ARMS INTERACTIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

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The set of issues suggested by the phrase "interactions" is generally recognized to be fundamental to arms control; yet these issues are very troublesome and intractable to deal with. A good model of interactions is indispensable to intelligent arms policy, but a naive model could both lessen security and intensify the arms competition in unprofitable directions. In my opinion, certain features of the interactions problem are not widely understood, and consequently I shall be attempting to redress the balance. I shall deal with (1) some general aspects of the interactions problem, (2) the ABM problem, and (3) some related aspects of the proliferation problem.

CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS

The rationalistic approach to arms control, which dominates the public discussion, tends to rest upon speculation and syllogisms. It presupposes that arms decisions made by a rival are formulated by a national decisionmaking process, governed by something like a unified intelligence. There is, for example, a good deal of casual (one might say half-baked) speculation on what the Soviets might do; the resulting hypothesis is gradually transmuted into the certainty that this..
indeed is what the Soviets will do -- with little attempt made to temper the speculation by considerations of bureaucratic or economic feasibility. The result is to impute tremendous flexibility to the Soviet posture. Little attention is paid to resource availability or to the deadening and stultifying effects of the bureaucratic process. Diabolically clever measures and countermeasures follow one another, and we are off into an ingenious -- and, incidentally, a costless and frictionless -- arms spiral.

By contrast, consider the real-world limitations on such a process. First, extraordinarily long lead times are encountered before a new weapon system is deployed and operational. Typically in public discussion these lead times tend to be ignored or truncated. On the other hand, in good research studies lead-time considerations are prominently displayed, though even here it is my impression that the times involved are substantially understated. Nonetheless, one effect of sensibly introducing lead times is to stretch out the arms race. A second is that the weapons systems being designed today will be introduced a decade hence into what may be an altogether different strategic environment. Thereby hangs a tale to which we shall shortly return.

But there are other constraints, perhaps of greater importance, on a hypothetical arms race in which scientific marvels succeed scientific marvels. I almost entitled this paper "Budgets, Bureaucracies, and Blindness: The Three Hidden Weapons in Arms Control."

It is these key ingredients that explain the slowness of arms responses, the lost opportunities, and the perseverance of vulnerabilities. Budgets after all are not unlimited, and major deployments, which in
speculative design could occur simultaneously, compete for the same resources. For example, with limited budgets, it may be infeasible to project the expansion and upgrading of offensive forces at the same time that a major ABM deployment takes place. Moreover, for good bureaucratic reasons budgets, when limited, tend to be inflexible. Each bureaucratic element fights to preserve its fair share of the budget. New programs encounter resistance to obtaining ample funding. This bears on the issue of blindness, a term I use without pejorative intent since it is inherent in the human condition. Accepted doctrine tends sharply to limit permissible action and moderately limits permissible views. At any one time there is a somewhat stereotyped view of the threat of proper strategy and of acceptable armaments. Proposals falling outside of this circle, no matter how ingenious, encounter seemingly endless resistance before obtaining acceptance.

Two bits of evidence may be mentioned to support this contention. The work of Loftus and Marshall on Soviet military allocations underscored the ability of established Soviet military units to obtain the lion's share of appropriations. The astonishing result was that in a period that American researchers were discussing, and even forecasting a surprise attack, the Soviets were doing remarkably little to build up their intercontinental strike forces. These forces were neglected, not only in terms of the American surprise attack fixation, but in terms of a minimal deterrent against the overwhelming U.S. strategic capabilities. The second piece of evidence contrasts the high degree of flexibility in military postures obtained in playing the SAFE game, which contrasted sharply with the much lower degree of flexibility experienced in the real world. Nations demonstrate a persistent
reluctance to phase out deployed equipment, which game players or researchers would tend to regard as obsolescent. As a result the roll-over cycle in military posture tends to be slower than a number of analysts have suggested. Incidentally, the willingness to incur substantial operations and maintenance charges on older equipment is not simply irrational, it reflects an understandable desire to hedge against the failure of new and untested equipment by standing with the tried and true.

