DETERRENCE AND DISARMAMENT

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THE PROBLEM

Deterrence and disarmament both relate to preserving in a dangerous world the nation, peace, and the possibility of freedom. They are complementary, not conflicting, policies for coping with the conflict between the free world and the Communist Bloc. If they are pursued with wisdom and force they may buy some decades in which to cope with basic problems. If central war can be avoided, perhaps we can accomplish some genuine reduction in the fundamental hostility between the Bloc and the relatively free nations—without the loss of freedom.

There is no clear causal link between disarmament and the fundamental source of danger of war. There is none between deterrence and that source. The threat of general war stems basically from a conflict of objectives backed by power. Any approach to the essential problems of war and peace must address that conflict.

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The political conflict derives ultimately from differences in effective national values. Four values are central to the problem: the value attached to not killing others, the value of survival, the value of freedom, and the value of international expansion.

The moral revulsion at inflicting unnumbered casualties is bound to be important in the decisions of the United States government. It may not be entirely unimportant in the considerations of the Kremlin. It is a value to which every decent person must assign great weight; but there are other values, and few of us would give this one alone so much weight as to preclude all others.

Survival, individual and national, is cherished by both the Bloc and the democracies, as by others. It is not only the basis for any extensive agreed disarmament; it is also prerequisite for deterrence. Unless the opponent is anxious to survive, the threat of a nuclear strike against his population will not deter him.

A major stated objective of the United States and its chief allies is to retain and expand freedom. It seems obvious that retaining it for themselves is pragmatically the more important portion of the objective. Freedom has many meanings. But the liberal tradition provides a general concept that has the merit of being operationally useful while minimizing the task of making other people's value judgments. Freedom is richness and variety of choice: political choice through government-by-consent and the protection of individual rights; economic choice through material well-being, and choice in occupation and consumption; cultural and social choice through the removal of barriers to mobility, through education. The list could be much.
expanded. That freedom, if not a universal value, one cherished inside the bloc, is attested by the Wall, police state itself and some tentative budding of tolerance. Although Marxism had some roots in liberal thought and historically there has been, and apparently still is, an important western orientation within the Russian intelligentsia, the hierarchy is obviously dogmatically and practically opposed to extensive free choice among the people it controls.

The greater the value the Soviet Union places upon expanding its hegemony, the greater the risk of war. Indeed one can conceptually measure the value the Soviets place on expansion in terms of the costs and risks they are willing to incur to achieve it. The same measure applied to the West suggests that it has small interest indeed in aggrandizement.

Especially with their hostility to freedom, much hangs on how high the Soviet leaders value expansion. We can never know with certainty. A good deal of historical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that they attach great value to it; and there is little evidence that they are not interested in expansion, even when it is against the will of the peoples concerned.

The greater the value both sides place on their own survival or on not killing others, the less the danger of war—obviously. Similarly, the greater the value each places on its political objectives, aggrandizement, freedom or independence for itself or others, the greater the chance of war.
Then the basic danger is not primarily that general nuclear war will descend on the world out of thin air, nor as a consequence of some neurotic "tensions," nor by accident, but as a consequence of the grave conflict of political aims backed by devastating power. In that conflict would lie the danger of World War III, even if there were no nuclear arsenals.

The chief threat is that the Soviet Union will for some reason undertake aggression somewhere - that the United States will not acquiesce - that a crisis will follow, leading to local warfare, which might in turn escalate to central war. The main barriers against central war then lie in preventing aggression and controlling escalations.

If the Soviet leaders are serious about world domination or just further expansion of their wealth and power, Europe is the great prize. The danger is the more because the United States could not safely acquiesce in the Soviet's absorbing Western Europe. Leaving aside the particulars of the present military posture, if Western Europe fell to the Soviet Union, the industrial strength and, hence, the military potential of the Bloc would be enormously expanded. Even if the Soviets were subsequently deterred from initiating a direct attack on the United States, the probability that the Bloc could eventually isolate and surround the United States would be drastically increased.

