SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

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This Memorandum contains the first report of the author's research on Soviet policy in Latin America. It states the general argument of several hypotheses but, with a few exceptions, does not at this stage present the documentary evidence. The Memorandum is incomplete also in its analysis of the latest relevant and major event—the Tricontinental Conference of January 1966 in Havana—because the proceedings of that meeting are not yet available. Subsequent studies will attempt to remedy these deficiencies in documentation and coverage. This first RM is being issued to evoke critical response that may aid the author in his further investigation.

This study is being distributed to those governmental agencies concerned with Soviet foreign policy and Latin American affairs.
SUMMARY

Traditionally, Soviet interest in Latin America has been low. With the communization of Cuba, however, it mounted, and for a short time there were expectations in the communist camp that communism would spread in the Caribbean and on its shores. Since the missile crisis, the expectations of the Soviet Union and, more recently, of Cuba have diminished. This Memorandum examines the development of Soviet policy in underdeveloped countries in general and in postwar Latin America in particular, and attempts to make some projection into the future.

Until the Cuban revolution, Soviet theorists thought that all underdeveloped countries would go through a lengthy process. Its first stage was expected to be the achievement of national independence, in which the Communist Party would play the major role and assume the leadership of the revolution. The second stage would be the classic seizure of power by the communist revolution over the opposition of the bourgeoisie. Since 1956, however, this formula has been modified for two reasons. First, the Soviet leaders, deeply concerned about the possibility of nuclear war, including one that could grow out of confrontations on a scale smaller than general war, developed the idea of the peaceful transition to socialism. Second, the communization of Cuba was demonstrating to them that the traditional methods of transition to communism were not necessarily the models for the present. Castro achieved power as a noncommunist leader and then became a Communist, absorbing the existing, and antagonistic, Communist Party and carrying the country along with him. By this political
change he sought to force the Soviet Union to support him against the United States, with which he had embroiled himself in serious difficulties. This development made it clear to the Soviet Union that the pattern of the October revolution of 1917 or of the seizure of power in China could not be repeated, but that each new communist revolution would be different not only in its particulars but in its essentials.

Following this reasoning to its logical conclusion, the Cuban revolution, too, will not be a model for future revolutions. This has now been explicitly realized by the Cubans as well as the Russians, who argue that the very fact of the Cuban revolution has inspired the United States to adopt a policy that precludes its repetition elsewhere in Latin America. This conclusion leaves the Soviet Union with the problem of its relations both with communist and other leftist parties and with active guerrilla movements in Latin America. In dealing with countries in the underdeveloped world in general, and Latin America in particular, the Soviet Union has to face the twofold problem of its relations to noncommunist governments and to communist parties within those governments.

For many years, the Soviet Union could point to the Soviet revolution and the subsequent economic and political development of the USSR as an example for the underdeveloped world. But as underdeveloped countries have actually become independent, the irrelevance of the Soviet model has become clear. The Soviet Union developed heavy industry on the basis of forced savings without any help from abroad. Today, the emerging countries expect, and receive, assistance from the more highly developed capitalist and socialist
countries. Communist or noncommunist, these underdeveloped countries do not have to go it alone, and, quite naturally, none wants to do so.

With the newly independent nations able to claim aid and advice from both sides, the Soviet Union has not been able to insist that they restrict themselves to Soviet assistance, and has rationalized the changed situation with a theory of the progression to socialism on the basis of aid from the Western powers. If the state sector of the economy is emphasized, say the Soviet theorists, the transition to socialism will take place. Furthermore, this transition may be entirely nonviolent because, given the concentration of economic power in the state, the most effective political class will be the technicians who manage the state. Lacking the conservative, antirevolutionary tendencies of the property-holding bourgeoisie, these groups will convert to communism at the critical juncture, thereby making the state communist. The relevance of Castro's case is obvious. Russian writers have made it clear that they do not expect this transition always to be as precipitous as it was in Cuba. One suspects even that they prefer it not to be so, for "premature" communist states established on a shaky economic and political basis may require the kind of economic and military assistance which the Soviet Union either cannot or will not furnish. Furthermore, such states may be overturned from within or by the United States, and either event would be a defeat for the Soviet Union. The problem for the Soviets, therefore, will be to decide in any given case whether or not to support the revolutionary state that is on the point of becoming communist or has already proclaimed itself so.
Despite Castro's success, the Soviet Union does not expect this kind of revolution to recur in Latin America. Its major endeavor has been to strengthen Latin American nationalism because it is anti-United States. The larger communist parties in Latin America are either seeking coalition with or otherwise supporting nationalist groups. This policy is inexpensive, promising, and unlikely to result in "premature" communist states.

Within the framework of this general policy, the Soviet Union has also been supporting the guerrilla movements in Central America, Venezuela, and Peru, which are largely in the hands of noncommunist elements. The communist parties in these areas maintain an uneasy relationship with them, for they are afraid, on the one hand, that these movements may fail and that, whether or not they succeed, the Communists will suffer for what the guerrillas do. On the other hand, as Communists, they cannot afford to ignore those who are "fighting with arms in their hands" and must therefore help them to some extent.