In contrast to this observed sluggishness in changing military postures is a picture of rapid-paced technological revolutions presented by some weapons scientists and arms controllers. Although diametrically opposed morals are drawn, these two groups present surprisingly similar images. Technology represents the primary constraint -- organization, production, bureaucratic, and resource barriers pale into insignificance. When the technological barrier is breached, the transformation to a new posture is achieved through comparative statics. The lags are brief, and any resource requirements are assumed, like manna, to be supplied by a Kindly Providence. That a variety of alarming conclusions are drawn is not surprising (nor should it be regarded as simply accidental). One view suggests that the world will quickly be destroyed through an unfettered arms race unless political constraints are imposed that rein-in technology. The opposite view suggests that an opponent will come into a position in which he can destroy U.S. retaliatory capacity and major cities in one surprise attack -- unless U.S. technological advance is further stimulated. Nonetheless, there is an underlying similarity in the acceptance of the ease and speed of technological change.
My own conviction is that the use of rational models, presupposing quick perception, development, and absorption of new technologies and a high degree of interaction based on astute moves and countermoves, leads to a misunderstanding of the arms control problem. Nations, as they determine arms policies, should be viewed organizationally -- as sluggish organisms, dominated by doctrines based specifically on obsolescent strategic views, and comprised of contending bureaucracies that create major obstacles to the instituting of serious change. Major changes come as a result of political shocks. Smaller changes, even though they be cumulatively important, are ignored for long periods of time. National powers of perception are quite limited -- for large numbers of people must be persuaded that their previous judgments are outmoded. This is a time-consuming process at best.

Thus, I would argue that, rather than arms interactions being a game of subtle move and countermove based on high sensitivity to the logical implications of opponent's actions, it reflects the erratic and occasional reaction and overreaction to dramatic and shocking achievements by the opponent. The elements of surprise and humiliation may be crucial in determining the response. The first Soviet ICBM launching in the summer of 1957 caused nary a ripple in U.S. defense programs; the impact of Sputnik in the fall was far greater. In the Soviet case, one might hypothesize that the anger and frustration felt by Soviet leaders regarding the U-2 flights after 1956 provided a powerful stimulus.

* Even here the spending implications -- as opposed to the psychological and political consequences -- tend to be much exaggerated. On a seasonally adjusted basis, defense expenditures in constant dollars held steady at roughly a $46 billion annual rate through 1957 and 1958.
to the development of the SA-2, which is reasonably effective at high altitudes. (It may also have intensified the traditional Soviet emphasis on air defense.) For low altitude defense, however, no such stimulus existed, and the Soviets' lag in this respect has been noticeable, despite its equivalent importance for effective air defense. But, more recently, the performance of Soviet SAMs in North Vietnam has been such to suggest that a new and powerful stimulus may be operating regarding low altitude Soviet defenses. Other examples might be cited, including the ABM case to which I will turn presently. The point to recognize is that rational or pseudo-rational optimizing procedures may be far less important in determining an opponent's (or our own) responses than what organization theorists call attention cues.

If we are to deal intelligently with the arms control problem, we shall have to invest far greater effort than heretofore into what are the true attention cues for particular national organizations relying on imperfect information and achieving imperfect adaptation. What are the actions on our part that are likely to elicit a serious response by the opponent? Among a number of alternative responses, which one is he likely to choose, and can we influence that choice? (In the tendentious discussions that comprise public argumentation it is frequently assumed that there is but one route the opponent can follow.) What is the likely magnitude of the response in terms of resources invested -- and in the face of conflicting budgetary demands? On the other hand, what are the classes of actions that we can take -- and these are probably the majority -- which the opponent will ignore or to which he will respond only after long delay?
Let us contrast the method of analysis stressing the uncertainty of the character and magnitude of the opponent's response with one that is frequently encountered, based on the casual extrapolation of logical tendencies. Let me cite the specific case of civil defense and raise some issues that will bear on the discussion of ABM in the next section. Consider the class of argument regarding passive and active defenses that suggests defenses create instability by undermining an opponent's confidence in his residual deterrent, thereby possibly inducing him to "go first" in a confrontation (or, at a lesser level, to further expand his strategic offensive forces). The argument is based upon a strategic concept, probably obsolescent, that deterrence is ultimately based upon the ability to destroy some specific fraction of an opponent's population. In regard to civil defense, so the argument runs, action on our part would either induce instability by tempting the opponent to a first strike or touch off a new phase of the arms race as the opponent attempts to maintain his kill potential. For this reason, it is argued that it may be wisdom to deny ourselves civil defense. Although the line of reasoning is in a sense impeccable, it is in conflict with what I would regard as the realities of interactions.

