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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

IMPACT OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. PATTERNS OF PUBLIC RESPONSE

BY

ROBERT H. MAST

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FOR

OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

OCD-PS-64-61

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OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE
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RESEARCH SUBTASK 48-21-C

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This report is one in a series of impacts reports examining the impact of civil defense on American society. These analyses include data from studies available at the Civil Defense Data Bank maintained by the Research Office of Sociology, and by an ongoing content analysis of all major propositions and arguments bearing on civil defense systems, their implementation and postulated impact on society.

The present report examines the public response to a specific threat. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 posed a threat to which people responded by engaging in specific kinds of civil defense activities. The data contained in the 1963 national survey explored some of these responses, and for this reason provides one of the bases for the following report.

IMPACT OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS:
PATTERNS OF PUBLIC RESPONSE

SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

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SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

This report examines the impact of a critical event on the American public and attempts to assess the substance and dynamic of the public's response to the resulting crisis situation with special emphasis on responses associated with civil defense measures. The event involved was the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 which produced a period of severe international tension. In a 1963 sample Americans were asked if they had engaged in any of six crisis related activities during the Cuban crisis. These activities comprised efforts to respond in some meaningful fashion to the threat posed by the crisis. Patterns of response were examined, both for overall distributions among the six activities and for paired sets of activities. Individuals in the sample were classified by their degree of participation in the various activities. Those who had engaged in "Any Activity" were compared with those who had not, and those who had engaged in each of the six separate activities were compared with each other, the sub-totals and the fifteen sets of paired activities as well. These comparisons were made with regard to personal characteristics that served to locate individuals in the overall social structure and also with regard to personal attitudes deemed to be of relevance for crisis response. Differences in crisis response were found and they established summary patterns that are of theoretical interest. Let us now review the findings.

For each of eleven major social-structural and attitudinal characteristics, Table 1 summarizes the proportion of respondents in each category of each characteristic who engaged in "Any Activity" as a result of the Cuban crisis. In the total sample 42.3 percent engaged in "Any Activity" but there is considerable variation about this figure in the variables under consideration.

The relative size of the geographic unit where respondents live has an appreciable effect on the extent of their overall crisis response. Those who live in metropolitan areas other than the large Standard Metropolitan Areas are most likely to engage in "Any Activity", almost half did so. On the other hand, the lowest rate of crisis response, less than a third, was found in those counties that had no town as large as ten thousand in population. Respondents engaging in crisis activity tend to earn more money, be better educated, and think of themselves as middle rather than working class when compared to those not engaging in crisis activity. They are more often married and younger in age. Females are somewhat more active than males. Participants in crisis activities manifested a greater sense of need for protection while maintaining relatively greater "optimism" regarding both the possibility of such protection and the avoidance of its need. Similarly, even if war did

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF PARTICIPATION IN "ANY ACTIVITY"

		Percent Engaging in "Any Activity"
	National Total	42.3
Structural Characteristics	Size of Geographical Unit	
	Standard Metrop. Area	41.5
	Other Metrop. Area	49.3
	Large County	41.6
	Small County	31.0
	Income	
	Under $5,000	37.3
	$5,000 to $10,000	42.5
	Above $10,000	53.5
	Education	
	Eighth Grade or Less	29.3
	High School	43.5
	Above High School	51.2
	Perceived Social Class	
	Middle Class	49.0
	Working Class	37.9
	Marital Status	
	Single	36.0
	Married	49.0
	Other	29.6
	Sex	
	Male	39.8
	Female	44.5
	Age	
	Under 30	55.5
	30 - 49	45.4
	50 and above	26.0
Attitudinal Characteristics	Need for Protection	Higher
	Optimism	Higher
	Collectivity Orientation	Lower
	Group Efficacy	Higher

come, these respondents indicated greater confidence in the possibility of rebuilding American society. Those engaging in "Any Activity" seemed somewhat less oriented to collectivity centered efforts and preferred to rely on themselves and their families. In line with their higher general "optimism" and confidence in the utility of "action" these respondents also attributed higher efficacy to the power of significant social groupings in our society than did those who did not take any crisis action.

The six crisis response activities dealt with in the study covered a broad spectrum of action. The most common activity, reported by thirty percent of the sample, consisted of discussion within the family of what might be done if a war started while they were separated. Some fifteen percent claimed to have made some provisions during the crisis period as to where shelter could be found for the family if a war were to start. Fourteen percent either considered the building of a shelter or started building. Increased purchase of food and drugs, consideration of a move from residence to a safer location, and contact with the local Civil Defense office were less frequent activities. Only five percent said they had called the local Civil Defense office. However, in terms of total number of households throughout the nation, even five percent amounts to a huge figure.

Since a total of 1114 "activities" were reported by 607 respondents, it is clear that many people engaged in two or more activities. This was to be expected since "Discussion" was included in the list of activities and it is clear that Discussion was paired with the other five activities by the vast majority of participating respondents. This, of course, corresponds with the usual theoretical patterns describing action modes. However, a fair proportion of the remaining activities were also paired with each other.

As a developing theoretical perspective throughout this report, the suggestion was made that the modal individual who engaged in crisis behaviors tended to be more like the fairly "solid", middle class type who seems to relate well to, and be reasonably well oriented toward, his society. Such could be characterized as the "integrated" individual who takes the broad social values rather seriously and probably accommodates his personal life to their prescriptions. A somewhat similar finding comes from Stephen Withey.[1] He reports the public's perspectives on United States-Russian relations in late 1961. A study was based on interviews with a national probability

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[1]Stephen B. Withey, The U.S. and the U.S.S.R., (University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, Survey Research Center, March, 1962).

sample of 1,474 adults. Withey considers the interviews to have been conducted at a time when crisis was high, caused by the death of Dag Hammarskjold and peak tensions in Berlin. Of numerous Cold War questions asked, certain items determined whether respondents had built or planned to build fallout shelters. It was found that only six percent of the sample answered affirmatively. This compares with our 1963 study in which 13.7 percent said they thought of building or actually started building a shelter as a result of the Cuban crisis.

Withey analyzed his six percent of shelter building according to certain structural and attitudinal characteristics, as was done in the present study. He found:

> "The few respondents who have built shelters are quite different from most of the general populace. As a group they tend to be better educated, they tend to have higher incomes (they could afford it), and they tend to have certain value perspectives that set them apart somewhat from the national averages. They tend more than the average to agree with notions that rebellious ideas are immature, that authority should be highly respected, and that obedience is the most important thing for children to learn. Also, they tend more than the average to disagree with notions that problems' solutions should be found in the situation rather than in principles, that fun is more important than long-term planning, or that values are relative; or that everyone has a right to the satisfaction of important basic needs, that everyone should have an equal chance and say, or that organizational hierarchies may not be the best way to get people to work."

Withey's conclusions about shelter builders tend, we think, to support our tentative conclusions about the nature of those who engaged in avariety of Cuban crisis activities. The implication of Withey's conclusion is that shelter builders are "responsible" people, somewhat conservative, don't necessarily act by impulse, take the value prescriptions of the society seriously, are somewhat intolerant of deviance, and so forth. Withey analyzed only that group who had built or intended to build shelters. Our conclusion is somewhat broader to include all those who responded to the Cuban crisis by taking some action, even if it was only to discuss the situation. Withey's shelter builders and our active crisis respondents are, we maintain, similar people. Apparently, in society, individuals respond to crisis conditions in difrerential ways, some more intensely, some less. Apparently, also, the mode of response is greatly determined by the position of the individual in the broader social structure and the set of attitudes associated with this position.

To the extent to which the above assertions are true, and additional research is necessary to validate their truth, there are implications both for policy-making and for the sociology of crisis. It is hoped that a small contribution has been made to both.

THE OBJECTIVES OF IMPACTS RESEARCH

The Office of Civil Defense is charged with the responsibility of provision of a system to protect life and property in the United States in the event of an enemy attack. In an era where such an attack may assume the form of a massive nuclear strike at the American homeland, the technological and organizational requirements levied upon such a protective system are unprecedented. The vast scope of both the threat and the nation's response to that threat raises two fundamental questions concerning the impact of the threat on the American social system and possible responses to that threat. These can be summarily expressed as:

1. What are the possible and what are the likely consequences of alternative civil defense systems for the American as an individual and for his social structure and its values, institutions, and functions?

2. What is the societal context into which alternative CD systems would be introduced? What are the nature and dynamics of public and institutional support, opinion, and information?

Research on the impact of Civil Defense on society must address itself to the specification of these fundamental questions and to provision of responsible answers within the constraints of available information and methodologies. Where present information and methodologies are not adequate this must be spelled out and criteria established for the development of future studies as may be required. An innovation of the magnitude of a comprehensive Civil Defense program will have definite and pervasive consequences for the individual as well as the larger society as, indeed, does any major effort on behalf of the public welfare. It will not be possible to determine fully all possible and probable effects of the proposal, introduction and implementation of a variety of alternative CD systems with existing social science techniques and methodologies. But, within these limits, some answers can be provided and the boundaries of our ignorance delineated.

In addition to evolution of methodologies for present and future application, impacts research has been concerned with a variety of substantive inquiries. Some of these are listed below.

1. What is the nature of the public controversy centered around Civil Defense and related Cold War issues?

2. Provision of a general frame of reference for the specification of the acceptance process of any major system innovation and the application of this paradigm to Civil Defense.

3. What is the present perception of the American public of the consequences of Civil Defense for certain basic personal and social values?

4. What are the social institutions and customs upon which <u>any</u> innovating federal program might have an impact of consequence? What might be the impact of a variety of alternative CD programs on each component of such a check list?

5. What is the flow and dynamic of information and opinion concerning Civil Defense and Cold War issues? Who are the opinion influentials that may determine acceptance and support of a program?

6. Are there ecological and socio-structural differences in American society with regard to Civil Defense and Cold War issues?

7. Have there been any trends over time with regard to selected CD and Cold War issues?

8. What has been the American perception of the threat and the response to it to date?

THE METHODOLOGY OF IMPACTS RESEARCH

As comprehensive an endeavor as the examination of present and future impacts of existing and possible innovations for a complex social structure necessarily entails a wide range and variety of methodology and associated techniques. Concepts and approaches have been drawn from system design, sociology, economics and political science and have been implemented via a number of specific support technologies including statistical and computer applications. The integration of this diversity has been effected in terms of the relationship among elements of system design criteria with structural sociological theory, especially in terms of Dr. Jiri Nehnevajsa's Outcomes methodology. Part One of the 1963 final report, Civil Defense and Society provides an extensive overview of impacts methodology.

Some specific techniques and their applications are listed below. In addition to the social-science oriented modes of data collection and analysis which comprise the core of impacts research, reference has also been made where necessary to "hard" data that comprise the "reality" of nuclear war and Civil Defense programs.

Content Analysis. For a five year publication period, an extensive literature search was made in professional and lay journals, books, etc., to extract all major propositions and arguments bearing on Civil Defense systems, their implementation and postulated impact on society. Specific propositional statements concerning Civil Defense and its possible relation to American traits and values were abstracted and codified. These formed the base of the opposition-acceptance paradigm of the final report, Civil Defense and Society. In addition to the examination of the available literature, an ongoing compilation of news and editorial content of a number of American newspapers is being conducted on all aspects of Civil Defense, the Cold War, and military technology.

Survey Research. The Data Bank of the Research Office of Sociology contains some 400 study references and approximately 300,000 IBM punch cards from surveys containing material of interest to impacts research. In addition to OCD sponsored studies, this file includes material dating back to the nineteen-forties from surveys conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion,

the National Opinion Research Center, the University of Minnesota and others. This material is essential for assessment of the direct impact of issues, events and programs on the American public. The range and scope of the data available permit a wide range of analysis both over time and topic.

The final result of the application of the above methodologies is to be a mapping of the American value system and social structure, for the present and to some distance into the future, with regard to the relevant stress elements that may pertain to the innovation of alternative CD systems. Once identified, a variety of techniques will be applied to specify the consequences of proposal, adoption and implementation of CD alternatives into such system environments.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This is a study of impact. More specifically, it is a study of the impact of an extreme international crisis on American society. It poses the general question, "what kinds of people in our society behave in what kinds of ways in response to external threat of significant proportions?" This general question is posed within the framework of interests of the Office of Civil Defense as outlined in an earlier document by the Department of Sociology.[1] Among eight substantive areas of inquiry listed in that report, two are of immediate relevance to the present effort. These are:

1. Are there ecological and socio-structural differences in American society with regard to Civil Defense and Cold War issues?

2. What has been the American perception of the international threat and the response to it to date?

Answers to these questions are directly related to policy and fiscal problems within the scope of Civil Defense concerns. Thus, the major purpose of this report is to set forth certain social-structural, attitudinal and behavioral data of the American population under stress. The basis of this presentation is data from the national probability sample study conducted in 1963 by the Department of Sociology under the direction of Jiri Nehnevajsa.[2]

Along with various civil defense, cold war, disarmament and demographic items in that study, all respondents in the sample were queried with regard to their behavior during the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962. Six dimensions of behavior were tapped, all of which were responsive to an extremely tense international situation. The data presentation in the present report attempts to develop patterns of response to the Cuban crisis according to a variety of population attributes which were measured in the 1963 study. It is hoped that insights over and above our present knowledge will be generated by this effort. To the extent that this is possible, the activities and objectives of agencies such as the Office of Civil Defense may be enhanced, permitting a practical application of the research effort. At the same time, but with no less importance, there may be gains in our knowledge of the behaviors of populations and sub-groups under conditions of stress and anticipated disaster. In Carlyle F. Jacobsen's foreword to Man & Society in Disaster, he says, "As a field of scientific inquiry the study of behavior of people under stress, particularly in its psychological and social aspects, is very new. Indeed, its major development has taken place during the past fifteen or twenty years."[3]

The existence of stress is not new, but what is new is systematic research effort and acknowledgement of a great social need to understand its dynamics and structure. Now, as in no other time in man's history, the need for understanding is great because the world's present state of affairs raises questions about the capability of populations to make the necessary adaptations to permanent ever-increasing stress conditions. Perhaps there is no ceiling on the amount of stress a population can endure or to which it can adapt. If there is such a theoretical ceiling for the broader society, there may be sectors in the social structure whose ceilings are higher than the national norm while other sectors may be lower. Perhaps the ceiling is a continually rising one created by man's inherent ability to adjust to his environment. These and related problems are within the scientific interests of this report. In essence, we are studying patterns of adaptation to perceived crisis in pre-disaster conditions.

