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As we all know only too well, the American student of Chinese Communist affairs must rely heavily on the recorded public utterances of representatives of the regime. The interpretation of such data is of course subject to a number of uncertainties. The ways in which public political statements can be used to deceive, to mislead, or to bargain are not always obvious. Even when a statement embodies a real calculation or the speaker's genuine perception of the world, the motive for making it may lie in the passing demands of small-scale tactics, or it may be of extreme subjective import to the speaker. One of the more favorable situations for analysis of this kind of material is found when linked propositions concerning a unitary topic are reiterated over a fairly long time period, so that they occur in varying environmental contexts, with qualitative or quantitative variations in content, and with fluctuations of frequency or emphasis. The problem under examination here—the way the Chinese Communists have represented the significance for others of their experience in achieving power by revolutionary means—fits these last specifications.1

The Chinese Communist Party at the time of formally coming to power in 1949 had a fixed, detailed doctrine concerning the reasons for its success. The content of this historical appreciation of Naziist strategy has not varied since then,
although some members of the leadership may not be as intensely attached to it as others. Reduced to its essentials, the doctrine stated that revolutionary success in China depended on a tripod: a Leninist party, serving as the "vanguard of the proletariat"; a revolutionary army controlled by the party; and a "correct" policy regarding the united front. The elements of revolutionary strategy which constituted the so-called "creative applications" by Mao Tse-tung of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of China apply to the second and third legs of the tripod. It was repeatedly stated both before and after 1949 that the special characteristic of the Chinese revolution was that it involved a struggle of the "armed people opposing armed counterrevolution." The military strategy developed by Mao over the years, involving particularly rural revolutionary bases, was repeatedly and most emphatically described as having been correct and as having been in conformity with Stalin's own basic analysis, despite the left deviations committed in the early 1930's under the influence of the Russian-oriented returned students. In the area of united front policy, Mao's creativeness was said to have been demonstrated particularly in connection with decisions as to which sections of the bourgeoisie should at a given time be taken as the object of the "main blow" and which should be conciliated or neutralized. Again, there are indications that from the orthodox Maoist viewpoint the Moscow-oriented members of the leadership advocated a rightist deviation during the late 1930's.
Mao's "creative applications," then, consisted in certain practical political and military decisions, retrospectively sanctified by the test of success, as much as or more than in his supposed superior grasp of China's social structure. Whether really original or not, and if so whatever this demonstrates about Mao's total intellectual capacity, the Chinese Communist reading of their pre-1949 revolutionary history has ever since been pretty consistent and has continuously provided the basis for maintaining that the revolutionary process in each country had to adapt itself to the country's special conditions.

Nevertheless, during most of the first two years of the new regime's existence, the Chinese Communists repeatedly represented the Maoist strategy as the model for revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries, especially those of Asia. One of the best known of these statements, Liu Shao-chi's address to the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries, laid particular stress on armed struggle. An often quoted passage states:

"In a colony or a semi-colony, if the people have no arms to defend themselves, they have nothing. The existence and development of proletarian organizations and the existence and development of a national united front is intimately linked to the existence and development of such an armed struggle. This is the sole path for many colonial and semi-colonial peoples in their struggle for independence and liberation."

The above passage was quoted and its scope of application was underlined by a special article in the People's Daily on June 16,
1950. In spelling out the significance of the Chinese model for colonial countries, the article specified at length the weaknesses of "legal methods" in such countries. The precise areas to which the model applied were given as, first, Vietnam and Malaya, and, second, Burma and the Philippines—in short, those areas of Asia where armed dissidence was in fact in existence. The article also directed attention to the endorsement by the Cominform journal of Liu Shao-ch'i's statement and its acceptance in principle by the Indian Communist Party.

A rather complete restatement, in almost identical language, was made by Lu Ting-yi in an article prepared for the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, an occasion on which many leading members of the party reviewed the history of its climb to power. Again the tripod—party, army, united front—was described. The Russian revolution was designated as the "classic type of the revolutions in imperialist countries" and the Chinese revolution as the "classic type of the revolutions in colonial and semicolonial countries," and the "national liberation wars of the peoples of Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines" were specifically mentioned.

