carry out its task. Denmark has profited from the protection afforded by the alliance and should not pull out because of false allegations that NATO increases the risk of involvement in a global war and makes Denmark a lackey of U.S. policymakers. Only with the security provided by NATO can Denmark strive to improve international and European cooperation.

1531


P65P RR

The naval strategic situation in the Mediterranean has radically changed in the past decade. With only Gibraltar left in British hands, Great Britain has as good as disappeared from the area. France's withdrawal from the NATO military organization, the Turkish-Greek feud over Cyprus, the growing Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, and Moscow's increased influence in adjacent lands all strongly affect the strategic situation of the Atlantic alliance and all Mediterranean nations as well. On the whole, the Soviet threat to U.S. and NATO naval forces in the area surpasses their threat to the Soviet Navy.

1532


VA49, N28, v. 11

Urges U.S. retaliation in kind for Soviet-instigated incidents on the high seas. These incidents are but one aspect of the Soviet Union's aggressive maritime posture in the Mediterraean Sea and elsewhere. They represent a calculated attempt by the Soviet Navy to gain a psychological advantage over U.S. forces and should be met with vigorous countermovements.

1533


D853, A65, v. 6

"From a report to the NATO Committee of The Atlantic Council, February, 1968."

The initial reaction to the Harrel Report was predominantly negative, but subsequent analysis suggests that it may become a landmark in the progressive
development of the Atlantic alliance. French agreement to the report was an accomplishment in itself, and the procedure followed in the "Harned Exercise"...the initial preparation of recommendations by highly qualified individuals rather than governments--was precedent setting. A primary contribution of the report is its recognition that deterrence and defense are complimentary, not conflicting. Another is its reaffirmation of the necessity of U.S. participation in any European settlement and of the need for political solidarity in the quest for security and defense. The report also recognizes that the alliance has responsibilities outside the NATO area and approves the past practice of consultation without commitment on these problems. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the report is its recognition of the broad political tasks of the alliance. In this respect it effectively counters those who maintain that NATO is strictly a military organization and that its present usefulness is over.

156


The two tasks which De Gaulle has set himself are to forge a new national unity and to reorient for France its place of international leadership. French strategy is influenced as much by the domestic as the international goal. The most spectacular aspect of French military policy is its nuclear weapons program. The strategy for the use of these weapons is derived from Dulles' theory of massive retaliation. For the moment France lacks a second-strike capability, which means that its own forces invite a preemptive strike and can deter only conventional attacks. Thus a primary goal in the next 10 years must be to create a more credible massive retaliatory mechanism. The nonnuclear program calls for the reequipping of existing conventional forces, particularly the Army. It remains to be seen whether France can succeed with these plans since the technological and economic problems are formidable. Should De Gaulle depart before the war is finished, anti-Gaullese successors may undertake to scrap his programs and revert to nuclear and conventional--but it is unlikely that they would attempt to dismantle completed work. The Gaulists, of course, hope to see all parties reconciled to the military establishment, and the latter reconciled to the Fifth Republic. For the long term, the French must avoid that strategic dogmatism which has cost them so much in the past. De Gaulle himself follows a pragmatic approach. The massive retaliation doctrine will be continued through the 1970's, but after that, if antimissile systems are perfected by the superpowers, the French may again find themselves dependent on the United States. On the other hand, if antimissile systems become cheaper the French may be able to continue their independent course.

156


A coordinated and integrated defense system--not the Western nuclear arsenal alone--has deterred the Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The thoroughly defensive character of NATO strategy accounts for the alliance's failure to realize its most important goal, the solution of the European problem. The systematic buildup of the Soviet nuclear potential and simultaneous reenforcement in the U.S. nuclear deterrent in terms of destruction values will soon create for the United States a "megaton gap" large enough to upset the delicate balance of terror on which America's and NATO's present strategy rests. In number of ICBMs the Soviet Union is rapidly catching up with the United States. The diminishing credibility of the American second-strike capability may eventually call for U.S. adoption of a first-strike strategy. Some years ago the United States withdrew its medium-range missiles from Europe because of their alleged obsolescence. However, similar Soviet missiles are still in service, thus reducing the NATO potential to strike the Soviet Union. The strength of the Soviet missile-launching submarine fleet is catching up with that of the American, British, and French fleets combined. The newly developed Soviet fractional orbital bombardment system could put the entire American second-strike capability completely out of order. The American ABM system is still in the experimental stage, while the Soviet one has already been deployed for protection against any nuclear missiles launched by the U.S. 6th Fleet. The United States scrapped one thousand of its B-47 aircraft in the belief that they were obsolete. Consequently the Soviet Union now has the strongest fleet of strategic bombers in the world, constituting a serious threat to the American mainland from the North. Moscow's current efforts to make the Arab world the collective responsibility of the Warsaw Pact Organization threatens Western security still further.

156


UI.A66, v. 105

Although the House Appropriations Committee approved $77 million for the advance procurement of general purpose destroyers and nuclear-powered guided-missile ships and authorized construction-conversion funds for 28 ships, committee members expressed concern that the Navy's development programs would not be adequate to meet future operational challenges. In particular, they criticized the programs for failing to make sufficient use of nuclear propulsion and for sacrificing performance for cost reductions. The committee requested the Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense to prepare a thorough review and analysis of future naval requirements as a guide for authorization on forthcoming construction requests.

157

Ignatius, Paul R. THE SOVIET NAVY: WE ARE STILL AHEAD. Vital speech at the day, 24, June 1, 1968: 482-484.

PNHSI. V52, v. 24


Although the Soviet Navy has undergone remarkable growth in size and reach, the U.S. Navy is far larger, stronger, and more versatile. The Russian Navy is hampered by geographical deficiencies; it has only two areas in the Soviet Union that provide naval base complexes open to the oceans--the Kola Peninsula and the Northern Pacific area. But the Soviet Navy is learning, and it is here to stay. Aside from seeking greater political effectiveness, it hopes to use more mobile and flexible naval forces to achieve objectives in distant lands through indirect support of indigenous forces.
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

1538
Kent, Irvin M. CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 12, Feb./Mar. 1968: 71-73, 75. UA466. F5, v. 13
Reviews the principles of and describes the ideal organization for the conduct of civil affairs functions by military forces; critiques present NATO arrangements in this area and recommends improvements. The term civil affairs encompasses all the relationships between a military commander and his civilian environment. The goal of the commander is to promote essential civilian support for or reduce interference with his logistic and tactical operations. To achieve this goal, he may exercise three functions: to plan for and coordinate all activities; to engage in community relations; and to provide base support. Kent suggests that NATO organizations need some significant modification. In terms of planning for and organizing activities, NATO's military commanders are often not given the advantages they need to perform their functions. This is especially true when the commander must also carry out military operations. Kent concludes that the military must be better trained in civil affairs and that the NATO command must be better organized to carry out these functions.

1539
Argues for the continuation of NATO or an equivalent after the expiration of the original 20-year pact in 1969. The present international environment is different from that of 1949, but it is no less dangerous and certainly more complicated. The great destructiveness of nuclear weapons has created a balance of terror. However, the danger of nuclear war with the Soviet Union is not as great as it is in the Western world. NATO ought to be renewed in a revised form. Kruls suggests 10 important modifications fundamental to a reorganization and modernization of the alliance -- modifications that stress NATO's function as a power-balancing, peacekeeping organization rather than as the "fighting" alliance of the Atlantic powers.

1540
Translated from Pravda, June 1, 1968.

The NATO Command will hold a big military exercise under the code name "Polar Express" in northern Norway and adjacent waters between June 3 and June 22, 1968. The command's objective is to deploy mobile NATO forces on "vital flank" and "army air bases" to move large contingents of foreign troops with equipment and matériel into Norway. Such a demonstration of armed might is not yet clear to the Soviet Union, which has not given yet to occupy a leading position in NATO. Beside, the demonstration is intended to frustrate Norway's recently disclosed tendency to abandon its commitment to NATO.

Among protests and demonstrations and protected by a police cordon, the political representatives of the NATO countries met in Reykjavik to discuss NATO's future. Willy Brandt, the West German Foreign Secretary, attacked East Germany, holding it responsible for the destiny of East Berlin and Germany as a whole and recommending a demonstration of solidarity by the West European countries. His policy was strongly supported by the United States. Dow Rees, denouncing rumors that his country wants to recall its armies from West Germany for economic reasons and certain NATO arrangements, asserted that the United States will fulfill its obligations toward NATO. The Greeks complained about the "Soviet threat" in the Mediterranean area. The Portuguese tried to justify their colonization policies in Africa and expressed their reservations about the nonproliferation treaty. The Islandic press asked the United States to close its military bases and remove its forces from Iceland and advocated withdrawal from NATO and the dismantling of this aggressive bloc.

1542

History of the Soviet Army from its birth as an offspring of the Imperial Russian Army in 1914 to its present status as a bulwark of a great nuclear power. Léonin notes that after Stalin's purge in 1937, the equality of the Soviet Army was drastically reduced as it was seen in its 1939 defeat by the Finns army and its failure to resist the Germans in 1941. Since then, the Soviet Army has been adapting itself to the nuclear age through introduction of scientific instruction and modern weapons and equipment.

1543
LETTER FROM LONDON. NATO'S fifteen nations, v. 13, Feb./Mar. 1968: 14-16, 114a. Slav Rim
Comments unfavorably upon recent British security policy: the precipitous and ill-planned withdrawal from Aden, the possible for the perpetuation of the pound will offset the economies expected from cutbacks in defense spending, the financial aspects of Britain's purchase of fifty F-111K's from the United States, and the expected German withdrawal from the British-led Dacian project. The author suggests that the present British government has gone too far in sacrificing defense capability to the requirements of national economic rejuvenation.

1544
Lowe, George E. THE CASE FOR THE OCEANIC STRATEGY. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Proceedings, v. 94, June 1968: 25-34. VI, US, v. 94

Unless the United States devises a new grand strategy to resolve the conflicting demands on its resources created by the Vietnam War, the new weapons technology, ongoing commitments, and urban unrest, a disastrous competition for scarce resources may ensue that "could rip apart the very fabric of the American society." The three most widely discussed strategic options are nonproliferation, preemptive nuclear war, and a national interests strategy. Nonproliferation and preemptive war are both strongly supported by the
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

"technocrats," who maintain adamantly that America's best hope lies in the attainment of worldwide technical superiority. A national interests strategy would identify those interests and deliberate on appropriate policies and military force levels. One of the least considered but most promising means of fulfilling the national interest is a nuclear strategy that would be able to deter an attack by all states. A strategic force would be less vulnerable to attack than land-based forces and a sea-based ballistic missile system could intercept enemy missiles soon after firing. By combining its oceanic forces with those of other nations, the United States could patrol strategic areas of the world to maintain order. An oceanic strategy would force the advancement of American technology without nurturing a war-winning philosophy and would free trillions of dollars to improve the lives of impoverished Americans. Furthermore, "it is the only grand strategy that will preserve those liberal traditions and conservative values that make our civilization worth saving in the first place."

1545

Makogoni, S. ["EAST OF SUEZ": A SURVEY OF THE BRITISH IMPERIALISTIC STRATEGY IN ASIA AND IN THE PACIFIC BASIN] "K vostoku ot Suetsa": tioe of weaponry is pursued, and whether the superpowers can agree to slow down the arms race. Meanwhile the outlook for progress in the disarmament talks at Geneva can be expected to adopt such a policy in the near future. Those deciding the future of NATO must take these matters into account along with the political changes that have occurred since 1965. Above all, what to needed is a flexible approach to the future and to peace.

1547


An issue that is largely being ignored by the presidential candidates—except in reference to the ABM question—is America's lagging strategic weapons program, attributed to the financial drain of the Vietnam War and McNamaras's policies of self-restraint. There is considerable fear that Russia is outpacing the United States in strategic weapons development and Russias activities in the Mediterranean indicate a lesser degree of strategic inferiority than at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. Any attempt to develop new sophisticated nuclear weapons, at a time when a new 'missile gap' may become an issue in the campaign, would do more harm than good. What is more important is the "spirit in which the new generation of weapons is pursued", and whether the superpowers can agree to slow down the arms race.

1546


Despite the increase in Soviet naval strength and activity in the Middle East there is some doubt that this show of strength represents a new departure in Russian naval behavior as suggested by some American commentators. Although Russias Navy has grown and its leaders boast of a new maritime supremacy, its doctrines and procurement policies suggest that it has continued to regard the Navy "as primarily concerned with defence of the homeland." The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean is a defensive response to the strategic nuclear threat posed by American Polaris submarines. However, the movement of the Soviet fleet and new departures in Russian naval behavior deserve careful study. There are too many alarmists who, armed with patchy information, are misleading the public. U.S. military officials should be more open and frank about the Soviet Navy in order to avoid misjudgement of resolve and to answer the vital question of what effect Britain's withdrawal East of Suez will have in the Middle East.

1549


Adapted from an address given at the Air Force Association Convention, Apr. 4, 1969, in Atlanta, Ga.

The new supertransport aircraft, the C-5A, represents more than a major advancement in military lift; it has led to a major breakthrough in operational military capabilities. Whether such breakthroughs are the result of expertly managed programs like the C-5A or major technological discoveries, they are vital to the maintenance of military superiority. In order to meet the challenge of future technological advances on the part of potential aggressors, the United States must constantly endeavor to achieve new military capabilities. In the field of tactical airpower the United States
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

must not only seek higher accuracy in bomb delivery but should strive for a technological breakthrough that will narrow the gap between the firepower of nuclear and conventional munitions. While the United States has significantly improved its ballistic missile force, it has neglected to update the other part of the strategic mix, manned bombers. In order to preserve a two- pronged deterrent it should begin developing an advanced manned strategic aircraft to replace the obsolete B-52s. Operational breakthroughs are also desirable in the field of missile defense, since the first nation to achieve an impenetrable defense against enemy missiles will enjoy a tremendous strategic advantage. Because there is no such thing as the "ultimate weapon," the United States must be prepared to be the first to discover any new phenomena that could revolutionize warfare.

1552

The Near East crisis has proved that the Soviet pan- Slavic threat is still with us. It is not the defensive lines inside Europe that are endangered, however, but political and economic positions outside the Continent. The Mediterranean and the Near East are vital geopolitical areas for Europe, and the fates of the Continent are more likely to be decided between the Persian Gulf and Morocco than the Baltic and the Adriatic. Nevertheless, a strong shield in Europe is still essential. Soviet proposals to dissolve military blocs on both sides aim only at weakening the West. For economic reasons, the United States is considering a transatlantic airlift as a substitute for maintaining troops in Europe. Since such a strategy cannot succeed, it would be more honest of the United States to tell the Europeans outright that soon they will be on their own. French withdrawal from NATO has split the alliance in two and accelerated its decline. The French would like to go it alone but are too weak, as is every other European state acting singly. It is not the United States that deprives European states of their military independence but their own smallness. The need for an internally balanced and integrated European defense community is greater than ever, but Europe, weary after 20 years of vigilance, is unwilling to continue its defense efforts at the present levels, much less increase them.

1553

In the light of tactical nuclear weapons the reduction of the U.S. Air Force's NATO contingent will not adversely affect the alliance. The doctrine of flexible response precludes any serious conventional defense of Western Europe against aggression from the East. Because the West is outnumbered in conventional forces it must outweigh the East in nuclear forces.

1554


Reviews Belgium's armed forces in the light of that country's strategic position in the NATO alliance. Belgium's Army, Navy, and Air Force together number 111,000, of which 54 percent are volunteers on short-service engagements. O'Ballance concludes that the forces will play an important role in case of a Russian attack, they should be able to hold it off in their sectors.

1555
Surveys the development and structure, including financing, of France’s ORSEC (Organisation des Secours) plan. ORSEC organizes relief work in "large-scale disasters beyond the scope of local communities."

1558


U.S. cooperative in the defense of Europe is absolutely essential. The decision to use nuclear weapons will be the prerogative of the American President, though machinery is available for all NATO members to participate in planning and consultation. The defect of strategic nuclear weapons is that they provide no defense against low-level threats. Tactical nuclear weapons are designed for use at this level, but they are far too destructive for this role in Europe. These weapons have a deterrent function similar to the strategic arsenal: to prevent aggression, or halt it once it has begun. Conventional forces must be of sufficient strength to compel the enemy to make his attack on such a scale that the attack would itself justify retaliatory use of nuclear weapons. This is the answer to the “fait accompli” theory. By the maintenance of conventional forces adequate to this requirement, and a firm decision to oppose and liquidate any minor Soviet incursion, NATO can build an effective European defense.

1559


APLA183, v. 10.

"Translated from Epoca, Milan."

News

The Russian Navy is shifting the strategic balance of power in the Mediterranean in its favor, as evidenced by its Mediterranean fleet on NATO’s southern flank; in one year the number of Russian warships there has increased fourfold. For Italy, three-quarters of whose territory extends into the Mediterranean, the Russian Navy could threaten not only its merchant marine but also its vital economic trade links with the rest of the world. It is improbable that the Russians will directly attack anyone in the area, but their spreading the Communist and neutral states along the littoral and their increasing influence over the policies of these states are causes of great concern for the southern NATO countries. Italy would do well to increase the size and strength of its Navy in the face of the Russian threat instead of publishing articles warning of the danger and entrusting the fate to the “Star of Fortune.”

1560


U.S. naval bases on the Japanese islands. These bases provide the Americans with airfields, storage facilities, docks, and naval bases on the Japanese islands. These bases provide the Americans with airfields, storage facilities, docks, and naval bases on the Japanese islands.

Japanese security treaty of 1960 the Pentagon has established over 200 air, missile, and naval bases on the Japanese islands. These bases provide the Americans with airfields, storage facilities, docks, and naval bases on the Japanese islands.

The worldwide interplay of political factors has a much stronger bearing on military strategy today than ever before. Modern strategy rests on passive as well as active deterrence. Passive deterrence, a phenomenon of the nuclear age, causes the superpowers to reappraise and “depreciate” their interests each time a danger of mutual strategic confrontation becomes imminent. To be most effective in terms of the available deterrent NATO must strongly rely on the presence of substantial American forces in Europe and on U.S. nuclear weapons. Exclusive control over these weapons should remain with the United States. However, American policy should accept the existence of the French force de frappe instead of “sabotaging against it.” At the same time it should take steps to prevent this force from ever being used independently of NATO. While reformulation of the basic concept of NATO may be necessary, no radical change in the relation between NATO and the United States is needed.

1561


APLA83, v. 20.

Japan occupies a central place in the military base system in the Pacific. Under cover of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty of 1960 the Pentagon has established over 200 air, missile, and naval bases on the Japanese islands. These bases provide the Americans with airfields, storage facilities, docks, and naval bases on the Japanese islands. These bases provide the Americans with airfields, storage facilities, docks, and naval bases on the Japanese islands.

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American strategy is attempting to involve Japan in the Vietnam War, and leading Japanese circles, which favor strong armed forces, approved an increased defense budget of 350 billion yen in 1967. According to military authorities “Japanese industry will adjust itself within 5 to 10 years to the production of its own nuclear arms,” despite the protests of Japanese democratic forces.

