# THE CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITBURO AND ITS OPERATIONAL CODE: A FEASIBILITY STUDY

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# Part I

## THE OPERATIONAL CODE: A SPRINGBOARD FOR RESEARCH

### The Purpose of this Report

The concept of the operational code was originally developed by Nathan Leites of the RAND Corporation in a study of Soviet leadership. As we construe it, the operational code of an organization includes the values--and more particularly the goals--which the organization's leaders safeguard and pursue. An operational code includes also the available and preferred strategies, tactics and techniques which a given organization may use. These may be viewed as the definition of explicit and implicit rules for action.

The original study undertaken by Leites was completed in 1953 after more than seven years of research. We propose to use his findings as a jumping off place for a study of Chinese Communist decision-making. Our emphasis, however, will be upon the use of various innovative approaches and research techniques which, for the most part, have been developed since the Leites study was designed and implemented. Our recommendations will include an estimate of feasibilities combined with a program and model delineating both the optimal and minimal scales upon which an empirical investigation of Chinese decision-making might be conducted.

Part I of this report will be derived largely from discussions which emerged from a conference of China specialists held at Stanford University December 16, 17 and 18, 1967 and focussed upon the operational code concept and upon the difficulties and feasibilities inherent in it. Part I will also draw upon pertinent articles from recent

periodical literature and upon brief memoranda prepared for this report by scholars who do not in all instances consider themselves as China specialists, but who have an interest in the problems of Chinese decision-making and policy, combined with knowledge and skills that seem highly relevant to the issues under discussion.

Part II will present a unified model for studying the Chinese operational code and a variety of phenomena bearing on it. This section will draw upon papers and memoranda prepared specifically for the operational code inquiry, and also from a wide range of social science literature.

Part III will describe a number of research techniques, and Part IV will put forward research recommendations and priorities.

Part V consists of appendices. Included therein are some of the papers prepared for the conference.

## The Concept of the Operational Code

In the introduction to his book, The Operational Code of the Politburo, Leites put forward in 1951 the basic purpose of his study of the political strategy of Russian Communism. "The intention is not to discuss the major interests of Leninism-Stalinism but to discover the rules which Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for effective political conduct. Although a number of these rules, stated in general form, can be found throughout Bolshevik literature, many others have only been employed in the political analyses made by Bolsheviks within the last half century. An attempt has been made to draw explicit and systematic formulations from this wealth of data and to set them down within a meaningful frame of reference . . . ."

The rules cited in the Leites study fell into three categories. Some had been stated explicitly by Lenin and Stalin and were incorporated in the study as direct quotations from their writings. Some were so clearly implied for specific situations that Communist leaders themselves would easily recognize them as they appeared in the Leites text. Others were inferred as operative among Bolshevik leaders but might not be easily recognized by them. Leites and his associates felt that all of these rules were pervasive in Russian Communist policy calculations, whether they referred to domestic or foreign policy, propaganda, or military policy.

As a step toward achieving the best possible predictions of Russian Politburo action, Leites and his associates analyzed many types of data besides the writings of Lenin and Stalin. From the historical record of Communist policies, decisions and responses to events they found unverbalized but equally important rules of conduct --and also a disposition to deviate from recognized rules under certain conditions. As Leites put it, " . . . only an analysis of the historical record can contribute answers to the following questions: When the operational code specifies that there is an optimal degree for a certain kind of behavior, intermediate between too much and too little . . . what is that optimum for a certain period and area? And when the operational code permits the application of two or more contrasting rules to a certain situation . . . what are the factors determining the choice?"

Underlying the operational code as conceived by Leites is an assumption that a Communist leadership's behavior can be accounted for in large part by their explicit ideological assertions, that there

is thus a high correlation between what the doctrine "says" and what the leadership acts upon and "does." Is this necessarily so? The position of the present report is that the question should be regarded as empirical and that propositions or hypotheses for disciplined empirical testing should be derived from it.

It seems safe to assume that Chinese behavior--like the behavior of any individual human being or organization of human beings--probably cannot be accounted for in terms of any single, predominant factor or type of factor (ideology included), but rather in terms of several factors, or perhaps a rather wide range of factors, weighted differentially and varying somewhat in their importance with changing circumstances. This report will suggest ways in which research scholars, using a variety of approaches and techniques, can begin identifying and at least tentatively weighting some of these critical factors. It will be assumed at every step that--for the foreseeable future, at least--there will be no single, unchallengeable approach or method and that a variety of modes and techniques of research need to be carried out as a check upon each other.

## Difficulties with the Leites Approach

Any study of a communist operational code encounters special problems and dimensions. For Communism, as developed by Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung and oth[illegible]ders and theoreticians, is more than an ideology and more than an organization. It purports to be a total behavioral system with a "world view," a body of assumptions about man's role in the universe, a manual of "strategy and tactics," and a set of propositions about how to endoctrinate human beings and guide, influence and control their behavior (North). A part of the

the problem in a Communist state is to ascertain the degree to which Communist values and practices have successfully uprooted or destroyed more traditional elements of the society, and the degree, on the other hand, to which the Communist state is constrained by persisting cultural (as well as personal, ideosyncratic) phenomena.

The problem is further complicated not only by the many alterations that have been made in Communist theory and practice over the years, but also by the particular interpretations and constructions that have come about in different cultural and national environments. We would be making a serious mistake to view the leaders of a country apart from the cultural context in which they operate. Emile Durkheim and more recently Talcott Parsons and others have referred to societal and cultural values as the powerful stabilizers which make organizations feasible and continuous. Even revolutionary leaders who try to alter or uproot the whole society, as well as a particular government, cannot altogether escape the impositions and limitations of habit, custom, taboos, traditions and other manifestations of culture. There is considerable evidence to suggest that members of the top Chinese Communist leadership are still Confucians as well as Marxist-Leninist-Maoists.

<u>The Operational Code of the Politburo</u> consists of twenty chapters each of which deals with a significant theme from the body of rules which Russian Bolsheviks have put forward as necessary for affective political corduct. On the whole, these chapters tend to be quite separate and isolated from each other. The discussions of predictability and unpredictability, orientation of the past and future, and means and ends, for example, are not linked in any overall, systematized, conceptual design (Leites, 1951)--despite the fact that,

operationally, one would expect the elements to be interrelated. Although allowances must be made for a pioneering effort in its field, Leites' work is thus remarkably simple in overall organization, and for a work aiming to present a code, it gives little attention to synthesis and systematization. In effect, we are presented with a list of themes, but these parts of the code are not interrelated, even on one level. And there is even less attention given to questions of more complex structure, such as possible relationships between themes or principles of different levels--for instance, to the problem of what rules or principles are more general than others, which represent special cases within the more general, and so on. On this whole matter, Leites only marks certain rules as being particularly important --which is mainly a quantitative statement that does not touch the problem of structural relations--and in passing implies that a few points, such as that the Party's constant goal is to increase its power, are of greatest generality. There remains little explicit concern for systematization, although attempts to view how general formulations fit together is a main avenue in science toward testing and refining their accuracy of description and statement (Weakland, Appendix D ).

By centering largely on the most clear and specific principles of the Russian Bolshevik code, the Leites analysis almost necessarily emphasizes its rigid, monolithic and impervious aspects (Weakland, Appendix D). The first proposition of Chapter I is perhaps illustrative: "One point of Bolshevik doctrine affirms that future developments are either inevitable or impossible. Intermediate probabilities are excluded. This is a characteristic 'all-or-none' pattern of Bolshevik

thought (Leites, 1951)." Unquestionably, there is a persistent theme of such determinism throughout Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist thought, but no decision-making individual or group can conduct a successful revolution or manage a huge party or state without frequent calculations--conscious or unconscious--of probabilities and risks within an extensive "intermediate" zone of policy-making and execution. Strict determinism would bind national and party leaderships into an impossible straight-jacket (North). Lenin dealt with the contradiction between determinism and conscious leadership intervention in revolutionary affairs through a number of his writings, but to understand either Russian or Chinese decision-making styles we need a finer conceptual instrument than these formulations provide. Today there is sufficient evidence around to make us aware of the many subtle ways in which personal idiosyncracy, cultural peculiarities, habit, custom, tradition and the like can intrude upon, shape and often override ideological precept.

The Operational Code concedes that "Despite such beliefs in determinism, Bolshevik doctrine also contains contrasting points. Thus, although it is always asserted that the direction and end of a major historical development (e.g., the transition from capitalism to communism) is predictable, the ngth of time and path such a development will take re not held to be predictable (Leites, 1951, 2)." Politburo calcul tions, moreover, are "marked both by a deliberate orientation toward the future and by a flexible taking-into-account of immediate contingencies (Ibid., 4)." But the implications are on the side of a somewhat structured determinism that leaves us with inadequate space for treating day-to-day decision-making a navior.

The picture that emerges, while being helpful toward understanding and anticipating some Soviet attitudes and actions, may in other ways obscure matters and turn attention away from possibilities of communicating with Communist decision-makers and even influencing them in desirable ways by outside political actions. Any study of the Chinese Communist operational code should therefore take special care to include the precisest possible consideration of whatever is less definite, firm, or explicit, so that its basic focus does not act to foreclose possibilities for enlightenment in this crucial area (Weakland, Appendix D ).

A major limitation of the Leites approach is thus the casting of the code almost entirely within a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist context of assumptions and hypotheses. There is very little possibility of measuring Russian Communist dependence upon the code nor of a assing it in any meaningful way outside its own terms. In Chapter 3, entitled Means and Ends, for example, the reader is apparently expected to accept at face value the proposition that "Party policy must not be influenced by feelings or moral considerations (Leites, 1951, 7)." Yet, in a broader conceptual context, one would be hard put to identify any reasonably complex human behavior--inside or outside the Party--that is not influenced by emotions, affects or feelings, and there is considerable evidence also that Communist parties, like many another organization, tend to generate their own moral imperatives. To ignore the "feelings" and "moral considerations" of a Stalin or a Mao Tse-tung or a Khrushchev is manifestly absurd (North). Unfortunately, The Operational Code fails to discern or describe iples or premises, either of thought or of feeling, that are bro deeper than the

specifically political principles which form his main target. That is, although there is some recognition of differences in level between explicit principles, principles that are unstated but probably recognizable by Bolsheviks if stated, and implicit principles quite remote from their awareness, he does not actively inquire about the nature of any Bolshevik behavioral principles that are wider and less specialized than the specifically political, nor the nature of unconscious basic premises and patterns of cognition and emotion. Yet regularities at such levels must exist as a foundation for the more conscious, specific and focussed political orientations, and should help to define and illuminate the latter, and especially to clarify their interrelations, by viewing them within such a broader framework (Weakland, Appendix D).

There is a further difficulty. Although he asserts to the contrary, Leites (1951, 18) seems to imply that the values and thought processes of the members of the Russian Politburo are bounded (in a geometrical sense) rather than open-ended. The outcome is a somewhat rigid characterization which does not seem to allow sufficiently for change and evolutionary development. This impression is reinforced by the non-historical use of sources, citations being made purely on the basis of content, without concern for the time element (Van Slyke, Appendix C). It does not seem feasible to investigate Chinese decision-making apart from the history of Chinese values, institutions and behavior--both in the recent and more distant past. But this is much easier said than done.

It should be evident by now that when we examine the Leites approach closely, we encounter a number of fundamental difficulties

(Robinson, Appendix B ). However, in identifying these drawbacks and in seeking to overcome them, our purpose is not to deprecate a pioneering effort, but to underscore and seek to take advantage of some major developments that have taken place in the social sciences since his study was completed. Indeed, we have reason to believe that Leites would share many, if not all, of our comments on his work and would approve the spirit, though not necessarily the details, of our major recommendations.

As presented by Leites, the operational code is too narrow (Robinson) and imprecise. It is an exercise in intuitive content analysis, and as he himself acknowledges, there is no claim to prediction (Van Slyke). In the light of these and other considerations, Leites' work can best serve our present purposes not as a specific model, but rather as a springboard for new strategies of research. Its general focus helps to point out the existence and define the nature of a broad aim and approach to politics very relevant to the study of Chinese Communism, while closer examination of the work, and of comments upon it, aids in clarifying what would need to be done in addition or differently--beyond the evident matter of shifting focus from the Soviet Union to China--in order to realize adequately the aim of preceding a systematic formulation of the operational principles of the Chinese leadership (Weakland, Appendix D ).

## The Current Need

At the present stage of our studies of China the need is for the careful building--and even more careful testing--of theory by empirical effort. There are extremely promising possibilities for applying

contemporary social science concepts and techniques for the study of Chinese Communist decision-making, and at the same time to use China as a laboratory for developing and testing social science approaches --especially if different approaches and research techniques are put into constructive competition with each other (North).

These comments should not be construed as suggesting that we have reason to be complacent about the current status of relevant social science concepts and methods, or--as suggested by Davis Bobrow --"satisfied with our current abilities to describe the present and predict the future nature of Chinese behavior and its determinants (Bobrow, 1967, 306)." An enormous amount of hard work needs to be done. On the other hand, there have been some encouraging developments in conceptualization and the development of research technique since the Leites study was undertaken, and China seems to commend itself as a major "laboratory" for future investigations.

The ultimate aim should be the formulation of a picture of the Chinese code that would be considerably more explicit, comprehensive, systematic, and accurate than their own, and thus suited to more accurate understanding of past events and prediction of behavior to come (Weakland, Appendix D ). Such a goal is not necessarily as impractical as it sounds. It is well known that a psychiatrist can often discern characteristic patterns of behavior and from them predict what an individual or a family group will do, in a certain situation, more accurately than the persons involved. Similarly, even the layman has known comparable instances, where an outsider has been able to understand and anticipate the behavior of a friend better than the person himself (ibid.). We should work toward such a level in our studies of Communist China.

There are at least four major reasons for studying China: for many scholars the country, its history and culture hold a deep intrinsic interest; for the political scientist, diplomat and statesman China presents a fruitful field for developing hypotheses about problems of modernization and international affairs; beyond this, China is important for the United States in foreign policy; and for the contemporary scholar with research interests, China provides a testing ground for social science methods (Oksenberg). In many respects these somewhat distinct interests widely overlap and could be reciprocally reinforcing. Indeed, there is an opportunity here, in finding out more about China, to advance the development and testing of broad social science theory a significant way.

Some of the questions we would like answers for appear deceptively simple. How does the Politburo operate? What are its divisions? Who runs them? Is it really the apex of authority or do the lines of authority shift with the issue at hand and with different personality inputs? What are the other hierarchies of authority a hat are their lines of communication into and out of the Politburo (Robinson, Appendix B )? How much do we know about its procedures and its consultation patterns? How are problems identified and formulated? How are differences of opinion among Politburo members handled and by what means does a unified decision emerge from controversy (North)? Do the members clearly differentiate their roles when acting as a committee and when acting as an informal group? Who recruited whom into the party? Do persistent patron-client and peer relationships persist? To what degree are Politburo members embedded in Chinese culture (Rue)?

A fairly direct way to get at these questions might be through

the following queries: Who are the leaders? What are their origins and backgrounds? How did they ac[illegible] top leadership positions? What is their ideology? What are their individual predispositions and idiosyncracies? To what extent are they influenced by the customs, traditions and beliefs of their culture? To what extent are their decisions constrained or otherwise influenced by the capacities, peculiarities and general characteristics of the particular nation they lead? To what extent are their attitudes and beliefs--both expressed and inferred--consistent with their overt behaviors?

Elite Studies

Elite studies provide one way of identifying the leaders and correlating data from their backgrounds and careers.

The limitations and pitfalls inherent in elite studies are well known and do not need extensive elaboration here. It is conceded, for example, that neither social background nor training necessarily determines political action (Rustow, 1966). Nor does it seem feasible--at least within the usual framework of assumptions and conceptions--to develop a dynamic theory of elites. Beyond this, it seems unlikely that the singular stability of the Chinese Communist leadership--up to the outbreak of the Great Cultural Revolution, at least --is likely to re-emerge or persist (Cf. Pye, 1966, 392). In view of the absence of a "second generation" of young people in the "meaningful elite," moreover, it is exceedingly difficult to predict who will be leading China in 15 years (Doolin).

On the other hand, elite studies--particularly in research on the totalitarian and "emerging" countries--hold considerable promise for

at least three reasons. First and foremost, in the view of Dankwart Rustow (1966), "scholars in comparative politics have been turning away from the institutional-legal approach of a previous generation without having developed any new concept of equal scope or validity. Second, all the totalitarian and most of the 'developing' countries are indeed oligarchies, being typically ruled by cohesive elites drawn from a party or a military establishment . . . In both types of country, there is an evident discrepancy between this reality of oligarchy and the liberal and democratic tenor of the constitutions; hence the institutional approach is even less fruitful when transferred from Western to non Western countries. Finally, politics throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America is in rapid flux; hence, while constitutions and other formal arrangements would project a false image of stability, individuals and groups can be seen as a 'binding link' from regime to regime."

It ought to be re-emphasized, however, that although we may often consider it important to identify elites and to see who survives purges, we cannot legitimately infer that there are determinant decision styles which can be extracted from such studies. That is, although one may find where the Chinese elite come from (their social, geographical and educational backgrounds, careers and the like) variations in decision-making cannot be accounted for systematically on this basis (Brody).

In these terms Doolin's aggregate elite analysis (Appendix A) emerges as static but important (Oksenberg), its value deriving from the study of trends over a long period. Such an analysis might reveal what leadership forces are most important in Chinese society. Arbitrary analytical units might be established--perhaps a 'top 200'--for several

sample years in order to study the direction of change. Such an analysis might help us to answer questions about such things as functional specialization in the Chinese elite and lateral movement across functional hierarchies.

The Personalities of Chinese Communist Decision-Makers

Aggregate elite analyses leave unanswered important questions about the dynamics of personality factors and about the feelings, predispositions, ambitions and operating styles of the top leaders. Robinson (Appendix B ) raises the following questions: ". . . how are we to understand the personality makeup of the men who sit in the Chinese Politburo? Do their personalities come through from an analysis of their writings and speeches? It is difficult for me to say that they do to any degree. Surely we can (perhaps with the aid of computer content analysis) code these documents along the lines of personality trait indicators. But, in my opinion, that will not suffice. It is also necessary to know the life histories of the subjects, but unfortunately there is very little information on the personal histories of these men, especially the crucial details of their early childhood and home life. When this is the case, we must resort to building up what little clues we have, with the aid of psychoanalytic theories, into a picture of an entire personality. Here I would point to the work of Erik Erickson, especially his Young Man Luther, as a good example of how to go about this part of the work. In fact, I would go so far as to state that perhaps what we need is an approach grounded not so much in the work of Nathan Leites (not because it is not productive of ideas nor non-transferable to the Chinese case--it may well

be) but in the work of Erik Erickson."

There exist a number of other, largely untapped sources that might be useful in studying the personalities of Chinese decision-makers. Numerous people have had interviews with Mao Tse-tung and other top leaders. It might be useful "to seek out these people, interview them, and ask them certain questions designed to evoke evaluative and factual responses as to the personalities of the Chinese leaders with whom they spoke (Robinson, Appendix B )." Certainly, the work of Howard Boorman (Columbia University) and Donald Klein (Harvard University) would be relevant.

Various developing techniques may make it feasible to study personality "at a distance" through the use of sound film and other recordings. These include voice analysis and also studies of facial expression and gross bodily movement by Silvan Tomkins (City College, New York), Paul Ekman (University of California, Berkeley) and others.

According to Ekman (1967), there has been considerable progress in recent years in the study of body movement and facial expression. It has become possible to achieve some accuracy in diagnosing types of personality, personality disorder, and severity of disorder, and immediate emotional state. Most of this research has been performed within institutional settings on psychiatric patients where rather complete motion picture film records have been obtained and there has been ample opportunity to verify predictions as well as derive clues from careful study of the subject population.

It remains an open question as to the problems that might be interposed in extrapolating from such research to studies of normal people in non-institutional settings where more incomplete motion picture film

records are the basic data and where there is less opportunity to tune the predictive clues through direct access to the subject population. If we were to take the most optimistic view, we might hope that the study of body movement and facial expression from motion picture film records of the behavior of international decision-makers in public places might provide two types of information which would be of interest: (1) the possibility of dectecting early signs of on-coming personality crises or breakdown; (2) the ability to assess the nature of the on-going emotional relationship between the various individuals within the same social organization.

Before attempting to do any direct study of decision-makers from a foreign country, there are at least two preliminary steps which would need to be taken. Each of these involves probably a two to four year period of research and it is conceivable that they could be done simultaneously, although they could just as well be done consecutively, depending upon the time pressure. The first step would be to conduct an investigation in which local decision-makers, within our own country, perhaps in a business or military setting, would be filmed in public places over a reasonable period of time. One would attempt to take the same types of films, which might be available on foreign decision-makers. These films would then be subject to systematic analysis and predictions would be made as to the emotional state and personality organization of these decision makers. Presumably these decision-makers would be people on whom it would be possible to gain rather complete information about their actual personality functioning and emotional state through interviews and testing, and also presumably it would be possible to obtain access to their on-going decision-making activity. Thus, in this investigation we would have chosen a situation where one

has maximum opportunity to check the nature of predictions from nonverbal behavior, to learn about the error rate, and to determine on an inductive basis the kind of clues which might be relevant to these predictions.

A second type of investigation which might wait until the first was finished or might be conducted simultaneously, would be to conduct research on socio-cultural norms governing nonverbal behavior in the countries whose international decision-makers would be the subject of later study. Such cross-cultural comparisons of nonverbal behavior have, of course, been made on an informal basis, but have not been carried out systematically to date. This type of investigation would involve getting access to already existing motion picture film records of conversational nonverbal behavior in the country of interest. It would also involve access to members or former members of that country for extensive interviewing regarding their evaluation of particular body movements and facial expressions which have been isolated from the film records. The second step in this project would involve a considerable amount of time, probably at least a two to four year period. After completing these two steps it would be possible to then design a study of personality organization and emotional relationships between different decision-makers within a foreign nation.

One should not under-estimate either the advantages or the disadvantages of such studies of nonverbal behavior. Advantages of using this mode of behavior as a source of information are: (1) it is possible to obtain records without the knowledge of the person being recorded; (2) it is possible to obtain records from a distance; (3) present evidence would suggest that nonverbal behavior is less likely

to be censored or controlled by the individual and thus may be more revealing of conflict. Disadvantages: (1) this is an experimental endeavor and, while progress has been made to date, its findings must be regarded as tentative and the question of success in this particular application is difficult to estimate; (2) such research is costly in material, equipment and manpower; (3) the probability of pay-off is difficult if not impossible to determine and the necessity for these two preliminary investigations, both of which would be time-consuming and expensive, must be considered at the outset.

A Blend of Chinese Communism and Chinese Culture

Many of the special problems inherent in research on China are well known. However, as pointed out recently by Lucian Pye, "Attempts to surmise the realities of Chinese political development are not limited only by a shortage of data; there is also the larger problem of trying to set appropriate standards for judging Chinese performance. Within what larger historical context should we place Communist China in our effort to get a clearer idea of the patterns in its current development? What assumptions can we safely make about its longer-range prospects? And in considering our own policy responses, how fatalistically should we observe the glacial movements of the Chinese as they advance from forming one-quarter of the world's population to being one-half, and from being weak and disorganized to being united and assertive (Pye, 1966, 387)?"

These considerations require that any study of Chinese Communist political leadership must take extensive account of two related aspects of the cultural context--Chinese Communism itself, as an overall cultural system, and behind it, traditional Chinese culture. The latter

is important as necessarily a major basis for whatever the present Chinese Communist culture and society may be, despite formerly very widespread views that Communist China is "un-Chinese," and despite the obvious prominance of an imported Marxist-Leninist ideology (Weakland, Appendix D ). Furthermore, as will be stressed further along, these considerations require taking careful account of how Mainland China fits into the world environment--as a national actor--and how growth trends along certain dimensions are likely to affect its ranking, predispositions and behavior (North).

Human beings do not respond to events, but to their perceptions of events--and the more Communist views differ from our own, the more essential it is to understand the basic nature of this viewing--that is, views which are general, pervasive, and enduring--if we are to understand correctly any more limited or detailed matters (Weakland, Appendix D ). Chinese Communist ways of viewing the world, themselves, and other peoples emerge from some 2,500 years of history as well as from nearly 50 years of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist development. We cannot study Chinese Communist views of the world and Chinese Communist decision-making and behavior effectively without a profound appreciation of how Chinese Communist lenses are ground. It is Leites' chief merit--and much to his credit--that he aimed primarily at Russian ways of viewing things in his study of the operational code. A similar aim seems equally desirable, and equally feasible in principle, for the case of Chinese Communism, although there are certain problems peculiar to that case which need special consideration (Weakland, Appendix D ).

The term ideology has been used in so many different ways and frequently defined so loosely that its usefulness to social science

investigation is frequently questioned. Here we use it to denote a belief system, or a world view, that is, the special ways in which the Chinese Communists seem to view the universe, man's role in it, relationships among men, the nature of man's history, and the probabilities of his future. We would expect to find clues to the Chinese Communist belief system in the political writings and speeches of Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues, in their interpretations of history, in their policies and predictions about the future, in their literature, drama, art, motion pictures, thought reform techniques, and styles of operation.

Studies of Chinese Communist belief or ideology present another research access, and also special problems. Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues have written voluminously about their views of the world, of man's role in it, of inherent contradictions and conflicts, and of the line of future developments, and yet there are obstacles to disciplined research.

The ideology of the C.C.P. cannot be properly understood apart from an understanding of the revolution which produced it. Unfortunately, one cannot achieve a sense of the revolution or a true understanding of it from Mao's works as they stand today. The Selected Works are incomplete, and many of the parts have been re-edited or re-written over the years (Van Slyke). An example of such alterations can be found through a comparison of Mao's original version of "Introducing the Communist" with the version of the same essay in his Selected Works.

There is a basic need for some coordination among those scholars who are studying Mao Tse-tung and his works--including the many revisions that have been made over the years in his basic texts. Each new

edition of the Selected Works (and of other basic Chinese Communist writings) should be compared over time (Weakland). A central clearing house would be extremely useful in order to facilitate such coordination (Van Slyke). The modus operandi might be something like this: Participating scholars with access to original documents would send them to the central clearing-house to be compared character by character with the Selected Works editions. Differences, changes, and deletions would all be noted on the prepared text and would be printed in loose-leaf editions and would be returned to the scholar. The scholar would prepare a signed introduction to the completed text establishing the importance of the work, analyses changes, and established bibliographical credentials.

A more elusive difficulty in studying ideology involves the extent to which its propositions correlate--or do not correlate--with actual decision-making and behavior. The distinction drawn by Franz Schurmann between Mao's "pure theory" and "action-oriented thought" is persuasive. Certainly the thought of Mao Tse-tung connects pure ideology (Marxism) with practical problems (the Chinese situation). But Schurmann seems to have overlooked the tendency in Mao's thought to escalate toward a realm of pure theory (Van Slyke).

It could be argued that if (1) P (problems) is multiplied by M (mind conditioned by Marxism-Leninism) the result will be T (thought). (2) Efforts to solve P (problems) lead to E (experience) and (3) generalized experience generates thought which (4) leads, in turn, to successful solutions of problems. But this assumed identity--relationship 4 as derived from 1 or 3--may be fallacious, since it exchanges dependent variables and independent variables. In Mao's early period it

seems that thought was viewed as a dependent variable (it grew out of problem-solving behavior conditioned by Marxism-Leninism) but eventually it has become an independent variable . The interaction between thought and problems has greatly decreased. This would mean that Mao's thought is on its way to becoming a closed system (Van Slyke, Appendix C ).

It seems feasible to suggest a periodization of Mao's thought. Up to 1935 problems were viewed essentially as independent variables, and Mao's thought was problem-oriented and not systematized. Between 1935 and 1942 there was a period of interaction and feedback between thought and problems. This was a period of general systematization. During the years 1942-1949 problems were successfully solved by reference to Chinese thought (decline of interaction). The more successful the Chinese were in referring to Mao's thought in problem-solving, the greater was their predisposition toward referring to thought. From 1949 to 1958 (Great Leap Forward) reference to thought was increasing, but still somewhat open-ended because of the variety of new problems (social, economic, political) encountered. The final period seems to extend from about 1958 until the present. Solutions of the 1949-1958 period were now seen by Mao as insufficiently successful. Consequently, there was a more literal application of the solutions which had been successful before 1949. Increasing irrelevancy was accorded to present problems (failures) matched by increasing commitment to the thought of Mao Tse-tung as containing the solution to all problems. This implies a movement of thought away from action toward pure theory.

On the other hand, Mao may never have intended his thought to be accepted as a specific set of propositions, but rather as a way of thinking, or as epistemology (Rue). Initially, at least, his outline

of the correct way of thinking was from perception to conception to practice. There is also the danger of losing sight of the broader, more fundamental questions if one pays too much attention to Mao's categories. Perhaps all we are finding out is that as people--including Mao--get older, their thinking often gets more rigid (Oksenberg). In any case, as thought becomes more abstract, one would expect more strains between practice and theory. The rigidity in Mao's thought may be on the "meta" level--solving problems dialectically has become a prescription rather than a method (Brody). There is also the possibility, however, that we need to distinguish rigidification and elevation of thought--perhaps the elevation of thought needs simply more interpretation and might in fact mean more flexibility rather than rigidification. The Bible is an example of the elevation of thought and represents a case where as thought becomes elevated, it becomes more flexible (Mancall).

Clearly, Mao's thought has changed over time. In general, however, human minds tend to change more slowly than policy statements. The drawing of sharp distinctions between ideology, thought and action might help indicate just what it is that changes (Mancall). In the current context it is important to understand how Mao--or how his successors--evaluate reality because Mao, at least, is more interested in the evaluation of reality than in understanding it. It might be interesting to pose the following question: under what conditions will a society change its world view and retain its interpreters or change the interpreters and save the world view?

However we go about the problem, it seems evident that Chinese ideology cannot be separated from the Chinese cultural context. But

here, too, there are special difficulties.

If we are on the edge of a new period of Chinese history, then we cannot assume that the Maoist synthesis will remain (Van Slyke). On the other hand, there may not be any great discontinuities in Chinese history after the death of Mao (North).

There are "pervasive patterns present and important in Chinese culture. We should look for these continuities and not be deluded by superficial changes (Weakland). Also, the environment itself suggests certain basic problems and overriding trends with which any Chinese government will have to cope--whatever its ideology. Elites cannot long ignore such considerations as growth rates, resource development figures, and population change. Whatever major challenges come to the surface in the future will probably have been present in the Chinese social scene long before they emerge. They will be there for analysis --at least in their germinal form--if we can identify them (North).

In many respects the mind is like a computer, but it is programmed in more ways. A part of the programs of individual units which is widely shared is called the "grammar of culture." The grammar of a culture consists of a continuum of symbolic elements through which ego interprets inputs from the outside environment. Ego perceives nature, society, and culture through a symbol structure mechanism, and there is a hiatus between perception of reality and reality itself. Different symbol structures imply different views of the structure of society. Too many of the Chinese studies have been refracted through the symbol structures of Western observers and not the symbol structures of the Chinese themselves. An operational code study must present all of the ramifications of mind in the world (Mancall).

Leites' approach stressed too much the regular and consistent nature of the Soviet world view and gave us the picture of a monolithic Soviet Politburo. In studying the Chinese world view, we should be prepared to analyze the ambiguities and contradictions. We must be careful to interpret Chinese cognitive structures and Chinese goals in their own terms rather than in our own, and we must find how they themselves view their actions and also the actions of others in relation to both their immediate and their long range ambitions. One of the places to begin is with the Chinese language itself.

The Leites operational code is insufficiently historical (Van Slyke). The tacit agreements of a culture probably do not change very much over time (Weakland), but that which is tacit may become explicit over time through conflict (Rue).

The Chinese world view differs in the western world view in many significant respects. For centuries, even millenia, China viewed itself as the hub of the universe, the world's major civilization, the only culture on earth that really mattered. There was no view of equality in international relations, and other peoples were viewed as barbarians tributary to China.

Internal matters were viewed somewhat similarly. Natural disasters were seen at a certain period as the breakdown of the emperor's Heavenly Mandate. The Chinese concept of dualism is also significantly different from the dualism of the West--the dualism of good and evil is a typically Western dualism which forecasts the eventual victory of good while Chinese dualisms have no guarantee that one side or another will inevitably win out over the other. The Yin-Yang symbol is a harmony of two opposite forces, and this may mean that there could be significant differences between the dialectics of Mao and those of Marx, Hegel, and

Lenin. There is a more subjective element in Chinese culture--more of an emphasis upon will (Mancall).

The code would be a description of Chinese elite behavior, but these traditional concerns would be pertinent. There are crucial dynamic elements affecting whatever way the mind is "programmed" or conditioned. Increasing stress may produce psychotic occurrences, and if the whole culture is effected by these psychotic stresses so as to change its cultural grammar, revolutionary social change occurs (Mancall). We do not have sufficient knowledge about such emotional and behavioral dynamics within Chinese culture.

Numerous sources of data should be tapped--both traditional and contemporary. Documents are of major importance. Primary emphasis must be upon Chinese Communist statements and upon simple descriptive statements about what they do (need to limit materials for intensive examination) and we must start from specifically political materials and work outward to richer cultural and psychological contexts--and back through traditional sources.

We must not conclude, however, that documentary analysis alone can explain decision-making behavior. Although we can use various kinds of data, it is important that we learn to weigh different data sources with reference to the kinds of questions we ask (Brody). There has been emphasis upon documents as descriptive of action and not enough emphasis upon anthropolitical/sociological information--both of which may be more important. Stress upon Confucian documents cannot reveal how personal cases of conflict are handled within Chinese culture--to answer that kind of question we need to study Chinese legalism (Mancall).

There is a literature which deals with aesthetic history. For example, art forms and architecture can reveal interesting things about

cultural needs and concerns (Brody). It must be re-emphasized, however, that there are dangers in using Western aesthetic theories in evaluating Chinese art forms (Weakland).

There is plenty of data. Levi-Strauss has a technique for the analysis of myths which can be used to analyze world views, but this kind of structural analysis of the Chinese language has not been done yet. The problem is to develop a model with sufficient sophistication that makes use of all the data available at the present. Clearly, the operational code includes many "tacit understandings" as well as conscious agreements. Levi-Strauss shows that a variety of "tacit understandings" exist in a myth or set of myths. One way of penetrating the operational code might be through such tacit-explicit distinctions. It might be possible, for example, to use this kind of analysis in explaining the ferocity of Red Guard responses. To ignore this distinction amounts to systematic ignorance of tacit factors (Mancall).

Novels, films, art, interviews, are all rich sources for analysis --films being of particular importance because they are group products (Weakland). Textbooks represent another important source (Doolin).

## Dimensional Analysis

Much can be learned about the behavior of a nation state--and much can be inferred about its decision-making characteristics--by examining its geography and demography (Sprout and Sprout, 1962, 287-391); the number of other states with which it primarily interacts and their characteristics (Deutsch and Singer, 1964); its bloc or alliance patterns, relations and memberships (Kaplan, 1957); and its dimensions, e.g., size, economy (developed or underdeveloped), polity (open or

closed), and so forth (Rosenau, 1964), populations, resources, and rates of growth, as compared with other states

Traditionally, the Chinese Empire viewed itself as the hub of the universe, the only true civilization, the only deep culture, the only Great Power on earth. For the Chinese there was no concept of equality in international relations. There was China, the Middle Kingdom, the great sovereignty, and around its fringe and periphery were lesser barbarians for whom it was a privilege to pay the Empire tribute. A westerner can scarcely imagine the trauma which many Chinese must have suffered when, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this ancient, proud and persisting image came into collision with the realities of China's industrial, financial, economic, military and political impotence.

Yet the old image did not entirely disappear. On the contrary, parts of it, at least, achieved some acceptance in the West--partly, no doubt, because of China's considerable territory and huge population. During latter phases of World War II--as the defeat of Japan seemed to be in sight--President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were at pains to include Nationalist China as a Great Power along with the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. In view of the unmistakable developments since then in a number of economic and technological sectors, it would seem that the nation's status as a Great Power should be clearly established by now. Yet scholars and statesmen are still puzzled by the problem of "trying to set appropriate standards for judging Chinese performance (Pye, 1966)."

Is the People's Republic a Great Power comparable to the United States and the U.S.S.R., or a second level power such as Great Britain

and France? Or is it a lesser power than even these? On the basis of what criteria can we make a judgment? Is Mainland China today a modernized state, or is it one of the developing countries like India, Indonesia and Egypt?

It goes almost without saying that any consideration of contemporary China in depth involves the development of a society which over the better part of two millenia or more created one of the great civilizations of human history. This depth of cultural background cannot be overlooked. Do we therefore view the People's Republic in terms of China's earlier historical continuity and cylical evolution and perceive current developments as an emergence from a period of temporary confusion and the beginnings of another period of order and stability under a new "dynasty?" Or do we treat contemporary China as a new revolutionary regime that has broken entirely from its earlier history and institutions?

Rudolph Rummel's Dimensionality of Nations Project has defined and determined measures for most of the major dimensions of variations of nations on their attributes. Economic development, size, totalitarianism, density, Catholic culture, domestic conflict, and foreign conflict are the largest of these dimensions. Their measurement enabled the Dimensionality of Nations Project to determine the profile of each nation across the dimensions and to group nations as to their similarity in profiles. China is thus located in terms of attribute similarity to and dissimilarity from other nations and it is possible to specify what group of nations the People's Republic should be most identified with on its characteristics (Rummel, 1967).

During the first half of the 1960's at least three collections and categorizations of data about national actors were made, each

concerned with a different set of variables and designed to separate nations into clusters in terms of certain common characteristics. Russett, Alker et al. (1964) were concerned primarily with demographic and socio-economic data. Banks and Textor (1963) and Banks and Gregg (1965) dealt with political system characteristics. Ivanoff (1966) developed indices of national power.

Significantly, China did not appear similar to the same nations in any two, let alone all three of these categories (Bobrow, 1967a).

In terms of demographic and socio-economic indicators China ranked among "traditional civilizations" in the second from the bottom stage of "political and economic development." Other states in this category included Bolivia, India, Haiti and South Vietnam. With respect to political system characteristics, the People's Republic emerged as "centrist" or totalitarian. In this group were Spain, Portugal, all the Communist states, and some of the authoritarian states among the developing nations. However, in the national power analysis, China appeared among "major international actors" in the second category from the top. Other states in this category included France, West Germany, the United Kingdom and Canada.

Within any extensive typology of Communist States, China clearly emerges in a category by itself (Bobrow, 1967a). In terms of modernization, China tends to cluster with the least developed and culturally least Western among the Communist states such as North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania and Outer Mongolia. On the other hand, in terms of attenuated ties to the Soviet Union, China resembles Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania, but not North Korea, North Vietnam or Outer Mongolia. Even among nations of the so-called Communist Bloc, China thus emerges as something of an anomaly. With respect to national

power ranking, however, China was surpassed only by the Soviet Union among Communist states and--as noted above--was clustered with advanced non-Communist nations of the industrialized West.

There is considerable evidence to suggest that Chinese leaders are keenly aware of incongruities between the effectiveness of the People's Republic in certain spheres of operation and the effectiveness of other Communist--and also non-Communist states. Under these circumstances ". . . the Chinese elite find it necessary to seek justifications for" differences in rank among nations and "to mobilize a mixture of political loyalty and economic energy either to reduce or sustain them (Bobrow, 1967a, 311)."

