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PRESENT AND ANTIPOATED ALTERNATIVE UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGIES

SUMMARY REPORT

Frederick S. Pishky
November 1965

Analytic Services Inc
5613 Leesburg Pike,
Falls Church, Virginia 22041

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PREFACE

A major project was undertaken in 1965 by the Plans Branch of Analytic Services Inc. to develop a methodological approach to the planning and programing of Air Force operational requirements, research, and development. The close relation between specific hardware development and the principal trends in the Nation's military strategy was fully recognized at an early stage of the study. The hardware developer—looking to the future in order to anticipate the requirements and contingencies of national defense—needed "plausible alternatives" in future military postures in a form which would lend itself to determination of supporting system options, technologies, and R&D programs. The conceptual framework of this approach is summarized in ANSER Report AR 65-4, Methodological Approach to Planning and Programing Air Force Operational Requirements, Research, and Development (MAPORD), by H. E. Emlet (Analytic Services Inc., Falls Church, Virginia, December 1965).

This paper was written as an integral part of the larger effort and is now published in a simplified form in an attempt to describe—primarily for the research and development planner—the most pertinent views of the Nation's political-military community concerning strategic alternatives.

Because of the nature of the subject, this ANSER Report is largely eclectic, drawing heavily on the wisdom of others (as interpreted by the author). The ideas, views, and arguments of the many persons are intermixed to such extent that crediting the individual sources is impossible within the limited space of this report. Yet, some record should be made of the many contributions to this study. Appendix B is a selected bibliography which lists a portion of the related literature on the subject of national defense.

In the course of the inquiry, the author was privileged to consult a number of experts whose comments and constructive advice were particularly helpful: Messrs. Francis Armbruster, Harvey Averch, Bernard Brodie, Andre Caranfil, Herbert S. Dinerstein, Arnold Horelick, Malcolm Hoag,

"Professional" military views—although not official—were generously contributed by Colonel Robert G. Brotherton, United States Air Force; Colonel Eugene B. Ely, United States Army (Ret.); Colonel William A. Stewart, United States Air Force (Ret.); Colonel John L. Sutton, United States Air Force; and Colonel Erwin F. Wann, United States Marine Corps (Ret.).

Finally, the author wishes to acknowledge the assistance and encouragement received from Mr. Harry E. Emlet, Jr., ANSER Plans Branch Chief, who initiated the inquiry.
SUMMARY

This ANSER Report reviews, primarily for the research and development planner, pertinent thoughts concerning national defense. The various concepts are grouped and related to specific strategic military alternatives.

Two constant elements, which have emerged in the course of the past two decades, appear to guide and limit U.S. strategic thinking:

-1 Forward deployment ("forward strategy")

-2 Controlled use of power ("controlled response").

These two concepts represent the military counterparts of the present and anticipated future national policy in the next 10 years and eliminate some of the strategic theories as plausible alternatives.

The number of theories is further reduced by geopolitical considerations—analysis of the political-military situation and trends in the various theaters. The observations point out that:

-1 The U.S. "bipolar" view of the world must be re-examined.

-2 A militarily strong and politically viable NATO remains the prerequisite of U.S. defense of Europe.

-3 A firm U.S. nuclear-response theory is needed for the containment of Communist China.

-4 There is an increasing probability of local wars which will not fit into any nuclear-response theory.

-5 Drastic changes in the existing political alignment of the nations in the Pacific theater may occur in the next 10 years.
-6 In the probably increasing local revolutions, identification of subversive elements with outside Communist centers will become difficult.

-7 The trend toward increasing arms control measures is clearly indicated in the U.S. national policy.

Selection, or—because each strategy represents a variety of ideas, theories, and substrategies—compilation and description of alternative strategic mixes is simplified by grouping the spectrum of conflicts and the corresponding force capabilities into four broad categories:

-1 General nuclear war
-2 Controlled strategic (nuclear) war
-3 Limited war
-4 Counterinsurgency.

In these terms, five alternative strategic postures are presented, based on the differing emphasis in their political rationale:

-1 Strategy 1 (a posture of "retained options") is based on, but not necessarily identical with, the prevailing views of the present Administration.

-2 Strategy 2 (a "Soviet-oriented" posture) emphasizes the concentration of efforts to build and maintain decisive military superiority over the Soviet Union because the advocates of this strategy question the stability of the present detente.

-3 Strategy 3 (a "China-oriented" posture) assumes a static detente with the Soviet Bloc but points to the specific need of a firm strategy of demonstrating U.S. military superiority in the Far East.

-4 Strategy 4 (a modified "fallback" posture) visualizes the successful development of viable, regional
defense systems that would enable the United States to resume its former role of "strategic reserve."

Strategy 5 (an "arms control" posture) takes into account the impact of the most probable arms limitations on the U.S. defense system in the forthcoming decade.

Appendix A offers a comparative tabulation of the main features of the five alternatives.

Because strategies evolve with time and circumstances, the reader should bear in mind that the five postures are, by no means, mutually exclusive. Strategy 1, for example, may gradually evolve into Strategy 3, 4, or 5. The combinations are numerous and go well beyond the scope of this report.
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PRESENT AND ANTICIPATED
ALTERNATIVE UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGIES
SUMMARY REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose and Scope

This ANSER Report is designed to serve as a working tool in R&D planning and programing to estimate U.S. Air Force operational requirements. Accordingly, it treats the historical background and the geopolitical considerations as briefly as possible, summarizing only pertinent points which seem to be indispensable for enabling the reader to follow the author's approach in screening and reducing strategic theories to the five alternative postures presented.

The synthesis contains the author's answer to the question that was the basis of the assignment: What are the plausible competing strategic alternatives—present and future—if any, which can be used in planning operational requirements and R&D to meet the Nation's future defense needs? The specific, practical requirements of the task mentioned above made it necessary that the complex nature of competing strategies be greatly simplified and yet be valid reflections of the real situation. This proved to be a formidable task.

B. Definition and Approach

In order that the aims of the inquiry be understood, two key words, "strategy" and "plausibility," need some elaboration.

The broadest definition of "strategy" was probably formulated by Dr. Herbert Rosinski and excellently elaborated by Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles; it incorporates
all the more specific, and therefore sometimes controversial, formulae:

"Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to control situations or areas in order to attain broad aims or objectives."

