UNREST AND COHESION IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
NATO AND THE GERMAN QUESTION

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PREFACE

This Memorandum is part of an effort, undertaken for U.S. Air Force Project RAND, to re-evaluate the political and military realities of the Atlantic Alliance.


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SUMMARY

There is a widespread impression that the Atlantic Alliance has entered recently into a period of unrest, and that this development is due to the relative quiescence of the Soviet Union on its European front. But unrest in the alliance is neither new nor a plausible consequence of the lessening of the perceived Soviet threat alone. The atmosphere of détente might explain a quiet fading away of the alliance, clear indications of impending exits from it, or even intergovernmental review of the North Atlantic Treaty in the pursuit of fundamental reforms. But none of these things is happening.

Much of the continuing unrest in the alliance is due to two key factors: (1) the high degree of institutionalization of the military pact "in peacetime"; (2) the deep involvement of the alliance with divided Germany, the unfinished business of World War II. These two structural elements, paradoxically, also explain much of the cohesion of the alliance. They constrain the policies of individual members, but they also account for the alliance's functioning as a peace system that has maintained, at least so far, a political balance, as well as a state of military security, for the countries of the Atlantic area.

The genesis of the alliance organization and West Germany's inclusion in the early 1950's formed a set of interlocking events. Their close interrelationship reflects important conclusions drawn by member governments from the political conditions of the postwar period,
conclusions that were expressed in international commitments exchanged and decisions made in 1954. Since the subsequent decade brought neither a European peace settlement, nor a resolution of the problem of Germany's division, nor the formation of a European Union encompassing West Germany, the organized Atlantic Alliance subsisted. It was a structure designed for war, yet living in an unsettled environment free of open military hostilities (the cold war), and therefore an institution of greater diplomatic than military reality.

By subsisting, the alliance has not outlived its usefulness. While it has failed to give full satisfaction to any of its members, it has provided all of them with an instrument to manage the potentially explosive relationship between the Soviet Union and Germany, and to lend force to the Western political requirements for the eventual unification of Germany (internal freedom and integration "within the European community"). The value of the instrument appears great to the Europeans as well as to the United States, to Germany's neighbors as well as the Federal Republic itself, not only because it serves to prevent a European war but also because it guards against dangerous changes in Germany's relationships to the Soviet Union and to the West. This double purpose constrains but does not forbid the evolution and adaptation of the alliance system.

Since the Atlantic Alliance plays the perhaps indispensable role of a regional peace system, it is saddled with the complex political problems of such a system (how to maintain an internal political balance, how to conduct relations with other parts of the world), in addition to
conclusions that were expressed in international commitments exchanged and decisions made in 1954. Since the subsequent decade brought neither a European peace settlement, nor a resolution of the problem of Germany's division, nor the formation of a European Union encompassing West Germany, the organized Atlantic Alliance subsisted. It was a structure designed for war, yet living in an unsettled environment free of open military hostilities (the cold war), and therefore an institution of greater diplomatic than military reality.

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problems pertaining to its military organization in anticipation of external conflict. The intermingling of these problems of peace-oriented political management and war-oriented military posture creates confusion, especially at a time when differences of view are fostered by the absence of an acute conflict between the alliance and the Soviet Union. Far from invalidating the alliance, the "détente" with the Soviet Union invites a clarification of its persistent usefulness to the members.
I. UNREST IN THE ALLIANCE

Since the failure of Khrushchev's missile adventure in Cuba opened a period of "détente" in Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance has been restless. It has been attacked and criticized from within, found to be "subordinating," "uneasy," "unraveling," "cracked," and approaching its "end." In the same period it has been defended and justified, called a "permanent alliance," and "entangling" in the sense of effectively tying the United States to Western Europe; but the arguments of the defenders have not overcome an impression in Western public opinion, notably among better informed people, that the alliance in recent years has entered into a state of disarray that foreshadows disruptive events and calls for major reforms. A group of political science students, whom the author recently asked to respond to the mention of "NATO" with the first word that came to mind, said "alliance," "de Gaulle," and "unrest."

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Subordinating is the epithet that General de Gaulle bestowed on the integrating feature of the alliance in his press conference of September 9, 1965; the subordination he perceives is vis-à-vis the American ally. Permanence has been attributed to NATO by Cottrell and Dougherty: "When an alliance which is founded on geographic and strategic logic is also buttressed by the existence of political, social, economic and cultural commonalities, it deserves to be called a 'permanent alliance.' NATO meets these qualifications and merits the designation." Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance, Praeger, New York, 1964, p. 26. The other characterizations are taken from the titles of various books and articles on NATO by Henry A. Kissinger, Walter Lippman, Louis Halle, Ronald Steel, and Robert A. Osgood.
Though at no time since NATO's beginnings in 1949 have its members been less pressed by Soviet aggressiveness in Europe, or felt more remote from an actual test of their compact in war, the Alliance has become troublesome to important elements of Western opinion, to some even moribund.

No significant changes have been made in recent years in the political and military structure of the North Atlantic Alliance, or of its organization, "NATO," which has become a shorthand expression for the 15-nation alliance itself. Of the reform ideas that have been ventilated--such as military-political directorates; abolition of military "integration" in NATO; a European Union (confederation?) that would replace the several European states and make of them a single partner of the United States; a multilateral nuclear force; a web of "special relationships" to take the place of one alliance, etc.--few have progressed beyond the most elementary sketching, still fewer beyond tentative inter-governmental explorations, and none at all to the point of making significant revisions in the relations among the allied countries. This is not to say that things have stood still and that no steps have been taken that in time might lead to significant changes. But if the continuation of the alliance were to depend on early, major reform, its prospects might appear dim indeed.