Our involvement in and obligations to Western Europe, of course, run far deeper. Therefore, should the Soviets advance into Western
Europe with forces that could not be contained locally, the danger of central nuclear war would be great.

But, do we have to be ready to fight over Europe? These are foul words to see three times in half a century—but it has been a foul half century. Do the Soviets want Western Europe so much that unless its military price is fearful high they will try to take it? This is an unknown upon which our policy has to be based. All we can do is look at the available evidence, keep trying to garner more, make considered judgments—and proceed.

What is the existing evidence? Communist leadership has long declared its purpose of establishing its particular brand of dictatorship—"of the proletariat"—throughout the world. The Soviets tried to get Western Europe. Shortly after World War II they had strong parties in France and Italy, as well as in Greece. In the years immediately after the war, Russia acquired the present satellites. The Soviets opposed the Marshall Plan. Berlin was blockaded in 1948. The Soviets have a huge land army and tactical air force in Eastern Europe ("on foreign bases") and in Western Russia. They are trying to force the Western powers out of Berlin and to sever its ties with the Federal Republic. They have already forced us out of East Berlin. They have made some gains against Finland. They oppose the Common Market.

None of these things prove that the Soviets would be dangerously aggressive toward Western Europe if the cost were not excessive. But they are consistent with the hypothesis that aggression there is a Soviet aim. There remains the possibility, however remote, that the
Soviets are not aggressive. The brightest spot is the Russian concurrence in the establishment of an independent and neutral Austria. Conceivably, too, Russian leaders are genuinely afraid of Western aggression, that they believe they are reacting to Western threats. By some reasoning, many of the events mentioned above can be considered consistent with the hypothesis that the USSR is basically defensive. However, by the principle of Occam's Razor it seems more reasonable to believe, at least pending more evidence, that the Soviet Union attaches great importance to expansion. But some doubt remains.

If the Soviets do hope to move into Western Europe, using force where necessary and promising, we can expect further pressure on vulnerable points such as Berlin. If we accept the loss of Berlin and if the Soviets are aggressive, one would expect them to undertake to move further. If they are defensive and we were to acquiesce, we should then have bought peace at the price of the freedom of "only" two million more people plus some reduction in hope for all Eastern Europe. This is tempting, perhaps, but in seventeen years we have already bought peace at the price of Hungary and, in fact, at the expense of the freedom of six or seven European Satellites—some 50 million people.

If we resist in Berlin and in subsequent crises, there is some risk of local fighting, and, if local fighting develops, some risk of central war. Although these risks do not appear great in the sense that there is a high probability of central war in the next several years, they are literally matters of life and death for all of us. It is the purpose of both deterrence and disarmament to keep those
dangers small.

Whatever the other motives for hostility between the relative free nations and the Soviet Bloc, there are values at stake. Unless the West is willing to abandon its self-determination and much of its present degree of freedom, or unless the Soviet motives for aggression are effectively curtailed, there appears to be no prospect for greatly reducing the existing political hostility. Eventually some form of supranational government might conceivably be established that would hold the hostility more or less permanently in check, without greatly impairing political liberties. However until or unless the hostility is diminished or constrained, the threat of general war carries with it the danger that the conflict will be resolved through catastrophe. Any chance of a long-run and basic solution on humanistic terms requires that both Western and liberal values survive the short run. How?

SHORT-RUN MEASURES

Five alternatives appear to exhaust the list of options immediately available: deterrence, disarmament, limited war, preventive war, and acquiescence. Acquiescence and preventive war are ruled out on the ground that they are grossly inconsistent with democratic values—the values at issue. Only disarmament and deterrence hold some promise of avoiding war in ways not patently inconsistent with those values.

Deterrence and disarmament have in common one major characteristic. They are negative strategies. The most they can do is prevent war: the first by threatening a potential aggressor, the second by removing
enough of the means of war to make it unpromising and hence unlikely. Disarmament has the additional purpose of reducing devastation should war come. Both are imperfect tools. Both involve risks and costs.

**Deterrence**

So long as the Soviets are aggressive, the denial of Western Europe to Russia is vital. Conceivably Western Europe could be defended in local fighting there, but the West does not appear to have the conventional capability to do that, and the tactical use of nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe looks highly disadvantageous.