The effect of civil defense programs is difficult for a foreign observer to define precisely, and the ambiguity alone may lead an opponent partially to disregard them. Just as an aside, in our own calculations of Assured Destruction with present and programmed forces, we disregard the impact of a variety of Soviet civil defense programs. Would the Soviets be more responsive than we have been, especially along the lines of the destabilizing response? There are a number of reasons for
thinking not. In contrast to offensive weaponry, civil defense is more subtle and less conspicuous, and I suspect that the most probable Soviet reaction would be to do little. Moreover, the argument reflects the American preoccupation with kill potential, which the Soviets may not share. The Soviets have steadily argued, as in ABM discussions, that defensive measures should not be viewed as provocative or as a stimulus to the arms race. It seems uncertain, to say the least, that our acting on their doctrine would necessarily generate the destabilizing consequences projected above. In addition, the Soviet offensive forces program, reflecting lengthy internal bureaucratic decisionmaking, is probably inflexible, and is likely to be played out, whether or not we take action on the civil defense front.

More fundamentally the belief that both sides must and will insist on maintenance of the ability to destroy some pre-set fraction of the opponent's population is probably erroneous. It rests on a concept of strategic bombardment in spasm war, which becomes increasingly dubious as the two major antagonists deploy staggeringly large offensive forces. Do both sides need to maintain kill potential against, say, 25 percent of the opponent's population? Would deterrence not remain effective if both sides could reciprocally inflict lower levels of population destruction? Would the ability to destroy more than 50 percent of industrial capacity plus only 10 percent of the population, for example, be so inadequate a deterrent that the Soviets or ourselves would be tempted to initiate city-busting warfare? If we question, in this manner, the value of catastrophic threats to population as an unalloyed and stabilizing asset, it becomes unclear how the Soviets might respond. The response might reasonably be civil defense activities of their own.
If this were the type of interaction, the net effect would be to reduce population destruction on both sides, if war should come, yet not significantly impair the effectiveness of deterrence.

From this civil defense example, I would suggest the danger of formulating arms control policies by the simple spinning-out of logical tendencies without deeper inquiry into the likelihood of response and the character and magnitude of a response, should it occur. But I would add one more element: the tendency, in the face of the very long lead times for the procurement of new systems, to decide on the acquisition of new hardware a decade or more hence with the objective of implementing the strategic concepts of today. Future forces should have sufficient flexibility built in so that they can perform something more than that strategic mission which appears dominant today. In the present context, with Assured Destruction as the sole criterion, we have been selecting hardware essentially for the purpose of population kill. Yet, with the buildup of major devastation potential on both sides, it becomes increasingly doubtful whether such capabilities are the most reassuring or desirable to possess or whether they could serve any useful purpose in that range of contingencies which are becoming increasingly probable.

**ARM AND ARMS CONTROL**

Let me go now in some detail into what is so vexed a question: the implications of ABM deployment for arms control. Initially I shall deal with two sharply contrasting and simple formulations of the effect of ABM on arms control. Subsequently I shall raise some questions that will amplify and extend the list of formulations, and then discuss
some considerations that I feel add realism to the role of ABM in the more probable nuclear clashes. Let me emphasize that I am trying to deal with ABM systems that we will encounter in the real world, that is, systems that are subject to enormous variance in actual performance and ones in which all of the ingenious improvements or retrofits that the engineers can develop will not have been incorporated.

At the outset let us examine the two views that have dominated the arms control debate. First, that expressed by Secretary McNamara in his San Francisco speech of September 1967; second, the one presented by Donald Brennan in a recent issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.* (For the time being I am restricting my observations to the bilateral case: the Soviet Union and the United States.)

The Secretary argues that ABM deployment is disadvantageous for both powers. Each power can and will maintain its Assured Destruction capability, i.e., the ability to destroy its principal rival in retaliation after absorbing a first strike. At lower cost each major power will spend whatever sums are necessary to maintain its offensive forces so as to compensate for the attrition imposed by the defense. ABM deployment thus implies heavy and wasteful expenditures which will add to the stock of weapons of mass destruction, but ultimately it will leave both powers in the same relative position. By contrast, Brennan argues that a "Soviet freeze," i.e., one on offensive systems and with no limit on deployment of defensive systems, is superior to the previously proposed "American freeze" applying solely to defensive systems. He

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argues, quite rightly in my view, that both sides could continue to deter even as their Assured Destruction capabilities shrank with the buildup of defensive systems. If both sides retain the ability to destroy say five to ten percent of their rival's population, mutual deterrence will continue to be as effective as with 25 to 30 percent of the respective population at risk, but we should all be better off if deterrence were to fail. I believe this is a fair representation of the two views.