The Soviet Union and Cuba have accommodated themselves to the needs of these parties in varying degrees. Since the end of 1964, the Soviets have given more verbal encouragement to active guerrilla movements in Latin America than for many years before. From their point of view, this is a way of preserving some influence over revolutionary situations, and it also helps ease their relations with Cuba. The Soviets probably feel confident that these guerrilla movements will not succeed in overthrowing governments and setting up communist states, for, if this were to happen, the Soviet Union would find it embarrassing not to help such new states and yet very dangerous to help them.
likely, the Soviets assume that the United States would intervene before matters reached such a point, and that American intervention, in turn, would provide justification for the Soviet Union's general policy of supporting anti-Americanism in Latin America.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The general conclusions of the study will be stated at the outset in the broadest terms to aid the reader in his evaluation of the cogency of the argument as it is unfolded in more detail.

Before Castro's assumption of power in Cuba, the Soviet Union viewed Latin America, in general, and the Caribbean, in particular, as an area where American power limited communist opportunities severely. The overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954 seemed to prove the point. But for a time after the Bay of Pigs episode, the Cubans believed, and seemed to have convinced the Soviets, that the Cuban revolution could be exported. But the failure of several attempts to do so, and the outcome of the missile crisis in the fall of 1962, caused first the Soviets and somewhat later the Cubans to revise their hopes for new communist states in Latin America in the near or foreseeable future.

The pattern of high hopes for the expansion of communism followed by a more modest estimate of what could realistically be expected was characteristic of Soviet policy the world over, and this alternation of euphoria and sobriety was perhaps even more strongly evident in Cuba than elsewhere. In the mid-fifties, the Soviet leaders expected the economic situation within the Soviet Union to improve rapidly; after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, they looked for a period of stabilization in Eastern Europe; and they hoped to advance in Western Europe. But now, ten years later, the domestic economy is in the doldrums, and the splintering of the international communist
movement has probably gone far beyond even the worst expectations. In Western Europe, beginning with 1958, the Soviets hoped that the pressure on Berlin against the background of growing Soviet military strength would yield positive results. Had they been right, this would have opened a new phase in the Soviet advance in Western Europe which had been halted in 1948. Yet this hope, too, collapsed as the Soviet Union's claims to military superiority were exposed as hollow.

The Soviet leaders in the last decade also expected to make great advances in the underdeveloped world, then in the process of decolonization. In retrospect, it seems clear that the new Soviet program for the underdeveloped countries (and other parts of the world, for that matter) had started with Stalin, who made the first tentative moves toward modifying the two-camp theory. (The reexamination of the Indian Communist Party's attitude toward the Congress Party was a case in point.) After Stalin's death, his successors continued to probe cautiously and then struck out boldly. The attempt to influence Guatemalan policy had to be abandoned, but this did not discourage large-scale Soviet arms sales to Egypt in 1955 (by a proxy, to be sure) and to Indonesia (directly) some five years later. Soviet expectations from this policy were threefold. The first aim was to weaken the sphere of Western influence by buttressing such newly independent countries as Egypt and Indonesia, turning Western losses into Soviet gains. The second was to embroil newly independent nations with NATO member countries, thus straining the Western alliance, as, for example, the United States had to choose between Dutch and Indonesian claims in West Irian and similarly,
in Indochina and in Algeria, had to make a choice between aggravating its relations with NATO members and offending the new countries. Third, Soviet influence was expected to put these newly independent countries on the path to socialism rather than capitalism. However, since the first two objectives were in themselves sufficient to justify the policy of investment in the underdeveloped world, the prospects for communization of these countries did not have to be very immediate. In fact, as we shall see later, the only country to become communist--Cuba--had not been expected by the Soviet Union to do so, and it is by no means clear that the Russians view the Cuban policy as a complete success.

The situation has changed markedly since 1955. Then, it could be expected that in the struggle for independence the colonies would find themselves at war with the imperial powers. Now, with the exception of South Africa, Portuguese Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and some small islands, decolonization is almost complete, and there can be little expectation of turning these former colonies against the United States or its allies. In Southeast Asia, the Russian competition with China is paramount, and the first interest of the Soviet Union is to prevent the expansion of China, not to foster revolutionary activity.

In Africa the Soviets have backed all the radical countries and the radical elements in most other countries. But so far the results have not been very gratifying, and sometimes, as in the Congo and, more recently, in Algeria and Ghana, the horse backed by the Soviet Union has been eliminated from the race. It is yet too early to tell
whether communism may not have better opportunities in white settler-rulled areas, but thus far Africa, too, is a grave of lost Soviet hopes.