II. THE CRISIS SITUATION

On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy made the historic announcement that a quarantine would be imposed by the United States on certain offensive weapons entering Cuba. A naval blockade was established with the intention of stopping foreign ships, searching their cargos and, if necessary, seizing weapons with an offensive capability. Further, it had been well established that certain quantities of such weapons had already arrived in Cuba, some of which had been installed in permanent launching sites. These weapons had the capability of attacking American cities with atomic warheads. President Kennedy demanded the dismantling and removal of such weapons from Cuba. These strong actions of the President involved a calculated risk of war with the Soviet Union or, at least, retaliation by the Soviet Union which could have escalated into a central war.

Do these described conditions constitute a crisis? In the everyday, common-sense view, the answer is affirmative. In this sense crisis is viewed as a temporal orientation, such as "decisive moment", "turning point", "crucial time". It suggests something akin to that involved in a medical state where the crisis point of an illness is that point from which death or recovery follows.

From the point of view of journalists and reporters of the Cuban situation a crisis situation existed. From both "slick" magazines and the more scholarship-oriented journals, the tone of articles reporting or interpreting the Cuban situation suggested an all or nothing state, analogous to the medical illustration given above.[4] No elaboration need be given to the capability of the press to enhance or even establish a public emotional state by the turning of a word and the introduction of a set of words with emotional impact.

Approaching the crisis situation from the point of view of public opinion, what do we find? If the public were found to view the Russian involvement in Cuba as laden with potential crisis for East-West relations, the suggestion of sending United States troops into Cuba to overthrow Castro would not receive resounding support. This is precisely what Samuel Lubell found in a poll conducted in September, 1962.[5] At that time he found that two of three respondents believed that sending United States troops into Cuba would lead to war with Russia. This, of course, preceded by about one month the Kennedy quarantine announcement which, from our point of view, represented the crucial time point in the Cuban controversy. Lubell conducted another poll in March, 1963--some five months after the Kennedy announcement--asking again whether United States troops should be sent into Cuba. In this instance, only one of three respondents believed such action would lead to war with Russia. Lubell's results offers moderate,

though indirect, evidence that the intervening event (viz. Russia's withdrawal) reduced the crisis proportions of the international situation.

Another source of public opinion data comes from a non-systematic survey by Newsweek magazine.[6] During the Fall, 1962 political campaign correspondents tapped voter opinion on Cuba. Summarily, respondents indicated they were frustrated, uncertain and fearful. They felt the need for some kind of action, but were grossly uncertain what form it could take short of war and still be acceptable under international law. The Cuban affair crept into the campaign in what might appear to be an additional vehicle for sensitizing Americans to a crisis.

A fresh view of crisis response was provided by Norman Caplovitz who reported "feeling states" during the Cuban affair.[7] The National Opinion Research Center had begun research on mental health related behavior with special attention to the impact of public events and trends on the psychological states of people. At the advent of the Cuban crisis, the NORC field staff reinterviewed a panel of respondents in two midwestern communities who had been interviewed seven months previously. Caplovitz wished to determine if significant changes had occurred in respondents in such areas as psychosomatic symptoms, happiness and general worry. His findings indicate that such worry as there was tended to shift away from personal problems. He says, "We did find a consistent decline in the reporting of worries over personal problems in October, suggesting that the crisis might have taken people's minds off their own troubles."[8] There was no "ignorance" of the Cuban incident since 79 percent of the respondents had heard the President's address to the nation on the night of October 22, and the balance of respondents quickly learned about the crisis from mass media or word of mouth. Further, respondents were well informed about the nature of the situation in that 80 percent noted that the crucial issue was missiles. Caplovitz believes that the research did not firmly establish a pattern of high worry over the crisis, but there were "tantalizing" hints here and there that certain processes were operating upon respondents which would account for the state of worry and anxiety which was revealed. The NORC major interest lies in psychological states, and certain of the findings may be pertinent in later treatments in the present report. The NORC report has insight and is instructive; it addresses the question posed earlier regarding stress levels which may be changing upward over time. If so, this may partially explain the relatively low levels of measured or reported worry from the NORC study in March through the October study. What the NORC study does not do is investigate adaptive patterns of the population. It may well be that adaptations of one kind or another may give meaning to anxiety levels for specific sub-populations. Furthermore,

the NORC study speaks to the subjective aspects of reported worry after respondents had perceived a crisis situation. To determine what other samples of respondents have reported on perceived tensions inherent in the crisis, let us briefly turn to other data.

In a study by Nehnevajsa et al.,[9] perceived levels of international tension were measured immediately after the Kennedy announcement but before the Soviet response was known. Interviews were conducted with 194 high school and university students in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. They were asked where they would place international tension levels on a ten point scale. The mean response for all respondents was 9.27. This exceptionally high level contrasts with the 6.42 level reported by students interviewed in seven foreign countries by "Project Outcomes" in the pre-Cuban crisis period of 1961. Perhaps part of the almost three scale points difference can be accounted for by the relatively close proximity of United States students to Cuba. Yet, we would think this will not explain all the difference. It seems eminently clear that the critical character of this particular crisis is next to unprecedented, since this situation involved the first direct confrontation of this kind between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Another study of student reactions to the Cuban situation was done by Chesler and Schmuck.[10] The study was conducted at the University of Michigan where a silent demonstration protested the Kennedy administration's actions. Sixty-nine non-protest students were asked their opinions on the quarantine. Seventy-two percent believed the missiles should be removed from Cuba without invasion by the United States. There was general support for the actions of Kennedy. Fifty-five percent said the Cuban incident frightened them, while forty-five percent denied such fear.

Those who were frightened appeared to be disposed to conciliation regarding Cuba and at the same time to possess a greater tendency toward political alienation than those classified as non-frightened. Those favoring an aggressive policy toward Cuba were less favorable to disarmament, more materialistic, less intellectual and more dogmatic. Apparently the existence of an extremely tense international situation which involves the nation's safety creates differential attitudinal and behavioral responses for different sectors of the population. Chesler and Schmuck say, "Specific social and political events or crises are perceived and evaluated in terms of a broader framework of political, ideological and personal constructs."[11] We take from this the notion that responses to crisis situations are not necessarily a one way affair with predictable responses to a stimulus. Rather, responses are related more to the way a

situation is defined by individuals and the meanings they take from the crisis which are of immediate relevance to their individual situations. Those who have studied families in disaster speak to this question and thereby serve our purposes. Referring to work by various family investigators, Hill and Hansen say:

> "The family will define a crisis on the basis of various influences, including the nature of the event or intrusive force; the degree of hardships or kinds of problems the stress creates; the resources available to the family, which may vary during the course of the crisis sequence; the family's past experience with other crises, particularly with those of similar nature; the evaluation of the situation which may be made by others outside the family unit."[12]

The context of the family is both important and unimportant for our purposes. Its importance lies in its being the key socializing and stress management agency for individuals and therefore crucial for understanding individual adaptation to crisis. The family is not immediately important to the study of crisis response, per se, if the investigative efforts deal only with patterns of crisis response for a national population, as is true of the present effort. It should be sufficient to say that patterns of adaptation of our national sample to the Cuban crisis were significantly influenced by variables of the family unit. Some of these variables were measured and will be treated where possible. Others, possibly quite important ones, remain for future research.

III. THEORETICAL GUIDELINES

What have we said so far, and what assumptions can we draw from published research as well as sense impressions? It seems perfectly clear that the public perceived the Cuban situation to be highly explosive and tension laden. This was caused, doubtlessly, by a high awareness of the situation created by complete, and often dramatic, coverage by the mass media. Given this situation, what is known thus far about public response? Certainly, there was present the element of concern for the possible catastrophic proportions into which the situation could have escalated. At the same time, there is some evidence that the amount of worry and anxiety did not exceed reasonable levels. This consideration is posed with the complicating realization that the public revealed high levels of indecision about what courses of national action would be most efficacious. How does one make any sense out of this possibly contradictory but certainly complex set of circumstances? As mentioned earlier, we might speculate that the explanation lies somewhere in the notion that the society is continually pushing its ceiling of anxiety tolerance higher and higher as a mechanism for adaptation to seemingly limitless cold war-hot war tensions. Corollary to this, we might push the speculation a bit further and suggest that the society is capable of modifying or revising the past to the extent that retrospection does not invoke vast amounts of unmanageable anxiety. To the extent that this is true, we are free to analyze present structures, attitudes and behaviors more as a function of future orientations to crisis and other situations and less as a function of past orientations.

What further assumptions of pertinence to our interests can be made? We can assume the existence of a "mass society", but assumptions about its extent and meaning are most difficult. We can say with some certainty that there is probably a definable range of attitudes and behaviors associated with important social issues which circumscribe the vast majority of the society. Limits are thereby operating upon members of the "mass society" which define and therefore predict the nature and extent of available action alternatives. We are speaking now of the appropriateness of attitudes and behaviors for specific issues. The degree of institutionalization of such limits is difficult even to guess. Yet, we can assume with plausibility that mass communication and transportation, mass education, expanding bureaucratization, urbanization, pervasive middle classism, mass consumption--in short, features commonly understood as characteristic of our contemporary society -- are forming certain normative expectations for increasingly larger masses of our society. There is no reason to think that such normative expectations, or limitations on individual or collective action, are not applicable to "mass" perceptions and "mass" activities in international relations

issues. This is suggesting that the range of alternative actions perceived by the public to be available for adaptation to a crisis situation may be narrowing to a circumscribed set of actions prescribed by certain societal conditions. If we add to these notions the fact of the extreme nature of the thermo-nuclear problem, concerning the very basic issue of survival or extinction, it is not difficult to understand individual alienation, where located, or public apathy, if it is to be found, or inaction toward crisis, if this is also uncovered.

We could perhaps predict, if the present thesis is valid, that gross variations in the degree and kind of public responses (soon to be termed "adaptations" in this report) in situations similar to the Cuban crisis will be the exception rather than the rule; that the proportion of individuals who undertake some action is less than of those who do nothing. We might further suggest that identifying characteristics related to responsive action are not only to be found in positions in the social structure but also in a configuration of attitudes. Thus, attributes such as race, religion and social class alone do not have high explanatory power for crisis response patterns but must be related to beliefs about group efficacy, state of optimism, feeling of independence, and so forth. This suggestion of the juncture of attitudes and social structure position in explaining crisis response is based on the speculation that "mass society" is a "leveling" agent. Class, racial, religious and other broadly differentiating social characteristics seem of less importance now than at a time when these characteristics were the major means of population distinction. In effect, since we speculate that these alone do not have adequate explanatory power for behavior, we must search for more subtle and perhaps more hidden social characteristics. Such seem to lie in the area of attitude systems.

Let us think for a moment of some hypothetical man living in an urban center who has just heard a radio broadcast which reported the quarantine announcement of President Kennedy. Whether he rationally deliberated upon this announcement as a point of extreme crisis or intuitively felt a sensitive moment was at hand, we can assume that he was alerted to some generalized state of danger. Reflective thought would cause him to speculate on the possibility of nuclear escalation and the profound vulnerability of his family system. These cognitive processes or awareness of reality create for our hypothetical man a state of disturbance, frustration, powerlessness, disequilibrium or, in sum, a state of cognitive dissonance. He wishes to survive if the worst comes but, in all likelihood, would not survive in his present state of readiness or protection. To reduce the discomfort created by the inconsistency of his perceptions (or of his cognitive dissonance) he decides that his precarious situation can be made more consonant with outside reality if he takes some

Following this reasoning, we might posit that a decision making unit operates within a social system having definable properties. If we could specify the nature or combination of these properties at various points in time, we would be specifying the state of the system. This would be a useful device to analyze adaptation to to a crisis. Any social system can be seen as having three major areas of reference. The first consists of general characteristics of individuals which define their position in the broader social structure (age, sex, race, income, occupation, and so forth). The second area of reference consists of social-psychological states or attitudes which serve to organize the individual's cognitive and affective structures and attach him in some meaningful way to his environment. The third area involves distinct behaviors which are responses to the situation in which the individual finds himself. The exact arrangement of the structural characteristics, attitudes and behaviors will vary as the external situation varies. So we may think of each of the above areas of reference as sets of variables. The combination of the variable sets or of the individual variables will define the state of a system at any point in time.

Perhaps there is reason to think that certain variables have a priority over others. Perhaps the existence of one arrangement is sufficient or even necessary for the existence of another arrangement, thus the two arrangements would be causally related. Allowing this, we suggest that structural characteristics and attitudes of individuals will greatly determine the nature and extent of the behaviors in which they engage. We may call the structural characteristics and attitudes independent variables while the behaviors may be called dependent variables. The logic of this relationship is dependent upon a simple notion of time. The structural and attitudinal properties (independent variables) exist at a point prior to certain behavior (dependent variables), therefore greatly determining the kind of behavior which can be expected. The kind of behavior which ensues is <u>dependent</u> upon the earlier alignment of variables in the system. Now, let us turn to the substantive concerns of this report and attempt to apply these theoretical guidelines to an analysis of data generated in the 1963 national probability sample study.

IV. CUBAN CRISIS ACTIVITIES

Six dimensions of behavior related to the Cuban crisis were investigated in the 1963 study. These involved the purchase of food and drugs, building a fallout shelter, getting in touch with Civil Defense, going to a safer place, family discussions and making provisions for family sheltering outside the home. For each dimension we only wished to find out whether respondents did or did not engage in the activity. Table 1 shows the questions asked all respondents and the extent of engagement in each activity, arranged in descending order by number of respondents engaging in the activity.

For convenience in description of the activities in Table 1, they will be referred to hereafter as discussion, provisions, building, food-drugs, leaving and CD office. The earlier theoretical assumptions suggested that some individuals will take protective measures to reduce the inconsistency of great vulnerability and great danger. Table 1 shows what we consider to be the incidence of adaptive undertakings designed to protect self and family.

