THE POLITICS OF INSTABILITY

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In trying to understand the specific differences between the politics of advanced societies and those of the rest of the world, we are likely to reflect first on the role of violence. This is understandable as violence carries the most immediate and direct threat to our daily lives and is repugnant to our value system. We only feel secure in society if violence is restrained and directed into predictable and legitimate channels.

When violence is thus controlled, the individual feels that he can avoid becoming its victim by behaving in socially approved ways: he accepts the demands of legitimate authority, advocates only changes by peaceful means, and sticks to the "rules of the game," which in advanced societies are supposed to exclude the use of force. The underlying and not necessarily correct assumption is, of course, that even the strongest social interests and passions will remain under the control of reason.

Recent events remind us inexorably that no society has yet become immune to violence. There are, nevertheless, crucial differences between situations in which violence

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is a central feature of the political system, such as in totalitarian societies, situations where violence is an accepted tool of political action, though not an all-pervasive feature of society, and situations in which it appears primarily as the aberrant manifestation of deviant individuals and marginal groups.

These are obviously rather fine distinctions which, however meaningful to analytic minds, tend to blend nowadays into a cruder picture of horror and concern, as the quality of life in our society appears increasingly beclouded by gunsmoke. But we should not let such impressions obfuscate a crucial distinction between stable and unstable political systems, namely the fact that their resistance to the effects of violence is entirely different.

Stable political systems are those which despite constant institutional adjustments, which result cumulatively in major social transformations, absorb well the shock of violence. Conversely, political instability creates superficially an impression of drastic systemic mutations, while in fact the significant features of the respective society remain unchanged. Characteristically they are very vulnerable to relatively small inputs of violence.

A comparison of social changes in the stable constitutional societies of the West in the last 150 years with that in the countries of Latin America during the same period will provide telling illustrations for this assertion. Political instability and social change are not concomitant and may even be mutually exclusive.

The existence of political stability in a given country is, of course, best tested over an extended period of time by an examination of the historical record. If institutions
resist successfully radical efforts to destroy them, if authority is transferred in accordance with predetermined rules which are well understood and predictable, the system is presumed stable. But the most important test of political stability is to be found in the relations between antagonistic social forces. If these relations are suddenly and drastically changed by political events, the results are usually far reaching in their effect on the lives of people in that country, on economic interests, and on international relations. This is what one usually calls a change of regime, in contradistinction to a mere change of government which involves personalities and even opposing parties but takes place within the framework of commonly accepted basic principles and institutions.

The sudden and basic restructuring of power relations in society involves in most cases the use of violence, whereas the gradual and slow transformations which have taken place in the most advanced countries of the West were by-and-large the result of peaceful change. In studying political instability the key question is to determine how the respective political system reacts to the application of various forms of violence and how the anticipation of those reactions determines the calculations of the major participants in the game of politics.

Where the political system is stable, the leading protagonists in the political arena know that basic changes in the system require the support of a very large portion of those participating in the political life of their country. This may involve the broad electoral masses of constitutional democracies, or only the active members of a totalitarian party, but in either case isolated events have only limited impact on the system as a whole.
In this respect the Western democracies and the Communist states seem to have certain common characteristics which set them apart from the unstable transitional societies of the Third World. Despite very important differences in the source of their political stability, Western democracies and Communist states show great resilience against marginal violent pushes attempting to destabilize them.

Nobody in his right mind expects a change of regime in Washington as the result of the assassination of a president or of any other major political figure. Even direct action on a larger scale, such as the march on the Pentagon in protest against the war in Vietnam, or widespread urban rioting, causing considerable loss of life and property, have no significant immediate impact on the allocation of political power in American society. In this respect the tragedies of the last few years illustrate in compelling fashion that this country indeed has political stability.

By contrast, it is not tautological to argue that, if current disturbances in France result in the collapse of the Gaullist regime, this proves that the political system of that country is unstable. Without trying to explain the socio-cultural forces underlying political stability, one can nevertheless argue that historical experience suggests that France since 1789 has been politically unstable, whereas the United States since 1776 has a record of stability.