1561


U.S. cooperation in the defense of Europe is absolutely essential. The decision to use nuclear weapons will be the prerogative of the American President, though machinery is available for all NATO members to participate in planning and consultation. The defect of strategic nuclear weapons is that they provide no defense against low-level threats. Tactical nuclear weapons are designed for use at this level, but they are far too destructive for this role in Europe. These weapons have a deterrent function similar to the strategic arsenal: to prevent aggression, or halt it once it has begun. Conventional forces must be of sufficient strength to compel the enemy to make his attack on such a scale that the attack would itself justify retaliatory use of nuclear weapons. This is the answer to the “fait accompli” theory. By the maintenance of conventional forces adequate to this requirement, and a firm decision to oppose and liquidate any minor Soviet incursion, NATO can build an effective European defense.

Neither peaceful coexistence nor nuclear weapons are deterring the Warsaw Pact nations from increasing their conventional forces. The 1966 Warsaw Pact maneuvers throughout Eastern Europe demonstrated that the Communists do not trust the West and continue to view NATO as an enemy. These operations also gave the Russians an opportunity to develop new techniques in logistics and communications. In 1967 further military exercises were held in the Ukraine despite a thaw in Russian-American relations. There is little doubt that because of their politicomilitary strategy the Communists will intervene in Western Europe should the opportunity arise.
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The proposed nonproliferation treaty provides for elimination of horizontal, but not vertical, proliferation, thus amounting to protection of only the strong. And Moscow-Washington cordoned on the treaty by no means portends an end to the Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms race. Only a year ago a second-strike capability appeared to be the ultimate in deterrence against the first nuclear strike and a strong reason for stabilization of the superpower nuclear arsenals on that level. But deployment of a Soviet ABM system prompted the United States to prepare deployment of its own. This change has reduced the deterrence value of the superpowers' second-strike capabilities, deprived the balance-of-terror strategy of its most important rationale, and restored the long-load value of the first-strike potential in relations between the two powers. In a serious Soviet-American conflict the side that forestalls the other by dealing the first thermonuclear strike would save at least 50 million of its people's lives. This hypothesis may be inaccurate, but the magnitude of the premium it puts on, the first strike is justified. Soviet policy in regard to arms control agreements has long service to drive the West's alertness to a first strike. According to 1963 estimates the Soviet Union would have to surpass the United States in total number of missiles by a ratio of 4 to 1 to venture the first strike. "A small circle of experts" has warned, however, that Moscow could develop more-hit missiles within 5 years. The dynamic development of technology has allowed an impressive refinement of American nuclear weapons, but at the expense of their yield. Some experts believe that this "malign gap" can give Moscow a chance to venture a devastating first strike even with an arsenal much smaller than the American.

1563


Tactical instruction should be accompanied by a wide use of films in order to accustom the soldier to a specific environment—nuclear, conventional, biological, or chemical. Military men must be trained in these environments and kept in a specific one as protection from surprises and psychoses. The use of films accompanied by commentary and discussion, in the only means for creating a conventional or nuclear environment. Domestic fire and the use of local terrain do not create a real feeling of danger. In chemical and biological warfare, soldiers must be made to understand that they may be attacked by hitherto unknown chemical agents.

1564


Conflicting statements about U.S. and Brazilian strategic capabilities indicate that U.S. policymakers disagree about the effectiveness of Soviet ICBM's. Although Under Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze testified that one-half of the Soviet ICBM force will consist of low-yield, less accurate missiles by 1974, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara noted that the U.S. strategic system would be "likely"-equipped, because it could not be effective against a sophisticated high-yield Soviet offense. John S. Foster, Director of Research and Engineering, stated that if the United States is to maintain a strategic superiority it will have to deploy 1,000 more missiles than originally planned a few years ago. In addition he believes that the Russians have emphasized bombs of smaller yield and that, if the United States is to provide an assured destruction capability, it will have to emphasize smaller yields. The disparity between these evaluations of Russian strategic capabilities does not instill confidence in U.S. strategic capabilities nor does it prevent the Soviet Union from making use of its growing military force in political-psychological warfare designed to erode U.S. influence around the world.

1565


Translated from Izvestiya. June 15, 1968. Slav Rim

The Soviet Union and the other East European Communist countries are coordinating their efforts to establish a European security system. The main obstacle to this endeavor is NATO. The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), established to counteract NATO's aggressive plans, and the subsequently concluded bilateral mutual assistance treaties between the East European countries opened fresh potholes of economic and cultural cooperation, consolidated the world Communist movement, and guaranteed the borders of the countries as well as their national independence. Leaders of the Western bloc were naturally alarmed. Without abandoning their old imperialistic methods of war in Vietnam, the intensification of the arms race in the NATO countries, and increases in military expenditures, they have applied "peaceful methods" of anticommunist struggle and a new "bridge building policy" in order to undermine the socialist community from within. But now NATO is in a crisis. After the withdrawal of France the other West European countries tried to free themselves from U.S. dictates and get rid of U.S. monopolies. Despite these difficulties NATO is still a great danger for Eastern Europe because it has restored militarism and revanchism in West Germany, built up that country's economic potential, and turned it into a leading military power. Under these circumstances the consolidation and improvement of WTO, especially in defense, and coordinated foreign policy actions within WTO go far beyond ensuring peace in Europe and have become an important factor in the consolidation of world peace and security.

1566


The withdrawal of British forces from Southeast Asia will have a tremendous impact upon Australian defense policy. Located on the periphery of Southeast Asia, Australia has long depended upon the protection
afforded by the British presence in and around the area. Now it must cope virtually alone with the problem of protecting an area roughly the size of the United States and inhabited by only 13 million people. In view of its limited resources and the growing nationalism in South-east Asia, most policymakers agree that the future "security of Australia and its territories is best assured less by military excursions than by contributing to the development of order and economic progress in the South-East Asia region." While Australia is not capable alone of deciding the fate of the Asian Continent, it can play a major role in establishing friendly and stable regimes by contributing to economic development programs and helping to thwart the efforts of Communist subversives. Although it will probably depend upon the United States for assistance in its new role, it "is no less nationalistic than the emerging states of South-East Asia" and does not intend to be dominated by the United States.

Althoh the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union had slackened off somewhat with the advent of satellite reconnaissance in the mid-1960s, Russia's subsequent increases in offensive missile strength and its deployment of an ABM system triggered demands among many Americans for commensurate increases in U.S. strategic capability. The United States first reacted by ordering the replacement of the Polaris missile on 31 of its 41 nuclear submarines with the more powerful Poseidon and the installation of an improved ICBM, "a Minuteman III." Secretary of Defense McNamara maintained that these improvements in offensive capacity would more than adequately protect the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated additional insurance in the form of an ABM system. With public opinion on their side, the Joint Chiefs won, and the President authorized the deployment of a limited missile defense system. While the U.S. decision was long in view of Russian defensive activities, many technical problems will have to be overcome before the effectiveness of the U.S. ABM system is aspired. Possibly the present system will have to be radically changed to meet the challenge of Russian multiple warheads and boost glide missiles. On several occasions in the past America has been forced to support a tremendously costly weapons turnover to maintain the credibility of its deterrent.


With many of its manned strategic systems in use in Vietnam, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) relies heavily upon the Minuteman to carry out its prime mission --deterrence against the Soviet Union. Although SAC continues to adhere to the mixed force concept, the Minuteman now dominates the force structure. Thus, a large portion of SAC's manned forces may be diverted to tactical missions in the general purpose forces, the 1,600 Minutemen now in inventory remain on constant alert at home. The nearly 1,500 launch control officers that man the six Minuteman bases are subjected to the same strict requirements that distinguish SAC airmen. Virtually cut off from the outside world during their duty hours, the "isolated" officers must maintain a constant alert by their machines. Because of the strain of the environment, strict precautions are taken to prevent an unauthorized firing by any one launch control officer.


In line with recent defense cuts, British forces will be confined to a principally European role in the next decade. With the cancellation of the P-III long-range bombers and the phasing out of the Canberra, V-bombers, and long-range transports, the Royal Air
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Force (RAF) will have become almost entirely a tactical support force by 1975. In the Government’s estimation improvements in ICBM and antiaircraft defenses will have rendered long-distance bombers obsolete by that time. Although the Government has decided to give up the option of a major conventional war, the RAF will still be equipped to provide tactical support in the European theater. It will maintain a medium-range transport force and by 1975 should have about 150 Phantoms, 100 Anglo-French Jaguars, 60 Harriers, 150 Lightnings, and 50 Buccaneers. A number of British defense officials are concerned over the abandonment of the RAF’s long-range capabilities; however, it does not hold the advantage of having to defend Britain and its European allies in designing military aircraft suited to the needs of Europe, thus reducing dependency on U.S. aircraft.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1. Biological

1972

Contents.
1. Table of chemical and biological agents.
2. The history of chemical and biological warfare.
3. America first: CBW adventure.
4. The chemicals.
5. The biologicals.
7. CBW boosters.
8. College presidents and board chairmen: the CBW research establishment.
9. The making of a science.
10. What other countries are doing.
11. The problems of disarmament.

Critiques and exposes America’s role in the production of chemical and biological weapons, include accounts of the myriad professional agencies that are involved in the chemical and biological weapons process. Herresh notes that large and small nations may turn to chemical weapons if there is an agreement to ban nuclear weapons. Treaties and verification systems will be needed to stem the biological-chemical arms race, but Herresh concludes that it may already be too late for any resolution of the problem.

1973

Contents.
1. A statement by the Board of Directors of the American Association of the Advancement of Science.
2. Supplementary statement by some members of the Board of Directors.
3. Herbicides in the perspectives of 20 months and 20 years, by ohn A. Wheeler.

Comments by representatives of the scientific community regarding the Government’s use of herbicides in Vietnam. After reviewing the Government-sponsored Military Research Institute report assessing the ecological effects of herbicides together with evaluations of the report, the board of directors of the association expressed concern over the long-term environmental consequences of large-scale deployment of herbicides. They urged suspension of the use of arsenical herbicides in Vietnam until their effects are better known and recommended that a U.S. study be undertaken under U.N. auspices to analyze the long-range effects of herbicidal agents and determine the precautions needed to assure future protection of the affected areas. Several board members advocated entirely stopping the military use of herbicides, including 2, 4-D and 2, 4, 5-T, because they anticipate hazards from the use of all herbicidal chemicals. Other individuals on the board agreed with the Defense Department position that defoliants were not unduly harmful to the environment and stated the board’s recommendations for a U.N.-sponsored field study on herbicides was politically unfeasible. According to Wheeler, available information on herbicides indicates an adequate safety margin for continuing their use in Vietnam and, by projecting “worst cases” for each imaginable situation, sufficient precautions can be taken to avoid disastrous consequences. Furthermore, he notes the experimental value of the operation in Vietnam and indicates that the final decision to continue it rests with the people of South Vietnam, not the United States.

1974

Describes the search by a team of scientists from the National Research Council of Canada for an antidote for the treatment of persons who have received excessive doses of radiation. Calcium chloride may provide the answer. Experiments are also being carried out with a compound named Versene which reduces the calcium level in the body.

1975

Traces the history and nature of America’s chemical and biological warfare (CBW) effort. Smith reveals that during the Kennedy years CBW became the beneficiary of a rethinking in military strategy; mutual nuclear deterrence reduced America’s freedom of action, and a new weapon that would increase its flexibility in foreign affairs was needed. The author surveys American CBW installations, noting that Britain’s CBW effort is minuscule compared to America’s. He concludes that the growing disposition to CBW is caused not by concern for its immaturity per se, but rather its involvement with the universities, since secret military contracts to colleges clash with the view of a university as a forum of free speech and discussion.

1976

Discusses chemical and biological weapons from the seemingly crude chlorine gas used in World War I to today’s VX nerve gas, a drop of which can kill in minutes. The sophistication of gases, evidence of man’s inhumanity as well as his ingenuity, has reached a frightening stage. One of the lethalism toxins could kill as many as 60 million people. Seymour M. Herresh, in his book Chemical and Biological Warfare, notes that the Army lets contracts to universities, industry, and private research institutions. In fact chemical and biological warfare (CBW) research is a giant complex

Reviews ways that the U.S. economy could adjust to a cessation of the Vietnam War. People and companies are prepared for this eventuality, but defense spending will remain at or near current levels. The U.S. will have altered the military's equipment needs and continued world tensions will necessitate maintaining a strong peacetime military force.


Imperfect terminology and arbitrary data pose the main difficulties in the conflict economy as the economic impact of the defense industry. Leontief's input-output matrix overlooked the possibility for the authoritative quantifications of processes; but statistical data are still inadequate, so the method cannot be applied in practice. Some relatively authoritative studies seem to confirm that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Atomic Energy Commission research commissioned by the U.S. Defense Department has "no commercial potential" and that the aerospace industry's defense sector's output effect on economic growth is nil, while input effect is substantial. Government financing has made capital turnover in defense industry twice as fast as that of civilian industry. Consequently private investments in defense industry bring higher yields. But the monopoly associated with defense industry gives the state far-reaching and decisive influence over the industry and related markets. The size of the American aerospace industry allows for cheaper production, which is reflected in its costs progress curve. The prices of American aircraft on the world market are unbeatable. West Germany should proceed with concentration of its aerospace industry and work out adequate national research and development strategy.

ANDERSOII, Walter. PENTAGON WRESTLES WITH HUGE BUDGET CUTS. Aerospace technology, v. 21, June 17, 1968: 13-14. UG30, M54, v. 21

Estimates effects on military projects of the contemplated $2 to $3 billion cut in the defense budget. The leading candidates for cuts or deferrals appear to be ABM systems, new aircraft defense systems, and space projects, including a possible cut of at least 10 percent in the manned orbiter laboratory. Although research and development efforts will probably receive the heaviest reductions, the cutbacks will also affect the support and improvement of operational systems, including the entire range of strategic aircraft and Titan II and Poseidon missile forces.


Under the leadership of Secretary Paul R. Ignatius the U.S. Navy is revolutionizing its procurement techniques. By replacing its old politics of in-house design and distribution of work among many contractors on a one-at-a-time basis with total package multiyear procurement policies, the Navy hopes to increase shipboard efficiency and stimulate the development of a progressive and profitable shipbuilding industry. Although at first some shipbuilders opposed the new approach for fear that unsuccessful bidders would go out of business, many firms have now responded to the additional requirements by streamlining their management techniques and improving their engineering capabilities. Three major shipbuilding programs emphasizing consolidation of mission and standardization of design have already been initiated. Litton Systems has been awarded the development and production contract for the new general purpose amphibious assault ship and is competing with General Dynamics and Bath Iron Works for the design of a new series of destroyers. Litton also provided the most acceptable design for the fast deployment logistic ship and will begin negotiating a production contract once congressional approval is forthcoming. While the initial costs of the new procurement techniques are higher than those of the old piecemeal approach, the long-term benefit to ship performance and maintenance and to private industry are expected to more than compensate for the added expense.


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II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

1592
d the easy assumption that the $38-billion Vietnam war budget will soon be available to ease the fiscal crises, the balance-of-payments crises, and the human crises of America's cities is wrong. No significant drop in military spending is now expected until 1970—even if a cease-fire takes effect soon after the November elections. Most of the Defense Department's biggest procurement contracts—for aircraft, missiles, ships, electronics, and communications—will not be much affected by an end to the war. The only industries that will be hit hardest are clothing and textiles (where about 65,000 extra jobs were created by government orders for military gear) and munitions manufacturing (where about 225,000 jobs are at stake). In fact, no export new exports defense spending to ever get back to the pre-Vietnam level; optimists say it could level out at $50 billion, others put the figure closer to $75 billion. (Abstract supplied)


Although the financially generous Marshall plan was widely accepted and supported 20 years ago, public support for the foreign aid program is declining and there is a very narrow margin of tolerance in congressional support. The total appropriation for this year is just under $2.3 billion as compared to $4.3 billion in 1961 and $3.25 billion in 1965. In 1968 America will not spend more than 0.3 percent of its gross national product on economic aid, in sharp contrast to 2.75 percent in 1949. Similar development can be traced in other countries. Public opinion polls have registered a steady decline in public support due to dissatisfaction with the results achieved and doubts about the program's efficacy. Moreover the disparities between defense and foreign aid spending are constantly and rapidly widening. It is much easier to pass a $12 billion supplemental bill for defense than a $1 billion supplemental bill for foreign aid, because it does not possess in the public mind the tangible values of bigger defense. It is much easier to pass a $24 billion supplemental bill for defense than a $25 billion supplemental bill for foreign aid. And yet economic development is closely connected with security, and economic growth might prevent military involvement of the Western countries. If the foreign aid program is to survive it will require a fresh strategy, a new assessment of the potential sources and costs of international assistance, and increased public and private assistance, perhaps doubled in 1975. What is needed is experience and a sober realization of the importance of mobilization planning almost insuperable. The most formidable difficulty is comprehending those interrelations of autonomous economic units that have arisen because most firms depend on the outputs of other firms as inputs to their own productive processes. Input-output analysis is a mathematical technique devised to deal with this range of programming problems. To date it has been used mainly to measure the impact of national defense programs on the economy as a whole. This was the case with the "emergency model" drawn up for the rearmament program of the early 1950's. Used in this way, the technique is one of the most important tools of analytical strategic analysis. It provides the planner with a set of rationally structured alternatives based on knowledge of the probable consequences of each. In the nuclear age choosing the right strategic alternative may mean the difference between survival and death.


Suggests a method of forecasting quarterly defense expenditures. Inaccurate forecasts lead to multiplied errors in predicting the gross national product and can result in inappropriate policy decisions. Galper and Gramlich have developed a forecasting method that uses two Department of Defense series as indicators to predict quarterly expenditures on a national income accounts basis. They also have attempted to throw some light on the award-expenditure lag, its relationship to military and economic conditions, and the nature of inventory buildup associated with defense spending.

1587

An "experimental nonmilitant meeting of industrialists" of the NATO member countries, held in Brussels in May 1968, was attended by 90 industrialists as well as government representatives. The obvious aim of the meeting was to preserve NATO, in which the monopolies dictate the bloc's policy and have succeeded in maintaining wartime economic conditions in peace-time. In 1967 the military expenditure of the NATO countries reached almost $60 billion, more than five times the 1946 expenditures. The profits of the member countries' industries grew considerably. The bloc's share of the profits went to the United States, which has almost a monopoly in the NATO arms market. The West European countries annually pay the United

1594


Modern war is as much a contest of industrial economies as of armed forces, and this state of affairs has put a premium on the ability of a nation to mobilize its economic resources and facilities quickly and efficiently. Unfortunately a complex modern economy makes the difficulties of mobilization planning almost insuperable. The most formidable difficulty is comprehending those interrelations of autonomous economic units that have arisen because most firms depend on the outputs of other firms as inputs to their own productive processes. Input-output analysis is a mathematical technique devised to deal with this range of programming problems. To date it has been used mainly to measure the impact of national defense programs on the economy as a whole. This was the case with the "emergency model" drawn up for the rearmament program of the early 1950's. Used in this way, the technique is one of the most important tools of analytical strategic analysis. It provides the planner with a set of rationally structured alternatives based on knowledge of the probable consequences of each. In the nuclear age choosing the right strategic alternative may mean the difference between survival and death.
ARMs CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

States one billion dollars. The upkeep of American troops on West German territory is compensated for by the sale of American arms to the Bundeswehr. Under these conditions the monopolies understandably ignore the peoples’ aspirations for relaxation of tensions, abolition of NATO, and a collective security system in Europe and unhesitatingly uphold the arms race.