Certain obvious questions may be raised. First, Brennan has little to say regarding the inducing or the policing of the freeze or offensive capabilities. My own view is that such policing continues to be infeasible, especially since the development of the MIRVed missile. One would have to have access to launching tubes, silos, and pads, and to examine the missile payloads in order to prevent the expansion of offensive capabilities. From the first the Soviet Union has with unusual consistency opposed any such prying activities on the part of the West. Second, the Secretary's view presupposes a substantial elasticity of budgets accompanied by a total inelasticity of demand for second-strike population-kill capabilities. In view of the very substantial sums involved, this is subject to question. It would require a remarkable and extraordinarily smooth process of adjustment, if such major activities with all the attendant uncertainties, were to take place, and everything remains the same as before. Let me mention a few additional propositions which could drastically affect the probable outcome even if we remain within the context of Assured Destruction capabilities.
One rather disconcerting possibility, sometimes stressed by political scientists, is that ABM deployment would be far more destabilizing than the Secretary indicates. It is suggested that each nation will fear that after an opponent’s initial strike, it could strike back only with a ragged attack which could readily be handled by its opponent’s ABM system. Therefore, so the argument runs, each nation will be tempted to strike before its own forces have been attacked. The ABM deployment thus would recreate the vulnerability problems that existed with the not well protected offensive forces in the 1950s. ABM deployment therefore may be highly destabilizing. I personally do not put much credence in the argument, for it implies that the temptation to go first is strong despite the assurance of one’s own destruction, and that the disadvantages of waiting will appear overpowering. In my view the attractiveness of initiating and the weaknesses of deterrence are overstated, but I believe that the position should be mentioned.

A second possibility is somewhat less disquieting, but also more realistic in my view. Suppose that, in practice, ABM systems will perform quite badly. Yet, each side apprehensively overstates the capabilities of its opponent’s ABM and each side consequently hedges by overbuilding its offensive forces so that the “requisite damage” can be inflicted -- in the face of very effective performance by the opponent’s ABM. Thus, each side overresponds -- and each side acquires even greater devastation potential than it originally thought was necessary. Moreover, the weapons obtained may be designed solely or primarily for the Assured Destruction mission and be useless in other roles. There
is at least some evidence that this is taking place. The United States has espoused a doctrine of "offensive-conservative" and may be overbuilding in relation to the real capabilities of the Soviet forces. If the Soviets were to do likewise, the result would be as hypothesized in the model: a superfluity of weapons designed for the mass destruction mission.

Third, consider a more reassuring possibility. The evidence from the past hardly demonstrates that the Soviets' demand for Assured Destruction capabilities is inelastic. Throughout the '50s the Soviets were niggardly in providing resources for the intercontinental mission. Their retaliatory capability was limited, to perhaps 5 to 10 million Americans, and they seemed satisfied with that condition. In the past the Soviets have not been captivated by the strategic bombardment doctrines that took hold in the West during World War II. Unfortunately, there is some evidence that the Soviets have recently been "learning" from us. Their strategic doctrine has tended to lag 5-10 years behind our own, and there are a number of indications that the current discussion within the Soviet Union is couched in terms of the Massive Retaliation notions popular in the United States in the late '50s. Nonetheless, the Soviets have historically been defensive-minded. When faced with the enormous budgetary drains represented by the deployment of an ABM system, is it certain that they will simultaneously accept the need for investing even greater sums in offensive forces in order to counter the effect of the U.S. ABM? Instead of moving to offset the U.S. ABM entirely might they not rather downgrade or ignore the capabilities of the system in their planning?
Fourth, to expand further on this point, much of the domestic debate on arms control has been couched in a hypothetical manner that disregards the budgetary and bureaucratic constraints facing any nation. It presupposes a degree of responsiveness to the deployment decisions of a rival that is historically questionable. What if deployment decisions and plans are, in fact, unresponsive? I would argue that the Soviet program for offensive forces was designed years ago, that it will be completed irrespective of arms control initiatives from the United States, and that it might not be further expanded unless American activities "shock" the Soviets out of a preconceived mold. If our activities are such as to tranquilize the Soviets, it becomes unlikely that they will face up to the painful budgetary and bureaucratic adjustments implied by a substantial expansion of the offensive forces program. It must be kept in mind that the defensive forces, other military components, and other bureaucracies will be jealously safeguarding their claims to a rightful share of total Soviet resources. There is no evidence that Soviet analyses are as competent as those in the DoD, or that there exists the equivalent of a Secretary McNamara who could impose a reallocation of resources, or even that the Soviets are as dedicated to maintenance of Assured Destruction as are we. When these budgetary and bureaucratic limitations are recalled, one might suggest slow responsiveness to a U.S. ABM buildup with a consequent Soviet willingness to permit some erosion of their Assured Destruction capabilities.