The protection of Western Europe consists, as has been pointed out frequently, of a NATO shield, a moderate theatre force which, should the Soviets attack, will be sufficient to check their advance, to show that they will in reality have to fight for gains there, and to induce them to withdraw so as to avoid the blow from the NATO sword, a retaliatory strike.

If the conventional forces of NATO were being overrun, it is conceivable that the United States might then decide not to strike the Soviet Union. The deterrent lies in the fact that the United States might strike—and that, if we did, the devastation in Russia could be incalculably large. Since any massive strategic blow would not only eliminate Russia as a world power and the leader of the Communist Bloc but might obliterate much of the material gain since the Revolution, nuclear retaliation need not be a certainty to be an effective deterrent. However, given the exposure of Europe, the historical reluctance of the United States to exploit its erstwhile strategic supremacy, and the possibility of technical surprise or
even of attack without warning, it may be that our strategic advantage has to be large to be convincing.

Should Soviet society be opened and the possibility of conventional aggression by surprise be reduced, it may become less important to retain commanding strategic superiority. Should NATO achieve effective parity with the Bloc in conventional forces, so that the Soviets would have demonstrably little chance of making important gains in Europe through non-nuclear warfare, it would be possible to reduce, but perhaps not to eliminate, Western dependence on a strategic retaliatory threat.

For the strategic deterrent to be effective in guarding Europe, the Soviets must have some doubt as to the adequacy of their own deterrent. If the United States were believed to be, in some absolute sense, deterred by the Soviet intercontinental capability, Europe would be exposed to local aggression, conventional or nuclear, and to nuclear blackmail. Only if Soviet decision makers fear that, should they invade Western Europe, the United States might retaliate against Russia, can our deterrent work. And we must be able to deter attack on Europe, for that is where the danger of central war lies. Only by dispelling any Russian hopes of successful attack can the danger of nuclear war or of ultimate defeat of the West be kept low.

It need hardly be added that the security of the West depends also on the ability to deter a Russian attack directly on the United States.

Disarmament

The basic objective of disarmament is to reduce the likelihood and consequence of war, especially major nuclear war. In the present
military-political environment an overriding criterion for disarmament is that it not critically reduce the effectiveness of the American deterrent. To do so would, according to the present analysis, greatly increase the probability of war. Therefore, such measures would not be in the interest of the West—nor of humanity in general.

Measures which reduce the devastation of war while leaving the American deterrent intact tend to be in the interest of a free and peaceful world, so long as the United States is not aggressive.

Measures which would retard advances in military technology may be in the general interest. A secure test ban and effective restriction of missile testing are possible examples.

Because it is largely Soviet conventional superiority which forces reliance on strategic retaliation for the protection of Western Europe, reductions in the Soviet conventional pose may be worth examining. So long, however, as the Soviet Bloc remains a closed society with vast paramilitary forces which cannot readily be identified, there are peculiar problems of control. Unless a suitable price were offered, it is, of course, unrealistic to expect the Soviets willingly to abandon their conventional advantage.

Open skies would have left the deterrent unimpaired and would have provided the West with assurance—or with warning—as to Soviet activity. If, in fact, the Soviets were strong but not preparing for aggression, it might have been to their advantage to provide evidence of that fact. If they were weaker than they wished the West to know or were making offensive preparations, it was "rational" for them to reject the idea.
Given that Europe is a potential source of central war, measures looking toward some sort of regional disarmament, total or partial, deserve attention. So do arrangements which would reduce the total level of armament without impairing the American deterrent.

Sources of danger common in arms control discussion have so far been ignored: the arms race per se, nuclear disarmament, surprise attack, pre-emption, inadvertent war. All are of some importance.