Liu Shao-ch'i's remarks on the same occasion are of particular interest. He even more clearly specified the central importance of armed struggle. In his tribute to Mao Tse-tung's "correct guidance," he pointed out that Mao "organized and strengthened the People's Liberation Army as the principal instrument of the
Chinese People's Revolution...the principal instrument by which our Party and the people defeated imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism, and founded the People's Republic of China."^5

At the same time, Chinese Communist statements of this period consistently pointed out that the Chinese revolution was at once anti-feudal and anti-imperialist, that it was a part of the whole world revolutionary movement, and that it could hardly have been conceived, let alone carried out, without the prior example of the Russian revolution and the material political support created by the existence of the Soviet Union.

As Liu Shao-chi put it:

...without the October Revolution of Russia;
...without the sympathy and help of the proletarian classes and laboring people of Soviet Russia as well as the other countries of the whole world, it would have been impossible for our Party and the Chinese people to attain the victory of today....

There are some comrades of ours who do not understand these deep and complicated factors in relation to the achievement of the victory of our Party and the Chinese Revolution. They believe that the victory was brought about solely through the efforts in conquering the country. As a consequence, they have been putting on airs. We must teach these comrades the history of the revolution of the world and of China so as to broaden their horizon, rectify their haughtiness and other wrong concepts.6

In terms of the world balance of power, the 1949-1951 Chinese formulation was essentially arithmetical: as a result of the revolution, China had been subtracted from the Western camp and added to the communist camp, with a resulting change
in the world balance of power. This otherwise rather uninteresting formulation deserves attention for two reasons. First, the predisposition of the Chinese to maintain a continuing calculation of the world balance of power has been underestimated. Inspection would show, I believe, that after every major world event the Chinese have in some way or other revealed that they have calculated its significance in these terms. This is, for instance, true of their evaluation of the Geneva Conference of 1954. Second, in the contrastive perspective of positions later adopted by the Chinese, their 1949-1951 estimate of their contribution to the Soviet bloc's power position seems remarkably passive, especially in the light of their apparently sanguine hopes for armed "liberation movements" in Asia.

The position at the time of the 30th anniversary of the CCP was, it should be recalled, taken at a time when Chinese perspectives were dominated by the "two world" thesis and the denial of the possibility of a "third road." It appears that even at the time they were made, the statements lagged behind important decisions. The position was at any rate almost immediately abandoned and replaced by another formulation, that of the "peace offensive," which remained standard at least until the end of 1956. By October 1, 1951, China had become not a model for specific armed dissident movements, but "a good example to all the colonies and semicolonies, especially those of Asia, which are fighting to liberate themselves." Or, as Chou En-lai put it,

The situation in Asia has undergone a fundamental change. Under the influence of
the success of the Chinese Revolution. The level of consciousness of the Asian people has been raised to an unprecedented degree and liberation movements are developing more and more strongly with each passing day. The unity of the Chinese people and peoples of Asia will certainly create a powerful and matchless force in the Far East which will rapidly push forward the great wheel of history in the movement for the independence and liberation of the peoples of Asian countries.

It is tempting to interpret this shift to recognition of the declining fortunes and increasing costs of the Asian armed dissident movements or to the deeming realization that the neutral Asian countries were not hostile to the Chinese People's Republic—both factors connected with the course of events of the Korean War. But there is the even more tempting possibility of seeing in it a symptom of a far-reaching change of perspective in the Communist world as a whole, to a determination, later enshrined in the documents of the 19th congress of the CPSU, that the whole postwar world situation had reached the point where the strategy of “revolutionary advance” was no longer fruitful and had to be superseded by a strategy of consolidation. For the Chinese audience, the new definition of the situation was contained in a People's Daily reprint of a Cominform journal article commenting on the CPR's second National Day. The operative sentences are:

...The peaceful aspirations of the Chinese people are threatened by American imperialism.... The Chinese people are administering a merited rebuff to the imperialist machinations. In the united camp with all peace-loving people, they are defending their revolutionary gains and the cause of world peace.
Over the next five to six years, this basic perspective remained more or less constant, while its implementation in action went through several phases. Chinese leaders found it necessary in their public utterances to represent the West as actively preparing aggression and the Communist bloc as acting to stave off war both in the short and the longer run. The Sino-Soviet alliance was consistently described during these years as a "bulwark for the safeguarding of peace in Asia," or later "world peace." It hardly seems credible that the Chinese leadership believed the likelihood of war during these years to have been as high as they said it was. It does seem credible, however, that they believed a "peaceful international environment" and the relaxation of international tensions to be an indispensable condition for their own economic progress, specifically for the implementation of the First Five Year Plan.

The apparent foreign policy goals and practices of the CPR during these years are not inconsistent with this premise. In a series of moves from the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference of 1952 to the Bandung Conference of 1955, the CPR amplified its lines of communication with noncommunist countries, first through representatives of the noncommunist left wing and eventually on the government-to-government level. At each stage in this process, the CPR identified its declared goals with those of the audience it was at that point wooing most ardently. Consider, for example, the similarity in the emphasis given to the emancipation of women at the APPC with that given
to unredeemed territories at the Bandung Conference.

Progressively throughout this period, Chinese statements developed an image of the CPR in which its common interests with all Asian and African countries and its common experience of the evils of colonialism became a dominant trait. One of the key statements of this line in 1954 asserts that the

...colonial and semi-colonial states have either won national independence or are engaged in the struggle for national independence. Both the Chinese people and the people of these countries have for a long time been subjected to the oppression and exploitation of imperialism and have suffered long enough. Accordingly they all express intense sympathy with the struggle against imperialism and for national independence. The victory of another nation for liberation is looked upon as one's own victory. They share a common interest in the wiping out of colonialism, and there are no basic conflicts of interest among them....

Very much the same formulation is found in other major Chinese statements of the period, including Liu Shao-chi's political report to the Eighth CCP Congress in September, 1956. This, then, was the heyday of Chinese support for Asian, later African, neutralism, taken wherever it occurred for what it was, and of the predominance of diplomatic activity in China's approach to her neighbors. This period was also, especially in its latter portion, the peak period for the presentation of the Asian facet of China's self-image, and for a certain claim to moral leadership, so that Chou En-lai could say, "When China speaks, she speaks for Asia." It might be worth noting at this point that in spite of the aberrations of 1959
and the growing skepticism of many Asians regarding China's good will, a part of the Chinese leadership has never abandoned the slogans expressing the "common interests and aspirations" and the absence of basic conflicts between themselves and at least the Asian neutralist states.

The goal toward which the Chinese hoped other Asian countries would direct themselves was designated as "national independence." In the 1951-1957 period, insofar as the content of "national independence" was specified, it was in terms of "freedom from foreign interference," specifically in the form of military establishments and secondarily in the form of economic aid. It is reasonable to see in this the expression of a strategy of denial, which was essentially what Chou En-lai epitomized in the phrase "area of collective peace."

The background for the revival of the Chinese revolutionary model was the turbulent years 1957-1959. One might choose as the starting point the Hungarian revolt of 1956, in the wake of which the Chinese found it necessary to restate their attachment to basic Leninism, their opposition to revisionism, and their concept of the adaptation of Russian experience to the concrete conditions of other countries. Among the stated fundamentals were the vanguard party and the taking of state power by revolutionary struggle. In the course of the rectification campaign of 1957, China's dependence on the Soviet Union was sharply criticized. It became imperative to reaffirm the necessity of the Sino-Soviet alliance and of bloc
solidarity under Soviet leadership even before Mao Tse-tung put this affirmation in canonical form at the 40th anniversary celebration of the October Revolution.