I believe that these factors, described as "non-rational," deserve careful attention. It may appeal to both our pride and our sense of
logic to treat the arms policies of nations as if they were logical in the game-theoretic sense. Nonetheless, in the determination of arms policy the behavior of states is more rigid and their objectives are less sharply defined than it is customary to admit. If this is difficult to believe for the Russians, consider our own arms decisions here in the United States: the ABM decision, for example. The Secretary of Defense indicates that deployment may be useless, and is undoubtedly premature. Nonetheless, the United States decides to deploy. Why? It seems doubtful that the United States would have deployed, if the Soviets had not "pre-empted" by initiating deployment of a well-advertised system. Did electoral calculations, looking forward to 1968, have something to do with the decision to go ahead? Such calculations strike me as a non-negligible influence. What this suggests is that the Soviet decision to deploy, working through political factors, precipitated the U.S. decision. Yet, irony of ironies, the rationale publicly offered features defense against the Chinese threat. Does this not dramatically underscore the role of mechanical, imitative, and un-analytical influences in national decisionmaking? To go on, although the only reasons we ascribe for deploying ABM are (1) defense against China, and (2) hard point defense of Minuteman sites, some statements have been made about deploying ABM in Europe -- to which neither of the reasons could possibly apply.

The ways of political decisionmaking are wonderful to behold -- and really lie beyond reproaches of the rationalist critic. But, it appears to me that, knowing what we really know about political decisions, it is inappropriate for us to pretend in our analyses that such decisions emerge from rational models.
Some of the major implications of ABM deployment are obscured by the type of debate indicated earlier: first, because the role of uncertainties is ignored; second, because the argument is couched in terms of Assured Destruction; and, third, because quite frequently only the bilateral case is considered. Uncertainties, which get shunted aside by assumption, affect the results in ways other than simply inducing both parties to build up redundant offensive capabilities. The fact that uncertainties regarding the actual performance of the opponent's defense are uneradicable might provide an important stabilizing element. If one can never be sure, whatever temptation to go first in a surprise attack will be further reduced. Only the most desperate circumstances would induce one of the major powers to alter its conviction that waiting is better than going.

Perhaps an even more important consequence of ABM deployment is obscured by confining the debate to the Assured Destruction case. One of the apparent casualties of the ABM deployment is damage limiting through counterforce. The argument seems to be: we cannot be sure we could penetrate the defenses in a timely manner; therefore why should we invest major resources in counterforce? It is better to put our resources in what is assumed to be the real task: Assured Destruction of the civil fabric of the opponent's society. Given the present American predilection for "offensive-conservative" and the belief that we must exhaust the opponent's defenses (the rival is assumed to be able to discriminate decoys), the result is the proliferation of small RVs that can be relied on ultimately to destroy the rival's cities, but are of limited utility for counterforce. I fear that at some future date the
The historical conclusion may be that the most significant result of ABM deployment was to turn our thoughts away from city avoidance and minimizing collateral damage to the civil fabric of our opponent's society and toward employment of military capabilities in their most destructive mode.

Admittedly ABM should make a difference; under any circumstances it would have major implications for arms control. But perhaps its most important impact has been to augment the perceived difficulties in attempting to do clean counterforce and to turn our attention and concentrate our inventiveness, rather obsessively, on the city-destruction task. I question whether this is a healthy development.

In the event of war the most desirable thing that can happen to weapons of mass destruction is that they be destroyed before they inflict damage. For the reason indicated earlier, I would question whether Soviet procurement policies will be much influenced by our non-procurement of counterforce capabilities. The direct response to U.S. procurement decisions is probably not close, but in any event the Russians will ascribe counterforce capabilities to us whether or not we procure them.

Perhaps more fundamental is the need to question the view that the Soviet ABM will necessarily frustrate a U.S. counterforce mission. In satisfying our compulsion regarding "offensive-conservative," we have been ascribing astonishing capabilities to the Soviet ABM system, while remaining keenly aware of the deficiencies of our own ABM. Yet, ironically, we are persuaded that our own defense systems are superior. Is this offensive-conservative? To me it does not seem to be even simple prudence. There must be some consistency: if it is so easy
for the Soviets to penetrate our system, it seems rather odd to assume that theirs will be leak proof.