Bobrow (1967a) has hypothesized three policy strategies that the Chinese can use to compensate for attributes of the People's Republic that are deficient relative to those of other Communist states. The leaders can ". . . blame the rank differences on strong but not invincible external actors"; they can ". . . make the differences and their relative uniqueness to the People's Republic a symbol of success rather than failure"; and they can ". . . make sizeable efforts to maximize the use of economic resources and minimize demands on them (Bobrow, 1967a, 311-312)." To the extent the first and third strategies do not work, Bobrow postulates, the second becomes exaggerated in importance.

How does China measure in terms of such indicators of power as area, population, and Gross National Product as compared with other nations?

In area the People's Republic ranks third (9,761,012 square kilometers) after the U.S.S.R. (22,402,000 square kilometers) and Canada, with the United States in fourth place (Russet et al., 1964, 139).[1]

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[1]The areas of Canada and the United States are 9,974,375 square kilometers and 9,363,387 square kilometers respectively.

There is considerable evidence to remind us, however, that the Chinese Communist leaders--as well as Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, in fact --are predisposed to measure the area of the People's Republic against the sum of territories governed or strongly influenced by the Chinese Empire at various points in its long history. Thus, there may be more dissatisfaction over area than the relatively high ranking might, by itself, lead us to expect.

With respect to population, the People's Republic is clearly the world's largest country with well over 700,000 million people (Russett et al., 1964, 18).[2] The next three nations in population are India, the U.S.S.R. and the United States. The annual percentage rate of increase is calculated to be 2.0, which places China in sixty-fifth place among the nations (Russett et al., 1964, 47).[3]

In terms of capability, China's large population is undoubtedly a mixed blessing--since some considerable proportion of it are still minimally productive above their own subsistence needs. The distribution of production capabilities among the Chinese population is difficult to assess, but literacy rates offer something of a clue. In percentage of population literate (47.5), China ranks sixty-fifth--between Burma and Lebannon. The United Kingdom is in seventh place (98.5), the United States in fifteenth place (98.0), and the U.S.S.R. in twenty-third place (95.0) (Russett et al., 1964, 222-223).[4]

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[2]Russett gives the figure 694,200,000 in 1961 with an error range of 20.0 as compared with 1.0, 5.9 and 1.2 for India, the U.S.S.R. and the United States respectively.

[3]India ranks fifty-fourth (2.2), the U.S.S.R. seventy-third and one-half (1.8), and the United States seventy-seven and one-half (1.7). Kuwait is first (15.1) and Sarawak second (5.1).

[4]Australia and Austria are in first and second places. The precise rankings of China, the United Kingdom and the United States and the Soviet Union are 7.5, 15.5, and 23.5 respectively.

There are special difficulties in comparing the G.N.P.'s of capitalist and socialist or communist countries because of the differences between free market economies and systems where prices are not based on market forces and also because of differences in accounting methods. In terms of G.N.P. China ranks fifth ($46,256 million) after the United States ($443,270 million), the U.S.S.R. ($121,920 million), the United Kingdom ($61,379 million) and West Germany ($49,906 million). France, Canada, India, Japan and Italy rank sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth (Russett et al., 1964, 152).[5]

Per capita G.N.P. offers another clue to the distribution of productive capabilities among the Chinese populace. The People's Republic ranks in one hundred first place in Gross National Product per capita (73) as compared with Kuwait in first place (2,900), the United States in second (2,577), the United Kingdom in eleventh (1,189), the U.S.S.R. in twenty-first (600). India and China are about equal in this ranking (Russett et al., 1964, 155-156).[6]

A third indicator of constraint upon the power capacities of the People's Republic is suggested by the proportion of G.N.P. attributable to agriculture as compared with industry. In terms of percentage of gross domestic product originating in agriculture, China ranks in eighth place (48%) after Nigeria, Uganda, Sudan, Tanganyika, Indonesia, Pakistan and Ceylon (Russett et al., 1964, 173-174).[7] The percentage

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[5]The French, Canadian, Indian, Japanese and Italian G.N.P.'s are $41,563 million, $32,291 million, $28,648 million, $27,844 million and $25,003 million respectively. The figure for China is considered accurate within ± 20% limits.

[6]The precise rankings given for China and India are both 101.5, and that of the U.S.S.R. 21.5. The figures for the U.S.S.R., China and India are considered accurate within ± 20% limits.

[7]The percentages for the other nations are 63, 62, 57, 57, 56, 56 and 49 respectively.

for the U.S.S.R., in forty-fifth place, is 22, and for the United States, in last place, the percentage is 4.[8]

In many instances it is probably not a discrepancy of absolute levels of capability that motivates a nation state to try to increase its power vis-a-vis other states, but a gap in terms of rates of growth. We might expect a country with high growth rates to be more concerned with differences between itself and a stronger nation state than a country with a moderate or low growth rate. In this connection, the annual growth rate of G.N.P. per capita for the People's Republic is 5.5%, which places the country in thirteenth place. Japan (7.6%), Austria (7.2%), Yugoslavia (7.2%) and Rumania (6.9%) rank in the first three places. The Soviet Union (5.7%) ranks twelfth--just above China. The United States (1.8%) is in forty-fourth place (Russett _et al._, 1964, 160-161).[9]

These uneven foundations of power, according to Bobrow, "represent reasons for the Chinese elite to locate substitute bases, particularly in the following three policy strategies: First, they can try to substitute scales of achievement relative to obstacles for scales of achievement, which involves them in statements about the stagnant nature of pre-Communist China, the problems inherent in China's volume, and the obstacles presented by external actors. Second, they can try to compensate for inadequate objective means of mass mobilization by elaborating on the monolithic control and reliability of those that exist and by eliminating alternative channels of communication and

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[8]The precise rankings of China, the U.S.S.R. and the United States are given as 8.5, 45.5, and 74.5 respectively.

[9]The precise ranking of the United States is 44.5.

foci of loyalty that could affect their efficacy. Third, they can seek leadership by achievement in foreign and defense policies (Bobrow, 1967a, 313)."

Interaction Analysis

Whenever two individuals or interpersonal organizations--including nation states--interact, they have a choice of behaving in a number of ways: they can interact verbally or non-verbally; their behavior can be essentially affirming or contradicting or damaging; they can negotiate, bargain, produce a deadlock, or try to coerce; they can compete in comparative advantage or essentially zero-sum terms; and they may act symmetrically or unsymmetrically (Heider, 1958, 200-207). Much can be learned by measuring and analyzing these and other dimensions of nation state behavior. This is often called action, or more properly interaction analysis, as developed by Karl Deutsch, Charles McClelland, Rudolph Rummel and others.

McClelland (1965) has already applied some of these techniques to a study of the Taiwan Straits crises, and on the basis of this and other studies, he has put forward the following recommendations: "The astounding events of the day in China suggest that, for the time being and from the standpoint of systematic research and prediction, Chinese behavior should be approached as a heavily stochastic process. I mean that we ought to be having some experiments which include some orderly Chinese external behavior and some wild chance factors as well. Settling-down will occur, of course, and we should be prepared to take advantage of the opportunity to trace the beginnings and the development of a new operational code, where relations with foreigners and the outside world are concerned. My viewpoint has sharpened on the point that it is

largely irrelevant to try to unravel the whole story of the dynamics of intra-nation affairs when the inter-nation phenomena are the main concern. I agree that basic research and theory on the sensitive indicators of variation and change for the intra-societal levels should be attended to, but the matter of ultimate importance is the connection of this research and theory to external behavior. That is, the selection of the intra-national indicators should be governed by knowledge about inter-nation actions and responses. Thus, I can see two research domains needing extensive development:

1. A comprehensive quantitative re-studying of Chinese external behavior for the period 1949-66 for the purpose of identifying the character of China as a source of a varying stream of acts directed abroad; all this fitted to at least three conceptual frames: (a) the regime's evolving intent to act during the period as registered in the statements of the governing foreign policy elite (via content analysis of documents) and according to some classification of international situations, (b) the regime's developing operational code during the period--i.e., a step back into the national system's dynamics--and (c) a comparison of China's external behavior against behaviors of other countries--we must really begin to find out what is particularly Chinese and what is general or universal.

2. A comprehensive quantitative re-study of the external responses <u>to</u> China's behavior in the period 1949-66. Taking China as a target of foreign reactions, we need to construct in detail what other nations have done to China as target--both perceptually and actually. This particular line of inquiry concerning the response behaviors directed toward China may have the first priority where the planning and policy interest is uppermost. If we want to establish trends and directions

of world reaction to the China phenomenon, then the observations must be continuous and connect a rich record of the past with the current, unfolding configuration. In order to keep up and in order to be able to project, one needs to be able to show where and how the responses to China's international system outputs fit into the whole international system. The need to build that ability--to deal with the whole system so that parts of the whole can be traced in--is the essence of my current theory and research activities. The pilot study done in the fall shows me the feasibility of keeping account of the whole international system by drawing inferences and making comparisons by statistical means from a continuous world event-interaction survey. I see this WEIS project as the means of building the international-flow indicators and as a device for moving step by step into the rich, difficult, and ambiguous world of perception and reality of the national systems and their connected sub-systems. To sum this up, an important research task is to build an empirical and quantitative configuration of China-as-target and the firings at that target from abroad and then to place this configuration in a still larger map of the total configuration of the whole international system. The latter keeps shifting, of course, and that is part of the research task to find the directions and trends in that shifting (McClelland, 1967)."

Davis Bobrow suggests that a better understanding of Chinese bargaining behavior could be achieved through a systematic and rigorous analysis of negotiation participation. "Also, we may have tended to focus overly much on negotiations in which we have been a party or in which military conflict was the principle subject matter. I would like to see a disciplined analysis which draws on Geneva, Warsaw, and Bandung protocols with important supplements from economic negotiations conducted by Japanese and Canadian representatives (Bobrow, 1967b)."

There are several different ways of analyzing interactions between states, such as the "standard marker" system developed by Brody, Moses, Milstein and Kadane (1966) and the various types of interaction analysis undertaken by Karl Deutsch, Rummel, and others.

Within the Dimensionality of Nations Project, as described by Rudolph J. Rummel (1967), "Some ninety kinds of foreign actions of nations have been factor analyzed to determine the major kinds of variance in external behavior. Several dimensions were found and indicators of the dimensions were defined. This analysis enables Chinese foreign behavior to be measured on these major dimensions and her behavior to be compared with that of other nations. Her foreign behavior can thus be placed in the context of the international system. Moreover, her behavioral profile can now be determined and she can now be grouped with nations acting most like her."

The Dimensionality of Nations Project dyadic studies have a number of dyads involving China, e.g., China--U.S.S.R., China--U.S., U.K.--China, and so forth. "The analysis of interaction between the dyads, such as trade, mail, treaties, conflict, I.O.s, tourists, migrants, and U.N. voting; and social and geographic distances, such as air distance, distance in political systems, transaction distance, differences in language, race, and religion, etc., has defined some major dimensions of interaction between nations. D.O.N. is now in the process of defining profiles of dyads on these dimensions so that the behavior of specific dyads can be compared. This will enable Chinese behavior towards specific nations (and vice versa) to be measured and compared with that of other nations (e.g., France--U.S.) and with the prevailing behavior within the system." This represents work completed or almost done. Over the next few years, according to Rummel, "it is planned to define the behavioral and attribute dimensions at several points

in time (1955, 1963, 1965, 1960, 1950). These cross-sectional slices will enable me to track the path of change through time of nations such as China on her attributes (e.g., economic development), her foreign behavior (e.g., level of conflict), and her interaction patterns (e.g., with the U.S.S.R. conflict). These paths can then be compared to yield a dynamic picture of change within the system and can be analyzed to determine the basic structural characteristics associated with behavioral change."

What else needs to be done? "Much of my work has been on nations in general," Rummel reports, "using aggregate data. China has been one nation among many and although this gives a comparative context for describing China, it may not be sufficient for a host of specific questions about decision making, change in political relations with specific nations like the U.S.S.R., or predicting policy decisions in Vietnam. I think we can help approach answers on these questions by making more use than heretofore of what systematic multivariate (multiple regression, canonical analysis, analysis of variance, factor analysis) methods of analysis we now have available. Much data on China is lying around, unsystematized, but potentially useful in multivariate analysis. For example, Sino-Soviet relations 1945-1965 can be systematically analysed on trade, aid, conflict, conferences, visits, treaties, etc., longitudinally using P-factor analysis. Such an analysis would define the major components of changes in Sino-Soviet relations, the years associated with these changes, and the crucial behavioral indicators heralding and measuring the change."

Studies of Chinese Communist Decision Processes

Elite studies, personality studies, studies of Chinese ideology, studies of Chinese tradition and culture, studies of Mainland China's

dimensions and physical attributes, and studies of Chinese actions, are all of somewhat limited value unless appropriate, influential variables can be brought into relationship in a systematic and controlled fashion in terms of dynamic decision-making processes. To what extent do personal idiosyncracies override ideology or political and economic demands and limitations? Do such idiosyncracies become more or less crucial in high stress situations? There are other important questions of this nature. Without doubt, whatever is known about aggregate elite data about individual personality factors, about ideology, about culture, and about the Chinese People's Republic as a national actor all demands major attention to and controlled analysis of a range of intervening variables in the decision process. Otherwise, as suggested by Davis Bobrow and demonstrated by much of the writing about China, we run the risk of drawing premature and possibly false and misleading conclusions. Thus, for example, "Unless we try to establish empirically what 'facts' the subjects of analysis do see and what might be the conceivable reasons for their responses to them, we become tempted to infer, if their responses do not fit what we think the 'facts' warrant, that the subjects are evil, irrational, or stupid to some significant degree (Bobrow, 1967a, 315)."

In fact, if we ignore popular stereotypes and "turn for counsel to professional observers of Chinese developments over the last decade," we find a tendency to stress that whereas "the leaders in Peking have made mistakes and committed numerous follies, they are not madmen, and they have a capacity to learn (Pye, 1966, 389)."

This is not to assert that attributions of Chinese Communist stupidity or irrationality are necessarily invalid. On the contrary, most national decision-making--particularly in situations of stress--

reveals elements that are not entirely rational. Thus, we may find that Chinese Communist leaders were ". . . stupid on a certain occasion, in that they did not manipulate knowledge available to them logically but were not in states that impaired intellectual performance, e.g., emotional or tired states. We may even be able to impute stupidity as an attribute of the elite group if we can observe stupid handling of information on a series of occasions (Bobrow, 1967a, 315)." Or, similarly we may find that they were highly rational in some situations and much less rational in others.

The Leites approach is in the tradition of national character studies: another word for operational code is value structure. The total value structure can be broken into two subsets--values about ends and values about means. Suppose that there is a stable set of values with stable subsets A (values about ends) and B (values about means). One might be able to locate these sets through writings, literature, documents, and so forth. The subsets (A and B) are ordered under "normal" conditions. The order can change from one situation to the next. The set of all inputs (I) can come from any source into the decision-making unit and impinge upon the stable, ordered subsets (A and B), and thus may change outputs (O). The set C is for our purposes the set of all missing elements (i.e., role structure, plans, capabilities, audience, constraint structure, memory, and the like). These factors all affect perception of inputs. Feedbacks are a subset of inputs. The question is--what kinds of knowledge would we have to have to implement this model in order to locate the ordered subsets A and B (Brody)?

Among the things we need to know are the following: (1) who is likely to be in the decision-making set and does the makeup of this set change with a change in the nature of the issue or problem involved?

2) How do the participating decision-makers internalize subsets A and B? (3) How do these individuals relate to other sets of decision-makers in the past? (4) Do the Chinese have to change decision-makers in order to change approaches or can the same decision-makers change approaches to deal with different problems? This is another way of asking about feedback arrangements within the Chinese Communist decision-making structure and about how they work (Brody).

With the aid of some such conceptual framework it should be feasible to study decisions where some natural controls are involved. A study of textual changes in Mao's writings can allow us to get into the "black box"--at least as it has operated over the last decade and a half (Brody). Adequate data are available for analyzing communications and decisions within the bureaucratic structure (Oksenberg), and it might be possible to construct a typology of researchable decisions from the past (Van Slyke).

Against this background, and as suggested by Bobrow (1967a) there are at least three explicit reasons for studying the nature of intervening Chinese elite decision processes. "First, most acts that the Chinese take in relation to the international environment have been reviewed or modified or otherwise affected by the elite. Second, such study can produce more precise and specific predictions. National attributes usually leave elites a large variety of options, selection from which is affected by what they want, know about, and know how to do. The third reason is that such study provides control for what one might call 'analytic projection,' that is, the tendency to assume that the subjects of one's analysis see the same 'facts' as the analyst and manipulate them in the same way and in the same context (Bobrow, 1967a, 314-315)."

There is a major difficulty in that we know so little about Chinese cognition and its relation to Chinese language and Chinese non-verbal behavior. The problem is especially acute in view of our heavy dependence--for so much research--upon language, whether in the original or in translation. Given this dependence, it would seem most useful, as emphasized by Davis Bobrow "to bring psycholinguistic expertise to bear. I have not been able to find any psycholinguist who combines top-notch disciplinary and area skills. If we lack such people, it would seem very desirable to attempt to create them either through mid-career retooling or incentives for graduate training (Bobrow, 1967b)."

A high priority should certainly be placed upon investigations--within a Chinese cultural context--such as those undertaken by psychologists with respect to cognitive interaction.

Among psychologists the development of theories about cognitive interaction are a comparatively recent phenomenon. Heider, in his pioneering work (1944 and 1946), put forward the idea of cognitive balance and thus provided an impetus for subsequent contributions by Newcomb (1953), Cartwright and Harary (1956), and Abelson and Rosenberg (1958). A second model--cognitive dissonance--was developed by Festinger (1957), and a third model--the congruity model--emerged from the investigations of Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum into the measurement of cognitive meaning (Osgood et al., 1957).

Human beings normally strive for a kind of consistency between what they know or believe and what they do. Granting, however, that consistency is the usual thing, what about the exceptions that come to mind so readily? Seldom, if ever, according to dissonance theory, are they accepted psychologically as inconsistencies by the person involved.

"Usually, more or less successful attempts are made to rationalize them." But human beings are not always successful in rationalizing them or explaining them away, and in such instances the inconsistency simply continues to exist--and thus gives rise to psychological discomfort. This dissonance suggested to Festinger the following hypotheses (Festinger, 1957, 3, 31):

> "When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance."
>
> "The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance."
>
> "Manifestations of the operation of these pressures include behavior changes, changes in cognition, and circumspect exposure to new information and new opinions."

Dissonance almost always ensues after a decision has been made between two or more alternatives, or "after an attempt has been made, by offering rewards or threatening punishment, to elicit behavior that is at variance with private opinion (Festinger, 1957, 261)."

In the congruity model cognitive elements are equated with the connotative meanings of signs--words, sounds, forms, colors and so forth--which elicit symbolic processes. A measurement system, the semantic differential, identifies the factorial meaning of a concept according to its location along three dimensions--Evaluation, Potency and Activity--which are found to be the most salient factors in meaningful judgments in a variety of modern cultures.

This does not assume, however, that two people will agree on whether the stimulus is good or bad, strong or weak, active or passive; it only assumes that these factors account for an overwhelming proportion of discrimination of variance.

A major part of the basic problem is to identify which phenomena are shared by many, most, or all peoples and which are culture-specific or peculiar to a given belief system. The question has been raised this way by Charles Osgood (1966,1). "What might we expect to be shared across human groups in the domain of interpersonal behavior? Certainly not the overt expression of interpersonal intentions--overt expressions of the intent to help, for example, should vary as much across cultures and across situations within cultures as modes of dress or items on a menu. Certainly not the appropriateness of intentions for particular role pairs--the intent to obey may be quite appropriate for a mature son toward his father in one place but quite inappropriate in another place. The only likely constant in this domain would seem to be the dimensional structure of intentions themselves. Thus we might expect all human groups to distinguish between associative and disassociative intentions (e.g., between helping vs. hindering), between superordinate and subordinate intentions (e.g., between dominating and submitting), and so on. If such a common system of structure of interpersonal intentions could be demonstrated, then comparisons across groups could be made in a reasonably rigorous and meaningful way."

## Mapping the Literature

In the accompanying diagram Michel Oksenberg suggests a way to map out the existing literature in the China field, sensitizing us to areas worthy of further research.

On the horizontal axis are listed the six perspectives which are most frequently and validly used to analyze contemporary China: historical (problems of continuity and change), development (problems of

politics in the modernizing societies), totalitarian (indluding comparative communism and the politics of dictatorships), revolution, bureaucracy and organization, and methodology (problems of studying a society at a distance).

The vertical axis lists eleven interrelated and somewhat overlapping topics which interest political scientists: the environmental factors which shape politics, political socialization, communities, interest groups, institutions, elites, ideology, policy formulation (decision-making), control, communications, and basic issues.

Each of these topics can be analyzed from one or more of the perspectives mentioned. Any particular publication on Communist China can be categorized--or pigion-holed--into one or more of the boxes provided. For example, an article comparing religious groups in the U.S.S.R. and China adopts the totalitarian perspective, and deals with the topic of interest groups. C. K. Yang's village study (1959) has as its topic "community" but his perspectives include historical, totalitarian, modernization, and revolution. Skinner's paper on the compliance cycle is originally derived from considering China in the light of organization theory, but then expands to include problems of social change and modernization; his topics are control + response and communication (1965). Schurmann's study (1966) neglects the topics of environment, socialization, groups, and communications, and does not embrace the "revolutionary" perspective.

Particular perspectives necessarily lead to a stress upon certain topics. For example, a stress upon questions of continuity and change tends to produce an emphasis upon topics dealing with environment, socialization, community, groups, elites, and institutions. Viewing China as a totalitarian regime makes us focus upon elite culture, ideology,

and control + response.

Looking at each of the topics, in the light of the theoretical literature concerning these subjects (interest group theory, decision-making theory, community power structure theory, etc.) and the theoretical literature on the broad perspectives (theories of revolution, totalitarianism, the modernization process, etc.), one immediately begins generating the questions about contemporary Chinese politics which need to be answered. A few examples suffice:

1. Socialization: On the local level, there are six kinds of leadership groups each with different kinds of socialization experiences--the old cadres recruited before 1949, the land reform activists who joined in 1949, the activists who emerged since 1949, the demobilized People's Liberation Army members, the elite of the old regime, and the students trained in the local schools. How did the process of political socialization differ for these groups? What conflicts result?

2. Community Studies: Although there is some literature on Chinese communities, there is a great methodological problem involved in obtaining data in this area. What can be done, through the use of a computer data-bank, is to compile--as completely as possible--socio-economic profiles on every county in China from 1900 to the present.

3. Interest Groups: How does interest articulation take place in China? What latent interest groups (based on occupation, age, sex, education, geographic origin, revolutionary experience, etc.) become manifest? How?

4. Institutions: We need to study the functions of various structures throughout Chinese society, and to study the relationship between institutions and elites. One might hypothesize, for example, that people in multi-functional institutions rise more quickly than those in single-functional institutions. Is this true?

5. Elites: We need studies of how amorphous social forces impinge upon particular leaders. This can be done through biographical studies. Biography can suggest how ideology effects behavior. We need a bibliography of all speeches made by people with Central Committee status, and also a data bank of the career patterns of top party, government, army, and economic leaders. Eventually, we might be able to study the "ladder of success" in China. We must study career patterns to see the degree to which there is mobility among institutions (government, party, army) and among functions. We might also study the tensions resulting from the under-representation of the geographic areas previously the strongholds of the Kuomintang.

6. Policy Formulation: A series of case studies on the shaping of particular policies is needed. Suitable candidates for such studies are land reform, collectivization, the Great Leap, and the Cultural Revolution.

7. Control: Refer to Lasswell's psychological notion of deprivation and indulgence--it is important that we know the psychological implications of control mechanisms (dependency, loyalty, isolation, and fear). What types of controls are particularly effective in the Chinese cultural context? One typical pattern of control has been the "campaign style" of economic development. Another has been the regularized, bureaucratic "rule of law" style of economic development. What mix of these two ways of eliciting a response should the rulers adopt?

8. Communications: We need to study communications patterns within the bureaucracy.

9. Basic Issues: What are the substantive issues which concern the Chinese elite? There are four which immediately come to mind: treatment of China's past, strategies for economic development, zoning of

power and authority, and priorities to be assigned among goals among the party's multi-goal program.

OKSENBERG DIAGRAM: A TYPOLOGY OF CHINESE STUDIES

MAJOR FOCI ⟶

| TOPIC AREAS ↓ | CONTINUITY /CHANGE (historical) | COMPARATIVE POLITICS & MODERNIZATION | TOTALITARIANISM comparative communism & dictatorships | REVOLUTION | ORGANIZATION & BUREAUCRACY | METHODOLOGY problems of studying a society at a distance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENVIRONMENT: foreign geographic economic cultural (mass, elite) | | | | | | |
| POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION | | | | | | |
| COMMUNITY | | | | | | |
| GROUPS | | | | | | |
| INSTITUTIONS structure and function | | | | | | |
| IDEOLOGY belief systems | | | | | | |
| ELITES aggregate analysis individual analysis | | | | | | |
| POLICY FORMULATION | | | | | | |
| CONTROL AND RESPONSE | | | | | | |
| COMMUNICATIONS | | | | | | |
| BASIC ISSUES | | | | | | |
| MISCELLANEOUS | | | | | | |

Dilemmas Problems and Challenges to the Social Sciences

The central question remains, what will we have when we have done all of this? China is moving into a new period of history studies centered around Mao may well be unclear after his death (Oksenberg) for the most part, but Tsetung's Great Cultural Revolution has produced yet surprise after another for scholars and China watchers, and it is difficult to see what may be around other bends in the road ahead (North). One reason for the weaknesses of Soviet studies in the past was its overemphasis of Stalin and his personality (Oksenberg). Certainly there is not much in the operational code to account for the changes which have taken place in Soviet policy-making since Stalin's death (North). We are concerned with the question of how to get at the common core values of the Chinese leadership (Oksenberg)--at the persisting values, attitudes, predispositions and trends that are most likely to survive changes in leadership and at the stubborn environmental problems with which Mao's successors, whoever they are, will almost certainly have to cope (North). Without doubt, ". . . major improvements in our descriptive and predictive capabilities would seem to require some rather fundamental restructuring and innovation in our tools of concept and method (Dobrow, 1967, 306)." Up to the present, the study of Communist China has only to a small degree taken advantage of the panoply of theoretical and methodological approaches available; there has been a general separation between these approaches and that study. The present project, however, is in a position to contribute to a lessening of that gap (Robinson, Appendix B ).

In recent years a number of theoretical orientations have emerged, but only the most limited applications of them have been made to problems of China. Included among these are decision making theory, game theory;

organization theory; conflict theories; bargaining theory (including alliance and coalition theory); influence and power theory; communication theory; information theory; modernization theory; theory of ideology; small group theory; theories of mass behavior; coercion theory (including work on "coercive persuasion"); and the theory of cognitive dissonance (Robinson, Appendix B ). Mainland China, its domestic politics and its interactions with other countries should provide an important laboratory for the application of such approaches. The problem is to put the theoretical orientations at the disposal of China specialists, or bring Chinese problems and data to the attention of social science theoreticians and investigators or--preferably--to do both. In order to bring wide varieties of data into focus, however, and to achieve some relevance from competing approaches, and to facilitate theory development and testing, we need a basic, more or less unified model.

## Part II

## TOWARD A UNIFIED MODEL

### Traditional and Behavioral Research

This part of the report will suggest general outlines for development of a unified model to facilitate studying the domestic and external policies and behavior of the People's Republic in a systematic fashion. The intent is to suggest a construct which will provide a focus for relevant research; which will help to relate a wide range of distinct research undertakings in a meaningful way; which has the possibility of helping to integrate "traditional" political analysis and the so-called "behavioral" approach.

The newer techniques and conceptual frameworks have emerged so fast that few attempts have been made to relate them to the vast amounts of data produced over generations by more traditional scholarship. Problems in the China field offer a rare opportunity for bringing the older and newer styles of research into a reciprocally supportive relationship. As suggested by Thomas Robinson, the older approaches have much to offer which we cannot afford to lose sight of. They present both a challenge to and a cross check on newer behavioral techniques and conceptual frameworks (Robinson, 1966b).

Even within the behavioral camp itself there are difficulties. A multitude of theoretical approaches have been developed, but only a few build on the work that has come before. "There seems to be a dual compartmentalization--of theory from theory and method from method, on the one hand, and theory from method, on the other. This, too, is

probably a product of the speed and richness of progress in the recent period, but it must be rectified before approaches become schools and schools find traditions to defend. New combinations of theory and method must be tried out: let us, for instance, marry systems analysis to simulation and 'power politics' to game theory. We may obtain some bastard offspring but perhaps a genius or two will also emerge (Robinson, 1966a)."

Configuration and Capability

Many of the policies and activities of a nation state can be accounted for in terms of its capabilities, relative to other states, and to its position within the international configuration. Other aspects of policy and behavior must be explained in social, psychological or political terms. This section of the report tries to link policies and behavior with both types of data in a consistent model.

A great deal can be inferred about a nation state, its policies and its behavior by examining aggregate data--through time--with respect to its area, population, productivity and other capabilities as compared to the capabilities of other states. It is often these considerations which determine the setting in which a state must operate and which constrain its activities in some directions and provide it with important options in other directions. The following propositions are suggestive:

1. Successful maintenance of the political system requires on the part of the leaders a balancing of demands and supports from the environment--including demands and supports from their own populace and also demands and supports from other nation states. National leaders try to maximize their possibilities for maintaining office

by meeting enough of these external and internal demands to insure a balance of supports. If such demands should greatly exceed the level of support, the leadership runs the risk of losing its position. Normally, the security and survival of the state override all other public values in the minds of the national leaders. However, nations often differ markedly in the means they use in pursuit of these basic ends.

a. To what extent do these fundamental goals seem to account for the decisions of the Chinese Communist leadership at any given time?

b. What values, if any, might be expected to override the urge for survival, that is, can we identify any goal, ideological or otherwise, which the Chinese Communist leadership would consider more important than preservation of the basic security, sovereignty and well-being of the People's Republic?

2. For a nation state to achieve its basic security and survival goals at a minimal level is not sufficient for stability or operational effectiveness. The wider the margin of resources, consensual domestic order and cohesiveness, and national productivity, the higher the probability of survival.

a. How wide are the Chinese Communist margins at any given time?

b. To what extent can decisions of the Chinese Politburo be accounted for at any particular time in these terms?

c. Can the minimal level for reasonably assured Chinese stability be calculated in objective, quantified terms, and if so, how does the actual level of Chinese operation compare with this reasonable level?

3. In pursuing these fundamental national interests the leaders of a strong nation frequently try to achieve and maintain external capabilities greater than those of any other state in the system --although again there are marked differences in the means which different nations prefer and rely upon. Their efforts are constrained, however, by domestic needs and by limitations on the amount of the state's resources and on its ability to use those resources. Historically, the two, three, four or five most powerful nation states in the world system have frequently found themselves in close, sometimes bitter competition for optimal influence, drawing heavily on domestic resources.

   a. To what extent does the Chinese Communist leadership aspire to world primacy for the People's Republic?

   b. To the extent that they do so aspire, in what ways do such aspirations influence domestic and foreign policy decisions?

   c. What are the major constraints on the policies and activities of the Chinese Communist leadership?

4. The more successfully the leaders of a nation state balance demands and supports from the environment--including demands and supports from their own populace and also demands and supports from other nation states, the higher the probability of survival. National leaders try to maximize their possibilities for maintaining office by meeting enough of these external and internal demands to insure a balance of supports. If such demands should greatly exceed the level of support, the leadership runs the risk of losing its position.

a. What are the major domestic and external demands and supports and how do they balance out at any given time for the Chinese Communist leadership?

b. To what extent can Chinese Communist decision-making be accounted for in terms of efforts on the part of the leadership to maintain the level of support at least somewhat in excess of the level of demands?

c. To what extent can the external behavior of the Chinese Communist leadership be accounted for in terms of domestic demands?

5. If the ability of a state--through its leaders--to manage, control or constrain its external or internal environments (or both) falls below a certain threshold, there is likely to be a change in the leadership. Or, if this capability falls too low, below an even more critical threshold, there is likely to be a revolution.

a. What considerations might be identified as defining these two thresholds, and how much of the definition derives from the external environment, how much from the domestic?

b. What are the principle means employed by the regime to manage, constrain or control the external environment? What alternative means exist?

c. What are the principle means employed by the regime to manage, constrain or control the domestic environment? What alternative means exist?

Incongruities or Discrepancies and their Potential Dynamic

6. An incongruity or discrepancy between the actual external condition of a nation state and its preferred external condition gives rise to dissatisfaction, or tension. Such dissatisfaction or tension, in turn, impels on the part of the leadership the selection of some activity calculated to alter the environment to one degree or another and thus reduce or eliminate the discrepancy and dissatisfaction. The discrepancy may be registered in absolute terms or also, when one state is measuring itself against another state, in differential rates of growth or other change.

   a. How would one most accurately and efficiently identify the external conditions preferred by Chinese Communist leaders?

   b. How would one most accurately and efficiently measure the difference between the external conditions preferred by the regime and the actual external conditions?

   c. How do these preferred external conditions relate to the office-holding threshold and the revolution threshold cited in Proposition 5? Are they compatible or at least partially in conflict?

7. Similarly, an incongruity or discrepancy between the actual domestic condition of the nation state and the preferred internal condition gives rise to dissatisfaction or tension, and the selection of some activity calculated to alter the domestic environment and thus reduce or eliminate the discrepancy and dissatisfaction.

   a. How would one most accurately and efficiently identify the domestic conditions preferred by the Chinese Communist leaders?

   b. How would one most accurately and efficiently measure the difference between the domestic conditions preferred by the regime and the actual domestic conditions?

c. How do these preferred domestic conditions relate to the office-holding threshold and the revolution threshold cited in Proposition 5?

d. How do these preferred domestic conditions relate to the actual external conditions and also to the external conditions preferred by the regime? Are they compatible, partially in conflict, or mutually exclusive?

8. Often, however, the leaders must choose between the allocation of energy and resources to the reduction of discrepancies emerging from the external environment and those emerging from the domestic environment. Frequently this type of problem is referred to in terms of a choice between "guns and butter."

a. To what extent have Chinese Communist leaders found themselves confronted by this type of choice? In what spheres of policy have the choices had to be made?

b. Is it possible to make generalisations about the way Chinese Communist leaders have made this type of choice? To what extent have they undertaken certain foreign policies at the expense of important domestic policies, or vice versa?

c. Is it possible to identify the basic values or goals that have shaped Chinese Communist choices?

9. The capabilities of a state derive fro its location, area and natural resources; its population; levels of technology, industry and production; trade; and military strength or potential. The contribution of population numbers depends, however, upon the ability of the people to produce more than they consume.

a. What are the operating capabilities (and the potential capabilities) of the People's Republic objectively measured in terms

of absolute levels and also in terms of rates of growth or other change?

b. How do these capabilities compare with the capabilities of neighboring states and of major powers?

c. To what extent does the Chinese population contribute to Chinese capabilities, and to what extent is it a constraint or hinderance? How will the implications of population change with changes in technology?

10. Each additional increment of population in a state constitutes an additional demand upon the resources of that state. This means that in order to contribute to the capabilities of a state, a given increment of population must produce creative energies beyond the value of the resources these additional people consume. Thus, a large population enhances the power of a state to the extent that a substantial part of the people are productive well beyond their own subsistence requirements.

a. How are productive capabilities distributed among the Chinese populace?

b. What are the rates of change in these distributions, and what are future rates of change likely to be?

c. What effects will these rates of change in distribution have on the future capabilities of the People's Republic?

11. A nation state can also seek to increase its capabilities by allying with another state. In selecting this strategy the leadership of a state will try to obtain alliance partners that will provide maximal strength in return for minimal return concession or payment, risk of domination or other cost.

a. What have been the alliance pattern and strategy of the People's Republic since 1950?

b. To what extent have various capabilities of the People's Republic been enhanced (or constrained or diminished) by these alliance patterns and strategies?

c. What was the effect upon Chinese Communist capabilities of the alliance with the Soviet Union, and what has been the effect of the straining of that alliance?

d. What is the balance sheet of Chinese Communist gains and concessions or costs emerging from their alliance strategy?

12. Depending upon national history and culture, upon their assessment of the international system of which their country is a part, and upon their assessments of their country's own relative capabilities and other attributes, the leaders of a nation state will tend to pursue some general strategy of operation in order to achieve or approximate their goals. State strategies often differ considerably, two nations employing quite distinct means for pursuing the same or similar goals.

a. What characterizes the strategy of operation employed by the People's Republic since 1950?

b. From their strategy (or strategies), what can we infer about their assessments of their country's capabilities and other attributes relative to the capabilities and other attributes of neighboring states and of various other states?

c. From their strategy (or strategies), what can we infer about their assessments of the international system?

d. To what extent do Chinese Communist assessments appear congruent or incongruent with realities as perceived and measured by the outside observer?

13. It has been noted frequently that new nations--including the United States in the early nineteenth century--tend to focus upon their own internal economic and technological growth and upon problems of nation building and to avoid "entangling alliances" abroad. The predisposition is toward maintaining a military establishment designed for minimal protection against outside attack and for strengthening a sense of order and cohesion at home. Insofar as such nations tend to get involved in war they are likely to be defenders rather than aggressors--except that they frequently take initiatives in order to adjust or extend uncertain sectors of their boundaries or to reestablish control over territory which the leaders feel has been alienated from the national sovereignty.

a. To what extent does the People's Republic appear to have operated according to this style since 1950?

b. To the extent that the People's Republic appears to have operated according to this style, in what ways can we account for this type of behavior?

14. Another category of nation state is illustrated by modern Sweden which, while maintain small but well-trained army, tries to control its external a. internal environments through diplomacy. trade and domestic growth in terms of specialized skills and carefully chosen concentrations of effort. Often the policy of this category of state--with respect to international affairs--is to seek comparative advantage relations with other states rather than to rely on intense or hostile competition, threat, coercion or armed force.

a. To what extent, if any, has the People's Republic depended upon this style of operation?

b. To whatever extent the People's Republic has employed this style of operation, in what spheres of activity have the operations taken place, and with what countries?

c. To the extent that this style has been employed, in what ways can we best account for it?

15. A third category of nation state tries to avoid "entangling alliances" and military involvement in the world arena, but uses every capability at its command--including military force--to compete against other nations and gain advantage on a local or regional level.

a. To what extent can the People's Republic be said to fall into this category?

b. To whatever extent it does, in what spheres of activity and with what countries has it carried out the two contrasting styles of operation?

c. To whatever extent the People's Republic operates in this style, how can we best account for such behavior?

16. A fourth category of state comprises those that are not yet Great Powers, but which display strong economic and industrial growth, dominate regionally, aspire to Great Power status, and tend already to behave in ways that are characteristic of Great Powers. Japan and the United States seem to have fitted into this category around the last turn of century--although the two countries used quite different methods in pursuit of their goals.

a. To what extent does the People's Republic appear to fall into this category?

b. On the basis of what particular behavior or inferred goals can it be said that the People's Republic appears to belong at least partially in this category?

c. To the extent that the People's Republic appears to operate like a state aspiring to Great Power status, how can we best account for this style and pattern of behavior?