Unrest and disarray, however, are not altogether new afflictions of the Atlantic Alliance. It has lived with them for more than fifteen troublesome years, as a simple (and undoubtedly incomplete) listing of the major divisive
issues shows (see p. 4). One need not examine the details of all these problems and difficulties in order to recognize that the alliance never enjoyed a golden age of 15-nation harmony and, indeed, that it has a tradition of unrest.

If the alliance survived all that, a complacent man might say, it must be able to survive a lot more. But such complacency could be misleading. Perhaps the historic disputes, especially the open-ended ones, are cumulative; perhaps the to-and-fro of complaints has gradually weakened the fabric of the relationships; perhaps the current issues are really graver than the past ones. No judgment on these possibilities will be passed here.

Could it be that the troubles of recent years come from a novel source, the unprecedented difficulties of the Soviet Union with the Communist world movement? Could this, together with a sharpening of certain weaknesses of its domestic economy and politics, have converted the Soviet Union from the presumptive aggressor in Europe into what looks to some like "a peaceloving state?" To put it differently, have Moscow's troubles resulted in a Soviet preference for engaging in conflicts with the United States indirectly, through "wars of liberation" outside Europe, rather than directly in the North Atlantic theatre? It is indeed tempting to think that these developments have deprived the Atlantic Alliance of raison d'être, and that they are the real source of its disarray. But if that were really so, we should expect to find something else in the relations among the Atlantic partners.
**NATO'S TRADITION OF UNREST**

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II. WHY DOES IT NOT FADE AWAY?

No student of alliances would be surprised to find that a divergence of national interests caused allies to treat their alliance as a matter of lessened value. The alliance might then fade from public discussion, like the permanent alliance of Britain and Portugal. Some members might lose interest more rapidly than others. The alliance might be deserted, as was the Triple Alliance by Italy in World War I, or it might be put in question by growing direct conflicts between the members, as seems to be the case with the Soviet/Chinese alliance in recent times. But the principal happenings in the Atlantic Alliance that we observe today are not of this kind.

The alliance gives rise to worries and disputes over peacetime dispositions. Some allies have almost come to blows (Greece and Turkey over Cyprus), but no country has broken, denounced, or even ceased to affirm its belief in the value of the North Atlantic Treaty. No country has announced its intent "to cease to be a party" after the twenty years of alliance stipulated in Article 13 of the Treaty, i.e., in 1969. After General de Gaulle's dark allusions to, and demonstrations of noncooperation it would be rash to predict that no country will do so in 1968, the earliest "legal" date that the Treaty admits for formal unilateral declarations of dissociation. But acts of noncooperation by the present French government do not necessarily signify that the French government of 1968 will wish to place itself outside the alliance. Even if it were to withdraw, the alliance of the other countries might continue.
This is not to minimize the gravity of the apprehensions that General de Gaulle has created in France and Western Europe by his utterances and diplomatic moves. In the words of the editor of Le Monde of Paris, "The long abhorred Soviet Union is becoming again [in de Gaulle's presentations] a friendly Russia, while the United States has almost the right to ask itself whether, despite so many declarations in favor of the alliance, it is not about to be considered the real enemy." But the General's complaints and unilateral acts have run far ahead of his ability to persuade others of the desirability of concrete changes in the Atlantic system. When, according to press reports in the fall of 1965, the United States government made it clear to him that it would not accept a system of bilateral alliances as a substitute for NATO or a dismantling of the alliance's military command structure, it was reacting to the atmosphere that the General had created by his press conference statements, and to other more or less informal declarations of French officials, but not to formal requests for review of the Treaty or reform of the organization. In his press conference of February 21, 1966, General de Gaulle outlined steps by which France would "from now to the ultimate date foreseen for her obligations, i.e., April 4, 1969, continue to modify successively the [alliance] dispositions now in force, as far as they concern her"; but he continued to refrain from translating into concrete reform proposals

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3 Los Angeles Times, October 19, 1965.
his complaints about the alliance structure. Some European observers have attributed this policy to his hope that the worried partners will come forward with reform proposals that meet his complaints half-way and will enhance his influence even if he rejects them.

That this has not happened so far is no proof that everybody else is happy with the alliance. De Gaulle's complaints have overshadowed, partly through the manner of their presentation, the misgivings of other allies about alliance arrangements. Several of the allies, including the United States itself, are disturbed by NATO shortcomings. What is not sufficiently appreciated by many observers is that for the Atlantic Alliance to experience all this unrest in the presence of the currently quiescent Soviet threat suggests the working of strong cohesive forces in the existing system that keep the allies from quietly going their own ways. Some may say that they

6 No attempt will be made here to list the expressions of discontent with various aspects of the alliance that have come from various national, functional, doctrinal, and party-political positions, or the reform ideas that have been suggested in recent years. The literature, which is extensive but probably not exhaustive, reveals that they are multifarious and show a remarkable lack of convergence on what is wrong and what would be right. For some examples, see *NATO in Quest of Cohesion* (K. H. Cerny and H. W. Briefs, editors), Praeger, New York, 1965; and report and debate on the reform of NATO in *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Winter 1966, pp. 456ff.
do that anyway, and to some extent this is so and always has been. But it is perhaps more correct to say that they do not get very far away from each other, or from their system, even while quarreling.

The unrest in the Atlantic Alliance in the face of what members perceive as a reduced Soviet threat reflects the special nature of the alliance. Every alliance, of course, is special in some sense; but in NATO's case the emphasis on specialness should not be overdone. The Atlantic Alliance is not special because of the extent of the members' formal commitments to each other in the eventuality of war. Many alliance treaties have gone somewhat further than the obligation to "consider" an armed attack against one member, within a circumscribed geographic area, as an attack against all, and to promise assistance to the attacked member by "such action as [the assisting member] deems necessary, including the use of armed force" (Article 5 of the Treaty). This commitment hardly explains either cohesion or unrest in the alliance.