The danger of inadvertent war and such political/military crises as those mentioned above are closely connected. First, in a period relatively free of conflict, a single nuclear explosion might be recognized as an isolated incident. Both sides seem aware of the consequences of general war, and it is reasonable to expect that neither would be rash about launching a general attack. Certainly President Kennedy would move with great care and thought. However, if there were already a highly dangerous local crisis, especially one involving conventional warfare, one would expect both sides to be much more afraid that the other would initiate general war. In that case, the risks would appear to be somewhat higher. Second, an incident seems more likely to arise during a crisis. Clearly the risk of accident would be increased if there were fighting. Bringing weapons to a high state of readiness in a crisis might increase the chance of an accident. Thus, being able to deter local aggression also serves to reduce the risk of inadvertent war.
There may also be arms control measures which would reduce the likelihood of accident or unauthorized action at all levels of tension or conflict.*

The danger of surprise attack outside the context of any sharp crisis seems nearly negligible. In the case of the United States, at least, the moral revulsion to massive destruction itself precludes initiating preventive war. We do not know whether that factor is operationally important in the Kremlin, but tender concern for human values is sometimes difficult to infer from Soviet actions. However, if the Soviets believe that Secretary Gilpatric stated in his address of October 21, 1961, that the United States has so large a strategic capability that even after a Soviet attack we would have at least as great a striking force left as the Soviet Union has before attacking, the immediate danger of preventive war, i.e., surprise attack, seems small. Khrushchev's prompt withdrawal from Cuba is at least consistent with such a belief.

In the event that one side believes that the other is irrevocably committed to launching a strategic attack, for whatever reason, the intended victim has good reason for trying to pre-empt. The advantage of doing so depends largely upon the vulnerability of the strategic forces of both sides. The greater the vulnerability of the intended victim, the more of his force he can use and the greater the destruction he can impose on the attacker by pre-empting. Also, the greater

*See, for example, the "Humphrey resolution": United States Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Senate Resolution 203, 87th Congress, 1st Session, September 5, 1961.
the attacker's vulnerability, the more the intended victim can reduce damage to his own country by successful pre-emption. Because vulnerability of strategic forces makes speed in pre-emption of utmost importance, a nation with a vulnerable force seems relatively likely to act on misinterpretation of an accident or some other event and to pre-empt erroneously. Hence, decreasing the vulnerability of one's own strategic force may be a useful form of unilateral arms control.

The dissemination of nuclear weapons to countries which now lack a nuclear capability seems a source of new danger. In the hands of the Chinese, with their current history of aggression and their verbal advocacy of it, a capability would appear to be dangerous indeed. How dangerous it would be in the hands of the French, or of other nations is less clear. Eventually it may be possible for even a small dictator to have a nuclear capability.

Finally, an arms race is itself conceivably a source of general war. Unrestrained war would now be an enormous catastrophe. As the accumulation of weapons continues, the magnitude of possible catastrophe grows. Clearly, if there is some way that the growth of capability to destroy can be retarded, or reversed without increasing the risk of general war and without reducing the prospects of freedom, that is desirable. Few proposals promise both large reductions in devastation and little or no increase in the risks of loss of freedom or of war.

Although competitive arming directly increases the potential devastation of war, the causal link with the risk that general war will occur is not direct. Perhaps the chief danger is that one side
will gain and exploit a critical advantage. A major technical breakthrough or the concealed accumulation of striking power could provide one side with a capability the opponent could not counteract. Because of their secrecy the Soviets might achieve such surprise. With their political orientation if they gained it they might use it. Thus again, the danger depends on the political values of the nation which achieves an advantage.

There is another argument: The psychological and political consequences of an arms race may change the national characters of the opponent so as to exacerbate the political conflict. This is a difficult argument to assess. It suggests that arms and deterrence become their own excuse for being. This argument has a good deal of intuitive appeal. Certainly, arrogance and hatred has been a correlate (but perhaps a prerequisite) of arming, notably in the case of the Nazis and the Fascists in the thirties. At present, however, both sides have gone to some length to identify the enemy not as the people on the other side but as their governing cliques, and to identify the conflict as one not between nations but between systems and policies. Further, the predictions of the thirties that if the democracies should fight the fascist camp, we would ourselves become fascists simply proved false. There is a more persuasive proposition: that increasing arms and the size of the military establishment changes the internal distribution of political power. That seems plausible but unproved. Its effect on the danger of war is not obvious.