17. Great Powers normally try to achieve and maintain external capabilities at least equal to if not greater than those of any other state in the system--although their methods and styles of operation differ notably. They frequently maintain powerful military establishments; they tend to become involved in international politics in many parts of the globe; often they assert a sense of responsibility for keeping the international peace and protecting the rights and security of lesser powers in which they have an interest. In the contemporary context Great Powers frequently employ elaborate information or propaganda apparati, trade and aid programs, and various subversive and other interventions in attempts to influence or control other states and thus to enhance control or influence over the international environment. Like lesser states, however, and in spite of their greater resources, Great Powers are also constrained by their limitations and domestic requirements. In efforts to constrain, influence or control their external environments, therefore, they not only try to maximize their own individual strength, but also tend to seek alliances. The characteristics and behaviors of these alliances depend to a large extent upon the characteristics of the various nation states in the system and especially upon their relative capabilities. Alliance formation may also be strongly affected by grievances--

as when one state has increased its territory at the expense of another.

a. Are there any useful criteria for distinguishing a Great Power from a state that is strong, but not a Great Power?

b. Insofar as it is possible to distinguish, does the People's Republic appear to be a Great Power, or nearly a Great Power?

c. Does the People's Republic behave in ways that are commonly thought to be characteristic of Great Powers, and if it does, how can we best account for such behavior?

d. If the People's Republic is not a Great Power, is it likely to become one, and if so, when?

18. The strongest nation state tends to measure itself against the second strongest nation state--often in terms of comparative rates of growth. Because of its position, the strongest state often feels compelled to defend the status quo, and this inclination is likely to contribute to its involvement in "police actions" and wars against dissatisfied nations aggressively in search of a new order.

a. To what extent does this appear to be an accurate and useful assertion?

b. If it is not an accurate assertion, on what basis is it not? How could it b re-stated?

c. To the extent that this statement is accurate and useful, and if we assume for the time being that the Un States is the strongest nation and the Soviet Union is the second strongest, what, if any, are the implications for China? Are the implications different if we assume that the Soviet Union is the strongest nation and the United States is the second strongest?

d. What are the implications for the United States and the Soviet Union if the People's Republic becomes significantly stronger?

e. What are the implications for the United States and the Soviet Union if the People's Republic becomes significantly weaker or even collapses?

19. The second strongest nation state tends to measure itself against the strongest and against the third strongest. In some configurations the second strongest nation state may be a candidate for the role of dissatisfied and aggressive challenger of the status quo.

a. To what extent does this appear to be an accurate and useful assertion?

b. To the extent that this assertion is accurate, and if we assume that the United States is the strongest nation, the Soviet Union is second strongest, and Japan is third strongest, what implications, if any, does this have for China? Do the implications change if we change the rank order assumptions, and if so, in what ways?

20. Other nation states tend to measure themselves, at least hypothetically, against the strongest nation state, but more immediately against both the state that is next stronger and the one that is next weaker.

a. To what extent does this appear to be an accurate and useful assertion?

b. If it is accurate, to what extent do Chinese Communist leaders measure their country against the United States?

c. If Great Britain is the next stronger country after Communist

China and West Germany is the next weaker, what are the implications for the People's Republic?

d. How different would the implications be if Japan were the next stronger? Or the next weaker?

An Indication of Dissatisfaction or Tension

21. Thus, an increment of lessening of the differences between the capacity of the strongest power in a system and the second strongest power in the same system may serve as an incremental indicator of tension or dissatisfaction in the strongest power.

a. To what extent does this appear to be an accurate and useful assertion?

b. If it is accurate, and if the strongest and second strongest powers are the United States and the Soviet Union, what are the implications for the People's Republic and its relations with the other two countries?

22. On the other hand, an incremental increase in the difference between the capacity of the strongest power in the system and the second strongest power in the same system may serve as an incremental indicator of dissatisfaction or tension in the second strongest power. In either case, the potential dynamic is to a considerable degree generated by changes (and rates of change) in difference rather than by absolute amounts.

a. To what extent does this appear to be an accurate and useful assertion?

b. If it is accurate, and if the strongest and second strongest powers are the United States and the Soviet Union, what are the implications for the People's Republic and its relations

with the other two countries?

23. In general, the widening of the difference in capability between a given nation state and the next stronger power and the lessening of the difference in capability between a nation state and the next weaker power give rise to dissatisfaction or tension in that nation state. However, if the difference in capability (or rates of growth) is too great, or if the functional distance between the two nations is too great, or if the strategy of the states is not to compete for dominance, the likelihood of the generation of dissatisfaction or tension will decrease. [It should be noted that there are many other possible sources of tension for a nation state. The postulation here is that for states involved in competitive relationships, these differences are likely to become major tension sources.]

a. To what extent is this an accurate and useful statement?

b. To the extent that it is accurate, what are its implications for the People's Republic in its relations with the next stronger and weaker nation states?

c. Historically, to what degree can the behavior of China be explained in these terms?

24. Tension can also be generated through a direct provocation--as when one state increases its territory at the expense of another. In such an instance, we might expect tension to be generated even though the aggrieved state succeeded in achieving overall capability superior to the capability of the state that had deprived it of its territory.

a. To what extent, historically, can the external behavior of China be explained in terms of provocations (and Chinese capabilities at the time of such provocation)?

b. To what extent can current policies and behaviors of the People's Republic be explained in terms of recent provocations or recollections of provocations in the past?

c. Against the background of past provocations, what are the implications of increased Chinese capabilities since 1950?

25. In order to challenge and overtake a stronger power or in order to defend its position against an encroaching weaker power, a nation state may undertake any one of a number of strategies or a combination of two or more such strategies. For the most part, these strategies involve increasing the capabilities of the state, or reallocating resources from one category of capability to another.

a. To what extent can Chinese Communist behavior since 1950 be accounted for in these terms?

b. Insofar as Chinese Communist behavior can be accounted for in these terms, what strategy or combination of strategies has the People's Republic relied upon?

26. More specifically, a nation state can increase its capabilities through internal growth (population growth or a growth in productivity); through trade; through acquisition of territory and population by conquest, purchase, discovery or preemption; through increase of its military capabilities; through alliances; or through a combination of these developments.

a. Specifically, which of these strategies, or what combination of these strategies has the People's Republic relied upon?

b. In more detail, what means has the People's Republic used in attempting to carry out its major strategies?

c. If the People's Republic has tried to implement a combination of strategies, what has been the relative emphasis placed

upon them?

27. As indicated above, however, an increase in population means an increase in consumption and an increase in demands upon the resources and national product of the state. These are subsistence requirements. Beyond these, the productive potentials of a population may require additional raw materials and markets if their production potential is to be realized. Thus, increases in population and increases in productivity may, while contributing to the capacity of the nation, also raise additional demands for increasing national control over or influence within the international environment.

a. How are productive capabilities distributed among the Chinese populace?

b. In balance, has the Chinese population enhanced or constrained the capabilities of the People's Republic?

c. Given projections of probable population growth and rates of economic, technological and educational change, are Chinese Communist capabilities likely to increase or decrease over the next decades and at what rate?

28. So it is that the internal growth of a state, whether or not it is part of a consciously conceived policy, may lead--indeed, if it is sufficiently vigorous, is almost certain to lead--toward an increase in the external activities of the state and a disturbance in the international equilibrium.

a. In what ways has internal growth--population, economic, technological, educational--affected the behavior of the People's Republic?

b. In view of probable rates of growth in China, in other countries of Asia, and in major world powers over coming decades, in

what ways are the international system and its configurations likely to be altered?

Strategies for Enhancing Capabilities, Influence and Control

29. In general, a nation state is no stronger than its basic capabilities (area, resources, population, level of productivity, and so forth). However, its military and political power can sometimes be enhanced by drastic reallocation of resources--greater investment in heavy industry and military equipment at the expense of consumer goods, for example.

a. To what extent has the People's Republic sought to enhance its capabilities in this way?

b. Insofar as the People's Republic has attempted such reallocations, what has been the outcome, and what are the implications for the future?

30. These various considerations suggest that the international system is always in a more or less dynamic condition with states continually testing each other's capabilities and displaying great lability of tensions in their relations with one another.

a. If this is a reasonably accurate assertion, we may expect the international system--in view of differential population growths and differential rates of economic and technological change--to undergo spectacular alterations between now and the turn of the century. To what extent can we foresee the shape of things to come, and what are the implications for international affairs?

b. What are the possibilities, in these changing circumstances, for achieving and maintaining a relatively viable and secure international equilibrium?

31. In these terms we might postulate that the higher the tension between two states, the greater the probability that each of them will choose a military strategy and the greater the probability of armed conflict between them.

a. To what extent can Chinese Communist policies and activities be accounted for in these terms?

b. What would be some of the major constraints modifying the operation of this proposition?

32. The lower the tension between one state and another state--compared with the tension between either of these states and a third state --the greater the possibility of alliance between these two states.

a. Can Chinese Communist alliance patterns be accounted for in these terms?

b. Given their respective capabilities and tension profiles, what seem to be the probable future alliance patterns of the People's Republic, the U.S.S.R. and the United States--particularly as nuclear technology is further developed?

33. As a nation state increases its capabilities relative to the capabilities of the next stronger power, its tensions vis-a-vis the stronger power will lessen provided the trend continues and the stronger power is not perceived by the weaker power as preparing counter measures. But see No. 35, below.

a. Does the case of the People's Republic provide evidence?

b. What are the probable capability and tension trends in Asia?

34. However, as a weaker nation increases its strength vis-a-vis a stronger nation, the tension of the stronger nation is likely to increase, and its leadership, in turn, will feel the need of increasing capabilities through growth or through the re-allocation of resources, or the achievement of new allies or all three.

With each increment of strength gained by the stronger nation, however, the tension increases again for the weaker nation, which now feels under compulsion to undertake additional efforts.

a. To what extent can the relationships of the People's Republic with other nation states be accounted for in these terms?

b. In these terms, what are the probable trends in Asia?

c. What are the probable world trends?

35. As the gap between the capabilities of a weaker power and the next stronger power (especially if it is the strongest power) narrows below a certain threshold, the overtaking power may suffer anxiety inverse to the rate of change in the closing of the gap. This means that the tension suffered by the stronger power is matched by the anxiety of the weaker power.

a. If we accept West Germany as the next stronger power, does this proposition seem to hold?

b. If we accept France as the next stronger power, does this proposition seem to hold?

c. Does this general proposition seem to hold with respect to the relations of the People's Republic with the U.S.S.R. or the United States?

d. To the extent that the proposition does not hold empirically, can it be re-stated to account for some significant part of Chinese Communist behavior?

36. The narrower the gap--below a certain threshold--between the capabilities of a weaker power and the next stronger power (especially if it is the strongest power), or between an aspiring Great Power and the one or two strongest Great Powers, the greater the anxiety of the weaker power; the greater the tension of the stronger power; the greater the tendency of the stronger power to take counter

measures; the greater the tendency of the lesser power to overestimate the counter activities taken by the stronger power (and the generation of a reciprocating predisposition on the part of the stronger power); the greater the tendency for grievances to be remembered and made salient; the greater the tendency for the material competition to be thus augmented by psychological conflict; the greater the tendency toward exchanges of threat and counter-threat; and the higher the probability that an "incident" or provocation will precipitate a crisis.

a. To what extent does this set of propositions seem to account for some significant part of the policies and activities of the People's Republic?

b. Can the set of propositions be re-stated to account more effectively for a significant portion of the policies and activities of the People's Republic?

37. Marshalling its capabilities, pursuing its goals and interacting with other countries, a nation state may carry out its strategies --and perceive and respond to the strategies of others--largely in comparative advantage, non-zero sum terms; or in essentially zero sum terms; or in some combination of these two distinct styles.

a. To what extent do the leaders of the People's Republic seem to have operated in one or another of these styles?

b. How can tendencies toward one or another or all three of these styles be analyzed in a systematic and controlled fashion?

38. In general, the higher the tension felt by the leaders of a nation state (and also, in many instances, by the populace), the stronger

the tendency toward operating in essentially zero sum terms, at least in response to those countries which are perceived by the leadership as antagonistic.

a. To what extent does a tendency toward a zero sum style of operation correlate, empirically, with rising tension?

b. As the People's Republic interacts with other states, to what extent, empirically, do rising levels of tension and zero sum styles of response lead, empirically, into a reaction or Richardson process of reciprocal, spiralling tension and essentially zero sum styles of operation on higher and higher levels of hostile competition, threat, attempted coercion and possibly violence?

## The Decision-Making Processes

Up to this point we have been suggesting ways in which a significant part of Chinese Communist policies and behaviors can be accounted for in terms of the capabilities of the People's Republic, in terms of its position within the objective configuration of the international system, and in terms of basic national security and some level of control or influence over its domestic and external environments optimal for national survival as a major purpose or goal. We have had little or nothing to say about Chinese history, the Chinese Communist decision-making processes, or Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology. The problem now is to link these considerations of capability, ranking, and survival with other important, often more elusive, elements in the decision process. In this section we shall be considering to what extent Chinese Communist policies and behaviors must be accounted for in terms of perceptions, memories, habits, beliefs, values, purposes, feelings, expectations, and other subjective, essentially psychological phenomena.

attitudes of those relatively few individuals in any given government who make foreign policy determinations and commit their nations to a course in international activity.

The key concept in this approach is the perception, the process by which decision-makers detect and assign meaning to inputs from their environment. Thus, we are concerned with the ways in which Mao Tse-tung or Liu Shao-ch'i or other major leader sees the world, the people and the events around them.

For an individual--including the leader of a Communist state--to respond to a person, object, event or situation, there must first be the detection of signals, which is a function of the senses. In addition, however, the decision-maker--like other human beings--must have some code, a set of concepts or images, which permits him to interpret the meaning of the stimulus.

For the leader of a Communist state--as for other human beings--these codes are largely a product of training and experience. The infant with normal hearing can detect the sound waves created by human voices. But there is little understanding, and therefore little influence on the behavior of the child, until he learns the code (language) which permits him to organize and interpret the sound waves into meaningful patterns. In the case of top Chinese Communist leaders we would expect some of these codes to be traditionally Chinese in origin, others to have emerged from early family, village or other local experience, others to have derived from Marxist-Leninist sources, and still others to be the outcome of many years of guerrilla experience, the Long March, rural indoctrination, and the like. This, then, is one of the major points where history, tradition, culture, the training and other experiences [illegible] that decision-makers, personally [illegible] [illegible] events.

idiosyncracy all may come to bear on the making of decisions.

These various views, predispositions, beliefs and concepts become the "lenses" through which the individual makes sense of the otherwise unmanageable number of signals from the environment with which he is bombarded every instant. Clearly, they affect his perceptions of the world, of events, of other people and of himself.

Some concepts are relatively simple and may be subject to little variation across individuals or time. Other concepts are more complex and open to disagreement. As Snyder (1958, 104) has pointed out, complexity, ambiguity, and lack of stability are a few of the characteristics which tend to differentiate the foreign policy decision-making of all countries from that in other settings. Obviously, we are interested in generalities that apply more or less to all situations on the national and international levels, but even more we would like to identify, analyze and understand the peculiar perceptions and codes of Mao, his colleagues [illegible] their successors.

Much [illegible] of the field of international relations and nation [illegible] actions--non-verbal behavior--[illegible] as the basic datum. Considerable [illegible] work has also been done with respect to [illegible] content of speeches, dispatches and other documents [illegible]. Research in the first category--action analysis--usually isolates and investigates the overt, more or less gross behavior of states, while research in the second category is normally used to determine what can be termed <u>perception</u>, or cognitive structure, <u>Plan</u> or <u>intention</u>, decision-making process and the like. These are some of the ways of carrying out "research at a distance" from the subjects under study. An effective model must be able to relate "objective reality," cognition, evaluation, feeling

[illegible] in meaningful and systematic ways.

Feedback and Mediating Processes

In propositions 6 and 7, under Incongruities or Discrepancies and their Potential Dynamic above, we referred to incongruities or discrepancies between the actual condition of a nation state (domestic or external) and the condition preferred by its leadership (and perhaps also its populace) as giving rise to dissatisfaction or tension. We suggested the use of objective, aggregate data for determining discrepancies, but made no effort, at that point, to introduce perceptions of discrepancy or incongruity, evaluations, feelings, expectations, intentions or other essentially psychological phenomena in any systematic way. In their book, Plans and the Structure of Human Behavior, Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960) refer to TOTE, that is, Test-Operate-Test-Exit, wherein an action is initiated by an "incongruity" between the actual state of a system and a potential new state that is being tested for, and the action persists until the incongruity--the proximal stimulus--is removed. "The general pattern of reflex action is to test the input energies against some criteria established in the organism, to respond if the result of the test is to show incongruity, and to continue to respond until the incongruity vanishes, at which time the reflex is terminated. Thus, there is 'feedback' from the result of the action to the testing phase, and we are confronted by a recursive loop (Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960, 26)." Processes of learning behavior are similar but involve marked modification of broad behavior strategies and patterns on the basis of wide and long term testing experience. In these terms we may view the incongruity or discrepancy between the outcome of a given test and the criteria

established by the organism [illegible] rise to dissatisfaction or tension.

Living systems and systems [illegible] members function to bring about alterations and transformations in the environment and its configurations--including changes in relationships between one system (or a coalition of systems) and other individual (or allied) systems. They are constrained or otherwise influenced, however, by their capabilities relative to the physical environment and to other actors in the system and by their self-perceptions, their perceptions of the physical environment, their perceptions of other actors, and so forth.

The individual human being, in undertaking transformations, responds to environmental events or stimuli (S) including the behavior of other actors, with his own activities (R), which to one degree or another alter the previous state of affairs in the surroundings. Intervening between the stimulus event (S) and the overt response (R) are various encoding and decoding procedures (see Figure 1).

The incongruities or discrepancies referred to in propositions 5 and 7 exist objectively in a given situation, and their dimensions are defined in terms of area, population, Gross National Product (or rough equivalents), budget allocations, and the like. These aggregate data are useful, even basic, but they do not tell us how Chinese Communist or other national decision-makers perceive, evaluate, or subjectively define whatever incongruities or discrepancies exist. A fundamental problem confronting the investigator is how to relate the objective data with the cognitive, interpretive and evaluative data which also exist objectively but which are shaped by the training, broad experience, personal attitudes, habits, views, predispositions, preferences, goals and idiosyncracies of individual decision-makers. These latter are the mediating elements of the model which can be categorized generally as decoding and encoding processes.

| ENVIRONMENT | | ACTOR | | BEHAVIOR | CONSEQUENCES |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Configuration | Situation (S) | Decoding | Encoding | Output (R) | Transformation |
| China and the other nations with which it interacts in terms of (1) respective characteristics (area, population, resources, growth rates, political and military power, etc.); (2) spacial relations; and (3) frequency and content of interactions. | The set of events, actors and their relationships at a particular time. | The perception of environmental phenomena, including the behavior of other parties, the evaluation of these phenomena, and feelings generated by them. | The emotional charging and selecting of one out of alternative strategies of behavior. | The overt behavior. | The change or changes effected on the environment. |

Memory, habit, expectation, goals and the like.

Figure 1.

Decoding refers to the way the individual's central nervous system (or the decision and control apparatus of an organization) receives and processes information from the situation or environment--the internal responses to stimuli (S). These decoding processes include: information translation, i.e., the translation of stimuli (S) into neural impulses; information transmission from the periphery of the nervous system toward the decision-making center; information integration in terms of past experience (Cf. James Miller, 1965, 356, re stored information or memory) and other information "stored" from the past; and information interpretation and the arousal of feelings about it (Osgood and North, 1963).

Encoding comprises efforts on the part of an individual to select and execute a response (R) to the environmental event (S) which has excited him. Initial encoding processes include the selection of a response plan or response hierarchy and the emotional charging or activation of it. These policy and decision-making processes include the comparison--in terms of appropriateness--of various possible plans or strategies of means-end hierarchies of response on the basis of (a) goals, (b) past experience and habit, and (c) emotions and feelings. Also involved is the activation or emotional charging of one plan or strategy above the others, which then provides a basis for behavior (Osgood and North, 1963).

Mediating processes include phenomena of perception (or, more precisely, cognition, interpretation, and evaluation), affect, memory, values, goals, purposes, intention, selection of intention, activation, decision, and so forth. These are electro-chemical processes within the central nervous system of the individual human being. There are analogies between the decoding and encoding processes of the individual, on the one hand, and organizational--including nation state--information

gathering and decision-making on the other.

Both individual memories and public memories bear upon the decision-making process. Inescapably a national leader is influenced by his recollections of past events--both those in which he has been personally involved, and others he has read about and been told about. There is abundant evidence that Mao Tse-tung, for example, is profoundly influenced by China's plight during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, and also by his personal experiences, especially as a revolutionist and guerrilla leader in Kiangsi on the Long March and in Yenan. But unquestionably he is influenced, also, by his awareness of public memories--those memories that are shared by large numbers of his colleagues or by the Chinese populace at large. The problem is to ascertain not only which of these memories influence Chinese Communist policy today, but also which are likely to persist after the passing of the current leadership and thus to continue affecting Chinese behavior in the years to come.

Each individual human being is likely to maintain some characteristic views of the universe, of man's role in it, and of his own particular position and interactions with his fellows. There will be memories, habits, preferences, attitudes, expectations, perceptions of (beliefs about) what is, what has been, what ought to be, and what will, can, and cannot be. There will be expectations of "self" and of various "others." There will be identifications and loyalties. To the extent that some of these perceptions, values, preferences, expectations, identifications, loyalties, and habits are shared and/or reciprocated and/or complemented by other individuals in the environment we have a foundation for community, for custom, for what Durkheim (1960) called the <u>conscience collective</u>, for law, and for institutions.

Indeed, we can go a long way toward explaining laws and institutions if we view them as expectations of interaction validated by more or less habitual responses. In any case, the behavior of the individual will be profoundly influenced by his perception o --and feelings about --such more or less shared phenomena. Durkheim viewed the conscience collective as the great stabilizer of an integrated society.

We may properly ask, then, what are the perceptions of Chinese leaders with respect to the universe, man's role in it, and the nature of relations between men historically, in the present, and in the future. What are traditional and contemporary Chinese views about chance, or fortune, on the one hand, and man's ability to shape or control events on the other? Which of these perceptions emerge from traditional Chinese sources, which from Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology, which from personal experience, and which from a blend of these considerations? To what extent have elements of the traditional Chinese conscience collective survived and to what extent have these elements been supplanted by a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist conscience collective? Or, to put the question another way, to what extent do traditional elements persist in the conscience collective as it operates today? We know that a considerable part of the Chinese Communist effort has been directed--through thought reform and other efforts--to destroy the traditional conscience collective and replace it with a whole new ethic. There are evidences, however, not only that many old values and ways of doing things survive among the people, but also that Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues despite their immersion in dialectics derived from Marxist-Leninist sources, at times respond in ways that are traditional and Confucian rather than Communist.

There can be little doubt about the powerful influence of routine --cultural habits, traditions, customs and institutions--in China down through the centuries until the revolution of 1911 and even until the overthrow of the Nationalist regime in 1949. As one of the world's two oldest civilizations (along with India), early twentieth century China had some 2500 years of almost unbroken cultural lineage behind it. There had been ebbs and flows of political power and cultural salience, but the basic institutions had been pervasive and persistent. Today the crucial question here is whether the Communist regime has brought about a nearly complete and permanent change in Chinese habits, customs, traditions and styles of operation, or whether many of the old patterns and predispositions persist, or are likely to reappear. Again, a basic problem is to try to discover how much of Chinese Communist behavior is attributable to historical and cultural considerations, how much to dimensions of power or capability, how much to ideology, and how much to the personal attributes and idiosyncracies of Mao Tse-tung and other leaders.

The encoding phenomena--purposes, goals, intentions, activation and decision--correspond generally to what Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960) refer to as Plans in individual behavior.

Analogously, on the nation state (or other interpersonal) level, the stimulus (S) and response (R) represent overt, observable events --both verbal and non-verbal--in the environment external to the system itself. This does not mean that such events necessarily occur outside the territorial space of an interpersonal system. On the contrary, for example, an earthquake or other natural disaster taking place inside the frontiers of a nation state, or the explosion of a bomb or missile launched by an agent outside the decision-making and communications

system of the system but inside its territorial limits would normally qualify as an external stimulus (S) and response (R) event.

Within a nation state system input information is first received (and processed) by individual human beings--diplomats, intelligence agents, military personnel in foreign outposts, and a variety of other official and unofficial agents. This information must pass through the decoding and encoding apparati of individual human beings somewhere along the line in order to become an input and be translated into written or oral symbols (or Morse code symbols, and the like). It is then transmitted further into the system along established communication channels crudely analogous to neural transmission processes within the individual.

At some point, or at several points, the input information is integrated by officers of the nation state system in terms of past experience, as stored in historical archives, operational codes, the memories and skills of trained personnel, and so forth. Again, it is processed through the decoding and encoding sectors of individual nervous systems at every step. More or less simultaneously the incoming information is now interpreted by officers of state (and others, too, if communications are sufficiently open) and feelings about it are generated. It is evaluated in terms of personal and societal values, norms, customs, laws, habits and expectations. These processes give rise, in turn, to the generation and activation--within one or more decision makers--of intentions and emotionally charged inclinations as the first step in decision-making. If the information is considered important, there is likely to be a considerable amount of comparing of interpretation, reinterpretation, comparing of intention, the generation of new intentions and activations, and much personal interaction before one plan or "decision-hierarchy" out of two or more available plans or decision hierarchies--is (in one way or another) decided upon. The choice will

be influenced by experience, habit, custom, law and similar phenomena.

The decision, once activated, is integrated, that is, various constituent parts fall into place and the whole is made to fit somehow into the broad strategies of the nation's behavior. Then it is transmitted--in written or oral or other symbol form--outward toward the periphery of the system where agents translate it out of the system's code into actions upon the environment.

These generalized functions are likely to be performed by the leadership hierarchy of any nation state or other complex organization, but the procedural patterns and details may vary enormously. A part of our long range problem is to determine, or at least to infer as much as possible, about the ways in which these functions are performed by the People's Republic.

Among shared or public mediating processes within the state system are more or less institutionalized habit patterns, customs, laws, societal values--the conscience collective--and responses and response patterns that have been used with some frequency in the past. We would expect these habit patterns to be persistent and resistant to change in a culture as old as China's. In general, such phenomena become operational within a system to the extent that the central leaders perceive them and take them seriously--whether or not they deeply share them. In any case, with respect to the individual decision-makers, they are likely to be buttressed or tempered or paid lip service or ignored according to the mediating elements within that individual--including those elements that pertain to his personal habit patterns, his perception and assessment of his own role and capacity and his perceptions of the role and capacity of the state.

Inescapably, then, the decoding and encoding processes that intervene and mediate between an environmental stimulus (S) and nation state behavior (R) constitute a combination of electro-chemical phenomena occurring within individual human evaluators, decision-makers, and the like and of sign and symbol communications transmitted from person to person orally, in writing, or Morse code, or by gesture, facial expression or other observable activity. Even the simplest operations involve systems and sub-systems on various organizational echelons and also on distinct organizational levels including always the individual.

With respect to the behavior of nation states (or other interpersonal systems) the electro-chemical phenomena occurring within individual human components of the system must be inferred--to a large extent--rather than directly observed. On the other hand, many aspects of the information translation, transmission, integration, interpretation and [illegible] processes (on the [illegible] and decoding side), and the intention, [illegible] translation process as [illegible] interpersonally and [illegible] each other [illegible] in writing) [illegible] of communication [illegible] by [illegible] ational, institu- [illegible] unfold--or by [illegible] the [illegible] documents, taped [illegible] ons, [illegible]

Stimuli (S) [illegible] model--both on the individual and the nation state levels--whereas responses (R) constitute the outputs. A stimulus is an event that takes place objectively without regard to how it is perceived or responded to. A response, the other hand, is an action of an actor without respect to his intent

or how either he or other actors may perceive or feel about it. Thus, both S's and R's are non-evaluative and non-affective; that is, there is no good or bad residing in them inherently--they merely exist. The "good" or "bad" (and other evaluative qualities) are bestowed upon them or attributed to them by various perceivers--or "charged into" them by their perpetrators.

Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960) refer to all the accumulated knowledge that an individual human being has about himself and the world--his values as well as his facts--as the Image. Included are perceptions of the environmental configuration and alterations which the individual would prefer to see take place. All these are among the encoding processes. A Plan is any hierarchical process within the individual human being that can control the order in which a sequence of operations to alter the environment is undertaken. "Changes in the Images can be effected only by executing Plans for gathering, storing or transforming information." These are encoding processes. Conversely, "Changes in the Plans can be effected only by information drawn from the Images."

A public Plan emerges whenever two or more people try to cooperate to attain a result that they would not be willing or able to accomplish alone. "Each member takes upon himself the performance of some fragment of the public plan and incorporates that fragment into his individual personal Plans (Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960, 98)." In these terms the policies and initiatory activation of behavior hierarchies by a nation state are necessarily public Plans.

If we apply the mediated model to nation state decision-making we find--analogously--feedback processes operating between sub-systems of the leadership hierarchy, and feedback within processes of feedback--

including, inescapably, the processes operating within the nervous system of the individual participants.

Ideology, world view, or belief system may have important effects on various parts of the decision-making process. It may contribute to defining the situation: labor (and only labor) creates surplus value; the contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are inherently irreconcilable; imperialist wars are inevitable as long as capitalism is in power. It may see values, asserting that one object or state of affairs is preferable to another: a good Party member should have no personal interests which are at variance with the interests and demands of the Party; socialism should be achieved first of all in one country. Ideology may define choices: there is the capitalist way, there is the socialist way, and there is no other alternative. Ideology may define relationships: the poor peasants are a major ally of the proletariat. It may assert which alternative set of means is preferable: it is better for the peasants to conduct their own land reform tribunals rather than to have Party cadres do it for them. Ideology may influence modes and styles of response and so forth. Yet we cannot assume that ideological principles are operative merely because they have been asserted--although Party leaders often go to considerable lengths in rationalizing their cognitions, purposes and decisions in ideological terms. On the contrary, we need to consider with respect to any major Politburo decision, to what extent it can be accounted for in terms of personal ambition or idiosyncracy, group interaction, national habit or tradition, national self-preservation, or other interest, or a blend of such considerations.

"Competing" Perceptions, Goals, and Response Strategies

When an individual human being makes a decision, we may visualize competing inputs (from the external environment and from his memory, habit structure, and so forth) struggling, so to speak, for influence upon that decision. In this "struggle" some inputs will tend to be dominant and to suppress or override others. Similarly, as he considers choice of response, we may visualize alternative sets or strategies of action "competing" for implementation. In this competition for action, the successful candidate strategy will suppress or override other candidate strategies. Whenever we are analyzing a decision that has been made or are trying to predict the outcome of a decision that is impending, we shall be concerned with the relative value or strength of inputs with the relative value or strength of goals, and with the relative value or strength of alternative strategies or means-end sets of possible behavior. Inputs may gain strength from habit--the way a person habitually perceives things--or from training or other experience, or because they have some special significance, and so forth. The following illustrative propositions have emerged from western decision-making literature. [illegible] assertions hold for Communist China, or [illegible] or cancelled by cultural, ideological or other [illegible] to the extent that they hold, what are their implications [illegible] Republic and its relations with other countries?

1. "The perception process examines information inputs by relating the syntactic and semantic structure of the input messages for explicability. The credibility of the input message is tested by requiring the processes to satisfy criteria on the degree of congruency of elements and relations of the input with

those of the structure (Kessler and Pool, 1965, 177)."

2. We may postulate some set of rules--implicit or explicit, held and applied consciously or unconsciously--which determine what input messages [perceptions] are accepted (Abelson and Bernstein, 1963, 95).

3. "When the message is not already existing in the structure, a search is made in the semantic hierarchy in order to generate new sentences with similar content whose credibility is tested (Kessler and Pool, 1965, 177)."

4. "Messages containing elements not found in the cognitive structure are not explicable and may be put aside to await further information (Kessler and Pool, 1965, 177)."

5. Among the chief determinants of acceptability or non-acceptability are attitudes toward the message source, previous acquaintance with the type of message, congeniality of the message in terms of special predispositions, and position on the issue which the message raises (Abelson and Bernstein, 1963, 95).

6. An assertion is especially likely to be accepted by an individual if it is consistent with his predisposition toward that assertion, and under no circumstances will it be accepted if it runs counter to his predisposition (Abelson and Bernstein, 1963, 101).

7. Thus, ". . . the perception which occurs is the one that least disturbs the person's 'cognitive balance'--least shakes up the interconnecting structure of ideas which he has (de Rivera, 1965)."

8. Receptivity to a source is an inverse function of the extremity of the individual's position, that is, individuals with some more extreme attitude positions are more resistant to influence (Abelson and Bernstein, 1963, 99).

9. People pay more attention to information that deals with them (Kessler and Pool, 1965, 178).

10. People pay less attention to facts that contradict their views (Kessler and Pool, 1965, 178).

11. Receptivity to a given source is a direct function of the attention value of the assertions made by a particular source (Abelson and Bernstein, 1963, 100).

12. People pay more attention to information from a trusted, liked source (Kessler and Pool, 1965, 178).

13. People pay more attention to information bearing on actions they have already taken, i.e., action creates commitment (Kessler and Pool, 1965, 178).

14. People pay more attention to information that they will have to act on or discuss because of attention by others (Kessler and Pool, 1965, 178).

15. Receptivity to a particular source is a direct function of the assertion match between the individual and the source, which is positive when the assertions of the source agree with those already accepted by the individual and negative when they disagree (Abelson and Bernstein, 1963, 100).

16. An assertion is more likely to be accepted by the individual if he has not previously encountered it than if he has previously disagreed with it (Abelson and Bernstein, 1963, 101).

These propositions are merely suggestive and many more could be put forward. However, to the extent that the behavior of the People's Republic--or of any nation state--is affected by the cognitive processes of its leaders, such propositions need to be examined.

It frequently happens that an individual maintains incompatible or mutually exclusive preferences, purposes or goals. To the degree that these preferences, purposes or goals are equally valued, we assert that the individual is in a quandary. The closer the equality of the competing preferences, the greater the quandary. Illustrative is the plight of the hungry but probably apocryphal ass immobilized between two equally attractive bales of hay. Such near equality gives rise to oscillation between alternatives, increased decision time, and so forth Once a clearly defined alternative has emerged, however, its occurrence will tend to interfere with the occurrence of other alternatives (Lewin, 1948).

Sometimes an individual tries to activate incompatible or mutually exclusive Plans. This situation is somewhat similar to the quandary with the difference that his goal is clear, but he is caught between alternative means, or is trying to implement mutually exclusive means and strategies in pursuit of a clearly defined overall goal.

Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960, 97) suggest that a person caught between conflicting Plans may be in a more difficult position than one caught between conflicting goals "He is almost necessarily unaware that his Plans conflict, whereas he may be painfully conscious of his incompatible desires." It frequently happens that two conflicting Plans may be sufficiently isolated from one another that it never occurs to the person to contrast one with the other." This concept might be examined in terms of Mao's writings on contradiction, and also it might be useful to examine Chinese Communist domestic and foreign programs for conflicting schedules of implementation and for clues about the ways in which they are handled.

What determines which alternative course of action is chosen? At least three factors are involved. The past experience of the actor is important because what has happened before may happen again. His momentary "set" is important because it establishes expectancies which are likely to influence what he perceives. And what the actor wants to do is important because "some perceptions will allow him to achieve his desire more easily than others (de Rivera, 1965)."

Charles Osgood defines a decision as the "selection of the most probable alternative within any divergent hierarchy" of possible alternatives. This is conceived as an all-or-nothing phenomenon. "The momentarily most probable alternative, and only this alternative, occurs (Osgood, 1957, 359)." In these terms the decision will be an outcome of activation [motivation? impulse toward reduction of tension?] multiplied by habit strength. This formulation underscores the necessity for bringing past experience, custom, tradition, and the like to bear upon the incongruities, discrepancies or tensions of a given decision situation.

There are other complications. In rational choice models an individual is likely to be viewed as confronted by a number of distinct, specified courses of action. Attached to each of these alternatives is a set of perceived consequences that will ensue if that particular alternative is selected. Each individual develops a system of "utilities" or preferences that permit him to rank these sets of consequences according to preferences and to select that alternative that yields the preferred consequences (Cyert, Simon, and Trow, 1956, 237).

In the real world, however, alternatives frequently are not "given." They must be sought, and consequently the search for alternatives becomes an important aspect of the decision process (Cyert, Simon and Trow, 1956, 237). Furthermore, comparisons among alternatives in real life

are not necessarily made in terms of any single criterion of preference, some consequences often being so intangible that clear cut evaluations are difficult to achieve. Rather than search for the "best" alternative, the decision-maker is frequently concerned with selection of a satisfactory alternative that will attain a specified goal and also satisfy a number of auxiliary conditions (Cyert, Simon and Trow, 1956, 237). In the real world, moreover, the problem itself is not always "given." Rather, the decision-maker is engaged in a search for significant problems to which he or his organization should turn attention (Cyert, Simon and Trow, 1956, 237).

Similarly, it often happens that the consequences are not evident, there being some uncertainty as to which consequences ensue from which alternatives. Hence, the search for consequences also becomes an important part of the decision process (Cyert, Simon and Trow, 1956, 237).

As suggested in propositions 37 and 38 under Strategies for Enhancing Capabilities, Influence and Control, nation states differ among themselves with respect to the modes and styles of operation upon which they rely. There are differences from individual to individual, probably from culture to culture, and also from specific situation to specific situation, with respect to willingness to take risks. There are differences in pace and timing. Also, individual states--through their leaders--tend to alter their response strategies as their circumstances and operational contexts are altered. In this connection, game theory has often been criticized as being too remote from real world politics to be of substantial practical use. More specifically, the point is often made that the political "game" is inherently non-zero sum and that zero sum theory is therefore not applicable. These arguments are well taken. On the other hand, viewed in psycho-political terms, some heads of state and other powerful leaders respond to competition and

choose modes and styles of operation as if they were perceiving the political game in zero sum terms. By contrast, other leaders--or sometimes the same leaders in significantly different situations--choose modes and styles of operation that display non-zero sum, comparative advantage characteristics. As suggested in proposition 38 above, it appears in general that the higher the tension felt by the leaders of a nation state (and also, in many instances, by the populace) the stronger the tendency toward viewing the environment and responding to perceived threats in zero sum or near zero sum terms. Much behavior can be viewed as involving different amounts of zero sum and comparative advantage assumption, perception, and choice of strategy.

Interpersonal Conflict in Decision-Making

Interpersonal competition and conflict is common to virtually all group decision processes. On the nation state level such competition and conflict take a variety of forms depending upon the characteristics of the political system and the culture and traditions that have shaped it. There are considerable differences, for example, in the way interpersonal competition and conflict among leaders is played out within a parliamentary system, such as that of Great Britain, and within a federal, "separation of powers" system such as the United States. We would expect still different patterns in a system such as that of the People's Republic.

With respect to an interpersonal decision-making unit or group we may visualize the competing inputs, the competing goals, and the competing candidate strategies of response as "struggling" for dominance inside each of two or more personal systems, but also the competitors that are successful within one personal system may confront antagonistic

or contradictory competitors that have successfully dominated within their own personal systems--Mao Tse-tung's successful [perception, goal or response] candidates being in opposition, for example, to Liu Shao-ch'i's successful [perception, goal or response] candidates. In simple language, the two men disagree or are in conflict. The interpersonal analogy to the quandary is thus a deadlock. This situation suggests an interpersonal competition which may be resolved in several different ways or in a combination of ways: Mao may persuade Liu; or Liu may persuade Mao; or Liu may defer to Mao, while still disagreeing; or Mao may defer to Liu; or they may draw straws or flip a coin; or, if the whole Politburo is involved, a vote may be taken; or Liu (or Mao) may be eliminated (non-violently or violently) from the decision-making situation; or the whole decision may be postponed or dropped altogether; and so forth.