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7 Cf. e.g., the German-Italian "pact of steel" of 1939, or the Dunkirk treaty of alliance between Britain and France of 1947, in which the parties promised each other immediate military support in case of conflict with "another power" in the first instance, "Germany" in the second instance. The Brussels Treaty of 1948, which after the evaporation of the European Defense Community project became the basis of the Western European Union (WEU), had its parties promise that if any of them were the "object of an armed attack in Europe" [the rest would render] "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." Seven European members of the North Atlantic Alliance (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux states) are members of the WEU. Their treaty is to remain in force until 1998. In October 1954, the WEU placed
The Atlantic Alliance is also held to be special because it is America's first peacetime alliance, or because it has so many members. These are interesting features, but they hardly explain or even significantly affect the unrest in the system. The United States has become accustomed to peacetime alliance; most of the fifteen members have found ways to adapt the alliance to their particular conditions so that the actual relations among the several members, especially between the United States and others, comprise various bilateral and group arrangements within the multilateral framework. The "political, social, economic and cultural commonalities" of the member nations that Cottrell and Dougherty noted, or what Salvadori called the "common civilization, the deep and sincere attachment to basic beliefs, values and institutions," are sometimes considered peculiar to this alliance and an important source of its cohesion. But while such "commonalities" undoubtedly exist, the two inferences drawn from them are questionable. Common characteristics of this kind existed in pre-1914 Europe and did not bar its division. In the post-1945 Atlantic world, the "values," political structures, government policies, and national interests of the alliance members have shown a remarkable diversity, similar to that of


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other historic alliances and perhaps greater than can be found in relations between some allies and non-allies (e.g., Norway and Sweden). Similarities of means and ends among the allies have appeared strong against the background of differences with the Soviet Union and its client states, but as the example of some European neutrals shows, this has not been a sufficient condition for military alliance. To say that the fifteen members of the alliance, from Iceland to Turkey, have a great deal of civilization in common is not enough to explain why they have been staying together despite the pressures and blandishments of the Soviets and their own often divergent interests.

This matter could be elucidated by imaginative historical research. Since 1945 the business, technical, and governmental elites of North America and Western Europe have become so interdependent, that sovereign nations are greatly restrained in any effort to break away from an important part of the institutional framework in which they have become involved. The opportunities to cooperate, and also to bicker over cooperation, in this framework are much greater than the opportunities to disentangle oneself from it, to secede, to "reverse alliances." This may well apply to the institutional framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

The cohesion of the group as a whole, however, may also encourage a particular member to refuse positive cooperation in the hope that others will bear the costs of his non-cooperation and still provide him with the benefits of the system. Such a policy of non-cooperation
and non-secession was outlined by General de Gaulle when he proposed a progressive denial of French territory, communications, and forces to NATO. France was to continue to "adhere" to the alliance, and to participate in "the allied cooperation in Germany." Presumably the cooperation he offered would include the stationing of forces in Germany and participation in WEU control of German armaments.

In the face of such a trend, on the part of one or more members, the rest will have to prove to themselves, and to the dissident, the value of active participation in the institutional system. Otherwise their cohesion, to the dismay of all, may become an empty form, devoid of security value.

This Memorandum looks to a more specific explanation of the cohesive force in the Atlantic Alliance that holds its principal members together, even in times of external "détente." This force emanates from two peculiar structural elements of the alliance, which also give rise to much of the unrest and discontent in the alliance. One is the institutionalization of the defense pact in peacetime through NATO. This comprises a system of permanent consultation and policy coordination of the member states, military "integration" (a variety of arrangements concerning commands, force assignments, force groupings, communications, and logistics), and civilian and military international staffs—a system and arrangements in which the United States plays a leading role. The other is the important place in the alliance of the Federal Republic of Germany, a country to which the threat of future

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aggression against its territory represents only an extreme extension of something that has already occurred, and in effect, still continues. The actual violation from which it suffers is the continued denial of self-determination to 17 million Germans in the Soviet-occupied area, twenty years after the end of World War II.

These two structural elements are interconnected in their genesis and continuing logic. The unprecedented and persistent effort of this alliance to intertwine national defense establishments and policies in anticipation, but not in the presence, of military conflict is largely attributable to the postwar situation of Germany, which furnished the most direct evidence for the assumption of an acute Soviet threat to Western Europe. The political development of postwar Germany has been strongly conditioned by the institutionalized defense pact.

To designate these two features of the alliance as the prime sources of its unrest is not to say that they should be deplored. They are also vital elements of cohesion without which the alliance might never have become important, and would probably lose most of its meaning to the members. The troublesome things, which cause much of alliance unrest, are (1) that the valuable ties between the Federal Republic and the Western alliance also bind the alliance to the problem of Germany's division, and (2) that the cumbersome intertwining of national defense efforts in NATO is to a large extent inseparable from the German situation. Most of the basic issues that have bedeviled the alliance, e.g., those of a common strategy and policy coordination, of leadership and discrimination, of international burden sharing and accountability for
force dispositions, are rooted in the historical structure that institutionalization and the German membership have given to the relations among the countries. In several of the issues, institutionalization and Germany's role are directly at stake. If one looks at these two factors from the viewpoints of several countries, not just one, they appear as key elements of the system that the West has devised to organize a state of relative peace in a crucial part of the world.
III. ALLIANCE INCARNATION AND GERMAN MEMBERSHIP

Both of these important factors are somewhat younger than the North Atlantic Treaty itself. The peacetime "incarnation" of the Atlantic Alliance, through the creation of SHAPE, other integrated commands and international staffs, and through the effort to create "integrated forces," began with the Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December 1950, under the impact of the attack on South Korea.\footnote{SHAPE and the Northern and Central Allied Commands began functioning in April 1951. The Southern Allied Command followed in June of that year. The international staff obtained its charter in September 1951, and the first general secretary of NATO, Lord Ismay, was appointed in March 1952.} It was not stipulated in the Treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany, constituted one month after the conclusion of the Treaty, in May 1949, obtained its sovereignty in October 1954 and became a NATO member in May 1955. Though Germany's admission was not unexpected, the particular form it took was not foreseen. At the time of Germany's entry, the peacetime incarnation of the alliance was significantly enhanced by an intensification of military integration (see below, p. 23). But while integration and the German element were woven into the fabric of the Atlantic Alliance during the five years following the Treaty, the requirement for them was as old as the Treaty, in a sense even older.