1968

Analyzes the current reorganization of the West German aerospace industry from an economic standpoint. Gross-Talmon considers the industry’s competitive strength to be centered on Walter Haen’s thesis that resources now committed to the war could be used for less destructive purposes. All the experts agree that war is not necessary for economic well-being.


A collection of views by five experts—Albert C. Hart, Hans J. Morgenthau, Christopher Creme, Joseph A. Pochman, and Leonard C. Lewis—on what will happen to the American economy after the Vietnam War ends. Comments are centered on Walter Haen’s thesis that resources now committed to the war could be used for less destructive purposes. All the experts agree that war is not necessary for economic well-being.

1968

Asserts peace in Vietnam will have no long-term adverse effects upon the earnings of aerospace companies. While 10 percent of the companies’ annual revenue is now related to the Vietnam War, losses incurred by the cessation of hostilities will not be offset by the revitalization of strategic defense and space programs and by growing demands for commercial aircraft. Revenue from government contracts for such enormous projects as the Minuteman III, ARIES system, amphibious assault ships, etc., is reduced, and Poseidon submarine-launched missile should far exceed the $3 billion in sales the aerospace industry gets yearly from the war. In addition the financial effects of a peace settlement will be cushioned by industry involvement in the supersonic transport, space, and TRIDENT programs.

1968

Discusses the impact of the Vietnam War on the United States’ economy. Since contracts related to the war are widespread, transition from a “semi-war economy” will be relatively easy once the war ends.

1962

Slav Ru
Translated from Izvestia, Apr. 17, 1968.

The real aims of U.S. imperialism, allegedly concerned with “prosperity for all,” is world hegemony. Every conflict emerging in one or another part of the globe is supported by the U.S. alliance of capital and the military. The role of war is to ensure anti-Communist “order” in the tense spots on earth and to provide American corporations with profitable military orders by encouraging a permanent arms race. The Wall Street armaments monopolies are the most expansionist, but the initiative is shifting ever more to the Middle Eastern, Pacific Coast, and Texas rockety, electronics, and other military products concerns. Finance and industrial executives are appointed to the office of defense secretary, and retired generals take up positions in corporations. The “creative democracy” is turning into a “militarized society.” The “war on poverty” program has been replaced by the Vietnam War, which swallows up about $25 billion a year, while the U.S. Congress has rejected a proposal to allocate several hundred million dollars for annihilating rats in the slums. The military-industrial complex is responsible for the Vietnam failures. U.S. internal struggles, and the currency crisis. The monopolization of production and intensification of social hostilities in capitalist society call for revolutionary social changes, which “the iron heel” of the monopolies cannot stop.

1953

“Second article on Government-contractor relations.” See Item no. 1597 and 1598 in this bibliography for 1941 and 1952 articles.

Examines the outlook for electronics specialists on aged in the Nation’s space efforts. Although most National Aeronautics and Space Administration officials predict a 3-year period of austerity before major expansion in the civilian space effort, the cutbacks will principally affect those engaged in the launch and propulsion areas and not those in the electronics field. Since the military space effort is expected to rise in order to sustain America’s strategic superiority, any engines that are displaced from civil space programs can transfer to military projects. Current needs in the total space effort could be altered by changes in budget priorities and defense requirements, but at this time no experts anticipate an upsurge in funding within the next decade.

1954
McCarthy, Terrence. WHAT THE VIETNAM WAR HAS COST. New university thought, v. 6, summer 1956: 1-10. D059, 6884, v. 6

An assessment of the economic and political costs of the Vietnam War. Direct military expenditures, together with the sale of Government assets and the depletion of military inventories make up only a part of the economic costs of the war. To this total must be added the cost to the Nation of distortions introduced into employment patterns and the credit structure, the diversion of badly needed resources from civilian use, the reduction of consumer purchasing power through
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

unfairness, the growth of the Federal budget deficit, and the aggravation of the balance-of-payments problem. But the political costs are more grave than the economic ones. The war has deprived the United States of its world position while at the same time enabling the Soviet Union to strengthen its economic, military, and political influence everywhere.

1595.

African states are being forced into a period of painful cultural readjustment by the impact of the Western technological civilization. Many of them have turned to the use of coercion to speed development, with the result that unattractive violence has been done to human rights. Most African civil services are corrupt and inefficient—of profits to elites, misery to everyone else. The only other organized cadre available to the state, the Army, has no real reason for existing since in African frontier defense is seldom necessary. The real functions of the Army are to provide well-paid jobs for the unemployed and offer an organized alternative to civilian rulers. The tragedy is that these military establishments consume resources that otherwise could be devoted to economic development. African militarism cannot be dealt with directly. The underlying economic causes of the disease must be attacked first. What Africa needs today are not grandiose planned economies but abstinence and handicraft improvements at the village level. What are the chances for nonviolence in Africa? Though no formal organization of nonviolent forces exists on the continent, nonviolence has in some cases evoked profound enthusiasm among Africans and seems to appeal strongly to the African temperament.

1596.
Mason, John F. CONTRACTORS AND GOVERNMENT. CLASH OVER RULES. Electronic design, v. 16, June 6, 1968: 36-44. TK7800. E437, v. 16

An exchange of views on Defense Department procurement methods between representatives of an industry and Government. Many contractors complained that the voluminous Government controls and regulations have caused them excessive amounts of work and resulted in unjust reductions of profits. Government representatives countered by accusing many companies of extracting unreasonable profits through unfair pricing methods and unauthorized use of Government equipment. In an attempt to reconcile the clash. Representative Chet Holifield has introduced a bill to establish a commission of 14 members drawn from the private sector and the legislative and executive branches of the Government to examine procurement procedures and recommend improvements.

1597.

"Last of three articles on changing Government-industry-urban relationships." See item nos. 1593 and 1598 in this bibliography for first two articles.

Discusses the new opportunities that are expected to open up for electronics engineers now working on space and defense projects. Tomorrow's "glamour" engineers may be called upon to solve "life" problems in the fields of air traffic control, radio communications, air and water pollution, and oceanography. Government spending should increase in each of these areas in order to meet the challenges of a rapidly expanding population.

1598.

First of three articles on Government-industry relationships. For the other two articles see item nos. 1593 and 1597 in this bibliography.

Forecasts the status of electronic design engineers now engaged in military projects following the end of the Vietnam War. Most industry experts agree that very few engineers will lose their jobs since they are expected to become engaged in replenishing spare parts for operating military equipment, extensive research and development programs, producing new electronic consumer products, and supporting commercial efforts to "pull riches from the sea." Although the outlook in the field of electronics design could be drastically altered by the defense attitudes of the next President and changes in the international situation, the industry should not suffer as long as America maintains its foreseeable strategic commitments.

1599.
Myrdal, Gunnar. AN ECONOMIST'S VISION OF A SANE WORLD. In Indian Institute of Social Order, Delhi. Social action, v. 16, Mar./Apr. 1968: 129-144. HN681.958, v. 18

Protests against the irrationality of an international system in which the rich nations get richer and the poor nations get poorer while scarce resources are squandered by rich and poor alike for the construction of vast war machines. Myrdal warns that widespread fanatics may be more of a threat to the future of mankind than nuclear violence, but he is pessimistic about man's chances of avoiding either danger. If a worldwide hunger crisis is to be averted, the underdeveloped countries must press ahead with birth control programs and carry out radical social reforms, but these domestic measures can be successful in promoting rapid progress only if all nations— particularly the rich nations— cooperate to establish a more equitable international economy and substitute the rule of law for the arms race.

1600.

Analyzes the detrimental effect of the Vietnam War on the U.S. economy and its consequences for American citizens. Nastarevksii concludes that the situation proves the shortsightedness of the U.S. Government, which wants to impose its dictates on other countries.

1601.

357
Stimulated by their successful “revolt” in April against military spending, military budget cutters in the Senate are mobilizing their forces to fight for further reductions in defense expenditures. Defense budget requests will be scrutinized more closely during the forthcoming weeks than ever before because of rising senatorial discontent with the so-called “expansionist” policies supported by Defense Department funds and because of the density for overall reductions in Government spending. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee James William Fulbright have criticized the Defense Department for wasting billions in the area of research. During a committee hearing Fulbright questioned John S. Kugler, the director of Defense Research and Engineering, about the propriety of Defense-sponsored research in the social sciences and in foreign countries. Fulbright and other committee members also expressed doubts over the value of the private “think tanks” subalized by the Defense Department. They criticized the high salaries and quality of work of employees of these research centers and accused the “think tanks” of disrupting U.S. universities and relations with several foreign countries. Although there is no indication of a revolution in the Senate against defense spending, “there are signs of a small-scale uprising,” and military authorization measures will meet a good deal of opposition during the remainder of the session.

1962
PENTAGON POSES AT COSTS. Business week, no. 2027, June 8, 1966: 44. HC431, E87, 1968
Reveals the intentions to lower the price of engines for the F-111 aircraft and demand a $20 million cut, which already exceeded, because of production deficiencies disclosed by a naval task force. Alarm over a sharp increase in the costs of the F-111 engine. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had ordered an inquiry into the operating procedures of Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation, the company that produced the engines. The unprecedented act of checking behind the costs of defense projects may signify a new trend in defense contracting.

1963
Notes congressional demands for reductions in the $50 billion non-Vietnam portion of the $81 billion defense budget. Many cuts will involve personnel and operating expenses, but the greatest saving will come from cuts in procurement and research and development programs. The Sentinel ABM system, manned orbital laboratory, F-111 long-range fighter-bomber, and space employment logistic ships are among the projects most likely to be slashed or stretched out.

1964
In his farewell address, former President Eisenhower warned the American public of the grave dangers inherent in the “military-industrial complex.”

While Eisenhower acknowledged the need for a vast arms industry in the interest of national security, he pointed out the potential for its acquisition of un warranted power, “whether sought or unsought,” because of its tremendous influence over a broad segment of American society. Currently 10 percent of the American labor force is employed directly or indirectly with military enterprises, and about 25,000 prime contractors and 100,000 subcontractors do business with the Defense Department. Often the prosperity of a particular community is highly dependent upon the military base or defense plant in its locality. In a number of cases politicians have supported arms programs more for their “pork” value to their constituencies than for their military value. Universities and other nonprofit institutions receive over $700 million a year from the Pentagon. Even the Federal Government itself has a vested interest in munitions production, since its overseas arms sales have brought in $1.1 billion since 1952. The influence of the arms industry is further boosted by the abundance of retired military officers employed by defense contractors and by the support given to the military-industrial complex by various pressure groups. Currently, the existence of countervailing pressures and a public awareness of the potential dangers posed by the military-industrial complex militate against the United States becoming “a garrison state in which most of its energies are devoted to arms.” The very openness of the debates between civilian and Defense representatives over security issues reduces the likelihood of military domination of public policy. Moreover, intraservice rivalries often prevent concerted action in support of military objectives. Additional safety factors include Government economic controls, the fierce competition for the military dollar among defense contractors, and the conflicting demands made on legislators that may cause even a defense-oriented Congressman to vote against a military appropriations bill in order to trade support for other issues.

1965
Reviews the main outlays of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) since 1941. Rensberger also considers AEC investments in development and production of weapons.

1966

Describes the Economic Information Survey (EIS) which "directly measures employment in 453 major defense contractor plants and imputes employment for the unreported plants." EIS gauges the differential effect upon the economies of regions and states. Employment in defense plants is more variable than in industry as a whole and this variability creates the need for flexibility in the affected labor market. The short or long term reaction of a community to changes in defense activity is not known.
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

1607
Sergeev, A. U.S. MILITARY BUDGET. International
affairs (Moscow) June 1968: 112-113.

DE39, 1465, 1966

Analyzes military allocations in the U.S. 1966-68 fiscal
year budgets.-overlay states that even a cursory
acquaintance with the policy of building up its military
potential for total and local wars and seems to be bent
on stepping up the arms drive.

1608
Tadashi, Kawata. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
N. CLEAR ARMAMENT. Japan quarterly, v. 15,
Apr./June 1968: 180-186.

The superpowers to
may not have--
to prevent it from using a weapon Britain may not have.
This research has pervaded the universities and is cor-
rupting "pure" science.

1609
Weidenbaum, Murray L. CONCENTRATION AND COM-
PETITION IN THE MILITARY MARKET. Quarterly
review of economics and business, v. 5, spring 1968:
7-17.

Attempts to measure the degree of concentration and
competition in the military market in the United States.
Weidenbaum finds considerable concentration but sug-
gests that this is a characteristic of American industry
as a whole. Competition is unevenly distributed but
substantial in large and important sectors of the mar-
ket. "Contrary to much of the writing on the so-called
military-industrial complex," giant firms neither domi-
nate the market nor are dominated by it. In fact, the
greatest share of the military market goes to medium-
sized firms, not the corporate giants.

1610
Weidenbaum, Murray L. INDICATORS OF MILITARY
DEMAND. SUR business and government review,

Weidenbaum suggests that the Federal govt. publish a monthly or quarterly
report containing all the relevant statistics.

3. Ethical and Social

1611
Calder, Ritchie. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH: CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE. Pax et

Extracts from an address by Lord Ritchie-Calder at

Chemical and biological weapons are among the most
frightening invented by mankind. However, there is a
conspiracy of silence about them, and scientists them-
selves shy away from their implications. These weapons
are manufactured on the pretext of "defense": to
research and build a weapon the enemy does not have--
to prevent it from using a weapon Britain may not have.
This research has pervaded the universities and is cor-
rupting "pure" science.

1612
Chekhov, B. JUST DEMANDS, Daily review, transla-
[items] 2, 1-2.

The Japanese scientists' discovery that coastal
waters in the Bashi port had been contaminated by the
discharge of radioactive waste from the U.S. sub-
marine Swordfish produced vehement protests from the
Japanese people, who do not want Japan to be turned
into a U.S. military base. The Japanese Government
is obviously pursuing a nuclear policy that permits U.S.
nuclear warships to enter Japanese ports and is pre-
paring the population to accept nuclear armaments for
the country's defense. The people fear a repetition of
Hiroshima and therefore demand the annulment of the
U.S.-Japanese peace treaty and the withdrawal of
American military bases from Japan.

1613
Graham, Thomas F. ANATOMY OF AGGRESSION;

-Contents. -Preface. -Introduction. -Acts of aggres-
-Animal trends. Basic reaction. Nature of war. -
- -gms of storms: Western winds. Bino-Soviet
alignment. South Viet Nam. -Power profiles. Types of
- -C. Politicians. Demoralization. -Issues or
-insights: Implications. Disarmament. Alternatives. -
-Price of peace: Principles. Deterrence. Thinking. -
-Index of names. -Index of subjects.

Defends the theory that violence is not an inherent
characteristic or universal trait. Aggression is a
learned response to frustrations that evolves from sim-
ple reflexes. Radical or reactionary social movements
provide the greatest risk of war because they are influ-
enced by frustration, which tends to make members
militant and aggrieved. Peace can be achieved and
war eliminated through existential psychology, which
"views man as a creature of love and trust and not just
one of hate and suspicion."

1614
Long, Edward L. WAR AND CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA.

-Chapter 2. 1.5

-Contents. -Preface. -Introduction. -Acts of aggres-
-Animal trends. Basic reaction. Nature of war. -
- -gms of storms: Western winds. Bino-Soviet
alignment. South Viet Nam. -Power profiles. Types of
- -C. Politicians. Demoralization. -Issues or
-insights: Implications. Disarmament. Alternatives. -
-Price of peace: Principles. Deterrence. Thinking. -
-Index of names. -Index of subjects.
Partial contents. -- The changing nature of war: Atomic and nuclear weapons. -- Religious support for conscientious participation: The war ethic of the crusaders, and the development of the justification for war: Activist pacifism. -- Morals and policy: Vietnam as an example of judgment. Policy disagreement as a cultural problem in judgment. The junta's militaristic policies. Warheads seem to silence the Greek people's protest against machines for consultation and integration, but atomic proliferation may contribute to polycentric political tendencies.

Analyse the problems raised by war and the moral issues confronting young men who face military service. Long argues that the image of conscientious objection as a great international threat managed by military control from one center is fading away and that the policy of containing war becomes largely ineffective. The author concludes that if some men are called by conscience to reject the Vietnam War, "they should stand well informed about the ground upon which other men in other times have made similar decisions."

1919
Translated from Pravo, May 22, 1969.
Several intermediate-range ballistic missiles were recently launched from a new NATO missile range on the Italian coast. The Greek Army junta used this occasion to assure the world that Greece was a "reliable member of NATO." This assurance indicated that the junta's military doctrine is more and more in the United States and West Germany's hazardous design in the Mediterranean, but the role of the NATO missile fired by the Bundeswehr at the Haifa range cannot silence the Greek people's vehement protests against the junta's militaristic policies.

1949
In response to criticism of its chemical and biological warfare (CBW) policies the British Government announced it would open its chemical research establishment at Porton Down to the public for one day and would seek a new international CBW control measure through the 8-Nation Disarmament Committee. Students at Birmingham and Essex Universities recently harassed a Porton representative visiting their institutions and demanded more information on the activities of the military research center. During the same week a number of prominent scientists requested the Government to transfer the microbiological establishment at Porton from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Health and declassify its work. The formation of an Anti-Chemical and Biological Warfare Group was announced in May, and it joined other peace groups in protesting governmental involvement in CBW. The drive to transfer Porton out of the Ministry of Defense was also joined by Labor Party representatives in Parliament under the leadership of Tam Dalyell. Although the Government argues it is following a strictly defensive CBW policy and claims it is not engaged in developing or manufacturing offensive CBW weapons, Porton's critics point out that the difference between identifying CBW agents that might be used by potential enemies and producing such agents for offensive purposes

is not that great. In addition to prompting responses from the Government, the public protests about Porton's work have intensified the debate within the scientific community over the integrity of engaging in scientific work with destructive potential.

4. Other

1977

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents. -- Cynic thinking. -- The international situation. -- Christ in his state.

Wars against the people of some Christian peace movements in Western Germany, e.g., those participating in Christian-Marxist peace conferences, that unwillingly support the Soviet policy of perpetuating the East German status quo and the division of Germany.