Only Cuba has diminished the Western camp by leaving it and adding a new communist state, the first since June 1949. In this case, a noncommunist revolution converted itself into a communist revolution, and then replaced the old Communist Party leaders to become a very independent type of communist state. This has yielded genuine benefits to the Soviet Union, but, of late, Soviet attention has been directed to the bitter which is mixed with the sweet. First of all, although Castro will probably remain a Communist, he will continue to be as defiant as he can afford to be. Second, Castro has cost the Soviet Union a great deal of money and, although these contributions have been reduced, the end is not yet in sight. Third, the appearance in Latin America of regimes seemingly on the road to communism has been shown to provoke United States intervention. Such intervention is less costly to the Soviet Union when the loss of a communist state is not at issue than after the Soviets have made la. xe commitments or after a socialist regime has been established. For this reason, and because the Soviets do not foresee the victory of traditional communist parties in Latin America and have all sorts of reservations about parties headed by "Johnny-come-lately" Communists like Castro, they prefer a long transition from coalition governments to communism, and indeed favor an extended period of national democracy in which many social elements participate. As long as the situation is one which might be called "creeping revolution," the Soviet Union's commitment, economic and military, can
be kept within the bounds of what the Soviets are willing to invest. But once a country labels itself communist, the Soviet options are greatly restricted. Hence the Soviet Union's preference for a gradual transition in Latin American countries to such rapid communization as in the case of Cuba. ¹ But the Soviets are not free to follow their preferences if they want to maintain influence, let alone control, over revolutionary parties. In Central America, particularly in Guatemala, Venezuela, and Peru, there are partisan movements, most of which are run by indigenous, noncommunist revolutionaries who are willing to take greater risks and resort more readily to violence than do the traditional communist parties. The Cubans and

¹The following is an expression of Soviet preferences in the form of a prediction: Some developing countries have already begun their noncapitalist development. It would be more accurate to say of those who have followed this path consistently that they occupy a "special place," not in the capitalist world system, but rather in the socialist world system. This means that the appearance and establishment of world socialism can no longer be represented only by the unity of countries where socialism has already been completely victorious and where the political form is the dictatorship of the proletariat or the government of the whole people which has developed from that form. The world socialist system can also include not completely socialist or semi-socialist links. The passage of the developing countries from the world capitalist to the world socialist system is possible not only in the form of a comparatively rapid action such as occurred in Cuba in 1959-1960, but also in the form of a prolonged process stretching over many years. S. Tiul'panov, "Osnovnye problemy politekonomii razvivaushchikhsia stran" (The Basic Problems of the Political Economy of the Developing Countries), Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (World Economics and International Relations), No. 9, 1965, p. 72.
the Chinese are potential sponsors of these movements and thus a threat to Soviet influence. To preserve its influence, the Soviet Union has to grant these movements greater autonomy, and this in turn creates conflicts with the traditional communist parties in Latin America, which stand to suffer as a result of communist support of violence in any one country.

It is unlikely that the Soviets will be able to have revolutions in Latin America when and how they want them. Much more likely, in any future case, the Soviet Union will be confronted with a revolutionary situation where it will have either to support or to reject the incipient communist revolution. Soviet doctrine, which is to be examined in the next pages, does not enable us to predict which choice Soviet leaders will make, but it can furnish a better notion of the intellectual atmosphere in which Soviet policymakers move.
II. SOVIET DOCTRINE ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Soviet scholars writing on the underdeveloped world recognize that its political problems represent a special category and that communist revolutions in these areas will differ from earlier communist revolutions elsewhere. Few go as far as did a young French Communist writing in a Cuban weekly, who said, in effect, that the history of the communist revolutions of the past was a poor guide to the future. "The true value of the Cuban revolution is perhaps more forcefully perceived within the revolution itself: it dispenses with the revolutionary models of the Soviet Union, China, and even Cuba...."2 If one reviews American and even Soviet accounts of the revolution in Russia itself, and of the creation of communist states in Eastern Europe and China, it becomes obvious that all the peering into the entrails of a political situation to see if the pattern of Moscow 1917, Peking 1947, Prague 1948, or Havana 1959 is being repeated has been wasted effort. Some such realization seems to inform Soviet analyses of the underdeveloped world, as we shall presently see.

Not only is any future seizure of power likely to follow different rules, but the model of the development of the Soviet Union has little relevance for underdeveloped

countries. For years before and after the Second World War, the experience of the modernization of a backward part of the Soviet Union, Soviet Central Asia, was compared to the situation in colonial countries. By almost any definition, Soviet Central Asia in 1921 (when that area was pacified) was an underdeveloped country. Literacy rates were extremely low; disease was widespread; one-crop economies and dependence on the metropolis were characteristic of the situation. In the almost fifty years of Soviet rule the situation has changed radically. By the standards of the neighboring Chinese provinces, of Pakistan, and of Afghanistan, the Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kirghizia are models of progressive modernization. Illiteracy is almost extinct, public health is good, elementary education is universal, and higher education is well established. The Soviets do well to bring their Asian visitors to Moscow by way of Tashkent. The contrast is indeed striking.

But how was this achieved? Enormous amounts of Soviet capital and of trained personnel (a special form of capital) were invested in this area over a period of fifty years. In so doing, the Soviets were continuing and greatly expanding a trend that had started in Tsarist times. Within the framework of all-Union economic planning, they were making a conscious effort to put their best foot forward in an area which was small and therefore manageable. The equalization of living standards between the backward and the more advanced areas of the Soviet Union was one consequence of planning on an all-Union scale. Thus, although the economic state of European Russia hardly gives cause for self-congratulation, Central Asia represents
genuine progress. Since the latter area has a much smaller population than Russia and the Ukraine, the cost to the Soviet government was bearable. But who is going to provide the capital for the four hundred millions of India? For the six or seven hundred millions of China?