In many decision-making bodies there are rules, customs or traditions to determine how interpersonal disagreements are to be resolved and a decision reached. There is also considerable evidence to suggest that in times of crisis the patterns for reaching a decision are likely to change. Data from a number of national crisis situations suggest, for example, that as tension or stress increases, the number of top-level participants in the making of a decision tends to decrease. On the other hand, the greater a threat or stress upon a system, the more components of it are involved in the overall adjustment (Miller, 1965, 401). With respect to the Chinese Communist Politburo we have some crude notions about such aspects of decision-making, but for the most part we remain in the dark concerning details and procedures. The question is, can we devise better techniques for discovering or inferring how Politburo decisions are reached and how the processes are affected by changes in context? Can we develop and test a theory of international decision-

making on the Politburo level?

Clearly, the decision-making process is complicated to the extent that two or more leaders of somewhat comparable status and influence are involved in making a public decision. There may be honest differences in perception, goal or preferred Plan; or the individual leaders may be influenced in their predispositions by personal ambition for influence or power. These and other differences may be so mixed as to defy identification either by the leaders themselves or by the investigator. Harold Lasswell's (1935) accounting for the behavior of homo politicus from a premise of "low estimation of self" is profoundly suggestive:

Private Motives

Displaced on Public Objects

Rationalized in Terms of Public Interest

The discrepancy which a national leader perceives between the power and prestige of his nation as compared with the power and prestige of a rival nation may frequently have its analogy in the discrepancy which that same leader perceives between his own power and prestige and the power and prestige of a rival leader. Under such circumstances we would not be surprised to find ambitious leaders using national issues and resources and the power and prestige of their offices in order to protect or further their personal positions. Leaders are frequently accused of resorting to war as a means of securing themselves in office. We would thus expect to find personal goals and interests more or less inextricably confused with national goals and interests in many decision situations.

In general, we would expect that the greater the influence or power of one decision-maker relative to the influence or power of the others, the greater the probability that his perceptions, goals, and choice on

Plan will prevail. Depending upon the circumstances and configurations of influence or power, however, a group of decision-makers may be susceptible to the formation of coalitions--based on bargaining, threat, or both--in order to achieve the dominance of one set of perceptions, goals and choice of Plan over a competing set.

Research dealing in a general fashion with conflict within the Chinese Communist political elite has had several different foci (Beck). The Kao-Jao affair (1954-1955), an early instance of political conflict during the post-1949 period, has been examined by Peter Tang (1955 and 1961), John Lewis (1964), and others. Apparent differences within the Chinese Communist leadership concerning social, political and economic policy during the Great Leap Forward (1957-1960) gave rise to further research by Roderick MacFarquhar (1958 and 1959) and Harold Hinton (1960). Their research has been further developed by Donald Zagoria (1964) and Franz Schurmann (1966). Other scholars have focussed on the problem of succession (MacFarquhar, 1957; Tang, 1961; Hinton, 1966; and Klein, 1962).

Should competitions, struggles and purges within the Chinese Communist leadership be viewed as pathological phenomena symptomatic of serious weaknesses in the system--or as more or less institutionalized procedures for reaching a decision when the leadership is divided? This becomes a crucial issue as the Great Cultural Revolution unfolds.

Whatever can be ascertained about relationships in recent years among Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao and Liu Shao-ch'i raises a number of challenging questions about conflict and competition within the Chinese Politburo, but does not yield much persuasive evidence. In view of our limited information, we can only speculate--so far, at least--on what bases of influence and power and through what conflictual, bargaining or other processes Mao and Lin achieved alignment and Liu emerged

as a major contender and antagonist.

Given the quality of data on the Chinese Politburo available, it is exceedingly difficult to establish--or to infer with any degree of confidence--how these aspects of the decision process are carried out. Western decision-making literature provides numerous propositions which may provide a starting point, but to test their validity for the Chinese Politburo is not an easy undertaking.

It has been postulated that Up to a certain level of stress, systems do more centralized deciding when under stress than when not under stress. Beyond that level deciding becomes increasingly decentralized until the system terminates or the stress abates (Miller, 1965, 406). With respect to the People's Republic, it would be important--insofar as sources of data allow--to keep close watch upon the centralized-decentralized dimension of Chinese Communist decision-making. Along a somewhat different line of investigation, an hypothesis from the general literature asserts that As stress increases, it first improves system output performance above ordinary levels and then worsens it (Miller, 1965, 401).

An analysis of how the Chinese Politburo deals with competitions for influence within the decision process (and of decision processes generally) should take into consideration the writings of Mao Tse-tung and others on the concept of contradictions within the Party. Sources of this kind will indicate what the Chinese Communist theory is with respect to "struggling out" various differences in decision-making situations. It would be a mistake, however, to accept this theory as an empirical description of how conflicts are resolved and decisions reached. On the contrary, we need to gather from whatever sources are available to us a variety of data from which inferences about Politburo decision-making can be drawn. Theory--both from western and from

Marxist-Leninist-Maoist" sources--should be tested as closely as possible with empirical data.

In these efforts we should keep clearly in mind that there is not likely to be a single currency of power, authority or dominance in group decision-making. On the contrary, currencies of power tend to change from wartime to peacetime, from situations of economic competition to situations of technological competition, and so forth. Much depends upon the organizational environment, the characteristics of the individual decision-makers and how they interact, the issue at stake, the decision context, and the like. An individual or a faction of individuals may gain dominance for their definition of the situation, purpose and Plan; through the merit and persuasiveness inherent in the definition, purpose and Plan; or through the logic of argument and supporting evidence; or by bargaining; or by threat or other coercive persuasion; or by the removal, through one means or another, of their opposition; and so forth. Currently it appears that the Lin Mao leadership derives its power and authority in part from the armed forces, in part from the Red Guard and in part from the prestige inherent in Mao's name and career. There may be other important factors.

In sum, the behavior of a decision-maker will be influenced and constrained by considerations such as: his perceptions of and feelings about the characteristics of the system of which he is a component (including its other components, its capabilities and theirs.); the characteristics (including the capabilities) of other systems with which his system is interacting; and the characteristics of the encompassing supra-system of which all these systems are unit components. Among significant characteristics in each case will be role structures, communications patterns, distribution of power, and the ways in which these phenomena are perceived and internalized by the actors.

Four hypothetical [illegible] situations will be illustrative:

| Situation a | | Situation b | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Decision-maker [Mao?]: | Aye | Decision-maker [Mao?]: | Aye |
| Chief Lieutenants [Politburo?]: | Aye | Chief Lieutenants [Politburo?]: | Aye |
| Populace. | Aye | Populace. | 50-50 |

| Situation c | | Situation d | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Decision-maker [Mao?]. | Aye | Decision-maker [Mao?]. | Aye |
| Chief Lieutenants [Lin Piao faction, Liu Shao-ch'i faction?]: | 50-50 | Chief Lieutenants [Whole Politburo?]: | Nay |
| Populace: | 50-50 | Populace: | Nay |

In Situation a Mao faces no domestic difficulties with the issue at hand. In Situation b the decision-maker and the Politburo must decide how much power they have (whether in terms of police force, economic power, charisma, persuasion or whatever) as compared with the divided populace. In Situation c Mao and his supporters must calculate their power relative to that of the Liu Shao-ch'i faction as well as the dissenting half of the populace. In Situation d Mao appears to be in grievous trouble- unless he can muster some power that is not evident or unless the issue is not significant.

In Situation b and c the domestic characteristics of the system and how the leadership perceives them may be crucial. Who are the chief lieutenants and from what sources do they derive their power? What are their relations with each other? Do they agree or disagree on other issues? How much power resides in the populace, how much mandate, how much initiative, what channels of protest? What are the relations of the chief lieutenants to the populace? Does the populace have leaders of its own who might challenge the chief lieutenants or

even the decision-maker? How do the decision-maker, his lieutenants, and the populace stand with respect to other crucial questions.

The behavior of the head of state is thus constrained, limited, biased or skewed, and otherwise influenced (depending on how capabilities are distributed and perceived to be distributed, by perceptions and expectations held by other officers of government and by the citizenry about goals, means, roles, statuses and reciprocations, and about where the head of state ought to fit and how he ought to behave.

To the degree that these perceptions, expectations and habitual reciprocations have been internalized by the head of state, by other officers of government and by the citizenry, they serve, in Parsonian terms, as stabilizers of behavior. They become Durkheim's conscience collective. Since each head of state and those around him operate in a discrete and particular culture and a discrete and particular society, differences in cultural and societal values (including ideological elements) will contribute to asymmetries in the interactions of nation states.

## Evaluative, Potency and Activity Dimensions

Charles Osgood and others have found in a variety of cultures that when human beings perceive themselves, other human beings, and events generally, the most relevant discriminations are made in a space defined in terms of evaluative, potency and activity factors (Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1957; Osgood, 1960; Suci, 1957; Kumata and Schramm, 1956). It would be extremely important--especially in view of the amount of research dependent upon the Chinese language as a channel of measurement and analysis--to find out to what extent these same factors account for Chinese Communist discriminations. Tentatively, it appears these factors ought to be of considerable importance both in relationships

between individuals and in relations between nations as viewed by major leaders.

Let us suppose that

| In his relationship with B, Actor A perceives | | In his relationship with B, Actor B perceives | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Self | B | A | Self |
| Positive ←——→ | Positive | Positive ←——→ | Positive |
| Strong ←——→ | Strong | Strong ←——→ | Strong |
| Active ←——→ | Active | Active ←——→ | Active |

If we now discover that A and B are both inclined to pursue goal X, we may predict that the two will cooperate--especially if they can achieve it more easily through joint effort and provided there is no quality of X which might put them in competition with each other.

Now let us suppose that

| In his relationship with B, Actor A perceives | | In his relationship with A, Actor B perceives | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Self | B | A | Self |
| Positive ←——→ | Positive | Positive ←——→ | Positive |
| Strong ←——→ | Weak | Strong ←——→ | Weak |
| Active ←——→ | Passive | Active ←——→ | Passive |

Under these circumstances, if A and B pursue goal X, we shall not be surprised if they cooperate in a relationship with A dominating B.

In any interactive situation it will make a difference how all the actors perceive each other, and also whether they see the relationship symmetrically or unsymmetrically. If A perceives himself as strong, active and positive and B as weak, passive and positive, does B, for example, perceive A as strong, active and positive and himself also as strong, active and positive? If so, this produces a symmetry.

Another dimension of analysis is added if one examines not only current perceptions, but expectations of the future:

| In his relationship with B, Actor A perceives the present as: | | In his relationship with A, Actor B perceives the present as: | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Self | B | A | Self |
| positive | negative | negative | positive |
| strong | weak | weak | strong |
| active | passive | passive | active |

But,

| In his relationship with B, Actor A perceives the future as: | | In his relationship with A, Actor B perceives the future as: | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Self | B | A | Self |
| negative | negative | negative | negative |
| weak | strong | strong | weak |
| active | active | active | active |

A situation of this type is doubly unstable. Each party perceives itself as able to dominate the other but expects time to erode his position vis-a-vis the other. Thus each may come to perceive--as did Austria-Hungarian leaders in 1914 in regard to Serbia--that preemptive action is the only solution, and to proceed accordingly. In such circumstances the perceptions of the actors may be more crucial than objective reality.

## Chinese Communist Reality Testing and Flexibility-Rigidity

Assumptions are sometimes made about Chinese Communist decision making which have not been adequately tested. Bobrow cites assertions, for example, that ". . . the Chinese elite live in an unreal world, i.e., have poor reality testing . . ." and that they are "rigid in their attitudes and actions (Bobrow, 1967, 315)." An investigation

of certain aspects of Communist Chinese and Soviet Russian reality testing was made recently over brief time spans by George Zaninovich, who attempted ". . . to seek out those conditions under which such absence of 'reality orientation' occurs among actor-states (Zaninovich, 1964, 6)."

For the limited periods of time examined, Zaninovich found that on the whole ". . . the Soviet Union indicates a reality orientation, i.e., perceptions are commensurate with behavior that effects it (Zaninovich, 1964, 199-200)." On the other hand, ". . . communist China mistranslates or distorts behavior-events to the critical side (Zaninovich, 1964, 200)." In certain situations in which the People's Republic had been involved ". . . the behavior of the aggressive or 'enemy' state is over-perceived to the critically high side . . . (Zaninovich, 1964, 309)." Consequently, Zaninovich concluded, ". . . if forecasting Communist Chinese behavior is the goal, more emphasis should be placed upon Chinese perceptions of the 'enemy' than upon either incoming stimulus events or verbalized intentions (Zaninovich, 1964, 344)." It needs to be emphasised, however, that although the Chinese elite are selectively rigid, the data "do not support the hypothesis that they are indescriminatingly so (Bobrow, 1967, 317)." Indeed, ". . . on the basis of the Zaninovich data, Chinese reality testing tends to be relatively good except when major events are directed primarily at China (Bobrow, 1967, 316)." In general, ". . . the higher the level of tension, the greater the discrepancy between perception and stimulus events. Thus: The role of distortion and mis-perception increases as tensions within the system rise (Zaninovich, 1964, 314)."

Assumptions of Chinese Communist rigidity need to be examined in a similarly disciplined way. As suggested by Bobrow, "We can begin to measure rigidity by the extent to which Chinese perceptions and actions

change or remain the same in different contexts and toward different actors (Bobrow, 1967, 317)."

China and the Reaction Process or Conflict Spiral

It has frequently been noted that if Country A--either correctly or incorrectly--perceives itself threatened by Country B, there is a high probability that A will respond with threats or hostile action or at least by increasing its deprival and/or punishment capacity. As Country B begins to perceive this activity seemingly directed toward itself, it is probable that B, too, will behave in a reciprocally hostile and defensive fashion by raising its deprival and/or punishment capacity or by taking other measures. This threatening behavior by B will soon further confirm A's original perceptions of danger and threat, and A will be inclined to increase its active and/or passive defensive activity. Thereafter, the exchanges between the two parties are likely to be caught up in an increasingly intense spiral of self-confirming hostile suspicions and expectations.

This phenomenon is commonly known as a reaction, or a Richardson process, and it opens the possibility that Country A's weapons systems --undertaken for security, and not for aggressive purposes--may incite Country B to responses which will, in the long run, bring about warfare which the initial system was designed to inhibit. According to Kenneth Boulding, "The political scientist meets the reaction process in the concept of the arms race, which is theoretically very similar to the price war. We find the same processes going on, however, at all levels of relationship--between union and management, between husband and wife, between king and parliament, between president and congress, between administration and faculty, between teacher and student, and even in

the animal kingdom, between predator and prey, parasite and host, eater and eaten (Boulding, 1962, 25)." The distinctive aspect is that in military affairs the reaction phenomenon is likely to be especially dangerous for the participants, and particularly self-destructive.

The objection has been raised that many escalations de-escalate, that "there are down-escalators as well as up-escalators, and there are landings between escalators where one can decide to get off or to get on, to go up or down, or to stay there; or to take the stairs (Wohlstetter and Wohlstetter, 1965)." This is fortunately true, or human beings--who get caught in many such spirals--would be in a condition of perpetually spiralling warfare. However, the reaction or crisis spiral is no less real because it does not always--or even usually--escalate into large scale war. What has given it significance as a crucial phenomenon is the development of nuclear warfare, which transforms a remote chance of escalation into a sobering statistic.

If either party in a conflict chooses to provoke a spiral and press for victory, the other may find it almost impossible to stop the escalation short of capitulation or withdrawal. In a nuclear age such considerations can produce something that suggests an ultimate dilemma. On the other hand, possibilities for reversing a spiral often exist as long as both parties basically prefer to avoid full-scale war and provided at least one of them can detach itself sufficiently to take necessary counter-measures. Few of us understand the reaction process sufficiently, however, to predict with any certitude "Just where automaticity or irreversibility takes over . . . (Wohlstetter and Wohlstetter, 1965)." Often enough the difficulty is that both parties are too deeply caught in the escalation to achieve detachment--even when more objective third parties are able, intuitively or otherwise, to sense an approaching threshold of irreversibility.

Much military and political policy is based upon an assumption that a sufficient capacity to punish enjoyed by Country A will deter Country B. This is frequently a safe assumption--but not always. Empirical studies suggest that Perceptions of its own inferior capability, if perceptions of fear, threat or injury are great enough, will fail to deter a nation going to war (Zinnes, North and Koch, 1961, 470). There are enough such exceptional cases in history to provide pause for sober reflection.

This means that increasing the threat or application of force is not--by itself--a necessarily effective way to reverse a spiral. On the contrary, such action may accelerate the escalation. Effective deterrence will undoubtedly vary with context, but in many cases it is probably a subtle blend of deprival, punishment, reward and other psychological as well as material phenomena. Conversely, deterrence, if improperly conceived, may contribute to the very outcome it is undertaken to prevent.

To date, we know dangerously little about what the subtle blend for successful deterrence really is, or what its properties and limits are. A part of the task is to identify environmental phenomena which contribute to the lability of affective elements in the model. Exploratory research suggests that--in addition to the threats, real or imagined, which Country A may perceive in the surroundings--perceptions of time pressure or limitation and perceptions of narrowing alternatives of response are among crucial factors contributing to the lability of affect.

Ole Holsti and others have largely supported the following hypotheses by empirical test in a number of crisis situations:

Hypothesis 1. As stress increases in a crisis situation:

a) time will be perceived as an increasingly salient factor in decision-making.

b) decision-makers will become increasingly concerned with the immediate rather than the distant future.

Hypothesis 2. In a crisis situation, decision-makers will perceive:

a) their own range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries.

b) their allies' range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries.

Hypothesis 3. As stress increases, decision-makers will perceive:

a) the range of alternatives open to themselves to become narrower.

b) the range of alternatives open to adversaries to expand.

Hypothesis 4. The higher the stress in a crisis situation:

a) the heavier the overload upon the channels of communication.

b) the more stereotyped will be the information content of messages.

c) the greater the tendency to rely upon extraordinary or improvised channels of communication.

d) the higher the proportion of intra-coalition messages against inter-coalition communications.

(Holsti, 1965)

McClelland et al. (1966) have reported somewhat contradictory findings for Hypothesis 2a. The discrepancy may emerge from differing definitions of crisis. The Studies in International Conflict and Integration have focused on situations prior to the outbreak of active hostilities--on the period when the decision of whether to fight or not to fight lies in the balance. In these terms, the Quemoy and Matsu

crises would be viewed as small, localized wars--the question hanging in balance being whether to escalate into a major war. Another problem may emerge from differences in levels of alternative. In July 1914 major leaders had increasing difficulty identifying alternatives to war, but this does not mean that they necessarily failed to perceive alternatives on "lower," implementing levels of decision--whether to consult with the Italians, etc. Later, once the decision had been made to fight, the implementing levels offered proliferations of alternatives. No doubt a crisis in the sense of a small war or inter-state duel would similarly require a proliferation of decision in the conducting of hostilities. Finally, according to our hypotheses, any kind of de-escalation, whether in a Cuba (1962)-type crisis or a Quemoy Matsu-type crisis, would display wider perception of alternatives than a crisis of either type that continued to escalate.

When an escalation is under way, the negative affects produced by threats and counter-threats appear to distort time as perceived by the participants, and also decrease their capacity to identify more than the most stereotyped alternatives--at a juncture when the same participants tend to perceive the alternatives available to their adversaries to be significantly widening. The extent to which the Chinese Communist leadership under Mao may not be susceptible to these tendencies is a subject for further investigation.

# Part III

## SOME PROMISING RESEARCH TECHNIQUES

### Research Alternatives

Obviously, there is no single most useful research technique or set of research techniques. The problem is to find the tool which best suits a particular inquiry or a particular body of data, or to use alternative approaches and alternative tools as a check of one against another. Depending upon the investigation at hand, one may choose a traditional technique, or a newer, perhaps more experimental technique, or a combination of the two. In this part of the report we shall discuss --out of numerous--broad types of research techniques. The selection is not intended to be conclusive, but rather to suggest the possibilities for developing new and useful methodologies and combinations.

Studies of China pose a special problem, inasmuch as the language is difficult to learn, and for this and other reasons there tends to be a shortage of scholars qualified to undertake the research that ought to be done. Government agencies often face a dilemma in that to the extent that they recruit scholars from the universities, they tend to reduce the limited number of teachers available for training new and badly-needed younger specialists. No doubt we shall never find a way entirely out of this dilemma, but there is the possibility that the development of new research techniques--particularly those employing electronic computers--may multiply the effectiveness of those China scholars who are available and also enhance the capabilities of non-specialists to analyze Chinese materials.

In discussing the use of computers for studying Russian materials, John R. Pierce of the Bell Telephone Laboratories (1962) has made a

persuasive argument for switching some of the emphasis away from problems of machine translation in the direction of analytic programs operating on the original, untranslated text. If much Russian (or Chinese?) is to be read, Pierce argues, the reader will save time in the long run by learning the language. But analysis performed on the original text could--for many purposes--eliminate the translation problems and thus avoid the losses of meaning which inevitably accompany the translation process. ". . . the machine itself could carry out certain operations, such as searching for key words or combinations of key words or indexing or even abstracting (Pierce, 1964, 290-307)."

At the present time there seem to be at least two major ways in which computers could be employed to alleviate the constraints imposed by the shortage of qualified scholars in the China field. The first way is to build computerized banks of cumulative data about the People's Republic, its component regions and localities, and its quantifiably measurable relations with other nations (trade, relative GNP, exchanges of diplomats, casualties suffered or inflicted, months of warfare, and the like). A second way--not yet operational--would be to devise programs of content analysis that would operate upon Chinese language texts and provide tabular printouts and/or graphs under bi-lingual (or multi-lingual) rubrics.

Aggregate Data Analysis

The organization of data banks is a relatively uncomplicated operation--the greatest difficulty residing in the unreliabile character of many statistics about China. In order to achieve dynamic analyses, it is necessary to gather relevant statistical indices (areas, populations, GNP's, budget allocations, trade flows, months at war, casualties, and

so forth) at yearly data points over a considerable time. In addition to handling absolute numbers, the computer programs should calculate rates of change. The data can be subjected to multi-variate analysis, to regressions, and to other types of manipulation and statistical control.

The devising of content analysis programs operating directly upon Chinese language texts will rest upon the achievement of a number of innovations. The important thing would be to facilitate three-directional communications among content analysts, linguists and psycholinguists working with the Chinese language, and technologists who are working on computerized translation problems. It would be important to alert the computerized translation people to the minimal requirements for doing content analysis on Chinese texts, which might be met somewhat sooner than a satisfactory Chinese-English translation system. A program operating on Chinese language texts could accomplish General Inquirer (and other types) of retrieval and analysis--without translation--and print out statistical tables, graphs and the like under combined English and Chinese (and other) rubrics for interpretation by analysts who need not be capable of reading Chinese. To be optimally useful, however, the system should be capable of Chinese printout in order that each occurrence of any single word or combination of words --including perceptions as defined for the Stanford General Inquirer sys (as described below)--could be retrieved and made available (in the Chinese original) to specialists with language capability. In this way distortions and losses of meaning--inevitable in any translation--would be avoided; analyses would be made available to investigators without a knowledge of Chinese; and at the same time virtually total retrieval of text and components of text would be at hand for

specialists with linguistic capabilities. The computer would do the searching and retrieving--locating and selecting whatever was needed from document texts--and the scholar would read and, if appropriate, translate what the machine had pulled out.

Both aggregate data analysis and content analysis appear to be basic approaches to studies of decision-making processes.

## Content Analysis

Since almost all research in the social sciences and humanities requires the careful reading of written materials, the question arises, what characteristics distinguish content analysis from other, somewhat more traditional methods of documentary investigation? "Among the characteristics of content analysis upon which there is wide agreement," according to Holsti, "are those of objectivity, system and generality. Objectivity stipulates that the analysis must be carried out on the basis of explicitly formulated rules which will enable two or more persons to obtain the same results from the same documents. Systematic means that the inclusion and exclusion of content or categories is done according to consistently applied criteria of selection. This requirement eliminates analyses in which only materials supporting the investigator's hypotheses are examined. Generality requires that the findings must have theoretical relevance. Purely descriptive information about content, unrelated to other attributes of content or to the characteristics of the sender or recipient of the message, is of little scientific value. These three characteristics are not unique to content analysis, being necessary conditions for all scientific inquiry. But they serve to indicate that, in general terms, content analysis can be considered as the application of the canons of scientific research to the analysis of communication content (Holsti et al., forthcoming)."

The assumption is sometimes made that content analysis is almost by definition quantitative. This is not necessarily so. Alexander George (1959) has drawn the distinction in terms of frequency and non-frequency analysis. "We employ the term 'non-frequency' to describe the type of non-quantitative, non-statistical content analysis which uses the presence or absence of a certain content characteristic or syndrome as a content indicator in an inferential hypothesis. In contrast, a 'frequency' content indicator is one in which the number of times one or more content characteristics occur is regarded as relevant for purposes of inference." As an illustration of the differences and similarities, George suggests that ". . . on the basis of a quantitative study which shows a sharp decline in number of references to Stalin in Pravda, the frequency analyst might infer that the successors to Stalin are attempting to downgrade the former dictator or are trying to dissociate themselves from him. On the other hand, the non-frequency analyst might make a similar inference from the fact that in a public speech one of Stalin's successors pointedly failed to mention him when discussing a particular subject (e.g., credit for the Soviet victory in World War II) where mention of Stalin would formerly have been obligatory (George, 1959, 7-32)."

Content analysis can be used to study novels, plays and other literature, decision-making documents, news reports, propaganda broadcasts, and many other types of material. The purpose may be to discover public values, insofar as they can be inferred from a particular source, or to measure the stated perceptions, goals, attitudes or intents of a single leader or, by aggregation, of a group of leaders, and so forth. Where possible, such studies should be supplemented and cross-checked by alternative modes of investigation. Data on the facial expressions

and gross bodily movement of key leaders, for example, could be used in conjunction with content analyses of speeches, essays and even--as in the case of Mao Tse-tung--poems. Computer content analysis greatly enhances the possibilities for systematic replication of studies by independent investigators.

The emphasis in subsequent pages will be upon quantitative, rather than qualitative, content analysis--largely because these are the methods with which we are most familiar. Nothing that is put forward should be construed as detracting, however, from qualitative methods, which frequently constitute the most feasible and appropriate approach.

Studies of cognition, interpretation, evaluation and decision take on meaning--and achieve some degree of analytic control--when variables from this part of the model, the mediating variables, are correlated in systematic fashion with stimuli (environmental events, including the actions of other nation states) and with the perceiving nation's own behavior.

Before we undertake a discussion of measuring techniques for mediating elements of the model, a number of caveats need to be mentioned. To a considerable extent these become necessary because the overt behavior (R) and the "outside" stimulus event (S) can be either verbal or non-verbal. This state of affairs presents us with several difficulties.

First, even a purely physical, non-verbal event such as the explosion of a Chinese nuclear device or the deployment of the United States Seventh Fleet or the crossing of the 38th parallel in Korea frequently reaches the decision-maker--and eventually the research investigator--in symbolic, verbal form. This cannot be avoided: our sole access to purely physical non-verbal events often lies through symbolic, verbal representation.

Second, overt, non-verbal, physical behavior such as signing a treaty, mobilizing an army or initiating a military advance through the Himalayas is frequently initiated verbally by the decision-maker, the plan or order or command being transmitted through many agents and often much elaborated upon. In such instances the verbal commands must be viewed as internal messages between the leader and those agents empowered to perform the physical acts. Thus the plan initiated by the head of government or other top decision-maker with respect to the state system is just that--a statement of intent (encoding, or Plan), not overt behavior (R) until the order is activated.

Third, either a stimulus event (S) or a response event (R) may be wholly verbal and symbolic in that it does not--and was not intended to--represent or translate into a physical event. The message as long as the United States supports the Nationalist Government in Taiwan, we shall not negotiate is a strictly verbal event which achieves its status through transference of symbolic meaning. Something similar could be said for the message if you attack Quemoy or Matsu, we shall retaliate. It does not command a gun to be fired nor an army to invade. Regardless of what the recipient may do in response, there is no physical act for which it was the foreshadowing verbal command--the activating message The total value lay in the meaning of the verbal message, and therefore it is a response (R) of its initiator, and a stimulus (S) for the recipient.

On the other hand, the conditional, purely verbal message if you attack Quemoy or Matsu, we shall retaliate is only the initiator's plan or intent (encoding, or Plan sector of the model) until it is articulated outside the boundaries of the state that issued it. Thus, unless a top decision-maker transmits it himself directly to the

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recipient by telephone, telegraph, or wireless or announces it publicly, it may well be delivered--as with a non-verbal act such as the firing of a gun or dropping of a bomb--by an agent, an ambassador, perhaps, deputized to perform this function. The distinction becomes clear in the case of a message from a head of state which is not delivered, or which is transmitted in garbled or otherwise altered form. Even a telegram may be altered in transmission.

The fifth consideration is that a stimulus event (S) or a response event (R) often consists of a complex set of subsidiary events. An attack along a front embraces dozens or hundreds of sector attacks, a speech with implications of violence can be subdivided into paragraphs or themes or words with more or less implication of violence, and a Five Year Plan has many components. This means that the boundaries of an "event" are frequently difficult to define, and whatever designation is used may be wholly arbitrary.

Sixth, the same speech, telegram or other document may qualify as an action (R for the asserting nation and S for a receiver nation) and at the same time contain perceptions of "other" and perceptions of intent from which affect and other decoding and encoding data may be inferred for the actor nation. Under these circumstances great care must be taken not to confuse the function of data which are being subjected to a given procedure of analysis, i.e., is it action or perceptual material that is being measured, and to which actor is it properly attributed?

And, finally, whatever measurements we make of affect (or of other qualities attributed to decision-makers) depend upon inference. They amount to the investigator's view or perception or assessment of qualities inferred on the basis of measuring a certain class of behavior e.g., written verbal output. This is unavoidable, since affect is inferred as generated within individual electro-chemical systems.

Within the limitations imposed by these caveats, content analysis offers a useful method of measuring variables from the decoding and encoding sectors of the model. Several automated systems are now available, and the feasibility of running the same data--once punched on cards--through two or more competing programs represents an attractive feature of this type of analysis.

The General Inquirer Systems

Among basic content analysis tools is the General Inquirer, which has been developed by Philip Stone and his associates at Harvard University and M. I. T. (Stone, Bales, Namenwirth and Ogilvie, 1962). A considerable number of specialized variations of the basic General Inquirer are now available (Stone, Dunphy, Smith and Ogilvie, 1966) and new, improved systems are in various stages of development. The Stanford General Inquirer was adapted from the Stone system for the analysis of political--especially crisis--materials (Holsti, 1964, 382-388). Once the raw empirical data have been punched on cards, they can be run through the Stone program as a cross check on the findings of the Stanford system. These systems can be used to analyze relationships between individuals as well as relationships between component sub-systems of a state or between states--provided appropriate documentary sources are available.

Measurement of perceptions (from decoding and encoding sectors of the model) by means of content analysis depends, of course, upon the availability of appropriate and adequate written records. This is a severe limitation upon this particular tool as an instrument for the study of Politburo decision-making. The measurement of actions (R and S) is subject to somewhat similar limitations, but the procedures are likely to be different in a number of significant respects, and the

types of sources are frequently different. Many action measurements are done "by hand."

In specific situations the investigator must often adapt to reality, doing the best he can with the most nearly appropriate materials available. Thus, if the United States or the Soviet Union announces or implements a new action program (R), bona fide perception and decision-making documents may not be available on the Chinese Politburo level. In such circumstance, a search must be made to determine which available documents are most reliable and appropriate. For example, Chinese official news announcements, editorials, articles in political or military journals and the like may be accepted as reasonably accurate reflections of how the leadership perceives and feels about the Soviet or United States activity. In such uncertain circumstances, the best strategy is to monitor diverse channels and check for consistency or inconsistency.

The Stanford General Inquirer consists of three major elements: two dictionaries; a system of data preparation; and a series of programs for retrieval and analysis of data.

The political dictionary constitutes the major link between the theoretical formulation of the research program and the mechanics of analysis. Supplementing this central dictionary, the Stanford General Inquirer includes a dictionary of proper names which provides cross-referencing for economical retrieval. It is also useful in problems which depend on discriminating between sub-units of a larger class and for aggregating sub-units for retrieval. The General Inquirer programs are flexible enough to accommodate a variety of dictionaries and alternative analyses.

Within the Stanford General Inquirer system of data preparation the basic unit which provides for retrieval and analysis is the per-

ception, defined in terms of a Perceiver; a Perceived; an Attitude or Action; and a Target, viz: the People's Republic (Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao) perceives that the United States (Johnson, Rusk) is bombing Hanoi. Or self-perception), the People's Republic perceives that the People's Republic is supporting the Vietnamese people, and so forth. There may be one or two or more perceptions in a sentence. Only Attitude or Action and modifiers are scaled for intensity.

Four major programs are currently in use: a word frequency count for tallying the number of occurrences of each word in the text, rank ordering them, and listing them alphabetically within each frequency group; a tag talley for counting the scores of words in the text which have been tagged for the various dimensions in the dictionary (positive, negative, strength, weakness, activity, passivity); a question and search program for retrieving and printing out tags, theme codes or sentences in the text meeting any designated specifications, for example, all sentences which contain a certain text word or cluster of words, or all themes in the indicative mode, or the future tense, or references external to a given decision-maker's system, and so forth; and a direct table program through which the printed output is arranged in table form and through which the intensity level of words in the dictionary may be adjusted according to mode of expression--reflecting, for example, the probabilistic nature of an assertion such as "The Soviet Union may increase its aid to Vietnam (Armour, 1964)."

The political dictionary is used to measure changes in verbalized perceptions--inferences about the decoding and encoding sectors of the basic model--in terms of both frequency and intensity. The measurement takes place along three dimensions: strength-weakness; activity-passivity; positive affect-negative affect. These dichotomized dimensions correspond to the evaluative, potency, and activity dimensions which have been found

to account for human cognition in a variety of cultures (Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1957; Suci, 1957; Osgood, 1960; Kumata and Schramm, 1956; Osgood, 1962).

The Stanford General Inquirer enables the investigator to measure both subtle differences and very complex relationships. At the very simplest level he might wish to analyze Chinese Communist perceptions of the Soviet Union, or Object X (nuclear weaponry?), or Person Y (Johnson, Rusk, Kosygin), or Event Z (the Soviet achievement of ICBM capability). The initial question might be: Does Country A perceive Country B as positive (good) or negative (bad)? The measurement can be made in terms of both frequency and intensity as a basis for predicting A's probable behavior toward B.

By measuring another dimension--activity--a somewhat more confident prediction of action is possible. To use a naive example, a woodsman's response to a dormant rattlesnake (perceived as negative, strong, passive) will probably differ from his response to a coiled and poised one (negative, strong, active). Similarly, let us assume that Soviet decision-makers at some particular time and in a particular situation perceived the People's Republic and the United States as:

People's Republic -- high negative, moderate strength

United States -- moderate negative, high strength

If we now obtain the activity component--perhaps China has been perceived as high activity and the United States as low activity--our confidence in predicting probable Soviet actions toward these two nations might be substantially enhanced.

Tagged on three dimensions and on three intensity levels each, the Stanford dictionary is thus a measuring instrument designed to analyze even a simple relationship--such as the examples above--with fine discrimination. Including intensity levels, there are 343 dif-

ferent combinations which may describe A's perception of B.

If we are to analyze perceptions satisfactorily within an interaction situation involving two or more states, we shall be in search of further data. It is not enough to know how A perceives B. One must, in addition, know how A perceives himself, how B perceives himself, and how B perceives A. Thus any dyadic relationship can be described in terms of the following perceptual combinations:

| In terms of his relationship with B, Party A perceives: | | In terms of his relationship with A, Party B perceives: | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Self | Other (B) | Other (A) | Self |
| positive or negative ←→ | positive or negative | positive or negative ←→ | positive or negative |
| strong or weak ←→ | strong or weak | strong or weak ←→ | strong or weak |
| active or passive ←→ | active or passive | active or passive ←→ | active or passive |

Even without intensity levels an arrangement of this sort identifies A's perception of his own attitudes, posture or action toward B and also A's perception of B's attitude or action toward A in any one of 64--$2^3 \times 2^3$--possible combinations. Since B maintains the same number of perceptual possibilities, there are 64 X 64 conceivable perceptual relationships (omitting intensity levels) between A and B in the above diagram. Many research problems may involve a third participant, C, in which case the possibilities increase to 64 X 64 X 64, and so forth, as further parties are added. However many actors participate in a given relationship, it will make a difference how they perceive each other in these terms, and also whether they see the relationship symmetrically or unsymmetrically. For example, if A perceives himself as strong, active and negative and B as weak, passive and

negative, does B see the relationship in the same terms (symmetry) or in different terms--does he see A as strong, active and negative and himself as weak, passive and positive?

Another dimension of analysis is added if one examines not only current perceptions, but expectations of the future.

The Stanford political dictionary is an arbitrarily defined and constructed measuring instrument in somewhat the way that a yardstick is an arbitrarily defined and constructed measuring instrument. Both are based upon arbitrary conventions. A yardstick--if everyone agreed upon it--would serve just as well if it were thirty, instead of thirty-six, inches long. Indeed, a meter is "just as good" as a yard--for some purposes more convenient. Those who constructed the Stanford political dictionary hold no particular brief for the conventions upon which it is based. They merely assert that if the texts of two separate documents are measured against the political dictionary--page by page or paragraph by paragraph or theme by theme--the differences in trend, as measured along the evaluation, potency and activity dimensions will be discriminated with a high level of precision. Taken by itself, no single value point on a trend curve will have any useful meaning.

The Stanford political dictionary must be recognized as an artifact of those who constructed it. In the first place, word lists were given to a series of three or four judges, who were asked to indicate which dimensions were relevant to each word. Because it was assumed that the paired dimensions are mutually exclusive rather than overlapping (an assumption borne out by the judges who categorized each word), any word might be tagged for one, two or three dimensions. A word might be rated positive-strong-active, but not positive-negative or strong-weak

Upon completion of the tagging, the dictionary was divided into six lists--positive affect, negative affect, strong, weak, active, passive--for scaling. A series of judges then rated the words on each list in terms of three intensity levels. The results of these judgments were then averaged. For example, if two judges assigned the value of 3 to a word, whereas a third judge rated the intensity of 2, that word was assigned a preliminary value of 2.67. The word list for each of the six dimensions was then forced into a 30%-40%-30% distribution according to its preliminary value--that is, those words whose average rating was in the top 30% were given the intensity rating of 3, the next 40% were rated 2, and the lowest 30% were assigned the intensity rating of 1. The choice of three intensity levels and of the 30%-40%-30% distribution of ratings was a somewhat arbitrary one, although based in part on consideration of computer running time. Each added intensity level would materially increase the number of questions required for retrieving desired information.

A computerized content analysis program operating upon Chinese language texts along Stanford General Inquirer lines would require construction of a Chinese language political dictionary scaled, preferably, by recent Chinese Communist defectors. Actually, the construction of such a dictionary--for comparison with the existing English language political dictionary--need not wait for the perfection of a program operating upon Chinese language texts. A great deal could be learned about Chinese Communist verbal behavior through the construction of such a dictionary right now.

The various ways in which interacting nation states--or their leaders--perceive themselves and others will have considerable effect on their behavior--influencing them toward cooperation or conflict or perhaps toward quite complex organization or unification. An important

factor in the stability of the relationship, in any case, will be the amount of symmetry or asymmetry in their perceptions. The degree of symmetry or asymmetry, moreover, is highly variable from relationship to relationship--and also through time within the same relationship--and is therefore a consideration to be determined in each instance by empirical research.