This is, of course, "grand strategy," applicable to the direction of all means of national power, of which military power is only one. Narrowing this to military strategy, but within the context of the broadest possible definition, the form employed by the U.S. Air Force Dictionary is adopted:

"Military strategy is the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to attain over-all military or national objectives by force or the threat of force."

The word "employing" shows the dual meaning of the definition, for it calls for both a concept of how to attain the objectives and a posture, the combination of force capabilities required for the implementation of the concept at the various levels of conflict.

This report translates "plausible" concepts into posture formulae which, simplified as they are, may help the hardware developer to understand the strategic planner and his requirements. Plausible strategies are those which harmonize with national interests and international commitments.

The first phase of the inquiry was directed toward defining some of the political objectives—and their military counterparts—which represent a guideline or constraint to any strategic theory claiming plausibility. A survey of political-military developments, beginning with the end of World War II, helped to identify such determinants. Recognition of these constant elements led to elimination of a number of theories.
The second phase scrutinized the remaining contestants in the light of "international political realities," questioning not only the feasibility but also the desirability of the various theories, in terms of political consequences. This "geopolitical screen" further reduced their number.

The third, and final, phase called for a synthesis of the remaining plausible strategic concepts and the development of the formula for each corresponding posture.

C. Historical Background

Present American strategic thinking began to take form in about 1946 or 1947 in a dramatically new international-political, socio-economic, and military-technological environment. Its present status and its future trends cannot be understood and anticipated without an examination of its origins and the environmental factors that have motivated its course. The first phase of the inquiry surveyed the interaction of political, economic, and military events from the end of World War II up to the present conflict in Vietnam in search of constant elements in U.S. strategic thinking which:

-1 Limit the theoretically unlimited number of strategic alternatives

-2 Serve as guidelines for military concepts in the foreseeable future.

The survey showed that, as long as military strategy supports and serves the attainment of the Nation's political objectives and remains an integral part of the national "grand strategy," two distinctly discernible elements can be called "constant," because they cannot be discarded without basic changes in the U.S. Weltanschauung:

-1 Forward deployment ("forward strategy") is designed to meet any enemy aggression in the most forward geographic position and carry over the hostilities to the enemy's own territory as quickly as possible.
- Controlled use of power ("controlled response") is designed to apply force or threat of force—in response to the enemy’s action—in a flexible, graduated, measured manner that avoids or minimizes unnecessary escalation of the conflict.

Forward deployment is the strategic expression of the Nation's political determination to "contain" communism; hence, its geostrategic rigidity, which rules out a number of theories—for example, those visualizing an isolationist "Fortress America."

Controlled, flexible response, on the other hand, stems from the realization of the devastating effects of general nuclear war and from the desire to counter conflict situations effectively at the lowest possible level of violence; hence, the need for flexibility in the choice of strategic as well as tactical means of response and elimination of theories proposing automatic or uncontrolled "massive retaliation." Even if the United States resumed the military initiative and were no longer responding to a threat, the requirement for controlled flexibility would not diminish but, on the contrary, further increase.

The first phase concluded that these two concepts—under various labels—have motivated most of the realistic military theories in the course of the past decades and that they are likely to continue to exert the same type of limiting influence. These two constant elements are the first criteria for determining the plausibility of strategic alternatives.

However, as the optimum balance between forward deployment and flexible response differs in almost every individual conflict situation—depending on its geostrategic sensitivity and its (lowest desirable) level of intensity—the number of alternatives is still unmanageably large. There are at least as many strategies as there are conflict possibilities. Seeking to further reduce the number of alternative strategies, the study posed the question: Which of the conflict situations can be considered plausible? The answer requires consideration of geopolitical factors.
D. Geopolitical Considerations

The second phase of the study evaluated the political-military situation of the world and pointed to some of the major trends in order to test the plausibility of various strategic concepts.

The first observation was that during the past two decades, development and structure of the entire U.S. military posture have reflected a bipolar view of the world (United States versus Soviet Union). Offensive and defensive forces of the United States—strategic-nuclear, tactical-nuclear, conventional- and unconventional-war capabilities—have all been built around this concept. The much debated escalation theories have centered around it. The bipolar concept has worked quite well and, perhaps with some modifications, will continue to work well against any threat that operates under the Soviet strategic-nuclear umbrella. Yet, as the new decade begins, it appears that the threat will become increasingly multipolar. Thus, the primarily "Soviet-oriented" bipolar concept of the United States must be re-examined.

The second observation concerns the somewhat paradoxical effects on the European theater of the Sino-Soviet rift and the aspirations of the satellite nations. The diffusion of power in the once monolithic Communist empire contributes to the creation of a static, if not stable, situation all along the Soviet perimeter but, at the same time, encourages similar centrifugal trends within the Atlantic Alliance. While the United States welcomes the former, it is determined to resist the latter. The policy of containment toward the Soviet Union continues to rest on a militarily strong and politically viable NATO, however difficult to maintain.

In view of the Sino-Soviet rift and the fact that China has acquired nuclear power, formulation of a firm American nuclear-response theory is needed for a policy of containing China. Such a selective strategy must not reactivate the Sino-Soviet collaboration and has to be tailored to the specific political circumstances of the Far East, which are characterized by the lack of a viable defense system such as NATO.
Even if an effective "strategic-nuclear umbrella" can be extended to support the policy of containing Communist China, there is an increasing probability of intraregional (local) wars which will not fit into any nuclear-response theory and in which the use of theater (tactical) nuclear weapons will not serve the interests of the United States. Nonetheless, such conflicts may require sustained massive Western support.

In the Pacific theater, American political interests rule out any major rollback strategy including a "fallback" on the defense alliance of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS), whether or not it is militarily feasible. Nevertheless, the coming decade may bring such drastic changes in the existing political alignment of nations in this region that the most serious consideration has to be given to sea mobility, air mobility, and "floating depots" as a partial compensation for the possible loss of foreign bases because of political uncertainty.

The spread of "wars of national liberation"—subversive insurgencies—and local revolutions is highly probable. However, identification of hostile elements with outside Communist centers (e.g., Moscow, Peking, Havana) will become increasingly difficult, if not impossible. The local and international political consequences of any direct military intervention by the United States will have to be weighed in each case with extreme care. An indirect approach—through United Nations or regional defense alliances—seems preferable.

A trend toward more unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral limitations in the conduct of general nuclear war—increasing arms control measures—is clearly indicated in the American national policy. Such constraints gradually reduce, and perhaps remove, the "holocaust" character of a nuclear conflict and increase the significance of military capabilities in the terminal or postnuclear phase of the war.