Such questions throw into sharp relief the dilemma that foreign economic development poses for the Soviet Union (and indeed for the United States). For much longer than the United States, the Soviet Union has been offering its own experience as a model for the development of other nations. But it is becoming increasingly evident that the present situation in almost all the underdeveloped countries makes both the Soviet and the American model only marginally relevant. Conditions in the underdeveloped world differ in many ways from those that faced eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England, or the United States in the last century, or the Soviet Union of 1921. We shall point to only some of the differences which impel a radical revision of hoary Marxian constructs.

Marx himself furnished the archetype of the theory of primitive accumulation of capital by forced savings. Although this theory minimized the role of merchant profits as a source of capital, it convincingly demonstrated the importance of forced savings through the exploitation of labor. But the role of forced savings was to change with the growing importance of borrowed capital. Thus, for the United States and Canada, for example, the travail of industrialization was eased by the importation of capital. Since World War II, however, loan capital has been less readily available, because lenders cannot be so sure that it will be repaid as they were when dealing with colonies.
or with semicolonial regimes which could be forced to repay. As a result, international capital has tended to be invested at lower returns in safer areas rather than in the areas that promise the greatest return. Of course, this is only one of the reasons why countries now facing the problems of modernization cannot follow the example of the well-established capitalist countries. As one might expect, Marxian economists have been much impressed by the change in the pattern of capital export.

But if Marxian analysts cannot expect the underdeveloped countries to undertake industrialization on the model of capitalist development, neither can they expect them to follow the example of the Soviet Union. The latter, paradoxically, followed Marx's model of capitalist industrialization more closely than any other country has done. Capital was accumulated almost exclusively on the basis of forced savings, for the Soviet leaders made an early decision to go it alone and refused to permit foreign capital to be invested in their state. Although some of the leaders of the underdeveloped world may have wished to believe that their only course was to follow the Soviet example, political realities in their own countries have ruled this out. It is possible to force present generations to sacrifice themselves for the future, but only if the state is run by ruthless leaders, who are convinced that immutable laws of economics exist and that they alone understand them. Thus far, only communist regimes have met these criteria.

If regimes of this kind should continue to appear, they would present a peculiar problem to the Soviet Union because of the political and economic demands they would
make on it. Even had it desired to do so, the Soviet Union obviously would have been incapable of helping China on the same scale that it did its own Central Asian republics. Therefore, successful communist revolutions in poor and overpopulated countries hereafter will not be able to emulate the Soviet experience without aid from the Soviet Union of a magnitude far beyond that nation's resources. Thus we see that a new problem has emerged, the problem of "premature communism."

The Soviet Union has contributed to the Cuban economy, but it has done so only reluctantly and without any genuine choice in the matter. Yet Cuba is smaller and has a much better articulated infrastructure than many other underdeveloped countries. There is a limit to the potential number of new communist states which could expect economic support from the established communist powers, and "premature" communist regimes that could not count on Soviet economic support might well founder. In a sense, the Soviet Union has been forced into the very position for which it criticized the Mensheviks in 1917. It prefers that capital be accumulated in the precapitalist period, so that the new communist states will have a better chance of success and not make embarrassing demands upon the Soviet Union. Obviously, such a blunt formulation is not to be discovered in Soviet writing, but it is most prominent in Chinese writing. As we go on to examine Soviet doctrine on the economic and political development of underdeveloped countries, the basis for so radical a shift in Soviet preferences will emerge.

Soviet economists argue that improving labor productivity is a better way to accumulate capital than
concentrating on large capital installations with scant reference to productivity. Therefore, some underdeveloped countries are advised against following the Soviet example and developing large steel mills and all the paraphernalia of heavy industry, but are urged instead to develop whatever pays best and to use the profits from that to capitalize. Thus, "Che" Guevara, who created a mystique of sacrifice and was willing to industrialize Cuba without regard to whether it was economically expedient, was overruled by the Soviets who would have had to foot much of the bill. The Cubans were advised to industrialize by starting with what they could do most profitably, which was to grow sugar. Similar advice has been given to Africans.

The Soviets have also stressed the need for agricultural reforms, particularly for Latin America, as a way to increase the size of the internal market. Their argument, familiar enough in Western economic writings, is that large segments of the peasant populations of the world produce so inefficiently that they can do little more than feed themselves and are unable to buy any of the products of industry, thereby putting a ceiling on the expansion of domestic manufactures. To expand the internal market, therefore, agricultural reforms (not agricultural revolutions, it should be noted) are advocated. Given such reforms, the peasants will have some surplus; they will enter the market; the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will expand; and the preconditions for political and economic progress will have begun.

Soviet economists advise underdeveloped countries to get their capital from both the Soviet Union and the United States. They say, in so many words, that the Soviet Union
has neither the capital nor the skills to help the entire underdeveloped world, and that these countries therefore must have recourse to Western capital.³

This reasoning differs very little from the advice of the United States; the major points of difference are in the Soviets' emphasis on the confiscation of foreign capital and or. state ownership of industry. Also, the two formulas end differently: in the Soviet prescription, a country as it modernizes will go over to socialism (in a way shortly to be described); in the American prescription, it will go over to free-enterprise capitalism.