First, it can be pointed out that practically all respondents answered these questions which require a simple yes or no response. This, of course, limits our analysis of the extent to which respondents engaged in each activity (How much food and drugs were purchased? How extensive were the family discussions, etc.?), but question wording was partly motivated by the fact that all-or-none activities would be easier to recall by respondents some months after the crisis than would be details pertaining to their behavior. A distinction among the activities can be drawn in terms of the act of discussion and the remaining five activity areas. Almost one-third of the national sample said there was family discussion, but only between five and 15 percent engaged in any of the other activities. We would expect a significant proportion of the population to discuss the crisis within the family, perhaps even more than responded affirmatively. We would also expect considerably fewer to engage in any one of the other activities since these are rare forms of behavior for the American population. The 211 (14.8 percent) individuals who made shelter provisions for their families, and the 196 (13.7 percent) who considered building a shelter, constitute two groupings manifesting direct protective action. The eight percent of the sample who purchased more food and drugs is an interesting grouping for we wonder whether they were mainly motivated by economic considerations, profound anxiety or rational planning to meet an emergency. Consideration of leaving their residence was made by about five percent of the respondents. This low response reflects the extreme nature of the activity. Another five percent claimed they called the local Civil Defense office. Such a low response can be accounted for partially by

TABLE 1

INCIDENCE OF ENGAGEMENT IN CUBAN-RELATED ACTIVITIES
AS A PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL TOTAL

QUESTION	YES		NO		NO ANSWER
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	
Did you discuss with your family what you all might do if a war were to start while you were separated from each other? (discussion)	435	30.5	991	69.5	8
Did you make any provisions at all, either at home or with friends and neighbors, as to where you and your family would go to find shelter if there were a war? (provisions)	211	14.8	1218	85.2	5
Did you think of building a fallout shelter, or actually start preparing a shelter space at your residence? (building)	196	13.7	1235	86.3	3
Because of the Cuban crisis, did you buy more food and drugs for your household than you usually buy? (food-drugs)	122	8.5	1307	91.5	5
Did you think of leaving your place of residence at that time, or actually leave your residence and go somewhere you thought it might be safer in the event of war? (leaving)	79	5.5	1348	94.5	7
Did you at any time during the Cuban crisis, or in connection with it, get in touch with local Civil Defense for information or advice? (C-D office)	71	5.0	1359	95.0	4

the general reluctance and lack of experience of Americans in contacting government offices as well as the probability that only a small proportion of Americans are sensitized towards, or have very deeply internalized information about, Civil Defense offices. This is said even in light of additional data from the 1963 study which show that respondents consistently viewed the major sectors in our society as being favorably disposed to civil defense and in the fact that only 2.1 percent of respondents said their attitudes toward civil defense had changed unfavorably as a result of the Cuban crisis (34.7 percent were more favorable). There apparently is a positive attitude toward civil defense in a generalized sense, but at the same time an absence of personal identification with it and/or lack of information about how to contact it when crisis exists.

There are some methodologically relevant problems in the data in Table 1. Interviews took place some nine months after the Cuban incident. The extent to which respondents could accurately recall their thoughts and actions at that time is of interest. Another question concerns the perception of appropriateness of behavior by respondents as they look back. If some were later ashamed of their behavior, they may not have reported it to interviewers. On the other hand, it is probable that, recognizing the Civil Defense orientation of the interview instrument, there may have been a conscious or unconscious desire by some respondents to give answers which the interviewer would find appropriate. It may be that both directions of bias tended to cancel out each other. A third issue is related to new perceptions of Soviet-United States relations after the Cuban situation. Since relations markedly improved, there may have been a tendency for some respondents to underplay their crisis-related behaviors. In sum, we suggest that the reported Cuban behaviors are low estimates of actual behavior, especially in areas such as family discussion or in the abstract ranges of thinking about building a shelter or leaving the residence. These latter variables are not adequately measured since the research instrument could not be sufficiently sensitive to accurately tap inner thoughts occurring nine months prior.

We can pose several tentative conclusions at this point about response to the Cuban crisis. It was suggested earlier that the Cuban incident was a crisis, in terms of intensity and implications for world devastation. It was possibly the most directly extreme confrontation of its kind for the American people in the nuclear age. Such a stimulus should provoke a response of near-equal magnitude, assuming the logic of the stimulus-response relationship. But it also was posed earlier that the adaptive decision may be for protective action or for non-action. Pursuing these considerations, the data in Table 1 can be evaluated according to the action-non-action scheme. The single largest

behavior category is family discussion. Including this as a "behavioral" category raises certain conceptual questions. Indeed, if it were not included, we could conclude that no more than 15 percent of the American public engaged in any one of the specific areas of protective-adaptive behavior included in this study. For our purposes, it will be included as one dimension of behavior among six. Even so, it is evident that no more than 30 percent of Americans engaged in any one activity, and we can take this as being a relatively low proportion in view of the crisis level.

But it would be a distortion to look only at each activity separately. It is necessary that we also look at the proportion of respondents who engaged in any one or more of the activities regardless of the activity content.

TABLE 2

INCIDENCE OF ENGAGEMENT IN ONE OR MORE ACTIVITIES

	Number	Percent
One or more activities	602	42.3
No activities	832	57.7
	1434	100.0

Table 2 shows the incidence of engagement in some activity by the national sample. It casts a slightly different picture when we see that a full 42 percent of respondents did something responsive to the crisis, whereas about 58 percent did nothing. We have, thus, two sub-groups--the engaged and the unengaged. It will be interesting later to see if there are any significant differences between them as groups. Meanwhile, Table 2 is instructive for other purposes. It shows that there is a greater number of people engaged in adaptive action behavior of some kind, than was evident from a look at each activity separately in Table 1. Obviously, the same people are not engaging in the same activities.

But let us take a closer look at what is happening in light of material introduced by S. B. Withey.[14] He suggests that material in physiology, personality and group behavior research propose that under threat a system tends to adopt a sequence of attempted accommodations in which the "cheaper" behaviors are tried before the more expensive reactions are precipitated because of a failure

of the initial accommodations. Withey says that certain "cheap" (easier, more available, more normative, more expected) behaviors will be attempted first to accommodate to threat (we call this adaptation to crisis). If these fail, another set of more expensive (less easy, etc.) behaviors will be initiated. In our treatment, family discussion could be seen as the "easier" behavior and, indeed, the more frequent one, with the more extreme and non-normative behaviors following the failure of discussion to adapt to the crisis. This raises the question whether there is a logical relationship between the activities whereby engagement in one activity would logically follow from engagement in another. For example, if a person began to prepare a shelter, would he also logically buy more food and drugs to stock the shelter? Or if provisions were made as to where a family would go to find shelter, would that family also discuss what it would do if it were separated? In partial answer, the engagement in activities as shown in Table 1 was reviewed to see the extent to which persons who engaged in the most frequent activity (discussion) also engaged in the next most frequent activity, and in the next activity, and so forth. Table 3 shows the result.

TABLE 3

INCIDENCE OF ENGAGEMENT IN SETS OF CUBAN ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITY	MAXIMUM POSSIBLE NUMBER*	ACTUAL NUMBER	PERCENT POSSIBLE NUMBER	PERCENT ANY ACTIVITY (N=602)	PERCENT NATIONAL TOTAL (N=1434)
Discussion		435		72.3	30.3
Disc./Prov.	211	155	73.5	25.7	10.8
Disc./ Prov./ Building	196	53	27.0	8.8	3.7
Disc./Prov./Building/ Food-drugs.	122	22	18.6	3.7	1.5
Disc./Prov./Building/ Food-drugs/ Leaving	79	3	3.8	0.5	0.2
Disc./Prov/Building/ Food-drugs/ Leaving/CD office.	71	1	1.4	0.2	0.1

*The maximum possible number is based on the number of respondents in the least frequently engaged-in activity in each set of activities. This number determines the maximum possible number of joint engagement.

Table 3 lists in decreasing order of frequency of engagement the six Cuban Crisis activities and their progressive combination into sets of joint activities. Thus we see that 435 respondents, 30.3 percent of the sample, engaged in discussion with their family. They represented 72.3 percent of those 602 who engaged in any activity at all. It is clear that for most respondents family discussion was engaged in regardless of what else they may have done in response to the crisis. A total of 211 respondents reported that they had made some sort of shelter provisions. Accordingly, this number (211) represents the maximum possible number of respondents who might have engaged in both discussion and provisions for shelter. We see that the actual figure is 155 respondents who did both. Thus 73.5 percent of those engaging in provisions also engaged in discussion. This, however, is the only instance where one activity appears subsumed by others. As the less frequent activities are introduced the association among them diminishes. Only one individual engaged in all six activities. The presentation in Table 3 shows only the relationship of activities in decreasing order of the incidence reported by respondents. Decreasing order is only one analysis of relationship, whereas it is possible that the incidence of engagement in other combinations may be even more revealing. Let us try another approach and see the proportions of respondents who engaged in any combination of two activities.

TABLE 4

INCIDENCE OF ENGAGEMENT IN SETS OF TWO CUBAN ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITY PAIRS	ACTUAL NUMBER	POSSIBLE NUMBER	PERCENT POSSIBLE NUMBER	PERCENT ANY ACTIVITY (N=602)	PERCENT NAT'L TOTAL (N=1434)
1. Disc./Prov.	155	211	73.5	25.5	10.8
2. Disc./CD office	49	71	69.0	8.1	3.4
3. Disc./Food-Drugs	79	122	64.8	13.1	5.5
4. Disc./Building	124	196	63.3	20.6	8.7
5. Disc./Leaving	50	79	63.3	8.3	3.4
6. Building/CD office	33	71	46.5	5.5	2.3
7. Building/Food-drugs	55	122	45.9	9.3	3.9
8. Prov./Leaving	33	79	41.8	5.5	2.3
9. Prov./CD office	25	71	35.2	4.2	1.7
10. Prov./Food-drugs	42	122	34.4	7.0	2.9
11. Food-drugs/CD office	24	71	33.8	4.0	1.7
12. Prov./Building	66	196	33.7	11.0	4.6
13. Leaving-Building	21	79	26.6	3.9	1.5
14. Leaving/Food-Drugs	17	79	21.5	2.8	1.1
15. Leaving/CD office	12	71	16.9	2.0	0.8

The most important column for analysis in Table 4 is PERCENT OF POSSIBLE NUMBER, for that shows the proportion of those respondents who could have engaged in both activities that actually did engage in the set of two crisis activities. This is always based on the number of respondents in the less frequent of the two activities. The table was arranged in descending order of this percentage and the results are quite revealing. The first five activity pairs show the interaction of Discussion with the other five activities, ranging from 73.5 percent to 63.3 percent. Clearly, there is no engaged in activity which is not highly associated with family discussion. This suggests several things. First, it is a logical relationship since we are dealing at the level of the family system and it could be expected that few decisions of the nature dealt with here could be arrived at in the absence of some interaction on the part of family principals. Second, the methodological point should be raised concerning whether the respondents actually responded to the question uniformly as intended by the authors. The question set forth the condition, "if a war were to start while you were separated". It is possible that this condition was not fully considered by respondents; instead, many may have responded only to the fact of discussion in general, rather than within the restrictions posed by the condition. The extent of the methodological consideration is unknown, but it does seem clear that high levels of discussion are associated with, and probably preceded in time, the other five activities.

Next, we should look at activity pairs six and seven. They concern the decision to build or the thought about building a fallout shelter. Nearly half of those who called the Civil Defense office or bought more food and drugs also were concerned with shelter building, though in absolute terms the numbers who did both are small (33 and 55 respectively).

Looking next at activity pairs eight, nine, ten and twelve, we see that somewhat over a third of those respondents engaging in calls to the Civil Defense office, consideration of leaving, shelter building or food-drug purchase also thought of making some kind of shelter provisions for their family. Since consideration of shelter provisions for one's family is essentially a less overt action than the other activities, it is not surprising to find it associated with these and it likely preceded them in time.

Lastly, activity pairs 13, 14 and 15 show interesting results. These involve respondents who left or thought of leaving their homes because of the crisis. Of those who could have engaged in these three pairs of joint activities, roughly one-sixth to one-quarter actually engaged in building or calling the Civil Defense office or buying food and drugs.

The data in this section have described the incidence of response to the Cuban crisis. We are now in a position to say that certain patterns have emerged in terms of crisis response. There is a sizeable group that made some adaptive efforts in the sense of direct action (42.3 percent) even though such efforts may have been only to discuss the situation with the "families". There is a larger group whose adaptation took the form of doing nothing (57.7 percent) in terms of the action categories in our research instrument. These two groups should be compared to determine what, if any, social or psychological differences there are between them. We saw also that not many respondents engaged in more than the two most popular activities - discussion and provisions. However, by looking at the various combinations of activities, we see there are certain associations that seem to be related to the nature of the two activities, some associations being logical and some being non-logical.

The fact that some patterns have emerged give cause to suggest that there might be certain social and/or psychological attributes shared by respondents whose engagement pattern was similar. To the degree that such sharing is true, there may be a basis to explain why engagement occurred as it did. This will be the effort undertaken in the next section.

V. STRUCTURAL-ATTITUDINAL PATTERNS

We assume that behavior is caused. It does not occur by happenstance. Most behavioral forms can be explained in terms of the social and individual characteristics of those who behave. Now, from one point of view we can say that behavorial responses to the Cuban crisis were caused by the existence of the crisis itself, and this would be correct. It would not explain, however, the differential forms of response. It would not explain why some did and some did not take some protective actions; nor would it explain why some took more extreme protective actions than others. These latter explanations come from an understanding of individual differences and group orientations. We believe that there are reasons why people behaved as they did, but the task is to tease the explanations out of existing data.

Earlier, it was suggested that some combination of variables which define a person's position in the social structure, along with certain attitudinal, belief or orientation variables form a composite set of independent variables. The combination of these variables tends to determine behavior, the latter being a dependent variable. The independent variables exist prior to actual behavior and therefore greatly determine how behavior will occur.

With the above view guiding our analysis, the task at hand is to try to explain crisis response in terms of the kinds of different people involved. To facilitate the analysis, the assumption will be made that those individuals who engaged in each crisis activity or in each pair of crisis activities, will form analytical groupings, as will those individuals who engaged in any activity or in no activity. Since there are six separate activities and fifteen pairs of activities, the total number of groupings is 23. These are analytical distinctions, of course, not real distinctions. The groupings are formed merely because respondents did or did not engage in the crisis activities, but bear no resemblance to social groups with definable properties.

Pursuing our notion that response behavior follows from social-psychological antecedents, we can try to explain the difference in behavior by selecting certain respondent attributes and determining if any observed differences in attributes appear to be responsible for differences in behavior. The structural attributes (such as race, religion, social class) tend to be a-priori differentiators and can be used as direct vehicles for respondent comparison. Attitudinal data, on the other hand, is more subtle and indeterminate and more difficult to measure. The 1963 study elicited opinions and perceptions on empirical problems at various levels of abstraction. Thus, perceptions of

the state of world tensions, desirability of alternative types of shelter systems, disarmament prospects, power of different collectivities and other opinion-type questions were asked respondents. Certain of these can be considered indicators of hidden and internalized attitude states or orientations and will be utilized where possible for the description of attitudes.

Rather than compare the incidence of engagement in crisis behaviors with the national total along various structural-attitudinal dimensions, the present approach will compare the 23 groupings among themselves. This will allow us to conclude the extent to which the structural-attitudinal variables have something to do with the different crisis behaviors. The only part the national total will play in this approach will be to set a base for each structural-attitudinal variable as it appears in the national sample. Thus, a national norm will be set up for each such variable so that we may see how those in the response groups vary in their attributes from a "national standard". Those structural-attitudinal variables will be presented which seem to have a bearing on behavior, or seem to make a difference. Those variables not appearing may be assumed not to have been related to crisis behavior as measured by our instrument, or were not measured.