If sufficient documentary material is available, the Stanford General Inquirer can yield changes in these variables between two (or more) nation states on a day to day or even an hour to hour basis.

This description of the Stanford General Inquirer system is only illustrative. There are various alternative programs available, each with its own particular advantages and disadvantages, and more are being developed. The Stanford General Inquirer offers precision of analysis, but a great disadvantage is the labor and expense involved in preparing the text for reading by the computer. Because of these constraints, it would require considerable manpower, for example, to analyze an international crisis as it unfolded. There are alternative programs which require much less preparation of texts: the simplest require only that the material be typed on cards. What is gained in facility, however, is lost in analytic precision. An optimum of speed, precision and analytic depth will require a combination of optical scanning and grammatical parsing.

The S and R parts of the model can be investigated--and correlated with decoding and encoding data--in a number of different ways. This type of correlation across the mediated model is essential for controlled behavioral analysis involving data from decoding and encoding sectors. For the most part, these S and R measurements should be considered properly as two problems: the aggregation of data which are reported in "natural numbers," and the scaling of data for which natural numbers do not exist.

Measurement of Actions (R and S)

With respect to aggregations reported in natural numbers, we can use financial indices, troop movements, and the like--provided the appropriate data are available on a more or less daily basis. Studies of various international crisis situations have shown that both these types of data are useful. Where available, flows of gold across international boundaries, stock market fluctuations within the major powers in a crisis (but not in uninvolved nations), commodity futures, and interest rates have all revealed high correlations with variables from mediating sectors of the model. Similarly, troop mobilizations and movements have also correlated--though it is evident that some variations in decoding and encoding data have been in response to verbal threats rather than to military and naval maneuvers.

These particular correlations do not indicate causal connections. They probably mean that two separate elites in each country--a political elite and a financial elite--have responded characteristically as a crisis has unfolded. What such correlations do--where these relatively hard data are available--is to enhance the confidence of the investigator in the softer data which are ordinally scaled.

Although data with respect to military and naval movements are already in quantitative form, a number of problems remain. Let us suppose that a research problem centers on the mobilization and deployment of armed forces by several nations involved in a crisis. Assume further that reliable quantitative data are available regarding the number of men, airplanes, ships and other weapons called into action by various nations. At least some of the following problems may arise:

1. The comparison of units of a single nation. What is the difference, if any, between mobilizing a guerrilla battalion and a battalion of conventional infantry, a cavalry brigade, a certain number of bombers,

a naval squadron, or a tactical nuclear unit? What are the equivalences between a regular and a reserve division? Can the investigator use the number of men called to arms as the unit of measurement, or should one type of unit be "weighted?" These questions are sometimes relevant even in a historical case where weapons are relatively uncomplicated. Clearly, the problem becomes more important and difficult in the analysis of recent crises involving more complex and diversified weapons or--as in Vietnam--a range of variously trained and equipped units.

2. The comparison across weapons systems within a single nation or across an alliance, as represented by combinations of South Vietnamese infantry and highly mechanized American forces fighting together.

3. The comparisons of units across two or more nations. How, for example, should one count and weight the various troops that were engaged in the Korean War? Since there are no readily available formulai to ease the investigator's task, the only satisfactory solution is to cross-check with competing techniques.

4. Time, distance, proximity and other factors. Other important factors are likely to include time, distance and proximity. If the United States moves a division from Fort Ord to Honolulu, or if the People's Republic moves a [illegible]on from Shanghai to Chungking there may not be any tangible, international effects. But similar deployments of American troops in Laos or Chinese Communist troops in Hanoi might easily trigger a crisis.

An alternative--or supplementary--approach is to identify one or more common dimensions underlying a body of action data. One dimension which is relevant in the study of inter-state relations is the level of violence or potential violence in an act or interchange. Or one might wish to compare the data along the dimension of generality to

specificity of the actions. The problem here is somewhat analogous to comparing apples, oranges and bananas. Although these are all qualitatively different, they share certain characteristics. An investigator can compare them for weight, a relatively simple task. He might also compare them for somewhat harder-to-define characteristics such as texture, sweetness, pleasantness of shape, and so on. The latter may be accomplished by one of many available techniques of scaling in which the judge (or a panel of judges) assigns ordinal numbers to the various items.

For the student of international relations, scaling has at least one major advantage: Much relevant action data are not available in quantitative form, e.g., "Khrushchev denounced Mao Tse-tung at his news conference of April 15, 1964," or "The People's Republic protested a U-2 overflight." However, even such seemingly disparate items can be quantified along a dimension of shared characteristics.

A common type of scaling is one in which the categories are defined in terms of certain relevant criteria. Each category is then assigned a scale value, and the data are scaled according to this measure. For example, an investigator might wish to construct a twelve point scale to assign rank-order values on a conflict-integration scale. No matter how carefully each category is defined, such a scale probably will not avoid some judgments. The advantage is that, provided the scale is properly constructed, the measure [illegible] results which are comparable across two or more cases.

A second type of scaling includes the Q-Sort (Block, 1961), which has proved useful in a range of problems from psychiatric research to international crises ([illegible], [illegible], Zaninovich and Zinnes, 1963, 5[illegible]-77).

The major difference between the Q-Sort and techniques of the type discussed above is that the latter does not require category definitions or detailed scaling rules. The scaling judges are given a clear and explicit definition of the variable, and told to rank items on a most-to-least continuum: more violence to less violence, for example. In effect, the Q-Sort is a rank-order scaling technique within which judges are permitted to assign tie rankings. The distribution of items over nine scaling categories is rigidly specified.

The forced symmetrical distribution of the Q-Sort requires the panel of judges to make fine discriminations, a consideration which may be especially useful if the definition of scale categories seems difficult. The major drawback to Q-Sorting is that results across two or more cases are not comparable, the numerical value assigned any single item being a function of the character of the universe of scaled items. This means that the data may be used for intra-case but not for inter-case analysis--though the data from two cases can be pooled and analyzed as one case. Moreover, Q-Sorted data cannot be interpreted numerically, but only ordinally, in rank order.

The problem of inter-case comparability has been solved in part by developing a system of "standard markers" which can be put in with the material from any crisis or other time period. This arrangement makes it possible to score the materials according to how intense they are in comparison with the standard markers (Moses, Brody, Holsti, [illegible] and [illegible]stein, 1967). For example, if the average statement for Country $A_2$ in Situation 1 exceeded 3/4 of the marker statements and the average score for Country $A_1$ in Situation 2 exceeded 7/8 of the marker statements, this permits the inference that the material for Country $A_2$ was more intense than the material for Country $A_1$.

There are important caveats. The markers must span a wide range of intensity; otherwise some bodies of material may lie above or below the limits of the deck. Moreover, the cards must be of a character allowing them to be applied over a wide range of situations. The word "missile," for example, cannot be used since its inclusion would not be appropriate for World War I, World World II, or other situations of the less recent past. Also, marker cards must be in a standard format, such as Country A, Country B, and so forth, rather than France, Viet Cong, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the like. This further requires--as with the Q-Sort--that the data cards be coded in such a way that the country sources are not identifiable by the judges. Finally, a deck of marker cards must be strongly reliable, that is, different judges should put them in almost exactly the same order--otherwise they are too vaguely defined to be useful.

Experience with crisis studies suggest that, wherever feasible, all these methods should be used--competitively--in order to provide cross-checks and thus to enhance confidence in the findings. In this connection, Charles McClelland (1961, 1962, 1964, 1965, 1966) has developed a system of international transaction analysis, which deserves careful attention. In his paper "The Communist Chinese Performance in Crisis and Non-Crisis: Quantitative Studies of the Taiwan Straits Confrontation, 1950-1958" (1965) he has demonstrated the usefulness of this technique for analyzing certain types of relationship between the People's Republic and other nations.

Aggregate Data Analysis

Numerous techniques are being developed to analyze levels and rates of change in population, GNP, budget allocations, men under arms, months

of war involvement, trade flows, casualties and the like in terms of tension levels and international transactions. The Dimensionality of Nations Project, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, has circulated a series of Research Reports describing some of these techniques.

Currently, ARPA has undertaken a program to facilitate the interchange and further development of such techniques. At a preliminary meeting in March, 1967, research scholars from a number of institutions where such research is in progress drew plans for three symposia to expedite exchanges of data, methodology and criticism: (1) on Data Organization and Measurement in June 1967; (2) on Middle Level Theory in early autumn 1967; and (3) on Simulation in early winter 1967. The asserted overall purpose is to strengthen existing programs with experience in international relations quantitative research and to encourage inter-program communication. Steps are also being taken to coordinate these undertakings with the efforts of David Easton and Philip Stone, who are working with the Committee on Information in the Behavioral Sciences, National Academy of Science, on a proposal to National Science Foundation on a nationwide Information System to provide for standardized coding and indexing along with electronic storage and retrieval--perhaps to be nationally inter-connected via digital data linkages.

Studies of China and of the Chinese Communist Politburo might well draw upon the outcomes of these symposia.

## Part IV

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Parts I, II and III of this report--together with a list of tentative recommendations--were submitted to Dr. Nathan Leites and to Dr. Alexander George of the RAND Corporation for comment, criticism and suggestions. Dr. George has already undertaken substantial work toward revising, modifying and refining the original Leites model of the Operational Code for specific application to the People's Republic of China. Among members of the original work group under ONR Contract N00014-67-A-0112-0005 there was, and remains, a certain skepticism about the Operational Code concept as originally developed, but we believe that Dr. George's comments offer a promising refinement and an extremely valuable corrective to the general viewpoint presented so far in this report. Moreover--and happily--we believe that there is no inherent incompatibility between the basic mediated stimulus response model presented in Part II of this report and the line of investigation which Dr. George recommends. On the contrary, the two sets of statements--those put forward by the work group and those put forward by Dr. George--seem to be complementary in considerable part, and mutually reinforcing. As modified and refined by Dr. George, the Operational Code approach is also in line with the risk-taking studies undertaken by Professor Jan Triska (August 1964 and September 1967).

In his critique of our draft report, Dr. George emphasized the desirability of identifying--and assigning priority to--certain

research problems relating to Chinese decision-making where--with readily available research resources--it ought to be possible to make "critical" breakthroughs. He then made the following specific points regarding the operational code as he conceives it:

1. What is called "operational code" (in important respects a misnomer) refers, after all, to the political actor's general beliefs about central issues of history, political conflict, and political action.

2. Every political actor must have some position on these central issues, whether his beliefs are fully articulate or fully consistent.

3. Moreover, there is a structure, a psychological and logical relationship between these various beliefs [John Weakland is right--in his perceptive, fair and balanced appraisal of Leites' work--to criticize Leites' operational code for lacking a better structure and synthesis; I have tried in my paper to make up for this weakness by re-structuring and interrelating the various code elements Leites listed].

4. The image of the opponent and the related belief about the nature of political conflict (the first of the "philosophical" beliefs in my schematic of the operational code) appear to be of critical importance in shaping the entire character of the operational code belief system--they are, therefore, particularly deserving of close research attention.

5. The fact that the Chinese operational code is subject to change is not a good reason for not studying it--we need a study as soon as possible of the content and development of

Mao's operational code to serve as a "base line" for identifying more exactly any changes in post-Mao operational codes.

6. To be able to deal properly with the important question of possible changes in operational code beliefs, we need a fairly explicit and comprehensive research model of what we mean by an "operational code"--I have presented one such model, deliberately phrased in general categories and of a skeletal character; other ways of explicating the content and structure of an operational code are no doubt possible, but what needs emphasis is that we do need some kind of explicit model or framework and evidently there is considerable agreement that it should not follow Leites' chapter headings but attempt to achieve a more systematic structuring.

7. The research construction of a political leader's operational code should be approached via an iterative procedure; it should not be designed or approached as a "one-shot" research effort but rather proceed via early formulation of provisional but quite explicit hypotheses, in which oversimplification is permissible, as to what the content of the belief system may be like, leading from this to additional, more focused research that will hopefully provide more complex, subtle and conclusive hypotheses.

8. An actor's operational code beliefs obviously have some impact on his behavior; let us regard this as an open question for the time being and not allow understandable uncertainty on this point to discourage research on the operational code; for we can hope to determine what the relationship of an actor's

operational code is to his behavior only after we know what the content of that code is.

We cannot take any exception whatsoever to the general premise that the political actor's general beliefs about central issues of history, political conflict and political action are critical to his decision-making and strategies of behavior, nor to the concept of belief relationship and structuring. This idea is--or should be--central to the mediated stimulus response model. The major caveat we think needs reemphasizing--and we infer that Dr. George is with us on this--is the need for testing what Chinese political actors say they believe against the history of choices they have actually made. In this connection, also, we would reemphasize the importance of distinguishing, insofar as is possible, between general beliefs that appear to be basically Chinese--and hence likely to survive changes in leadership--and those which seem to be characteristically Maoist (or Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) and therefore more subject, perhaps, to alteration, modification or replacement in the event of an alteration in leadership.

Similarly, we agree in a most fundamental way that the image of the opponent and related beliefs about the nature of political conflict are of essential importance--again with the caveat that we need to distinguish, insofar as is feasible, between asserted beliefs and actual behaviors, and between traditional, essentially Chinese beliefs and those that seem to be more particularly Maoist.

The investigation of Mao's operational code as a base line makes eminently good sense provided it is explicitly conceived as such and ample latitude preserved for measuring against it (a) whatever

alterations actually take place over time and (b) whatever alterations seem likely to take place when alternate possible types of leaderships are projected as possibilities or probabilities for the future (in the case of increasing military participation in decision-making, for example, or a Communist but anti-Maoist succession, or a non-Communist succession).

Chart I from RAND Document D-15669-PR suggests the major thrust of Dr. George's operational code study:

THE CONTENT OF AN "OPERATIONAL CODE"

I. Philosophical Beliefs

A. The "essential" nature of political life: conflict or harmony; image of the opponent.

B. Optimism or pessimism regarding the future: in re ultimate realization of one's fundamental values and aspirations.

C. Predictability of the future: In what sense? To what extent?

D. How much "control" or "mastery" does one have over historical developments? What is one's role in "moving" or "shaping" history?

E. Role of chance.

F. Can one "muddle through"?

II. Instrumental Beliefs (regarding means-ends relationships in politics; i.e., general rules of strategy and tactics)

A. Choice of policy goals/objectives.

B. Pursuit of goals/objectives.

C. Calculation and control of risks

D. Timing of efforts to make desired gains.

E. Evaluation of means.

(George, 1967, 13)

We believe that Dr. George has developed a model that merits serious attention. Undoubtedly its use should be encouraged in "friendly competition" with the mediated stimulus-response

model, the Triska approach, and other models. We fully share Dr. George's view that studies of the operational code should not be undertaken as a "one shot" research effort, but rather via early formulation of provisional but quite explicit hypotheses--and also competing hypotheses.

With respect to priorities between stated beliefs and actual behavior, we respect Dr. George's preference for finding out what the code is "first" and then comparing it with behavior--provided what emerges as asserted belief (without checking against behavior) is explicitly labelled as stated or asserted belief and not accepted as operational belief (or left vulnerable to such inference) until it has been so tested. One of the virtues of the mediated stimulus response model, we believe, is the possibility of keeping this distinction explicit--although we recognize that Dr. George's model can also preserve the same distinction.

In sum, we feel that Dr. George's comments constitute a timely reminder that no single model offers a magic key and that pluralism in conceptualization and in research methodology is not only useful but--at this stage, at least--indispensible.

The Office of Naval Research and other governmental agencies can serve as a catalyst for the conceptual drawing together of these various lines of investigation provided sufficient emphasis is maintained on basic, as contrasted to applied and topical, research. We believe that the preservation of such emphasis in this sphere of research best serves the long-range interests of the United States. There is ample evidence that more applied research--however relevant and useful it appears at first glance--

fails to uncover the roots of nation state behavior in general and Chinese Communist behavior in particular. To rely upon it at the exclusion of basic research is poor strategy and bargain basement economy of the most treacherous sort. Within the last two or three years there have been encouraging signs of convergence in the development and empirical testing of fundamental social science theory in the fields of international relations and politics, and the facilitating of this tendency is likely to yield some important pay-offs over the next decade. We believe that Chinese studies offer a promising "laboratory" for developing this thrust.

On a minimal level of research enterprise we recommend the following priorities for the Office of Naval Research and other governmental agencies:

Priority 1a: Undertake or encourage analysis--from data bases founded as many decades as possible in the past--of China's objective capabilities and needs, and make projections of alternative future profiles of China's population, technology, production-consumption ratios, and the like, with probabilities attached; and develop, associated with each possible profile, a probable attitudinal and behavioral profile, or a set of alternate attitudinal and behavioral profiles, within the context of China's relations with other nations including the United States.

Priority 1b: Encourage the systematic investigation of Chinese Communist perception, belief, decision-making, crisis behavior, risk-taking and conflict strategies and tactics where parallel

measurement systems are used as a check on each other--the operational code as designed by Alexander George, for example; the system developed by Charles McClelland; the Moses, Brody, Holsti, Kadane, Milstein tag marker system; the various General Inquirer type systems, qualitative content analyses, and so forth. Such studies should include selected conflict and crisis situations in which China has been involved (including at least some in which the United States has been involved) and also negotiating and bargaining situations as they emerge.

Priority 2a: Make special efforts to encourage social scientists such as Charles Osgood and those working with him--or some of their students at the very least--to bring their specialized knowledge and skills to bear upon Chinese cognition, ways of formulating intent and behavior, and the relationships of these phenomena to the Chinese language; and, conversely, to bring historians, Chinese language specialists and others into closer touch with what psychologists, social psychologists and psycho-linguists are doing.

Priority 2b: Undertake or encourage studies of Chinese customs, tradition and habit patterns as they bear on current Chinese behavior via novels, plays, philosophical and ideological writings, motion pictures and other media--with special emphasis upon checking what is actually done; a variety of techniques should be encouraged, including both quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis. Emphasis should be placed upon the identification of persisting patterns that may be expected to survive changes in political regimes. Included also in

this research sphere would be experimentation with various types of "analysis at a distance" such as that developed by Silvan Tomkins, Paul Ekman and others.

Priority 3: Undertake or encourage an objective analysis--using competing techniques (both quantitative and qualitative analyses) as cross-checks--to see what perceptual and behavioral responses have been evoked from China by major United States interventions. What have been the United States assumptions and preferred outcomes, and have the real outcomes been similar to or different from the outcomes which the United States preferred, expected and predicted--and how similar or how different and why? The reality testing and response patterns of the Chinese, Soviet Russians, Americans, and others should all be systematically, objectively and comparatively examined.

Priority 4a: Facilitate the development of data banks, bibliographical systems, and document collections with emphasis upon standardized coding conventions and computerised storage and retrieval systems.

Priority 4b: Facilitate--wherever data banks of international politics are being developed--the inclusion of area, population, weather, natural resource, agricultural, industrial, social, economic, financial, political and other types of quantifiable data for the major regions of China, the provincial areas, and so forth, down at least to the hsien level.

Priority 4c: Operate in close touch with other governmental and non-governmental agencies moving along similar lines [ARPA is currently organizing a series of small symposia on data measurement and standardization of coding, middle-level theory develop-

ment and testing, and simulation; and steps are being taken to coordinate these undertakings with the efforts of David Easton and Philip Stone, who are working with The Committee on Information in the Behavioral Sciences, National Academy of Science, on a proposal to NSF on a nationwide Information System to provide for standardized coding and indexing along with electronic storage and retrieval--perhaps to be nationally inter-connected via digital data linkages.]; Chinese problems should be assured salience in these undertakings.

Priority 5: Open and maintain communications between specialists working on machine translation and the automated content analysts, bringing to the attention of the machine translation people the advantages--given adequate scanning and syntactical control--of analyses of material in the language of origin in lieu of translation.

On an optimal level of research enterprise we recommend all of the above noted undertakings, together with:

Priority 6: A major effort involving content analysis people, computer translation people, psycholinguists, computer hardware specialists and others to devise with as much dispatch as possible a system which will provide optical scanning and syntax recognition and which will perform on the raw Chinese language text a maximum of storage, indexing, retrieving and content analysis functions with a minimum of human intervention --combining Chinese print-out capability with an English language rubric system so that readers of Chinese can call up any portion

of text for scrutiny, while non-readers of Chinese can interpret all scores and tabulations.

Priority 7: The building of a major data bank on China and the major nations with which it interacts--to be associated with the analytic system suggested under Priority 6, above--storing aggregate data on population, area, national product, budget allocations, men under arms and the like, and also speeches, pronouncements, major writings, patterns of habit, cultural constraint, and so forth, with possibilities for systematic and combined analyses.

On either the minimal or the optimal level of research planning and execution we believe that a number of conferences should be supported or encouraged. On the other hand, China has been "conferenced to death" over the last seventeen or eighteen years with --on the whole--remarkably little to show for it. There is not much point in investing further funds in talk fests of Peking watchers. We believe, therefore, that conferences, for the most part, should be small, carefully-planned affairs to bring research scholars together on common problems of data, conceptualization, research technique, or a combination of these. Along these lines, the recent work conferences supported by ARPA and arranged through JDA--in response to the needs of a small number of scholars using quantitative data in the field of international relations--might serve as extremely useful models. We believe that such conferences if sharply focussed and carefully planned, would provide a useful instrument for facilitating the priority recommendations listed above.

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The second undertaking is a Bibliography on Modern Chinese Society, under the direction of G William Skinner. Planned to appear in four volumes (a total of 2,570 pages), this work covers (1) Geographic China (western languages); (2) Geographic China (Chinese language sources); (3) Geographic China (Japanese and other language sources); and Overseas Chinese (all languages). The volumes are scheduled to appear in series between April, 1968 and May, 1970.

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Appendix A

# CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ELITE: A TENTATIVE SURVEY

by

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Prepared for the Politburo Feasibility Study Conference,
Stanford University, 16-18 December 1966.

## INTRODUCTION

This paper is neither complete nor definitive, for a number of reasons. First the Chinese Communist elite has been defined as including only the full and alternate members of the Eighth Central Committee, although some non-Central Committee personages are much more important today than some full members of the Central Committee, even members of the Politburo (for example, compare Chang Wen-t'ien and P'eng Te-huai with Chiang Ch'ing [Mme. Mao Tse-tung], Huo Shih-lien, 1st Secretary of the Shensi Provincial Party Committee, and Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, Mayor of Shanghai). However, it was felt that if dditions and deletions were made with the current situation in such a state of flux, the problems attendant upon individual interpretation might raise more questions than they answer.

Secondly, the number of comparisons and contrasts attempted with regard to the backgrounds of Central Committee (CC) members is by no means exhaustive. Limitations of time as well as data obtain in this case; more important, it was deemed prudent to forego more sophisticated comparisons and contrasts (at this stage, they can scarcely be called correlations) until after the following preliminary efforts have been critiqued.

Thirdly, no candidate propositions for the propositional index have been received at the time of writing.

Finally, no biographical sketches have been appended to this paper. Sketches of individual CC members can be provided upon request, and the author will have his biographical cards and data deck at the Conference.

## I. CHANGES IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE HIERARCHY DURING 1966

**Code:**
+ gained
- lost
x held ground
o inactive or unimportant in power structure
------ line through name indicates definitely purged

The following is based on the lists of officials attending the following rallies in Peking during 1966: 18 August, 31 August, 15 September, 1 October, 18 October, 3 November, 10 November, 12 November; together with other data.

### Politburo Standing Committee

| | Current (probable) | | Previous |
|---|---|---|---|
| x | Mao Tse-tung, Chairman | | Mao Tse-tung, Chairman |
| + | Lin Piao, Minister of Defense | | Liu Shao-ch'i, Vice Chairman |
| x | Chou En-lai, Premier | | Chou En-lai, Vice Chairman |
| + | T'ao Chu, Party Propaganda Chief | o | Chu Teh, Vice Chairman |
| + | Ch'en Po-ta, Head of "Cultural Revolution" Group | o | Ch'en Yün, Vice Chairman |
| + | K'ang Sheng, Advisor to the "Cultural Revolution" Group | | Lin Piao, Vice Chairman |
| + | [illegible] economic planner | | Teng Hsiao-p'ing, General Secretary |

### Other Full Members of Politburo

| | Current | | Previous |
|---|---|---|---|
| - | Teng Hsiao-p'ing, still General Secretary but actual Party rank uncertain | o | Tung Pi-wu, Party elder |
| - | Liu Shao-ch'i, still Chief of State but actual Party status uncertain | | ~~P'eng Chen~~ |
| o | Chu Teh, Party elder | | Ch'en Yi, Foreign Minister |

| | |
|---|---|
| o Ch'en Yün, once top economist; in disfavor since critical of "Great Leap" in 1959 | Li Fu-ch'un, economic planner |
| o Tung Pi-wu, Party elder | -P'eng-Te-huai- |
| x Ch'en Yi, Foreign Minister | o Liu Po-ch'eng, Military Affairs Committee |
| o Liu Po-ch'eng, Military Affairs Committee | Ho Lung, Military Affairs Committee |
| x Ho Lung, Military Affairs Committee | Li Hsien-nien, Finance Minister |
| x Li Hsien-nien, Finance Minister | Li Ching-ch'üan, Head of Southwest Party Bureau |
| x Li Ching-ch'üan, Head of Southwest Party Bureau | T'an Chen-lin, agricultural specialist |
| x T'an Chen-lin, agricultural specialist | |
| + Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Military Affairs Committee | |
| + Nieh Jung-chen, Military Affairs Committee | |
| + Yeh Chien-ying, Military Affairs Committee | |

**Alternate Members of Politburo**

| Current | Previous |
|---|---|
| o Ulanfu, Party leader in Inner Mongolia | o Ulanfu, Party leader in Inner Mongolia |
| - Po I-po, economic planner; actual Party status uncertain | -Chang-Wen-t'ien- |
| - Li Hsüeh-feng, still Head of North China Bureau and Peking Municipal Party Committee, but actual Party rank uncertain | -Lu-Ting-i- |
| + Hsieh Fu-chih, Minister of Internal Security | Ch'en Po-ta, propagandist and Mao's ghost writer |
| | K'ang Sheng, intelligence work |
| | Po I-po, economic planner |

## CC SECRETARIAT

| Current (probable) | Previous |
|---|---|
| Teng Hsiao-p'ing, still General Secretary but actual Party status uncertain | Teng Hsiao-p'ing |
| T'an Chen-lin, agricultural specialist | ~~P'eng Chen~~ |
| Li Hsüeh-feng, still Head of China Bureau and Peking Municipal Party Committee, but actual Party status uncertain | o Wang Chia-hsiang |
| Li Fu-ch'un, economic planner | T'an Chen-lin |
| Li Hsien-nien, Finance Minister | Li Hsüeh-feng |
| K'ang Sheng, intelligence work | Li Fu-ch'un |
| T'ao Chu, Party Propaganda Chief (may have been promoted out of Secretariat) | Li Hsien-nien |
| Yeh Chien-ying, new Secretariat member; Military Affairs Committee | ~~Lu Ting-i~~ |
| Liu Ning-i, new Secretariat member; foreign affairs specialist | K'ang Sheng |
| | ~~Lo Jui-ch'ing~~ |

Comment: Analysis of the foregoing changes just recently effected in the upper strata of the Central Committee indicates that Lin Piao, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and trusted Maoists ---sycophants (Ch'en Po-ta) and practitioners (T'ao Chu)--- have gained ground at the expense of some members more closely identified with Party and/or Governmental functions. It would appear that Mao Tse-tung is using the "Red Guard" and the PLA, through his inner circle of confidants, to purge the Party and the Government in much the same manner as Stalin used the secret police.

Note: Fruitful comparisons can be made with regard to Stalin's comments on the Cheka and its successors, on the one hand, and Chinese Communist statements on the role of the PLA and the "Red Guard," on the other.

## II. THE CURRENT "MEANINGFUL" ELITE

The Eighth CC, by virtue of the 1956 Party Congress and the 1958 IInd Session, has at one time or another included one hundred ninety-five (195) members, ninety-nine (99) full members and ninety-six (96) alternate members. Of this total (195), seventeen members have died, reducing the membership of the Eighth CC to its present strength of one hundred seventy-eight (178).

However, further subtractions can be made in an effort to determine a maximum "meaningful" elite. Female CC members, for example, are not privy to the inner circle's deliberations. (Eight women are members of the Eighth CC.) We may also discount the ten non-Han members of the CC (three Mongols; two Hui; and one each of the following: Korean, Uigur, Tibetan, Chuang, and Hakka).

Next, we can eliminate those definitely known to be in disfavor (the count as of 23 November 1966 stands at twenty-three); those probably in disfavor (ten); and those possibly in disfavor (fourteen).

Finally, we can exclude six CC members known to be seriously ill, as well as seven members often referred to as "aged comrades" --- that is, too old to serve as little more than living exemplars of the revolutionary past.

Avoiding double-counting, this leaves a current and maximum "meaningful" elite of one hundred and two (102) CC members, and it

is quite probable that even this greatly reduced figure is too large. However, on this basis alone, it would appear that some seventy-six persons --- forty-three percent (43%) of the present CC membership --- do not enter into power considerations as of mid-November 1966. (By power considerations, I mean participation in policy formulation and execution at the national level.)

The breakdown by "excluded groups" is as follows:

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CCP): EIGHTH CC

* denotes Full Member of 8th CC
** denotes Alternate Member of 8th CC

A. DECEASED (17) 8* 9**

Chang Hsi** 8 January 1959

Chang Te-sheng** 4 March 1965

Ch'en Keng* 16 March 1961

Chou Pao-chung** 22 February 1964

Huang Ching* 10 February 1958

Kan Szu-ch'i** 5 February 1964

K'o Ch'ing-shih* 9 April 1965

Ku Ta-ts'un** 4 November 1966

Lai Jo-yü* 20 May 1958

Li K'o-nung* 19 February 1962

Lin Po-ch'ü* 29 May 1960

Liu Ya-lou* 7 May 1965

Lo Jung-huan* 16 December 1963

P'eng T'ao** 14 November 1961

Shao Shih-p'ing** 24 March 1965

Sun Chih-yüan** 11 October 1966

Ts'ai Shu-fan** 18 October 1958

B. FEMALES (8) 4* 4**

Chang Yün** b. 1905, Kiangsu. Vice Chairman, All-China Democratic Women's Federation

Ch'en Shao-min* (Mme. Li Hsien-nien) b. 1905, Shantung. Vice Chairman, All-China Federation of Trade Unions

Ch'ien Ying* b. 1909, Hupei. Minister of Internal Affairs

Li Chien-chen** b. 1904, Kwangtung. Secretary, Kwangtung Provincial Party Secretariat

Ou Meng-chüeh** b. 1903, Kwangtung. Secretary, Kwangtung Provincial Party Committee

Shuai Meng-ch'i** b. 1907, Hunan. Member, CC Control Commission

Teng Ying-ch'ao* (Mme. Chou En-lai) b. 1903, Honan. Vice Chairman, All-China Democratic Women's Federation

Ts'ai Ch'ang* (Mme. Li Fu-ch'un) b. 1900, Hunan. Chairman, All-China Democratic Women's Federation

C. MEMBERS OF MINORITY NATIONALITIES (10) 4* 6**

Chu Te-hai** b. 1911, Korea. Chairman, Yen-pien Korean Nationality Autonomous Chou, Kirin Province

K'uei Pi** b. 1903, Suiyüan. 2nd Secretary, Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Party Committee; Vice Chairman, Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region People's Government

Liu Ko-p'ing* b. 1912, Hopei. Vice Governor, Shansi Province

Saifudin (Sai-fu-ting)** b. 1916, Sinkiang. Chairman, Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region; Secretary, Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region Party Committee

Songgi Ish** (aka T'ien Pao or Sansrygasyesbes) b. 1917, Vice-Governor Szechwan Province.

Sung Jen-ch'iung* b. 1904, Hunan. 1st Secretary, Northeast Regional Party Bureau

Ulanfu (Wu-lan-fu)* b. 1903, Suiyüan. Alternate Member, CC Politburo; 1st Secretary, Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Party Committee; Chairman, Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region People's Government

Wang Feng** b. 1916, Shensi. 1st Secretary, Kansu Provincial Party Committee; Secretary, Northwest Regional Party Bureau

Wei Kuo-ch'ing** b. 1914, Kwangsi. Chairman, Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region; 1st Secretary, Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region Party Committee

Yeh Chien-ying* b. 1898, Kwangtung. President, PLA Academy of Military Science; Vice Chairman, CC Military Affairs Committee

D. IN DISFAVOR (23) 15* 8**

Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo Fu)* b. 1900, Kiangsu. No known Government or Party post save CC membership

Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming)* b. 1905, Anhwei. No known Government or Party post save CC membership

Chia T'o-fu* b. 1911, Shensi. Opposed "Great Leap" policies. No known Government or Party post save CC membership

Ch'ien Chün-jui** b. 1908, Kiangsu. Purged in early 1961. No known Government or Party post save CC membership

Chou Hsiao-chou** b. 1909, Hunan. Purged October 1959 as "right opportunist." No known Government or Party post save CC membership.

Chou Huan** b. 1904, Liaoning. Dismissed as Secretary of Liaoning Provincial Party Secretariat, June 1966

Chou Yang** b. 1908, Hunan. Purged, Spring 1966.

Feng Pai-chü** b. 1900, Kwangtung. Purged Spring 1958 for "localist activities." No known Government or Party Post save CC membership

Hsi Chung-hsün** b. 1912, Shensi. Purged 1962 for "opposing Chairman Mao's domestic policies." No known Government or Party post save CC membership

Hung Hsüeh-chih** b. 1910, Kiangsi. Purged during P'eng Te-huai affair. No known Government or Party post save CC membership

Li Hsueh-feng* b. 1906, Shansi. Currently under attack

Li Li-san* b. 1896, Hunan. No real power

Li Wei-han* b. 1897, Hunan. Undergoing "reform through labor" in Sinkiang. Replaced March 1965 as Director, CC United Front Work Department

Lin T'ieh* b. 1905, Szechwan. Purged, September 1966. Replaced as 1st Secretary, Hopei Provincial Party Committee

Liu Jen** b. 1909, Szechwan. Purged in P'eng Chen affair. Replaced as 2nd Secretary, Peking Municipal Party Committee

Liu Shao-ch'i* b. 1898, Hunan. Currently under attack

Lo Jui-ch'ing* b. 1907, Szechwan. Purged 1966. Replaced as Chief of PLA General Staff by Yang Ch'eng-wu

Lu Ting-yi* b. 1901, Kiangsu. Purged in P'eng Chen affair. Replaced as Minister of Culture by "acting" Minister Hsiao Wang-tung

P'eng Chen* b. 1899, Shansi. Purged May 1966. Replaced as Mayor of Peking and 1st Secretary, Peking Municipal Party Committee by Wu Te and Li Hsüeh-feng (q.v.) respectively

P'eng Te-huai* b. 1900, Hunan. Ousted as Minister of Defense in September 1959. Replaced by Lin Piao. No known Governmental or Party post save CC membership

Po I-po* b. 1907, Shansi. Currently under attack

Teng Hsiao-p'ing* b. 1900, Szechwan. Currently under attack

Yang Hsien-chen* b. 1899, Hupei. Purged in early 1960s as "heretical revisionist." No known Governmental or Party post save CC membership.

E. PROBABLY IN DISFAVOR (10) 7* 3**

Cheng Wei-san* b. 1895, Hupei. Opposed Mao in late 1930s in Yenan. No important posts since 1949. Last known appearance April 1961

Chiang Nan-hsiang** b. 1910, Chekiang. Minister of Higher Education. Last known appearance 11 May 1966. Under attack by "Red Guard"

Hu Yao-pang* b. 1915, Hunan. Replaced as 1st Secretary, Shensi Provincial Party Committee and 3rd Secretary, CC Northwest Regional Bureau by Huo Shih-lien, a non-CC member.

Huang K'o-ch'eng* b. 1899, Hunan. Although elected Vice Governor of Shansi Province in December 1965, he has made no known public appearances since May 1961. Purged in 1959 during P'eng Te-huai affair

Lin Feng* b. 1906, Heilungkiang. Director, State Council's 2nd General Office (Culture and Education) and chief Party liaison man regarding cultural and educational affairs. His posts make him a natural target at present.

Liu Ko-p'ing* b. 1912, Hopei. Dismissed as 1st Secretary, Ninghsia Hui Autonomous Region Party Committee in September 1960 for "trying to engineer a split among the nationalities." Elected Vice-Governor, Shansi Province, in December 1965, but no known public appearances for some time

Tan Cheng* b. 1903, Hunan. Started losing power during P'eng Te-huai affair; lost last major post (Vice Minister of National Defense) in March 1965. Now Vice Governor, Fukien Province. No known appearances during 1965, one (10 March, Foochow) during 1966

Teng Hua* b. 1901, Hunan. Fell along with P'eng Te-huai. Lost military posts. Now Vice Governor of Szechwan Province but little or no real power

Wan Yi** b. 1902, Liaoning. No known Governmental or Party post save CC membership. No known public appearance since April 1959

Wang Ho-shou** b. 1908, Hopei. Replaced as Minister of Metallurgical Industry in July 1964. No known public appearances since that time

F. <u>POSSIBLY IN DISFAVOR</u> (14) 5* 9**

Chang Chi-ch'un* B. 1900, Hunan. Probably out as Deputy Director, CC Propaganda Department. Closely identified with P'eng chen. Last known appearance 18 August 1966

Chang Ch'i-lung** b. 1900, Hunan. Deputy Director, CC Organization Department. Not mentioned in the press for over one year. No known 1966 appearances

Chang Han-fu** b. 1906, Kiangsu. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Last known appearance 8 May 1966. Although President of the Sino-Cambodian Friendship Association, he did not head the November 1966 Chinese delegation to Phnom Penh, nor did he see the delegation off or greet its return

Hsü Tzu-jung** b. 1907, Shansi. Vice Minister of Public Security. Only known 1966 appearance in March. Ousted with Lo Jui-ch'ing???

Ling Huo-ch'ing** b. 1906, Hopei. 1st Secretary, Liaoning Provincial Party Committee. No known appearances since 2 September 1965.

Li Ch'ang** b. 1916, Fukien. President, 2nd College of Foreign Languages, Peking. No known public appearance since 17 June 1966. College administration under attack

Li Chieh-po** b. 1911, Hopei. Not seen in public since October 1964. No known Government or Party post save CC membership

Liu Ch'ang-sheng* b. 1904, Shantung. Not active since late 1963 (was #2 man in organized labor movement under Liu Ning'i). No information as to why.

Liu Chen** b. 1909, Hupei. Vice Commander, PLA Air Force. Passed over 17 August 1965 when Wu Fa-hsien was appointed Commander of the Air Force due to death of Liu Ya-lou. One minor public appearance since then

Ou-yang Ch'in* b. 1899, Hunan. Replaced 5 March 1966 as 1st Secretary, Heilungkiang Provincial Party Committee. No known public appearances since 23 July 1966

T'an Chi'i-lung** b. 1912, Hunan. 1st Secretary, Shantung Provincial Party Committee. No appearances since 19 August 1966 although many prior to that date. Budapest MTI (17 November) reported T'an under attack for opposing Mao

T'ang Liang** b. 1908, Hunan. Lost command of Nanking Military Region, January 1965. Last known appearance 31 July 1965. No known Government or Party post save CC membership

Ulanfu* b. 1903, Suiyüan. Alternate Member, CC Politburo; Party and Government boss, Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Last 1966 appearance 1 October; certain of his major lieutenants in Inner Mongolia have been attacked and/or dismissed

Yang Shang-k'un* b. 1903, Szechwan. Director, CC General Office. Last known appearance 29 November 1965. Previously appeared frequently in public.