When one considers the numerous, alternative ways of degrading or penetrating an ABM system, the more unwise it seems to me it is to become discouraged about counterforce. I cannot go into details, but far too little attention and effort has gone into designing a system intended to degrade an enemy ABM system. Any real-world system is going to have vulnerabilities. The possibilities for circumventing the defenses are substantial. Quite frequently, these possibilities are defined away because paper studies by our engineers design for the Soviets highly versatile systems with no vulnerabilities. Real-world systems are not like that. The initial deficiencies are only irregularly cured. This seems especially pertinent since the Soviets have been even more prone to living with the deficiencies of systems as initially configured than have we.

If war can be kept at a low level and directed toward military rather than urban targets, it would seem to me to be most consistent with the objectives of arms control. The aspirations of arms controllers should be higher than to deal simply with the numbers of weapons. Ideally, arms control should deal with strategies as well as weapons. Arms controllers should examine whether arms postures, which would permit conflict to be carried on between military forces rather than to be bent toward urban destruction, are not more consistent with their long-range goals. In the arms control context the connection between strategies and numbers of weapons deserves much more serious attention.
BEYOND THE BILATERAL CASE

One of the difficulties with many arms control analyses has been that, when the complexities of an n-person world become too staggering, the tendency has been to slip back into the bilateral case. When one considers the importance attached to non-proliferation in arms control, the basic inconsistency of confining analyses to the bilateral case become apparent. By and large, arms controllers have sought a world in which the two superpowers reduced their offensive forces to much lower levels and in which proliferation, preferably beyond the original two nuclear powers, either did not take place or was reversed.

Is there not a basic inconsistency in this set of desires? Is it not the dominance of the superpowers -- and their ability to control lesser conflicts -- that provide the principal deterrent to the rapid spread of nuclear weapons? Without the essential bipolarity existing in the military realm, the tendency toward acquisition would be strengthened. To discourage nuclear spread, and to control the spread that takes place, the military capabilities under the control of the superpowers may have to be disproportionately large. This applies not only to counterforce capabilities, which sharply reduce the potential threat embodied in third forces, but also to ABM deployments. The existence of even moderately effective ABM systems will diminish the ability of the third forces of Britain, France, and China to destabilize the international political balance.

Arms controllers, like other groups, tend to deal with those parts of a problem that they consider subject to manipulation. It is interesting therefore to note that in recent years arms control proposals have
focused exclusively on what the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain can be induced to do. But the activities of others, most prominently those of China, will not go away and are too important to ignore. The discussion in the Wiesner Committee's report some years ago concentrated primarily on the bilateral case: an ABM moratorium and a freeze on strategic delivery vehicles for the United States and the Soviet Union. China was dismissed as essentially a trivial influence in the international power balance. In some respects this was a healthy step, for there has been a marked tendency on the American scene to inflate the potential Chinese threat. Nonetheless, China cannot be reduced to triviality. In this connection let me cite an earlier paper by Jerome Wiesner in which he stated:

Any comprehensive arms-control agreement will of necessity involve the participation of the government of the People's Republic of China. It is obvious that if we fail to gain their participation in arms-control agreements, we will have to accept a serious shortcoming in any security system we create.

I suggest that it is unwise to truncate or abandon analyses simply because the real-world possibilities do not match our aspirations. We must carefully study what the inability to capture China within the context of arms-control agreements implies, for China's non-participation

* The Department of Defense has not, of course, ignored third parties. China, if not the broader proliferation problem, was stressed in Secretary McNamara's recent announcement of the ABM decision. My references here are to the views emanating from the arms control community rather than to the actual policies of the U.S. Government.


may alter the ideal shape of such agreement. We cannot afford to attempt to limit only the two superpowers because other nuclear states refuse even to participate in arms control discussions.

Arms control policy is faced with a special dilemma. The military dominance of the United States and the Soviet Union has served to keep the proliferation threat under control. If arms control is successful in reducing the relative advantages of the superpowers, their ability to stabilize third areas of the world will be substantially reduced. The effect may be to turn the third areas into even more of a mess than they are today and to set off a scramble for nuclear weapons. It is reasonable for arms controllers to aspire (1) to reduce superpower armaments, forestall ABM deployment, and so on, and (2) to prevent proliferation and maintain stability in the third world. I am not sure that both objectives can be pursued at the same time. In any event, the conflict between the two objectives must be studied, and whatever choice is necessary should be explicitly made. Unless there is some underlying consistency in the objectives that we choose to endorse, we are indulging in pieties. Indulging in pieties is not the path to serious influence on national policy decisions.