If in the early postwar years the Soviet Union had limited its position of dominance to the countries of
Eastern Europe and had not followed the policy of turning its German occupation zone into a Communist bastion in the center of Europe, it would probably not have posed a threat to Western Europe strong enough to induce Western leaders to seek a militant regional defense system. These leaders, especially the Americans, might well have relied on the United Nations system, a German peace treaty, and collaboration with the Soviet Union to maintain the peace in the European area. This was the dominant expectation at the time, and it was given up only reluctantly. The concept of an integrated defense system against the Soviet threat developed, as we shall see presently, in a European framework and was embodied in the Brussels treaty of 1948 before it found its way into the Atlantic Alliance.

As for Germany, not only did the state of that country bear witness to the Soviet threat that motivated the alliance, but the western part of it entered into the alliance before there was a German state. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty protected "the occupation forces of any Party in Europe," and that meant notably the military establishments that exercised sovereign power in the Western occupation zones and Berlin sectors in Germany. The adherence of the German state to the alliance was recommended, at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty, by John Foster Dulles, in whose tenure as Secretary of State it was to become a fact. But it took some years for this recommendation to become policy.\footnote{Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the North Atlantic Treaty, on May 4, 1949, Dulles said: "The statesmanlike course is to provide the}
In what follows, the paper will recall briefly some of the interactions between the development of alliance integration and the German problem. This will serve as an introduction to a later and more thorough study of the political structure of the Atlantic Alliance. In particular, the author will defer a study of the alliance commitments, the system of inequalities in this alliance of equals, and the meaning of "integration" in NATO, all of which topics should throw further light on the interactions just mentioned. The last section of this paper will deal with the significance of the continuation of the alliance, in its institutionalized form, for the further evolution of the German situation. Germans with a decent and hopeful future within the orbit of the West. But again the Germans would be too strong for the comfort and safety of our European allies, unless the West is strengthened by the adhesion of the United States. The Germans can be brought into the West if the West includes the United States. They cannot be safely brought into the West if the West does not include the United States. The Atlantic Pact will superimpose upon the Brussels Pact another western unity that is much bigger and stronger, so that it does not have to fear the inclusion of Germany." The Atlantic Pact, Statement before the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate by John Foster Dulles, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, N.Y., 1949.

But in its report recommending ratification of the Treaty, the Senate Committee said: "So many imponderables affect the current position of Germany, which is still under military occupation, that in the negotiations extensive consideration was not given to the inclusion of Western Germany. Presumably Germany will be reunited one day, but time is required so that the German people may prove their attachment to the principles of the treaty." Department of State, American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Basic Documents, Washington, D.C., 1957, p. 841.
To begin with the development of Germany: The territory, the population, and the political future of that country formed the principal objects of contention among the victors of World War II. With the Hitler Reich destroyed and Stalin's Soviet Union engaged during the first postwar years in attaching to itself Eastern Europe and the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, the United States and the countries of Western Europe gradually rallied to the thought that to keep all of Europe from falling to Communism it was necessary to rehabilitate and defend the western and major part of Germany, and to enlist German energies in that task. Adenauer's Federal Republic responded to the call. But the United States and the Western European countries had no desire to strengthen West Germany for the sake of reconquering by armed force the German territories occupied or detached by the Soviet Union. The Western powers were not to execute the last dream of the defeated Nazi leaders. Therefore, the Federal Republic had to purchase the rehabilitation and arming of a sovereign German state with the renunciation of reunification by force and of production of nuclear and certain other kinds of weapons; with the authorization of the stationing of allied, formerly occupation, forces

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on its territory; and with the acceptance of continued rights and responsibilities by the United States, Britain, and France "relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement."  

In the contractual network that emerged in 1954, the United States, Britain, and France reciprocated these German commitments with their own commitments "to consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs," to seek a final "peace settlement for the whole of Germany" and determination of Germany's boundaries ("an essential aim of their policy"), as well as to achieve "through peaceful means ... a fully free and unified Germany [as] a fundamental goal of their policy."  

The three governments

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14 Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, May 26, 1952, as amended by Schedule I to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, October 23, 1954. Department of State, American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Basic Documents, Washington, D.C., 1957, p. 486. This Convention--known in Germany under the name of Deutschland-Vertrag--modified the original convention of 1952, which was supposed to enter into force on the consummation of the European Defense Community. After the rejection of the latter by France, most of its provisions were incorporated in the Convention, concluded in Paris in 1954.

invited and obtained the association of the other members of the Atlantic Alliance with this declaration. Together with the Federal Republic, they also elaborated on the fundamental goal of a free and unified Germany in the following significant sentence: "Pending the peace settlement, the Signatory States will cooperate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a reunified Germany, enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic, and integrated within the European community."\(^{16}\)

The tying of the German state into the alliance coincided with the decision of the North Atlantic Council to give greater substance to the system of integration of members' forces—a decision that ushered in a qualitative development of "integration." But the institutionalization of the North Atlantic Treaty, while clearly a child of the unsettled situation in central Europe, had its first roots in developments that preceded the formal joining of the Federal Republic. In 1948 already, the Western European countries that had been allies in World War II had pledged themselves in the Treaty of Brussels to a joint defense system and decided to create a Western Union Defense Organization with three commanders in chief and a permanent chairman above them, on the pattern of the World War II SHAEF system which the United States had

\(^{16}\) American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, p. 488.
dissolved soon after VE-day. This was a blueprint without sufficient military power, and without an effective economic base; but it set the pattern for the future NATO: There was no real peace; therefore the alliance had to be organized on a quasi-wartime footing, with a permanent council, supreme commanders, and a collective force structure. This came to be the first rationale for the institutionalization of the Atlantic Alliance.