These and many other geopolitical considerations indeed reduce the number of alternatives. It becomes quite obvious
that a concept for a specific strategic posture can be plausible only if it offers a blend or mix of military force capabilities that fully takes into consideration the entire spectrum of probable conflict situations, the rapidly changing world environment, and the unchanged requirements set forth by the two constant elements—forward deployment and flexible response. Surprisingly small is the number of strategic mixes which can "orchestrate" the Nation's military power in such manner.

In the third phase of the inquiry, the results of which are presented in the following sections, a method was developed for grouping the required force capabilities so that simplified formulae of strategic mixes of alternative strategic postures could be derived.
II. CONFLICTS AND CAPABILITIES

It was pointed out in the Introduction that the definition of a military strategy calls for both a concept and a posture—a posture is explained as a combination of force capabilities at various levels of conflict. The ensuing discussion describes first the levels of conflict and then the force capabilities.

A. Spectrum of Conflicts

The study revealed that, in defining the major alternative strategies, it was not necessary to go beyond the four commonly recognized levels of war: general nuclear war, controlled strategic-nuclear war, limited war, and counter-insurgency. Cold war, as a separate category of conflict situations below the counter-insurgency level, was deliberately omitted, since it is—in terms of this report—the psychological-political exploitation of the over-all military posture of the Nation.

1. General Nuclear War

General nuclear war—in present terminology—covers a wide range of high-intensity conflict situations in which a variety of strategies can be employed against countervalue targets, counterforce targets, or any combination of the two. The purpose of the general nuclear war strategy of the United States is to deter and prevent the enemy from further escalation of the conflict by reserving the capability of "assured destruction" of the enemy's society. However, once conflicts escalate to that level, targeting will respond increasingly to military imperatives which inevitably lessen the concern over collateral damage to industrial and city populations.

2. Controlled Strategic-Nuclear War

In controlled strategic-nuclear war, countervalue targets, counterforce targets, or any combination of the two may be selected, as in general nuclear war. Its character
tends, however, toward counterforce, because its purpose is less than assured destruction of the enemy (some authors call it "limited nuclear war"). The key word is "controlled," and the purpose is to coerce the enemy through exemplary strategic demonstration or highly selective damage infliction.

3. Limited War

Limited war is limited in its objective by geography, political considerations, or any combination of the two. Political considerations include weapon and military objective limitations. Nuclear weapons may or may not be employed to attain these limited objectives. Accordingly, a number of strategies may be chosen which employ minimal conventional forces backed up by strategic-nuclear forces (the conventional forces serve as a "tripwire" for the strategic-nuclear forces), purely conventional forces, or a variety of combinations of conventional and theater (tactical) nuclear forces.

4. COIN—Counterinsurgency Warfare

COIN is now accepted as the designation for the lowest level of military involvement and ranges from military assistance and training programs through advisory and logistic (noncombat) support to defensive and offensive combat support—the latter already blurring the division between COIN and limited war.

B. Required Capabilities

The required military force capabilities roughly corresponding to the four broad categories of conflict situations just described are assured destruction, damage limitation, limited conflict, and counterinsurgency operation. (Assured destruction and damage limitation both relate to nuclear war and cannot be separated logically from a warfighting strategy for such a war. By itself, an assured destruction capability aims at nothing but deterrence.)
1. **Assured Destruction**

The required capabilities corresponding to the category of general nuclear war are predominantly those which call for assured destruction, a force capability which is part of Strategic Offensive Forces in terms of the Department of Defense program packages. Assured destruction describes a level of nuclear capability that can destroy the enemy "as a viable society" (a substantial percentage of its population combined with an even higher percentage of its industrial capacity) even after a well-planned surprise attack is absorbed. The United States already possesses such capability, while the Soviet Union is rapidly approaching a comparably credible posture; hence the phrases "nuclear stalemate," "balance of terror," and "mutual deterrence." Although Europe is not capable of absorbing massive nuclear attack and retaliating with sufficient strength to destroy the attacker as a viable society, European military thinking leans toward a countervalue targeting concept, with heavy reliance on its deterrent character:

-1 Budgetary considerations make it more attractive because it is cheaper than the maintenance of the highly sophisticated and much bigger selective retaliatory systems.

-2 The relatively less sophisticated technology required for target selection and weapon delivery makes it a more realistic—and therefore more "credible"—posture for European strategists.

-3 The general conviction is that any major, direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies in the Central European theater is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future as long as a credible deterrent exists.

One can see that assured destruction has a close affinity with "finite deterrence" as well as an extensive involvement with countervalue targets. By its nature, assured destruction favors hardened, survivable, surface-to-surface missiles; submarine-launched ballistic missiles; and,
generally speaking, second-strike (multistrike) capabilities. A somewhat distorted European interpretation erroneously identifies assured destruction with massive retaliation and the "tripwire" concept. The truth is that assured destruction has a strongly emphasized flexible-response character based on survivability with no fixed threshold for triggering nuclear response.

Maintaining a capability for assured destruction has been simplified to date by the assumption that any complete, meaningful defense system (covering Western Europe as well as North America) has been almost "unacceptably" costly, even if technologically possible. Because an assured-destruction capability is mainly a deterrent rather than a war-fighting capability, it would constitute the "last card" in national security that would be retained during arms control or gradual disarmament.

2. **Damage Limitation**

Damage limiting (as a capability, added to assured destruction) is the force capability which most closely corresponds to the requirements for controlled strategic war. The damage-limitation concept is intended to cover a number of missions that have one thing in common: they all intend to limit or minimize the damage that would result from an enemy's attack.

The concept includes both offensive and defensive components:

-1 The offensive component of damage limitation is a part of the Strategic Offensive Forces and also includes the assured-destruction force capability, although requirements differ significantly.

-2 The defensive component is assigned to the Strategic Defense Forces and Civil Defense packages of the DOD program. A large part of antisubmarine warfare (ASW), now included in the General Purpose Forces, also belongs here.
The very nature of damage limitation suggests, to some strategists, pre-emptive action or a first strike. These can certainly reduce the enemy's war-making capacity and, obviously, limit the anticipated damage to the United States. Any pre-emptive action, however, should be firmly controlled and flexibly selected. Because it seeks to eliminate the enemy's war-making capability, damage limitation has a strong counterforce character. Offensive damage limitation calls for constant reconnaissance; highly accurate target acquisition; precise, carefully controlled delivery; damage assessment; quick retargeting; and a foolproof command and control system.