G. <u>KNOWN ILL</u> (6) 4* 2**

Ch'en P'i-hsien** (Ch'en P'ei-hsien) b. 1911, Fukien. 1st Secretary, Shanghai Municipal Party Committee

Hsü Hai-tung* b. 1900, Hupei. No major post save CC membership. Seriously wounded during Sino-Japanese War; has never fully recovered

Liao Lu-yen** b. 1899, Kiangsu. Minister of Agriculture, but "Acting" Minister Chiang I-chen in charge since late 1964

T'eng Tai-yüan* b. 1904, Hunan. Vice Chairman, 4th Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

Wang Chia-hsiang* b. 1907, Anhwei. Secretary, CC Secretariat. Last known appearance May 1962

Yeh Chi-chuang* b. 1893, Kwangtung. Minister of Foreign Trade, but Lin Hai-yün now "Acting Minister." Yeh suffered a stroke in 1965

H. "AGED COMRADES" (7) 6* 1**

Chu Teh (80) Chairman, Standing Committee, 3rd National People's Congress

Hsieh Chüeh-tsai (85) Retired

Hsü T'e-li (90) Deputy Director, CC Propaganda Department

Liu Po-ch'eng (74) Member, CC Politburo

Tung Pi-wu (80) Member, CC Politburo

Wang Wei-chou (82) 1st Deputy Secretary, CC Control Commission

Wu Yü-chang (88) President, Central College of Socialism.

MAXIMUM "MEANINGFUL" ELITE: 102 members. This represents some fifty-seven percent (57%) of the total live membership (178).

## III. VARIOUS MEAN AGE CALCULATIONS (end 1966)

Mean age ALL live members: 61+ years (calculated using ages of 177 members; age of one CC member, Chang Lin-chih**, Minister of Coal Industry, unknown).

Mean age full members of CC: 64+ years (including Lo Kuei-po, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, raised to full membership from 3rd ranking alternate status 17 November 1966).

Mean age alternate members of CC: 59 years (87 alternate members alive; Chang Lin-chih excluded from calculation as explained above).

Mean age CC Politburo: 66+ years (nineteen members used in calculation).

Mean age "real" CC Politburo: 64 1/2 years (twelve members used in calculation: Ch'en Po'ta, Ch'en Yi, Chou En-lai, Ho Lung, K'ang Sheng, Li Ching-ch'üan, Li Fu-ch'un, Lin Piao, Li Hsien-nien,

Mao Tse-tung, T'an Chen-lin, T'ao Chu).

Mean age "real" Politburo Standing Committee: 65 years (seven members used in calculation; listed in order of rank: Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, T'ao Chu, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Li Fu-ch'un).

Comment: The 15 May 1966 memorandum, Feasibility of Developing an "Operational Code" of the Chinese Communist Politburo, states:

> "Clearly, the men who make up the Politburo membership are of great pertinence to the operational code and to this kind of study. Mao Tse-tung and those leaders closest to him are well along in years, and it will make a great difference who succeeds, how the succession takes place, and what new lower level personnel move into the next lower echelons of leadership. In view of these considerations, the research design should make provision for studying these elite levels and for showing how they seem to relate to one another." (pp. 7-8)

Mao Tse-tung's current arbitrary rule --- indeed, his Stalinist way of turning upon some who have been his closest comrades-in-arms for decades --- renders speculation on the succession question (let alone the "next generation" problem) tenuous at best. Two facts are certain: first, Mao is using the elite to purge the elite; that is, no "new blood" is being infused into the top-level decision-making apparatus at the present time. The Chairman is still the Chairman; he is unquestionably in control and directing the purge. He has also named his successor: Minister of Defense Lin Piao.

Secondly, the purge has not been confined to the Central Committee; rather, it has left its mark on Party and Governmental bureaus throughout the country. It is quite probable that the worst is yet to come, inasmuch as it was not until 23 November that Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing (together with Li Hsüeh-feng and Po I-po) were explicitly denounced for "twenty-one years in opposition to Chairman Mao" (i.e., since the Seventh Party Congress in 1945) in a twenty-page pamphlet widely distributed in Peking. If past experience is any criterion, the attacks will eventually be directed against those at all levels who Mao and Lin perceive to be followers of Liu and Teng.

Note: For the above reasons, and to provide some (albeit modest) information with regard to the effect of the present turmoil on non-CC personnel --- i.e., Party members who under "normal conditions might advance to CC membership in the future --- the following list has been compiled identifying those non-CC officials definitely known to be victims of the "GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION" as of 12 October 1966.

## IV. NON-CC PURGE VICTIMS

| Name | Major Position(s) |
|---|---|
| Chang Che | Secretary, Shansi Provincial Party Committee |
| Chang Chin-lin | 2nd Secretary, Peking Municipal Young Communist League |
| Chang Ching-chi | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Peking Municipal Party Committee |
| Chang Ju-chang | Procurator General, Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region |

| | |
|---|---|
| Chang K'o-wei | Former President, Shenyang Agricultural Institute |
| Chang Li-chun | Deputy Director, General Office, Southwest Regional Bureau of CC |
| Chang Tung-yüeh | Vice President, Singkiang University |
| Chang Wen-sung | Director, Culture and Education Department, Peking Municipal Party Committee |
| Chao Hsün | Secretary, Drama Workers Union |
| Chao Li | Alternate Secretary, Chengtu University Party Committee |
| Chao Pan | Former Deputy Secretary General, Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Party Committee |
| Chao Shou-i | 2nd Secretary and former Director, Propaganda Department, Shensi Provincial Party Committee |
| Ch'en Chi-tung | Deputy Director, Culture Department, General Political Department, PLA |
| Ch'en Ching-po | 2nd Secretary, Kirin University Party Committee |
| Ch'en Fang | Director, Propaganda Department, Shenyang Municipal Party Committee |
| Ch'en Han-po | Editor in Chief, The Commercial Press |
| Ch'en Hung | Director, Culture Bureau, Fukien Province |
| Ch'en I-hsin | Vice Governor, Hupei Province |
| Ch'en Kuang-yüan | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Tsinghai Provincial Party Committee; Editor in Chief, Tsinghai Daily |
| Ch'en Leng | Deputy Director, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Sciences |
| Ch'en Ping-yü | Former Secretary, Huhehot Municipal Party Committee; Acting Mayor, Huhehot |
| Ch'en Po | Secretary, Cinema Union; Deputy Secretary General, Photographers Union |
| Ch'en Po-lin | Editor in Chief, Chengtu Evening News |

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|---|---|
| Ch'en Ta-yu | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Kweichow Provincial Party Committee |
| Ch'en Teng-ko | Vice Chairman, Literary and Art Federation, Anhwei Province |
| Cheng I-ping | Secretary, Harbin Municipal Party Committee |
| Cheng Yün | Vice Chairman, Literary and Art Federation, Hupei Province |
| Chiang Lung-chi | President, Lanchow University; Secretary, Lanchow University Party Committee |
| Chiang Tsun | Editor in Chief, Harbin Evening News |
| Ch'ien Hsien-ai | Chairman, Literary and Art Federation, Kweichow Province |
| Ch'ien Hsin-chung | Minister of Public Health; President, Chinese Red Cross Society |
| Chien Po-tsan | Vice President, Peking University |
| Chin Mu | Vice Chairman, Kwangtung Branch, Union of Chinese Writers |
| Chin Sha | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Tibetan Autonomous Region Party Committee |
| Ching Kuan | Abbot, Mi-La Temple, Harbin |
| Chou Hsin-fang | President, Shanghai Peking Opera Institute; Vice Chairman, Union of Chinese Dramatists |
| Chou Tsun | Director, Culture Bureau, Kiangsu Province |
| Chou Yu | Former Editor in Chief, Peking Daily; Secretary, China Journalists Association |
| Chu Pai-yin | Deputy Director, Shanghai Cinema Bureau |
| Chu Shao-t'ien | 1st Secretary, Wuhan University Party Committee |
| Chung Lin | Former Editor in Chief, Kwangsi Daily |
| Fan Chin | Editor in Chief, Peking Daily |
| Feng Ting | Deputy Director, Philosophy Department, Peking University |

| | |
|---|---|
| Ho Ch'i-fang | Director, Literature Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Sciences |
| Ho Hsi-lin | Vice President, Nankai University |
| Ho Hung | President, Kueiyang Normal College |
| Ho Lu-t'ing | President, Shanghai Institute of Music; Vice Chairman, Musicians Union |
| Ho Ting-hua | Vice President, Wuhan University |
| Ho Yao | Member, Investigation and Study Department, Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Party Committee |
| Hou Wai-lu | Deputy Director, 2nd Historical Institute (Medieval), Chinese Academy of Sciences |
| Hsi Sha | Editor, Tibet Daily (hsi-tsang jih-pao) |
| Hsia Yen | Vice Minister of Culture |
| Huang Ching-tao | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Tsinghai Provincial Party Committee |
| Huang Pu-chung | Secretary, Kueiyang Normal College Party Committee |
| Jen Shen | Vice President, Tsinghai University; Alternate Secretary, Tsinghai University Party Committee |
| K'ang Cho | Vice Chairman, Writers Union, Hunan Province |
| Ko Lin | President, Chungshan Medical College |
| Ku Chi-kuang | Professor, Kiangsi University |
| K'uang Ya-ming | President, Nanking University; 1st Secretary, Nanking University Party Committee |
| Kuo Hsiao-tang | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Honan Provincial Party Committee |
| Li Chi | Director, Propaganda Department, Peking Municipal Party Committee |
| Li Ching | Alternate Secretary, Kirin Engineering College Party Committee |
| Li Chun-ming | Editor in Chief, Chung Hua Book Company |

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|---|---|
| Li Fan-fu | Vice Governor, Anhwei Province; Director, Propaganda Department, Anhwei Provincial Party Committee |
| Li Kuei | 1st Secretary, Huhehot Municipal Party Committee |
| Li Lin | Vice President, Chengchow University |
| Li Meng-p'ei | Editor in Chief, Yunnan Daily |
| Li Shu-sen | Vice President, Tientsin University |
| Li Ta | President, Wuhan University |
| Li Ting-k'un | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Kiangsi Provincial Party Committee |
| Li Tsung-kang | Vice President, Shensi Provincial Party School |
| Li Ya-chun | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Szechwan Provincial Party Committee |
| Liao Mo-sha | Director, United Front Work Department, Peking Municipal Party Committee |
| Lin Hung | Deputy Editor in Chief, Anhwei Daily |
| Lin Mo-han | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Party CC |
| Lin Tan-ch'iu | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Chekiang Provincial Party Committee |
| Lin Yang | Director, Propaganda Department, Inner Mongolia University Party Committee |
| Liu Chih-ming | Vice President, Chungshan Medical College |
| Liu Hsiao-wu | Vice Chairman, Literary and Art Federation, Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region |
| Liu Hsiu-shan | Vice Chairman, Literary and Art Federation, Anhwei Province |
| Liu Ming-fan | Vice President, Shantung Normal College |
| Lo Ting | Deputy Director, Culture Bureau Liaoning Province |
| Lou Ping | Vice President, Nankai University |

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|---|---|
| Lu P'ing | President, Peking University; 1st Secretary, Peking University Party Committee |
| Lu T'ao | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Fukien Provincial Party Committee |
| Lu Ti | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Kwangsi Provincial Party Committee |
| Ma Shih-tu | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, CC Southwest Regional Bureau |
| Na Sha | Vice Chairman, Literary and Art Federation, Anhwei Province |
| Ou-yang Shan | Chairman, Literary and Art Federation, Kwangtung Province |
| P'eng Hsiao-chien | Vice Governor, Honan Province |
| P'eng Kang | President, Sian Communications University; Secretary, Sian Communications University Party Committee |
| P'eng P'ei-yüh | Alternate Secretary, Peking University Party Committee |
| P'eng Te-yüan | Alternate Secretary, Peking University Party Committee |
| Shih Ling-hao | Director, Culture Bureau, Kiangsi Province |
| Shih Shao-p'ei | Vice President, Kiangsi Agricultural College: Secretary, Kiangsi Agricultural College Party Committee |
| Su Chuang | Deputy Secretary, Tientsin Municipal Party Committee |
| Sun Yeh-fang | Director, Economics Insitute, Chinese Academy of Sciences |
| Sung Chen-ting | Director, Propaganda Department, Kirin Municipal Party Committee |
| Sung Shuo | Deputy Director, University Scientific Work Department, Peking Municipal Party Committee |
| Sung Yu-hsi | Director, Propaganda Department, Honan Provincial Party Committee |
| T'ao Hsiung | Deputy Director, Shanghai Peking Opera Theater |

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|---|---|
| T'ao Pai | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Kiangsu Provincial Party Committee |
| Teng T'o | Secretary, Peking Municipal Party Committee; Editor, Frontline (ch'ien-hsien) |
| T'ien Ching-jen | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Kiangsu Provincial Party Committee |
| T'ien Hsin | Alternate Secretary, Inner Mongolia University Party Committee |
| T'ien Wei | Director, Broadcasting Affairs Administrative Bureau, Kwangtung Province |
| Ts'ai Ch'u-sheng | Chairman, Cinema Union; Vice Chairman, All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers |
| Tseng Tun | Director, Propaganda Department, Hupei Provincial Party Committee |
| Tu Hsi-t'ang | Deputy Director, Culture Bureau, Honan Province |
| Tung Pien | Editor in Chief, China Women; Secretary, All-China Democratic Woemn's Federation |
| Tung Shao-p'eng | President, Kunming Agricultural and Forestry College; Secretary, Kunming Agricultural and Forestry College Party Committee |
| Wang Chia-lu | Secretary, Peking Young Communist League |
| Wang Ch'in-ching | Director, Culture and Education Department, Tientsin Municipal Party Committee |
| Wang Hsiao-ch'ian | Director, Propaganda Department, Kweichow Provincial Party Committee; Editor in Chief, Kweichow Daily |
| Wang K'u-ling | Editor, Singkiang Literature (hsin-chiang wen-hsüeh tsa-chih) |
| Wang Lin-kang | Deputy Director, United Front Work Department, Kweichow Provincial Party Committee |
| Wang P'ei-yu | Acting President, Chengchow University |
| Wei Tung-ming | Vice President, Hunan University |

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|---|---|
| Wu Chien | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Kansu Provincial Party Committee |
| Wu Han | Vice Mayor of Peking |
| Wu Hsiao-chang | Secretary, Hunan Party Cadre School |
| Wu K'o-jen | Vice Chairman, Literary and Art Federation, Wuhan |
| Wu Pai-tao | Deputy Director, Culture Bureau, Kiangsu Province |
| Wu Te-jen | Vice President, Nankai University |
| Wu Tien-shih | Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Kiangsu Provincial Party Committee |
| Yang Han-chang | Former Acting President, Inner Mongolia University |
| Yang Han-sheng | Secretary General, All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers |
| Yang Shu | Director, Propaganda Department, Peking Municipal Party Committee |
| Yen Yin-chien | Secretary, Kunming Medical College Party Committee |
| Yü Hsiu | Vice Governor, Shantung Province; Director, Culture and Education Department, Shantung Provincial Party Committee |
| Yü P'ei-chen | Vice President, Inner Mongolia University; Alternate Secretary, Inner Mongolia University Party Committee |
| Yü Yung-nien | Acting Chairman, Political Department, Industrial and Commercial Bureau, Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region |
| Yüan Ti-min | Former Director, Propaganda Department, Kansu Provincial Party Committee |

## V. PLACES OF BIRTH OF CC MEMBERS

| Province | Number |
|---|---|
| Hunan | 49 |
| Shensi | 17 |
| Hopei | 16 |
| Szechwan | 15 |
| Hupei | 15 |
| Kiangsi | 13 |
| Fukien | 10 |
| Kwangtung | 9 |
| Shansi | 9 |
| Kiangsu | 9 |
| Chekiang | 5 |
| Shantung | 5 |
| Liaoning | 4 |
| Anhwei | 4 |
| Honan | 4 |
| Suiytian | 2 |
| Kwangsi | 2 |
| Yunnan | 1 |
| Chahar | 1 |
| Sinkiang | 1 |
| Heilungkiang | 1 |
| Kirin | 1 |
| Korea | 1 |
| Japan | 1 |

## VI. EDUCATION

Chinese university (74) (Twenty-seven CC members who attended normal school or normal college are included in this category)

Chinese classical (6)

Chinese military school (33)

Japanese university (10)

American university (3)

Russian university (48)

French university (13)

German university (4)

Belgian university (1)

Middle school only (16)

Elementary school only (11)

No formal education (6)

Educational background unknown (20)

Note: The total exceeds the number of CC members due to double counting. It should also be noted that many CC members who attended college or university did not finish their courses of study.

## VII. MAJOR INITIAL OCCUPATION OF CC MEMBERS

Military (non-Communist) (6)

Education (16)

Journalism (4)

Professional revolutionary (155)

Unknown (6)

Other (8) (one each: sailor, warlord, potter's apprentice, longshoreman, tradesman, beggar, translator, lawyer)

Note: Upon leaving home or school, 79.5% of all present CC members became professional revolutionaries.

## VIII. PATERNAL BACKGROUND OF CC MEMBERS

Peasant (27)

Worker (9)

Scholar/Official (7)

Landlord (20)

Merchant (16)

Military (1)

Other (3) (one each: exiled revolutionary, wandering musician, vagabond)

Unknown (112)

Note: Of those background items checked in this paper, this category has proven to be the least satisfactory. The author has no information concerning the paternal background of some 57 percent of all CC members

## IX. DUAL ROLES: PARTY AND GOVERNMENT

CC members with high Government posts (140)

CC members with low Government posts (11)

CC members with no known Government post (27)

Note: A high Government post has been arbitrarily defined as being at least (1) a member of the Standing Committeee of the 3rd National People's Congress or (2) a provincial Vice Governor. Those eleven CC members listed as having low Government posts hold down no known position save that of Deputy to the 3rd National People's Congress

or membership in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

## X. FOREIGN TRAVEL OF CC MEMBERS

Never abroad or unknown (44)

Has been abroad (151)

Abroad pre-1949 (76)

Abroad pre-1949 only (16)

Abroad post-1949 (130)

Abroad post-1949 only (75)

Abroad only post-1949 to Communist bloc countries or pre-1949 to USSR (95)

Abroad only post-1949 to non-Communist countries (6)

Abroad post-1949 to Communist bloc and non-Communist countries (40)

North Korea only (12)

North Vietnam only (5)

North Korea and North Vietnam only (1)

Has visited or studied in United States (3) (all pre-1949)

Has visited non-Communist underdeveloped world only (14)

Has visited or studied in USSR only (25)

Has visited Latin America (2)

Note: Although 77 percent of all Eighth CC members have been abroad, nearly 50 percent have never travelled to a non-Communist country. Of those who have, fourteen have visited underdeveloped countries only. Some 23 percent of all Eighth CC members are not known to have travelled abroad, and 9 percent have been to the Communist-controlled areas of Korea and/or Vietnam only. It is felt that meaningful propositions could be generated focusing upon the

very evident Communist Chinese stereotype of the outside world.

Further note regarding foreign travel: Foreign travel on the part of CC members during the period 1 January through 15 November 1966 has been restricted to the following thirteen countries: North Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Congo (Brazzaville), Rumania, Albania, and the USSR. The only visitor to the Soviet Union was the Communist Chinese Ambassador to Moscow, P'an Tzu-li. P'an returned to Peking prior to National Day (1 October) and has not taken up his post again in the Soviet capital as of mid-November. In all, eleven CC members travelled abroad during the first ten and one-half months of 1966.

Appendix B

# ON THE PROPOSED STUDY OF THE "OPERATIONAL CODE" OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITBURO

by

Thomas W. Robinson

Prepared for the Politburo F sibility Study Conference,
Stanford University, 16-18 December 1966

It has been proposed that a large-scale, serious study be made of the Chinese Communist Politburo. The questions to be answered here are whether or not this project is feasible; if so, how best to carry it out; and if not, what alternative formulations exist? Let me approach the topic under the following headings: (1) my understanding of what is called for; (2) a critical appraisal of the project, especially of the desirability of using the Leites study as a base; (3) alternative and supplementary formulations; (4) bibliographic sources useful in such a study.

I. The Project

As I understand it, the purpose of the project is to inquire into the "operational code" of the Communist Chinese Politburo, that is, to derive 1. the values (cultural, societal, and political); 2. the goals; and 3. the strategies and tactics of the Chinese ruling group. In particular, an attempt will be made, explicitly and systematically, to state "rules" of behavior - both explicit, clearly implied, and inferred in nature. The data will consist of the classical writings of Chinese leaders - particularly those of Mao Tse-tung - plus historical data (records of policies, decisions, and responses to inputs). The method is, first, to apply to the Chinese case the theories, categories of analysis, and some of the results of Nathan Leites' The Operational Code of The Politburo, noting in each instance what transformations must be made. Next, an attempt will be made to derive from that approach and by using the sources noted an inventory of propositions describing Chinese Politburo behavior. These propositions would either tend to confirm or deny the parallel approaches in Leites,

or would supplement them. Also (presumably as a result of an investigation of those propositions) the political components of the Chinese Politburo would be noted. These are three: actors - their perceptions and interactions -; roles; and functions. The research design, once these preliminary stages had been surmounted successfully, would then be carried out in five parts; 1) amplification and refinement of the propositions; 2) their documentation; 3) empirical testing by reference to the two sources of data referred above; 4) model confirmation or modification; 5) model refinement by means of going through parts 1-- 4 again (and, if necessary again, until more or less complete correspondence between theory and data are achieved). Finally, a number of subsidiary research goals are formulated: 1) a particular study of the personalities of the members of the Chinese elite, of the problem of succession, and of the question of geogrpahic and funcional division of labor; 2) Chinese Communist ideology, in both its theoretical and empirical senses (and in the latter, the subcategories of ideological antecedents, cultural elements, and rules of behavior would also be studies); 3) new techniques of research; 4) the question of the influence of Chinese tradition on Chinese Communist decision-making behavior.

II. Critical Appraisal

Three things immediately strike the reader of the proposal: first, it is an orderly and well thought-out design thoroughly inbued with the scientific method; second, it is a very tall order and would require an enormous amount of research and data inputs; third, the proposed is heavily dependent upon the presumed usefulness of the

Leites approach. Let us inspect each of these features in turn. I very much approve of the desire to build up a model of Chinese Communist decision-making on the basis of the historical and textural data available and then test it, refine it, retest it, and refine it again until a valuable model capable of making predictions with some confidence is arrived at. Such techniques have not yet been used in China studies and the proposal, if approved, gives promise of applying in that field an approach long since universally accepted in other fields. Furthermore, it is encouraging to note the emergence of the idea of using in Chinese area studies an idea which was worked out and has had great currency in Soviet area studies: not only should there be more work in the area of comparative communism, but the very thought of using concepts derived elsewhere, and thus contributing to the rise of a general political theory of operational communism, is exciting. (Such a statement is, of course, tantamount to admitting to the poverty, up to the present, of Chinese political studies. The field so far has been dominated by works in the field of history. While history is an extremely important component in the study of any area of knowledge, it represents only the beginning of understanding. Further development comes only when the other social sciences in turn enter the field. The project may, therefore, become an initial forward step in that direction).

Having made this general point, however, we must now consider whether the proposal as stated would, in fact, make that contribution, be that forward step, and serve as that firm foundation for further work in examining the Chinese decision-making process. Or would it,

in the words of a reviewer in another field, be a "giant misstep in the right direction?" I am afraid that I tend to come down on the latter side. For one thing, the project would require an enormous amount of data collecting and processing. To take one example, how are we to determine the "ideological" component of the operational code? The proposal suggests looking at theoretical works on ideology (and, I presume, therefore on the sociology of knowledge), and this is a necessary component. The proposal also suggests looking at the traditional Chinese Weltanschauung, cultural elements, and actual rules of behavior; it is necessary and desirable to consider these aspects of the problem too. But even looking at the secondary works on the second set of elements above would be extraordinarily time consuming, to say the least. One would have, at the least, to consult the entire bibliography listed, say, in H. G. Creel's, Chinese Thought From Confucius to Mao Tse-tung. And how is one to get at the influence of traditional Chinese rules of behavior on Chinese communist actions? How much, and what part, of this tradition is ingrained in the psyche of Mao? For this, we would have to consult, for a start, Marcel Granet's Chinese Civilization and the bibliography cited therein, or Rene Groussett's, Rise and Splendor of the Chinese Empire, or the volumes by Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation and East Asia: The Great Tradition. One of Leites' techniques was to shortcircuit this necessity by quoting from Russian literature, on the presumption both that is summed up within itself the Russian cultural and intellectual tradition, that the founders of Bolshevism had read that literature, and that hence the Bolshevik leaders

carried that tradition within themselves. This may or may not be the case with the Chinese leaders If it is not, the project will have to go through the laboreous process of reducing that tradition and culture to the same sort of pithy phrase-models as we would need later when defining the operational code (such would be the only way of feeding this particular input into the model). If it is the case, then it is still incumbent to delineate the themes of Chinese literature - both communist and non-communist, which means referring, as a start, to the bibliography contained in C. T. Hsia's, A History of Modern Chinese Fiction, for the pre-communist period, and to the China Quarterly's "Special Survey of Chinese Communist Literature" (n. 13), and the references cited therein, for the communist period. This says nothing about using the theoretical works on ideology listed below. My point is, of course, that even though the research proposal is a good one, it may be entirely unworkable because of these problems of data: how are we to manage such a surfeit? If there is a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, we may not be able to make our way over all the obstacles of the research landscape to obtain it.

Somewhat the same conclusion is arrived at when purely communist material is considered. If something like the Leites analysis is to be made in the Chinese case, a huge array of documents will have to be analyzed. Not only will one have to go through the Selected Works and Selected Writings of Mao Tse-tung, but one will have to bring together and analyze the writings of all of the other members of the Chinese Politburo. This collection is voluminous, to say the least, and has not yet been collected. It is true that there are some specific indices of Mao's own work, making the task in that case somewhat easier, but

the entire collection and analysis task will have to be done for the rest of the Politburo. And it must be done separately for each member of that group, for not only is that what the study calls for, but also, because the present and future stages of Chinese Communist political history seem destined to be much more turbulent than the past, we must survey a wider range of the writing and speeches of Chinese decision-makers, ranging down the hierarchy to perhaps the hundredth rung (T'ao Chu moved from 94th to 4th place in less than a year). This raises fundamental questions concerning the availability of competent researchers to do the task: are there enough people around to handle those documents with the same skill that Leites handled the Soviet documents. Although some sort of computer content analysis may be of some use here, Leites own work was intensive and qualitative while computer work tends to be extensive and quantitative. Whereas in the past one could, without departing too much from reality, quote from the outlook of Mao (with a little bit of Liu Shao-chi and a dash of Chou En-lai thrown in) and emerge with a fairly accurate view of the Chinese elite's view of things, surely we cannot approach the problem that way today, and when Mao departs from the scene the possibilities for doing so will be even less. There is no assurance that China will continue to be ruled by one man or even by a small, closely knit group. The proposed study would have made fine sense in the early fifties (when Leites' work itself was done) and it still may make sense today. But the amount of extra work to be done will, in my opinion, reach astronomical heights. The upshot of the data problem - in both traditional and communist areas of study - is that it may be better to opt for the restricted version of the project rather than the expanded version; the former will be large enough, the latter, perhaps, unmanageable.

Another input to the research design concerns the problem of elites - their personalities, roles and functions, who they are, at what levels of command they operate, and the problem of transfer of elite authority (succession). Looking at the first component of this composite variable - personalities - how are we to understand the personality make-up of the men who sit on the Chinese Politburo? Do their personalities come through from an analysis of their writings and speeches? It is difficult for me to say that they do to any degree. Surely we can (perhaps with the aid of computer content analysis) code these documents along the lines of personality trait indicators. But, in my opinion, that will not suffice. It is also necessary to know the life histories of the subjects, but unfortunately very little information on the personal histories of these men, especially the crucial details of their early childhood and home life. When this is the case, we must resort to building up what little clues we have, with the aid of psychoanalytic theories, into a picture of an entire personality. Here I would point to the work of Erik Erickson, especially his Young Man Luther, as a good example of how to go about this part of the work. In fact, I would go so far as to state that perhaps what we need is an approach grounded not so much in the work of Nathan Leites (not because it is not productive of ideas nor non-transferable to the Chinese case - it may well be) but in the work of Erik Erickson. It may also be that there exist a number of hitherto untapped sources useful in studying the personalities of the Chinese decision-makers. For instance, by now quite a number of people have had interviews with those leaders, from Mao and Lin Piao (who has interviewed Lin?) to Lin Shao-c'hi and

Chou En-lai to T'ao Chu and K'ang Sheng. Would it not be a good idea for the project, if approved, to seek out these people, interview them, and ask them certain questions designed to envoke evaluative and faccual responses as to the personalities of the Chinese leaders with whom they spoke. Unfortunately, I do not know of any single list of such people. Often they are journalists who then publish their appraisals in the press; sometimes they are diplomatic personnel or party leaders of both Western and non-Western states. Perhaps the U. S. Government (C.I.A.?) maintains such a list and would be willing to release it. Surely the work of such people as Howard Boorman and Donald Klein would be relevant. Perhaps another device would be to retain trained psychoanalysts to view movies and pictures of the Chinese leaders, to listen to their speeches (voice intonation, etc.), and even to analyze their handwriting. Although this may impose unusual personnel requirements (who is qualified as a handwriting analyst of Chinese characters?), the point I wish to make is that there exist a number of areas of research and types of data which are as yet unused in the study of the personalities of Chinese decision-makers. The project may be a good place to bring these research techniques and data sources into the picture; surely it would be creative.

The problem of defining the role and function of each of the Chinese leaders is a very difficult one. It is here that information is most lacking. How does the Politburo operate? What are its divisions? Who runs them? Is it realy the apex of authority or do the lines of authority shift with the issue at hand and with different personality inputs? What are the other hierarchies of authority and

what are their lines of communication into and out of the Politburo? It is doubtful that hard and fast answers will become available to these questions. Yet the problem is one common to other areas as well. In the case of the Soviet Union, we are really not much farther along than in the Chinese case, yet we seem to know a bit more in the Soviet case than the relative difference of data inputs would indicate (although even in the Soviet case we are badly off: witness the surprise that befell Sovietologists upon the announcement of Khrushchev's ouster). The reason, in my opinion, is that in the Soviet case, initial attempts have been made to mix these facts with theories drawn from other areas of inquiry. We could, in my opinion, be much further ahead if we mixed what little data in this realm we have with some theoretical inputs - such as decision-making theory, organization theory, theory of bureaucracy, and small group analysis - together with a drawing out of some of the lessons learned from case studies in each of these areas. Suppose, for instance, one were to consult the following four books in the field of organization theory and bureaucratic theory: Robert Prenthus, The Organizational Society; Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organization; Wilbert E. Moore, The Conduct of the Corporation, and Edward S. Mason (ed.), The Corporation in Modern Society. I wonder if one would not find there a large number of hypotheses which might be applicable to the Chinese communist case? Again, in the field of small group theory, suppose one were to take Sidney Verba's Small Groups and Political Behavior and the bibliography referred to therein and see what it says for the Chinese Politburo. My feeling is that a great deal would come from this sort of exercise.

Perhaps this is a good point to put forward my general thesis in connection with my evaluation of the proposed project. Although the proposal seems on the surface to be very good, particularly when one knows of the success which the Leites studies has had in the Soviet case, I think a better method of approach would be to take advantage of the work in the various "behavioral" sciences during the last two decades and use some of the many theoretical approaches and methodologies which have come along. Surely one would wish to include Leites' approach in such a listing, yet to make it the exclusive basis of the study would be to depend overly much on one school of analysis to the exclusion of all of the rest, as well as to lean too heavily on the presumption that the conditions present in the Soviet case are also present in the Chirese case. The purposes of the project are to understand the nature of the Chinese decision-makeup process and to predict its future course of action. This is laudatory? Yet I fear that the approach is not readily transferable; that too much subsidiary work will have to be done; that the approach contains some very serious flaws not easily remediable; and that there exist other techniques and theories which may well be applicable and which, in any case, it would be a pity to exclude.

Let us look at the Leites approach and attempt to discern: its assumptions; to what extent it is applicable, as it stands to the Chinese case; what its method is and whether the Chinese case lends itself to such a method; and what its inherent flaws are. As to the assumptions grounding the study, they include: (1) the "operational code" represents the essential Weltanschauung together with the modus

operandi of the decision-making group; (2) such a code exists and is knowable from an analysis of the very top decision-makers in a system; (3) the characteristics of the system as a whole can be discerned i. e. all societal, cultural, political, psychological, international, etc., influences bearing on the organization in question are summed up and held within the minds of the elite of that organization; (4) there is a single operational code for all members of the organization, coterminal with the code used by the elite; (5) the code, at least in the communist cases, is quite dependent upon the past history of the organization and especially upon life history of the very small number of men (especially Mao) who make up the elite; (6) the history of the organization is knowable, as are the life histories, particularly the early childhoods of those who dominate the party; (7) the "operational codes" of each member of the elite deviates from those of the others of the elite only in unimportant particulars; (8) the correct sources consists of texts of the writings of the founders and early leaders of the organization (whose will, it is assumed, lives on and influences further development of the organization long after those men have passed from the scene); (9) societal, cultural, etc., sources influencing the elite are best investigated by detailing the themes common in the national literature, since the latter tends to reveal the unexpressed content of the "operational codes;" (10) the leaders of the organization are members of the intelligentsia and the intelligentsia are the carriers of the representative cultural and societal values of the nation. A glance at the Chinese case reveals that, in the case of Mao, assumptions 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9 probably carry over; assumptions 2, 4 and 7 remain to be shown; while assumption 10 does not

seem to be true (Mao's negative attitude towards the Chinese intelligentsia seems to bear out this last judgment, despite Mao's own "intellectual" background and interests). Thus, in Mao's case, on balance it may be feasible to develop some sort of "operational code." Furthermore, in his case, we have seemingly, enough documentation of his writings, reports of interviews, biographical data, to do a credible job in building up Mao's own "operational code." The question then become whether or not one can do the same job for other members of the Chinese Politburo (that the process has to be repeated for each individual should be obvious. Too much depends on an analysis of the individual's own writings and a matching of his adult activities with those of his early childhood). One should not expect to obtain and find useful an "operational code" of the Chinese Politburo, where the latter term is understood as a composite and undifferentiated entity, for the dozen or so individual "operational codes" will not, when summed, add up to something approximating a unitary outlook which ca be called an "operational code" of the Politburo itself. Although it theoretically may prove possible to obtain such a code, I am doubtful (1) whether it can be done (the problem here is one of sources and of finding enough people able to do the same competent job that Leites himself did); (2) whether it should be done (there are all sorts of problems ranging from intrinsic difficulties of the Leites approach, to problems of integrating the results of the work of several researchers, to the question of whether the research would be wasted: the composition of the Politburo is liable to change much more rapidly in the future than it has in the past, while the founding father is about to pass

from the scene. There is no assurance that his influence will continue to a degree roughly equal to that of the present); and (3) whether it is worth doing (is it really worth a great deal of time and money to do a job at this stage in the life history of the Chinese Politburo? The future composition of the body is likely to be rather different from that of the past, its membership rate of turnover rather high, and its political orientation possibly quite different from that of the past). Furthermore, there may be better ways of getting at the problem of the political "style" of the Chinese Communists and it would be a pity not to try to use them. If we attempt to apply the assumption grounding the Leites study to Lin Piao, some of the problems are more evident. I believe that assumption 5 may well apply, while with regard to all of the rest we must be dubious or remain agnostic Surely, for instance, Lin Piao cannot be classed as an intellectual who has read enough of the national literature to have Chinese societal, cultural, and intellectual values inscribed upon his mind (assumption 10) and surely Lin's own "operational code" deviates substantially from those of many of the other members of the Chinese leadership group (assumption 7); otherwise we would not be witnessing such drastic changes in Chinese politics as at present which, presumably, reflects fundamentally different "operational codes" among the Chinese leaders.

In sum, I would advocate using something close to the Leites approach in studying Mao's own "operational code" but I would advocate merging this orientation into a multi-disciplinary study using the best theories, the most advanced techniques, and the top people available,

each attempting a partial answer to the question of what is the political "style" of the Chinese communists and what is likely to be the future policy - in various fields - of the Chinese decision-making group.

When we look at the Leites approach itself, we find a number of intrensic difficulties which, if the study is adopted as the basis of an analysis of the Chinese case, may be expected to carry over. (1) When studying revolutionaries, especially peasant communist revolutionaries, it is very difficult to believe that their own latent beliefs are expressed in the national literature. This is especially true of China, where the Yenan group was both militaristic and nationalistic in its orientation. While it is true that one can find examples of a parallel between Mao's own thought and certain strands of China's national literature (such as the Water Margin [Shui Hu Ch'uan]) and Romance of the Three Kingdons [San Kuo Chih] and while there is a parallel between the views of Mao on certain subjects and the writings of certain of the twentieth century Chinese novelists - Lu Hsun is, of course, the best example - it is also true both that Chinese literature as a whole betrays no singular character, being divided against itself in many ways; that the Chinese intellectual tradition taken as a whole is anti-communist; and that the Chinese Communist ruling group from Mao on down, from before the Yenan forum to the "great Proletarian cultural revolution" has been profoundly anti-intellectual and anti-traditional. Thus, in the Chinese case, the assumed parallel between latent beliefs among the political leaders and expressed beliefs in national literature is not present. (2) The

proposition that the most important source of data are the early history of the party, the writings of the founder, and the childhood experiences of the party leaders, is dubious. While there is much truth to be found here - the Chinese communist party, like the Soviet party, looks to its own past for parallels by which to reason its way through contemporary decisions; there is a heavy reliance on the writings of Mao just as the Soviets relied on the writings of Lenin and Stalin; and the early and formative experiences of the leadership group are very important influences on their present Weltanschauung - many other facts are shunted aside by this emphasis. In particular, the party continues to learn and to integrate its recent experience with the early lessons. Especially does it learn from the history of other parties - witness the tremendous influence - both positive and negative - which the history of the Soviet Communist Party. The same thing can also be said for such other components as the international factor - witness for instance the changed relationship with the United States and the existence of nuclear weapons. Leites could safely match the lessons of early party history with total party outlook because these sorts of influences were only marginal in the Soviet case. They are not in the Chinese: they are central. It is true that Leites himself wrote a sequel to The Operational Code, dealing with the Khrushchev era in somewhat the same manner as he dealt with Lenin and Stalin earlier (Kremlin Moods, RAND, RM. 3535-ISA) and that later party history and international elements were influences that were taken into account. But even here there were problems: Soviet literature was found to be of little use (at least it was not used)

and Khrushchev's own early history was not thought to be germane to the study (little was known of that history). The result was a study useful in understanding that part of the Soviet leader's world view which is recorded in his writings and speeches, but not for understanding the entirety of Khrushchev's "operational code" of the Soviet presidium. I would submit that, if the "operational code" approach is adopted, the model taken should be Kremlin Moods and not A Study of Bolshevism or The Operational Code of the Politburo; that the quality of the work and the attention it receives will be roughly equivalent to the Kremlin Moods and not to the latter two studies; and that (since the project is about to begin at the end of Mao's tenure in China rather than at the beginning or in the middle) the fate of the project will be approximately that of Kremlin Moods (which was published shortly before Khrushchev's removal as First Party Secretary). The point is that a study which bases itself on sources similar to those that Leites used can expect to be only of partial explanatory usefulness and useful only for the moment: such a study is outmoded by the first major change in policy or personnel of the party). (3) Too many variables are left out of such a study. I have already alluded to the international component. Additionally, the influence of economic, geographic, and demographic, etc., factors are all abstracted from. Such a mode of research was acceptable for those periods of Soviet studies in the early 50's when very little information of any sort was available. It makes less sense in the Chinese case in the late 60's when, despite all problems of access and data, the knowledge of the numbers and kinds of influences on the Chinese Politburo is

much greater than was the situation in the Soviet case in the early 50's. There is, accordingly, little reason to take the route of the "operational code" in understanding the Chinese mode of decision-making. Stated another way, the "operational code" approach diverts attention away from other important influences on decision-making behavior and pulls one into a sense of false security that he is in the possession of a method which will permit him to know the essence of the subject.