In the Communist states, in turn, it is hard to deny that the Soviet Union has achieved political stability in the half-century since it was established. The deaths of Lenin and Stalin, the succession struggles of the last fifteen years, sustained and extended attacks from abroad,
and economic, religious, social and cultural crises of catastrophic proportions have not jeopardized the hold of the Communist Party on that country. Changes of personnel can only be explained, probably, by the total inner dynamics of that party, numbering several million members.

How stable Communist China is, remains to be seen. At first sight it would seem that the convulsions of the last three years have ended in a stalemate between various groups sharing political power. In the other Communist countries, despite dramatic changes in policy, it cannot be said that changes of regime have taken place.

Power relations between various groups in society have not been altered in such fashion as to modify substantially the life expectations of those concerned: the Communist parties are still in control, an official ideology is still sanctioned, imposing severe limitations on the freedom of expression of intellectuals, and property relations and the role of the state in the life of the individual remain basically as before.

It is interesting to speculate whether the absence of coups and assassination attempts in Communist countries is the result of extraordinarily successful security measures or of the conviction on the part of hidden enemies of the regime that they would be unable to overthrow it by using the amounts of violence which they could mobilize. After all, the few totalitarian societies which have been destroyed crumbled only after the sustained application of major military power by the Allies against the Axis in World War II.

In the Third World the situation is entirely different. Leaving aside for the moment the question whether the use of violence results in changes of regime or only of govern-
ment, it is quite clear that most of the countries of Latin America and Africa and some of the Asian countries are politically unstable; governments are easily overthrown by violence or the threat of violence. I lack statistics for Africa at this moment, but the figures for Latin America are indicative. From 1930 to 1965 the illegal and unscheduled changes of heads of state in 19 Latin American countries totalled 106. The only exception was Mexico, which experienced no coups during that entire period.¹ It can therefore be argued that only Mexico has achieved political stability in Latin America.

In Asia, one can argue impressionistically, on the basis of the record of the last twenty years, that despite extraordinary institutional changes, or perhaps because of them, Japan is today a politically stable country and attempted coups or political assassinations are unlikely to affect the future of the regime. In a different way India seems to have surprising political stability despite economic and ethnic-linguistic difficulties, a political spectrum ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left, and serious international complications. One can also argue that the Philippines, despite serious social tensions, sometimes of an explosive character, have had political stability throughout their independent existence. Indeed, President Marcos is reported to believe that civil disorder would not be able to topple the regime in the next five years.²


²Personal communication from my colleague Dr. Paul Hammond following a visit to the Philippines in early 1968.
Without attempting an exhaustive survey, one can safely state that in most other Asian and African countries the use or threat of violence has played an important role in inducing political changes. Even the nationalist struggle for independence and for the maintenance of unity has rarely been able to prevent clashes between domestic forces, which sometimes occurred while the armed struggle against imperialist forces was still unresolved. Indonesia, for instance, which is the object of my remarks today, never had political stability. Factional strife marred the achievement of national objectives throughout the years of struggle for independence.

Although a quasi-parliamentary regime was established a few months after independence was proclaimed in August 1945, extra-parliamentary forces brought cabinets down easily and the Western "rules of the game" never took hold. Until Sukarno was able to establish himself as dictator in July 1959, Indonesia had seventeen cabinets, none of which fell through a formal vote of nonconfidence in Parliament.

Relatively minor external pressures and behind-the-scenes maneuvers sufficed to make a Prime Minister return his mandate and create a political crisis which lasted occasionally several weeks, until a new governing coalition was put together. Constant cabinet changes created an atmosphere of administrative paralysis and economic stagnation, depriving the country of the release of energy that should have followed the achievement of independence.

After the proclamation of Sukarno's "guided democracy" in July 1959, political instability manifested itself in new forms. As constitutional rules were rendered meaningless by changes in interpretation which suited the whims of the
ruler, a pervading atmosphere of uncertainty engulfed the political life of the country. The position of vice-president was left vacant after the resignation of Drs. M. Hatta in December 1956. The modality of presidential succession was left undetermined, thus encouraging the ambitions of various politicians, without giving them any clear guidelines on how to establish their claim.