1969

Since 1968 the Soviet Union has been trying to strengthen the East European alliance by reinforcing military and political ties within the Warsaw Pact. It has sought to modernize the allies' military forces, encouraged joint maneuvers, and tried to tighten the machinery for consultation and integration, but atomic weapons seem to be still under Soviet control. Political measures to achieve further coordination, the alliance members have demanded a plan to integrate atomic-armed units under Soviet officers. This action may have been partly influenced as a result of German negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty. Today Soviet military power still predominates in the Warsaw Pact. But the alliance members' subservience to Moscow may be waning as a result of their growing economic prosperity. Moscow itself seems to be doubtful about the East European armed forces' reliability and effectiveness. Probably for this reason the security of Eastern Europe continues to be guaranteed by Soviet nuclear power. Czechoslovakia's independent stance since the beginning of 1989 may lead to its eventual disengagement from the pact's first strategic echelon and later "generate pressure for supranational military and political strategies on a selective basis by other WTO powers."

During the last decade Russia has used the pact to control polycentric tendencies and tried without success to secure the political loyalty of the area by supranational economic planning. Recently it has agreed to collective decisions in marginal issues. If this trend continues the Warsaw Pact may contribute to polycentric political tendencies within the bloc, depending on the extent to which members may give or withhold their consent on key issues.

1979
PACIFIC AIR

Interview with John D. Beattie, Commander, Electronic Systems Division (ESSD), Air Force Systems
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Command, dealing with ESD's reorganization, its involvement in Southeast Asia, and significant future programs. Bessie notes that ESD's reorganization will permit the division to put the resources where the work is, free some of its manpower from lower priority tasks, and further help realize the goal of ESD to produce command, control, and communications systems for the Air Force throughout the world. He adds that, in Southeast Asia, ESD has over six operational communications systems, including an underwater cable communications system around the Indochina Peninsula, another ocean cable between Vietnam and the Philippines, and 200 miles of tropospheric scatter communications giving Thailand and South Vietnam telephone networks comparable to that of the United States.

1620


It is senseless to allocate needed and limited government funds for the construction of an ABM system that "in merely a technological daydream" with no guarantee of total effectiveness in the event of a thermonuclear war. Although the Russians, finally realizing the illusion of ABM protection, have now agreed to accept the U.S. offer of talks aimed at making the ABM, Co., as still may not completely halt the immense spending for the proposed system. Congress did conclude that $40 billion--the cost for the complete system--would be too much for what might prove to be a white elephant, but it is considering the possibility of a $3.5-billion appropriation for a smaller system. In the end the United States will probably spend the $3.5 billion, wrangle with the Russians for several years, and then agree to scrap the entire idea, claiming that the cause of world peace has been advanced-world peace being merely a wishful thinking for national security. While a defense might not ensue this year, its arrival seems inevitable. But of what value will the defense be to the underdeveloped countries where the real issues of peace and war are unresolved? Probably none, unless America and Russia agree to a "massive, open-handed sharing of the wealth liberated by the limitation of their arms." However, this would endanger the defense.

1621


Since NATO appeared in Europe the arms drive has been mounting, and NATO's military capacity and equipment now cover Western Europe, Germany has built its own formidable military force, which has become NATO's most powerful striking power, and is now trying to acquire nuclear weapons. This resurgence of militarism and revisionism alarms Western Europe. The military spending of NATO member states has reached enormous proportions, bolstered by the myth of the "threats," invented by NATO leaders. But in the light of the Soviet Union's peaceful policy, NATO seems illusory, and American politicians have begun to demand a withdrawal of forces from Europe. This new policy affects West Germany, which has been asked to recognize the existing European boundaries, renounce nuclear weapons, and normalize its problems with East Germany. Although the politicians are doing their utmost to preserve the old NATO dogmas, the people of Western Europe favor Soviet proposals for a conference of all European states to discuss an effective system of European security.

1622


"References": p. 1172.

Reviews the literature relating to the social and scientific problem of damage resulting from underground blasting and cites some of the criteria used to determine structural damage. The authors conclude that the level of claim response for blast-related damage will be higher in low to middle income neighborhoods, where small houses are occupied and self-owned, and that owners of larger dwellings seldom submit claims for vibration damage.

1623


Had Secretary of State John Foster Dulles been around today, the Vietnam War, the Berlin Wall, and the Ruble crisis would never have happened. Dulles would have moved swiftly against any Communist aggression. Under the Kennedy administration the doctrine of flexible response evolved and now furnishes a screen for no response. The rejection of massive retaliation "signalized the Communists a willingness to meet them on a favorite battleground. The United States must stand firm against communism, as Dulles did, and resolve to stand up to the Communists in the Paris peace talks. If it does not, "the final nail will have been driven into the coffin of American credibility."

1624


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Calls for improved weapons research and development in the future. Kyes notes that too often the United States has entered a new war committed to the strategy and weapons of the last one. To counter the debilitating effects of peace-time complacency, the United States must build two separate and highly specialized defense systems, to contrast a nuclear attack and a limited war. On the other hand America must also "pursue the elucidation of the fundamental causes of war" to decrease the possibility of conflict. Kyes finds a key to the problem of war in Robert Ardrey's concept of the "territorial imperative."

1625


APL.06975, 1968

With surprising rapidity China has transformed itself into a nuclear power. Already it is capable of black-
malling neighboring nations and soon will pose a direct threat to the United States. The Chinese took the difficult U-235 route to the manufacture of nuclear weapons but were careful to keep their ambitions within the limit set by their small industrial base. Quite obviously their goal is to produce nuclear weapons by the hundreds rather than thousands. China's current need is to develop an effective delivery system as quickly as possible, but ICBM design and manufacture raise no serious technological or scientific problems. The U.S. decision to deploy the Sentinel system is said to be a direct and necessary response to Chinese nuclear power. It is doubtful, however, that the system can be made effective even against an unprepared Chinese strike. The truth is that the decision to deploy an ABM rested on domestic political considerations. What effect will this decision have on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union? Russia's agreement to a nonproliferation treaty and willingness to discuss further arms control and disarmament measures have been downplayed by decision to move toward a détente with the West. The Sentinel may undermine this opportunity for relaxing tensions and new arms control. The Pentagon argues that the Sentinel is required because the Chinese are more likely than the Russians to act irrationally; but if the United States assumes that the Chinese are rational, when it formulates Vietnam policy, then why not in this more general case? One clear consequence of Chinese nuclear power is that more than ever before "the landmarks of military power are shrouded in ambiguity" and "more dollars no longer automatically buy increased security."

1626


The danger that "militarism" in America might become institutionalized and no longer accountable to the public must be halted. Recommendations for meeting the threat include: making all feasible cuts in the defense budget, seeing that Congress takes more seriously its obligations to review and control military spending and military missions, envisioning programs that would convert industrial efforts previously directed to military purposes into creative peacetime activity, scrutinizing and seeking to limit the use of the university for military research and development, limiting the activities of American arms salesmen, and endeavoring that the military remain out of foreign aid and civic action programs in the underdeveloped countries.

1627


Congressional skepticism regarding defense-sponsored research was recently reinforced by the testimony of Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Rickover not only questioned the value of military research but also pointed out the danger of creating a vast military-scientific complex that would control and profit from the nation's military research. Moreover he claimed that research subsidized by the Defense Department contributed to campus unrest and profit from their teaching responsibilities. In view of congressional sympathy toward Rickover's accusations, the Department of Defense may decide to drop some of its research projects, particularly in the social sciences field. Although before Rickover's testimony the Defense Department's Director of Research and Engineering, John S. Foster, staunchly defended the Pentagon's research programs, research that was once considered useful may "seem less essential when it serves as fuel for congressional[!] derision."

1928


The Director of Research & Engineering for the Defense Department, John S. Foster, recently pleaded with the Senate Armed Services Committee not to slash the $1.38 billion FY 1969 budget request for military research and development. He warned the committee that any reductions would seriously jeopardize the nation's long-term security posture. Although the Pentagon has sufficient funds for quick-result research projects, it has had to forgo many promising basic research programs because of lack of money. The Defense Department finds it particularly difficult to get congressional support for its social science projects aimed at aiding defense policymakers in understanding the cultural effects of their decisions. In its crusade to cut military research funds as a whole, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has located a good deal of ridicule on the Pentagon's involvement in such projects as the study of withdrawal in the Congo and a comparison of normative behavior between Japanese and American youth.

1629


Included an English translation of parts of the speech.

Excerpts from a speech by Gerhard Schröder, the German Federal Republic's Defense Minister, to a group of industrialists on defense policy in a modern industrial society. Schröder stresses the importance of defense research and development for the nation's industrial technology and outlines the Federal Government's long-range fiscal plans in that area.

1630


News

Advances in industry and technology depend significantly on the coordination of military expenditures and policies. Failure to coordinate defense policies has caused Europe to lag behind the United States in such important areas as space exploration, computer development, atomic research, and aeronautics. Pierre Gallois, consultant for Dassault and adviser to De Gaulle, contends that military technology cannot be advanced unless the Europeans give up their separate programs for a "common military production based on the leading industries." While many French military critics encouraged European cooperation, France has pursued a "two-track" course—collaboration, but only for the advantage of France. The Italians, Germans, and even the English, must expose these inconsistencies in De Gaulle's policies to pave the way for "genuine collaboration."


Social science has failed to provide a usable model for the role of organizations or social systems during disaster. Widespread disasters that affect whole communities overtake local facilities and require specialized skill and equipment and effective organizational methods. Mass volunteer help in such situations is hindered by lack of motivation, incompetence, and ill-defined allocation of aid. A major organizational problem in "testing how to use our tradition of local autonomy and local public participation in a world which demands more professionalism and more coordinated planning over large areas." Civil defense preparations must reflect the ascendancy of local responsibility. The basic function of civil defense organizations are planning and organizing activities and providing skills and capabilities not present in existing governmental organizations. If community know how to operate under emergency conditions, and emergency functions and priorities are properly integrated at all levels of government, then loss of life and property can be limited.

Even though the decision to deploy a light missile defense system will be difficult to reverse, U.S. policymakers would be wise to terminate the project. The low probability of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union does not warrant taxing the economy by continuing to build missile defenses. Moreover, because ABM systems have a tendency to obsolescence, the maintenance of an adequate system is a costly and probably unsuccessful struggle. Both the Soviet Union and the United States would attempt to neutralize each other's defenses, the adoption of the ABM would seriously exacerbate the arms race. Once the deployment of any missile defense system begins and antimissile begins accelerating, then there is little possibility of stopping or reversing the trend. Although China has become the main rationale for deployment of the Sentinel system, most experts deny China would risk attacking the United States. Furthermore, there are no guarantees that an anti-Chinese missile defense system would offset advances in the Chinese missile force or that it could be dissuaded from a larger Soviet-oriented force. From the Soviet point of view the American ABM may look like a threat of preemptive war, and the proponent of a new round of the Soviet-American arms race may encourage a number of countries to begin developing nuclear weapons. Because of the many drawbacks even ABM proponents cannot have very high expectations for its success. Nevertheless in the absence of Soviet-American disarmament talks, the Government will probably feel compelled to press on with missile defense since it has not yet learned "to distinguish between a legitimate interest in insurance and an obsessive, neurotic concern for an unachievable nuclear security."

In the United States a considerable outcry has been raised against Government research programs in chemical and biological warfare. In Britain protest has been limited to sporadic lobbying. Significantly, the research objectives of the two countries are different. U.S. research aims at laying the groundwork for a chemical and biological arsenal, while the British program is limited to the search for attack countermeasures. Although revulsion against the development of these weapons in natural, it is asking a great deal to demand that a superpower give them up unilaterally. On the other hand it is not unreasonable to ask that the United States and the Soviet Union open discussions on the possibility of mutually abolishing these weapons. The problems here are obvious but not insurmountable. In Britain some critics argue that even defense-oriented research ought to be abandoned, but this not to be expected of a prudent government faced with the possibility that these weapons—however heinous—will be used. Others are demanding that research be transferred to the Ministry of Health and its results made public, but this demand too is impracticable—e.g. dangerous—because the information useful in research on countermeasures is equally useful in weapons development. The best course is for the Government to undertake to promote a better understanding of its work through a frank and informed public debate of the issues. In addition Britain should terminate its current practice of exchanging information on these matters with the United States. This exchange certainly benefits U.S. weapons research and for that reason would seem to be incompatible with present British policy.

Although the primary job of the Sandia research center in New Mexico is related to the long-term nuclear arsenal, it disseminates a good deal of technical information to the civilian industrial sector. In the process of designing and monitoring the production of the nonnuclear components of nuclear weapons Sanida is pressed by "the endless technological one-upmanship of the cold war" into constantly seeking new and improved techniques. Many of the discoveries, such as the Rola-Mite engineering principle and new computer components, have broad commercial applications and are made available to the public through a number of channels including Sandia's Office of Industrial Cooperation, the Atomic Energy Commission's Division of Technical Information Extension, the Commerce Department's Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific & Technical Information, professional and trade journals, and technology utilization conferences.


H. Murphy and Bjorn Klinge. -- Civil defense and national defense, by Herbert Roback. -- Afterword, by Stuart L. Pimentel. -- Appendix: letter to the President. -- Selected bibliography. -- Index.

Collection of essays on various non-technical aspects of civil defense from a study sponsored by the Civil Defense Forum. By calling attention to the requirements for protecting the public against the horrors of a nuclear attack, the authors hope to inspire more constructive efforts in this field by citizens and government officials. They emphasize the commonsense aspects of civil defense and decry the reluctance of U.S. policymakers to invest in a civil defense system.
III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

1636

Bibliography: p. VII-XXV.

Partial contents. -- pt. 1. International relations with nonrecognized states and governments as a factual situation. -- pt. 2. The legal situation of nonrecognized states and nonrecognized governments. -- Special problems of recognition. -- pt. 3. Particular legal relations: Bilateral treaties. Multilateral treaties. Special problems created by division of Germany. The practice of participation of the nonrecognized in international organizations. Diplomatic representations. Principal absence of diplomatic relations. The ways irregular diplomatic relations manifest themselves. Emphasizes that relations with nonrecognized states and governments are a subject of international law and not a "legal vacuum."

1637

Sponsored by the American Society of International Law. Bibliographical footnotes.


Collection of writings, classic and contemporary, on admissibility and inadmissibility under international law of foreign intervention in civil wars.

1638

Bibliography: p. v-xxv.

Partial contents. -- Legal nature and basis of the validity of the law of nations. -- The system of international legal order. -- Unity of international legal order. Inquiry into criteria for legality of treaty contents. Gralla investigates methods of solving the problem of legality, including the casuistic method that has lately become popular.

1639

Emphasizes that relations with nonrecognized states and governments are a subject of international law and not a "legal vacuum." Considers the legal profession best suited to evaluate the areas where society needs to change and the ways the changes could be effected. Because they are uniquely experienced in negotiations, lawyers could play a leading role in securing world peace and fostering international co-operation. Since law differentiates between liberty and license and represents the basis on which society is built, lawyers should drive to make justice the guiding principle of national and international affairs. There is an urgent need for leadership, and lawyers could contribute by forming a national advisory council on law and progress to propose long-term measures to form or improve existing legal and social systems and provide the public with a better understanding of problems and their solutions under law.

1640
Rusk, Dean. CONSOLIDATING THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. In U.S. Dept. of State, Department of State bulletin, v. 54, May 27, 1968: 669-673.

Address made at the University of Georgia, Athens, Ga., on Law Day, May 4, 1968.

Evaluates the contribution of law to the maintenance of international peace and security. Rusk calls the U.N. Charter the "constitution" of the international legal system and identifies collective security as its basic tenet. He cites recent cases from the fields of disarmament and arms control, ocean floor and space exploration, international communications, and poverty relief to show how international legal agreements are being used to knit together the diverse interests of the world community.
B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION


Partial contents. -- pt. 1. Political power in external relations from the beginnings of the modern state to the present: The foundations of the modern state; the individual consequences of the new distribution of power. The consolidation of the state; growing predominance of the political since the Treaties of Westphalia. International law from the Congress of Vienna to the First World War, 1815-1914. Between the two World Wars, 1918-1939. -- pt. 2. General relations of power and law in international relations: The political facts: its criteria; political disputes; political tensions: their various forms. Is there an "international community"? Sovereignty and international organization. The human ends of power. -- pt. 3. Convergences and tensions of law and power in positive international law: Social factors and political factors in the development of positive international law. The state in the international order. Inter-state relations. Effectivity in international relations. Peaceful change. -- pt. 4. The judicial settlement of disputes: Conciliations commissions (partial depolitization). Political obstacles to compulsory arbitration. Judicial settlement; the International Court of Justice (complete depolitization).

Concludes that positive international law tends now more than ever to be teleologically oriented.

1643 Haas, Ernst B. COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. Denver, University of Denver [1968] 117 p. (Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver. Monograph series in world affairs, v. 5, monograph no. 1)

Bibliographical references included in "Footnotes" (p. 99-117).

Partial contents. -- Forecasting, development models, and the reconciliation system. -- Systems and environments in history. -- The UN and collective security. -- Global tasks and the UN of the future. Speculates about the future role of the United Nations in the maintenance of world order. Developmental models "based on articulate assumptions, and established trends" are utilized to forecast the situation. After analyzing the requirements of an effective collective security system, the study concludes that the United Nations of 1965 will be "unable to carry out the collective security task as well as does the current UN" because the trend toward autonomy by each specialized U.N. agency will lead to a decline in interregional and interfunctional bargaining.


Stresses the close relationship between maintenance of peace and security and world economic and social advancement. Individual chapters review the United Nations past decade of development, its membership expansion, powers, and institutional changes, and its development agencies: the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development and the U.N. Industrial Development Organization. The author concludes that the growing effectiveness of the United Nations as a tool of economic and social development points to a "global partnership" in the making.


JX960.105, v. 22

A distinctive "socialist" approach to international organizations is discernible—the outcome of a common social system and ideology, interdependence, and a sense of shared destiny. A state elects to participate in an organization only if it expects the balance of gains over losses to be in its favor, but any given balance may be altered and the direction of change cannot be foreseen. Therefore Socialist countries have always insisted that every organization to which they belong incorporate adequate institutional safeguards of its members' interests. Many disputes over institutional questions in existing organizations would not have occurred had the Socialist states been invited to participate in the founding of these organizations. In this way the viewpoint of the Socialist countries would have been incorporated into the organization right from the beginning. The decisions of international organizations are of the nature of recommendations. However, even a
recommendation, if hostile, can be damaging. Consequently, Socialist states are inclined to oppose the use of simple majority to decide critical questions. The absence of adequate safeguards threatens not only the interests of the separate states but the existence of the organization itself. The greatest danger occurs when a majority of the states use the organization to advance their own interests without regard for the vital interests of other states.


Partial contents. -- The direction of United States' policy since 1940. -- Change and the charter. -- The United Nations security system -- The United States and arms control. -- Limitations of collective enforcement through the United Nations. -- Peacekeeping and the process of settlement. -- Peaceful adjustment and political change. -- The "rule of law" and the control of force. -- Organizational problems: financing and membership. -- The past as prologue. -- Selected references.