Damage limitation is by no means limited to a first strike. However, any extension of the concept beyond U.S. pre-emption strongly accentuates the need for active and passive defenses alike.

There is no doubt that a survivable damage-limiting posture is the optimum one can ask for and the most desirable from the viewpoint of the Nation's political principles. However, the price tag on an effective damage-limiting posture vis-a-vis a sophisticated enemy like the Soviet Union has been considered prohibitive. It would be practical and may be imperative to develop such a posture, on a smaller scale, against less sophisticated nuclear opponents of the future (such as China) and for the conduct of controlled strategic-nuclear war requiring the very same capabilities. The active and passive defenses created for such a posture could also become, if later desired, the nucleus of a meaningful system limiting the damage which could be inflicted by a sophisticated opponent's attack.

Offensive damage limitation would likely be the first force capability subject to limitation under any serious arms control agreement. Because of this fact, some regard it as a wasteful investment, some consider it a potential bargaining lever, and others point out that an ability to eliminate the enemy's withheld forces makes a significantly large contribution to reducing losses of U.S. population and industry.
3. **Limited Conflict**

Military capabilities—assigned to General Purpose Forces and Airlift and Sealift Forces in the DOD program—that are required for the conduct and successful termination of a modern limited war are not too well understood because of the misconception of the very nature of limited war. It is not a return to the old conventional warfare, nor is it an introduction to strategic-nuclear warfare. It is ruled by the specific circumstances that made it limited. For example, according to the "ground rules," it may or may not be confined to certain geographic areas and may or may not involve nuclear weapons. The argument is well founded that if nuclear weapons are employed, the danger of miscalculation and unnecessary escalation is considerably high in this kind of war. On the other hand, the nuclear option has too much potential value to be precluded. Introduction of theater (tactical) nuclear weapons should be decided on the principle of *cui prodest* (whose interest would be better served). In most instance, their employment would not necessarily serve the U.S. interests; thus, limited-war requirements will probably continue to be primarily conventional forces backed up by very-low-yield, highly accurate nuclear weapons. An enemy's intent to launch a massive attack or increase its own theater nuclear weapons, or drastic cuts in the U.S. forces-in-being, would automatically increase the need for the nuclear component.

Another distinction should be made between offensive and defensive theater employment of nuclear weapons. The escalation potential of the defensive use of ground-to-air or air-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads over one's own territory (even the declared establishment of atomic demolition munition zones) in repelling outside aggression is definitely lower than that of any offensive nuclear weapon. This distinction is often overlooked in discussions of escalation.

In any case, one of the chief characteristics strongly desired for modern limited-war forces is their capability to operate efficiently in conventional, prenuclear, nuclear, and postnuclear environments alike. Methods of deployment,
logistics, and operational doctrines are not completely worked out. Experts point out that this multipurpose character cannot be expected from some of today’s major weapon systems.

The paramount importance of mobility in limited war is well recognized—mobility in every sense of the word, from strategic air mobility and sea mobility to cross-country mobility. This includes an increasing need for airborne firepower and logistics. Modern limited war also creates "sanctuaries," whose existence challenges traditional doctrines and calls for added force capabilities; for instance, in the field of area denial or air-to-air combat.

Strategists recognize that the value of strategic reserves in limited war is increased by the speed of their deployment disproportionately to their size. It has to be added, however, that this disproportionate increase is vitally needed for various reasons:

-1 Domestic politics are not likely to permit the maintenance of large (limited-war) standby forces in peacetime.

-2 Eventual arms control agreements may freeze or reduce force levels.

-3 Quick redeployment capabilities may replace—whenever politically feasible—the permanent stationing of U.S. forces.

4. **Counterinsurgency Operation**

In terms of the DOD program packages, the COIN mission is assigned to Special Forces which are part of the General Purpose Forces. This assignment is logical, since the line between COIN and limited-war capabilities is blurred. The difference is in the origins of the conflicts rather than in the required capabilities of men and weapons. Transition from deployment of uniquely trained Special Forces to highly trained regular forces (Marines, Air Cavalry, Paratroopers, et cetera) occurs naturally when circumstances
warrant it. Many observers feel that the escalated form of COIN warfare—as seen in Vietnam—shows some marked characteristics of future limited wars in any other part of the world with the possible exception of Western Europe.

COIN operations represent the most extended form of forward deployment. In its original concept, COIN extends the "American military presence" to countries where no major American forces are deployed ordinarily, but where the nation's intention to defend that area from any form of subversion or aggression is openly declared.

The initial concept of COIN was based on the principle of preventing local subversive movements from growing into civil wars which could eventually lead to the establishment of local Communist or pro-Communist regimes. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this is still the primary objective of COIN. If there are special capabilities required—as there are, but mostly in the nonmilitary field—they are most needed at this preventive stage. Once the conflict develops into organized guerrilla warfare, the initial COIN mission has failed.

Russian, Chinese, and Castroite brands of communism are united in their eagerness to explore and exploit the "wars of national liberation." In the spectrum of conflicts, subversive insurgency has the highest probability of occurring in the coming decade. The capability of the United States to prevent, counter, and repel this type of aggression is an indispensable part of future military posture.

COIN is the logical counterpoint to assured destruction and requires a capability that cannot be given up in any arms control agreement.
III. STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES

Division of the spectrum of conflicts into four simplified categories and assignment to these categories of corresponding force capabilities make possible the following description of alternative strategic mixtures which conform to the guidelines of the two constant determining elements—forward deployment and flexible response—and which are based on international political realities.

Five alternative strategic postures were selected—or rather compiled, since each of them represents a variety of ideas, theories, and substrategies. For this reason, these alternatives should not be identified with a particular person or persons. The five alternatives are as follows:

Strategy 1—a posture of "retained options"

Strategy 2—a "Soviet-oriented" posture

Strategy 3—a "China-oriented" posture

Strategy 4—a modified "fallback" posture

Strategy 5—an "arms control" posture.

Each of the alternatives is briefly described below with the condensed political rationale that made it appear plausible. Appendix A compares main characteristics of these postures.

A. Strategy 1—A Posture of "Retained Options"

The political rationale behind this strategic posture is that the situation in regard to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations will continue to be relatively static, even to the extent that certain arms control measures seem possible. It recognizes the Far East as the area where
major conflict situations may be imminent in the coming decade and stresses a determination to contain Red Chinese expansion in that area. The high probability of Communist-inspired "wars of national liberation" in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the need for U.S. capability to counter such subversive insurgencies are strongly emphasized.