Several political parties were outlawed, and their leaders arrested, while the concept of "enemy of the revolution" received official sanction as part of the established ideology of the regime. Thus an important part of Indonesia's legitimate political life was driven underground, compounding the problem represented by the existence of ideological and regional armed factions which had never recognized the legitimacy of the national political institutions.

Among those groups which were accepted as participants in the officially sanctioned political process, most political parties seemed increasingly unable to mobilize mass support, despite their extravagant membership claims.

The only party which seemed capable of bringing the people into the streets and generating the semblance of enthusiasm for Sukarno was the Communist Party of Indonesia. Its young and dynamic leaders established themselves increasingly as national figures, especially after Sukarno gave them cabinet rank. In return they became the most zealous supporters of his ideological pronouncements, which they propagated incessantly in speech and in writing.

By the spring of 1965 the PKI claimed three million members, its youth organization Pemuda Rakjat another three million, and its various front organizations a total of some twenty million followers. The party chairman, D. N. Aidit,
who had taken over in 1951 a moribund organization of less than 8,000 members, was now a well-known figure in the international Communist movement and a major factor in domestic Indonesian politics. Although Sukarno had carefully avoided gestures which would have permitted anybody to establish himself as the President's chosen political heir, Aidit's chances began to acquire an aura of plausibility which other aspirants lacked.

As leader of the most vigorous and probably also most popular political party, Aidit could claim a right to the presidency not only in the name of democratic principles, but also by default, as all the other political groups except the Communists had participated in past cabinets without being able to help overcome the country's endemic economic, political and social crisis.

Promising improvements without spelling out a detailed program which could have been examined critically, the Communists seemed to appear to increasing numbers of ideologically uncommitted individuals as the country's last hope. Furthermore, they had the advantage of being able to add to their aura of dynamism and honesty the image of fierce and intransigent nationalists, supporting vociferously all of their country's chauvinistic claims.

Then disaster struck the PKI with lightning speed. On the night of September 30-October 1, 1965, six senior General Staff officers, including Army Commander General A. Yani, were shot down in their homes or abducted and murdered on the outskirts of Djakarta. The commander of a battalion of Sukarno's palace guard, Lt. Col. Untung, proclaimed himself leader of a "September 30 Movement" which, according to a statement broadcast over the captured Djakarta radio
station, was "solely a movement within the Army" directed against a "Council of Generals" which "harbored evil designs against the Republic of Indonesia and President Sukarno."³

The conspirators set up the same day an Indonesian Revolutionary Council to which -- consistent with Indonesian predilection for numerology -- they appointed forty-five members, many of which had no personal involvement in the affair. In Djakarta the September 30 Movement was crushed within twenty-four hours and in the provinces only a few isolated outbursts of activity signalled its existence.

On October 5, 1965, the day when the victims of these assassinations were buried with full military honors at the Heroes Cemetery, the Moslem N. U. Party, supported by five smaller political parties, urged the President to dissolve the PKI. This marked the opening of an anti-Communist campaign which resulted in large-scale massacres of PKI followers, especially in East and Central Java and in Bali, in late 1965 and early 1966, in the banning of the party by the military on March 12, 1966, and in the deaths of numerous Communist leaders, including Aidit and his two deputies Lukman and Njoto.

Many students of Indonesian affairs, including me, found it at first very difficult to accept the notion that the PKI was involved in the September 30 Movement. For almost fifteen years Aidit and his associates had shown considerable political skill. They had built up their party into the largest and most admired outside the Communist bloc. They had claimed insistently that the PKI

had not engaged in armed revolt in 1948 at Madiun, but had been the victim of a provocation by reactionary forces determined to destroy Indonesian Communism.

The party leaders were projecting an image of moderation and patience, demanding democratic elections and a broadening of the base of the government to include Communists, but without ever claiming full power for themselves. Consequently, although since about 1963 the PKI seemed very close to the line of the Chinese Communist Party in its attitude toward the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, domestically it seemed to practice not what the Chinese preached but what they condemned, a gradualist road to power, shunning the use of violence and relying on cooperation with all possible non-Communist allies.