Analyzing the role of the United Nations in U.S. national security policy, Russell notes that the United States has had difficulties in attempting to develop a satisfactory place for U.N. activities within the scope of its own foreign policy. The reason for this may be that the United Nations is a relatively new diplomatic implement that governments are often reluctant to use. The author states that the failure to achieve world peace after World War II is not the fault of interna-
tional machinery but rather of the policies of governments. Before there can be peaceful settlement of disputes there must be an adequate national will, which can be brought to bear within an international organization.


"References": p. 154.

Between 1954 and 1958 the Greek government reported to the U.N. General Assembly five times over Cyprus. An ostensible goal was to get the Assembly to adopt a resolution that referred to the principle of the right of self-determination for the population of Cyprus or, in the case of the fifth recourse, to the establishment of an independent Cyprus. The Assembly's responses to these five successive political stimuli, however, do not seem to have helped the achievement of these ostensible Greek goals, even though the latter goal was eventually attained. The setting up of an independent Cyprus was reached outside, not inside, the U.N. Nevertheless, the international instrument which the Greek government sought to use for promoting its foreign-policy goal as well as the Greek Cypriot aspirations for progress influenced not only the procedures finally adopted but the substance of the solution. Beneath the corporate will of the UN, two of the most influential third-party member states at the time--the US and India--had exerted their political weight. As a result, if the procedure of the conflict's resolution was primarily American, the substance of the settlement was, in the last analysis, Indian. (Abstract supplied)

C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES


"Originally designed as a reference paper for an informal study group on the United Nations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The first edition, which covered the period 1946-1965, was prepared by Catherine G. Teng and Kay L. Hancock of the Endowment's research and publication staff."

Outlines U.N. peacekeeping activities from 1946 through 1967. When pertinent, data is given for each of the 59 cases on the duration of the U.N. action, the nature of the security problem, the countries involved, U.N. objectives, U.N. bodies that determined and executed the action, the financing arrangements, and the U.N. action and its result.


"Explores the major obstacles to the way of international agreement on the nature, organization, and functions of U.N. peacekeeping forces. Doxford reviews the history of the dispute over the financing of the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) in order to illustrate the profound differences that exist between states on the political and constitutional issues raised by U.N. peacekeeping operations. He defends U Thant's decision to withdraw UNEF from Egypt on the grounds that a refusal not only would have been illegal and imprac-
tical but also would have provoked a controversy harm-
ful to the future of peacekeeping. Doxford believes immediate progress toward institutionalizing the use of peacekeeping forces is unlikely but does not doubt that their potential usefulness justifies a continuation of efforts in this direction."


"Announces the decision of the U.N. Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations to create a working group to prepare a report on the technical support..."
1652
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS BEGINS 1968 SESSION. This monthly chronicle, v. 6, Apr. 1968: 67-73. JX987.1A1564, v. 6

Highlights from the debate in the U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations during its March 1968 session. The Soviet representative repeatedly maintained there was no provision in the U.N. Charter for a military arm of the Secretariat. While he was unopposed to a study of U.N. peacemaking arrangements, he emphasized that the study must be directed at strengthening the authority of the Security Council. The U.S. delegate stated that the mandate of the Committee was clearly to study methods for improving practical arrangements for "consent-type" operations and not to consider enforcement actions of a binding legal character to be concluded under the Security Council." Representatives from Sweden, Canada, Brazil, the Netherlands, and Italy suggested that Committee members temporarily put aside constitutional differences and concentrate on examining the technical procedures needed to support all potential forms of future U.N. peacemaking operations. Urging that the Committee proceed on the basis of what "unites us instead of what divides us," the Italian delegate recommended the establishment of a subcommittee to compile an extensive record of past U.N. peacemaking operations.


U Thant has been severely criticized for his abrupt compliance with the Egyptian demand of May 1967 that no withdraw the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from Egypt, but in this specific case his decision was the only practicable one because of UNEF's vulnerable military position in Sinai. On the other hand Thant was under no obligation to comply automatically with the Egyptian demand; at the very least he should have made it clear that the withdrawal was being made under protest in order to create a stronger precedent for U.N. authority in the future. The more important question, however, is whether UNEF could have influenced the course of events had it remained on the scene. Obviously the force was too small to successfully interpose itself between the belligerents. However, its departure should have been the signal for a concerted international effort to avert an outbreak of war. "But such effort materialized in the 3 weeks that followed the withdrawal of the force. This experience with UNEF has made evident the need to clarify the relationship between any future U.N. peacekeeping force and its host state and the desirability of making more precise the extent of the Secretary General's independent authority over such a force. For the moment the argument against a new U.N. peacekeeping force for the Middle East is a compelling one: by increasing the security of the parties it would reduce the incentive to work for a compromise settlement. Only the failure to achieve a viable peace settlement, coupled with the imminent danger of a new war, would justify an attempt to renew the U.N. presence.

D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

S.1654
GM36.5.C6 1967

Based upon a symposium held at the Consiglio delle Ricerche in Rome, Sept. 3-12, 1965, in connection with the third plenary session of the World Academy of Art and Science. Includes bibliographies.


Anthology of views on the origins and resolutions of a wide range of conflicts. By discussing fundamental moral values, the contributors attempt to illustrate many of the principles that could form the foundation of international solidarity. To aid in identification of basic spiritual and intellectual values, they suggest the formation of a world university, which would "gather and evaluate the results achieved in all countries of the world which are connected with the solution of problems concerning all mankind."
Cooper, Peter. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR AND PEACE. War resistance, v. 2, 3d quarter, 1907: 19-25.

Fried argued that the moral personality is fixed at a very early age, but Piaget has shown that moral reasoning develops in much the same way as other intellectual skills. A study of the attitudes of 300 schoolchildren toward international conflicts has revealed that between the ages of 6 and 18 the outlook of the normal child passes through three phases, reflecting his shifting concern with first the effects, then the processes, and finally the causes of conflict. Bullycide seems to increase with age, but all development atrophies in the midgets, and there may even be regression to an earlier phase in some adults. At all ages, international affairs are conceptualized in terms of personal experience. These findings have important consequences for the problem of educating for peace. Schoolbooy contact with foreigners can help to break down antagonisms and foster a desire to think in stereotypes, but only if it is prolonged enough to permit comfortable adjustment to foreign ways. Use of the techniques of role-playing and political gaming in the classroom may get better results. A more balanced presentation of patriotic and foreign materials in textbooks and an earlier introduction to the human sciences also would be beneficial. At the moment the state of the public mind is such that an international uplift of trust and cooperation is highly improbable. The practical alternative is to teach and aid negotiation. Meanwhile education still has a role to play in directing youth toward a more peaceful outlook on international affairs.


Partial contents: --From kindergarten to the university. --Some central problems. --Many points of departure.

Projects the possible improvement of youth education toward peace on the basis of an exchange of educational methods "between schools and extracurricular education." Danckworth utilizes the materials and experiences of the German UNESCO Commission, the UNESCO Institutes in Germany, the Association of German Public Schools, and the German Federal Circle of Youth.


Education holds the key to a good many world problems, since it plays a major role in changing and expanding the economic, social, and intellectual framework of the world. Educators and students must question "popular assumptions, truths, and modes." Strengthen what is good, and alter what is bad. Education must respond to the realities of life yet remain free from political pressures. The most urgent task that education should undertake in the crowded, interdependent yet challenging world of today is to transfer "men's thoughts from their conflicts to their common interests." I cherish the world, divided by political discord, will in time experience such a synthesis once common goals and ideals prove more powerful than the differences. Education should be a lifetime project for everybody, particularly within the United Nations, where countries, "having graduated from totalitarianism and independence," learn the art of coexistence and mutual aid. The very essence of all U.N. endeavor is the steady pursuit of an ideal; with this ideal held high and generating new standards to live by, no problem will ever be too big. People everywhere have pretty much the same aspirations, though living conditions differ greatly--and it is these inequalities that are being exploited in pursuit of power. How to cope with this tendency? The answer lies in the realm of education: in schools that can stimulate the more powerful and more constructive human impulses of brotherhood, compassion, tolerance, and reverence for life.

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IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1659

Partial contents. --The decision to use the bomb, by Henry L. Stimson. --The bomb and concurrent negotia-

Selections from the debate over the U.S. decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan. Baker identifies four major foci of dispute in the controversy and presents materials representative of the conflicting points of view on each of these issues: the strategic soundness of the decision, its effects on postwar U.S.-Soviet relations with the Soviet Union, the morality of devising and using weapons of mass destruction, and the historical significance of the new weapon and its more powerful and widely proliferated offspring.

1664

A study of the official views of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark on problems of European security. Birnbaum wants to determine the basic motivations and primary arguments underlying the policies of these states and to detect any tendencies toward change. The attitudes of the four states toward central European problems, arms and arms control, defense, and relations with East Germany are compared. They all want a reduction of East-West tensions and take a positive view of regional arms control arrangements in Europe. They differ in their views of whether the security of the Nordic states can be divorced from that of Western Europe as a whole and in their estimates of the extent to which they can influence the course of European events.

1665

Partial contents. --The resurgence and isolation of China. --The Communist bloc. --Western Europe. --The Arab world and Israel. --Nationalism and oil in Iran. --The Egyptian revolution and the Suez War. --Cyprus. --India and its neighbors. --The Korean War and American engagement in East Asia. --South East Asia. --Northern Africa. --West Africa. --The Congo. --Latin America. --Index.

Retrace the events of the cold war from the Russian takeover of East European countries at the end of World War II to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the Arab-Israeli War in 1967. Calvocoresi notes that postwar disarmament discussions were fruitless until the end of the fifties. And while the superpowers have developed an increasing sobriety in relation to the use of nuclear weapons, there has been no reason to suppose that other countries, once they achieve a nuclear capability, will develop an intimate understanding of the permissible limits of nuclear politics.

1666
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents. --Introduction. --Soviet foreign policy until the end of World War II. --The cold war. --The search for nuclear coexistence: phase one to October, 1962, the movable status quo. --The search for nuclear coexistence: phase two, after the missile crisis.

Assesses the probability of a Soviet-American accommodation in the light of Soviet foreign policy since 1917. Dinerstein describes the Soviet Union's changing approach to peaceful coexistence with the West and the influence of "mutual misperception" on relations between Russia and the United States. He then relates these two historical elements to the most urgent current problems in Soviet-U.S. relations--the nuclear arms race and the Vietnam War. The war has provoked a new cycle in the struggle for strategic nuclear superiority, the most recent manifestation of which has been the decisions of the two countries to build limited ABM systems. A scaling down of the arms race would be advantageous to both powers but is unlikely until the Soviet Union abandons its current view that capitalism is doomed and coexistence is only a transitional stage.

1667

The division of Europe into opposing military alliances was a result of American, not Soviet, initiatives. Following World War II, the United States turned from international cooperation to atomic diplomacy in a grab for world dominion. The true purpose of NATO was not defense against the Soviet Union but suppression of
IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

attempts to establish leftist governments in Western Europe and containment or rollback of communist everywhere. The Soviet Union has consistently supported reunions of a disarmed and neutralized Germany and dissolution or merger of NATO and the Warsaw Pact but has been rebuffed by NATO. The U.S. R. clearly wants worldwide disarmament, but NATO does not. Many European leaders now agree with De Gaulle that the East poses no threat, but German "leaders," who owe their power to NATO, and the United States prefer that tensions be sustained. The real war, however, is not between the East and West but between the haves and have-nots, and the real enemy is poverty.

A world organization with power adequate to regulate nationalistic competition and deal with the problems of poverty is needed. Some have suggested that U. S. policy is now dictated from the Pentagon, but there is little doubt that Johnson is still the leader of the war hawks and responsible for the illegal, immoral, and genocidal war in Vietnam. The peace forces must translate their opposition to rampant militarism into meaningful political terms by next November and show the world that humanity is not dead in the United States.

1665

During the past 20 years India has built up an outstanding record as an eloquent and steadfast proponent of U. N. disarmament measures. Prime Minister Nehru was the first world statesman to advocate cessation of nuclear testing. In 1955 India submitted a proposal to the U. N. First Committee urging the negotiation of a ban on nuclear explosions and initiated the establishment of the U. N. First Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiations. Alarmed at the deadlock of test ban negotiations in Geneva, India in 1958 proposed the creation of a U. N. disarmament commission consisting of all member states and suggested the convening of a new Geneva disarmament committee composed of an equal number of representatives from the East and West. In line with the Indian suggestion, a new 10-nation committee was formulated in 1958 but was doomed to failure by U. S.-Soviet differences. Multi lateral negotiations on disarmament were not resumed until the new 18-Nation Disarmament Committee was convened in 1968. As one of the right minded members of the new committee, India could pursue its disarmament policy on more equitable terms. In the significant role in promoting acceptance of the partial test ban treaty, India has actively supported U. N. efforts to ensure the peaceful uses of outer space and expressed great concern over the problem of nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately India may now be propelled into the arms race by the aggressive attitudes of Pakistan and China. However, there is hope "the great people of India will not renounce the glory of their past but continue to extend their powerful and necessary contribution to efforts towards universal disarmament."

B. GENERAL ANALYSES

1666
"Published for the Center for International Studies, Princeton University."


Examines American nuclear policies from the Truman administration to the present and the special political and diplomatic circumstances of several nations within the context of their nuclear policies. Bader believes that U. S. nuclear policy has only recently been characterized by efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and that in reality postwar America endeavored to achieve a nuclear monopoly under the pretense of advocating nonproliferation schemes such as the Baruch plan. He contends that in its nuclear policies the United States has made its own values and attitudes valid for all other countries.

1667

Paper read at the 5th International Westkunde meeting on defense problems in Feb. 1958.

The threat to the "nation's substance" inherent in today's deterrence is the single most important difference between the modern military balance of power and those of the past, between contemporary security policies and classical, between new arms control and traditional. The failure of disarmament efforts in the fifties plus the existing Soviet-U. S. nuclear stalemate caused the United States in the sixties to propose a multilateral arms control policy. International negotiations in recent years have brought out two main aspects of such policy. In regard to the Soviet-U. S. military relationship, agreement was reached on matters of marginal importance only. (Efforts to check thermonuclear armaments or to limit development of mutual deterrents, broke down over the difficulty of finding a common denominator for the asymmetric advantages on both sides from possession of certain types of weapons.) In regard to the "existence of other nations, 'we' superpowers agreed to a remarkable extent. Proposals by non-nuclear nations that the nonproliferation treaty not preclude the possibility of creation of supranational regional nuclear power are incompatible with the superpowers' basic interest in stabilization of the nuclear status quo aimed at keeping the risks of catastrophic war to the minimum. This is in the interest of other nations as well.

1668

Disarmament: A Guide to Understanding

The only way to prevent war is general disarmament.

1969

Disarmament: A Guide to Understanding

Contents. -- Disarmament or arms control? Views on the question. -- Disarmament: a primary concern of the UN. -- ACDA coordinates U.S. arms control and disarmament efforts. -- Issues in arms control and disarmament. -- What some U.S. citizen groups are doing about arms control and disarmament. -- Films on disarmament and related problems. -- A cross-section of views on arms control and disarmament: suggested readings.

Introductory survey of the major issues in arms control and disarmament, of the major governmental and private organizations active in this field, and of the literature. In addition to the general bibliography, separate brief bibliographies are provided on the non-proliferation treaty, antiballistic missiles, the strategic nuclear balance, Soviet and Chinese policies on arms control and disarmament, regional arms control, the test ban treaty, inspection, chemical and biological weapons, outer space, general and complete disarmament, and the economic impact of disarmament.

1970

Race With Atomic Death. Documents, Opinions by Experts and Articles on the Danger of Nuclear War


Contents. -- The misery and starvation in the world stem from the arms race rather than from a shortage of goods. The defense industry impedes the proper development of the national economy, and nuclear arms tests threaten the biological survival of mankind. The only way to prevent war is general disarmament.

1971

Rulka, Jack P. The Nuclear Arms Race—Diagnosis and Treatment


Summary of an address to the April Stated Meeting of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Describes current and probable future U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons capabilities and examines the factors most likely to promote stability in the balance between the two powers. Rulka predicts that success in controlling the arms race will be achieved only when the United States drops its commitment to nuclear superiority and the Soviet Union becomes willing to abandon its closed social system.

1972


Bibliography: p. 77.

Contents. -- The character of war and development of weapons throughout history. -- The appearance of war and the development of armaments in the nuclear age. -- Disarmament efforts after 1945. -- Potentialities and the difficulty of peace planning.

Reviews supranational and multilateral disarmament and arms control plans. Schott also considers problems of the transformation of the defense industry into civil industry to be dealt with by plans for peace-time security. Disarmament -- he concludes -- must not be conducted with peace planning, though it nonetheless represents a most important prerequisite for it.

1973

Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control: Report to the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency

[Cambridge] East Asian Research Center [and] Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1966. 2 v. JX974.5557

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents. -- Vol. I. Foreword. Approaches to arms control. Sino-Soviet relations and arms control, 1957-1964. The interaction between the nuclear test ban and Sino-Soviet relations. The future impact of the
IV. GENERAL ANALYSIS AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES


Assesses the implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute for U.S. security policy in general and for arms control policy, particularly. Halperin takes issue with the contention that significant Soviet-U.S. arms control agreements are impossible without the participation of China. In truth, "almost any conceivable Soviet-American or multilateral arms control arrangement is possible without Chinese cooperation." Nevertheless, the United States can and should develop a separate arms control policy vis-a-vis China. Although the likelihood of any kind of agreement within the next few years in all, U.S. arms control initiatives would serve to draw the Chinese out of their isolation and introduce them to the nature of strategic dialog in the nuclear age.

1974

Bibliographical footnotes.

Stresses the significance of communications in accelerating or slowing down the arms race between Russia and the United States. While formal means to promote arms reductions may falter, the strategic dialog, the "flow of communications between the sides on matters of strategic arms control," never ceases. Since the strategic policy of each superpower is heavily influenced by its interpretations of the other's intentions, the strategic dialog could exert a positive influence on the arms race. In recommending this approach to arms limitations, Stone first outlines the problems inherent in meaningful and credible exchanges. He then discusses the character of the direct exchange of information, via unofficial bilateral discussions and the exchange of public pronouncements. A greater emphasis upon the nature of the audience in communicating strategic positions could lead to significant breakthroughs in attitudes toward arms control.

C. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

1975
Translated from Pravda, July 2, 1968.

Blaw Run

Complete text of a memorandum containing the Soviet proposal for agreement on implementation as soon as possible of the following urgent measures for cessation of the arms race and for disarmament: a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, for ending the manufacture of nuclear weapons and reducing and liquidating their stockpiles; limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic systems for delivery of weapons, a ban on flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons beyond national frontiers [and] limitation of voyages by submarines carrying missiles; a ban on underground tests of nuclear weapons, a ban on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, limitation of foreign military bases, measures for regional disarmament, and provision for peaceful uses of the seabed and ocean floor. The memorandum also stresses the necessity of solving the problem of general and complete disarmament.
V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

A. NEGOTIATION

1976

The responsibility for ending the Vietnam War through the Paris negotiations lies with the United States much more than with Hanoi: the National Liberation Front (NLF). In many areas of disagreement the NLF and Hanoi are both more willing and able to compromise than Washington. The NLF cannot and will not insist that a coalition government conduct negotiations for South Vietnam. It merely demands to be represented in Paris together with spokesmen of a non-Communist Saigon government that no longer stands for a military solution and denies NLF representation. Neither the NLF nor Hanoi insists any longer on an immediate and complete withdrawal of U. S. forces as a condition of settlement, and they will probably agree to postpone the decision on reunification for at least 5 years. The United States will gain by agreeing to a political compromise at Paris. Johnson can leave office feeling that America has achieved its purpose in Vietnam—the Communists have been forced to abandon their attempts to impose themselves on the South Vietnamese—and a new administration can “use its acceptance of a compromise that sanctions American political defeat on a realistic reading of recent Vietnamese history.”

1977
Cleveland, Hal. HOW TO MAKE PEACE WITH THE RUSSIANS. In U.S. Dept. of State, Department of State bulletin, v. 58, May 27, 1988: 697-699.


Evaluates approaches to the problem of building a stable peace in Europe. Cleveland emphasizes the crucial contribution of NATO to the work of peacemaking and peacekeeping. NATO keeps peace by maintaining a strong deterrent to Soviet aggression and by building peace through the negotiation of arms control agreements and the encouragement of political accommodation between East and West. The author points out that the growing economic and technological interdependence of states is no respecter of ideologies and this offers a third approach to peace through the encouragement of functional and technical cooperation.

1978

Text of letter sent to all nuclear-weapon states and to non-nuclear-weapon states belonging to the United Nations, U.N. specialized agencies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency announcing the convening of a conference of nonnuclear-weapon states at Geneva from August 29 to September 20, 1988. In accordance with a General Assembly resolution all nuclear-weapon states, including Communist China, were invited to participate in the conference with a nonvoting status.

1979

The strategic debate within both the United States and the Soviet Union shows that they question the wisdom of a showdown in the nuclear arms competition. The Soviet and American willingness to resume talks may be an attempt to discover whether agreed restraints constitute a realistic alternative to increased strategic expenditures. But progress will be slow because of each side’s doubts about the motives of the other in agreeing to the talks and the general difficulty of disarmament—establishment of a mutually acceptable strategic relationship, determination of strategic balance that takes into account the potential of research and development, and agreement on what constitutes stability and on inspection. While explicit limitations on strategic forces seem remote, in the atmosphere of détente symbolized by the negotiations the superpowers may reciprocally allow down the rate of their force levels and rate of innovation by small, token agreements. But internal pressures in both Russia and the United States will influence the course of the talks and possibly thwart adoption of any meaningful restraints.

1980

Discussion of the draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty within the U.N. Political and Security Committee. Chairman Ismail Farahy, of the United Arab Republic, introduced the draft as one of the most important items ever to come before the United Nations. Secretary General U Thant urged conclusion of the treaty as early as possible. Representatives from the United States and the Soviet Union praised the treaty, emphasizing its importance in facilitating further arms control agreements and minimizing the potential dangers threatening Committee members that the treaty was fair to both nuclear and nonnuclear countries. They pointed out that although the treaty contained a certain amount of compromise, it represented the collective efforts of both large and small countries. Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mitchell Sharp, stated that “progress must be put ahead of perfection in disarmament negotiations.” He warned that conclusion of the treaty must not be
V. SPECIFIC POLICIES AND LIMITED MEASURES

jeopardized by demands for stronger security commitments and disarmament obligations on the part of the superpowers.

1981

TORTUOUS ROAD TO NUCLEAR SANITY. Time, v. 92, July 12, 1968: 12-13. pp. 72

Hypothesizes that frequent willingness to engage in nuclear weapons limitation discussions results from fear that a negotiated settlement with Russia will make Washington channel billions of defense dollars into new weapons systems, a fear of U.S. inactivity in multiple worldwide arms races, and an argument of a disarmament-minded faction within the Kremlin that the arms race, in addition to causing further economic strains, might lead to war. In regard to missile systems, the most one can hope for is a freeze on existing offensive missiles and a partial placing of severe limitations on the already established or proposed ABM systems, and discussions will probably be long and painstaking. Suggested is a chronology of developments related to arms control, beginning with the Darnuth Plan of 1945 and ending with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty of 1968.

1982


Excerpts, revised光线 of subsequent events, of analyses presented before a bipartisan group of 15 congressmen and read into the Congressional Record for Dec. 15, 1967.


Endeavors to formulate a reasonable settlement for Vietnam. Eckstein believes that the Korean-type settlement apparently sought by the U.S. Government in Vietnam is politically and militarily unattainable, inasmuch as complete mobilization in the United States and total pulverization of Vietnam. Thus the United States must seek a compromise which might eventually mean considerable influence for the National Liberation Front in a South Vietnamese government and perhaps eventual unification of the North and South. Goldstein claims that U.S. military strategy in Vietnam has failed and no military solution to save face for America or allow it to avoid an agonizing reappraisal of its role. In future war of national liberation has been consti- tuted. Murphy asserts that primary attention in Viet- nam must be given to political problems. U.S. objectives cannot be gained by military means. A Vietnam unified through political processes would ensure the best outcome of the present dismal situation. Smith concludes that the United States has more to lose, as far as its relations with Vietnam's neighbors are con- cerned, from a protracted stalemate than from a negotiated withdrawal. Solomon contends that for this country to extricate itself from the conflict without leaving an unstable Vietnam ripe for Chinese manipulation the entire Indo-Chinese peninsula might have to be neutralized and given international security guarantees. Eckstein's solution is based on the assumption that our alternatives in Vietnam range beyond mere escalation and withdrawal. He suggests the alternative solution of carefully phased withdrawal coupled with a political compromise. This, he argues, has a much better chance of maintaining stability than our present course.

1983


Even if the nonproliferation treaty "represents the triumph of good intentions over harsh reality, nobody should complain." Admittedly the treaty has serious technical and political weaknesses. Nevertheless it has opened the way to agreement on more ambitious and meaningful measures—in particular a U.S.-Soviet limitation on satellite and antimissile systems. The enormous costs of these systems and the danger that antimissile installations will introduce new instability into the relations between the superpowers are ample incentive for the United States and the Soviet Union to get down to serious talks on these problems. On the other hand it is precisely this possibility of destabilization that requires these two powers to proceed with caution. Sudden and drastic limitations on numbers of missiles might eliminate the second-strike capability of both powers and thus put a premium once again on using nuclear weapons for rapid response rather than as a last resort. This kind of agreement will not be worked out at Geneva. However, the outlook for a ban on underground tests, discussions on chemical and biological weapons, and a limitation on the use of nuclear explosives in much tighter.

B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Escalation

1984


Points out West German prospects of selling military aircraft to Israel. After France's prolonged embargo on weapons sales to Israel, the latter started looking for other suppliers of military aircraft, among them Sweden, although purchases from that country would pose "unassailable political problems."

1985


Considers France's embargo on military aircraft to Israel and sale of Mirage planes to Iraq part of its tactic to gain oil concessions in the Middle East.

1986


"Based on a talk given at Chatham House on October 31, 1967."

The 1967 Middle East war has demonstrated that after the outbreak of hostilities in developing countries exter-
rior powers have little to gain and much to lose. In the Nigerian war, foreign assistance was needed to subdue Biafra. Thus the Nigerian Government sought to acquire aircraft from Britain and other Western countries, but providing such weapons would have represented a departure from Britain’s policy of supplying defensive arms only. The Soviet bloc agreed to supply the aircraft others had declined to send. However, the Soviet bloc may not reap any benefits from its arms sales since the Nkrumah Government, like military governments in other developing countries, resists communitarianism for patriotic reasons and fears the commissar system within the armed forces. Westerners often do not see that opportunistic conventional arms sales throughout the Third World can be counterproductive. For one thing weapons may end up in hands other than those for which they were intended. And the Nigerian allusion may mark the beginning of a new round in the arms race, because almost every African country has a succession problem of some kind and will try to preserve unity by buying sophisticated weapons. Friends of Africa, including Britain, can help it to help itself by giving civil aid, by ensuring a supply of purely defensive arms to developing countries, by detaching for a time to African training missions the best white officer, and by coming to the aid of the African countries before situations become as critical as the current one in Nigeria. An impartial Commonwealth force is clearly needed to restrain the fighting parties while they are working out their differences.

3. Nuclear Proliferation

1968

The nuclear nonproliferation draft treaty submitted in March 1968 by the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations is in fact a solely Soviet-American product. There have been several drafts since 1961, the last takes into consideration many reservations by the nonnuclear-weapon nations. Article 5 for instance even allows them to use nuclear explosives for nonmilitary purposes. This draft subjects only the traffic in nuclear fuels to the inspection, to international inspectors. The draft is ambiguous, however, on the role of the European Atomic Energy Community in control. Despite assurances to the contrary, the proposal would discriminate against the "have-nots," allowing foreign interference in their domestic affairs. This point is raised mostly by the Third World nations. Most of them want the treaty to be instrumental in nuclear disarmament and the consolidation of world peace. India realistically also wants better security guarantees for nonnuclear signatories. Fortunately for Germany many states in the United Nations, where Germany is not represented, have raised reservations to the treaty. Moscow has so far singled out only Bonn to blame for obstructing conclusion of the treaty.

1968

Mistrust of Mr. Nixon was certainly not the sole cause of the Soviet readiness to discuss limitation of offensive and defensive weapons. Probably the present technological and psychological circumstances have been found favorable for such talks. Russia has achieved parity with the United States in land-based long-range missiles, on-site inspection has become less important with the development of photography from spy satellites, and allocation of resources worries the Russians no less than the Americans. Thus the Soviet leaders abandoned their emphasis on strong defense, feeling that it does not offer immunity from penetration, and, along with the Americans, included offensive weapons in the Soviet Union. The maintenance of such a U.S.-Soviet dialog is paramount for the Russians, and they like to underscore the Soviet Union's superpower status and the interests they share only with the United States. The Soviet attitude is also designed to warn the Soviet Union's East European allies not to break on any future special relations with the United States, since the United States gives high priority to relations with the Soviet Union. The impact of events in Eastern Europe on the Soviet decision is also not to be underestimated. The Russians might fear that, just at the moment when Soviet military power has virtually caught up with the Communist doctrine of universality, [and] this doctrine is beginning to die on the vine, these events might undermine the exclusive power of the Communist Party, produce internal chaos in the East European countries, and have far-reaching repercussions in the Communist world.
clear states in the areas of national security and economic development. However, the new draft treaty presented in January 1968 by the United States and the Soviet Union discards the Swiss reservations almost completely. Switzerland, as a member of the Committee on the United Nations, can only indirectly influence their decisions. Situated on a "perimeter of conflict," Switzerland despite its smallness can assert itself in international decisions bearing on its security. Without real threats to its security, the Swiss government provides the necessary support available. For most of authoritative Swiss data the nation's defense policy runs the risk of delusion. Thus on December 16, 1971, Federal Councilor Sprecher fought for the diminishing deterrence value against the superpowers of nuclear weapons in the hands of small and medium-sized nations. However, a general but limited war in Europe is possible, a war that would see the use of nuclear arms confined to areas lying outside each superpower's heartland. In this case the most likely area for nuclear activity by the superpowers would be the Alps. Nuclear weapons dropped among several independent control centers (nations) would be a more persuasive deterrent to such a war than a big-power nuclear monopoly.

1692 DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE ADOPTS REPORT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5. Apr. 1968: 48-50. JX1877.A1584, v. 5

Announces the adoption of a report to the General Assembly on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons by the U.N. Committee on Disarmament and presents the complete text of the revised draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty as submitted in the report. The report, which was cosponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States and approved on March 4, also contains documentation of Committee proceedings and includes a copy of the Security Council resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union on the question of guaranteeing the security of nonnuclear nations in the event of nuclear aggression.


Calls for prompt action by the General Assembly to approve the draft treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Goldberg first describes the important contributions made by the nonnuclear-weapon states to the work of drafting the treaty. He then undertakes to prove that the treaty contributes equally to the security of nuclear-weapon and nonnuclear-weapon states; that it is equitable in its apportionment of obligations and benefits among these states; that it will promote, not heighten, the peaceful application of nuclear technology, and that it will help to bring an end to the arms race and spur new progress toward disarmament.


The proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) under consideration by the second session of the 22d U.N. General Assembly is one of the most significant documents ever brought before the United Nations. Although it will not necessarily assure international peace, the NPT "will strengthen the world consensus that it is illegitimate to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons." The remarkable cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in drafting the NPT is further evidenced in their joint support of a draft resolution in which, together with Britain, they pledge their assistance through the Security Council in the event of actual or threatened nuclear aggression. Many nonnuclear states have requested that guarantees against nuclear aggression be explicitly included in the treaty and have complained that the treaty is unfair since it prohibits the entry of new members into the nuclear club but imposes few restrictions on the current nuclear powers. However, because the small powers are expected to side with the major powers in support of the treaty and because the expected vote in the voting, the treaty will probably make it through the General Assembly with only minor changes. Despite its failure to attract universal support and to commit the major powers to a specific future step toward disarmament, the NPT should prove to be a milestone in international relations. Not only will it embody a legal commitment by near-nuclear powers not to acquire nuclear weapons and pressure the nuclear powers to curtail the arms race, but in conjunction with the Security Council resolution it will place both superpowers in the role of world nuclear policemen. Soviet-American cooperation cannot provide a permanent peace but it "may be the best security basis we can devise for the years immediately ahead."


The tremendous destructive potential of nuclear weapons makes it imperative for Japan to cooperate with all peace-loving peoples to rid the world of this terrible menace. While the Sato government has agreed to the three principles for nonnuclearization of Japan (not producing, holding, or bringing in nuclear weapons), it has refused to accept a declaration on nonnuclearization based on these principles and exposes a nuclear policy that is obviously contrary to them. By supporting the need for peaceful uses of nuclear power without accepting the nonnuclearization declaration, the Government could easily promote a transition from peaceful to military uses. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty clearly violates the three principles since it brings Japan under the American nuclear umbrella and is bound to result in the establishment of a Japanese nuclear security system. Moreover, reliance on American nuclear strategy could involve Japan in nuclear war. Japan should step out of the shadow of nuclear war by abolishing the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and begin to pursue a line of positive neutrality. It must adopt the nonnuclearization declaration and negotiate with all nuclear powers to accept it. Henceforth the Government should actively promote disarmament objectives and work for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Asia and the Pacific. While Japan must renounce nuclear weapons, it can safely support a program for the peaceful uses of nuclear power that is based on the nonnuclearization declaration and is open to inspection by an international agency.
The nuclear nonproliferation treaty will "seethe light of day later this year." The most perplexing problem, safeguards, has been ironed out. Both West Germany and Italy feared industrial espionage, but German worries went far beyond the economic issues. Germany accused Washington of rushing into an inspection agreement without consulting it, and there was talk of an "atomic confederacy." Another key issue in the amended January draft treaty is the peaceful use of atomic energy. Article 4 stipulates that nations have a clear obligation to help make available "the fruits of nuclear energy." The January draft also provides that the treaty remain in effect for 25 years, at which time 20 nations will convene a conference to decide whether it should continue indefinitely or for another specific period. Annex B of the draft treaty is an agreement between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to try to restore the balance between the obligations of the nuclear powers and those of the nonnuclear nations. It does not guarantee any precise military action to protect nonnuclear states, and this "reverses the diameters of all attempts to proliferate security in this manner." The value of a security assurance depends not only on the guarantor but on whether the state that is guaranteed has confidence and trust in the guarantor's pledge.

The overwhelming endorsement of the draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty by the U. N. Political and Security Committee is a major step toward world peace. Although its opponents, particularly the West German revanchists, did their best to block the treaty, it was accepted by a vote of 26 to 4, with 22 abstentions. In its consideration of the treaty the Committee made a number of constructive revisions, including an addition to the preamble that reinforced guarantees for nonnuclear nations, an amendment to ensure the rights of the nonnuclear states to share in the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, and one to commit all nations to stop barrier to the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The treaty should have no trouble receiving General Assembly approval and once in force should prove an effective means of bringing the nonnuclear weapon states in the Atlantic alliance co-responsibility in nuclear affairs. The Committee recognizes the urgency of both these matters and the element of tension that exists between them. It believes that a "useful voice" arrangement on nuclear decision-making within the alliance can be worked out that would not constitute proliferation. At the same time, however, it emphasizes that nonproliferation policy must take priority over other international policy concerning the control of nuclear weapons.
the U. N. Charter to all nonnuclear states party to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty that are subjected to acts of nuclear aggression, including the offer of immediate aid to victims of nuclear aggression by the Council of nuclear-weapon states, and reaffirming the right of all L. N. member states to individual and collective self-defense. Most Council members declared the resolution would provide a strong deterrent to nuclear aggression even though it would not absolutely guarantee the security of non-nuclear weapon states. However, a majority of representatives maintained that the guarantees supplied by the resolution were usually inadequate and obtained from Petition. The text of the resolution followed by the U. S., British, and Soviet declarations of support are appended.

1702

1703
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: COMMITTEE CON- CLUSES DEBATE. UN monthly chronicle. v. 5, June 1968: 55-75. JXWII/ A15584, v. 5

Reports the views of various members of the U. N. Political and Security Committee regarding the draft treaty and presents the amendments to the draft proposed by Committee members. Representatives from both nuclear and nonnuclear countries urged swift ratification of and adherence to the treaty and called for the prompt negotiation of additional disarmament measures. While delegations from a number of nonnuclear weapons states expressed skepticism about the question of guarantees and criticized the privileged position given the nuclear powers in the treaty, most representatives were willing to overlook its shortcomings and accept the treaty as a significant step toward disarmament. However, spokesmen from Albania, Brazil, Cuba and several African states rejected the treaty in its present form and some representatives refused to make a definite commitment before further examination of the treaty implications.

1704
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY WILL DISAPPEAR. Petition. Petition, v. 4, Jan-Mr. 1968: 7-8. To (J. P. R.
Taken in part from a letter to Gertrude Baer, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom's U. N. Representative, by E. L. M. Burns, Co-Chairman of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and his reply

Criticizes the accused nuclear nonproliferation treaty of January 16, 1968, for not including a pledge by the nuclear nations to renounce use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom opposes the nonproliferation treaty on the grounds that it sanctions the nuclear monopoly of the United States and the Soviet Union, fails to provide for a ban on underground nuclear testing, and does not include a cutoff agreement or freeze on nuclear weapons.

1705

Includes an examination of a new draft of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, presented by the United States and the Soviet Union, and reservations of nonnuclear members of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament to some of the draft's provisions. The Committee, together with American, Soviet, and British security guarantees to nonnuclear parties to the proposed treaty, were sent by the Committee to the U. N. General Assembly for consideration on March 14, 1968.