Soviet writers profess to see an important political difference between countries that are on the path to socialism and those that are not. Since many of the leaders of the underdeveloped world reject the capitalist system and tend to take out much of their frustration on the capitalist world, Soviet writers expect that in the transition

³ According to one Soviet scholar, who has written on the subject for many years, "The countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America cannot, naturally, count on the socialist states' being in a position to provide all their requirements for capital, equipment, and technical assistance. A significant portion of their requirements have to be satisfied through the agency of the imperialist states." V. Tiagunenko, "Current Problems of the Noncapitalist Path of Development," Mirovaiia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnia Otnosheniiia (World Economics and International Relations), No. 11, November 1964, p. 17. See also the same author in an article entitled "The Future of the Liberated States" in the more official Kommunist, No. 4, March 1965, p. 113, and Iu. Potemkin and V. Sandakov, "The Developing Countries: Some Aspects of the Problem of Accumulation," Mirovaiia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnia Otnosheniiia, No. 4, 1965, p. 43, for a similar statement with particular reference to Latin America, and most recently Ferenc Varnai, "Whither the Third World?" Nepszabadsag, Budapest, March 16, 1966.
period many of these countries will be adjuncts to the Soviet diplomatic system rather than the capitalist. If countries espouse the doctrine of socialism, say the Soviet writers, even if it is not socialism in the Soviet sense of the word, this represents an important predisposition for socialism and against capitalism. If Soviet leaders genuinely believe this to be the case (and there is no reason to think that they do not), the argument that such transition regimes will ultimately lead to socialism does not have to be examined very closely. If medium-term gains from a policy can be anticipated, it is not necessary to make a strong case for the long-term gains.

The Soviets' case for the ultimate passage of these transition regimes to communism is not very persuasive. They maintain that, even though these states continue to be linked to the Western world by the capital they borrow and the investments they permit, the preconditions for socialism are being created. If foreign capital is accepted in the proper manner and employed to strengthen state capitalism rather than monopoly (private) capitalism, so the argument runs, the transmutation of these regimes will be relatively uneventful.

A crucial factor in this new type of revolution is the concept of what the Soviet writers call intermediate, or interstitial, groups and what Western scholars would call the technocratic elite: a service class composed of people with skills rather than property. Its members may belong to the military, the bureaucracy, or the professional classes. According to Soviet theory, in a country developed on a state-capitalist rather than a private-capitalist basis this new class grouping will have a vested
interest in pushing toward a state-managed system rather than a traditional, capitalist state. As the political power of private capital will be small, the "new class" will meet little opposition as it moves toward socialism. When the prince becomes a Christian, the people follow; when the managers become Communists, so does the state. These intermediate groups, then, are unwittingly preparing a socialist revolution. Why they are bound to adopt communism rather than some new political form is not explained by the Soviet writers, unless one is simply to believe that all men must eventually arrive at the universal truth.

In practice, the foregoing is used to justify the Soviet support of transitional regimes by a modest program of loans and grants, as the Soviet Union can argue that history will help bring the new countries into the socialist camp. As might be expected, the Chinese have mocked the theory that nonsocialists will make socialist revolutions despite themselves.4 Actually, the Soviets may not believe

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4 The Chinese have singled out for particular ridicule the following Soviet formulation of this idea:

The leading role of the proletariat on a world scale finds expression in part in the circumstance that under the influence of its ideology the transition to socialist transformations in some countries can take place even without the direct leadership of the working class and--at least in the initial stage--under the leadership of the progressive forces which gradually go over to the position of scientific socialism.

B. V. Ponomarev (ed.), Mezhdunarodnoe revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie rabochego klassa (The International Revolutionary Movement of the Working Class), Moscow, 1964, p. 325. The very same statement appears in the revised 1965 edition. The 1964 edition was printed in 50,000 copies; the 1965 edition in 25,000 copies.
that a revolution notwithstanding the intentions of its makers is the only possible prospect. But lacking the economic and military resources to pursue any other policy, they make a virtue of necessity. The Chinese can parade their uncompromisingly revolutionary virtue, because, being poor, they cannot be expected to assist newly born communist states extensively.