This school of thought believes that the United States now possesses such a quantitative and qualitative superiority in the strategic-nuclear field that it has—in terms of assured destruction—not only a stable deterrence but also a margin big enough to hedge against a gradual increase in Soviet nuclear capabilities, barring any spectacular technological breakthrough. Consequently, its strategic-nuclear thinking is characterized by efforts to economize and to delay certain major decisions, since there seems to be time to "preserve the option" to choose at some later date.

In regard to strategic offensive forces, this school—referring to pragmatic-technological circumstances rather than doctrinal beliefs—shows a marked preference for improved survivable (hardened or submarine-launched) missiles over manned systems. Consistent with its targeting philosophy—which is characterized by the recognition that technology limits the "city-sparing" capabilities of strategic-nuclear forces—it tends toward an almost "finite deterrent" posture which limits the number and yield of missiles and minimizes the number and role of strategic aircraft.

The school's position on strategic defenses is somewhat self-contradicting. On one hand, it realizes that any increment to the offensive forces—above the ceiling of assured-destruction capability—is subject to the "law of diminishing returns" and that added credibility can be achieved through strengthening the defensive profile. Therefore, it recognizes the importance of active defenses (including ASW) and advocates a civil defense program. On the other hand, it is preoccupied with the "comparative investment" side of the problem, stating that high-cost investment in defensive damage limitation can be counterbalanced by a corresponding increase of the Soviet assured-destruction capability at substantially less additional cost.
The result is a rather stagnant attitude, based on the assumption that the Soviet posture is governed by similar considerations. Lately, a distinction has begun to emerge between the "indefensible" Soviet threat and the threat presented by the less sophisticated systems of "Nth countries" (China) where an effective defense seems possible. Efforts to achieve such a posture are predictable.

This school lays strong emphasis on conventional capabilities in its limited-war concept and is keenly aware of the "nuclear threshold." Some proponents do not choose to distinguish between the various nuclear thresholds that may be crossed in the course of controlled escalation. Others feel that the use of low-yield nuclear weapons against clearly indicated military targets in a geographically limited area establishes an "intermediate" threshold which it is hoped would not automatically trigger general nuclear war. In both cases, it may be said that the nuclear capabilities of the General Purpose Forces are regarded mainly as complements to nuclear strategic systems or as "theater deterrence" rather than backup capabilities integrated with conventional armaments. A moderate-sized but highly mobile land, air, and sea force is advocated with increasing capability for fighting escalated COIN wars. This school would prefer to have this force based in the continental United States as a central strategic reserve but recognizes the political necessity of massive peacetime deployment in certain forward areas.

The characteristics of this posture, summarized and grouped according to the four major categories of desired capabilities, are:

1. **Assured destruction** is regarded as an almost finite deterring, second-strike capability which relies primarily on missiles. It has been already achieved and—probably with only marginal improvements of the systems—can be maintained through the coming decade.

2. **Damage limitation**, in the sense of a "war-fighting capability" for a controlled strategic-nuclear war, is not well developed, because it is considered
mainly as an increment over the ceiling of assured destruction and not as a capability per se. Active and passive defenses are advocated but not pursued vigorously. The development of a small-scale defensive system against "primitive" nuclear-missile threats will probably be accepted.

Limited-war requirements place strong emphasis on the conventional capability of a highly mobile, moderate-sized force to fight protracted (conventional) conflicts under exotic conditions. Tactical nuclear weapons "preserve the nuclear option" rather than add to the practical war-fighting capability of theater forces.

COIN capabilities, as part of the limited-war, war-fighting capabilities, are vigorously stressed; the effort to maximize them during the coming decade is clearly predictable.

B. Strategy 2—A "Soviet-Oriented" Posture

Alternative Strategy 2 is based on the thoughts of those who criticize U.S. present defense posture and are, in general, alarmed by the euphoria that exists on both sides of the Atlantic as a result of the East-West detente.

The political philosophy that lends a certain degree of plausibility to this theory acknowledges the disintegration of Stalin's "monolithic empire" but points to the fact that the Sino-Soviet rift and the various brands of communism have placed the Soviet Union in the favorable position of being the strategic reserve of the broad anti-imperialist coalition, uncommitted in preliminary skirmishes or tactical engagements, and, if possible, playing a role similar to that of the United States in World War I and World War II. In fact, the Soviets gained this important strategic option through the process of the diffusion of power, while the United States, in spite of all its frantic efforts in quest of options, did not. The diffusion of power within the Western Alliance left the United States in the front lines, directly exposed to skirmishes, probing attacks, and tactical engagements. In other words, the Soviet Union, once an
underdeveloped country itself, was able to consolidate Communist rule over its vast territory amidst the hostile world of capitalists, imperialists, and Fascists; it completely understands the reasoning of the Chinese, even if convinced that the Mao/Lin Piao/Giap formula will not work. The Soviet Union knows that the United States will sooner or later become fully aware that acceptance of the Chinese challenge would result in a new form of the war of attrition and, at a critical point, may prefer a showdown, striking out against the "center of gravity." The Soviet Union simply does not want to be identified as the center of gravity at this point in the dialectic-historical development of the inevitable clash between communism and capitalism. Whether the Soviet Union chooses to join the fight is, once again, not the point. The point is that it has the positive option to join and, perhaps, decide the outcome of the fight, while the United States has a negative option—withdrawal.

How does the Soviet Union utilize its favorable position that enables it to choose the time, place, and form of committing its forces? The "Soviet-oriented" school admits the internal economic difficulties that exist in the Soviet Union and concedes that a considerable part of its national resources is being channeled to satisfy consumer demands. Yet, this school points to the vast, spectacular Soviet space program that was initiated and carried out under economic and social circumstances much less favorable than those of the present. Secrecy, relatively easy maneuverability (Nazi-Soviet Pact!), and the militant, close organization of the Communist society enable Soviet leaders to follow any course of action that maximizes their strategic advantage. Moreover, "they would be traitors to communism" if they failed to do so.

Therefore, United States strategy must remain geared to the fact that, detente or no detente, the Soviet Union continues to represent a very real—and, in terms of national survival, the only—danger.

Only a clearly superior posture can deter the Soviet Union from "joining the fight" at the most opportune moment.
Only with the Soviet Union kept at bay does the United States have a chance to contain or defeat China and successfully liquidate subversive insurgencies.