Even when members of the Political Bureau of the PKI were captured and confessed in open trials before an Extraordinary Military Court their involvement in the September 30 Movement, their statements were discounted by some Western commentators as products of show trials without basis in reality. Considerable ingenuity was used by some students of Indonesian affairs to explain the events of the night of October 1, 1965, as an "internal Army affair."

It goes without saying that events of such dramatic scope and consequence as those which terminated Sukarno's career as the national leader of Indonesia, destroyed the Communist Party and resulted in the establishment of a new pro-Western regime controlled by the Army were bound to arouse intense emotions. Not all pronouncements about the September 30 Movement, however scholarly their trappings, can be accepted as the result of dispassionate analysis.
But in fairness to those concerned it must be admitted that the circumstances surrounding the origin of that abortive coup are so complex and obscure that honest mistakes were also possible. Even after the chain of events was established in open court, impartial observers could retain strong doubts about the veracity of the crucial confessions and testimonies unless the inner logic of the seemingly foolish behavior of the Communist leaders could be explained.

I believe that Aidit's reasoning, which originated the September 30 Movement, can be explained rationally in the context of the politics of instability to which I referred earlier in my presentation. Whereas only madmen will try to overthrow the government in a stable political system, and political assassination is a futile action where it cannot lead to real changes of political regime, in countries suffering from political instability the same actions are far from foolish, even though miscalculations can lead to failure and disaster.

Where the political system is unstable, relatively minor changes in the balance of political forces can have major consequences. As I explained in a study entitled "The PKI's Road to Power", written in 1964 and published in the volume *The Communist Revolution in Asia* edited by Robert A. Scalapino, the basic strategy of the PKI, as formulated and guided by Aidit, was, in the early 1950s, to avoid "internal warfare" and to alter gradually the balance of power among social forces, both by mass action and by subtle political maneuvers among the elites, especially in the palace clique surrounding Sukarno. Aidit spelled out some of his thoughts in a General Report
to the Central Committee in July 1956, after the frustration of the PKI's hope to be included in the cabinet, although it had secured 16.4 percent of expressed votes at the September 1955 general elections. He said at that time:

Basically, the PKI's activity is to change the balance of power between the imperialists, landlords, and other comprador bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the people on the other, by arousing, mobilizing and organizing the masses. 4

Then in December 1958, in preparation for its Sixth National Congress, the PKI altered the emphasis on "peaceful transition to socialism" in the Preamble to its Constitution and replaced it with the following statement:

Whether the struggle is fierce or not and whether force is used or not in the transitional struggle toward socialism depends on the exploiting classes and on whether these classes are using force themselves, and not on the laboring classes. 5

Most students of Indonesian Communism ignored this change in doctrine, especially as that militant amendment seemed at the time contradicted by the patient, gradualist, policy of the PKI, which started only several years later to parallel the Chinese line. As late as 1962-1963 Ruth McVey was writing:

...The over-all tenor of the PKI's statements on the process of converting a nationalist state to a socialist one is that of emphasis on a long, hard pull toward power rather than on the expectation of inevitable and violent confrontation.  

Yet, as a matter of fact, the PKI was preparing for the "inevitable and violent confrontation." After Aidit's return from a trip to China and other Communist countries in September 1963, the PKI's militancy increased. The Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, held in December 1963, sanctioned the "unilateral action" instigated in the villages of Java by the BTI to carry out the provisions of the agrarian legislation of 1960, bypassing reluctant authorities and sharpening noticeably class conflicts in the countryside throughout 1964.

In January 1965 Aidit proposed that five million workers and ten million peasants be armed to counter Malaysia's military build-up, thus challenging head-on a fundamental unwritten doctrine of the Army that the PKI should never be permitted to acquire a para-military capability. The Army had strong feelings on this matter as the result of the Madiun rebellion of September 1948, when Communist military units attempted to overthrow the Republican government which was trying, in turn, to bring all irregular armed groups, formed during the struggle against the Dutch, under the control of the General Staff.