Soviet concentration on intermediate rather than ultimate goals (a counterrevolutionary tendency, in Chinese terms) is not the result of ideological reassessment alone but the consequence of successive defeats. Except in Cuba, Soviet intervention in the underdeveloped world has brought very little but headaches. Recent events in Africa have demonstrated how precarious even the most touted "national democracies" can be. In Ben Bella of Algeria, whom they honored with the title "Comrade" and with literally dozens of laudatory articles in their press, the Soviets had found a figure likely to make the gradual transition to socialism. They were even willing to sacrifice the Algerian Communist Party to this higher goal. All seemed propitious. France, for various reasons, continued to give Algeria economic support even though Ben Bella was publicly committed to state capitalism and a vaguely defined state socialism. But all was shattered in a twinkling when Colonel Boumeddine deposed Ben Bella and decided on a path not so closely identified with socialism. More recently, Nkrumah was deposed while out of the country. These developments would seem to support the contention of the Chinese that, unless the other classes are without power and Communists are in charge, there can be no socialist revolution. Time will
tell whether communist revolutions can be made without even the revolutionists noticing, but recent events give the Chinese critics a better case than the Soviets.
III. SOVIET DOCTRINE ON LATIN AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Before World War II, Moscow had little success in Latin America and great difficulties in controlling communist parties. In the immediate postwar period, this pattern continued; Soviet leaders believed the influence of the United States to be controlling, and the ease with which the Guatemala of Arbenz, a government friendly to the Soviet Union, was overthrown in 1954 confirmed their conviction. The communist phrase that described this state of affairs was "geographic fatalism." For this reason the breakneck speed of the radicalization of Cuba after January 1, 1959, startled Soviet observers. Theodore Draper's *Castroism: Theory and Practice* demonstrates conclusively that neither the Soviet Union nor the Cuban Communists viewed Castro as an ally until very late in the game, when the Communist Party of Cuba established liaison with him and assisted him in his victory, very much as a last-minute junior partner. Even after Castro entered Havana, the Soviets and the Cuban Communists regarded him as another petit-bourgeois leader, more promising than most, but still a man who might make his peace with the United States and continue the social structure essentially unchanged. However, as 1959 wore on and Castro became more radical in his internal policies, and as his relations with the United States worsened, the Soviets began to believe that here indeed was a new political phenomenon: a genuine social revolution in Latin America, seemingly tolerated by the United States. Moscow now supported him, first verbally and then economically, and even gave very carefully qualified assurances of
military aid. When Castro seized upon these vague Soviet formulas and tried to make them more specific, Khrushchev replied that his promise of missile support had been only figurative. But Castro was inexorable in his pursuit of the reluctant Soviets and insisted that he had always been a Marxist-Leninist—one of many untruths. Castro's becoming a Communist meant two things. First, it would now be harder for the Soviet Union to evade helping him both politically and economically; and second, it put the Communist Party of Cuba under his discipline. Castro did not hesitate to alter the Communist Party of Cuba to his own needs and to establish his dominance by eliminating many of the old Communist Party members from positions of power.

Here then was yet another kind of communist revolution. It began as an essentially middle-class revolution (with only a rudimentary, but much advertised, rural base) against a tottering dictatorship. The middle-class revolutionary, who had studied the lessons of Guatemala and Cuba very carefully, came to power with the conviction that the United States would not let him go very far. Castro wanted to be the Bolivar of the Caribbean. If he were to be only a more liberal Batista, he could not realize such a dream. In the assessment of the Latin American Left, the Guatemalan revolution had failed because it had left the army intact and had not really enlisted the peasants' support. It was the exigencies of holding power, not doctrinal conviction, that drove Castro leftward. By expropriating the large landowners, by moving rapidly to appropriate foreign property, and by forming a new army, Castro systematically did all the things that Arbenz had not done. In addition, he forced a reluctant Soviet Union to become his ally.
Once Castro had made these important changes in the political structure of his country, it needed more than a trumpet to blow down the walls of that Jericho. A small action from outside could not have the catalytic effects in Cuba that it had in Guatemala. This was the lesson of the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961.

The Soviets were confronted with an unexpected victory and an unusual new Communist. Castro at first tried to export his revolution, but he had little success. As the prospects for further Castroite revolutions in the Caribbean went glimmering, the Soviets had to take on the costs of fortifying the existing enterprise and to see if they could get more than political advantage from it. The cost in money was high, and money was hardly in abundant supply in the Soviet Union. Another and far from negligible cost was the complication of relations with Latin American communist parties, which will be considered at a later point.

Some time in the spring or early summer of 1962, the Soviets began planning to put medium- and intermediate-range missiles into Cuba. By this time, the Soviet Union, which had pursued an orderly program of missile development that involved moving to longer-range weapons at stages, possessed large numbers of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. But it had fallen behind the United States in ICBMs—hopelessly, it seemed. The easy solution of moving the available missiles closer to the target must have been very attractive to the Soviets. From Castro's point of view, it was doubly desirable, for it would bind the Soviet Union irrevocably to his defense and would deter the United States from a repetition of the Bay of Pigs venture. It is too easy in retrospect to characterize
policies as reckless and harebrained just because they failed. The Soviets and the Cubans almost succeeded in getting the missiles operational before they were discovered, and it was by no means unreasonable for them to have believed that they might succeed in doing so, and that an American response would be delayed by the Congressional elections and by the necessity of coordinating with the United Nations. No one can say now what the United States would have done in that event: whether it would have accepted the missiles or taken the greater risk involved in eliminating already operational missiles from Cuba. Be that as it may, both the Soviet Union and Castro suffered a great defeat in the outcome of the missile crisis. Since then, Soviet foreign policy appears to have accepted the status quo while waiting for a better day, and Castro has lost a great deal of his luster in Latin America. Originally, Castro's attractiveness lay in his independence of the great powers, and the Soviets' removal of the missiles without consulting him highlighted his dependence on the Soviet Union. Also, the Soviet Union was popular in Latin America precisely because it was far away. It was welcome as a counterweight to United States influence, but Latin American nationalists hardly wanted Soviet military bases in the area.