The school dismisses most "comparative investment" arguments by saying that "we can afford much more than the Russians." Thus, the United States must ensure the survival of its viable society through the most extensive program of damage limitation possible, regardless of cost, because "survival has little to do with cost efficiency." Accordingly, this alternative places its heaviest emphasis on the real damage-limiting profile—active and passive defenses that enhance the efficiency of the offensive damage-limiting capability. The arguments grouped around this theme are undoubtedly forceful. Some of the major points are:

-1 The extent of Soviet progress in the anti-ballistic-missile field is not really known; the United States has been surprised time and again.

-2 It is known, however, that the Soviet Union has a civil defense system, World War II experience, and nearly 50 years of militant social organization.

-3 If the Soviet Union wants to keep up with the United States, it will strain its economy to a far greater extent than damage-limitation measures would tax U.S. economy.

-4 The United States has a great advantage in the field of civil defense over the Soviet Union—surplus food supplies against constant food shortages. The same applies to medical supplies, transportation and communication means, and so forth.

-5 A defensive damage-limiting profile will make the flexible-response strategy of the United States far more credible.

-6 Because defensive damage limitation cannot be restricted to the North American Continent, but must cover the European allies too, U.S. efforts...
in developing defensive damage-limitation capabilities will help these allies overcome their "juvenile massive retaliation period" and understand the flexible-response strategy of the United States applied to forward areas.

-7 Some of the current NATO problems will be seen in a new perspective: the problem of U.S. "monopoly" over nuclear response ("who is dying for whom, when, and why?") would lose some of its gravity once neither Europe nor the United States is risking its survival as a viable society (particularly applicable to Germany).

-8 Joint NATO planning, R&D, and maybe delegated command and control authority in defensive damage limitation are far less provocative or "proliferating" than face-saving "stillborn" ideas of offensive coordination like the Multi-Lateral Force (MLF); the former may be "the thing" NATO needs for greater unity.

-9 The implementation of a meaningful defensive damage-limiting strategy would also result in badly needed psychological and functional training for the American people who, unlike Europeans, have no practical experience in civil defense.

In regard to the other elements of the strategic posture, the "Soviet-oriented" school believes that the increased credibility of the Nation's flexible-nuclear response capability would further deter limited wars. In summary:

-1 Assured destruction is not a finite quantity of destruction because it must hedge against all possible surprises and uncertainties of the enemy's damage-limiting capability. Some representatives of the school recommend the development of very-high-yield weapons for use against countervalue targets in retaliatory general nuclear war.
-2 **Damage limitation** is not simply an increment over assured destruction. It represents a real capability for fighting controlled strategic-nuclear war up to the highest possible level. The offensive profile is not detached from the similar capabilities of assured destruction, although the reliability of missiles is less taken for granted and, accordingly, the role of manned systems is somewhat more appreciated. Defensive damage limitation, active and passive alike, is heavily emphasized and, admittedly, would require an increase in the defense budget. This posture's assured-destruction and damage-limiting capabilities include both (selective) offensive and defensive requirements against an "Nth country" threat.

-3 **Limited war**—because it is held less probable in the framework of this posture—perhaps requires somewhat smaller forces than Strategy I with essentially the same characteristics of mobility and dual capability.

-4 **COIN**—in view of official Soviet endorsement of "wars of liberation," this school does not question the requirement for a strong capability of this kind.

C. **Strategy 3—A "China-Oriented" Posture**

The third alternative strategy would seem to have the closest affinity to the posture of "retained options." The basic assumptions of the political rationales are almost identical: continued, static, power balance and relative (military) tranquility in the Western front, because the Soviet Union would risk less and gain more by refraining from direct intervention in intraregional conflicts (Cyprus, Greece, Turkey) and exploiting only the political opportunities created by the crises. The same Soviet attitude, although with somewhat less confidence, is projected to the Middle East (Iran, Iraq) and to the Far East (India, Indonesia).

The interpretation of the political indicators differs from Strategy I in the evaluation of the Sino-Soviet rift.
This school believes that historical, racial, and cultural factors, as well as China's unhidden territorial claims, stem from such a solid basis (i.e., not simply an "ideological" difference) that the Chinese problem can safely be separated from that of the Soviet Union by proper strategy.

A common denominator in the varied thinking of this school is the recognition that, while the United States has been successful in containing the Soviet expansion through a firmly postulated nuclear-response concept, no suitable nuclear-response theory has been devised—or, at least, enunciated—in regard to China. This is the point where the "China-oriented posture" school diverges from the officially accepted theory on assured destruction—that is, "destruction of the enemy as a viable society" measured in percentages of population and industrial capacity destroyed. This targeting philosophy simply could not be applied to China, since she has unlimited "floorspace and personnel" and the roots of her Communist society are as deep in the far-removed villages as in the cities. How viable the 730-million-plus Communist Chinese nation will remain as a guerrilla society carrying on protracted warfare on a vast, basically primitive continent, after losing its major cities and newly acquired industries, is a question that cannot be easily comprehended, much less quantified.

The "China-oriented" theorists are convinced that the firm nuclear-response policy needed to contain China lies within the strategic framework of the controlled strategic-nuclear war. "Exemplary coercion," "selective damage infliction," "progressive attrition to coerce," and "strategic demonstration" are their different expressions describing basically the same concept: strictly controlled, graduated, nuclear warfare against selected targets of the military-political apparatus, with minimum damage to the people. This is the war the United States faces in the Far East, the school maintains, because any major conflict in that area would, sooner or later, involve China's homeland.

The nature of controlled strategic-nuclear war stresses the importance of selective targeting, or, rather, the sequence of targeting, to allow time to get the political
message across clearly. The political context of the war and its limited goals (no showdown)—a concept familiar to the "pause-and-negotiate" theorists of the "retained options" school—must be kept in the forefront at each step of the campaign. This would, it is hoped, keep the Soviet Union out of the conflict and minimize the possibility of escalation to general nuclear war. The concept also emphasizes the necessity of having communication channels available.

Some of the proponents of this school consider the current air campaign against North Vietnam an embryonic example of applying such strategy. Because this strategy requires constant and accurate reconnaissance, quick target acquisition, precision delivery, and damage assessment, with maximum psychological effect on, but with minimum damage to, the civilian population, the school looks favorably on manned systems with very-low-yield nuclear weapons.