For these reasons I think it best to reduce the "operational code" approach to one of a number of complementary methods for getting at the problem. This conclusion may be somewhat unpopular, but I think the arguments here presented must be taken into account when considering whether or not a large research project of the kind described in the research proposal is really feasible. Furthermore, (although it is only a footnote to the present discussion) I have spoken with Nathan Leites about the proposed project and he agrees that it would be best not to use the 'operational code' approach as the central focus of the proposed study. Rather, he tends to agree with the thesis presented here that a multi-disciplinary approach using the best of the present store of social science theory and methodology available is a better way to proceed.

## III. ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

What are some of the theories available in the social sciences which may prove useful for the study of Chinese communist decision-making? They are, of course, manifold. Some are potentially useful to the Chinese case while others have intrinsic limitations of data

and access which drastically limit their usefulness. The point to be made, however, is that up to the present, the study of communist China has only to a small degree taken advantage of the panoply of theoretical and methodological approaches available; there has been a general separation between these approaches and that study. The present project, however, is in a position to contribute to a lessening of that gap. (In this regard I find myself in agreement with the remarks of Chalmers Johnson, "The Role of Social Science in Chinese Scholarship;" World Politics, January, 1965. He argues for research in the Chinese case dealing with the topics of "community" totalitarianism and its sequences, and ideology in the functional sense.) In what follows, I shall try to point out some of those approaches which might, with profit, be used in the Chinese case.

The following theoretical orientations may be of some aid: decision-making theory; game theory; organization theory; conflict theories; bargaining theory (including alliance and coalition theory); influence and power theory; communication theory; information theory; modernization theory; theory of ideology; small group theory; theories of mass behavior; coercion theory (including work on "coercive persuasion"); and the theory of cognitive dissonance. In each case I shall present a few references together with a short discussion of the relevance of that approach to the study of Chinese political behavior.

A. Decision-Making Theory. National and International Decision-Making by R. C. Snyder and J. A. Robinson, and the bibliography referred to therein is a major source. This publication is, furthermore, a very

important source of ideas for the present project. Reference should, in particular, be made to Project 2 ("Relatively Unexplored Techniques"), 5 ("Historical Analogies to the Present Situation"), 8 ("Violent and Non-violent Conflict"), 10 ("Nature and Direction of Social Change"), 15 ("National Value Systems and National Behavior"), 19 ("Role of the Military"), 22 ("National Perceptions and Images of Reality"), 24 ("Nature and Cost of Policy Consensus"), 30 ("Problem of Leadership"), 31 ("Committees as Decision Units"), 32 ("Decision-Making and Weapons Systems"), 49 ("Personality and Role Relationships"), 50 ("Arousal of Hostile Responses"), 51 ("Elements of Projection in Personality"), and 52 ("Decision-Makers' Values and Attitudes Concerning Violence"). Reference should also be made to the work of Herbert Simon: Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization, as well as to the following: D. Davidson, P. Suppes and S. Siegel, Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach; the two-volume work edited by N. F. Washburne (Vol. 1) and D. Willner (Vol. 2): Decisions, Values and Groups; and R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and B. Sapin, "The Decision-Making Approach," in H. Eulau, S. J. Eldersveld and M. Janowitz (eds.), Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research.

B. Game Theory. This is by now a generic term for a vast and expanding set of related fields. Zero sum games are a branch of decision theory, since such games are actually sets of rules for rationally coming to correct (i.e. utility-maximizing) decisions. In non-zero sum games, it may not be possible to maximize utility, or to act rationally, and hence to come to correct decisions. This seems to be the case with most political actions, where conflict and

cooperation combine to present a series of choices whose outcomes are less than completely clear and where there may not exist an optional outcome for all. The possibilities of thinking in game theoretic terms are demonstrated in Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict. The virtue of such thinking is of sensitizing the researcher to the many alternative outcomes possible and to the alternative costs of each. The seminal work was done by J. Von Neumann and O. Morgenstein in 1944 and reported in their Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. An explanation particularly directed to social scientists is R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions, while many of the more recent applications are surveyed in Martin Shubik, Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior. In addition, the results of recent research can be reviewed in a number of journals, the most pertinent of which for social sciences are American Behavioral Scientist, Behavioral Science, and the Journal of Conflict Resolution. A critique is A. Rapoport, Strategy and Conflict.

C. Organization Theory and Theories of Bureaucracy. Several of the pertinent works were referred to above (Section II). To this should be added the vast compendium edited by Fredrick March, Handbook of Organizations, together with the many bibliographical references contained therein, and the classic works of Max Weber (a good starting place is W. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology) and of Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, 4 vols.

D. Conflict Theories. This is an extremely large and different field which penetrates into many of the other fields noted here. Perhaps a good entrance is Elton B. McNeil (ed.), The Nature of Human

Conflict; Lewis Coser, The Function of Social Conflict; Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense, and the recent work of Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression. One can anticipate the relevance of this field to Chinese communist decision-making capacity varies tremendously depending on whether Chinese society, the Chinese political tradition, the mode of organization of the communist party, the nature of the bureaucratic and governmental systems and the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist world-view are conducive to settling naturally arising conflicts or, on the other hand, contribute to the worsening of such difficulties. The advantage of looking at the question through an inquiry into the intrinsic propensity of humans to engage in conflict and the modes of settlement which they have evolved over the ages to cope with this propensity is that, on the one hand, we are reminded that even periods of apparent quiescence in Chinese political behavior are more probably times when the continuing conflict has been purposedly covered up, to reappear again in a bolder form in the future; while, on the other hand, solutions, however, temporary, to such conflict are probable and will probably take one of a limited number of general forms. If one could begin to theorize what specific types of conflict in the Chinese case are conducive to more and other types of conflict (i.e. negative feedback) and what types are readily soluable and carry with them the possibility of healing other breaches, a major step would have been taken in the study of Chinese communist decision-making.

E. Bargaining Theories (including Alliance Theory and Coalition Theory). Bargaining theory is akin both to decision-making theory and game theory. Still, it is possible to speak of a separate field in

both the political and psychological senses. Additionally, there are parallels with labor-management bargaining which may be of use in the Chinese case. Three major works in the political sense are W. K. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (the relevance of the "size principle" to the case of the Chinese Politburo should be obvious); J. Buchan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent; and F. C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate. The latter two references are useful more for the suggestions they pose, indirectly, for the Chinese case rather than as directly applicable models. A source using the psychological concept of "level of aspiration" is L. E. Forrester, Bargaining and Group Decision-Making. The parallel of labor-management negotiations apprises us of the importance, among other things, of the influence of the political situation inside the bargaining agencies on the bargaining position of that agency. An awareness of this interrelationship may perhaps help us to understand such important Chinese bargaining situations as those between the Party and the army, the Party and the governmental bureaucracy, and the red-expert controversy in education and administration. A major recent reference in a large field is R. E. Walter and R. B. McKensie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations.

F. Influence and Power Theory. These are also very large areas of inquiry whose bibliography is vast and whose potentialities of application to the Chinese field are great. Influence t is quite closely allied to decision-making theory. I couple it with power theory here only to emphasize that the power an individual or an organization holds is a direct function of his (or its) degree of influence over others. Some equate the two in their definitions of

power. The importance of these approaches to the Chinese case is apparent: if we can understand, map out and perhaps even rudimentarily measure the comparative influence of individuals and institutions in China, we will have taken a large step towards answering important questions about the Chinese Politburo and the future orientation and style of Chinese decision-making. References in influence theory include: Dorwin Cartwright, "Influence, Leadership and Control," in James G. March (ed.), Handbook of Organizations, pp. 1-47 (there is an extensive bibliography appended which quite adequately surveys the field); James G. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence," American Political Science Review, 1955, pp. 431-451, and his "Measurement Concepts in the Theory of Influence," Journal of Politics, 1957, pp. 202-226; W. G. Bemis, N. Berkowitz, M. Affinito, and M. Malone, "Authority, Power and the Ability to Influence," Human Relations, 1958, pp. 143-155; R. R. Blake and J. S. Mouton, "The Experimental Investigation of Interpersonal Influence" in A. D. Biderman and H. Zimmer (eds.), The Manipulation of Human Behavior; E. Katz and P. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence; and E. C. Banfield, Political Influence.

The field of power theory is almost coterminal with that of political theory--classical and modern--itself. Everyone has his favorite list in the classical realm. My own happens to include: Aristotle's Politics; N. Machiavelli's The Prince and the Discorsi; T. Hobbes, Leviathan; and J. J. Rousseau Social Contract. These and other approaches are summed up in B. Jouvenel's On Power. The difference between classical (pre-20th century) and modern political

theory is the subject of A. Brecht's Political Theory, while the connections are emphasized in W. Bluhm, Theories of the Political System. Important contributions of the last several decades, which may be of use in an analysis of the Chinese case, include: The Political Writings of Harold Lasswell; David Easton, The Political System; H. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society; G. Catlin, Systematic Politics; Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man; R. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, 1958, pp. 463-469; D. Easton (ed.) The Varieties of Political Theories, (especially the chapter by James G. March, "The Power of Power" and the references noted therein); D. Cartwright (ed.) Studies in Social Power; R. Dahl, Who Governs; F. Hunter, Community Power Structures; and H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics.

G Communications Theory and Information Theory. Since the end of the Second World War, these two closely allied fields have experienced rapid development; only recently, however, have there been attempts to draw out their political implications. The concepts basic to this mode of thinking can, if seems to me, be useful in analysis of Chinese communist decision-making. One might, for instance, attempt to develop an informational-decisional input-output model of Chinese communications, or survey the sources of information available to the Chinese hierarchy as one factor making up their Weltanschauung. One might attempt to construct a model of the Chinese political communications network, stressing the role of the "middle level" of communications and command and the function which positive or negative feedback plays in such a system. One might also, through

this type of reasoning, move closer to a view of the Chinese communist decision-making system as not only a political system based on relative degrees of power and influence, but one which changes, through the capacity to learn, its basic systemic characteristics. It is probably true, for instance, that the Chinese communist view of the external world, as well as their own society, has changed as they have learned more of the real character of Soviet society: surely this is one of the bases of the present difficulties between the Soviet Union and Communist China, as well as one of the roots of the "great proletarian cultural revolution." Perhaps the basic work in political science using this combined approach is Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government. Some of the seminal works in the field include: Norbert Weiner, Cybernetics, and his The Human Use of Human Beings; W. Ross Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics, and his Design For A Brain; Colin Cherry, On Human Communication (there is an extensive bibliography appended); and very suggestive work by J. R. Pierce, Symbols, Signals and Noise; and the basic work in communications theory by Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication.

H. Modernization Theory. The field of modernization, although young, is by now quite large, having experienced (and to some extent suffered from) very rapid development in the last decade. Its relevance to China is obvious and direct: that country, like many others, is attempting to modernize as quickly as possible. Yet it seeks to carry through with this process by its own rules, many of which at least in the short run tend to conflict with some of the more objective demands and inevitable processes associated with modernization.

Professionalism vs. "guerrillaism" in the army; "red" vs. expert in industry, education, and administration; industrial vs. agricultural priorities all reflect varying aspects of the problems China faces in its effort to come into the modern world. In her case, a serious question is whether or not the present leadership and the political style it has evolved is really compatable with the ends and processes of modernization. That system everywhere has depended upon the inducement of material incentives, the creation of a large number of stable hierarchies, and the appeal to nationalism. In China, however, we now find each of these requirements, including the last, either held in low esteem or purposely cast aside. The question must therefore be posed whether or not China is a modernizing society, and whether or not Mao is really a "modernizer "

The bibliography in the field is by now almost unmanageable. It is, however, conveniently summarized in a number of places, among which is an External Research Paper, Department of State, "Political Development - A Bibliography, 1960-1965" (Revised February 1965). I would put stress on entry numbers: 4, 5, 16, 18, 24, 25, 39, 42, 43, 45, 50, 61, 65, 74, 76, 82, 85, 87, 91, 107, 112, 113, 155, 168, 178, 181, 189, 195, 198, and 218. In addition, the following three volumes of notes have appeared since 1965; David Apter, The Politics of Modernization; Myron Weiner (ed.) Modernization; and Cyril Black, Dynamics of Modernization. The last of these has a bibliographic essay at the end.

I. Theory of Ideology. The study of ideology qua ideology is, in my view, one of the most underdeveloped of the areas of modern

knowledge. Yet we continue to speak and write as if this term were quite explicable. Perhaps this is more so in the field of communist orbit studies - including China - than elsewhere. To what extent does the "ideology" of communism influence Chinese communist decisions? What is their "ideology?" Is it the same as an all-embracing "Weltanschauung" or as specific as an "operational code?" If it really exists, can we know it to any useful degree? Or should we perhaps drop the term? How much are the Chinese rulers influenced by their own propaganda, i.e. what is the relationship between propaganda and ideology? There exists a rather voluminous literature on theory of ideology and there is much current interest in furthering its study. I believe that the present project should take advantage of this material and that interest, and integrate them with the facts that we already know about the way the present Chinese communist decision-makers think. We might come out with something which may not only satisfy the purposes of the project, but which may also be a major advancement in the theory of ideology What is needed is to integrate some of the present theoretical constructs with what we know of the Chinese case.

The bibliography of theory of ideology is extensive and I shall only attempt to set down those sources which have appeared to me to be of more than ordinary importance. They include the following: Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia; David Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent (there are extensive bibliographies at the end of both of these volumes); Arne Naess, Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity, Part B, "Ideological Controversy;" W. Y. Elliott, "Ideas and Ideologies," Confluence, September, 1953; George S. Pelter, "Ideology in America,"

Confluence, June, 1953; Karl Lowenstein, "The Role of Ideologies in Political Change," International Social Science Bulletin, June, 1953; Alfred Meyer, "The Function of Ideology in the Soviet Political System," Soviet Studies, January, 1966; Leon Dion, "Political Ideology as a Tool of Functional Analysis in Socio-Political Dynamics: An Hypothesis," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, February, 1959; Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy; Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics; C. W. Cassinelli, "Totalitarianism, Ideology, and Propaganda," Journal of Politics, 1960; Daniel Leiner, Ithiel Pool, and Harold D. Lasswell, "Comparative Analysis of Political Ideologies: A Preliminary Statement," Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter, 1951-52; J. M. Jansson, "The Role of Political Ideologies in Politics," International Relations (London), 1959; Raymond Aron, The Opium of The Intellectuals; Raymond Aron, "The Diffusion of Ideologies," Ethics, 1951; Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology; Reinhard Bendix, "Industrialization, Ideologies, and Social Structure," American Sociological Review, 1959; R. N. Carew-Hunt, Samuel I. Sharp, Richard Lowenthal, and J. L. Keep, "Ideology and Power Politics," Problems of Communism, No. 7, 1958; Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," American Political Science Review, 1957; Karl Lowenstein, "Political Systems, Ideologies, and Institutions: The Problem of Their Circulation," Western Political Quarterly, 1953; Czeslaw Milocz, The Captive Mind; A. K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny, Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Nature of the Soviet System," Slavic Review, October, 1961; Daniel Bell, "Ideology and Soviet Politics," Slavic Review, December, 1965; and Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao.

J. Small Group Theory. I have referred above to Sidney Verba's volume which, it seems to me, should be a starting place for work in this field. The relevance of this field to the Chinese case is obvious: the Politburo is a small group and must, therefore, experience many of the forces which are found to operate constantly in such groups. I would think that approaching Chinese decision-making by use of small group theory is one excellent way to get around the problem of having to do research on China at a distance. A major reference is: P. A. Hare, E. I Bargatta, and R. F. Bales, Small Groups, while Berry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow, A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision Making was published quite recently.

K. Theories of Mass Behavior. When studying Chinese Communist decision-making processes, it is important to include variables which derive from the influence upon the leadership group and, conversely, variables which reflect the feelings of that group as to how far, and by what methods, they can push and encourage the masses to move in the directions they wish to prescribe. The Chinese leadership places great stress on the "mass line" as a cardinal tenant of their rationale for authority over the populace. The reciprocal influences between party leadership and the masses has already been the subject of a major work on Chinese leadership principles and techniques (John Lewis, Leadership in Communist China. See especially Chapter III, "Mass Line as a Concept of Leadership"). I think this sort of work ought to continue. I also think that part of social psychology dealing with the properties of mass behavior ought to be consulted in order to determine why, in the sociological and psychological senses, the Party leadership is able to

gain popular support for its programs. How does the Party carry out its campaign (i.e., why do Chinese citizens participate in these campaigns and what are the stages of such campaigns)? Conversely, is there a set of inherent limitations to such campaigns, i.e., does there exist a point of marginality or of diminishing returns, beyond which social resistance overwhelms the exhortations of the Party? And in what direction in time is this point moving as more and more campaigns are carried out - toward the point of initiation of the campaign or away from it, that is, is the population becoming more inflexible or more tolerable and pliant in the Party's hands? There is a huge literature on mass behavior and I believe it should be consulted in an effort to understand better the social psychological bases of the Chinese leadership. Four references which enable the researcher to gain entrance to the field are: T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality; William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society; Niel Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior; and Hans Toch, The Social Psychology of Social Movements. There are extensive bibliographies appended to the first three volumes.

L. Coercion Theory, Propaganda, and Cognitive Dissonance. The question how, to what extent, and with what limitations the party is able to gain popular support for its policies can also be attacked by means of studying how the regime directly attempts to convince the citizenry of the rightness of its policies. That is to say, in order to determine correctly the relationship between decision-making in the sense of influences upon the leadership group and decision-making in the broader sense of policy application and elite-follower relations,

it is necessary not only to determine what motivates the population to accept or reject the program of the Politburo, but also to decide upon what instruments the latter has to convince, or force the former into doing its biddings. Three instruments seem to be available for this task: force, persuasion, and time. It would, therefore, be wise to study the theoretical bases of these instruments of state and party power: coercion theory, propaganda theory, and the theory of cognitive dissonance. The bibliography of the former two are huge; that of the latter is not as large, owing to the recent working out of the relations between cognition and dissonance. Coercion theory and propaganda theory, as to the subject about which they theorize, form a continuum. Coercion theory concerns the methods found useful in attempting to force people to do what they would not otherwise want to do and the responses of both individuals and groups to coercive situations. The relevance to the Chinese case is apparent: whether it be at the level of the Politburo leadership or of the individual Chinese peasant, all are under the stress at one time or another produced by the necessity of making choices which they would rather not make. In the case of the Politburo, this condition is, no doubt, the rule rather than the exception, where stress is produced not only from the objective domestic and international issues which demand response (if not solution) but also from the necessity to "play politics" against the other members of the Politburo. It would seem to me that an investigation of the types of stress probably encountered, and the variety of responses to be expected should be an integral part of a decision-making study of the Chinese leadership group. Some work has

already been done in the area in the Chinese case. See, for instance; Robert J. Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism and Edgar Schein et al., Coercive Persuasion and the sources referred to therein. The classical study by Bernard Bettelheim, "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situation," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1943, pp. 417 - 452 is perhaps the most important reference in the field as a whole. The study of "brainwashing" is also germane to the subject (a good bibliography is given in the Schein volume) as well as the important study by Marie Jahoda and Stuart Cook, "Security Measures and Freedom of Thought," Yale Law Journal, 1952, pp. 295-333. Also germane is the recent book by Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence. The whole area of coercion theory is, as it should be, grounded in psychology: it may, therefore, be wise to consult some of the works in that field (about which, unfortunately, I am almost entirely unfamiliar). At the least, however, we ought to follow Lifton's lead and consult the works of Freud and Erikson.

An entire field of study has grown up since the publication of Leon Festinger's. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance in 1957. His work, which to me is very exciting, seems to bridge some of the previously existing gaps between coercion theory, mass behavior, theory of ideology, and propaganda. There seems to be no reason to believe that Chinese are any less susceptible to the cognitive dissonance process than others: in fact, both Lifton and Schein refer to it in their works. If the project is approved, I should, therefore, like to see use of Festinger's work made a central concern. It has obvious reference to all levels of Chinese society, including that of the

Politburo, and I should think that some fascinating case studies could be made using his approach as a base.

I also believe that the theory of propaganda should also be made use of in studying Chinese Communist decision-making. The project should try to answer, in as definitive a manner as possible, just what the propaganda process is in China and just how it effects the view of the leadership group. Do they really believe their own propaganda as much as they would have us believe, or is there a reserved section, organizationally and/or psychologically, where a more "rational" view of the world is held? What do we mean by "rational" in such conditions? The best theoretical work on the subject that I know of is Jacques Ellul's Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes. Other works in this large field include: John W. Albig, Modern Public Opinion; Gordon Allport and Leo Postman, The Psychology of Rumor; Fred C. Bartlett, Political Propaganda; Edward L. Bernays, The Engineering of Consent; Leonard W. Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda; Leonard W. Doob, Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique; Ian Harvey, The Techniques of Persuasion; William Hummel and Keith Huntress, The Analysis of Propaganda; Alexander George, Propaganda Analysis; Daniel Katz, et al., Public Opinion and Propaganda; Richard T. LaPiera, A Theory of Social Control; Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics; Paul F. Lazarsfeld et al., The People's Choice; Daniel Lerner (ed.), Propaganda in War and Crisis; Robert K. Merton, Mass Persuasion: The Social Psychology of a War Bond Drive; Jules Monnerot, Sociology and Psychology of Communism; Marbury B. Ogle, Public Opinion and Political Dynamics; Institute of Propaganda Analysis, Propaganda

Techniques of German Facism; and Frederick T. C. Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China.

IV. Bibliographic Sources for the Study of Chinese Communist Decision Making

Section III of this paper proposed that one or more areas of behavioral science be used as a theoretical base in attempting to understand the process of decision-making in Communist China. The particular source material about China and the Communist system itself will, if the scheme proposed there is accepted, be a function of the approach(es) selected. Therefore, it is impossible to detail the primary sources which will prove useful in the study until such orientations are decided upon. It is possible, however, to do some advanced work in the direction of finding out what is available, in what language, and where to find it. Fortunately, we will have available shortly a monumental work on the bibliography of primary and secondary sources for studying Communist China. This is Contemporary China: A Research Guide by Peter Berton and Eugene Wu (Stanford: Hoover Institution, forthcoming, 196[illegible]). I have been able to look over the page proofs of this work and have noted a number of the sources cited therein and report them below. It is impossible to deal justly with many of the over 2000 sources cited in this work, just as it is impossible to give full citation and evaluative description to some of them. What is given here is a survey of the work, performed with the aims of the present project in mind, and done with the presumption that by the time the second stage of the project has arrived, the book will be published. In order to conserve space and get the job done with, I give only the entry number of each item.

A. Bibliographies

1. Of Bibliographies: 5, 8, 14, 15, 16, 16a, 42, 43, 44, 58, 59, 63;
2. Writings of Chinese Leaders: 66-70, 72, 74-76;
3. History: 79, 80, 81, 84;
4. Indoctrination: 102;
5. Law: 103, 104;
6. Economic and Social Developments: 107, 108, 110-112, 115, 119;
7. Military: 130;
8. Foreign Relations: 145;
9. Newspapers and Periodicals:
   a. General: 170-172, 174;
   b. Indices of Periodicals and Newspapers: 184, 188, 189, 196-198, 200;
10. General Reference Works: 203-205, 210;
11. Mainland Reference Works: 212, 215, 216, 217, 224, 226, 234;
12. Statistical Compilations: 264, 265;
13. Directories: 294-298, 300-304, 308, 318, 320, 330, 331;
14. Biographical Materials: 352, 353, 356-358, 361-363, 365, 373 (See also Union Research Service: Who's Who in Communist China;
15. Chronologies: 386-388, 397, 402, 403;
16. Atlases: 409, 411;
17. Directories of Place Names: 414-416, 420-422, 424;

B. Documentary Materials

1. General: 568, 570-573, 578;
2. Law: 583-585, 588, 589, 606, 609, 611, 612;
3. Government: 634, 636, 642-649;
4. Party: 650-656, 659, 660;
5. Mass Organizations: 663-665, 669, 671-674;
6. Economic and Social Developments: 709-713, 715-716, 720-722, 724, 727-731, 732-733;
7. Education and Culture: 739, 741, 743-747;
8. Foreign Relations: 750-752, 757, 461-463, 766-767, 774, 775, 777, 778-809, 810-816, 821, 823-828;

C. Selected Serial Publications

1. Newspapers: 831-848;
2. News Releases: 849;
3. Periodicals:
   a. Mainland: 852-868, 870-878, 880-891, 894-905, 907-909, 914-917, 920-937;
   b. Taiwan, concerning the Mainland: 991-992, 993, 1003, 1011, 1014, 1015, 1016;
   c. Hong Kong: 1034, 1035, 1036;
4. Translations and Monitoring Services: 1038-1065, 1068, 1071, 1076a, 1080-1081;
5. Additional Periodicals:
   a. English Language: 1085, 1087, 1089, 1093, 1097, 1101, 1103;
   b. Japanese Language: 1109, 1120, 1131, 1140, 1143, 1144, 1148, 1155, 1175-1176, 1179;

c. Russian: 1193-1204;

d. Other: 1212;

6. **Series:** 1213-1271, 1272-1298, 1337-1349, 1350-1383, 1396-1450, 1451-1464, 1465-1468a, 1469-1469d, 1470-1483, 1484-1501, 1502-1526, 1528-1539, 1540-1573, 1668-1682, 1643-1700a;

7. **Dissertations and Theses:** 1888-1889, 1896-1898, 1900-1902, 1904, 1907-1914, 1916-1959, 1960-2008, 2013-2024, 2025-2089, 2090-2100, 2101-2115 (no evaluation or commentary is presented in this last section).

APPENDIX C

# SOME REFLECTIONS

by

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Prepared for the Politburo Feasibility Study Conference,

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Nathan Leites' study is based on the assumption that the values and thought processes of an elite leadership group can be understood through their writings and speeches, and through the corpus of material which seems to have influenced the development of their minds (in this case, Marxist writings and Russian literature).

It must be admitted, I think, that such an approach is a last resort. It is primarily because we do not have better ways of studying the operations of the Politburo that a study of its operational code becomes important.

Leites' work might be called an exercise in intuitive content analysis. As he himself acknowledges, there is no claim to prediction. Instead, Leites is trying to heighten the sensitivity of the reader to the ways in which Russian Politburo leaders think, to create an awareness, as it were, of the categories and parameters of their minds. But these leaders, like other men, are not wholly consistent either in the values they hold or in the thought processess they follow. Therefore, there will be occasions in which two or more imperatives come into conflict, perhaps in a single mind, perhaps in the interaction among individuals. Additional skewing of the decision-making process will come from those extraneous forces which play such a large role in politics: ambition, taste, emotion, accident. Furthermore, even an accurate identification of the relevant values and processes still leaves the problem of the relative weight and priority they will have in a given situation.

In such a study, there is probably an unavoidable risk of circular reasoning: the categories which the analyst sets up come partly from

his own mind and partly from the material itself. Unless there is constant feedback between the alyst and his material, the reader may wind up knowing more about e mind of the analyst than about the minds of the leadership elite. Leites, I think, has been quite sensitive to this problem, but there is almost certainly some subjectivity. Leites acknowledges this when he says that the categories need not be set up and described in precisely the way he has chosen.

There is another methodological risk of which I think Leites has not been so fully aware. Although he asserts the contrary (p. 18), he seems to imply that the values and thought processes of the members of the Russian Politburo are bounded (in a geometrical sense) rather than open-ended. The result is a rather static, rigid characterization, which seems to allow little room for evolutionary development. This impression is reinforced by the non-historical use of sources: citations are made purely on the basis on content, without concern for the time element.

The CCP Politburo has kept is own counsel with far greater opacity than the Russian. This makes the preparation of a Chinese operational code perhaps all the more necessary. Is such a study presently possible in the case of China? Unquestionably it is, at least at a certain level. Because of the ideological conceptions of the present CCP leadership, such a study is perhaps even more appropriate to China than to the USSR. I tend to agree with Schurman that the Party leaders in China are aware of the fact that they are aware that they are operating in terms of an operational code, which they call "the thought of Mao Tse-tung." That is, a body of action-

oriented ideology which is connected with theory at its "upper" end, but which derives its greatest sanctions from its value in seeking solutions to problems in the real world. In this sense, the operational code of the CCP is perhaps more explicit than that of the USSR.

One can see, with Schurmann, the generation of "the thought of Mao Tse-tung" as the generalized dialectic between real problems and the human mind, based on the perceived Weltanschauung of Marxism-Leninism. My own study of one piece of this "thought," (the united front), leads me to think, however, that this process is not only continuous (as Schurmann affirms) but also has a tendency toward ossification (which Schurmann, I think, has insufficiently appreciated). The process of generation and ossification of thought might be expressed as follows:

(1) Problems x Mind (Marxism-Leninism) = Thought

But at the same time,

(2) Handling of Problems = Experience;

and

(3) Generalized Experience = Thought

Therefore, when new problems (P') are encountered, solutions may be sought in terms of experience expressed as thought. This is the identity implied in (2) and (3):

(4) Thought = Successful Solution of P'.

But this identity may be fallacious, because it exchanges independent and dependent variables. During much of the period during which Mao Tse-tung developed his theories, Problems were the independent variable, and Thought was the dependent variable. Once Thought comes

into both existence and awareness, it affects the perception of Problems, and the nature of Solutions which are attempted. This is an intermediate position, in which the relation between Thought and Problems partakes of both independent and dependent variability. But the more effective Thought is in finding Solutions to a particular range of Problems ($P_1$, $P_2$, $P_3$, . . . $P_n$), the greater the tendency to see it as the Solution to any range of P' Problems. Once the process has reached this stage, ossification has set in.

In other words, there is a kind of escalation from the concrete and flexible to the abstract and rigid. I think the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" is presently approaching the upper end of this escalator.

It is tempting to try to periodize Chinese Communist history in terms of these relationships, and I yield to the temptation without thinking that the result will be wholly satisfactory.

Up to roughly 1935, Problems seem to have been the independent variable. By this time Mao had developed a number of elements of Thought, but had not yet integrated them into a coherent whole. The process of integration, it seems to me, took place between 1935 and the early 1940's (with perhaps the cheng-feng movement as the outer limit). Now nearly all of the elements of Thought were developed and the relationships between them spelled out, if not fully elaborated. This was the period of intermediacy described above. Between the early 1940's and 1949, there were few Problems for which Solutions could not be sought and found in terms of this Thought. This period was important in that it confirmed the effectiveness (and hence the value) of this body of Thought.

An element of intermediacy continued to exist during the early and middle 1950's. During this period, Mao and the regime were faced by many P' Problems which were not, or not wholly, seen in terms of Thought. Solutions, therefore, could be sought partly outside Chinese Communist experience. There was some of the sense of openness which had characterized the Yenan period, because there was a willingness to consider P' Problems as still having some independent variability.

This period drew to a close, I think, during the traumatic years between the Hundred Flowers, retrenchment of the communes, and the failure of the Great Leap. For a variety of reasons which have to do with both the successes and the failures to the point, Mao apparently saw the enormous difficulties facing China as having not yielded to non-Thought, which was in turn endangering valid and vital elements of Thought. But if it was failure which threw Mao more fully back on Thought, it was perhaps also failure (or the spectre of failure) which has confirmed the commitment and added the last few risers to the escalation process. It is quite possible to reject non-Thought Solutions on the pragmatic grounds of failure, but one Thought is totally invoked (as is presently the case), admitted failure indicts and condemns Thought. Thought then stands as a fully independent variable, and the process is not reversible. Failure can be explained only in terms of betrayal ("revisionists who have wormed their way into positions of authority"), or of improper understanding and implementation of Thought.

If these logically extraneous explanations of failure cannot suffice, then either a new T' Thought must be generated, or Thought

must be rejected, in part at least. The two are probably synonomous. Yet it can be argued, I think, that Mao's Thought is not irrational. It may simply be that China's Problems are beyond reasonable Solution, and will take Thought down with them. From Mao's standpoint, this may be the tragedy of the Chinese revolution, a tragedy which may well be haunting his last years.

## A PROPOSAL

We know that Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works are faulty in two respects: first, they are incomplete for the periods they cover, and they cover only up to September 1949; second, they have been extensively re-edited, so that as Stuart Schram has pointed out, "one cannot accept even a single sentence as being identical with what Mao had actually written without checking it against the original version."

Now it may be argued with some force that the Selected Works are suited to the study of the present mind of the Chinese leadership, that they have "scriptural accuracy" in that they reflect what Mao wants to go down in history as having said. But as an historian, I believe that no understanding of CCP ideology will be complete without a careful consideration of its evolution. Apart from the evident historical value of such an approach, if we know how CCP ideology has developed, we shall be on stronger ground for extrapolation and weighting. A present, however, we are simply not in a position to draw these kinds of conclusions.

I know of no one who has worked with the history of the CCP who has not felt the lack of authoritative control over Mao's writings.

It is possible for an individual researcher to try (sometimes successfully) to locate original or early versions of materials of particular interest to him, and to make his own comparison. But this is laborious in the extreme, may be repeating a textual comparison done by someone unknown to him, and provides only a partial view. Even Stuart Schram, who has done more of this sort of thing than perhaps any other individual, evidently feels the problem keenly. Control of Mao's writings would be of great value not only to a study of the operational code of the Politburo, but perhaps even more to the field as a whole.

It is for these reasons that I make the following proposal for the handling of Mao Tse-tung's writings. It would obviously be beyond the capacities of an individual scholar to establish such control. But many scholars have worked on some of the writings as part of their own research. If these efforts could be brought into a central clearing house, cast into a common format, and distributed to interested persons, then it would be possible to have an on-going project which would not be inordinately large. The results of such a project could be used immediately, and would continually increase in usefulness. The project divides naturally into two parts, with the further possibility of later expansion.

Part I: A cooperating scholar with access to an original document would arrange to have a copy of the original sent to the clearing house. There a character-by-character comparison would be made, in the manner of the attached example. The comparative texts would then be returned to the scholar, and he would prepare a (signed) preface covering (a) bibliographical analysis and authentication of the original, (b) the

nature and significance of the article, and (c) analysis of the changes. The preface and parallel texts would be printed (in Taiwan perhaps?) and distributed in loose-leaf form, to be inserted in three-ring binders. Those of Mao's writings not included in SW would also be sought, but of course would not require comparative textual study. The loose-leaf format makes it possible to deal with articles regardless of date. The recipient can arrange them in proper chronolgical order as they arrive. Corrections and changes can also easily be made.

Part II: To enable the project to be as useful as possible, a bibliography of Mao's works would be undertaken, including the libraries which hold various important versions. Key articles (assuming originals can be found), would be compared and then farmed out to appropriate scholars for analysis. In this way, the essentially passive and random aspect of Part I could be systematized and given direction.

If the project were successful at these levels, it might be expanded in several ways. Similar bibliographies and compilations could be made for other leaders and for the Party itself. Periodic indexes might be prepared, so that the user could locate references to, say, the "national bourgeoisie," and to alterations in these references. Comparative [illegible] for particularly important articles.

Mao Tse-tung, "Introducing The Communist," HC, II, 593-605; SW, II, 285-296.

, "Kung-ch'an-tang jen fa-k'an-tz'u," Kung-ch'an-tang jen No. 1, (Oct. 4, 1939), pp. 1-10. [located in Bureau of Investigation, 052.1/806/15661].

I. Bibliographic Information

There can be no questions of the authenticity of the original document, since it appears in the first issue of the journal for which it was written.

II. Nature of the Document

The article was written in the fall of 1939, when ominous strains were beginning to appear in the alliance betweeen the KMT and the CCP. The early phases of the war, during which Japan had focussed most of its effort against government forces in Central China, were now over and a stalemate had set in. Now Japan was more concerned than previously with the CCP base areas which had developed rapidly behind its lines. So was the KMT, which at about this time terminated its financial support of CCP-led armies, and began to impose a blockade around Shen-Kan-Ning.

The first serious clash between CCP and Government forces came in April (Shantung), and was followed by fraternal bloodletting during the summer in Honan and Hupei. The united front with Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi was still in force, but was becoming more and more precarious (the split came in December 1939). Shortly thereafter, between December 1939 and March 1940, came what the CCP has called "the first anti-communist upsurge."

Since The Communist was an inner-Party journal, the article was not written as propaganda for external consumption, but for the guidance of Party members. Despite the exigencies of the situation, the essay is of general significance (though the Party was warned to be ready to cope with "any unexpected developments"). It sets forth Mao's view of the historical development of the Party, its present general line, the relationship of the classes in Chinese society (particularly with reference to the united front), and the Party's revolutionary strategy. It is the earliest definition, to my knowledge, of successful revolutionary strategy as consisting of the proper combination of the united front and armed struggle, directed by a properly bolshevised Party: "Our eighteen years of experience show that the united front and armed struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a united front for carrying on armed struggle. And the Party is the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons, the united front and the armed struggle, to storm and shatter the enemy's positions. That is how the three are related to each other."

With this definition, it seems to me that Mao has reached a higher level of generalization concerning the way in which problems should be approached. This view remains quite consistent thereafter.

III. Analysis of Changes

The article has been almost completely rewritten in those sections which deal with the bourgeoisie. The remainder has not been very much changed. In particular, SW discusses at length the "big bourgeoisie;" the original not once makes such a distinction, but speaks only of "the

bourgeoisie." This is sometimes accomplished by simply adding the word "big," sometimes by inserting ". . . especially the big bourgeoisie," and sometimes by adding parenthetically "the big bourgeoisie, which is compradore in character."

Above all, however, this change is reflected in a long insertion, none of which appears in the original: (HC, II, 597-598; SW, II, 289; compared texts, 10-11)

> (3) The Chinese big bourgeoisie, which is compradore in character, is a class which directly serves imperialism and is fostered by it. Hence the comprador Chinese big bourgeoisie has always been a target of the revolution. However, different groups within this big bourgeoisie are backed by different imperialist powers, so that when contradictions among these powers become sharper and when the edge of the revolution is mainly directed against a particular power, the big bourgeois groups dependent upon the other powers may join the struggle against that particular imperialist power to a certain extent and for a certain time. At such times, in order to weaken the enemy and add to its own reserves, the Chinese proletariat may form a united front with these groups and should maintain it as far as possible, provided it is advantageous to the revolution. (4) The compradore big bourgeoisie continues to be most reactionary even when it joins the united front alongside the proletariat in struggling against the common enemy. It stubbornly opposes any ideological, political and organizational development of the proletariat and the proletarian party, . . .

Other changes seem designed to give the piece of greater doctrinal sophistication, and to make the Party look a little better (the original says that the conditions for a mass nation-wide Party are in the process of creation; SW says they are in the process of development). Much of this increased doctrinal sophistication is the result of the differentiation of the bourgeoisie, and the analysis of imperialism's varying relation to this class, all of which is absent in the original. What was called in the original "the ten years of civil war" (i.e., 1927-1937) has been everywhere changed to "the ten years of agrarian revolution."