Regarding domestic Chinese developments of the period, it is necessary here to refer to the swing to the left following the rectification campaign, as shown by the Great Leap Forward and the institution of People's Communes. We can do no more than note the attacks in 1959 on "right opportunism" as evidence of disunity within the leadership. From the foreign policy standpoint, there would be good reasons for a Chinese Communist leadership predisposed toward militancy to be dissatisfied with the achievements of the soft line. It had not succeeded in achieving the results envisaged by the strategy of denial, either in terms of weakening the U.S.-sponsored collective security systems in Asia, of setting limits to the acceptability of American economic assistance or of solving the problem of Taiwan. From the militant point of view, the obvious result of the soft line may have appeared to have been merely loss of initiative. One might also guess that the soft line was sufficiently congenial to China's noncommunist elements to be partly responsible for criticism of China's dependence on the Soviet Union.

In this context, the joy with which the Chinese leadership greeted the news of Sputnik I as signifying a new "turning point" in history is understandable. The decisive shift in the world balance of power which they now sensed meant the attainment
of a position of strength for the Communist bloc, carried the promise of release from encirclement, and meant restoration to their own hands of the initiative in foreign affairs. Chinese statements of the period following Sputnik I contained redefinitions of practically all major relations between China and the rest of the world and finally a strong reaffirmation of the significance of the Chinese revolutionary model. I shall not here attempt to follow the exact chronology of these developments, but will indicate what I believe to be the main lines that emerged.

First, the Chinese once again saw the relation between the East and West as a class struggle on the international plane, as a question of who will conquer whom. Accordingly, the significance of the Sino-Soviet pact was reinterpreted as early as February, 1958. It was no longer simply a bulwark of world peace, but the basis for progress toward the achievement of the common cause of the two countries. Ultimately, in the course of debate with Khrushchev, it became the foundation stone of the international proletarian movement. During 1958, the Chinese both in actions and demands for action, and in their evident dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's relative moderation, made it clear that they wanted a worldwide communist policy exploiting the bloc's regained initiative. The publication immediately after the Quemoy incident of 1958 of Mao Tse-tung's *Imperialists and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers* was one of the clear signs of the Chinese belief that the western world
was new vulnerable to a worldwide offensive against imperialism.

Second, the Chinese now reviewed their own contribution to
the shift in the balance of power and found it significant.
It was no accident that General Yang Yung's account of the
actions of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea appeared
at the same time as Mao's "paper tiger" writings. Over the
next two years, the Chinese repeatedly came back to the Korean
War experience in developing the argument that the decisive
shift in the world balance was due not alone to Russian weapons
developments but to the more primitive but more protracted
struggle carried on by themselves in Asia. The same experiences
were used to bolster the argument, which later became one of
the central issues in the Sino-Soviet ideological debate of
1960, that imperialism can only be combated by struggle.

Third, the significance of the third countries was
reinterpreted. Just as China's contribution to anti-imperialist
power was new phrased no longer in terms of a mechanical
subtraction of power from the forces of imperialism but as a
source of strength in the battle against imperialism, so the
Chinese now saw the decline of colonialism no longer as
facilitating a zone of collective peace, but as a transformation
of the "imperialist rear" into the "anti-imperialist front."
In this context the meaning of "national independence" movements
was reinterpreted. Their value now lay in their becoming an
adjunct of the international class struggle, a source of active
rather than passive resistance to the West. This was a result
that the strategy of denial had not achieved.
Many of these points were formulated quite clearly by
April, 1959, by Chou En-lai:

...Asia, Africa and Latin America, which used to be the imperialist rear, have now come to the forefront in the fight against aggression and colonialism.... U.S. imperialism, which is the prop of modern colonialism, is already caught up in a "veritable whirlwind."...

The imperialist colonial forces will not step down from the stage of history of their own accord, and the struggle to achieve and safeguard national independence will not be all plain sailing.... In order to gain complete victory all the countries striving to win and safeguard national independence not only have to defeat the armed intervention and aggression of the imperialists but also to smash their various underhand schemes and machinations.

...We are ready to give support and assistance to the full extent of our capabilities to all national independence movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America....13

Many of the issues which were later central in the Sino-Soviet dispute were thus already stated in early 1959. It needed only Khrushchev's choice of an incompatible strategy to make matters for dispute. In the course of this debate, the Chinese revolutionary model became an essential support for the demands the Chinese made on bloc strategy.