The "China-oriented" alternative proposes to withhold "tactical" nuclear weapons, except as a means of "exemplary coercion." On the other hand, it rules out Korean-style "limited wars" as a test of strength between China and the United States.

In most of its other aspects, the "China-oriented" concept agrees with Strategy 1, recapitulating in terms of the four categories:

-1 Assured destruction, with its almost finite, countervalue, missile-based, survivable second-strike character, is primarily designed to contain the industrialized Soviet Union. With marginal improvements of the present systems, it is likely to be effective throughout the coming decade.

-2 Damage limitation, designating the characteristics of controlled, strategic-nuclear, war-fighting capabilities, requires a conceptually and functionally different approach, especially tailored to the needs of the Far Eastern theater: controlled, graduated, progressive strategic-nuclear offense
against primarily counterforce targets, most effectively carried out by manned systems. As the Chinese Communists do not represent a sophisticated nuclear threat to the United States in the coming decade, the development of a relatively small-scale, defensive, damage-limitation system is feasible and desirable.

-3 Limited war calls for highly mobile, conventional forces. Theater-based nuclear components may be used for strategic demonstration or exemplary coercion, complementing offensive damage limitation, but not for tactical purposes. As damage limitation is both a deterrence and a minimum-risk strategic war-fighting capability, the size of the required conventional forces may be somewhat smaller than in the case of Strategy 1.

-4 COIN requirements call for maximum capabilities, in recognition of the fact that identification of subversive insurgencies with outside Communist powers may be increasingly difficult, if not impossible; thus, COIN forces may have to operate efficiently outside any "nuclear umbrella."

D. Strategy 4—A Modified "Fallback" Posture

The fourth alternative posture is based on a school of thought advocating a fallback strategy for the United States, under such conditions, and with such capabilities that it cannot, by any standards, be called an "isolationist" or a "Fortress America" concept. Indeed, a closer examination shows that this alternative would conform to the principles of both forward deployment and controlled response. It leaves, however, the primary responsibility of theater defense to the friendly local forces and replaces continued American military presence with explicit and mutually satisfactory guarantees of quick redeployment of tactical forces and/or strategic support.

The concept is attractive, for it would reinstate the United States as the central strategic reserve of a worldwide defense system, in a position similar to the one it
hold in two world wars. It was this decisive role that enabled the United States to assume the military leadership of the non-Communist world. Undeniably, this posture is also militarily sound and economically feasible. It might even appeal to American public sentiments strained by protracted peripheral conflicts.

It is an optimistic alternative. To what degree this posture is politically plausible cannot be ascertained. One may call it a marginal case, since it depends on international political conditions which are extremely difficult to achieve. Yet, as the proponents of the theory point out, it represents exactly that "kind of world" the United States foreign policy would like to see. It is politically as well as militarily difficult; but, in view of the history of the past two decades, one cannot categorically rule out the possibility of such achievements in the next 10 years.

The political rationale assumes a continued detente between the Warsaw Pact countries and the Atlantic Alliance, a basically unchanged nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the existence of a viable European defense community with conventional as well as coordinated nuclear capabilities (which presupposes the solution of both the French and the German problems). The theory further visualizes a steady deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations (an interpretation similar to that of Strategy 3) that would facilitate the formulation of a credible nuclear-response policy to contain China (still similar to Strategy 3). In turn, this policy would serve as a strategic-nuclear backup to a strong Far Eastern defense system similar to NATO. In regard to Latin America, the theory postulates progress for the Alliance for Progress. As to the rest of the world, it counts on the increased peacekeeping role of the United Nations.

It must be noted that, even under such favorable circumstances, a considerable element of uncertainty and insecurity is likely to remain.
In summary:

-1 **Assured destruction**, as far as forces-in-being are concerned, acquires an almost "minimum deterrence" character, somewhat less than Strategy 1 postulates, although the school does not deny the need for a strong R&D profile to minimize the surprise of a Soviet technological breakthrough.

-2 **Damage limitation**, offensive and defensive, should be tailored to the non-Soviet threat (similar to Strategy 3) and to the explicit and implicit guarantees given to the regional alliances. This implies a rather moderate (Strategy 3) level of forces.

-3 **Limited war** requires moderate-sized, but completely mobile, extremely high-performance, land, sea, and air forces, probably with reliance on low-yield, high-accuracy nuclear weapons, for tactical use and complementing strategic systems.

-4 **COIN** capability requirements, assuming the existence of efficient, local defense systems, should be smaller than in Strategy 1.

E. **Strategy 5—An "Arms Control" Posture**

Among the repeatedly declared objectives of the Nation's policy, attainment of a peaceful world community—as sketched in the Preamble, and in Articles One and Two of the United Nations Charter—ranks high.

This goal visualizes a world of independent nations—each with the institutions of its own choice, but cooperating with one another to promote the mutual interest of their citizens—a world free of aggression, a world which moves toward the rule of law, a world in which human rights are secure, a world of better life for all mankind.

This goal is indeed distant. It is to be approached with care, through a step-by-step limitation of the arms race and gradual disarmament. Five Presidents have
confirmed the Nation's desire, as well as its persistence, to work toward this end.

As a major political objective, however desirable, it is subordinated to the basic requirements of national security, particularly in a nuclear age, when no less than national survival is at stake. This fact eliminates a number of theories stemming from either idealistic pacifism or the realistic fear of nuclear holocaust.

However, some practical avenues of unilateral (policy of mutual example), bilateral, and multilateral arms control measures and agreements remain which represent a slow and gradual approach toward the world envisioned by the United Nations Charter.

The fact that an "arms control environment" already exists becomes strikingly clear when some of the past milestones are reviewed:

- 1 Nuclear-test moratorium (1958)
- 2 Treaty banning military use of Antarctica (1959)
- 3 De facto acknowledgment of non-nuclear South America (1962)
- 4 "Hot Line"—a bilateral step to prevent accidental war (1963)
- 5 Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963)
- 5 Implementation of inspection provisions of the Antarctic Treaty (1963)
- 7 Peaceful exploration and use of outer space—U.N. Resolution (1963)
- 8 No nuclear weapons in space—U.N. Resolution (1963)
- 9 A "understanding" between the United States and the Soviet Union, joined by the United Kingdom (1964).
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson delineated a number of subjects about which the United States is prepared to come to terms, independently from, but leading toward, a "General and Complete Disarmament." These subjects include, among others, a "verified freeze of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles," a comprehensive test-ban treaty, restriction of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the exchange of military observers in certain strategic points to reduce surprise mobilization and deployment of forces.