As the United States moved back into the alliance picture—beginning with expressions of sympathy for the Brussels venture by President Truman, the Marshall Plan for European recovery, the Vandenberg resolution for association with collective security agreements, the North Atlantic Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949—Atlantic institutions came to give military and political effect to the West European blueprints. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) came to supersede the Western Union Council in defense matters and, beginning in 1950, the Atlantic Supreme Commands replaced the Western Union Supreme Commands. In May 1950, at its fourth session in New York, the NAC took over the concept of "balanced collective forces," and in September 1950, in Brussels, it adopted the concepts of "an integrated force under centralized command" and of a "Supreme Commander." At that session, "the Council also reached unanimous agreement regarding the part which Germany might assume in the common

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On December 19, 1950, in the midst of the Korean war, President Truman designated General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and assigned to him operational command of the U.S. forces stationed in Europe. Beginning in 1951, these forces were to be greatly augmented by four divisions of ground troops as well as significant air and naval forces.

In 1952, NATO activities were said to be "shifting in emphasis from the planning to the operational stage," and the NAC, at Lisbon, called for "the earliest building-up of balanced collective forces." Assignment of forces to NATO Supreme Commanders had clearly begun, and so had the exercise of their authority to organize and train the national units "into an effective integrated force in time of peace as well as in the event of war." NATO had begun to function as a corporate entity, with civilian and military subsidiaries. But there remained one important step on the road to a full-blown NATO: the inclusion of the forces of the new German state in the Atlantic defense system. On the manner of this inclusion depended not only the completion but probably also the continuation of the corporate entity of NATO.

It was not always clear that the peacetime "integration" of German forces with others would be effected in

19 Ibid., p. 1609.
20 Ibid., p. 1505. Prior to 1951 the United States maintained about two divisions of ground forces in Europe, on occupation duty.
21 Ibid., pp. 1620-21.
the Atlantic framework. In October 1950, the French government had proposed that the new German forces form an element in a unified continental West European defense force, the European Defense Community (EDC). This was to be a single force of Frenchmen, Italians, Germans, and others, in peace as well as in war, with a single budget, administration, and logistics system. SHAPE, it was thought, should "integrate" this unified force with "purely national forces from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other countries not members of the EDC."

This scheme was on its way to ratification by the continental European countries, when it was defeated in the French parliament, in August 1954. Thereafter NATO became the direct "integrator" of the national contingents assigned by the members, European as well as non-European, continental as well as insular, World War II allies as well as Germany and Italy.

Germany's entry into the alliance in the absence of the EDC made NATO (with its WEU appendage) the specific carrier of the military integration idea, but of course without a single budget, without a common administration and logistics system, and in fact without a "single force."

On October 22, 1954, in an important resolution that formed part of the Paris Agreements, the NATO Council announced its decision that "all forces of member nations stationed in the area of the Allied Command Europe shall be placed

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under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe or other appropriate NATO Command and under the direction of NATO military authorities with the exception of those forces intended for the defense of overseas territories and other forces which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has recognized or will recognize as suitable to remain under national command."23 This resolution formally established the assignment of forces to the integrated commands--subject to the escape clause, of course--and declared that "all deployments shall be in accordance with NATO strategy" (thus postulating the existence of a NATO strategy) and that members' forces would be "integrated" at certain levels of organization and be trained under SHAPE direction.24 While this resolution may not have changed significantly the degree of integration among the forces of the "old" allies, it signified an important extension of NATO's integration, which may be called qualitative in the context of Germany's new membership. Since the German forces, which were destined to form NATO's largest national contingent on the continent, came into existence under NATO auspices, and since in view of Germany's situation they were less eligible than the forces of the "old" allies for withdrawal to purely national command under the escape clause of the resolution, the German forces were to be more firmly enmeshed with the other nations' forces than the latter had been with each other.

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24The ways in which the force resulting from this program differed from a single force will not be examined in this study.
The relation of this change in NATO to the accession of Germany was expressed by President Eisenhower in his message to the United States Senate of November 15, 1954:

The treaty constituting the European Defense Community failed of ratification, and the convention, being dependent on the treaty, could not be brought into effect. Accordingly, it became necessary to devise a set of alternative arrangements by which the nations of the North Atlantic Community might pursue their common security objectives....

In accordance with these arrangements, the Federal Republic will be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty and, along with Italy, to the Brussels Treaty. Furthermore, important changes will be made in the military arrangements under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization....

In NATO, the powers of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, will be strengthened in the fields of assignment and deployment of forces, inspection, and logistical organization. In addition, the principle of integration of units may be carried to lower echelons than is now the case. These measures are desirable in their own right because they increase the general effectiveness of NATO forces. At the same time, they create a degree of mutual interdependence among national forces assigned to NATO that will effectively limit the ability of any one nation to take independent military action within SACEUR's area of command.25

Had the entry of the new German state into the Western defense system happened along the lines of the European Defense Community, i.e., with a European defense budget and German units no larger than divisions incorporated in a European army, the institutionalization of the Atlantic

Alliance might well have regressed and that of the Western Europe.-n Union solidified and advanced. Perhaps the ebbing away of the Korean conflict would then have led to a considerable reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, the appointment of a European SACEUR, and an alliance of the reinsurance type between the EDC and the United States, Britain, and Canada. The North Atlantic Treaty would have lent itself to that development as well as to that of NATO. It lacked specific provisions for an institutionalized Atlantic Alliance. After the demise of the EDC, NATO became the integrator of a German national army (with units up to corps strength), and the institutionalization of the Atlantic Alliance acquired its second basic rationale, the attachment of the Federal Republic to the West. The Brussels treaty was amended in 1954 so as to transform the WEU from an alliance directed against Germany to an agency (1) promoting the Atlantic Alliance and the unification of Europe and (2) exercising arms control functions in Germany and the continental European member countries within the general framework of NATO.