Occasionally during 1958 Chinese statements described China as an "inspiration" to the Asian-African countries. It was even said that "China's today is their tomorrow." But these statements were not accompanied by descriptions of how the thing is done. The first really readable signs of revival of the Chinese model as a set of recommended procedures for achieving "national independence" appeared in the speeches
at the 10th National Day celebration, October, 1959, after the bitter Chinese attacks on the Indian national bourgeoisie in connection with the Tibetan uprising had more or less run their course.

Liu Shao-chi, for example, stated:

The fact that Marxism-Leninism has been widely disseminated in such a large Eastern country as ours...and that it has resulted in victory in the actual practice of the revolution and construction must... be considered a big event in the history of...Marxism-Leninism. Of course, revolution and construction in China have features peculiar to this country. But it is also possible that some of these important special features may reappear in some other countries. In this sense, Chinese experience is to a certain extent of international significance.

Teng Hsiao-ping and Chen Yi, on the same occasion, laid particular emphasis on proletarian internationalism as "an important condition for victory of the revolution in all countries," on the function of the vanguard party, and on China as a source of inspiration to anti-colonial movements. Thus, Chen Yi stated that Chinese successes in revolution and construction were a

...tremendous encouragement to all the oppressed nations and peoples of the world fighting for their liberation. In the Chinese people they see their own tomorrow. They feel that everything the Chinese people accomplished they too should be able to accomplish. They draw unlimited confidence and courage from the victory of the Chinese people.

The Chinese people see their yesterday in all the oppressed nations....
The preoccupation with one's own past which was expectable on an occasion like the 10th National Day not only continued throughout 1960, but increased in intensity. Chinese writings concentrated more and more on the techniques of revolution as against these of construction. The volume of this commentary, whether directed to domestic audiences, to international communist meetings, or to the newly independent nations is simply staggering. Here we can do no more than indicate the main emphases.

Most conspicuous was the emphasis on armed struggle. In the April, 1960, statements the need for armed struggle was put in the form of a prediction of the occurrence of "just wars" in the future. The emphasis on war by people who regard their unique effect on the balance of power as deriving from their efforts in Korea should not have been as shocking to the outside world as it seems to have been. In the Chinese statements of October-November, 1960, connected with the publication of volume IV of Mao's Works, it was the national liberation wars that received most attention. The whole history of rural revolutionary bases was reviewed. There was if anything more than in 1949-51 an opposition drawn between the effectiveness of armed struggle and the ineffectiveness of legal revolutionary methods. This applied both to the history of the Chinese revolution and to the tactics of national liberation movements in the newly independent countries.

Second only to armed struggles was the importance attributed to the correct handling of the national bourgeoisie.
Here the Chinese position was that unless united fronts were controlled by parties which followed the Chinese pattern of maintaining autonomy and never forgetting the tendency of the national bourgeoisie to vacillate, the results would in the end bring no advantage to the international proletarian revolution. Liu Ning-I, in his address to the Peking meeting of the General Council of the WFTU in June, 1960, emphasized this point in the course of his attack on revisionism, negotiation, and compromise:

But, our workers' movement of the world is a militant proletarian movement. We must stand on the battle front of the peoples of the world in their struggles against imperialism and its lackeys..., unite all the forces that can be united with, and isolate imperialism.... Only thus can we educate the masses of workers and the people, and gradually raise their level of consciousness from one of defending immediate interests to one of winning long-term, fundamental interests.18

On both these points--the uses of armed struggle and of the national bourgeoisie--the arguments raised rather clearly imply that the methods adopted in the Chinese revolution were "correct," while the advice the Chinese received from the Russians at critical points contained rightist errors. In the course of the Sino-Soviet debate, the counterarguments seem to have been that in the underdeveloped countries there are neither real revolutionary situations nor sophisticated revolutionary parties, that the national liberation movements do not have and cannot be given sufficient armed strength to win by military methods, and that the Chinese position was tantamount to exporting revolution. On this last question, the Chinese disavowed any...
intent to export revolution, but this did not affect their view of the similarity between their own historical situation and the contemporary situations of the newly independent countries. On the other two points, Chinese reinterpretation of the anti-imperialist significance of, for instance, the Boxer rebellion was perhaps intended as a riposte. More prominent was the amplified volume with which they repeated the "paper tiger" theme and, with appeals to their own history, the thesis that men are more important than weapons. For Mao Tse-tung, after all, the revolutionary process had always been one of turning weakness into strength.