A. Structural Characteristics

In this section we wish to place respondents in the 1963 study in their social structural context. Chosen for analysis are the following structural characteristics: size of geographical unit, perceived socio-economic class, marital status, sex, age and religion. Each of these characteristics is potentially capable of helping to explain behavior. Various tables will follow which present the data of structural characteristics in percentage form. Each structural variable is broken down into its major component categories with the percentage of each crisis response grouping shown. Reading the tables vertically down the columns, a quick percentage comparison can be made among all 23 groupings, including those who did nothing in the crisis, those who did something (any one or more activities), all those who engaged in a single response area (without reference to other possible response areas) and those who engaged in a pair of response areas. Further, the percent of the national sample for each category is shown for additional comparison. Our interest, of course, is in the structural characteristics of the various crisis response groupings. We wish to see if there are tendencies or patterns that help explain their behavior. Characteristic of social science research, this analysis is a relative one; that is, we posit no absolute dimensions or

permanent nature of structural characteristics. Thus, the percentage array in the following tables must be viewed in relative terms. There is "relatively" a high position within a category and "relatively" a low position. Though the analysis is based on relative rankings, it is an heuristic device to uncover major tendencies. At the same time, for greater analytical organization it is possible to consider the percentages in the national total as well as those from the "no activity" and "any activity" groupings as norms or standards for comparison. These norms will serve as a baseline for our purposes. The present discussion will frequently use the "no activity" and "any activity" groupings in this manner.

1. Size of Geographical Unit

Table 5 indicates that patterns of crisis behavior are related to degree of urbanization. Those respondents engaging in "any activity" are more likely to come from the smaller metropolitan areas ("other" than standard) and relatively less likely to reside in "small" counties (those with no city as large as 10,000 in population). The tentative conclusion, then, suggests that living in the largest metropolitan centers, as well as in small cities, makes little or no difference in crisis response, but that living in large (but not the largest cities) cities creates greater protective activity while living in rural areas creates lesser protective activity. This finding is based on a difference of around 10 percent in each instance and this difference, plus or minus, is the general criterion applied in this report to determine significance between the "no activity" and the "any activity" groupings.

Let us look further within each geographical category. Running down the Standard Metropolitan column we see percentages which are greater and those which are lesser than the "no" or "any" activity norm of about 22 percent. Notably, those who engaged in "building" are about six percent below the given norm for metropolitan centers, whereas those who engaged in building, are 11 percent above the norm. Seen another way, proportionately twice as many people who considered leaving their residences are from Standard Metropolitan Areas than those who thought of building fallout shelters. Does this suggest an attitudinal component centering about the futility of direct protection in highly vulnerable areas and suggesting further that leaving or escaping is the only recourse?

Forty-six and two-tenths (46.2) percent of those engaging in Any Activity came from Other Metropolitan areas, while only 34.8 percent of those engaging in No Activity came from such areas. It has already been suggested that this difference is important, but looking at the percent response in other activity groupings, the difference is even greater. For example, about

Table 5

ENGAGEMENT IN CRISIS ACTIVITIES, BY SIZE OF GEOGRAPHICAL UNIT

Activities	Standard Metro. N=320	Other Metro. N=572	Large County N=226	Small County N=316
National (N=1434)	22.3	39.9	15.8	22.0
No Activity (N=827)	22.6	35.1	16.0	26.3
Any Activity (N=607)	21.9	46.5	15.5	16.1
Discussion (N=435)	21.6	50.4	14.0	14.0
Provision (N=211)	21.3	46.0	14.2	18.5
Building (N=196)	15.8	50.5	16.3	17.4
Food & Drug (N=122)	17.2	50.0	11.5	21.3
Leaving (N=79)	32.9	44.3	10.1	12.7
CD Office (N=71)	21.1	46.5	15.5	16.9
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	21.9	49.0	12.3	16.8
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	14.5	58.1	13.7	13.7
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	16.5	59.5	11.4	12.6
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	16.7	51.5	10.6	21.2
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	16.4	52.7	10.9	20.0
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	26.0	50.0	8.0	16.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	18.4	46.9	14.3	20.4
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	16.7	50.0	9.5	23.8
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	27.3	45.5	12.1	15.1
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	15.2	48.4	15.2	21.2
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	24.0	48.0	12.0	16.0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	25.0	45.8	16.7	12.5
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	23.8	42.9	4.7	28.6
Leave + F & D (N=17)	23.5	41.2	5.9	29.4
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	16.7	50.0	8.3	25.0

fifty (50) percent of those engaging in Discussion, Building and Food-Drug purchase were from Other Metropolitan areas. This is about 15 percent above the No Activity norm. But, dropping further down the column into the response pair groupings, it can be seen that those who engaged in both Discussion and Building jump to 58 percent, and those engaging in both Discussion and Food-Drug purchase, rise to 59.5 percent. These pair combinations are about 24 percent above the No Activity norm, a considerable difference. We can tentatively conclude that the fact of living in smaller metropolitan centers makes a decided difference in response to external crisis and that there are a considerable number of residents in such areas who take direct steps toward self-protection.

What about the fact of living in the Large County (with a city of 10,000 or more) area? Overall, it makes no difference at all in crisis response, in that about the same proportion of such residents engaged in No Activity and in Any Activity. This pattern is generally true for all groupings except those in which Leaving is involved. Proportionately fewer Large County residents considered Leaving their residences.

Lastly, what about the Small County category? It is to be expected that less crisis response behavior will occur in the more rural areas where the possibility of nuclear devastation is somewhat remote. This is confirmed in Table 5 in the Small County column. There is one unexplainable exception at the bottom of the column. Those engaging in Leaving-Building, Leaving-Food Drug and Leaving-CD Office are somewhat higher than the No Activity norm but the actual numbers involved are too small to be of much interest.

2. Social Class

One of the most useful definitions of position in the broad social structure is social class. To measure and plot a person's social class a variety of indicators can be used, such as income, education and occupation. Usually, if measures or observations are taken on these three dimensions there is a high correlation among them. It has been found that any two of the above three social class dimensions can usefully determine a person's class position. In the present study, the respondents' income and education were chosen for analysis. Since respondents were asked what they themselves perceive their social class to be, this item also was chosen for analysis.

Table 6 presents three broad annual income categories - Under $5,000, Between $5,000 and $10,000, and Above $10,000. Such a broad categorization has the disadvantage of including widely diverse population sectors into the same category as, for

Table 6

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY FAMILY INCOME PER YEAR

Activities	Under $5,000 N=515	$5,000 to $10,000 N=635	Above $10,000 N=241	Missing Data N=43
National (N=1434)	35.9	44.3	16.8	3.0
No Activity (N=827)	39.1	44.1	13.5	3.3
Any Activity (N=607)	31.6	44.5	21.3	2.6
Discussion (N=435)	27.6	47.4	22.8	2.2
Provision (N=211)	37.4	42.2	18.0	2.4
Building (N=196)	29.6	46.4	21.9	2.1
Food & Drug (N=122)	38.5	38.5	20.5	2.5
Leaving (N=79)	35.4	46.8	14.0	3.8
CD Office (N=71)	26.8	47.9	23.9	1.4
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	34.8	46.5	16.8	1.9
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	25.8	50.0	23.4	.8
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	31.6	43.0	24.1	1.3
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	34.8	37.9	25.8	1.5
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	36.4	34.5	27.3	1.8
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	28.0	52.0	18.0	2.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	26.5	49.0	22.4	2.1
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	40.5	38.1	21.4	0
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	27.3	51.5	15.2	6.0
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	18.2	48.5	30.3	3.0
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	28.0	44.0	28.0	0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	16.7	50.0	29.2	4.1
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	38.1	42.9	14.3	4.7
Leave + F & D (N=17)	29.4	52.9	17.7	0
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	33.3	50.0	16.7	0

example, the poverty-striken and near-middle class into the Under $5,000 category, on one hand, and the upper middle class and highest elite wealth in the Above $10,000 category, on the other hand. Recognizing this disadvantage, there is a greater benefit to be gained here by assembling larger numbers of respondents into categories which "tend toward" common social class identities. Therefore, those earning under $5,000 per year "tend toward" a lower social class, and so forth.

The patterns in Table 6 indicate that the higher the income, the greater the relative participation in crisis activity. The actual differences are not great but some interesting variations occur. The discussion and building groups have the highest proportions of high income respondents and the lowest proportions of low income respondents. In fact Family Discussion, the most frequent activity, practically by itself accounts for the overall pattern.

Of the grouping that called the Civil Defense Office, it is seen that about 38 percent were lower earners, the same proportion that engaged in No Activity. Yet, it is interesting to note that those respondents who called the Civil Defense Office and also considered building a shelter or bought additional food and drugs were about 22 percent lower in these response activities than those who engaged in No Activity. We can suggest that lower earners are less responsive to crisis in general, particularly in the instance of family discussion, and for certain activities requiring direct and positive action such as preparing a shelter and buying food and drugs.

Scanning the middle earners column ($5,000 to $10,000) we see no difference in the "No" and "Any" Activity groupings, while there is about a 14 percent range of difference among the different activity groupings (from about 38 percent for Building-Provision to about 53 percent for Discussion-Leaving and Leaving-Food Drug). Income data in the middle-range of earnings suggests greater activity in the areas of Family Discussion, Building and Leaving and lesser activity in the areas of Provision and Food Drug purchase.

As was noted earlier, the high earners ($10,000 and above) were over-represented in Any Activity. Family Discussion and Building had the highest proportion of high earners, but Leaving had the lowest. In fact Leaving was under-represented by this group. Perhaps most significant in this category is the relatively higher incidence of respondents who called the Civil Defense Office in conjunction with other activities. We see that of those who called the Civil Defense Office, about 20 percent were in the higher earner bracket and this proportion is quite near the proportion who engaged in Any Activity. Yet the

proportion was raised by about 10 percent for those who called the Civil Defense Office and considered Building, or who called the Civil Defense Office and made Provisions or who called the Civil Defense Office and bought more Food and Drugs. Such a finding tends to underscore the notion that the kinds of activities are nearly as important as the fact of crisis behavior.

A more general statement about the relationship of crisis response to income perhaps can now be made. Generally, as income rises, a corresponding rise is shown in protective activity, particularly in some of the less common behaviors requiring rather direct and forthright effort such as calling the Civil Defense Office and building a shelter. At the same time, a rise in income is positively related to greater family discussion. Further understanding for these patterns may appear from data on educational levels to which we will now turn.

Table 7 has three broad educational categories which draw together large numbers of respondents - those with eighth grade education or less, those who attended or graduated from high school and those with education Above High School. The educational attainment in each of these categories is associated with a meaningful social status. It is recognized, however, that diverse population sectors are drawn into this arrangement, so that in the Above High School category, for example, are collapsed together with Ph.D's along with those having completed only one semester of college. As defended in the Income presentation above, the educational categorization attempts to present aggregate tendencies of lower, middle and higher levels of education as related to response behavior.

Reviewing Table 7 in a sweeping glance, it is obvious that education is related to crisis response. While 26.5 percent engaging in No Activity were in the lower education category, only 14.9 percent of Any Activity respondents were similarly educated. Those completing high school had a slightly higher tendency to engage in Cuban crisis activities than to refrain from activity, while there is a nine percent rise from the "No Activity" to "Any Activity" respondents with above high school educations. These are not extremely high differences, but the direction of difference is important.

The lower educated engaged considerably less in Family Discussion than those with higher education. Those with lower educations also failed to call the Civil Defense Office regardless of the pair combinations arrayed in Table 7, whereas significantly higher proportions of respondents called the Civil Defense Office if they had completed or were above high school. Certain

Table 7

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY EDUCATION

Activities	Eighth Grade or Less N=311	High School N=759	Above High School N=362
National (N=1434)	21.7	52.9	25.3
No Activity (N=827)	26.6	51.9	21.4
Any Activity (N=607)	15.0	54.4	30.5
Discussion (N-435)	12.4	55.4	32.2
Provision (N=211)	12.3	56.8	30.9
Building (N=196)	12.2	58.7	29.0
Food & Drug (N=122)	17.2	54.0	28.7
Leaving (N=79)	13.9	50.6	35.5
CD Office (N=71)	7.1	56.3	36.6
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	8.3	60.7	31.0
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	8.0	60.6	31.4
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	10.1	53.1	36.7
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	10.6	60.6	28.8
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	5.5	61.8	32.7
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	8.0	52.0	40.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	6.1	55.1	38.8
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	9.5	52.4	38.1
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	12.1	42.4	45.5
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	3.1	63.6	33.3
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	4.0	48.0	48.0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	8.3	50.1	41.6
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	9.5	76.2	14.3
Leave + F & D (N=17)	29.4	35.3	35.3
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	16.7	41.6	41.7

behavioral groupings of the lower educated were much lower than the "No Activity" norm. For example, those jointly Discussing and Providing were three times lower in proportion to the "No Activity" grouping and those jointly Discussing and calling the Civil Defense Office were four times lower. The only grouping that was much higher than the "No Activity" norm was the Leaving-Food Drug grouping. This behavior pair appears to be a logical inconsistency or reflects a highly confused or randomly active arrangement.

Most striking among those who attended high school is the highly active pattern of those who considered building a shelter. Respondents considering such a course of action are uniformly above the norms, and in the pair combination Leaving-Building, are about 25 percent above the "No Activity" norm. With the exception of respondents who considered Building, the middle income category does not vary considerably in terms of specific crisis activities.

But conclusions about the middle educated do not necessarily apply to the higher educated. Let us take as the analytical base point the 21.4 percent of the "No Activity" grouping who had greater than high school educations. We observe that almost every behavorial grouping is at least ten percent higher, while some groupings are proportionately double or more than double the "No Activity" base point. Close inspection of those with educations above high school reveals some of the highest proportions coming from those who considered leaving their residence, and this follows even in the combination pairs.

What generalities come from Table 7? There is a definite pattern supporting the conclusion that as education rises the incidence of active protective behavior also rises.