The lack of real peace after 1945 and the attachment of the major part of temporarily divided Germany to the West appear to have been the two main sources of the institutionalization of the alliance. Since time brought no European peace settlement, no resolution of the German problem, and no European union, including West Germany, with a single defense system of its own, the institutionalized alliance continued. The wartime alliance structure lived on in the cold war environment characterized by political tension in the absence of open military conflict.
Under these conditions, the institutionalized alliance came to function primarily as an agency of military diplomacy rather than a directorate of military operations, although a good part of its form and language was molded in the spirit of military operations.

The formation of Federal Republic military forces began in 1956. From the beginning, these forces were "placed under the authority" of SHAPE; the Federal Republic never requested that any part of them should "remain under national command." It is the only member of NATO whose entire military forces are "assigned" to NATO command in peacetime, and which has made the operational framework of its forces largely dependent on allied armies stationed on its territory in peacetime. The qualitative development of "military integration," which added to the NATO command structure important interdependencies of various national forces with regard to groupings, logistics, and communications, was particularly important in the area of Germany.

In what sense can the unrest in the alliance be attributed to its peacetime institutionalization and the special role of Germany? To establish fully the connection of some of NATO's "divisive issues" with these two


key factors would require a much fuller analysis than will be attempted in this Memorandum. Without entering into a discussion of these issues, however, it can be said, first, that no desire has been voiced outside Germany, and little inside Germany, to see that country depart from the alliance; second, whatever attacks on the principle of NATO's institutionalization ("integration") have come from Gaullist France—and no such attacks on the principle have come from other allied sources—none has signified a desire to accord greater independence to the German forces.

Of late, a Gaullist voice has demanded that integration of Western European (including German) forces should be maintained, even be enhanced, but that the number of partners to this integration be reduced by one—the United States. After proposing to transform NATO into a "simple system" that would "exclude all integration of forces or high commands," the anonymous Frenchman suggested

28"Faut-il réformer l'Alliance atlantique," Politique Etrangère (Paris) No. 3, 1965, pp. 241ff. The anonymous author sketches a Western European defense compact on the model of the defunct EDC, except that, pending the chimerical advent of a European government, "Germany is to entrust her nuclear protection to France without participation in the decision to employ the nuclear weapon." Published in the quarterly review of foreign affairs of the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, the article was, said the New York Times of October 17, 1965, submitted to President de Gaulle: "According to qualified sources, the President concurred in the conclusions drawn by the authors." One does not know, however, exactly what statements he did concur in, and the French government has not openly endorsed the article.
"a local, i.e., European system that would unite much more closely, and in the framework of the first, the European nations, bound by geographic proximity and by a real community of fate." This local system, the voice elaborated, "could stand a rather substantial dose of integration (of commands, forces, and logistics)," but would exclude German participation in nuclear decision making. This may suffice to indicate that the principle of integration is not necessarily in dispute when integration in NATO is being criticized; the principle might be accepted by Gaullist critics in a different power context. The institutionalization or "integration" of the alliance may serve them as a convenient pretext for pressure that really aims to change the composition and the leadership of the alliance. On the other hand there is very little evidence, historical or contemporary, to suggest that the geographic proximity and real community of fate of the European nations form bonds strong enough for the "unification" of military establishments in the absence of the United States.

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29 Politique Etrangère, No. 3, 1965, pp. 241, 242. (The word "real" is emphasized in the original.) The voice also offered to Germany a commitment by France to promote "by all peaceful means at its disposal, a unification of Germany within its present frontiers," a commitment which does not go beyond the one that France made in 1954.

30 An anonymous critic, writing in the next issue of Politique Etrangère, notes the absurdity of the first article's proposal for Germany, i.e., that the nuclear guarantee of the United States be replaced by a French one: "While [the Germans] may accept as an unavoidable fact the preponderant influence of an infinitely more powerful country, why would they subordinate themselves
Even if Germany's presence in the alliance and the principle of integration are not themselves points of contention among the allied governments, they form the basis of incessant bickering over the definition of the external threat, the devising of a common strategy, the possession and control of nuclear weapons, the stationing of military forces, the joint conduct of economic warfare, the balance of power within the group, and other matters. Remove the German and integration problems, and the issues just listed might lose their sting and perhaps their existence. A sense of this connection may inspire some observers to seek a solution of, or an escape from, the issues by abolishing the institutions of the alliance or by changing basic allied policy toward Germany.

Our observations on the interrelations between the two key elements of the alliance will be brought to a conclusion by considering the risks to the political stability of Europe that would attend such shifts.

to a neighbor whom they surpass in population, industrial production and, virtually, military potential?" The critic also reasons that since it is America's, not Europe's, power that establishes the power balance, an alliance treaty must "accord the facilities to the United States for the defense of the European continent; these are the facilities that form the essence of NATO." ("Faut-il réformer l'OTAN? Un examen critique," Politique Etrangère, Paris, No. 4-5, 1965, pp. 324ff.)