The Chinese model did not fare too well in the statement issued by the Moscow conference of November-December, 1960. The following paragraph, compared to Chinese phrasings, is distinctly lukewarm:

The people's revolution in China dealt a crushing blow at the positions of imperialism in Asia and contributed in great measure to the balance of the world forces changing in favor of socialism. By giving a further powerful impetus to the national liberation movement, it exerted tremendous influence on the peoples, especially those of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The paragraph on "national peculiarities" seems to disavow all "mechanical copying" of the experience of others. While the statement allows for both armed struggle and nonmilitary methods in colonial countries, it seems definitely weighted in favor of a view of politics as the art of the probable. It treats national independence movements as a parallel, not an adjunct, to the world proletarian revolution and is mildly optimistic
regarding the national bourgeoisie. Khrushchev's speech following up the statement \(^\text{20}\) seems to assign more operational significance to civil disturbances ("popular uprisings") than to revolutionary bases and people's armies.

Since the turn of the year, the output of more or less learned articles recapitulating and reanalyzing the Chinese Communist strategy of revolution has continued with little abatement. In the columns of *Red Flag*, *World Culture*, *Historical Research*, and of more popularly oriented journals like *Chungkuo Ch'ingnien* as well, there have been treatments of state monopoly capitalism in pre-revolutionary China, of the party's peasant and united front policies, and the like. Special emphasis has been consistently given to Mao's injunctions concerning mastery of facts and objectivity in analysis. The over-all effect of such publications is to continue to stress the cult of Mao and the special features of the Chinese revolution.\(^\text{21}\)

In pronouncements concerning China's foreign relations in 1961, there has been a decline in the tendency to present the Chinese revolutionary model as directly applicable to the situations of the former colonial countries. The role of world communism in relation to national independence movements is still described as one of active support rather than merely fellowship. But the examples cited are for the most part of areas where developments approved by the Chinese have taken place or are taking place rather than of areas where something
new might be instigated. On some occasions, there has been an elaborate show of avoidance of pressure or interference in the affairs of others.\textsuperscript{22} The 1961 Chinese formula concerning the significance of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, though incorporating the phrase "foundation stone of the unity of the social camp and the unity of the international communist movement," placed major emphasis on the mutual protection afforded by the alliance and on its function of "safeguarding world peace."

The surprisingly small scale of the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the CCP appears inconsistent with the volume of comment related to volume IV of Mao's works but not inconsistent with the somewhat passive tone of the recent statements on China's foreign relations, referred to above. Only one major speech, by Liu Shao-ch'i,\textsuperscript{23} was prepared for the occasion. Comment on the article seems to have been limited to one editorial each in People's Daily and Red Flag. Together with the very evident coolness of the Soviet greeting to the CCP, the modesty of the Chinese on this occasion can be interpreted as reflecting willingness to avoid forcing the issue, but by no means as showing that the question is resolved.

There are two observations to be made about Liu Shao Ch'i's speech. First, the speech itself restates certain positions, though in an unadorned form. Throughout the speech Mao Tse-tung specifically is credited with originality and correctness. The practical value of Soviet experience is denied. Thus,
Confronted with the extreme complexity of the Chinese revolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung correctly posed and resolved a series of theoretical and tactical problems, thus enabling the Chinese revolution to steer clear of one shoal after another and to capture one position after another...

Our Party is good at learning. When we began, we had no experience of the democratic revolution, the socialist revolution or socialist construction. But through diligent study amid practice we came to understand and grasp the objective laws of the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution....