1706

Reprinted from (June min Lih pro, June 13, 1968.

The Chinese people adamantly oppose the so-called nonproliferation of nuclear weapons concocted by the American imperialists and Soviet revisionists as part of their collusion to suppress the revolutionary peoples of the world. The treaty is a plot to perpetuate the Soviet-American nuclear monopoly and place all other nations of their mercy. By promoting nuclear protection to nonnuclear states that subscribe to the treaty, the Soviet rogue clique and American imperialists are attempting to trick other states into becoming their "protectors." In addition they are using the treaty to "accelerate the rigging up of an anti-China encirclement" and fan anti-Chinese feeling around the world. However, many countries oppose this fraud and will not be bullied into submission by the American and Soviet imperialists. While American aggressors and Soviet revisionists believe that the treaty will enable them to hold back the revolutionary tide, they will find that the nuclear weapons are powerless against the will of the people.
The issue of morality in the nuclear arms race has shifted from the struggle between nuclear powers to a struggle among the nuclear "have nots." This has been a turning point in nuclear affairs. The leading nations of Western Europe, the United States, Russia, and Britain might then be tempted to pressure India by withdrawing aid. Fortunately India's economic condition deters rivalry of the superpowers or permitted adoption of measures to deal with the underlying causes of conflict. NATO, by stabilizing Europe and thus maintaining its economic unity, serves a crucial contribution to a relaxed atmosphere, and the United States must therefore give priority to a viable NATO or its equivalent--even if that means putting the interests of its European allies before its own interest in the nonproliferation treaty. The German Federal Government supports the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In its April 7, 1967, memorandum to all governments it suggested certain improvements for the proposed nonproliferation treaty. Some have been included in the new draft treaty of January 18, 1968, and the others should be taken into consideration so that the proposed treaty will be universally acceptable and viable. The treaty should be linked with the disarmament problem in more concrete terms than in the present draft in order to pave the way for a comprehensive disarmament agreement. Since the renunciation of the nuclear option by nonnuclear parties to the treaty could adversely affect their security, the treaty should ban the use of threats, political pressure, or political blackmail against any nonnuclear party. It should also be more adaptable to worldwide political, social, and economic changes so that the interests of nonnuclear parties will not be impaired by it. In addition, the treaty obligations should weigh equally on nuclear and nonnuclear parties.
V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

A major defect of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is that it does not deal with the fact that nuclear research—especially in the area of fusion-free nuclear explosives—will have on the treaty's objectives. While article 3 of the treaty prohibits nuclear research from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons and provides for the inspection of fissile materials, these states can develop research programs to produce nuclear explosive devices that would be devoid of fissile materials. The treaty ignores this problem because of the difficulty and unpopularity of safeguarding research, the disengagement of pure-fusion research in relation to weapon development, and the assumption that other countries must follow the fissile weapons route. The treaty must take into account research programs in pure-fusion nuclear explosives whatever their outcome—early devices may be peaceful but could later be refined into weapons. As the treaty does not prohibit research, some nations will feel that this is a tacit acceptance of the testing of pure-fusion research devices. Once testing is accepted, any nation would be able to produce such devices, and proliferation would begin all over again.

VI. SAY RON

The draft nonproliferation treaty must be approved by all the nations of the world if it is to avoid a nuclear holocaust. The enemies of the treaty—West Germany, Japan, China, and Israel—whose preoccupation, contribution to the present of world destruction. Indeed, China's leaders have stated that the deaths of millions of Chinese would be little harm because the people could always be replaced. Peking's advocacy of nuclear weapons for all countries is designed to rally all the nations of the world to arms against the U. N. peacekeeping and security machinery as a whole. It foresees that the durability of the treaty will depend on the success of the superpowers in curbing the nuclear arms race, the willingness of France and China to adhere to the treaty, and the perfection of programs for the international sharing of civil nuclear resources and technology.


A viable nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) depends on the cessation of the arms race by the nuclear powers and the dismantling of their nuclear establishments. This is impossible to envisage, since nuclear disarmament is highly improbable in the near or distant future. The assumption that only the nuclear powers may possess nuclear weapons while the nonnuclear powers are denied this right would kill the treaty from the outset. In addition the NPT contains within itself two dangers, diplomatic and military. If the nonnuclear powers sign the treaty they will have lost the bargaining power to extract an arms limitation measure from the nuclear powers; and as long as the arms race continues it can only end in the total destruction of civilization. Aside from perpetuating the inequality of states, which is becoming incompatible with human survival, the NPT places too much emphasis on the superpowers' willingness and capacity to abstain from actions that would create international conflicts—"the Middle

East and Southeast Asia are hardly encouraging examples. In effect it will do little to inhibit further horizontal or vertical nuclear proliferation.


The draft nonproliferation treaty must be approved by all the nations of the world to avoid a nuclear holocaust. The enemies of the treaty—West Germany, Japan, China, and Israel—who preconceive contribution to the present of world destruction. Indeed, China's leaders have stated that the deaths of millions of Chinese would be little harm because the people could always be replaced. Peking's advocacy of nuclear weapons for all countries is designed to rally all the nations of the world to arms against the U. N. peacekeeping and security machinery as a whole. It foresees that the durability of the treaty will depend on the success of the superpowers in curbing the nuclear arms race, the willingness of France and China to adhere to the treaty, and the perfection of programs for the international sharing of civil nuclear resources and technology.


Chronicles the National Military Command System Information Processing System (NIPS) from its inception to proposals for future improvements. Among the advantages of a rapidly expanding worldwide computer network are its ability to provide identical information to all echelons and compatibility of hardware and software. Some of the problems facing NIPS are the handling of documentation and the integration of intelligence and operations in new computer installations. Whether these problems will be resolved depends upon whether Defense Department authorities can keep the momentum going in computer and control systems.


Speaking at separate ceremonies attending the signing of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT), American and Soviet leaders aired plans for discussion on limiting offensive and defensive missiles. Any agreement to restrict their development and deployment would be the first time the two powers surrendered their freedom in this area. Earlier bans governing nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and underground and testing in outer space gave up little of significant military advantage. Now each power seeks to control the arms race. Before this lastest only wanted a curb on offensive missiles, "Just why the Soviets have agreed to talk is not clear," However, the successful conclusion of the NPT, the Vietnam peace talks, the apparent parity of arms capabilities, an infant Soviet antimissile system,
Southeast Asia can be partly attributed to the gradual Adams, Thomas W., and Alvin J. Cottrell. CYPRUS becomes more systematic in the Alekseev, Arik. ANOTHER BLOC? Dafiy review, transnational wars of liberation. While the United States 1717

Alroy, Gil C. DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH 1718

Alekseev, Arik. ANOTHER BLOC? Dafiy review, international affairs, no. 7) 1719

Partial contents. -- The roots of the contemporary problem, --Communism in Cyprus, --Soviet policy toward Cyprus, --U.S. policy toward Cyprus, --The outlook, --Greek-Turkish military balance (1967).

 contends that, although Cyprus per se is economically and militarily an insignificant factor in international affairs, it is a source of East-West tensions and contains the potential for escalation. The authors note that Russia has tried to exploit the Cypriot unrest in an effort to gain influence in this area and disrupt the Western alliance. The United States has had to walk a diplomatic tightrope so as not to alienate its relations with Greece or Turkey, prime Communist targets on NATO's southern flank.

At a ministerial conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malay- 1719

Asia. Singapore, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand discussed the consequences of the forthcoming withdrawal of British troops from Singapore and Malay- 1720

As in the previous years, the United States should strive for gradual deescalation of the war, it must not allow Hanoi to conclude that the American forces will accept defeat because of internal political pressures. Even if the United States wins its basic objectives in Vietnam, it should not pull out of South- 1721

Although regional security will depend for some time upon the American nuclear umbrella, the U.S. forces based in Southeast Asia can be gradually reduced in line with technical developments and increased capabil- 1722
The populations of all Southeast Asian states consist of several different linguistic, ethnic, and cultural groups, one of which controls the state machine and thus rules over all the rest. When the subordinate groups rival the dominant group in numbers or culture and internal political organization, rebellion is likely to occur. For years revolutions born out of such situations have been building in Burma and Northeast India. Recently these previously ill-coordinated resistance movements have achieved a new level of political consciousness and organization under young leaders whose attitudes are significantly different from those of their elders. The new leaders are more discriminating in their acceptance of Western values and more respectful of their own native traditions, and they reject the primacy of state sovereignty and national independence, since the pursuit of these goals has brought the region to the edge of chaos. They stress communal solidarity rather than political centralization and work for the autonomy of their peoples within a region-wide, confederative framework. The Chinese Communists have attempted to exploit these movements but so far without success. Nevertheless, national leaders threatened by the revolts have attempted to blame them on a Chinese conspiracy with the hope of provoking American or Soviet intervention against the rebels. The Chinese would like nothing better than to embroil either of these countries in action against the dissidents, since only China stands to gain from such a development.

The May 18 Moscow conference of obdurate satellites disclosed that the Soviet Union is worried about developments in Czechoslovakia and may even consider military intervention, notwithstanding the danger that it might produce another front from which each Soviet country may escape. Why does Russia take Czechoslovakia "revivalism" so seriously when it tolerated similar excesses in Rumania and Yugoslavia? The Rumanians and Yugoslavs consider these deviations do not weaken the strategic position of Russia, whereas Czechoslovakia is, with East Germany and Poland, a member of the Iron Triangle and a spearhead aimed at West Germany, Russia's worst enemy in Europe. Although the present status quo is the most ridiculous Europe has ever known, it suits Russia for the time being until it can be modified to Russia's advantage. Besides, the Russians fear the influence the Czechoslovak willingness to negotiate with the West could have on other satellites and the danger that the Warsaw Pact countries might be confronted by Western freedom.


Responses by eight distinguished intellectuals to an Israeli request for independent evaluations of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Each symposium discussed the events that led up to the war, the reaction to the war among American Jews, and the factors that should decide the attitude of non-Israeli Jews toward Israel. All contributors agreed that the Arab-Israeli conflict was a complicated manifestation of longstanding hostility and could not be explained by any specific event. However, opinions varied on the philosophical implications of the war and the proper psychological responses.


Outlines concepts of Europe and European unification held by various French political parties—from the Communist Party to Gaullist groups. Claisen bases his analysis primarily on the parties' "documentary literature."
Therefore Germany's prewar boundaries are still valid. The German Federal Government has renounced use of force as a means for changing the demarcation line, but it has not renounced the German claim to the territories situated eastward of this line. Even if it wished to, it could not, because it lacks the mandate of the German people to do so. Periodic repetitions of Bonn's position statements are not enough to prevent Polish encroachment of these territories under international law. To prevent such presumption the Federal Government would contest the legitimacy of the territories and place periodic protests against it.


Gallo, Patrick. WAR. New university thought, v. 6, May/June 1968: 29-34.

Gallo presents his selections in response to "the volatile and confusing Vietnam situation" that necessitate "a reexamination of American policy in Vietnam and Southeast Asia."


By their doctrinal rejection of mass support and acquiescence to the slow pace of change, orthodox Communist parties in Latin America have provoked widespread rejection from their ranks to the more extreme pro-Peking movements. The record of Soviet parties in Latin America has been discouraging from the very beginning. Geographical separation from the Soviet Union and a preponderance of American power in the region, as well as formidable class, ethnic, and cultural cleavages, have contributed an unfavorable revolutionary environment. For a time the Cuban revolution seemed to herald a new historical phase, but the Soviet Union, after a period of reluctance material and ideological support of the Castroite cause, has adopted a policy of applying economic pressure to dampen rather than excite Cuba's revolutionary enthusiasm. Chinese penetration of Latin America did not begin until the late 1950's but since then has accelerated rapidly. The Chinese mirror the similarity of the Latin American historical situation to their own, particularly with respect to the conditions of the peasantry and the struggle against imperialism. In opposition to orthodox Soviet policy they urge a sympathizer theory of revolution, stress rural problems, and reject the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The Chinese ideology does seem more appropriate to a region where feudalism and dictatorship are still the prevalent modes of economic and political organization. The outcome of the struggle between Soviet and Chinese factions will be determined by the populace not the intellectuals. The more deepen the frustrations of the people, and the more pessimistic their attitudes, the more they will turn to a Chinese solution to their problems.


The growing Soviet power in the Mediterranean area marks the end of unipolar dominance in the Mediterranean and seems to indicate a desire on the part of the Soviet Union to develop "a strategy better suited to its ambitions as a superpower and to the support of its friends in time of crisis." By endeavoring to improve its strategic position in the Mediterranean, Russia may be attempting to establish a regional balance between the Soviet Union and its client states and the United States and its client states. However, Soviet ambitions in the Middle East could be blocked by Arab fears of neocolonialism and cautious elements in the Soviet leadership, who believe a long-term commitment would be too risky and place an undue burden on the Soviet economy. Furthermore, as long as NATO's Mediterranean forces retain their superiority over the Russian fleet and the Russians do not have direct control over the main supply lines to the Mediterraneans, the Soviet military position in that area will remain relatively weak. Nevertheless the increased Russian presence in the Middle East has raised the confrontation between the superpowers in Europe to the Mediterranean area. This new confrontation will probably never evolve into a durable coexistence because that area lacks the homogeneity needed to delineate spheres of influence. Since the superpowers can exert very little influence on
V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

the Mediterranean littoral, the small states are not
restricted by fears of being drawn into a major con-
frontation that could seriously jeopardize their individual interests.
"The greatest danger in the Mediterranean is not a
direct clash between the superpowers but their lack of
control over local conflicts, and the possibility of
their eventually being drawn into them."

Hoge, Thomas A. THE LONG STRUGGLE ON CYPRUS,
American Legion magazine, v. 86, Aug. 1968: 24-28,
40-46, D797.A532, v. 86

Reviews the turbulent history of Cyprus. Strategi-
cally located at the crossroads of Asia, Africa, and
Europe, Cyprus has been subjected to internal strife
and repeated invasions for nearly 6,000 years. Cur-
cently the Turkish Cypriots are violently resisting the
efforts of the island's Greek majority to join Cyprus
to Greece. The latest threat of war between the two
NATO powers occurred in 1967; the combined efforts of
U.S. emissary Cyrus Vance, U.N. representative
Josep Bolt-Bellami, and NATO Secretary General
Manlio Brosio were required to subdue the crisis.
While the island now appears relatively calm under the
watchful eye of U.N. peacekeeping forces, the situa-
tion could explode at any time and once again bring the
world to the brink of world war III.

Howard, Michael E., and Robert E. Hunter. ISRAEL
AND THE ARAB WORLD: THE CRISIS OF 1967, Lon-
don, Institute for Strategic Studies [1967] 51 p. maps,
tables. (Adelphi papers, no. 41)

Historical interpretation of the June 1967 Middle East
war. The paper, which is intended primarily for mili-
tary and international relations analysts, draws more
upon Israeli than on Arab source material. The authors
analyze the conflict, give a chronological account of the
war, and review the criteria leading up to it. Informa-
tion on the U.N. Emergency Force, the Jordan
waters, and the armed forces involved is appen-
ded.

Kochar, Paul R. SOVIET SEA POWER SHIFTS TO
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE, Navy, v. II, July 1968:
23-27, VA49.N25, v. 11

Address to the South Carolina Bar Association in
Charleston, S. C.

Describes the growth, present size, and composi-
tion of the Soviet Navy and its challenge to NATO
forces in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union has
made major increases in the numbers of its surface
and nuclear submarine forces and more recently has
developed an amphibious capability. The mere pres-
ence of sizable Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean
demonstrates that NATO no longer dominates the sea
and that the Russians effective support for that poli-
tical maneuvers in the Near East and North Africa.
At present, however, it is uncertain whether Soviet
naval forces will be used to encourage or restrain
Arab activism, to increase or dampen tensions in this
troubled region.

Kawar, Paul S., ed. THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE,
Middle East forum, v. 43, no. 3/4, 1967: 5-75.
DOILM48, v. 4.

Although the United States has a moral obligation to
Israel, it should reassess the importance of the Middle
East to its national interests before publicly commit-
ting itself too deeply to Israel. Development of oil
resources in other parts of the world and the emergence
of long-endurance jet aircraft have considerably less-
ened the economic and strategic importance of the
Middle East. Since the Soviet Union can easily over-
ly the Middle East "land bridge" and has increased its
naval forces in the Mediterraneam, it has no need to
control the area and has also diminished. The principal remaining
function of the land bridge is to provide for the move-
ment of land forces, and neither the United States nor
Russia is likely to launch an invasion across this terri-
tory. Therefore America retains "little more than a
negative interest in the region, in the sense of assum-
ing that the Soviets do not gain by political action the land
bridge to Africa that they can gain now by direct
and unprofitable military action." In order to accom-
plish its limited strategic goals in the Middle East the
United States must court the favor of the Arab States.
The dilemma of seeking good relations with the Arabs
while maintaining its humanitarian responsibilities
toward Israel must be studied carefully, and political
aspirants must be requested not to exacerbate the situa-
tion by outspoken advocacy of Israel.

Kotyk, Vlastim. PROBLEMS OF EAST-WEST RELA-
TIONS. Journal of international affairs, v. 22, no. 1,

Increasing East-West cooperation is a consequence
of changed historical conditions that have given rise to
new objective needs and new attitudes for Socialist and
Socialist countries. An explication of the approach of
the majority of Socialist states to the problems of East-
West relations with emphasis on the new elements in thebusi-nesses of these states will help to avoid misunderstandings in the West that could jeopardize
rapprochement. Many in the West continue to assume

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that Socialist, and particularly Russian, foreign policy is expansionist. The truth, however, is that the Soviet Union has pursued a policy of peace practically from its birth. The Soviet Union recognizes that changed historical conditions—particularly modern armaments—require the total and permanent exclusion of war from international life. It foresees a continuation of the East-West struggle, but only in the economic and ideological spheres. Other more concrete and positive interests further encourage rapprochement. Socialist states have begun to look to the West for more fruitful economic relationships and to show a growing interest in all-European schemes of integration, cooperation, and division of labor. The process of differentiation taking place among Socialist states and their resulting independence open up new opportunities for bilateral economic and cultural agreements with the West. Some elements in the West would like to exploit this new-found independence, but such a policy can only undermine trust in the claim that the West wants to build bridges to the East. American intervention in Vietnam limits the possibility of cooperative relations with the United States. On the other hand, De Gaulle's attempts to emancipate Europe from American leadership has done much to encourage the new climate of all-European rapprochement. If rapprochement is to become a reality, however, the West must be willing to accept the boundaries created in central Europe by World War II and the existence of the two Germanies. The Socialist countries follow the Federal Republic's new Ostpolitik with great interest to see if it is willing to renounce all revisionist claims and accept the principles of peaceful coexistence.