This recalls some important reasons for which France gave preference in 1954 to WEU/NATO over EDC as the less disagreeable framework for German rearmament. It is not at all clear that acquisition of some nuclear weapons will enable the French government to reverse the choice. See Paris from EDC to WEU, by Nathan Leites and Christian de la Malène, The RAND Corporation, RM-1668-RC, March 1956.
IV. A DANGER THAT INVITES COHESION

If the North Atlantic Alliance were the simple alliance that some people wish it were, without an organizational structure in being and without responsibility for the German problem, the years of relative Soviet passivity in Europe would probably have led by now to the loss of much of its actuality. The United States, Canada, and European members might have shown a diminished interest in it; some of them might have concluded nonaggression pacts with the Soviet Union; and they would probably not be worrying and arguing over their military posture in the face of a receding threat.

This vision appeals to those who are impatient with the burdens and constraints of a highly organized alliance, and to those impatient over its involvement in the German problem. To realize the vision would mean, for the former group, an escape from the quarrels with Gaullism; for the latter, an escape from the quarrel with the Soviets. For the complaints of the Gaullists appear to be directed at the organized reality of the alliance, not to alliance in the abstract, while Soviet complaints seem to be aimed at the "unliquidated heritage of World War II" and the "tensions" that supposedly result from the Federal Republic's place in the alliance and the allies' endorsement of its claim to be the only legitimate German state. People concerned over one problem are not necessarily concerned over the other, but the two concerns interlock through their implications.

If the three main Western allies of the Federal Republic jettisoned their commitment to work for Germany's
unification in freedom and accepted the Soviet scheme of three or two German states, they would remove the main basis for an organized alliance in the remaining area (as well as jeopardize the Federal Republic's arms control commitment to them). What quarrel with the Soviet Union would induce the United States, Canada, and the states of Northern, Western, and Southern Europe to accept joint commands, joint stationing of forces, and other features of integration in Western Europe after Germany had been "dismissed" from the alliance? Presumably Germany would be left to buy its unification from the Soviet Union in a bilateral deal. Conversely, if the Atlantic allies were to dismantle the NATO structure they would dismantle the framework in which the Federal Republic's forces have been integrated with other forces stationed on or assigned to its territory (and jeopardize the contractual basis for the stationing of allied troops in Germany). Germany's allies would then have divested themselves of some of their means of exercising responsibility in the German area.

Thus by their implications, if not their origin, the two points of view tend to join. From either starting point one may construct a peace utopia that suggests reduced tensions with Gaullists and Soviets and that may encompass a neutral Germany or two, perhaps a neutral Europe.

It would be interesting to analyze in more specific terms what a loosening of NATO ties or a jettisoning of commitments to Germany might mean, and to see what concrete alternatives some observers may have in mind. Such an
analysis would probably reveal that the designing of alternatives, especially of comprehensive and consistent ones, lags far behind the expressions of discontent and the calls for "reform." To some minds, a loosening of NATO ties may mean transition to a simple alliance (of fifteen or fewer members) via a dissolution of NATO commands, or via a removal of American forces from Europe, or parts of Europe, or via the cessation of specific "integration" efforts. To others it may mean a transition to several alliances of different composition and form. To still others it may suggest no more than a departure, initiated by certain acts of dissociation, toward something undefinable. Likewise, abrogation of the commitments to Germany may mean a variety of acts on the part of various actors. The present Memorandum, however, will confine itself to the undifferentiated vision that expects improvement from the negation of what exists.

This vision is useful in that it helps us to understand the real peace system under which Germany and Europe have been living, and the danger to which they would be exposed if the grumblers' utopia were to inspire policy. By means of an alliance institutionalized for war, embracing the United States at one pole and West Germany at the other, the Western nations created an engine of peace in the dangerously divided Europe of 1949. They succeeded beyond the expectations of many, and failure is not yet in view. But understanding of the success is beclouded by a lack of imagination about what it is that NATO has prevented and prevents. It is all the more difficult to imagine the worst when it has never happened.
NATO's purpose has been widely understood as the prevention, through deterrence, of an armed attack by the Soviet Union on the West. In that purpose the alliance has succeeded. But a broader achievement of the alliance may be less widely recognized. Through the years, it has remained an open question whether the Soviet Union was intending an armed attack on the West. But there could be no question--at least from 1948 on--that the Soviet Union desired to change its relationship to Germany as a whole and to use its leverage on Berlin to that effect. Nor was there any doubt that West Germany, Berlin, and East Germany depended on the Soviet Union for their reunification, and that the Federal Republic was tempted to change its relationship to the Soviet Union.

The broader achievement of the institutionalized alliance can be found in the management of the Soviet-German relationship, so as to prevent certain dangerous changes in it. A sense of these dangers may well have inspired the leaders of the Western countries, and notably those of Germany itself, to continue relying on the complex system of management that postwar developments had put in their hands. The weakening of the Soviet effort to change the relationship by manipulating the Berlin lever can be interpreted as a grudging acknowledgment of the value of the system.

The dangers of the situation are apparent. A reunified Germany cannot be neutral. By combining the most productive economic complex of free Europe with the most productive economic complex of Communist Europe, one cannot expect to obtain an entity that will not project its power outward, into whatever conflict areas the neighborhood
and the world may present. That is to say, one cannot expect it to be neutral, in the sense of being normally passive and self-confined in the face of conflict. It is hard to imagine that German power could be neutralized merely by specifying neutrality in the contract of unification, or by a revival of the joint tutelage of the victors of 1945, which failed in its original form. The prospect of a neutral Germany, which would have been a novelty in European history, died in 1945 with the Morgenthau and Maisky plans for a "pastoralized" Germany.