A difficult, in evaluating these arguments is that extensive armament has arisen historically not out of nothing but out of
political purpose. Therefore, in determining the cause of war it would be difficult to segregate analytically the effects of an arms race from that of its own political base.

In sum, the short-run problem—the problem so long as there is a tyranny threatening Europe and North America—is to be able to deter a military offensive or, if it comes, to control its escalation and to reduce other sources of the danger of war. Limited war, left aside here, may be a necessary and bloody instrument in this venal business. Besides that, deterrence and compatible disarmament offer some chance for the survival of Western values.

LONG-RUN MEASURES

The discussion so far suggests that a necessary condition for a genuine solution to our present problems is that the Soviet's determination to expand—if indeed that is Soviet intent—be eliminated or permanently tethered. Perhaps a solution is not necessary. Perhaps life can continue indefinitely with the danger of thermonuclear war. It may also be that if this problem is solved, equally bad ones will arise. It still seems worthwhile to seek solutions. Control of each successive crisis in coming decades will, at least, put off the evil day.

A liberal can hold any of at least three views as to why it is valuable to gain time. First, the time is valuable per se in permitting hundreds of millions of us to live relatively normal lives for more years.

Second, more or less passively time may operate to reduce the sources of conflict. In many places inside and outside the Soviet
Bloc there has been a secular rise in material well-being, technical knowledge, and in literacy, and a revolutionary new awareness of the world beyond the horizon. One can believe that such changes are likely to lead to free institutions or at least to the pacification of aggressive drives. There seems no more reason to believe that Communism is the wave of the future than that it can be turned into the final desperate lunge of tyranny against the burgeoning humanism of modern history. Probably it is neither.

Finally, one can believe that we can exploit time gained through successive evasions of disaster to influence history. Obviously there is no assurance that anyone can significantly reduce the causes of war or even the sources of danger or central war. There is no evidence that we have the wisdom to solve such problems. Yet it has to be attempted.

Two broad classes of peaceful measures which may reduce Soviet motives for aggression and efforts to establish effective supranational government. The second has been rather widely discussed and I have little to add. Reducing Soviet motives for aggression is a largely neglected area of discussion.

One reason for the neglect is obvious. We do not understand tyrannys, what makes them, what makes them aggressive, indeed, whether

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Kenneth Waltz believes hope for the passive betterment of the world is fond illusion. "The simplistic assumption of many liberals, that history moves relentlessly toward the millennium, is refuted if the international environment makes it difficult...for states to behave in ways that are progressively more moral." Kenneth N. Waltz: Man, The State And War: A Theoretical Analysis, Columbia, 1959, p. 233.
in the twentieth century they are apt to be more aggressive than responsible governments. Although there has been much analysis of Communism as an idea and some of Communist reality; few theorems or predictive models have been developed, empirically examined and thrust into the major dialogue.

Without these analyses, one is forced to resort to hunch and judgment. There are three kinds of non-coercive steps which, as a matter of hunch, do suggest themselves: measures to reduce the isolation of Communists; to increase and to emphasize mutual interests; to encourage liberal elements inside the B.Ioc.

There are a number of actual or potential areas of mutual interest between the United States and the Soviet Union which could perhaps be emphasized. It is both common and largely wrong to say that there is mutual interest in avoiding war. There is mutuality of interest in avoiding war by accident, in preventing new powers from acquiring the ability to make nuclear war. But the West has an interest in war if the Soviets try to force their dominance on Europe; Russia has an interest in war if in fact it values expansion highly; it would have one if the West were intent on expansion. Thus any mutuality of interest in peace may be dominated by the conflict of political values.

One area of potential mutual interest between Russia and America is the latent threat of China. How serious that threat is to either is not clear. Yet China is obviously one of the great potential problems (could it be an opportunity?) of the next decade or two. The key question is whether governments in either the United States
or Russia can responsibly permit—if they have the power to prevent—the emergence of a new aggressive nuclear power. Although there is little to say about a solution, the question may deserve further comment.