Now, considering income and education as a two-factor index of social class, what generalities can be made? It is well known that as either of these two indicators rises, so does the other. It is further well established that as income and education rise, so does the attribution of social class. Our data on income and education suggest that there are large crisis behavior distinctions between those with lower income and education, on one hand, and those with higher income and education, on the other. There is less distinction in the middle areas of income and education, though there is a tendency for this social class range to be more active. Our general conclusion is that as social class rises, greater protective efforts are undertaken. Why is this so? One line of reasoning

would be that the higher the social class, the greater the economic investment in the general social order, and the greater the need to protect this investment in case of disaster. Another line of reasoning might suggest the following: the higher the social class, the greater the "social" investment in the normative order. This would mean that those with higher social standing would be more involved or "integrated" in their day-to-day world, and further, it would imply that they have more to lose by way of prestige and social favor than those in the lower ranks. A portion of this line of reasoning may be correct, but only that portion that deals with the abstract aspects of social investment in the broader social order; in other words, we deal here with orientations of individuals toward their society. We cannot consider social orientations towards family or community, specifically toward collectivities of a more "primary" nature in which feelings of belonging and personal identification permit certain amounts of emotional gratification. These latter social investments would be logically as important, if not more important, to the lower social classes as to the higher classes and would not seem to be involved as means of explaining differential crisis behavior. We can assume, on the other hand, that there may be greater amounts of psychological alienation toward the social order by those of lower status since these are, in a very real sense, the disinherited.

But there is a closely related characteristic to that of having investment in the normative order. Those of higher social class, because of superior education and economic opportunities, have had greater exposure to the society. They are probably more aware of events and more sensitized to political, social and economic change. They also have greater exposure to the media of mass communication which, in themselves, are sensitizing agencies. There is an explanation for the differential social class response patterns in our data, and such may come from aspects of the above reasoning. The exact approach remains for later work.

Let us take a last look at social class with a brief review of Table 8 in which respondents rated their own social class. Only 32 of the total national sample considered themselves to be in the Upper Class and only 56 in the Lower Class. The remaining respondents distributed themselves almost evenly between Middle and Working Class. The Upper Class numbers of respondents are too small for meaningful treatment. Seen in the Middle and Working Class categories, however, is a pattern which tends to confirm our earlier findings. Those engaging in

Table 8

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES BY SOCIAL CLASS, AS PERCEIVED BY RESPONDENTS ABOUT THEMSELVES

Activities	Upper Class N=32	Middle Class N=636	Working Class N=678	Lower Class N=56	No Classes N=12	Missing Data N=20
National (N=1434)	2.2	44.4	47.3	3.9	.8	1.4
No Activity (N=827)	2.0	39.2	50.9	5.2	1.2	1.5
Any Activity (N=607)	2.5	51.4	42.3	2.2	.3	1.3
Discussion (N=435)	2.1	54.0	41.1	1.4	.5	.9
Provision (N=211)	.9	54.5	40.8	2.4	0	1.4
Building (N=196)	2.1	51.5	42.9	1.5	.5	1.5
Food & Drug (N=122)	4.1	44.3	45.1	4.1	0	2.4
Leaving (N=79)	2.6	46.8	46.8	3.8	0	0
CD Office (N=71)	1.4	63.4	33.8	1.4	0	0
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	.6	55.5	40.0	2.6	0	1.3
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	.8	56.5	40.3	.8	.8	.8
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	2.5	51.9	41.8	3.8	0	0
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	0	56.1	39.4	1.5	0	3.0
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	1.8	51.0	43.6	1.8	0	1.8
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	2.0	52.0	42.0	4.0	0	0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	2.0	63.3	32.7	2.0	0	0
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	2.4	50.0	40.5	4.7	0	2.4
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	3.0	57.6	33.3	6.1	0	0
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	0	66.7	30.3	3.0	0	0
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	0	60.0	36.0	4.0	0	0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	0	66.6	29.2	4.2	0	0
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	4.7	42.9	52.4	0	0	0
Leave + F & D (N=17)	5.9	41.2	47.0	5.9	0	0
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	0	50.0	50.0	0	0	0

"Any Activity" have about a 12 percent higher proportion "Middle Class" respondents. Of those engaging in "Any Activity", there is an eight percent lower proportion of "Lower Class" respondents. Though the social class categories in Table 8 are not equivalent to the income and education categories in Tables 6 and 7, it is clear that the patterns revealed in these three tables confirm the relationship of class to crisis behavior.

3. Marital Status

Table 9 examines the distribution of marital status for the various activity groupings. The categories are Single, Married, and Other (which includes divorced, separated and widowed). As might be expected those with the greatest "investment", the Married, are better represented in the "Any Activity" group than either the Single or Other respondents. The difference, however, is not great although the "Any Activity" group does have substantially fewer Others than the "No Activity" respondents. It is interesting to note that the Discussion, Provision and Building groups are relatively over-represented with Marrieds while Leaving has more than its share of Singles, perhaps indicating the relatively greater mobility of this group and their lesser ties to their homes. Those who considered Building of shelters are especially likely to be Married and correspondingly unlikely to be Other in their marital status, reflecting perhaps the comparative lack of personal and social investment on the part of the widowed, divorced and separated. As expected, those who engaged in Family Discussion are least likely to be Single.

Since most adult Americans are married it is not surprising that the Marrieds dominate all the 23 activity groupings. By and large they are over-represented in the basic six crisis activities but in a number of the paired sets of activities the Singles or Others sometimes come to the fore with regard to relative proportions especially with regard to Leaving (reflecting their greater mobility) and Food-Drugs (perhaps indicating that their life style does not include ample stocks).

In summary, it can be said that Marital Status is a factor that helps explain the nature of crisis behavior. To be married and living with one's spouse appears to be one pre-condition to taking protection action in the face of impending disaster. Elements of involvement, cooperation, responsibility and commitment are concerned here, not only on behalf of one's spouse, but on behalf of the children and relatives residing in the family system. The family is the most elementary social

Table 9

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY MARITAL STATUS

Activities	Single N=125	Married N=1133	Other N=176
National (N=1434)	8.7	79.0	12.3
No Activity (N=827)	9.7	75.3	15.0
Any Activity (N=607)	7.4	84.0	8.6
Discussion (N=435)	5.7	85.3	9.0
Provision (N=211)	6.6	83.9	9.5
Building (N=196)	7.7	85.7	6.6
Food & Drug (N=122)	9.8	80.4	9.8
Leaving (N=79)	10.1	81.0	8.9
CD Office (N=71)	5.7	78.8	15.5
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	4.5	85.2	10.3
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	7.3	86.3	6.4
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	6.3	82.3	11.4
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	4.6	83.3	12.1
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	7.3	83.6	9.1
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	6.0	86.0	8.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	4.1	79.6	16.3
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	4.8	78.6	16.6
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	9.1	81.8	9.1
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	6.1	87.8	6.1
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	4.0	76.0	20.0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	16.7	75.0	8.3
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	9.5	76.2	14.3
Leave + F & D (N=17)	23.5	76.5	0
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	25.0	75.0	0

form, whether it is the more traditional extended kinship arrangement or the more contemporary nuclear arrangement. The family is the primary group. Orientations toward the family take primacy in the consideration of protective devices by those responsible for family welfare.

4. Sex

Table 10 displays the distribution of respondents by their sex. There is not a considerable difference in the activity proportions between men and women, and that difference which does exist (about five percent) is in the direction of greater activity for women. The kind of activity is interesting. Higher proportions of women than men bought more Food and Drugs, a finding that is not mysterious since it reflects the role of the female as the purchaser of consumable items for the home. Higher relative proportions of women than men considered leaving their homes. Though this may contradict the folk-wisdom notion of the "nesting instinct" attributed to women, it is consonant with the notion that women are more emotionally ambivalent under stress conditions. Table 10 displays suggestions of the leadership-dominance role attributions of men as well as their culturally-dominant "cool-headed" nature. The truth of these culture-bound attributes of the sexes is another question.

5. Age

Table 11 presents activity response in terms of three categories of age of respondents - 10 to 29 years, 30 to 49 years and above 49 years. The lower age category contains only 11 respondents below the age of 20, so, for practical purposes, this may be considered an age group of from 20 to 29 years of age. This group consists of the recently married, those with young children and the young unmarried. Of course, accompanying these demographic characteristics are certain social-psychological problems revolving around new family statuses and roles with accompanying tensions and insecurities. Table II shows that 26.3 percent engaged in "Any Activity" were under 30, while only 15.5 percent engaged in "No Activity" were that young. High proportions of the young are found in all provisions for protection and an even higher proportion of those who considered leaving their residence. They were much less active in building a shelter and calling the Civil Defense Office. This suggests a certain insecurity and absence of strong ties to the home or community.

The 30 to 49 year category could be considered more stable and settled as well as having older children. Behaviors in the middle group leaned more heavily to Family Discussion, Building

Table 10

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY SEX

Activities	Male N=654	Female N=780
National (N=1434)	45.6	54.4
No Activity (N=827)	47.6	52.4
Any Activity (N=607)	42.8	57.2
Discussion (N=435)	42.5	57.5
Provision (N=211)	40.8	59.2
Building (N=196)	45.4	54.6
Food & Drug (N=122)	36.0	64.0
Leaving (N=79)	38.0	62.0
CD Office (N=71)	46.5	53.5
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	42.6	57.4
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	42.7	57.3
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	36.7	63.3
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	36.4	63.6
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	34.5	65.5
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	44.0	56.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	42.9	57.1
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	33.3	66.7
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	45.5	54.5
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	45.5	54.5
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	40.0	60.0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	45.8	54.2
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	38.1	61.9
Leave + F & D (N=17)	41.2	58.8
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	41.7	58.3

Table 11

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY AGE (Percentage)

Activities	Under 30 Years N=292	30 to 49 Years N=725	Above 49 Years N=389	Missing Data N=28
National (N=1434)	20.0	51.0	27.0	2.0
No Activity (N=827)	15.4	47.5	34.5	2.6
Any Activity (N=607)	26.7	54.2	16.6	2.5
Discussion (N=435)	28.0	55.9	14.5	1.6
Provision (N=211)	37.5	45.5	14.2	2.8
Building (N=196)	23.0	56.6	17.8	2.6
Food & Drug (N=122)	27.9	54.1	13.1	4.9
Leaving (N=79)	45.6	43.0	8.9	2.5
CD Office (N=71)	21.1	67.6	9.9	1.4
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	39.4	46.4	11.0	3.2
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	30.7	54.0	12.9	2.4
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	32.9	53.2	8.9	5.0
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	36.4	47.0	13.6	3.0
Bldg. + F & D (N=56)	33.9	46.4	12.5	7.2
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	38.0	46.0	12.0	4.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	24.5	69.4	4.1	2.0
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	42.9	42.9	4.7	9.5
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	54.5	30.3	9.1	6.1
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	27.3	57.6	12.1	3.0
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	36.0	60.0	0	4.0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	25.0	66.6	4.2	4.2
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	28.6	62.0	4.7	4.7
Leave + F & D (N=17)	29.4	52.9	5.9	11.8
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	33.3	66.7	0	0

a shelter, and calling the Civil Defense Office, with less activity in making Provisions and in Leaving the residence. The feeling is present from data on the middle age group that they carefully calculated their actions, considered protection at home rather than leaving home, and sought official advice about what to do.

The older group (above 49 years of age) logically would be more settled in their habits and attitudes, less susceptible to persuasion, less resilient, having few or no children at home and possibly more alienated towards the society and insecure because of growing age and reduced involvement. The data on this age category in Table 11 shows that "No Activity" respondents were more likely to be 50 and over than "Any Activity" respondents. The highest incidence of older respondents occurred among those who considered building a shelter while the lowest incidence surrounded Leaving and calling the Civil Defense Office. Indeed, there were no older respondents reporting that they considered leaving and also called the Civil Defense Office.

We think there is a direct correspondence between the social and psychological security that one has in the broad social structure and the degree and nature of protective action taken. Younger people seem more prone to aggressive, extra-home responses. This is explainable by the fact that they are still insecure and have less experience adapting to traumatic or fearsome circumstances. Middle age people, on the other hand, are more economically secure, have greater commitments to family responsibilities and are enmeshed in their society. Their crisis behaviors seemed more calculated and home-oriented. Lastly, older people embrace both the aspects of dependency (in cases of economic deprivation) and independence (in cases where family ties are weak or cease to exist). Older people also may be seen as prone to social alienation because of the characteristics accompanying the aging process. In sum, the peculiar aspects of older people tend to cause a state of immobility or at least great caution in action, and possibly certain lack of trust both in the conditions and people in their social horizon. Our data on behavior in the older category appear to reinforce these assumptions.

6. Religion

The last structural characteristic to be investigated is religion. Table 12 presents the behavioral data of those identifying with the three major religions as well as a composite category of all others--those with no religion, those with "other" religions and those reporting themselves as

Table 12

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY RELIGION (Percentage)

Activities	Protestant N=983	Catholic N=350	Jewish N=39	All Others N=61
National (N=1434)	68.6	24.4	2.7	4.3
No Activity (N=829)	68.5	22.8	3.0	5.7
Any Activity (N=606)	68.5	26.6	2.3	2.6
Discussion (N=435)	66.4	27.6	3.2	2.8
Provision (N=211)	65.4	30.8	1.9	1.9
Building (N=196)	69.4	26.5	1.0	3.1
Food & Drug (N=122)	75.4	20.5	1.6	2.5
Leaving (N=79)	69.7	25.3	2.5	2.5
CD Office (N=71)	74.6	21.1	1.5	2.8
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	63.8	31.0	2.6	2.6
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	66.1	29.0	1.6	3.3
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	70.9	24.1	2.5	2.5
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	68.2	30.3	0	1.5
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	76.4	16.4	3.6	3.6
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	70.0	24.0	4.0	2.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	71.4	22.4	2.1	4.1
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	78.6	19.0	0	2.4
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	69.7	27.3	3.0	0
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	75.7	18.2	0	6.1
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	68.0	24.0	4.0	4.0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	75.0	20.8	0	4.2
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	76.2	23.8	0	0
Leave + F & D (N=17)	82.4	17.6	0	0
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	83.4	8.3	8.3	0

agnostics and atheists. It is clear that the American population places high value on belonging to an institutionalized religion. Only 61 respondents of the total of 1434 (4.5 percent) reported identity with other religious faiths or said they were non-religious.

In view of this, perhaps it is justifiable to consider those categorized as All Others to be a kind of deviant case. Their deviance consists of being outside established religions or having no religion. How do they behave in the face of crisis? Our data suggest that, by and large, they do not act. Twice as many of this category engaged proportionally in "No Activity" as in "Any Activity". One activity, Leaving, shows remarkable results when it is paired with the other activities. In four out of five pair combinations in which Leaving was present, there are no "All Other" respondents. Those without religion or who identify outside established religions have been considered a deviant case. Certainly, they may not be deviant in the sense of socially approved behaviors. Deviance, in the sense used here, is considered as being outside the normative mainstream. As suggested in the presentations of the aged, the unmarried and the poor in which there were clear tendencies toward not engaging in activities to the extent that the more solid middle class, middle aged and married respondents did, we can add a bit to understanding attachment to the society through religious identity. To belong to an established religion is to be normative; to not belong, thus, is to be "wrong" and non-normative. Assuming that being "wrong" and non-normative is socially isolating and psychologically uncomfortable, and assuming further that such states of affairs are inherently alienating, we can predict a more bland response to relatively abstract external dangers manifested in the Cuban crisis. At the same time, such bland response may be, in addition, a generalized function of uncertainty and indecisiveness due to the lack of direct attachments with the society.