By omitting reference to Soviet example and assistance, Liu here seems to "put on airs" of the sort he had considered, ten years earlier, deserving of correction. Further, for one as fond as Liu appears to be of expressing himself in cranky ellipses, his latest formulation of the Chinese role in the balance of power constitutes no retreat:

...[Lenin's] prediction has begun to come true. Undoubtedly, the victory of the Chinese revolution has changed to a certain degree the international balance of forces in favour of the people of the world and against imperialism and all the reactionaries. This victory has therefore been welcomed by the working people and peace-loving people the world over. It has also incurred the enmity of the imperialists, the reactionaries of various countries and the Yugoslav revisionist group.

Finally, though Liu avoids spelling out such matters as armed struggle and smashing of the state apparatus, his peroration states:

International experience and the experience of China are continually proving this truth of Marxism-Leninism: the forces of the people are the really great force that makes the history of mankind.
The second observation is that nothing in Liu's speech contradicts the content or implications of the commentary on Mao's works published during the eight or nine months preceding the speech. One is left with the impression that this whole collection of documents constitutes the real parallel to the documentation prepared for the CCP's 30th anniversary.

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In the analysis so far, it has been relatively easy to find plausible correlations between crests and troughs in Chinese utterances and certain tactical or short-range strategic needs of the regime. The revolutionary model was given prominence when the joint strategy of the communist bloc was conducted according to the perspective of revolutionary advance, suppressed in accordance with a change in this perspective and the adoption of a strategy of defense and consolidation, and revived in the course of what became a bitter dispute about whether revolutionary advance was again the correct perspective. Following the Moscow conference of 1960 and through the date of the 40th anniversary of the CCP, in parallel with a posture of watchful waiting in foreign relations, direct advocacy of the Chinese model has been avoided.

But the analysis has suggested some further questions, possibly of more enduring import, to which the answers are less self-evident.

A question that virtually raises itself is whether the revolutionary model rather than the nationalist model does not in fact represent the Chinese Communist regime's basic world
view, capable of temporary repression but persisting in thought and feeling. One could possibly argue that just because the post-1957 revival of the model occurred in a polemical context, the formulations employed represent overstatements for bargaining purposes. In the author's personal view, the tone of the statements argues against this. For the native radicals in the Chinese leadership, at least, the specifically Chinese experience of coming to power still has deep and vital meaning. There is sufficient evidence of diversity of views within the leadership to lead to the conclusion that there is a relatively conservative element for whom the Party's childhood and adolescence are phases that should be outgrown. One ought to speculate, though one can do no more, as to which of these tendencies of thought will be dominant in the next generation of the leadership—those, let us say, whose party history began after the Long March, or who may emerge from the 80 percent of the party's membership who joined after 1949.

There is apparently a correlation between estimates of the world balance of power and the emphasis on the revolutionary model. I think we are justified in supposing that the Chinese leadership is united in its persistent belief that the conflict between socialism and imperialism is permanent, inevitable and decisive, and that by whatever means are appropriate to the times, the direction of the world revolution must be forever forward. To say that this leadership emphasizes revolution whenever it feels its side to be the stronger and de-emphasizes
it when it feels its side to be the weaker is doubtless too simple. But enough evidence has been indicated here to show that careful calculations of factors in the world power balance, of which military strength is one of the most highly estimated, are constantly under review in Peking. The way these calculations are made—how a given weapons situation is assessed quantitatively, how the exploitability of political situations in other countries is evaluated or tested—these things, though not entirely resistant to analysis, remain largely unknown to us.

In this same connection, there is definitely a need for techniques which will enable us to measure the nonrational factors in Chinese decision-making. It is possible to list certain probable sources of nonrationality in Chinese foreign policy affecting the last three years. Professor North has recently attempted an analysis in terms of a cycle of frustration and aggression. In such a cycle, the source of frustration may be domestic and the direction of aggression toward the outside world. Ignorance may play a role, at the least in increasing the likelihood of projection—of supposing that situations partially resembling those one is familiar with are in all important respects identical with them. This is easy enough even given adequate information and easier without it. The data reviewed here also indicate a strong attachment to goals which are inherently nonrational, and to a method of calculating costs against payoffs which is heavily loaded in favor of payoffs which are potential, if not improbable.
The action record of the Chinese Communists to date also indicates that they are shrewd operators, and that their transitions from calculation to decision to action usually are not made without a rather exact specification of a course of action to be pursued, safeguards against undue costs in case of partial failure, and the maintenance up to the time of action of a route of retreat. For short-range predictions of Chinese action, one would have to take such factors into account. One would want to know also what are the sources and proportions of the leverage the Chinese can exert on those whose support they need—in short, how many risks they will take by way of blackmailing or forcing the hand of their partners.