The United States and the Soviet Union, working in cooperation, could, it would appear, coerce the Chinese into refraining from developing, say, a strategic offensive capability. Perhaps either could do so alone if the other stood aside. Suppose the governments of both should become convinced that the Chinese would develop a capability to destroy tens of cities in either America or Russia (not to mention India and Japan), suppose, too, that both were convinced that the Chinese Communists were intent on unrestricted aggrandizement. With such a set of convictions, could either government ignore the presumably, fleeting opportunity to cooperate in preventing the emergence of such a power?

There are three other, often-cited, areas of potential cooperation: space activities, economic development, and international trade.

Given that both sides want to explore space, there are probably economic advantages in cooperation in doing so. The physical sciences might advance faster, more important would seem to be that the effort would expose some of Russia's new bourgeois, scientists and engineers, to their Western counterparts. There might conceivably be military cost in space cooperation. So long as the Soviet Union remains closed it is critically important to free peoples, that we have effective reconnaissance over Soviet territory. Should cooperation in
space prevent effective satellite reconnaissance, without adequate alternatives, that would appear to be too high a price for the modest gains one could reasonably expect from cooperative space ventures.

International trade may be another way of increasing contacts between East and West, another way of exposing Russians to Western influence, a way of building some degree of interdependence. Especially as a means of providing the Satellites with some alternative to complete dependence on the Soviet Union, expansion of trade between the Bloc and the West appears desirable. Its importance should not be exaggerated and continuing to prohibit the exportation of weapons and of some strategic materials narrowly defined seems wise.

The most dubious area is that of cooperation in the development of new nations. There is, again, the advantage of further contact. The major question appears to be whether we could find a basis for genuine cooperation. The difficulty is, of course, that Western interests are served by the growth of independent states with progressively more responsible governments; that appears contrary to Soviet interest.

The most exciting prospect for moving the Soviets away from aggression appears to lie in encouraging relatively liberal elements inside the Bloc. Obviously this is dangerous ground. It is important that we explore sophisticated ways of inducing the more nearly liberal members of the Communist Party, of the bureaucracy, and of the intelligentsia into positions of influence. Should individuals be identified as being liked by the West, their prospects of rapid advance in the Communist hierarchy would hardly be enhanced. It may
require that we publicly damn them, ignore them, or praise their opponents; it may simply be impossible. But the problem deserves attention.

The most ambitious of the long-run measures which, at least, look toward the solution of the fundamental problems is the establishment of some form of world order with international control. The problems of getting there from here are immense and I shall make only three observations.

It may be that in the late 1940s the United States missed a chance to coerce the world into a Pax Americana that with great wisdom and effort could perhaps have been transformed into cooperative world government. Should the opportunity present itself again, we might be less reluctant to seize it. There is no denying the problems such a course would involve, but the history of the last seventeen years is hardly a prima-facie case for electing to avoid them.

Second, if effective world government is to be established without coercion, reduction in the political conflict appears to be mandatory so measures other than a direct approach to world government are needed.

Third, there have been some startling changes in the last several years. World War II apparently gave Europeans such a sense of urgency about developing instruments of cooperation that only seven years after the defeat of Germany, traditional enemies set up the Iron and Steel Community. Euratom and the Common Market followed and, many foresee some degree of political unification. Building the Western Alliance, perhaps including Japan, into political union with effective
government, while still a monumental task, no longer seems patently impossible.

Looking even beyond that, may we reasonably hope for some genuine reduction in hostility between the Alliance and the Bloc? With regard to European cooperation, World War II apparently did three relevant things: it eliminated aggressive organization in Germany and Italy, was reducing the source of political animosity; it impressed the nations with the consequences of war, i.e., with the consequences of earlier failure to cooperate, it created so great a need for productive efficiency; that some of the protectionist opposition was neutralized. We need perhaps a surrogate for World War III. Is there some way of getting, operationally similar results in the conflict with the Bloc without war? Deterrence and some disarmament may buy as much as twenty or thirty years in which to work on the problem.