In his foreign policy, which had the strong support of the PKI, Sukarno was isolating Indonesia not only from

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the West, but also from the United Nations from which he pulled out in January 1965, and even from the non-aligned countries with which his foreign policy clashed repeatedly, as demonstrated in the maneuvers concerning the organization of a second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers in June 1965. In moving toward an alliance with Communist China Sukarno and the PKI were arousing the strong resentment of an officer corps which viewed China as the most serious future threat to their country and were hostile to the Chinese minority living in their midst.

The sum-total of these Communist-initiated or sponsored policies was bound to bring the PKI on a collision course with the Army. It can be argued that an ultimate clash had been unavoidable for a long time, as the PKI and the Army were the only two well organized power structures in the country, competing for political control not only at the top but vertically at each echelon, all the way to the grassroots. But it can also be argued that an accommodation between the two organizations was conceivable, on the basis of radical nationalism and of Indonesia's "manifest destiny" in Southeast Asia.

In choosing the antagonistic road of confrontation with the Army, the Communist leaders misjudged the situation strategically, overplayed their hand and lost everything. We may never know to what extent this was the result of over-estimating the "revolutionary situation," in other words their party's actual popular appeal in the country, or the extent of their subversive penetration of the military establishment, or the value of Sukarno's protection.

In September 1966 the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PKI circulated clandestinely in Central
Java a "self-criticism" which was published in January 1967 in English translation in the *Indonesian Tribune* printed in Albania. We know now that the document was written by Sudisman who was captured by the Indonesian authorities in December 1966 and sentenced to death after a public trial in July 1967. That lengthy document concludes that the PKI leadership misjudged the situation on all those counts and accuses it of adventurism.

Sudisman's critique refers also to "mistakes in the organizational field, in particular those concerning the style of work which gave the Party leadership the power to build their own organizational channel beyond the control of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee."  

This cryptic remark refers to the covert organization created by Aidit personally in late 1964 to control and organize military personnel on active duty who were sympathizers, candidate members, or members of the PKI. This small organization known to a few as the Special Bureau (*Biro Chusus*), was known to other party leaders as the Contact Board (*Badan Penghubung*) or the Contact Bureau (*Biro Penghubung*). Most of the information we have about the Special Bureau comes from its head, a man who worked directly for Aidit and whose real name is Kamaruzaman although he is primarily known in relation to the September 30 Movement as Sjam. He was captured in March 1967 and tried by the Extraordinary Military Tribunal in Bandung in February-March 1968.

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I attended the trial and watched Sjam throughout the proceedings. I have no doubts that the information that he revealed was authentic and believe that the reason he, and earlier Sudisman at his trial, spoke so freely is that they had decided to use the platform provided by the court to inform the new generation of Communists which is now growing clandestinely in Indonesia what the mistakes of their predecessors had been.

From the trial of Sjam, corroborated by other evidence, it appears quite clearly that the PKI was not just marginally involved in the September 30 Movement but that the initiative and implementation actually came from Aidit himself, operating through his Special Bureau. To what extent the leaders of any political movement acting clandestinely engage the legal or even moral responsibility of their rank and file who had joined an overt organization and had no way of knowing what was planned covertly is a complex question which cannot be resolved here.

Through the Special Bureau, Sjam and his associates recruited and instructed the Army and Air Force officers who actually carried out the assassination of the six generals and proclaimed Revolutionary Councils in Djakarta and in the provinces. Contacts between military personnel and the PKI were so carefully guarded after the Special Bureau was established in 1964 that no names of military personnel were found on PKI membership lists during the investigations undertaken after October 1, 1965. This is why it was possible to stage the September 30 Movement as an "internal Army affair."

Although these facts can no longer be challenged by dispassionate observers it would be difficult to suppress a
residue of doubt, even after hearing Sjam's statements in open court, unless one can explain rationally the inner logic of Aidit's tactical calculations. Engaging the PKI on a collision course with the Army was the result of an erroneous assessment of the "revolutionary situation" in Indonesia and in the world. But risking a clash with the military is one thing, and provoking them to react violently to the assassination of their leaders is something else again.