Turning to the Jewish respondents, how far does our theory of alienation and isolation go? The traditional minority status of the Jewish community should have created gross alienation in the sense used here. However, the meager data in Table 12 on Jewish responses do not immediately reveal this pattern. It merely suggests a faint tendency toward "No Activity". The higher proportion of Family Discussion over the "Any Activity" norm conforms to the known state of high family integration in the Jewish community. Still, there is little evidence of tendencies to remain home and build shelters.

The percentage differences between Protestants and Catholics do not seem dramatically different. Overall, Catholics tended to be slightly more active, but not much more than Protestants. Their higher activity seemed to be associated more with the

generalized activity of making Provisions. The highest concern among Protestants appears to surround the purchase of food and drugs. There does not seem to be any reason why Protestants should purchase more food and drugs than Catholics, unless the Protestant food-drug purchasers mainly were rural. The table on size of geographical unit (Table 5) shows some evidence that rural people purchased more food and drugs.

7. Summary of Structural Characteristics

An effort has been made to present those structural characteristics that are main determinants of an individual's location in the broad social structure. It was earlier suggested that such location may bear upon the way that one behaves when he must decide to do or not to do something as a response to massive external danger. Data on the following four structural characteristics show similar patterns: social class, marital status, age and religion. The pattern revealed suggests that those classes of respondents embracing normative, accepted, "mainstream" socially-integrated attributes tend to be more active in the search for or practice of protective devices. Whereas, those classes of respondents who are somewhat outside the consensual or socially-integrated spectrum tend to be less active.

The remaining two structural characteristics, size of geographical unit and sex, are of a different order than the above-mentioned four. Sex and place of residence, indeed, help define location in the social structure but must be analyzed independently. Crisis Behavior by sex, it was suggested, seems to be associated with more traditional role prescriptions which do not seem appropriate to an analysis of the degree of social integration or alienation of those behaving. Similarly, the size of one's home locality is not amenable to an analysis of one's orientations toward the social order.

Let us temporarily leave the analysis of structural characteristics and turn to the other major component in this study, the attitudinal characteristics. Eventually, the two sets of characteristics will be joined.

B. Attitudinal Characteristics

The analysis scheme in the preceding section will be continued. An attitude which has been selected for analysis will be displayed on a table according to the incidence of crisis behavior within the 23 behavioral groupings. Many Cold War, disarmament and civil defense opinion questions were asked. It is assumed that opinions directly reflect attitudes. If we can attribute an attitudinal meaning to the response to selected questions, we would be indirectly tapping attitudes. Thus, responses to a selection of empirical questions have the two-fold advantage of

delineating where opinion lies in the national population (a practical, policy-making benefit) and upon what attitudes the opinions are based (a scientific benefit).

It is generally accepted that opinions are in large part a product of the activation of previous attitudes. Attitudes can be viewed as neuropsychic states of readiness for mental and physical activity. Attitudes prepare the individual to respond in certain ways to the stimuli in his field of perception. The existence of an attitude, then, can have a bearing on the kind of behavior that will be undertaken in the face of crisis as well as on the kind of opinions that will be expressed on various states of affairs. When attitudes are used as partial explainers of behavior and opinion, it is necessary to take into account several of their dimensions. An attitude has a direction, in that the holder of the attitude tends to be for or against something. An attitude also has intensity, since an individual has differential strengths of feeling for or against something. Lastly, an attitude has consistency since an individual behaves and expresses opinions under different conditions.

This section attempts to assess the direction, intensity and consistency of certain attitudes held by the various respondent groupings. The direction of the attitude, and in lesser measure the intensity, is assessed by selecting, in most instances, questionnaire responses indicating "agreement with" or "desirability of" or "probability of" or "preference for" the situation in question. Attitude consistency is assessed by selecting several questionnaire items which together presumably measure the same attitude. The respondents who expressed a like opinion on certain questionnaire items is seen in the tables as a proportion of their engagement in the various crisis behaviors. By reviewing and comparing the relative proportions among the groupings, we can determine what opinion-attitude patterns exist.

Several methodological problems exist. The decision whether a particular question is actually tapping an underlying attitude is speculative and subjective. The logic of the question was the procedure used to determine its bearing on an attitude. Another problem consists of determining whether the percentage difference among the behavioral groupings is significant. In this problem there is no baseline for comparison as, indeed, there was none in the analysis of structural characteristics. We use neither the zero percent point or the 100 percent point as norms. Instead, we use only the norm established by the "No Activity" and the "Any Activity" groupings and observe the percentage variation. In this treatment the direction of difference is quite important and is the basic tool available for determining whether there are differences in attitudes and strengths of attitudes among the groupings.

Data will be presented on the following attitudes: Need for Protection, Optimism, Collective Orientation and Group Efficacy. The analysis design consists of a brief discussion of the meaning-implications of each attitude as regards crisis behavior, an hypothesis predicting the relationship of the attitude to crisis behavior, a description of the questionnaire items selected to measure the attitudes and a discussion of the findings.

1. Need for Protection

Earlier, it was suggested that the critical nature of the Cuban situation logically created a state of cognitive dissonance for all those having any exposure to the crisis. In the effort to reduce or alter the uncomfortable dissonance, protective measures were taken, or were not taken, in the form of the six behaviors which the 1963 study investigated. Any of the courses of action had the effect of, or was theoretically capable of bringing dissonance into a state which was more consonant with the external situation. We have speculated that those who engaged in any of the six behaviors decided that direct action was necessary to invoke a more secure or protected family system. Data on structural characteristics suggested that those who engaged in the crisis behaviors tended to be more involved in the "mainstream" of American society by virtue of middle class identity and more normative structural characteristics. There is reason to think of this type of individual as more sensitized to the crisis because of a higher degree of involvement or integration in the society which is threatened, in a more abstract sense, and in the family system which is also threatened, but in the more direct sense. In one sense, such individuals have more to lose by nuclear devastation than those less involved. The following hypothesis is therefore suggested:

> The greater the felt need for protection, the greater engagement in crisis activities.

Two questionnaire items have been selected to test this hypothesis--the desirability of two alternative shelter-funding arrangements and the perception of annual per capita civil defense expenditures.

a. Shelter-Funding Arrangements

It is assumed that respondents favoring fallout shelters regardless of the source of funds for their construction (family or federal) are highly sensitized to danger and therefore have a high need for protection. Table 13 shows the proportion of respondents in each behavioral grouping who favored the following propositions:

> "Most American families will provide themselves with fallout shelters at their own expense."

Table 13

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY SUPPORT OF TWO ALTERNATIVE FUNDING PROVISIONS FOR FALLOUT SHELTERS

Activities	Most Families Provide Shelters at Own Expense N=733	Most Families Have Shelters with Government Help N=914
National (N=1434)	51.3	63.9
No Activity (N=827)	45.3	59.9
Any Activity (N=607)	59.5	69.0
Discussion (N=534)	60.2	68.5
Provision (N=211)	60.6	67.8
Building (N=196)	68.4	74.4
Food & Drug (N=122)	58.2	73.0
Leaving (N=79)	60.8	72.0
CD Office (N=71)	60.5	69.0
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	60.6	67.1
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	71.8	76.6
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	64.5	70.8
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	66.7	74.2
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	67.9	78.6
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	68.0	76.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	61.2	73.4
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	73.8	76.2
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	57.6	72.7
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	69.7	69.7
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	72.0	68.0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	54.1	58.3
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	61.8	85.6
Leave + F & D (N=17)	53.0	64.7
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	41.6	74.9

"Most American families will have family fallout shelters with financial help from the government."

Table 13 suggests two things. First, those engaging in "Any Activity" more highly favored family fallout shelters than those engaging in "No Activity" for the two conditions of family expense alone and with government help. This suggests the felt need for shelter protection with lesser concern for the source of funding. Second, there is a higher proportion of the "Any Activity" grouping over the "No Activity" grouping favoring shelters at the families own expense instead of with government help. Thus, proportionately more of those engaging in crisis activities favor shelters and support family initiation of such shelters. The data show also an expected higher incidence of shelter support on the part of those thinking of or actually building a shelter at the time of the Cuban crisis.

We think the data in Table 13 support the hypothesis that the greater felt need for protection is positively related to engagement in protective activities.

b. Perception of Civil Defense Annual Per capita Expenditures

The second indicator of Need for Protection comes from the following two questions:

"How much would you guess our country is spending at the present time yearly for each man, woman and child for Civil Defense programs?"

"How much do you think our country should spend for each man, woman and child for Civil Defense programs?"

The assumption behind the selection of these items as indicators is that those who feel a need for protection will perceive the current state of protection provided by the official agency as higher than those feeling less of a need for protection. Likewise, even more important, the former group will believe that more protection should be given. Further, we can assume that yearly, per capita expenditures are reasonable indexes of official protective action on the part of the Civil Defense Agency. Such an index may come close to having face validity.

Table 14 shows the proportion of respondents in each grouping who believed the amount presently being spent was $5 or less, $5 to $25 or over $25. Also presented is the proportion of respondents who selected one of the three increments as the amount that should be spent and those who replied "any amount necessary". The portion of Table 14 containing the estimates of what is actually spent on civil defense per capita indicates

Table 14A

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS INDICATING PER CAPITA AMOUNT THAT IS SPENT AND SHOULD BE SPENT ON CIVIL DEFENSE PER YEAR

Activities	Is Spent			
	$5 or Less N=604	$5 to $25 N=331	Over $25 N=202	Missing Data N=297
National (N=1434)	42.1	23.1	14.1	20.7
No Activity (N=827)	41.0	20.8	12.8	25.4
Any Activity (N=607)	43.7	26.2	15.8	14.3
Discussion (N=435)	44.6	26.4	15.2	13.8
Provision (N=211)	42.7	29.4	15.6	12.3
Building (N=196)	50.5	23.5	14.3	11.7
Food & Drug (N=122)	42.6	25.4	15.6	16.4
Leaving (N=79)	32.9	34.2	22.8	10.1
CD Office (N=71)	40.8	29.6	12.7	16.9
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	43.9	28.4	11.0	16.7
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	50.0	24.2	13.7	12.1
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	45.6	26.6	17.7	10.1
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	48.5	22.7	16.7	12.1
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	45.5	30.9	12.7	10.9
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	40.0	36.0	14.0	10.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	40.8	30.6	10.2	18.4
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	47.6	28.6	14.3	9.5
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	21.2	51.5	12.1	15.2
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	54.5	30.3	12.2	3.0
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	36.0	40.0	12.0	12.0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	33.3	41.7	12.5	12.5
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	47.6	23.8	14.3	14.3
Leave + F & D (N=17)	29.4	29.4	29.4	11.8
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	41.7	33.3	16.7	8.3

Table 14B

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS INDICATING PER CAPITA AMOUNT THAT IS SPENT AND SHOULD BE SPENT ON CIVIL DEFENSE PER YEAR

Activities	Should Be Spent				
	$5 or Less N=290	$5 to $25 N=387	Over $25 N=262	Any Amount N=293	Missing Data N=202
National (N=1434)	20.2	27.0	18.3	20.4	14.1
No Activity (N=827)	21.1	25.6	15.8	20.2	17.3
Any Activity (N=607)	19.1	28.8	21.6	20.8	9.7
Discussion (N=435)	20.9	29.2	21.4	20.0	8.5
Provision (N=211)	19.9	27.5	27.0	18.0	7.6
Building (N=196)	20.0	30.6	21.9	21.4	6.1
Food & Drug (N=122)	22.1	24.6	23.0	22.1	8.2
Leaving (N=79)	17.7	19.0	30.4	21.5	11.4
CD Office (N=71)	19.7	35.2	22.5	14.1	8.5
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	22.6	27.1	29.7	16.1	4.5
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	23.4	29.8	21.8	20.2	4.8
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	24.1	24.1	25.3	20.2	6.3
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	21.2	36.4	22.7	15.2	4.5
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	25.5	32.7	25.5	12.7	3.6
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	20.0	22.0	22.0	28.0	8.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	22.4	32.7	22.4	14.3	8.2
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	28.6	26.2	28.6	14.2	2.4
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	18.2	12.1	30.3	33.3	6.1
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	24.2	39.4	24.2	12.2	0
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	16.0	40.0	28.0	16.0	0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	33.4	29.1	29.1	4.2	4.2
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	23.8	19.1	33.3	14.3	9.5
Leave + F & D (N=17)	23.5	11.8	35.3	23.5	5.9
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	25.0	33.4	25.0	8.3	8.3

no great divergence of estimate patterns between those who did and those who did not engage in "Any Activity". It is, however, interesting to note that substantially more of those respondents who engaged in "Any Activity" answered the question. Apparently the "apathy" of those in "No Activity" is reflected in their lower response rate. Those who engaged in Building manifested somewhat lower overall estimates, perhaps including this estimate in their decision to take this sort of action and those who thought of Leaving had somewhat higher overall estimates.

When asked what per capita amount should be spent, those respondents who had taken some action not only were again more likely to provide an answer but also were more likely to recommend the higher amounts, thus indicating a greater perceived need for civil defense activities. It should be noted regardless of activity level that all groupings recommend substantially higher levels of expenditure than they estimate as actually being spent.

c. Conclusion

Within the constraints imposed by the analytical design, it is suggested that the hypothesis that felt need for protection is positively related to incidence of crisis activity is supported. The two selected indicators of the need for protection--shelter funding and civil defense expenditures--show consistent respondent tendencies in the same direction. The differences between those who engaged in crisis activities and those who did not indicated that those engaged in activities manifested a sense of need. Whether the questions selected as indicators of felt need for protection actually measure this attitude can be challenged. Yet, there seems to be some logical connection between the attitude under consideration and the essential meaning embodied in the questionnaire items.

2. Optimism

Are people who are more optimistic also more likely to engage in direct protection-oriented activities? Optimism can be defined as some generalized psychological state of good feeling and positive orientation toward the surrounding environment. From one point of view it could be suggested that those who are more optimistic are less likely to consider nuclear devastation as probable and therefore be less likely to consider means of protection such as building a shelter or leaving their homes. Those more pessimistic would see the worst and take any precautions possible.