1728
Digest of an article from Outlook, v. 3, no. 1.

1729

1730
CoVernations and observations in postwar Israel. Lang found the Israelis in the midst of a general and profound reassessment of national attitudes, which before the war had seemed permanently fixed in the national consciousness. The decisive victory over the Arabs has given an impetus to the mood among Israelis and restored to many of that ancient sense of mission so characteristic of the Jewish people. Nevertheless, except among the intellectuals and Communists, most Israelis remain staunchly anti-imperialistic and concerned with nation building, not conquest. The victory has made them more aware of the outside world, particularly the West and the Diaspora Jews—and consequently there is grave concern to maintain Israel's international reputation and good name. The loyalties of the Arabs in Israel are divided and uncertain. The status of the Arab population is at the root of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and unfortunately no one has yet offered a practicable solution.

1740

The chances for true peace in Korea are slim. The Communists are determined to humiliate the United States as long as it is involved in Asia and can do so by pulling the West into a Korean war. No settlement is reached in Vietnam. For this reason the United States is increasing the combat readiness of its forces in Korea by sending in officers with Vietnam experience and Special Forces teams and stepping up training for both conventional and anti-infiltration warfare. The South Koreans have developed a five-stage defense that consists of aerial surveillance, naval patrol, militia, combat police, and reserve battalions. Although the United States is entering a period of lengthy peace talks with North Vietnam it must continue to deal with the problems of South Vietnam and the frustrations of South Korea over the Pueblo affair.

1741

Describes the situation in Israel 1 year after the 6-day war, and notes that in many respects it is still a country at war, citing specifically the high level of military preparedness and heavy military expenditures. The Arab terrorists, while not a serious threat, manage to keep Israel in a continual state of tension and, by forcing the Arab governments to lend them support, decrease the probability that some Arab country will eventually sit down with Israel to make peace. The Israelis intend to deal with terror by using counterterror if necessary and will play a waiting game, holding firm until the Arabs decide they have exhausted every diplomatic and military possibility of removing Israel from the occupied territories.

1742

Although the new East German constitution declares that Berlin is the capital of East Germany and thus violator all wartime and postwar Four Power agreements on Germany, no word of protest has been heard from Britain, France, or West Germany. The West is interested in European defense and does not want to antagonize Russia, which must have approved the new constitution. Besides omitting several previously guaranteed "rights" of the people, the constitution restricts travel and residence in areas adjoining other countries, including East Germany's Communist allies. This is a response to Czechoslovakia's decision to cease travel across the Czechoslovak-West German border. West Germany wants to improve its relations with Eastern Europe. If it decides to weaken its relations with the West and accepts the role of France's junior partner it will be in a better position to do so, and the Soviet bickering of the East German regime may become an embarrassment for Moscow.
V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES


Contents: -Prevention of World War II. -Prevention of New German aggression. -Germany capitulates. -What remained of the foundations of law laid down in 1945 for the solution of the German problem -The Potsdam Agreement on Germany is still valid. -The peace treaty. -Disarmament. -German Confederation. -Europe and Germany. -The world and Germany.

Proposes that the German peace treaty be concluded by the Four Powers and their wartime allies with the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic either in the form of a single document or in two documents presented separately to each German state for signature. The problem of recognition of the German Democratic Republic can be avoided in the treaty, but Reintanz concludes that treaties must provide disarmament of the two German states. Such a treaty would be the most important step to German reunification.


One year after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War Israeli public opinion combines a new consciousness of national vitality with a pervasive sense of frustration. Victory over the Arabs confirmed the superior competence of Israeli arms and social institutions but at the same time shattered the Jewish dream that instant peace would follow a decisive defeat of the Arab states. The dream founded on the unrealism of Arab fascism, and the few recent signs that some Arab leaders are beginning to fight free of their delusions could for nothing against the flood of Arab hate. One hope for eventual accommodation rests on the increasing cooperation imposed by necessity on Arab inhabitants and Israeli conquerors in the occupied territories of Jordan, but any settlement then will require changes in the attitudes of the Arab Palestinians. The Israeli government is deeply divided over what is to be done. Neither the government nor the public has made up its mind as to what -besides peace and security -it wants. Attitudes range from those of the semiannexationists at one extreme to those of the Communists, who demand immediate withdrawal, at the other. The majority of the Israelis support the government's present policy of not permitting any territorial changes without a peace settlement and moreover a settlement with concrete guarantees. One of these undoubtedly will be the demilitarization of currently held territories. The Israelis do not want a repetition of the traumatic days of May.


V. M3. v. 65

Pseudonym *** denotes Near East contributors to Marine Rundschau.

The history of Russian efforts since the year 864 to win bases and establish its influence in the Mediterranean. The article considers the organization of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet, discusses the role of Soviet bases in the eastern Mediterranean, and lists 68 Soviet warships identified in the area in 1967. As in the past, Moscow's position in that sea is precarious, for it rests on friendships with Arab nations that are subject to revolutionary change.

While the U.S. Government professes to seek settlement of the Middle East crisis, it is in effect impeding "the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression and the establishment of durable peace in the area." Located at the crossroads between Asia, Africa, and Europe and exceedingly rich in oil resources, the Middle East has always been strategically and economically important to the United States. To protect its interests, the United States has consistently supported reactionary authority in this area and has collaborated with Israel in resisting Arab liberation forces. Initially, U.S. policymakers hoped the Israeli aggression of June 1967 would seriously weaken pro-Arab regimes and halt the progress of national liberation movements. However, when it discovered that the Israeli invasion had aroused widespread anti-American feelings in the Arab world, the United States announced it would seek a political settlement that would respect the territorial integrity of all Middle Eastern States. Since America had already determined to prod Israel into settling a suitable settlement, the announcement was obviously only for propaganda purposes. In reality, the United States wants to delay a settlement as long as possible in hopes that prolonged Israeli occupation of Arab territory will bring about the political changes desired by the West. Despite efforts of U.S. policymakers to cover up massive economic and military support of Israel by wooing some of the Arab States with promises of aid, the Arab world is not fooled. As long as Washington refuses to perceive "the processes under way in the world today and the actual balance of forces in this area," its Middle East policies will be unsuccessful.

The United States continues to support the Greek dictatorship with arms and money, and this is increasing the tension in an already volatile area. The Greek rulers have assumed the role of Washington's NATO's stooges and have endangered the favorable changes that have taken place over the past decade in Soviet-Greek relations. The United States regards Greece as primarily a military springboard in keeping with its aggressive expansionist policies. A U.S.-Greek agreement allows the United States to bring any kind of armaments into the country, set up military bases, and to arbitrarily use Greek territory for military purposes. Increased U.S. aid has made the new Greek rulers bold; they are calling for the erection of a "defense zone" against Bulgaria. Such actions are becoming typical of the tyrannical regime and can lead only to more trouble along the Mediterranean littoral.

National and racial tensions are not new to the Middle East and the Balkans, but until well into the 20th century there was little open strife. Under Turkish rule the various nationalities lived together in harmony, if only because they had no alternative, but the collapse of the Turkish Empire cleared the way for struggling national and racial factions to aspire to dominate their enemies. The development of modern communications, the establishment of the United Nations, and the growth of East-West tensions have exacerbated local disputes by raising for all contending parties the possibility of external support and final victory. Paradoxically, because outsiders lend support but at the same time are anxious that local conflicts not get out of hand, outside involvement has prevented local events from taking their course to a definitive (even if military) solution. At present, settlements in the Middle East and the Balkans are impossible and will remain so as long as the central issue dividing the various factions is "exclusive occupancy of the same real estate."
V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

1753
A lecture given at the R. U. S. I. on 16th November 1907. "Discussion included."

Examine the problem of counterinsurgency in the Middle East, particularly in Southern Arabia, imposing armed control, decentralizing command in urban areas, and the political repercussions involved in decisions to use armed force as major difficulties. With the only remaining British presence in the Middle East in the Persian Gulf, in Bahrain and in Surh, a danger of insurgency and instability exists in the area.

2. Disengagement, Neutralization, etc.

1754

A synopsis of the Korean War, the negotiations, and of the duties the various commissions entrusted with the task of carrying out the terms of the cease-fire. The author describes the armed forces of South Korea and notes that they are mainly supplied and supported by the United States. He concludes that North Korea might go to war again if the United States retaliates for the seizure of the Pueblo.

D. OUTER SPACE

1756

A comparative study of the "official neutrality policy doctrines" of Sweden and Finland. The authors stress that they are concerned with official and publicly declared doctrine and not with policy as such or the "real" causes or motives of decision-makers. They have attempted to extract from a large sampling of official policy statements a coherent and comprehensive picture of how neutrality is conceived and justified by these two governments. The official doctrines consist of statements on the substance of a neutral policy, arguments and reasons thought to prove the policy advantageous, and an image of the outside world that lends credence to these arguments and reasons.

1758

Evaluates Ghana's record of nonalignment--its diplomatic contacts, U. N. voting record, and general inclination toward East or West--which is a useful reference point for measuring a state's attitude toward issues that separate the two blocs. Because nonalignment is waxing as a factor in international politics, "the consistency and coherence of a nonalignment policy must be credible to all sides if a state is to derive any benefit from such a posture." Thompson notes that since 1964 Ghana has been nonaligned in name only; at various times it has excluded one side in favor of another. The nonalignment policies of the first generation of leaders of emerging nations may be of only historian interest to their successors.

1759

Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial content. --Modern cases of permanent neutrality and their origin. --The law of permanent neutrality. --Appendix.

An expertise prepared for the third Austrian convention of jurists. Verones considers permanent neutrality an institution of the "...mental foundation of peace which by definition outside all wars. He discusses the duties and obligations of neutral nations toward the permanently neutral and the right of the latter to trade with warring states. Permanent neutrality is a privilege based on a decision by the individual state to become permanently neutral as well as on "political compromise between other states, including great powers," in regard to that state. The appendix contains official Swiss and Austrian pronouncements on their neutrality.

E. VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

1. Violation, Inspection, Verification

1759

RQ76.068, v. 16

368
How should helicopters use their dipping sonar to search for a submarine submerged and attempting to escape, which had been sighted a short time before? By some approximations to reality and a shift in the point of view the problem is brought to a simple twoperson zero-sum game in which one side juggles areas and the other probability distributions. The solutions are exhibited and proved to be solutions by direct application of the definition of optimal strategies for a game. The solution may be understood with very little mathematical knowledge. It turns out that the helicopters should, generally speaking, exhibit the relative speed circle. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1760


The Sr 90 fallout as measured in rain by the Health and Safety Laboratory worldwide network gives a stratospheric residence time of 1.6 years, which is in good agreement with the value from the direct measurements of the lower stratosphere by Project Stardust. The interhemispheric mixing time appears to be about 3.3 years. (Abstract supplied)

1761


A summary is presented of previously unpublished microbarographic data associated with atmosphere thermocenuclear bomb tests in the Marshall Islands and in the Soviet Union from 1954 to 1959. Some effects of winds upon atmospheric pressure waves are indicated through study of wind conditions over the paths of propagation and through comparison with reported Japanese data. It is shown that, as well as the speed of the waves, the maximum amplitudes of waves-trains depend upon wind conditions so that estimates of the site of explosions must take into account prevailing winds. The possible usefulness of microbarographs in the study of upper atmospheric winds is indicated. (Abstract supplied)

1762


Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents: --Introduction. --The need for safeguards against the military use of nuclear energy. --Present safeguards. --Safeguards and a non-proliferation treaty. --Extension and strengthening of present safeguards. --Bilateral and regional safeguards and world-wide safeguards compared. --Special problems connected with the relations between the IAEA and Euratom.

1763

Analyses the problems involved in international control of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The committee recommends "unreservedly" that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) be made more stringent and would be simpler to operate and more acceptable to member states than a global arrangement, but these advantages are more than offset by the fact that a regional system would lack credibility with the states outside the region and would fail to generate the momentum on non-nuclear countries as will eliminate the desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Objections to the IAEA system arising out of fears of industrial espionage or other commercial disadvantages are unfounded. Differences between IAEA and Euratom inspection procedures, and requirements would have to be reconciled, but these pose no insurmountable difficulties.

1764


The daily fluctuation of the concentration of fallout particles in the ground-level air whose diameters ranged from 1 to 50 μm was observed for a period of about 3 months following the fifth Chinese nuclear explosion of December 28, 1967. It appeared that fallout particles larger than about 10 μm in diameter fell on the ground mainly by gravitational settling shortly after the explosion, and some smaller particles circulated with the air motion around the globe more than once. It was also found that about 20 days after the explosion the fluctuation of the particle concentration was rather well related to the variation of meteorological situations; the particle concentration decreased during periods of precipitation and increased during periods of high atmospheric pressure. (Abstract supplied)

1765

Zde, Sigurdur L., Robert S. Shariet, and Jean P. Love. LEAL ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION IN THE SOVIET UNION. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Dis-
V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

armed Agency. [Madison, University of Wisconsin Law School] 1967. 2 v. (ACDA/AC-03)

Bibliographical references listed at the end of each chapter.


Studies legal aspects of verification arrangements for prospective arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Part one attempts to "suggest answers for a range of operational modes between what might be considered a minimum useful agreement and a maximum feasible agreement." Part two consists of three case studies illustrating the questions that might be raised by the application of the general procedures developed in part one to specific arms control situations.

2. Enforcement

F. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES


DTSG, P. 21, v. 11
Reprinted from Jan-Mar Mar, July 8, 1968.

The Soviet revisionists and U.S. imperialists are collaborating in an increasingly open and shameless manner against the revolutionary peoples of the world. Washington's swift affirmative response to Gromyko's suggestion for U.S.-Soviet talks on vital international problems indicates the close cooperation between the two gangs. Following on the heels of their treacherous agreement on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the two conspirators are about to enter into a sinister bargain for mutual reductions of strategic weapons. Since the new deal will not impede the use of nuclear stockpiles by the American imperialists and their revisionist allies, it is an outrageous fraud. By proposing the reduction, the Soviet revisionists have shed their mask of "anti-imperialist pretensions." However, the betrayal by the Soviet revisionist clique will only inspire the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the world to speed up their ultimate victory over reactionaries.

G. OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

AD HOC COMMITTEE ON PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5. Apr. 1968: 50-51.

Recounts the proceedings of the first session of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. Meeting from March 16 to 27, the members elected B. S. Amerasinghe of Ceylon as chairman and decided to establish a legal working group and a technical working group. Amerasinghe suggested the Secretariat and member states should furnish the working groups with supporting documentation and announced that the Committee as a whole would deal with the political aspects of the problem of conserving deep-sea resources.

1770


Summarizes the proceedings of the second meeting of the U. N. Committee assigned to study the peaceful uses of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Both the U. S. and Soviet representatives suggested establishing priorities for the problems that must be overcome in developing international cooperation regarding the seabed and urged all countries to participate in the further exploration of the deep sea environment. The delegates from India and India shared the Soviet concern that the deep sea may be utilized for military purposes and agreed that measures may have to be taken to prevent the arms race from spreading to the ocean floor. The Committee's Legal Working Group and the Economic and Technical Working Group met for the first time on June 18.

1771


Includes summary.

Points out that the crisis game promises "systematic formulation of propositions about the behaviour of decision-makers under crises, which may then throw some light on the processes by which foreign policy is made."

1772


 Warns against the increasing control of the military establishment over democratic societies in the West. Using case studies drawn from French and American experience in Korea and Vietnam, Devillers attempts to prove that military leaders are becoming increasingly successful in imposing their will on civilian executives and that they have neither the experience, training, nor intellectual qualities to act as advisors to political leaders. In his view the outstanding characteristic of military advisors is a "quasi permanent ignorance of political implications of the decisions they urge." Devillers concludes that the grave threat to Western security and world peace today is neither Russian nor Chinese communism but rather the growing influence of the politically insensitive military men and that the "contamination" of this influence is the main problem of our time.

1773


Assesses the effectiveness of films in intercultural communications. Hurley's experience with the use of film to teach religion and social science in the United States and Chile leads him to conclude that film is a "worldwide language which can unite men in the depths of their being across all known barriers of sex, race, class, nation, politics, and religion," and a powerful "formative and informative instrument for creating the bases of community."

1774


Papers presented at a meeting held by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ostasienstudien, Oct. 5-12, 1965, in Heidelberg.

Includes bibliographies.


Empa.-- the growing polarisation of centrifugal and cohesive forces within the Soviet bloc.

1775


A consortium composed of the University of Washington, Honeywell, Inc., Batelle Memorial Institute, and the Oceanic Foundation of Hawaii is promoting an oceanographic research project directed at establishing U. S. jurisdiction over Cobb Seamount, a submerged extinct volcano located 270 miles west of the State of Washington that rises to within 15 feet of the surface. Although a number of Defense representatives personally support the project and stress the strategic importance of deep sea formations close to its shores, officially Washin-
V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURFS

too advocates an "open occupancy" policy for the deep
sea environment. The U.S. Government is involved in
organizing a 10-year international ocean exploration
project and supports U.S. efforts to prevent a race for
ocean territory. Despite the controversy over Govern-
ment ownership of Cobb Seamount, the consortium is
planning to initiate its "Project Sea Use" in the summer
of 1969 and is presently engaged in seeking funds for the
$2 million project.

Shay, Theodore L. NONALIGNMENT, NEUTRALISM

Classifies the cold war foreign policies of 50 non-
aligned members of the United Nations on the basis of a
statistical analysis of the voting pattern of each state on
cold war issues brought before the General Assembly.
The foreign policies of these states fall into one of four
categories: negative nonalignment (abstention on most
cold war issues), Western-oriented nonalignment,
Soviet-oriented nonalignment, and equidistant nonalign-
ment (distribution of votes about equally between East
and West). Shay finds that the chief spokesmen for
neutralism are almost all in the Soviet-oriented cate-

gory but also that the policy itself is declining in
importance. Evidence of a great diversity of views on
cold war issues among neutralized states leads him to
conclude that generalizations about the behavior of
states in the Third World are of little value.

Stoddart, David R. ISOLATED ISLAND COMMUNITIES.

Throughout the centuries man has altered the natural
ecology of most all oceanic islands. Since in their
unspoiled state these islands offer invaluable opportuni-
ties for scientific studies of evolution and complex envi-
ronmental relationships, "it is imperative that the few
undisturbed islands be preserved." Because island
biotas are small and because new forms have evolved
without competition, island ecosystems are often highly
unstable and susceptible to invading aliens. The Euro-
pean explorers were the first to deliberately modify
them by the introduction of plants and animals. Early
mining and farming operations on the islands resulted
in the disappearance of many unique plants and animals.
However, changes were relatively slow until the Islands
began to serve as civil and military air bases, test-
grounds for nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles,
and stations for satellite tracking networks. The
effects of disturbances on the island ecosystems are
generally irreversible and unpredictable. While ad hoc
conservation proposals have been made in response to
new development projects, no long-range plans have
been enacted for the scientific preservation of any of
the tropical volcanic islands, coral atolls, or high
limestone islands. International measures similar to
those provided by the 1961 Agreed Measures for the
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora could con-
tribute to the conservation of plants and animals on the
islands in lower latitudes.
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