In retrospect it is still hard to believe that the massive anti-Communist purges of late 1965 and early 1966 would have been possible in an essentially tolerant country, where the death penalty is virtually unknown, but for the haunting image, widely publicized through all mass media, of the mutilated bodies of General Achmad Yani and of his colleagues.

The tactical mistake of directly provoking the Army was indeed much greater than the strategic mistake of heating up the revolutionary climate after 1963. Those who have followed the events of 1965 will remember that the event which triggered the plot was Sukarno's sudden illness in August 1965 and the verdict of a team of Chinese doctors that he may die soon or become permanently incapacitated. As Sukarno is still in reasonably good health, although hardly happy, three years later, an interesting subsidiary question is whether the Chinese doctors were deliberately misleading Aidit. But even if Sukarno had died and the Army would have taken over and re-established martial law, the PKI would have stood a better chance to survive overtly or, like other political parties before it, covertly had it not given the Army cause for its physical annihilation.
Although Aidit's colossal error may be condemned as "subjectivism" or "adventurism" by his Communist critics, it is understandable within the context of the politics of instability characterizing Indonesia and so many other countries in the Third World. Where a small input of violence can alter drastically the balance of political forces in a country, overthrow a regime, and establish a new government, the assassination of a key public figure is, unfortunately, not the senseless act that it is in advanced societies.

In planning the September 30 Movement the PKI leaders assumed that they had widespread popular support, even within the military establishment, and that their enemies were a small clique whose authority was not based on their own popularity but on delegation from the charismatic father-figure of Sukarno. Therefore, if they were eliminated swiftly in a way that appeared to the populace as an internal settlement of accounts within the Army, and Sukarno then appointed a new Army leadership friendly to the PKI, the balance of forces would have been tipped decisively in favor of the party and a take-over could have followed in due course, regardless of whether Sukarno was still around as patron and protector.

Because it is frequently stated in Washington that the decisive response of the Army could not have taken place without the knowledge that the United States was stemming the Communist tide in Vietnam, I would like to add, in drawing to a close, that the opposite argument is more plausible.

Whereas General Suharto acted on October 1, 1965, in a reflex of self-defense following the death of his col-
leagues and had neither time nor reason to think about the international implications of his command decisions, Aidit's actions were premeditated and planned over a lengthy period of time, and he must have considered the risks of external intervention if the PKI acted too boldly. It seems plausible to me that he concluded that the United States, being bogged down in Vietnam, where it had been forced to escalate in order to save a crumbling anti-Communist regime, was unlikely to be able to intervene simultaneously in Indonesia.

Therefore, giving history a small push through the September 30 Movement, in an inherently unstable situation, was not only logical in terms of the domestic Indonesian situation, perceived as altogether favorable, except for the obstruction represented by a few die-hard generals, but also in the context of the international constellation of forces, as seen from Djakarta and probably also from Peking.

To conclude I would venture to suggest that the plot was probably much closer to success than may appear to be the case in retrospect, after its collapse. It is always difficult to speculate about human reactions which could have taken place but did not. In this instance it must be remembered that on October 1, 1965 Sukarno was still a formidable political force in Indonesia, not the pathetic figure which he appears to us today.

I suspect that he refused to endorse the plotters not because he disagreed with their objectives but because blood had been spilled and because General Nasution was still at large, after an attempt had been made on his life. Had the plotters confined themselves to kidnapping the generals, in good Indonesian tradition, and charging them with treason, which Sjam stated at his trial was their
actual intention, Sukarno may have been able to appoint a pro-Communist Army leadership and General Suharto may not have found it possible to react spontaneously in self-defense.

But the politics of instability are unpredictable, because they result to a large extent from the personal decisions of low-ranking individuals, who lack the analytic capability, the balance, and emotional stability which affairs of state require. Although my research on these complex matters is not yet complete, I tend to believe that somewhere down the line a political operation was turned into a crude murder plot and the unintended consequences of this switch in signals altered the course of Indonesian history and the strategic balance in the Western Pacific.