FORMAT FOR PARALLEL TEXTS

1. SW text in black in right-hand column.

2. Original or early text in red in left-hand column, with tick marks (') for each character identical with the SW text.

3. SW additions: a break in the red text, indicated by a vertical red bar.

4. SW deletions: a break in the black text, indicated by a vertical black bar.

5. SW substitutions: both versions, side by side.

INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL

1. Bibliographic information and analysis of the original or early text.

2. Nature and significance of the piece.

3. Nature and significance of the changes.

KINDS OF CHANGES

1. Stylistic: changes which do not alter the sense, tone, or emphasis of the original. Examples are corrections in grammar, terminological clarification (e.g., "Third Kuomintang Plenum" instead of "Third Plenum), changes of unimportant words (e.g., the connective ho instead of yü ), etc.

2. Minor: changes in wording which do not, individually, alter the sense, tone, or emphasis of the original. But the cumulative effect of minor changes may be significant.

3. Major: All other changes, particularly extended insertions, deletions, changes in key words, etc.

APPENDIX D

# INVESTIGATING THE OPERATIONAL CODE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP

by

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This paper is an examination of the desirability, central foci, and feasibility of a broad study of the operational code of the Chinese Communist leaders, as seen from my special viewpoint as a cultural anthropologist long concerned with patterns of Chinese culture, including politics, and with relationships between communication, attitudes and behavior in families and other on-going systems of social interaction. This viewpoint is emphasized here quite deliberately. Other relevant viewpoints exist, but my most positive function at this exploratory state is to concentrate on what this viewpoint has to offer, which might otherwise be neglected, rather than to obscure or dilute this, promote redundancy, by seeking areas of probable agreement with others considering the general problem.

The kind of study envisioned is significantly related to the pioneering work of Leites in The Operational Code of the Politburo[1] and the closely related A Study of Bolshevism)[2] but no means identical to it. In fact, Leites' work can best serve our present purposes not as a specific model but rather as a springboard, in two respects. Its general focus helps to point out the existence and define the nature of a broad aim and approach to politics very relevant to the study of Chinese communism, while closer examination of the work, and of comments upon it, aids in clarifying what would need to be done in addition or differently - beyond the evident matter of shifting focus from the Soviet Union to China - in order to realize adequately the aim of producing a systematic formulation of the operational principles of the Chinese Communist leadership. To outline the nature of this task is the main objective here.

LEITES' OPERATIONAL CODE - 1) POSITIVE VALUES

The primary orientations of Leites' approach and correspondingly its primary contributions for a more general application, are encapsulated plainly in his very title - although this has not prevented some of his reviewers from not merely disagreeing with the possibility or desirability of his aims, but failing even to perceive it, as illustrated later.

To title a work The Operational Code of the Politburo indicates immediately that Leites is considering politics (at least certain aspects of it) in terms of behavior of identifiable individuals or groups, while at the same time not, like many others, therefore dismissing the possibility of any general analysis by labeling personal or group behavior as totally unanalyzable because idiosyncratic, or at best only analyzable in a particularistic, historical way as involving "unique" persons, situations and events. Instead, as "operational code" also indicates, he is expecting and seeking certain behavioral regularities, a set of principles. Especially important, though his text here must provide evidence beyond his title, Leites is concerned to determine regularities in terms of general formal elements of concept and behavior rather than focusing mainly on behavioral content - "The intention is not to discuss the major theories of Leninism-Stalinism but to discover the rules which Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for effective political conduct."[3]

Although references in the social science literature to Leites' work appear quite scanty in relation to its importance[4] - perhaps because it did not fit neatly within the framework of any single

academic discipline - the major reviews which greeted its original publication do serve fairly well to reinforce and flesh out the foregoing sketch of its main significance - though sometimes in an inverse fashion - and its central weakness.

Merriam objects that The Operational Code made no new contribution to our general knowledge of political strategy,[5] but Leites' object of concern was not political strategy in general, but the system characteristic of the Bolshevik party. Similarly, Florinsky criticizes the work for not focusing on "major theories of Leninism-Stalinism"[6] but Leites was aiming not at the what of Soviet Communism but its how, not ultimate aims or broadest conceptions of history and society, but general principles concerning here-and-now political action Thus both these reviews in missing the mark help define the essence of the work - and also help indicate how different it is from certain other, and probably more common, conceptions of political analysis.

Several other reviewers perceived Leites' aims somewhat better, but were very doubtful as to their actual, or even possible, accomplishment. Towster objected that "Many of the alleged rules . . . . are but sweeping generalizations."[7] Moore, while appearing generally in favor of Leites' "attempt to set out the basic principles of the Communist Credo and the essential characteristics of Bolshevik thoughtways" as possibly helping American diplomacy "to evolve . . . from . . . personal impressions toward a more rational calculus of real forces," nevertheless repeatedly indicates doubts about the possibility of such general and systematic analysis; by stating that "the overall effect

is rather schematized" and that "the neatness of the presentation reminds this reviewer of Herbert Spencer,"[8] and by suggesting that more attention might better be given to details of historical contexts and other factual information, perhaps gathered by "old-fashioned stool pigeons," rather than to analysis of political statements by Lenin and Stalin. A similar view is put in more explicit and positive statement by Gurian: "Leites' method and approach make Bolshevism appear to be not an historical-social movement in a changing world, but a fundamental, almost extra-temporal attitude."[9] Much of this position is put in simplest and most extreme terms by Sulzberger: "Much as one would desire to simplify and codify Soviet methods and operations it is just not possible to reduce them to such flat, kindergarten terminology."[10]

These strictures are severe, but in such overall form they can only be accepted if we are willing to hold at least one of two general propositions implicit in these criticisms: 1) That the statements of political leaders are not significantly related to their behavior as leaders of societies, or 2) that their statements (and some actions are significant but only specifically, so that no more general analysis and characterization is possible. The first proposition not only contradicts general belief and common observation, but in any case is a matter to be tested out, not pronounced upon. The difficulty of establishing what relationships may hold is another and a different question. The second proposition, though, amounts to a denial of the possibility of any scientific work in this area - since science always aims at increasing generality and systematization. Indeed, the chief

glory of science lies in its "sweeping generalizations," so long as these can be shown to accord with empirical observations, for just such generalizations are essential for making sense - a unified, coherent, systematic view - out of a vast welter of facts. In the present instance, it is actually Leites' merit, in spite of Gurian's objections, that he really is looking for fundamental and extratemporal attitudes in Bolshevism. This does not mean he believes there is nothing else relevant to Soviet history and politics. It does mean that to whatever extent such attitudes exist and endure[11] they are always crucial to Bolshevik interpretations of and reaction to <u>whatever</u> historical events occur. Men do not respond to events, but to their views of events - and the more Bolshevik views differ from our own, the more essential to understand the basic nature of this viewing - that is, views which are general, pervasive, and enduring - if we are to understand correctly any more limited or detailed matters.

It is therefore Leites' chief merit - and much to his credit - that he aimed primarily at this end. A similar aim seems equally desirable, and equally feasible in principle, for the case of Chinese Communism, although there are certain problems peculiar to that case which need special consideration; these will be discussed later.

## 2: WEAKNESSES, AND THEIR LESSONS

Despite the importance of Leites' aim, and his considerable success in implementing it, there are still significant deficiencies in his attempt. The main areas of weakness - what needs to be done more, better or differently - can be illuminated by considering the critical foci of reviewers who understood his aims better and were reasonably

sympathetic to them. After this, we may proceed to analysis of how any study of the operating principles of the Chinese Communist leadership should be approached so as best to avoid these weaknesses while preserving and implementing a similar central aim.

Thompson notes that Leites' "analysis rests explicitly on the propositions that study of Bolshevik texts is valuable as a predictive aid since its practitioners are devotees of a secular religion; that the Politburo thinks its record . . . is . . . successful and . . . due to application of "correct" Leninist-Stalinist principles," and then goes on to comment that "The careful reader will discern contradictions, ambiguities, and overlappings . . . especially in the formulations derived from Bolshevik texts . . . . The question then becomes - When does the Politburo favor one or another course of action as the most expedient in terms of advancing the Party's interest? Unhappily The Operational Code gives comparatively little help in predicting choice where alternatives are closely balanced. The riddle remains, although Mr. Leites has taught us a great deal about the rules and strategy of the game."[12] This criticism, echoed less clearly by other reviewers also, remains valid and central even though Leites himself acknowledges the existence of such ambiguities and contradictions, and even though he, quite correctly, points out that these factors themselves derive from and reflect significant aspects of the Bolshevik code: "Throughout, statements have been constructed using words and phrases from the writings and speeches of Lenin and Stalin. This results in statements which may often be imperfect, or contradictory, from a scientific point of view, but which do represent an actual

pattern of Bolshevik thought For the same reason, in grouping these rules into chapters, the repetition and overlapping which has developed has not been eliminated Indeed, the lack of codification by the Bolsheviks not only makes such imperfections inevitable, but, from an analytic point of view, makes them significant.[13]

These "imperfections" are, indeed, significant; something further about the Bolshevik code is conveyed by the existence of such ambiguities, inconsistencies, and gaps. It is, in fact, the first and most essential task of the student describing any new or puzzling field to convey as fully and accurately as possible how it appears, and in the realm of human systems, especially, behavior and even stated principles will always originally exhibit apparent ambiguities, inconsistencies or gaps These must be noted and preserved as part of the data to be accounted for, at least equally with what appears initially clear and orderly.

This does not mean that attempts to predict human behavior by clarification of general rules or principles is necessarily futile, fruitless, or misleading. In the first place, certain general aspects of this problem need explicit and positive statement. Leites himself has taken note of some of these points, but not all, and they are so basic that maximum clarity and emphasis are desirable. 1) Attempts to analyze and (even more) to predict specific events via general rules are always apt to involve some, and often a considerable, degree of uncertainty, especially in new or complex situations. Only the most highly developed sciences can make detailed predictions reliably from theoretical premises, and even they only in certain, usually closely

specified, cases. "The Bolshevik code as presented below is of course very far from being sufficient to predict Politburo behavior in every given situation. You cannot predict the score in a game from its rules; nor can you predict it without knowing the rules."[14] But to recognize this uncertainty, though it may be psychologically difficult, already is a valuable step toward better prediction; it indicates the need for further investigation, and it helps avoid the extreme errors always likely to result from straining toward a certainty that is not immediately obtainable. "The answer," developed under such pressure, is likely to be an especially poor answer. 2 To obtain even a quite imperfect set of rules or principles can be of great value in several ways. First, envisioning the existence of any such rules is very helpful as a general but constant reminder that their rules are probably not the same as our rules. This point should be obvious, but ordinarily it is repeatedly ignored - and most ignored with respect not to details but to the far more important level of pervasive and basic general premises. We continually tend to view the circumstances and behavior of others, and "know" what is going on, according to our own code. And as Mark Twain said "It's not what we don't know that makes the most trouble, it's what we know that isn't so." Second, even an imperfect or partial code can serve to markedly narrow the range of alternatives within which prediction must grapple with uncertainty. An imperfect code may do this both negatively, by at least excluding certain conceivable alternatives,[15] or more positively by indicating a range of possible alternatives.

These broad points are of primary significance precisely because they are so general and fundamental, but it is still desirable and possible to proceed further. The ultimate aim should be the formulation of a picture of the Bolshevik (or Chinese Communist) code that would be considerably more explicit, comprehensive, systematic, and accurate than their own, and thus suited to more accurate understanding of past events and prediction of behavior to come. Such a view would be our construct as detached observers and analysts, avoiding distortion of the data of Bolshevism according to the first rule of science stated above, but according to a second rule, going further in formulating it systematically. These two points taken together, in fact, express the essence of the scientific aim generally. Such an aim really is not unreasonable, or even very remarkable, to apply to this area. Its counterpart in related areas is often common experience. For example, not only can a psychiatrist often discern characteristic patterns of behavior and from them predict what an individual or a family group will do, in a certain situation, more accurately than the persons involved, but every layman has also known similar instances, where as an outsider he could understand and anticipate the behavior of a friend better than that person himself. Indeed, much of Leites' original operational code formulations already represent steps beyond the formulations of the Bolsheviks themselves in explicitness and systematization: "The Party has never allowed a detached analysis, or even an attempt at codification, of its ideology by its theoreticians. Besides, the Bolshevik operational code is, to a considerable extent, presented merely by implication . . . without being clearly stated in general form."[16]

But how can this aim be carried on with respect to the "imperfections" - the ambiguities, the inconsistencies - of the Bolshevik material (and later, the Chinese case)? What else might Leites have done with his data should have been added? Leites himself approaches the key to the problem in stating about inconsistencies that "As is frequently the case, the unbeliever finds it easier to detect such flaws than the believer"[17] and in the statement cited above that these imperfections are not only inevitable but significant. His failing is that he does not follow through the implication here - that such ambiguities, inconsistencies and gaps are themselves a part of the code, and that what is needed is to analyze them also, along with the clearer and more consistent elements, and to integrate them into a single whole.

This might well do more than just fill out or add on to the picture of the operational code, making it more comprehensive. It might also bring out new fundamental points otherwise hidden. One such possibility is of particular importance. Leites' analysis, by centering largely on the most clear and specific principles of the Bolshevik code, almost necessarily emphasizes its rigid, monolithic, and impervious aspects. Thus the picture that results, while being helpful toward understanding and anticipating Soviet actions, might to some unknown extent turn attention away from possibilities of influencing them in desirable ways by outside political actions. Any study of the Chinese Communist operational code should therefore take special care to include consideration of whatever is less definite, firm, or explicit, so that its basic focus does not act to foreclose

possibilities for enlightenment in this crucial area. At any rate, in arthropological studies of cultural patterns generally, not only are ambiguities and apparent contradictions obviously a locus of maximal uncertainty initially, but correspondingly their analysis and resolution often proves a locus of maximal enlightenment.[18]

How can this further level of analysis actually be carried on in any given case? since it appears itself to propose what is illogical or contradictory, such as the unification of contradictions into one whole. Again, more specific critical focus on several aspects of Leites' Operational Code is enlightening and helpful. What aspects of his work are not compatible with greater clarification of ambiguities, resolution of contradictions, and elimination of gaps? - at least when they are gaps; here as everywhere one must remain alert to the question whether we may not be categorizing as 'gap" from our standpoint some areas that merely seems of little significance within the Bolshevik system, or is dealt with from some other angle.

In the first place, although allowances must be made for a pioneering effort in its field, Leites' work is remarkably simple in overall organization, and for a work aiming to present a code, it gives little attention to synthesis and systematization. Its own organization points this up clearly - there are listed some twenty chapters, each dealing with a significant theme of the Bolshevik code, but these chapters are, in the main, quite separate and isolated from one another. This means that, in effect, we are presented with a list of themes, but these parts of the code are not interrelated, even on one level. And there is even less attention given to questions of more

complex structure, such as possible relationships between themes or principles of different levels - for instance to the problem of what rules or principles are more general than others, which represent special cases within the more general, and so on. On this whole matter, Leites only marks certain rules as being particularly important - which is mainly a quantitative statement that does not touch the problem of structural relations; and in passing implies that a few points, such as that the Party's constant goal is to increase its power, are of greatest generality. There remains little explicit concern with systematization, although attempts to view how general formulations fit together is a main avenue in science toward testing and refining their accuracy of description and statement.

Three aspects of this general problem of inadequate systematization stand out particularly as areas of neglect and fields for potential improvement. Two of these are broadly related to the above-mentioned relative neglect of differences in levels and of interrelations among such levels. On one hand, Leites gives almost no attention to discerning and describing any principles or premises, either of thought or of feeling, that are broader or deeper than the specifically political principles which form his main target. That is, although there is some recognition of differences in level between explicit principles, principles that are unstated but probably recognizable by Bolsheviks if stated, and implicit principles quite remote from their awareness, he does not actively inquire about the nature of any Bolshevik behavioral principles that are wider and less specialized than the specifically political, nor the nature of unconscious basic premises

and patterns of cognition and emotion. Yet regularities at such levels must exist as a foundation for the more conscious, specific and focused political orientations, and should help to define and illuminate the latter, and especially to clarify their interrelations, by viewing them within such a broader framework.

It may be noted that this analytic weakness is consistent with Leites' great concentration on specifically political materials - especially the recorded statements of Lenin and Stalin; it is only mitigated somewhat by limited attention to the treatment of certain politically-related themes in classic Russian novels. More attention to 1) less specifically political statements by Soviet leaders and 2) contemporary artistic expressions on political and social topics, which are richer and more concrete than direct political statements if less focused and authoritative, should correspondingly have tended to broaden and deepen the picture of the political themes themselves.

On the other hand - similarly but in an opposite direction - The Operational Code gives little general attention to the relationships between more or less conscious conceptions or rules and actual behavior, although it should be evident to all but the most extreme and old-fashioned believers in "will" and "rationality" that what men do in practice does not correspond in a simple, exact, one-to-one fashion to their beliefs and principles, even for such disciplined and determined people as the Bolsheviks. Indeed, such a focus on self-disciplined behavior is often an indication of doubts and suppression of contrary tendencies which are likely to be manifested in some less simple and direct way. All this has an obvious significance for the aim of predicting behavior from a stated code of principles, but it also has,

conversely, an important bearing on the investigation and formulatic of any such code in the first place; it suggests that some examination of statements about behavior in such situations. Both are relevant, and they should be taken account of together. Leites certainly is concerned about and conversant with Bolshevik actions as well as their statements, yet he is weak on this matter because he puts aim and intent so much in a dominant position. That is, he largely - and largely implicitly - assumes behavior will parallel stated principles, if these are but stated frankly, whereas franknes versus deception is only one part of this problem of correspondence and he does not inquire into it further. Correspondingly, his examinations of principles and actions predominantly involve explaining historical actions by demonstrating their agreement with the code, with little viewing in the other direction - that is, using actions inductively, explicitly and deliberately, as material to develop, refine and systematize the principles of the operational code. In this sense, actions may define and explain statements as much as statements define and explain actions - since both are forms of communication, how should it be otherwise? The essential matter in suc clarification and correlation of communications at the two levels of political statement and political action is to avoid the misleading set of false alternatives recurrently proposed, especially in politi affairs, that statements either are "true," or else they are "merely propaganda," and thus "false." Communications, essentially, are neither.

Finally, Leites tends to state his operational code in the form of completely general and rather isolated principles, with very little mention of the contexts or conditions in which they apply. This is not, of course, absolutely the case; probably it could not be. But there is only a limited mention of certain contexts - for example, the most general one of Bolsheviks perceiving Bolshevism as always surrounded by enemies and therefore in constant danger of "annihilation," or the distinction between situations of advance and of retreat - and further, there is little explicit recognition that principles of action must be related to contexts. Actually, the two are necessary equally and in conjunction if a code is to specify behavior, and though they are of different orders, analysis of contexts, and of their relationships, since this again means the system of main political contexts as seen by the actors, is a task of similar nature and complexity to analysis of principles of action. Also, rather evidently, a study of the contexts in which particular principles of action apply should contribute greatly toward resolving ambiguities and contradictions that would appear otherwise.

All of the above, by bringing up many aspects for study in addition to principles of political action, might make the task of formulating any operational code at all seem impossibly large, complex and difficult. In practice, however, it should work the other way. To neglect significant and necessary parts of a job makes it really more difficult. The inclusion of the factors mentioned should rather - at every stage, and on whatever scale of study is chosen - make for a more comprehensible, reliable, and systematic view, and thus ultimately

for greater simplicity. On this basis, we may now consider the application of such an approach to study of the Chinese Communist leadership.

A CHINESE COMMUNIST STUDY 1) THE CULTURAL CONTEXT

Much time and space have already been spent on a general analysis of problems involved in formulating a political "operational code" as exemplified in Leites' work, and much of the following discussion of investigating the corresponding area for Chinese Communism will also be in rather broad and general terms. In part, this reflects a relative scarcity of specific substantive material that is directly relevant, but more importantly it reflects a deliberate emphasis. Basic principles are as crucial and difficult to perceive and, being perceived, to hold to, in such study as they are in its object, political behavior itself. Therefore they should receive special emphasis at the outset, or they are not likely, in the pressing course of actual research, to receive adequate attention later.

Three areas relevant to planning any study of Chinese Communism similar to Leites' Soviet work will be considered here: 1) comparison of the Chinese and Soviet cases, 2) delineation of objectives and approach for a Chinese study, which includes improved handling of the problems revealed by the prior Soviet study, and 3) surveying the relevant existing resources for such a study. These will be taken up in order, although with some overlapping and repetition since they are interrelated to a considerable extent.

Any study of Chinese Communist political leadership should take extensive account of two related aspects of the cultural context -

Chinese Communism itself, as an overall cultural system, and behind it, traditional Chinese culture. The latter is important as necessarily a major basis for whatever the present Chinese Communist culture and society may be, despite formerly very widespread views that Communist China is "un-Chinese," and despite the obvious prominence of an imported Marxist-Leninist ideology. Apart from the fact that a large part of the population with which the Chinese leaders must deal, and they themselves, were brought up within the traditional culture, even the most revolutionary socio-cultural changes must in many ways be based on or related to earlier and more general cultural patterns of the society, although these changes and relationships may be complex, and of various kinds - such as persistence of old patterns, or even their revitalization, adaptation of old forms to new content or the converse, or a reversal of overt and covert attitudes. To take an extreme example, even when a revolutionary change really attacks and reverses a traditional practice, there is a still relationship of inversion between the new and the old, not a lack of connection, and knowledge of the old may thus still be very valuable for perceiving the new clearly.

There are two significant values associated with such deliberate focus on cultural contexts. First, there is a safeguard against too ready and easy identification of Chinese leaders' statements or actions as merely "Communist" or "Marxist," leading toward over-simple interpretations that ignore the nature or extent of Chinese modification and reinterpretation of what they have adopted. This danger is probably less great now than earlier, during the heyday of the Sino-Soviet

alliance, but it is still significant, especially when the point of departure for our work is a study of Bolshevism. Second, attention to traditional Chinese patterns can be positively useful as an aid in discerning the nature of present, and more specifically political, patterns more clearly and fully, especially in cases where statements or actions are ambiguous or obscure; the general frame or background helps define the particular picture, as mentioned earlier, as well as the converse.

These considerations, though they are more generally applicable, are of particular importance for the case of studying Chinese Communism China has not been considered as "The Mysterious East" without cause; its culture is indeed exotic and very foreign to us - more so than for Russia, though there are also good grounds to believe the cultural differences between China and Russia, and even between Chinese Communism and Russian Communism, are also great. This poses serious initial problems for a study of the Chinese Communist "operational Code," since as a psycho-cultural study its first stage would require a description of the field of study which sees behavior "relative to context and 'from the native point of view' . . . tapping . the cognitive worlds of participants in the culture; and the thoroughgoing avoidance . . . of the imposition of alien descriptive categories on those worlds."[19] It is all too easy, in order to escape from the danger of being puzzled and confused by the foreigness of Chinese and Chinese Communist behavior, unconsciously to see it ethnocentrically, from our point of view. Several popular variants of this, indeed, are current already. One is the above-mentioned simplistic identification

with Marxism-Leninism; another involves the conception of Chinese Communist leaders as motivated purely by a lust for power, and a third the notion that their behavior is just "irrational," and thus will not or cannot be explained or understood further.

On the other hand, this problem is not insurmountable, and it is important to recall that with more foreign and complex situations the potential rewards of any real grasping of basic psycho-cultural orientations for understanding ideas and behavior are multiplied along with the difficulties. A study of the code of the Chinese Communist leaders therefore appears to be very desirable - likely to be at least as valuable as Leites' original study, and as feasible in principle.

At the same time, since the proposed study does derive from the prior Soviet study, it is important - as a partial counterforce to the influence the importantion of a name and an ideology must exert on any viewing of Communism in China - to note more specifically and concretely via a few examples how Chinese cultural factors might significantly alter various politically important matters, and correspondingly affect their study. The very ideas of a Politburo and of an operational code need careful consideration first of all. It is far from certain in advance how much the Chinese leadership involves a group equivalent to the Soviet Politburo. This question is not resolvable just by finding a group of leaders with a similar title or formal structure, as the functioning of these leaders might still be unlike the Soviet case in unexpected ways, influenced by older Chinese conceptions of leadership and organization.[20] Similarly, the ways in which a code of political action is made explicit, expressed in metaphors, or left

implicit, and the relationship of statement and overt behavior may be very different in the Chinese instance, where there has been a long tradition of indirect and allusive communication. The same kind of considerations hold for many other areas less immediately related to an "operational code," but where differences in basic conceptions of government and society in China, as against either Soviet or American views, may still be very relevant to our search for a better grasp of Chinese Communist behavior. A number of such additional areas will be mentioned later, all involving complexities related to the fact that "cultures may differ not only in the ways they categorize and segment some aspects of experience, but also in the very aspects of experience they select and group together for categorization."[21] These complexities do not mean that a study comparable to - and going beyond - that of Leites cannot be done for Chinese Communism; they do mean that one must constantly be watchful about the assumptions, explicit or implicit, which frame the work, and that in order to be comparable in essence, a Chinese study may need to be quite different in detail.

2) OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH

The three related matters to examine here are the general objectives and more specific foci of examination for a study of the operations of the Chinese Communist leadership, the proper approach to these areas, and the kinds of materials needed in implementing this approach.

The overall aim of any such study may be stated as the development of a progressively greater capacity to understand and to predict the

behavior of the Chinese Communist leadership - with a similarly improved view of the probable responses of the Chinese populace to such behavior as an important secondary aim. Leites' conception of delineating an "operational code" remains appropriate for transfer to this aim, given certain modifications and extensions.

A number of more specific foci of inquiry central to this aim can be stated initially, although such specification should not be carried too far at the outset; it is important to allow other foci and emphases to emerge from the material as actual data on these initial points are examined.

First attention should be directed to delineating a picture of the general current situation, as the Chinese Communist leaders themselves conceive it, together with some corresponding account of the historical background as it appears to their eyes. This would include a concern with their views both of internal politics - the state and nature of Communist China - and of China's international relations. These tasks involve more than a static summary, even of Mao's words, essential as these are; the aim must be toward detecting how political situations are conceptualized and analyzed, and what aspects are emphasized or ignored, so as to clarify the general nature of their viewing and its differences from our own, as well as what particular content they perceive. For example, Chinese Communist views of the state are likely to be related at some level to pervasive older ideas that "the country is like a big family" and associated ideas about "benevolent" control from the top, while international relations must involve feelings about the great differences in relationship with outsiders as against family members.

Secondly, attention must be given to the goals of the Chinese leadership, in similar terms. It would be only natural to consider this in terms of immediate and long-range goals, but care must be taken with even such a distinction - their own viewing may not make a separation in just this way, so common to us, and indeed their conception of goals, or of the relationship between present action and future conditions may be significantly different. Therefore, it is important also to explore the wider field of Chinese Communist conceptions of political organization and behavior. A number of important topics should be examined within this. Strategy and tactics, in war and politics, has been a center of Chinese attention from the ancient times described in the "Romance of the Three Kingdoms" right up to Mao's "On Guerilla Warfare." Conceptions of leadership, and relationships with the led, are important, and must be related to typical ways of promoting cooperation - long a Chinese preoccupation - and dealing with conflict and dissent. Methods of categorizing political situations, such as Mao's distinction of "antagonistic" and "non-antagonistic contradictions" need consideration, along with the repeated Chinese Communist mounting of mass campaigns of focused action, which seem related to certain cultural emphases on extreme concentration of attention, perhaps underlain by fears of confusion and disorganization.

At still more general levels lie two other foci of specific importance for study. Examination of relationships between political statement and actions, always relevant in a psycho-cultural study, is especially important for China in view of the traditional attitudes

to communication mentioned earlier. And for any increased understanding and control of international relations, study of Chinese Communist (and traditional Chinese) attitudes toward influencing others and being influenced is essential.

In approaching these foci of study, as suggested in discussing Leites' work, the essential point is to aim for a unified picture of Chinese Communist principles of political action as a whole - first in their terms, and eventually in a related but wider view. In fact, this approach is probably more important than any choice of initial topics, since by its very nature it leads inquiry from any one point to those others which are significantly related. It is in some ways easier to carry out and demonstrate than to describe abstractly, but several main points for such an approach can be specified here. First, there is a focus on what appears common and recurrent, rather than on deciding, from external criteria, what is especially important or significant. For example, in examining a group of statements by various Chinese Communist leaders, this would mean giving most attention - at least for a considerable initial period - to what they <u>all</u> say, rather than to any perceptible differences. At a time of apparent political struggle like the present, this is especially important for pursuing a broad understanding of their basic system, rather than becoming hung up on questions like "Who's really in charge now?," which, despite practical importance, are only meaningful given a prior understanding of the system of political premises they still share, and dispute <u>within.</u> Second is a constant aim toward generalization; that is, using specific observations of recurrent emphases in Chinese

Communist statements and actions to formulate broader characterizations of their views, combined with checking all such characterizations by further specific material. Third, observations and generalizations about various topics must be progressively interrelated. This orientation is already implicit in the preceding discussion of important foci for initial study, where many of the topics mentioned are rather evidently connected with each other, either on a similar level, or in terms of more specific or more general aspects of a investigative focus; it should be pursued deliberately and rigorously. Fourth, contexts must be sought and analyzed. This applies in several senses. The most obvious is that different kinds of political behavior should be considered - first discriminated, and later again oriented - in relation to different political situations, as these are conceived by the leaders. Again, principles of greater generality can well be seen as contexts for consistencies of more specific or limited nature; the series "stated principle - implicit principle - unconscious premise" is a set of progressively wider contexts in this sense. Emotional attitudes may be a context for ideology. Family patterns may be a significant context for other personal relationships.

As this approach is pursued via examination of the regularities and relationships discernable in actual communicational data, the constant goal must be toward interrelation and systematization into a unitary whole. Of course apparent gaps or contradictions will repeatedly come into view, but the goal should not therefore be abandoned too readily. Hymes' general advice is very pertinent to Chinese Communism in particular: "it is essential to resist the

temptation to assign an aspect of a native culture too easily to a familiar category, by either not investigating its full range, or by explaining discrepancies away as due to confusion, or ignorance, or breakdown of an old system, or intrusion of a new one. Such may be the case, but often enough the difficulty is failure to discern a principle or system actually in use, one which makes the full range of variation intelligible."[22]

All this emphasis on viewing Chinese Communism initially from within, so to speak, does not mean that their characterizations are to be taken as perfectly correct, nor that their valuations are to be accepted, though it might appear so to scientists accustomed to more external viewing or data than are anthropologists. Hymes clarifies this also: "The familiar but incorrect category may, of course, come from either a native or an ethnological [more generally, an outside scientific] source. The new approach avoids the Scylla and Charybdis of identifying valid theory and scientific relevance with either native formulations or existing ethnological [or, in this instance, political] concepts. The new approach does not reject native formulations, which are of great heuristic value; nor does it reject comparative study and the general concepts such study demands; but it insists on refining the empirical basis of comparative study, by providing more surely valid descriptions of the individual systems on which comparative study must depend."[23]

That is, once again, the first task is to see the system from within in order that it may then be seen, described, judged, and dealt with more accurately, adequately, and appropriately from without.

This takes place not by any sudden shift of stance, but progressively as the approach outlined is carried out in actual study.

The materials appropriate for such a study of the Chinese Communist code can be outlined rather simply and briefly here for maximum clarity, leaving certain more detailed and practical matters for discussion in the following section on "Resources."

Three general principles about materials may be stated; it should be evident how these are consonant with previous statements about the aim and approach of such a study. First, primary attention should be given to actual Chinese Communist statements, with secondary emphasis on simple, concrete descriptive accounts of Chinese Communist behavior by others; accounts of their ideas or actions that already involve outsiders' abstract categories, whether implicit or explicit, popular or scientific, should be used sparingly and cautiously. Second, the raw materials for study should be limited in quantity, so that they can be examined in a relatively leisurely yet intensive manner. This provides maximum opportunity for perceiving the order inherent in the data themselves, with relatively minor dangers, since cultural - and especially Communist - materials tend to be very repetitious as well as systematic. In contrast, large quantities of data promote extensive and more superficial examination, and exert pressures for rapid establishment of specified systems of data handling - which already imply the extensive use of categories probably foreign to the system under study. Third, the order of study should proceed from initial examination of specifically political materials to examination of supplementary materials of less focused but more concrete and richer nature (a parallel to study

of specifics in relation to contexts), but with recurrent returns to examination of the most highly political data in the light of what has been perceived elsewhere.

More specifically, such research should begin with study of the most explicitly and specifically political statements by Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders, including both statements of principles and descriptive or analytical characterizations of political situations. So far as is feasible, whole statements should be studied rather than excerpts, in order better to perceive what they view as unitary and relationships and structure within such units, and the same of statements examined should cover as wide a variety of political topics as possible.

Less directly political statements of these leaders are also important. Some, such as military writings obviously are closely related to politics, while others, even philosophical or poetical works, provide useful background, especially since Communist political discourse itself tends to slogans and stereotypes, though sometimes enriched by imagery, which is often worth particular attention.[25]

Lower-level Chinese Communist writings, such as press reports, are likely to be of value mainly for the depiction of recent specific policies or situations of interest, as they tend to stick cautiously to the most established stereotypes. In fact, the writings of Mao himself, despite his long immersion in Communist ideology, probably exhibit more freedom and richness than any other directly political statements.

The limitations of these kinds of data in regard to abstractness of language and restricted point of view would, in ordinary anthropological study, be met by field observation and interviewing. This is not possible in this instance, but the same function can be performed to a considerable extent by study of other kinds of material. Fictional materials are most valuable because they must flesh out political themes in depicting them in terms of concrete situations of social interaction. Novels are good for this purpose, but films are even better, since they provide visual as well as verbal material. Interviews with any available Chinese informants, whether sympathetic or anti-Communist, can be especially valuable, since they can be guided and focused onto particular problematic topics, if they are pitched at an appropriate level. The real use of such interviews is not to get factual data on political events or political beliefs. Rather it is to get at underlying attitudes and basic premises related to Chinese Communist, and more general Chinese, conceptions relevant to political life.

Descriptive accounts of Communist China by first-hand observers are of value - these together with news reports of Chinese events, (and certain aspects of film materials) provide the main basis for going beyond purely Chinese Communist conceptions and examining the relationships between statements and actions - but they have important limitations. The limitation ordinarily emphasized, that any foreign observers are allowed only a controlled field of observation, is certainly significant, but beyond this, such observers project their own conceptual framework into their reports. This is a likely source of

misunderstanding, and it is greater the more an account of China, lay or scientific, departs from simple reporting of direct observations.

Finally, materials on traditional China of similar kinds to those listed for Communist China exist and should be examined similarly, if to a more limited extent.

3) RESOURCES AVAILABLE

Study of the Chinese Communist leaders' code as outlined here, on whatever scale of operation, would be both scientifically and practically valuable, and perfectly feasible in principle. The overall question is "What resources - in terms of concepts, methods, raw materials, data sources, findings and personnel - are available now for utilization in such research?" Within this there is a specific practical question - "To what extent has such work already been done, what partial findings already exist?" In my view, the answer to this question is quite pessimistic - I see little existing work of the kind described on this subject which could be just "plugged in" to a research program on the Chinese Communist leadership - but to the wider question the answer is more optimistic. [illegible] conclude by surveying these matters.

It is unfortunately true that the state of anthropology in relation to these questions is generally indicated by the complete absence since its publication of any reference to Leites' Operational Code in the indices of such major journals as the American Anthropologist and the Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, even though his study reflected much anthropological influence. There has, in fact, been a decline of

anthropological interest in specifically psycho-cultural studies, especially political ones, since the early 1950's, although this line of interest still manifests itself in a variety of studies, a very similar basic orientation is currently being stated and utilized in other anthropological work. The psycho-cultural field as such is reviewed so comprehensively by Honigmann[24] that no further reference is needed here. On the other hand, after long neglect, the field of political anthropology generally is becoming more active in recent years. It is the subject of a critical analysis and review by Easton,[25] a brief general review by Fried,[26] and of a recent volume of papers,[27] including two related to China. Such works, beginning with the classic African studies of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard,[28] have been influential in expounding a more inclusive yet more behavioral view of politics: "We have not found that the theories of political philosophers have helped us to understand the societies we have studied . . . for their conclusions are seldom formulated in terms of observable behavior or capable of being tested by this criterion. Political philosophy has chiefly concerned itself with how men ought to live and what form of government they ought to have, rather than with what are their political habits and institutions."[29] But these works do not deal directly with the kind of study contemplated here, and also are still concerned mainly with primitive societies. Much the same is true of studies of culture change, an area potentially relevant to the revolutionary transformations in China, except for some suggestive general concepts such as that of "revitalization movements."[30]

The situation is somewhat better as regards methodology, not so much because of any recent advances (though Honigmann cites a few relevant pieces, and an article by Colby[31] should be noted) as because the work of Mead and Metraux on studying cultures at a distance[32] is still a mine of valuable discussion and examples.

For China as a subject of inquiry, there is a vast amount of descriptive material and more-or-less formulated pictures of various kinds, both for traditional and Communist periods. Bibliographies such as those of Fairbank[33] and Hucker[34] provide guidance to large amounts of material in English.[35] The problem is not a lack of material - if anything, there is too much - but that the great majority of these studies are too far removed from that contemplated here for their findings to be immediately applicable. There has been relatively little anthropological work on Modern China - most anthropologists are still avoiding work on major contemporary societies - especially on Chinese politics,[36] and there has also been little work by others concerned with careful and systematic delineation of Chinese cultural patterns in close relation to empirical data. Rather, empirical studies have usually been factual in a narrowly limited way, while broader views of Chinese patterns have usually been not only impressionistic but biased. Such material can be useful, but it must be used, carefully, as a kind of data rather than as established findings, and in such a case, it is often both easier and safer to stick more closely to use of raw materials directly.

It is fortunate, then, that the situation regarding primary data, with two exceptions, is good. There is an abundance of material by Mao readily available,[37] and some by other Chinese Communist leaders,

as well as large quantities of Chinese news and comment in translation, accounts by various Western observers of China, and recent Chinese fiction. The exceptions concern the inaccessibility of China for direct field observation, and Chinese films, which are available outside China only with difficulty and in limited numbers.

Finally, as to personnel, the situation again is one where there is a fair supply of scholars interested in China, but whose point of view is quite distant from the approach discussed here, and there is also a fair number of anthropologists to whom this approach would generally make sense, but who are concerned with problems remote from China or politics.

The main requisite for the kind of study described and advocated here, then, would be to bring together some of the general principles, concepts, people, and raw materials that now stand isolated and apart

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13. ABSTRACT


The concept of the operational code was originally developed by Nathan Leites of the RAND Corporation in a study of Soviet leadership. As construed here, the operational code of an organization includes the values--and more particularly the goals--which the organization's leaders safeguard and pursue. An operational code includes also the available and preferred strategies, tactics and techniques which a given organization may use. These may be viewed as the definition of explicit and implicit rules for action.

The original study undertaken by Leites was completed in 1953 after more than seven years of research. The present report uses his findings as a jumping off place for a study of the feasibilities for further investigation of Chinese Communist decision-making. The emphasis is upon various innovative approaches and research techniques which, for the most part, have been developed since the Leites study was designed and implemented. Recommendations include an estimate of feasibilities combined with a program and model delineating both the optimal and minimal scales upon which an empirical investigation of Chinese decision-making might be conducted.


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| 14. KEY WORDS | LINK A ROLE | LINK A WT | LINK B ROLE | LINK B WT | LINK C ROLE | LINK C WT |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| China | | | | | | |
| People's Republic of China | | | | | | |
| Operational Code | | | | | | |
| Politburo | | | | | | |
| Decision-making | | | | | | |
| Content analysis | | | | | | |
| Feasibility study | | | | | | |

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