In view of this clearly discernible trend, a concept that takes into realistic consideration the impact of an arms control environment on U.S. military posture must be included among the plausible strategic alternatives.

In summary:

-1 **Assured destruction**, in the form of a "minimum deterrence," should remain the "last card" of national defense until an adequate world system of deterrence and international law enforcement develops. The force is likely to consist of hardened, survivable missiles with the possibility of their periodic replacement, including a chance for the introduction of improved follow-on systems on a strictly limited scale.

-2 **Damage limitation** appears to be the principal area of arms control agreements. The offensive profile may be entirely eliminated. While strategic warning systems may be retained and overtly improved, the role of active defenses is highly controversial, and their deployment may be frozen or barred. It is highly unlikely that a civil defense program would be supported in the United States under such circumstances.

-3 **Limited war** is another major area for possible arms reduction agreements may freeze force levels at a mutually acceptable minimum. Also, tactical nuclear weapons may be prohibited. Establishment of a
functional system of inspection in staging areas and/or key mobilization centers, may lead to the thinning out of theater forces and ultimately to mere "tripwires" on both sides of the NATO-Warsaw Pact front. The geostrategic advantages of the Communist Bloc—the "inner circle"—must be balanced by retainment of quick deployment capabilities.

-4 COIN capabilities should not be subject to negotiations and must be retained at the strongest possible level, since there is no likelihood that the Communists would or could offer acceptable guarantees against subversive insurgency.
APPENDIX A

COMPARATIVE TABULATION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS
OF FIVE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC POSTURES

PRESENT AND ANTICIPATED
ALTERNATIVE UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGIES
SUMMARY REPORT
### COMPARATIVE TABULATION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FIVE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC POSTURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies Alternative</th>
<th>General Nuclear War</th>
<th>Controlled Strategic Nuclear War</th>
<th>Limited War</th>
<th>COIIC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assured Destruction Capability</td>
<td>Damage Limitation Capability</td>
<td>Limited Conflict Capability</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Operation Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not well-developed</td>
<td>Primarily conventional with tactical &quot;nuclear option&quot;</td>
<td>Part of limited-war forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Offensive: increment of assured destruction</td>
<td>Moderate size</td>
<td>Strongest possible, both in prevention and war-fighting, under conventional conditions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Primarily missile-based</td>
<td>Dual capability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Defensive: limited capabilities against Nth country threats</td>
<td>High mobility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Almost finite deterrence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City-sparing countervalue</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Primarily missile-based</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Second strike*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not finite deterrence</td>
<td>Most developed</td>
<td>Balanced conventional and nuclear with option to use either or both</td>
<td>Part of limited-war forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategy 2</td>
<td>War-fighting countervalue</td>
<td>Offensive: increment of assured destruction</td>
<td>Less than moderate size</td>
<td>Less than maximum (conventional) capability, in the belief that overall strategic posture would keep COIN warfare at a moderate level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed force</td>
<td>Mixed force</td>
<td>Dual capability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second strike*</td>
<td>Defensive: maximum capabilities required</td>
<td>High mobility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Almost finite deterrence</td>
<td>Well-developed</td>
<td>Primarily conventional with theater nuclear as complement to strategic systems</td>
<td>Part of limited-war forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 3</td>
<td>City-sparing countervalue</td>
<td>Offensive: tailored to Far East</td>
<td>Less than moderate size</td>
<td>Less than maximum (conventional) capability, in the belief that controlled strategic (nuclear) response would deter escalation of COIN wars</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primarily missile-based</td>
<td>Primarily manned systems</td>
<td>Dual capability</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second strike*</td>
<td>Defensive: limited to Nth country threats</td>
<td>High mobility</td>
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(Continued)
### COMPARATIVE TABULATION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FIVE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC POSTURES—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies Alternatives</th>
<th>General Nuclear War</th>
<th>Controlled Strategic Nuclear War</th>
<th>Limited War</th>
<th>COE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assured Destruction Capability</td>
<td>Damage Limitation Capability</td>
<td>Limited Conflict Capability</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Operation Capability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Strategy 3</strong></td>
<td>Minimum deterrence</td>
<td>Bargaining point</td>
<td>Bargaining point</td>
<td>Part of limited war forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countervalue*</td>
<td>Offensive: none Peacemaking—probably conventional</td>
<td>Minimum - ise</td>
<td>Peacekeeping—probably conventional</td>
<td>Strongest possible, both in prevention and war-fighting, under conventional conditions, complementing effective peacekeeping by U.S. forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile-based</td>
<td>Defensive: warning systems</td>
<td>No ABM Very high mobility</td>
<td>Peacekeeping—probably conventional</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second strike*</td>
<td>Civil defense not likely</td>
<td></td>
<td>Very high mobility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy 4</strong></td>
<td>Minimum deterrence</td>
<td>Developed</td>
<td>Balanced conventional and nuclear with option to use either or both</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countervalue*</td>
<td>Offensive: tailored to 5th country Mixed force</td>
<td>Moderate size</td>
<td></td>
<td>Relatively small war-fighting force on assumption that effective regional defense capabilities exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile-based</td>
<td>Defensive: limited to 5th country threats</td>
<td>Dual capability</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second strike*</td>
<td></td>
<td>Very high mobility</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*First-strike use of survivable second-strike weapons included.
*Tending toward countervalue, but not clearly defined.
APPENDIX B

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRESENT AND ANTICIPATED
ALTERNATIVE UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGIES

SUMMARY REPORT
APPENDIX B

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The works and statements listed below do not represent a reference list in a sense which implies that these works would necessarily lead the reader to the author’s conclusions. They do represent, however, an important segment of the abundantly rich literature related to the subject of national defense and offer historical insight into the recent past, as well as a great variety of strategic theories and political considerations.


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Abstract

Five competing military strategies are presented which can be used in planning for the future needs of the United States. These strategies are considered plausible within the framework of today's international political realities.

A survey of the military environment from the end of World War II until the present identified two constant elements in military strategic thinking—forward deployment and controlled response. These elements were used as criteria to eliminate less plausible strategies. The strategies finally chosen are described in terms of four categories of conflict (general nuclear war, controlled strategic-nuclear war, limited war, and counterinsurgency) and in terms of force capabilities associated with the kinds of conflict (assured destruction, damage limitation, limited conflict, and counterinsurgency operations). (Editor).