Thus, after the missile crisis, both the Soviet Union and Cuba had to lower their sights. To be sure, communism in Cuba was a considerable accomplishment, even if the most optimistic hopes had not been realized. But Cuba had cost, and continued to cost, a great deal of money, and the very existence of a communist Cuba had provoked an American response which reduced the likelihood of new Cubas. It
was clear even before the Dominican crisis that a new Castroite revolution would not be tolerated by the United States. However, even if this judgment had been mistaken and such a revolution might have succeeded, could the Soviet Union have afforded it? Brazil in 1964 offers a good hypothetical case. The Soviets, unlike most American political analysts, believed that the chief purpose of Goulart's approaches to the Communist Party and to the Soviet Union was to enable him to extract better terms from the United States. But even if they hoped that Goulart might follow the Castroite path and change his political color once he had consolidated power in Brazil, they could not have viewed such an eventuality with any enthusiasm. Cuba is a country of about seven million people; Brazil has a population of over seventy-seven million. Obviously, the Soviet Union could not support Brazil economically on anything like the scale on which it was supporting Cuba. A communist regime under Goulart would pose very serious problems for the Soviet Union while it existed, and its viability was uncertain. Perhaps in this case, as in many others, the wish was father to the analysis, leading the Soviets to believe that Goulart could not come to power.

Whether their diffidence is cause or effect, Soviet writers on Latin America are hardly sanguine about the prospects for revolution on that continent. The starting point of their analysis is that, by comparison with other underdeveloped areas, Latin America has a better-developed middle class, which opposes the assumption of power by the proletariat or by modernizing revolutionaries like Castro. Given the connection of this middle class with American imperialism and the immediate benefits that it derives from
the relationship, so the Soviet theory goes, members of this group can be relied on to suppress communist revolutions in Latin America. But some sections of the middle class suffer more from America's dominance than they gain from being its agent. From the Soviet point of view, the growth of this sector of the middle class is to be encouraged, and a precondition for doing so is the expansion of the internal market. In time, then, the comprador (middle-man between foreign imperialism and native business) is expected to yield political power to the national, and nationalistic, bourgeoisie. For the latter to flourish, the internal market must grow, and to this end there must be land reforms (not an agrarian revolution). As the nationalistic, patriotic components of the bourgeoisie in Latin American countries become preponderant, Soviet writers expect that they will break with the United States, the first step being the confiscation of American property. This process will take much longer in Latin America than in Africa, say the Soviet analysts, precisely because the comprador class is so strong in Latin America. Although in Africa the economy as a whole is less developed, the prospects for the transition to socialism are better because a concomitant of backwardness is a weak middle class.

At best, the Soviet prediction for Latin American communism is not wildly optimistic. Also, there remains the question why Latin American radical nationalists, once having shaken loose from the United States, should turn to socialism rather than to new types of government which do not fit present categories tidily. Of course, if the Soviets insist on calling whatever system emerges a variety of communism, they are assured of victories; conversely,
if we do the same, we are assured of defeat. But, on the basis of any reasonably objective definition of communism, one must agree with the Soviets' pessimism about their opportunities in Latin America especially when one recognizes that the Soviet Union is not prepared to grant large-scale economic assistance to the development of these new, presumably anti-American, governments. The dominant and unvarying theme of all Soviet analysts is that Castroism will not be the model. Why, they never say. One could imagine another situation in which a noncommunist leader, once having taken power, finds it opportune to turn communist. It appears, however, that this alternative is never discussed in Soviet literature, as much, one suspects, because the Soviets find it unpalatable as because the United States is not expected to permit such a development.
Actual Soviet policy toward Latin American states and their communist parties conforms generally to the theoretical analysis just summarized, but, naturally, with many modifications to meet local situations. The variations are most obvious in the differentiated policies toward Latin American communist parties. One of the consequences of the Sino-Soviet competition has been that the Soviet Union is holding communist parties on increasingly loose strings in order to be able to hold them at all. But it has not been possible to satisfy one party, or group of parties, without dissatisfying another. Thus far, Cuba has presented the most awkward case. The Cuban revolution cannot be popular with such old-established communist parties as those in Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, whose leaders have held their offices for years, in some cases more than a quarter of a century, and do not relish the prospect of being displaced, humiliated, and expelled from the Party by a Communist of such recent vintage as Castro. For them, Castroist infiltration in their respective countries is not only subversive of their authority within the Communist Party, but it furnishes a pretext for hostile state authorities to declare the Party illegal. Since they share the Soviet view that the best course is to rely on growing nationalism to further the movement toward communism, they want to retain the legality of their position so as to be able to exert maximum influence on the radical nationalists. The old communist leadership does not want to frighten the nationalists into making their peace with the United States and spurning the cooperation so eagerly offered by the
Communists. Thus far, although the Soviet Union has had problems in balancing the interests of Castro against those of the traditional Latin American communist parties, it has succeeded on the whole.