Another point of view comes from the theoretical orientation being developed in this study. On the oft-repeated assumption that individuals can be differentially attached to their society, some being more integrated and in the "mainstream"

while others are less integrated and "outside", we are in a position to make an assumption about the optimism of individuals. In simple terms, perhaps the more integrated individuals have more to be optimistic about. Perhaps greater integration and "solid", middle class type security creates a certain state of "good feeling" and positive orientation which, if true, could theoretically permeate many or most areas of social perception, including perceptions about the state of the world and its future and the possibility of dealing with disaster. On the basis of the foregoing assumption, the following hypothesis is suggested:

> The greater the optimism, the greater engagement in crisis activities.

Three questionnaire item areas have been selected for testing this hypothesis: the probability and desirability of worldwide or nuclear disarmament; perception of fallout shelter protection; and perception of post-war survival states.

a. Probability and Desirability of Worldwide or Nuclear Disarmament

Respondents in the 1963 study were asked to select the single most probable and the single most desirable international situation occurring by about 1968 out of the following set of propositions:

a. Worldwide disarmament with control provisions
b. Worldwide disarmament with no control provisions
c. Nuclear disarmament with control provisions
d. Nuclear disarmament with no control provisions
e. Continuance of the current arms race
f. Disarmament of nations other than United States and Russia
g. Major arms reduction

On the assumption that the probability and desirability attributions of the international disarmament propositions (a through d) can be considered an index of international optimism, responses for these four propositions were joined into a single measure of optimism, the proportions of each behavioral grouping selecting these propositions being displayed on Table 15.

It can be seen immediately that about a 13 percent higher proportion of those engaging in "Any Activity" believed disarmament more probable than those engaging in "No Activity", while the desirability attributions show about an eight percent difference in the same direction. Glancing down the probability column, it is clear that certain behavioral groupings are very much above those who engaged in "No Activity", activities such as Provision

Table 15

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS FINDING WORLDWIDE OR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PROBABLE AND DESIRABLE

Activities	Probability of Worldwide or Nuclear Disarmament N=737	Desirability of Worldwide or Nuclear Disarmament N=1197
National (N=1434)	51.5	83.7
No Activity (N-827)	45.7	79.5
Any Activity (N=607)	58.5	87.8
Discussion (N-435)	61.8	86.2
Provision (N=211)	65.8	91.0
Building (N=196)	50.0	90.8
Food & Drug (N=122)	64.1	86.0
Leaving (N-79)	53.2	75.9
CD Office (N=71)	60.6	86.0
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	65.7	94.2
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	52.4	92.0
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	56.9	89.9
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	53.1	94.0
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	59.1	92.7
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	64.0	80.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	61.2	87.7
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	59.5	92.8
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	63.6	78.8
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	63.7	87.9
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	60.0	96.0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	58.4	79.2
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	57.1	76.2
Leave + F & D (N=17)	53.0	70.6
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	50.0	66.7

and Food-Drug being as much as 20 percent higher. The same general fact pertains to the Desirability column. The core indicator of optimism here is Probability--that view of what actually will happen at a future time point. But, most interesting is the fact that there is some difference between those doing nothing and those doing something on the desirability dimension. Presumably the fact that all people do not wish disarmament is explainable by a somewhat complicated set of rational, policy-oriented considerations which are taken into account by those not desiring disarmament. They probably are taking into account the conditions under which disarmament occurs, rather than giving a blanket approval to disarmament. Yet, it is interesting for our purposes to observe that the "No Activity" grouping falls beneath the "Any Activity" grouping in both instances. The explanation lies somewhere between the possibilities that certain of the "No Activity" grouping are either very much alienated and non-rational or very much rational. The data will not permit direct pursuit of this interesting possibility.

b. Perception of Fallout Shelter Protection

As a further measure of optimism, we selected three propositions concerned with the nature of protection offered by fallout shelters. The following propositions were presented to respondents with instructions that they indicate whether they agree or disagree with them:

a. "People shouldn't take seriously all the talk about being protected by fallout shelters."

b. "Only people who don't understand the protection given by fallout shelters would say that they'd rather die in the open than die cooped up in a hole in the ground."

c. "People in fallout shelters may not have an easy time of it, but at least they will be alive and able to rebuild after a nuclear war."

Disagreement with the first proposition indicates optimism, while agreement with the latter two indicates optimism also. Table 16 shows a fairly clear, though not a large difference in groupings. Those engaging in crisis activities show a consistent pattern of favoring fallout shelters over those who do not engage in crisis activities.

c. Perception of Post-War Survival States

To further explicate the attitude of optimism, three propositions involving the nature of things following a nuclear war were

Table 16

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY PROPORTION OF AGREEMENT WITH PROPOSITIONS ON FALLOUT SHELTER PROTECTION

Activities	Shouldn't be Taken Sericusly N=661 (Disagree)	Some Don't Understand N=901 (Agree)	Shelter People Alive to Rebuild N=1109 (Agree)
National (N=1434)	46.6	63.0	77.5
No Activity (N=827)	50.9	59.4	73.3
Any Activity (N=607)	38.8	66.7	81.9
Discussion (N=435)	39.0	66.6	82.2
Provision (N=211)	33.2	65.9	85.8
Building (N=196)	30.1	71.3	89.7
Food & Drug (N=122)	33.6	60.6	82.7
Leaving (N=79)	35.4	68.3	87.3
CD Office (N=71)	36.6	67.6	84.5
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	32.8	63.8	86.4
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	28.2	70.2	91.9
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	27.8	62.0	89.8
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	21.1	71.2	92.4
Bldg. + F & D (N= 55)	21.8	61.8	89.1
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	32.0	72.0	92.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	30.6	69.4	85.7
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	23.8	69.0	92.9
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	36.4	69.7	84.8
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	30.3	63.7	84.8
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	20.0	68.0	92.0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	29.2	58.3	91.7
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	28.5	66.6	95.2
Leave + F & D (N=17)	35.3	52.9	82.3
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	16.6	50.0	91.7

selected for analysis. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following:

a. "A nuclear war would mean the end of the world and all life on it."

b. "A nuclear war would mean the end of civilization as we know it."

c. "Enough people would survive a nuclear war to pick up the pieces and carry on, with a good chance of rebuilding a system which lives under American values, as we know them."

Table 17 shows interesting results, but they are rather difficult to explain. There is no overall response difference between "No Activity" and "Any Activity" as to the proposition that war means the end of the world. Our hypothesis predicted that optimism and engagement in activities are positively correlated, which means that those engaging in "Any Activity" should be proportionately lower in agreement with this negativistic proposition than should those engaging in "No Activity". It is even more shocking to see that those engaging in "Any Activity" are higher in agreement with the proposition "war means the end of known civilization". This is clearly not a very optimistic view of things. Finally, in the proposition "enough would survive to rebuild the United States", there appears to be data which contradicts the first two. In the last proposition, those engaging in "Any Activity" are almost six percentage points higher in agreement than the engaging in "No Activity. Perhaps a partial explanation for these seemingly contradictory findings lies in the nature of the propositions concerning post-war states. The "world" and "civilization" are high level abstractions, so much so that even the most optimistic may have difficulty in response. Those who may be optimistic may be more so within the bounds of a system with which they directly identify, namely, their own society. Positing this as a tentative explanation, credence for its validity is partially found in the response pattern to the proposition "enough would survive to rebuild the U.S." Implicit in this proposition is the notion of integration with the society and concern for its welfare. Certain Behavioral groupings show very high agreement with this survival and rebuilding situation, to the extent of 80.6 percent of those making Provision, 84.6 of those considering Building, 81.7 percent of those calling the Civil Defense Office and even higher proportions occur among certain pair combinations.

d. Conclusion

It was hypothesized that the greater the amount of optimism in individuals, the greater the amount of crisis response behavior that could be expected. Three questionnaire areas were selected

Table 17

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY PROPORTION OF AGREEMENT WITH PROPOSITIONS ON POST-WAR SURVIVAL STATES

Activities	War Means End of the World N=578 (Disagree)	War Means End of Known Civilization N=445 (Agree)	Enough Would Survive to Rebuild U.S. N=1055 (Agree)
National (N=1434)	40.4	55.9	73.7
No Activity (N=827)	40.7	53.5	70.8
Any Activity (N=706)	39.2	58.4	76.2
Discussion (N=435)	40.0	58.8	77.4
Provision (N=211)	40.3	60.2	80.6
Building (N=196)	31.6	54.0	84.6
Food & Drug (N=122)	31.1	50.8	75.4
Leaving (N=79)	41.7	62.0	67.0
CD Office (N=71	35.2	59.1	81.7
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	39.3	60.0	81.9
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	30.6	51.6	83.1
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	32.9	54.4	81.0
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	28.8	53.0	92.4
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	27.3	49.1	83.6
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	40.0	62.0	72.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	30.6	55.1	85.7
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	31.0	64.3	90.5
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	51.5	75.8	60.6
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	18.2	51.5	90.9
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	36.0	64.0	92.0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	25.0	62.5	75.0
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	33.3	57.1	95.2
Leave + F & D (N=17)	41.2	70.5	76.4
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	41.7	58.0	67.7

as indicators of optimism. There was a reasonable amount of evidence presented via the indicators to suggest that the hypothesis is confirmed. At the same time perceptions on post-war survival of the world and civilization suggest relatively equal optimism of the crisis activity grouping compared to the "No Activity" grouping. One possible explanation for this inconsistency rests in the level of abstraction of these units in question. At the same time, lack of optimism at the international level does not deny presence of optimism at the societal level. In this latter regard, there was evidence supporting the hypothesis.

3. Collectivity Orientation

Individuals hold varying types and degrees of feeling towards groups or collectivities. There is both a qualitative and quantitative aspect to the feeling. Without specifically defining either of these aspects of feeling, we can suggest that in combination they produce an orientation towards a collectivity which may tend towards positive or negative feeling. A more positive orientation implies a tendency towards greater comfort in the presence of others, while a more negative orientation suggests a reduction of social comfort. Of course, the nature of the collectivity will greatly determine the valence attached to the orientation so that certain groups hold little or no attraction for certain individuals while other groups hold considerable attraction. The group task, group goal, type of members, and so forth greatly determine whether a specific individual will be positively or negatively oriented towards the group. This is one dimension of collectivity orientation. Another dimension is more generalized. It consists merely of a diffuse orientation towards collective bodies. This orientation may incline positively or negatively, depending heavily on individual personality attributes.

We can assume that all individuals embrace such tendencies either in a positive or negative direction. It would be interesting to know how collectivity orientations are associated with crisis response. Are those who take protective measures during crisis more or less collectivity oriented? Earlier, it was suggested that the family system is the unit of reference in this study. Those taking protective action are most likely basically concerned with protection of the family. Clearly, to take protective action on behalf of the family is an a-priori case of family orientation. A family is a collectivity, so to the extent that individuals take measures to protect the family they are collectivity oriented. At the same time, the family is only one of many types of collectivities to which individuals may be oriented. Indeed, the family is a very specific and unique case. What about individuals who may not be as family oriented? Does a reduction in family orientation demand also lesser orientation towards other collectivities? If it is

true that individuals with greater family orientation are more prone to protective action in the face of disaster, perhaps it is also true that individuals with lesser family orientations who take no protective actions are more oriented toward non-family collectivities. This speculation can be investigated from data in the 1963 study through the following hypothesis:

> The less the non-family collectivity orientation, the greater the engagement in crisis activities.

Two questionnaire items have been selected as indicators to test this hypothesis: Preference for private or community shelters; and Perception of help from neighbors.

a. Preference for Private or Community Shelters

The first indicator of collectivity orientation is the following question:

> "In case of a nuclear attack, would you rather be in your private shelter or in a community shelter?"

Table 18 presents for each activity grouping the distribution of their fallout shelter preferences, whether they would prefer to be in private versus community shelters in event of attack. Although both basic activity groups ("No" and "Any") overall prefer to be in community shelters those who did engage in crisis activities manifest noticeably greater preference for private shelters than those who did not and are more likely to have a preference. As would be expected, those who thought of Building a shelter exhibited a clear-cut preference for private shelters and generally those who engaged in activities other than Discussion had relatively higher rates of preference for private shelters. This pattern was accentuated for those respondents who engaged in two or more crisis activities. For twelve of the fifteen paired sets of activities, private shelters were preferred over community ones. Thus, as crisis activity "increased" so did both relative and objective preference for private shelters, thereby supporting the hypothesis.

b. Perception of Help From Neighbors

The second indicator of collectivity orientation exists in the following questionnaire item:

> "In the event of a nuclear attack, do you think that people in this neighborhood would tend to help each other out or would they just look out for themselves?"

Table 19 displays response data to the above question. In general, the distinctions between the "No Activity" and "Any Activity"

Table 18

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS PREFERRING PRIVATE OR COMMUNITY SHELTERS OR HAVING NO PREFERENCE

Activities	Prefer Private N=583	Prefer Community N=708	No Preference N=93	Missing Data N=50
National (N=1434)	40.6	49.4	6.5	3.5
No Activity (N=827)	36.8	50.2	8.0	5.0
Any Activity (N=607)	45.8	48.3	4.4	1.5
Discussion (N=435)	45.7	48.3	4.4	1.6
Provision (N=211)	46.5	46.9	5.2	1.4
Building (N=196)	56.6	38.3	3.6	1.5
Food & Drug (N=122)	45.1	46.7	4.9	3.3
Leaving (N=79)	46.8	45.6	6.3	1.3
CD Office (N=71)	49.3	43.7	7.0	0
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	49.1	43.2	5.8	1.9
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	58.1	37.1	3.2	1.6
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	49.4	44.3	3.8	2.5
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	53.1	42.4	1.5	3.0
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	49.1	41.8	3.6	5.5
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	48.0	42.0	8.0	2.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	51.0	38.8	10.2	0
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	50.0	40.4	4.8	4.8
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	51.5	42.4	6.1	0
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	54.5	36.4	9.1	0
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	28.0	60.0	12.0	0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	41.7	54.2	4.1	0
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	57.1	42.9	0	0
Leave + F & D (N=17)	47.0	41.2	11.8	0
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	41.7	58.3	0	0

Table 19

ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES, BY PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS BELIEVING NEIGHBORS WOULD HELP EACH OTHER OR LOOK OUT FOR THEMSELVES IN CASE OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK

Activities	Help Each Other N=927	Look Out for Themselves N=442	Missing Data N=65
National (N=1434)	64.7	30.8	4.5
No Activity (N=827)	67.4	28.2	4.4
Any Activity (N=607)	61.0	34.4	4.6
Discussion (N=435)	59.5	36.1	4.4
Provision (N=211)	60.2	34.6	5.2
Building (N=196)	63.2	33.2	3.6
Food & Drug (N=122)	59.0	36.1	4.9
Leaving (N=79)	39.2	49.4	11.4
CD Office (N=71)	55.0	38.0	7.0
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	60.7	33.5	5.8
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	56.5	39.5	4.0
Disc. + F & D (N=49)	58.2	36.7	5.1
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	63.7	31.8	4.5
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	67.3	30.9	1.8
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	44.0	46.0	10.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	51.0	40.8	8.2
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	57.1	38.1	4.8
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	33.3	54.6	12.1
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	60.6	36.4	3.0
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	56.0	32.0	12.0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	41.7	45.8	12.5
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	38.1	52.4	9.5
Leave + F & D (N=17)	35.3	58.8	5.9
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	41.7	58.3	0

groupings show that the former have greater confidence in help from neighbors, although the difference is only about six percent. Of those believing neighbors will help, some interesting patterns emerge. For those Leaving, the perception of neighbors help is considerably beneath the norm set by those engaging in "Any Activity". Apparently this grouping has an extremely low level of confidence in the help available from the environment, and upon the entrance of crisis conditions could be expected to take the extreme action of leaving. These people believe they must look out for themselves. To a lesser extent, those calling the Civil Defense Office also lack confidence in environmental help. In contrast, those thinking of Building a shelter show a slight tendency to greater collectivity orientation. The implication of this, of course, is that those people intended to remain in their homes with the apparent belief that those in their neighborhood would offer assistance if needed.

c. Conclusion

The two indicators of collectivity orientation seem to offer rather straightforward evidence of a tendency for those not taking protective measures to be more positively oriented toward collectivities outside the family system than those who did so. At least it can be said that the non-active have greater confidence in the help or protection offered by the immediate environment whereas those who did take family-oriented protective measures exhibit less confidence in the environment while apparently having more in themselves. How does this finding bear upon our general proposition that the respondents engaging in crisis activities are more integrated in the "mainstream" and positively oriented and attached to their society? Does this not suggest that positive orientations toward environmental collectivities would follow? This is not necessarily the case. Higher family orientation along with greater integration with the society does not necessarily require greater positive orientation toward environmental collectivities. Close family association is one buffer against the impersonalization and alienating tendencies of a "mass society". Theoretically, the primary nature of family association may create sufficient emotional gratification and primary identification in the individual so that his orientations to his society tend less toward alienation and more toward integration. Conversely, those individuals with lesser family connections must turn to other, semi-primary associations, possibly at the community or neighborhood level, for identification and emotional gratification. Admittedly, these associations are less tangible, but may serve the purpose of acting as buffers against the alienation tendencies imputed to mass society. The buffer effect may not be as strong or effective as that associated with family orientation, but it can be suggested that non-family associations may be functionally

adaptive. In sum, it is believed that collectivity orientation is positively, but not strongly, related to crisis non-activity. There is, therefore, support for the hypothesis.

4. Group Efficacy

A person's appraisal of his worth, power and ability to influence others is an important dimension of his personality and a key link in his attachments to his society. Likewise, his appraisal of the efficacy of other individuals and of significant social groupings is related to his own self-appraisal. Self-efficacy and appraisal of the efficacy of others are intimately related. It could be speculated that those who are more highly attached to their society also view the power of the significant groupings in their society as being high. Conversely, those less attached would view such power as being lower. To be highly attached to the society implies acknowledgement of and conformity with the societal values, including the attribution of power to leadership groupings recognized by the society. On the basis of this speculation, the following hypothesis is advanced:

> The greater the attribution of power to significant social groupings, the greater the engagement in crisis activities.

Respondents in the 1963 study were asked to evaluate the power of a number of major social groupings. The following were selected for analysis: Organized Labor, U.S. Congress, Big Business, Republicans, Democrats and Clergy.

Table 20 reports the proportions of the bahavioral groupings which attributed High power to the social groupings. The difference between the "No Activity" and "Any Activity" groupings is striking, not because there is a great percentage difference between them, but because the "Any Activity" grouping consistently attributes higher power to all the social groupings than does the "No Activity" grouping. The difference for Democrats and Republicans is about 10 percent, eight percent for Labor, five percent for Congress and Big Business, and four percent for Clergy. There are objective differences in the real power exercised by these social groupings and it is reflected in Table 20 across the power groupings. If it is true that the individuals in our society who took protective measures in the Cuban crisis are more attached to the society and therefore recognize the power values related to the society, it follows that they will attribute higher power to a range of social groupings. Such is the case in Table 20.

Table 20

ENGAGEMENT IN CRISIS ACTIVITIES, BY PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS ATTRIBUTING "HIGH INFLUENCE" TO SELECTED SOCIAL GROUPINGS

Activities	Social Groupings					
	Democrats N=874	Republicans N=655	Labor N=1056	Congress N=1215	Big Business N=1104	Clergy N=488
National (N=1434)	61.1	45.8	73.8	85.0	77.2	34.1
No Activity (N=827)	56.6	41.6	70.2	82.5	74.5	32.4
Any Activity (N=607)	67.0	51.2	78.6	87.6	79.7	36.4
Discussion (N=435)	66.6	50.8	76.5	86.4	78.6	34.7
Provision (N=211)	71.1	51.7	81.5	90.0	83.4	37.4
Building (N=196)	67.9	46.9	81.1	92.3	79.1	36.7
Food & Drug (N=122)	65.6	50.0	77.0	86.9	82.8	40.2
Leaving (N=79)	70.8	54.4	79.7	83.5	82.2	45.5
CD Office (N=71)	66.2	46.5	78.8	88.7	85.9	31.0
Disc. + Prov. (N=155)	72.4	44.2	79.5	89.1	82.7	38.5
Disc. + Bldg. (N=124)	66.1	46.8	79.0	92.7	76.6	33.9
Disc. + F & D (N=79)	72.1	55.7	77.2	89.8	82.2	38.0
Bldg. + Prov. (N=66)	69.7	47.0	81.8	89.4	78.8	42.4
Bldg. + F & D (N=55)	66.0	48.2	71.4	92.8	82.2	35.7
Disc. + Leave (N=50)	74.0	50.0	78.0	82.0	80.0	42.0
Disc. + CD Ofc. (N=49)	65.3	51.0	75.5	87.7	87.7	34.7
Prov. + F & D (N=42)	73.8	57.1	81.0	95.0	85.7	38.1
Prov. + Leave (N=33)	78.8	54.5	84.8	84.8	84.8	48.5
Bldg. + CD Ofc. (N=33)	63.6	42.4	72.7	93.9	78.8	27.3
Prov. + CD Ofc. (N=25)	72.0	48.0	80.0	88.0	84.0	32.0
F & D + CD Ofc. (N=24)	70.8	37.5	70.8	87.5	75.0	29.2
Leave + Bldg. (N=21)	71.4	38.1	90.5	85.7	85.7	52.4
Leave + F & D (N=17)	76.5	52.9	88.2	82.3	100.0	58.8
Leave + CD Ofc. (N=12)	58.3	33.3	75.0	75.0	83.3	25.0

VI. CONCLUSIONS

This report has examined the impact of a critical event on the American public and has attempted to assess the substance and dynamic of the public's response to the resulting crisis situation with special emphasis on responses associated with civil defense measures. The event involved was the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 which produced a period of severe international tension. In a 1963 sample Americans were asked if they had engaged in any of six crisis related activities during the Cuban crisis. These activities comprised efforts to respond in some meaningful fashion to the threat posed by the crisis. Patterns of response were examined, both for overall distributions among the six activities and for paired sets of activities. Individuals in the sample were classified by their degree of participation in the various activities. Those who had engaged in "Any Activity" were compared with those who had not, and those who had engaged in each of the six separate activities were compared with each other, the sub-totals and the fifteen sets of paired activities as well. These comparisons were made with regard to personal characteristics that served to locate individuals in the overall social structure and also with regard to personal attitudes deemed to be of relevance for crisis response. Differences in crisis response were found and they established summary patterns that are of theoretical interest. Let us now review the findings.

For each of eleven major social-structural and attitudinal characteristics, Table 21 summarizes the proportion of respondents in each category of each characteristic who engaged in "Any Activity" as a result of the Cuban crisis. In the total sample 42.3 percent engaged in "Any Activity" but there is considerable variation about this figure in the variables under consideration.

The relative size of the geographic unit where respondents live has an appreciable effect on the extent of their overall crisis response. Those who live in metropolitan areas other than the large Standard Metropolitan Areas are most likely to engage in "Any Activity", almost half did so. On the other hand, the lowest rate of crisis response, less than a third, was found in those counties that had no town as large as ten thousand in population. Respondents engaging in crisis activity tend to earn more money, be better educated, and think of themselves as middle rather than working class when compared to those not engaging in crisis activity. They are more often married and younger in age. Females are somewhat more active than males. Participants in crisis activities manifested a greater sense of need for protection while maintaining relatively greater

Table 21

SUMMARY OF PARTICIPATION IN "ANY ACTIVITY"

		Percent Engaging in "Any Activity"
	National Total	42.3
Structural Characteristics	Size of Geographical Unit	
	Standard Metrop. Area	41.5
	Other Metrop. Area	49.3
	Large County	41.6
	Small County	31.0
	Income	
	Under $5,000	37.3
	$5,000 to $10,000	42.5
	Above $10,000	53.5
	Education	
	Eighth Grade or Less	29.3
	High School	43.5
	Above High School	51.2
	Perceived Social Class	
	Middle Class	49.0
	Working Class	37.9
	Marital Status	
	Single	36.0
	Married	49.0
	Other	29.6
	Sex	
	Male	39.8
	Female	44.5
	Age	
	Under 30	55.5
	30 - 49	45.4
	50 and above	26.0
Attitudinal Characteristics	Need for Protection	Higher
	Optimism	Higher
	Collectivity Orientation	Lower
	Group Efficacy	Higher

"optimism" regarding both the possibility of such protection and the avoidance of its need. Similarly, even if war did come, these respondents indicated greater confidence in the possibility of rebuilding American society. Those engaging in "Any Activity" seemed somewhat less oriented to collectivity centered efforts and preferred to rely on themselves and their families. In line with their higher general "optimism" and confidence in the utility of "action" these respondents also attributed higher efficacy to the power of significant social groupings in our society than did those who did not take any crisis action.

The six crisis response activities dealt with in the study covered a broad spectrum of action. The most common activity, reported by thirty percent of the sample, consisted of discussion within the family of what might be done if a war started while they were separated. Some fifteen percent claimed to have made some provisions during the crisis period as to where shelter could be found for the family if a war were to start. Fourteen percent either considered the building of a shelter or started building. Increased purchase of food and drugs, consideration of a move from residence to a safer location, and contact with the local Civil Defense office were less frequent activities. Only five percent said they had called the local Civil Defense office. However, in terms of total number of households throughout the nation, even five percent amounts to a huge figure.

Since a total of 1114 "activities" were reported by 607 respondents, it is clear that many people engaged in two or more activities. This was to be expected since "Discussion" was included in the list of activities and it is clear from Table 4 that Discussion was paired with the other five activities by the vast majority of participating respondents. This, of course, corresponds with the usual theoretical patterns describing action modes. However, a fair proportion of the remaining activities were also paired with each other.

As a developing theoretical perspective throughout this report, the suggestion was made that the modal individual who engaged in crisis behaviors tended to be more like the fairly "solid", middle class type who seems to relate well to, and be reasonably well oriented toward, his society. Such could be characterized as the "integrated" individual who takes the broad social values rather seriously and probably accommodates his personal life to their prescriptions. A somewhat similar finding comes from Stephen Withey.[15] He reports the public's perspectives on United States-Russian relations in late 1961. A study was based on interviews with a national probability sample of 1,474 adults. Withey considers the interviews to have been

conducted at a time when crisis was high, caused by the death of Dag Hammarskjold and peak tensions in Berlin. Of numerous Cold War questions asked, certain items determined whether respondents had built or planned to build fallout shelters. It was found that only six percent of the sample answered affirmatively. This compares with our 1963 study in which 13.7 percent said they thought of building or actually started building a shelter as a result of the Cuban crisis.

Withey analyzed his six percent of shelter building according to certain structural and attitudinal characteristics, as was done in the present study. He found:

> "The few respondents who have built shelters are quite different from most of the general populace. As a group they tend to be better educated, they tend to have higher incomes (they could afford it), and they tend to have certain value perspectives that set them apart somewhat from the national averages. ----They tend more than the average to agree with notions that rebellious ideas are immature, that authority should be highly respected, and that obedience is the most important thing for children to learn. Also, they tend more than the average to disagree with notions that problems' solutions should be found in the situation rather than in principles, that fun is more important than long-term planning, or that values are relative; or that everyone has a right to the satisfaction of important basic needs, that everyone should have an equal chance and say, or that organizational hierarchies may not be the best way to get people to work."

Withey's conclusions about shelter builders tend, we think, to support our tentative conclusions about the nature of those who engaged in a variety of Cuban crisis activities. The implication of Withey's conclusion is that shelter builders are "responsible" people, somewhat conservative, don't necessarily act by impulse, take the value prescriptions of the society seriously, are somewhat intolerant of deviance, and so forth. Withey analyzed only that group who had built or intended to build shelters. Our conclusion is somewhat broader to include all those who responded to the Cuban crisis by taking some action, even if it was only to discuss the situation. Withey's shelter builders and our active crisis respondents are, we maintain, similar people. Apparently, in society, individuals respond to crisis conditions in differential ways, some more intensely, some less. Apparently, also, the mode of response is greatly determined by the position of the individual in the broader social structure and the set of attitudes associated with this position.

To the extent to which the above assertions are true, and additional research is necessary to validate their truth, there are implications both for policy-making and for the sociology of crisis. It is hoped that a small contribution has been made to both.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Dorothy V. Brodie, Perceived Effectiveness of America's Defenses, (University of Pittsburgh, Department of Sociology, March 1965). See "A Summary of Impact Research."

[2] Jiri Nehnevajsa, Civil Defense and Cold War Attitudes, (University of Pittsburgh, Department of Sociology, June 1964). A national probability sample of 1434 Americans.

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[4] For example see:
H. C. Allen, "Lessons of the Cuban Crisis," Contemporary Review, March 2, 1963, pp. 125-131.
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[5] The Pittsburgh Press, March 2, 1963.

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[9] Jiri Nehnevajsa, et al., The Cuban Crisis: Meaning and Impact, (University of Pittsburgh, Department of Sociology, October 1962).

[10] Mark Chesler and Richard Schmuck, "Student Reactions to the Cuban Crisis and Public Dissent," Public Opinion Quarterly 28, Fall 1964, pp. 467-482.

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[12] Reuben Hill and Donald A. Hansen, "Families in Disaster," in George W. Baker and Dwight W. Chapman, (eds.), op.cit., pp. 193-194.

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[14] Stephen B. Withey, "Reaction to Uncertain Threat," in George W. Baker and Dwight W. Chapman, (eds.), op. cit., pp. 93-123.

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