Since their recovery from the disastrous war, the two parts of divided Germany have failed to become powerful forces in the world, not only because of constraints imposed on them from both sides but also because of the absorption of their energies in a conflict with one another. It is easy to see how this fact can induce the thought that it would be good for the peace of Europe if Germany were never united again. One can find that thought in Western and Eastern Europe, the United States and the USSR, and even in Germany. But the division of Germany is also a potential threat to peace, because it is deeply repugnant to the Germans. In this contradictory situation, the Western powers have decided to commit themselves "to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a reunified Germany, enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic, and integrated within the European community," to quote again the Convention on Relations of 1954. In substance, they have specified a pluralistic society in Germany and its adherence to the West as the political conditions of German unification. This specification has been endorsed consistently by the
West German leadership and upheld repeatedly in debates within Germany. Up to the present, Germany's leaders have also prudently adhered to the view that the security of the European community, including Germany, depends on a firm alliance with the United States. 31

Since the Soviet Union has hitherto refused to accept these political conditions, nothing has come of reunification. But the Soviets may conceivably change their minds in changed world circumstances. Soviet disapproval does not invalidate the Western conditions, which are unlikely to be bettered as a means to ensure that the power of a reunified Germany will not become a disruptive force in the world.

To lend force to their politically specified unification policy, the Western powers have developed the alliance into a system for managing the Soviet-German relationship. The NAC's recurrent statements on the German question may be prompted by German desires; but they are also reminders to the Soviet Union that the settlement of some fundamental matters with Germany is a multilateral problem, and that the German policy Moscow has followed hitherto burdens its relations with the entire NATO community. More important, by stationing and "integrating" troops in Germany, the Western powers, notably the United States, have assured that the military forces facing the Soviet forces in East Germany are NATO forces instead of German ones. The

desirability of this is widely understood in Germany.\footnote{A public opinion poll (DIVO) in West Germany and Berlin has repeatedly asked for opinions pro or con the stationing of American troops in Germany. On the last occasion, at the end of 1963, 79 percent of the 2000 respondents declared themselves in favor (52 percent, much in favor), 17 percent against, 5 percent undecided.} NATO holds together and implements a bundle of commitments that have prevented the unification of Germany from becoming simply a bilateral German-Soviet question.

Against this background, one may now sketch somewhat more specifically the danger against which the two key factors of the Alliance are guarding. This unpleasant vision begins with the default on the mutual commitments that were made in 1954 and the "release" of an economically powerful and militarily independent West Germany to a search for unification through a \textit{bilateral} settlement with the Soviet Union. Will it seek it by force, or by concessions? Either way, will it be subjected to the Soviet Union, will it ally itself with the power that granted its unification and may want its help, or will it turn against that power (perhaps in alliance with China)? Either way again, what face will Germany present to the West when it emerges from this confrontation, how much benevolence or passivity can be expected from it toward the allies of yesterday?

It is impossible to answer any of these questions with confidence, except the last. Whether Germany would be allied with, conquered by, or victorious over the Soviet Union, its face toward the West would be a
threatening one. Regardless of how the bilateral confrontation develops, it appears to hold no promise for either the preservation or the expansion of a liberal-democratic Germany integrated within the European community.

This bilateral confrontation of Russia and Germany presents a danger that seems to invite continuing cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance even at a time of Soviet quiescence in Europe. Most governments sense that to relax what is defined as a guard against Soviet attack, i.e., to weaken NATO's structure and the American involvement in European defense, would mean risking a power shift in Europe that could pose at least as formidable a threat to their countries as a frontal Soviet attack on the West. It is between a Germany disenchanted with the West and the Soviet Union that a great change could come about that would throw Europe into turmoil, either through conflict or through cooperation between the two. Member countries cannot back away very far from the organized alliance without jeopardizing the force that holds not one but two great powers on the European continent in peace, the Soviet Union and Germany.

If the continued cohesion of the alliance can be explained in terms of the German problem, so can its restlessness. To approach the management of the Soviet-German relationship through the organization of a

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33 Some may contemplate a disestablishment of NATO that would not jeopardize the American involvement in Germany, or an end to this involvement that would not preclude some kind of Atlantic alliance. But it is very difficult to visualize the arrangements following such amputations of the present system, and to demonstrate their viability.
collective defense against the Soviets in peacetime poses enormously difficult problems regarding the obligations of the unequal sovereign partners, the nature of a common rational defense posture, the scale of German military power, the role of integrated commands and forces, and the conduct of relations with the Soviet Union. These problems would appear so much more tractable if the alliance were what it is not, a purely military compact unencumbered by historical political tasks and engaged in operations against an active opponent. If one slipped into assuming that the alliance is what it is not, he could so much more readily look at the problems and the system itself as perverse abstractions to be swept aside as a mere mental exercise. The countries, however, have to wrestle with the problems flowing from alliance institutionalization and German membership as long as they do not dare to open a Pandora's box in central Europe. At a time when the Soviet Union does not draw them together by a direct threat to their security, the member countries have to cope with political ambitions in their midst that tend to unravel the protective alliance fabric and to cause a renewal of the threat.

In 1964, an American author wrote, "The western alliance has ceased to be an instrument for policies to be pursued in common by its members. A tour d'horizon of the world scene presents a shocking picture of disintegration," but disarray in NATO is as old as NATO itself, and reflects problems posed by the alliance's

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continuing utility for a policy pursued in common by its members, i.e., the management of the Soviet-German relationship in a manner conducive to peace. The disarray could prove disastrous if it led to the destruction of this common policy.
Discussion of unrest in the Atlantic Alliance. The current difficulties are seen as part of a traditional tension within NATO, not as result of the détente between USSR and the West. Two key factors explain the continuing unrest in the Alliance: (1) the high degree of institutionalization of the military pact in peacetime, and (2) the deep involvement of the Alliance with the unfinished business of World War II, divided Germany. These two elements also explain the cohesion of the Alliance. The author details the reasons for this paradox and shows why the Alliance has not outlived its usefulness. Included in the discussion are the indispensable role of NATO as a regional peace system, the complex political problems of such a system, and the confusion created by juxtaposing peace-oriented political management and war-oriented military posture when there is no acute conflict between USSR and the Alliance.