The major purpose of this paper has been to explore the contribution of the analysis of overt communication to the understanding of the political processes of a closed society. The function of such analyses does not necessarily exclude short-range prediction, but this particular example has not been oriented in that direction.
The data reviewed for this paper consisted of a selection from the periodic reports on foreign policy made by Chinese leaders, statements on recurrent ceremonial occasions (anniversaries of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, The Russian October Revolution, and the National Day of the Chinese People's Republic), supplemented by a number of items that had attracted the author's notice over the years. The original intent was to rely on the recurrent ceremonial statements primarily, but it quickly became clear that this data was by itself quite inadequate.

Apart from the continued holding of high posts by men identified as having been deviationists at specified times, there have been continuing signs of differences of viewpoint within the regime. In ideological terms, the issue in the Hundred Flowers period (1957), for example, was whether the class struggle moderated or became sharper in the period of socialist construction.


Liu Shao-chi's speech at the mass meeting in celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, NCNA, June 30, 1951.

Ibid.


Chou En-lai, Political Report to the Third Session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC, in NCNA, November 2, 1951.

Ibid.


Revisions in the Chinese estimate of Japan's domestic politics and rising international status are relevant here, but not central to the argument.


14 Some earlier signs of Sino-Soviet differences on the approach to third countries could have been detected in the report of the discussion of a "Joint Conference of the Editorial Boards of International Affairs and Shihtze Chihshih" in \textit{International Affairs}, March, 1959. \textit{World Marxist Review}, Nos. 8 and 9, August and September, 1959, carried abstracts of a "seminar on the national bourgeoisie and the liberation movements" held in May at the Leipzig Institute of World History. This is the type of thing that becomes more meaningful by the application of hindsight.


19 Quoted from \textit{Peking Review}, combined Nos. 49 and 50, December 13, 1960.

20 Report at the meeting of party organizations of the Higher Party School, the Academy of Social Sciences, and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism attached to the Central Committee of the CPSU on January 6, as published in \textit{Kommunist}, No. 1, January, 1961.

21 Mao's 1941 pamphlet, Reform Our Studies, is frequently referred to as a guide to the achievement of objectivity. Of a number of articles emphasizing the unique features of the Chinese revolutionary process, two appear to be of special interest: Wu Chiang's "The Course of Seizure of State Power in the Chinese Revolution," Li-Shih Yen-chiu (Historical Research), No. 2, 1961, for its comprehensiveness and its emphasis on armed struggle and the smashing of state power; and Teng T'o's "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung Opens the Way for the Development of China's Science of History," \textit{ibid}., No. 1, 1961, for its attack on Europe-centered historiography.
Liu Ning-I's address to the World Peace Council meeting in New Delhi on March 24 approached humility in describing China's support for national independence movements based on local initiative and the reciprocal support of the "peoples of various countries" to the "Chinese people." Chen Yi in an interview in Jakarta on April 4 expressed himself as follows:

On the SEATO meeting in Bangkok: "We do not want to express any views as to how they conduct their meeting.... SEATO may commit an error; it is also possible that it will not commit this error. It is their own affair."

On Sino-Japanese relations: "It is mainly up to the Ikeda cabinet to take the initiative.... Would the Ikeda cabinet of Japan follow Indonesia? However, this is its own affair."

On Sino-American relations: "The U.S. leaders are too arrogant.... However, Sino-American relations are a matter of the United States adopting an imperialist policy toward China. Whether this will be changed or not is up to them."

Peking Review, combined Nos. 26 and 27, July 7, 1961. Excerpts cited below are from this source.