A major adjustment in this complex relationship seems to have taken place in a secret meeting in Havana in the latter part of 1964. Following Togliatti's recommendation to convene regional meetings of communist parties, the Soviets had called the meeting in Havana, which presumably was to be attended by all the communist parties of Latin America but to exclude all the pro-Chinese splinters. In agreeing to such a meeting, Castro went a long way toward estranging the Chinese. The communiqué of the conference, published in Moscow in January 1965, gave some indication of what the compromise between the Soviet Union, Castro, and the other parties must have involved. The critical issue was the employment of violence at the present juncture in Latin American affairs. On this issue Moscow's position had been changing. Two articles in consecutive issues of Kommunist in the summer of 1964 signaled the change. The main organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the monthly Kommunist, is largely focused on internal affairs. Its rare articles on foreign affairs express the official view of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the same sense as Pravda, therefore, it is distinguished from other journals, which may express opinions slightly different

5M. Kudachkin and N. Mostovets, "Osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Latinskoi Amerike" (The Movement of National Liberation in Latin America), Kommunist, No. 11, July 1965, pp. 121-130; A. Sivolobov, "Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Latinskoi Amerike" (The Peasant Movement in Latin America), Kommunist, No. 12, August 1964, pp. 100-107.
from the official view. The appearance in Kommunist of two consecutive articles on Latin America invites inspection—the normal interval would have been about a year—and inspection yields interesting results.

In their dispute with the Chinese the Soviets had never taken the position that a peaceful parliamentary transition was the only path to communist revolution. They always insisted that both the violent and the nonviolent paths were possible and that the choice in any given case depended on the circumstances. As a matter of fact, years ago, the South African and the Paraguayan parties were among those who took the position that in their particular countries violent resistance was necessary. But, in general, Soviet discussions since 1960 have allowed that both paths are possible and that the Chinese example of armed struggle is not to be applied automatically to other countries, and have then cited instances of choices that conformed with local situations. These examples have invariably happened to be of communist parties that did not consider the armed struggle suitable for their countries.

The first Kommunist article follows the pattern just described. The second article repeats the generalization that the choice of means must depend on the local situation, but then specifically approves armed struggle and guerrilla activity in some Latin American countries and peaceful means in others. The two articles are, of course, logically consistent, but an important policy shift has been signaled.6

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6 The first article said (p. 127):
A study of the programs of the communist parties of Latin America shows that the form of struggle has not been absolutized by the Communists.
At an undisclosed date at the end of 1964, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the communist parties of Latin America met in Havana and adopted a resolution which reflected the policy change which the CPSU had initiated in the summer or, more likely, had accepted at Castro's urging. The resolution called for "support in an active form to those who at present are subjected to severe repression, such as the Venezuelan, Colombian, Guatemalan, Honduran, Paraguayan, and Haitian fighters." It took the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet conflict and called for the unity of each communist party. Since none of the Chinese splinters and that they change according to the situation in one or another country.

Latin American Communists consistently support the implementation of the line indicated in the programmatic documents of the international communist movement and reject the position of the Chinese leaders who are trying to impose on all the parties the strategy and tactics which they worked out in the specific conditions of their own country [viz., armed revolution and civil war]. The article then went on to cite statements from the Chilean and Salvadorean communist parties, both of which are opposed to violence in their own countries at present. The second of the two articles said in its last paragraph (p. 107):

An analysis of recent events established that in countries where dictators are in power, dictators who are the henchmen of foreign monopolies, the development of the struggle on a broad front, including armed struggle, and the creation of partisan detachments in some areas, is a completely justified course.

Then follows a warning that this does not apply to liberal reformist regimes.

among the Latin American communist parties had been invited to the meeting, it was obvious that unity within each of the Latin American parties was to be interpreted as applying to parties which followed the Soviet lead. In addition, Castro, after his initial reluctance, agreed to come to the Moscow Party meeting scheduled for March 1965, which was directed against the Chinese.

What seems to have happened at Havana is that the Soviet Union on the one hand secured the support of Cuba and other Latin American parties against the Chinese, but on the other hand made support of its position on China easier for those parties by making explicit that there were several Soviet lines in Latin America. The Havana communiqué called for a further meeting, or meetings, of groups of Latin American communist parties, implying that they should either concert their activities or agree to pursue different policies in different areas. Unity of the Latin American parties was restored by the explicit endorsement of diversity of policy.

At first sight, the Soviet Union's encouragement and support of guerrilla movements in Latin America, whether grudging or spontaneous, seem to contradict its estimate of the prospects for revolution in Latin America. But if the Soviet Union is to maintain its influence over Latin American parties (control being no longer in question), it must be responsive to their needs. When guerrillas are active in Latin American countries, the communist parties find themselves in a quandary. (Castro's guerrilla movement from 1957 to 1959 is a good example of this.) The guerrilla leaders often are not Communists. Sometimes only a minority of them will be communist; in no case in the
past have they all been Communists. Typically, the guerrillas operate in the countryside and are thus relatively elusive; only in exceptional cases will they be active in the cities, as they were for a while in Venezuela. The established communist parties often are opposed to guerrilla activity because they are convinced that it will fail and that their support of any movements which they do not control may uselessly jeopardize whatever legal rights they have. However, in weighing their own opposition, they have to take into account the danger of losing the support of young militants who admire those who are fighting. Most typically, the relations between the communist parties and the guerrillas are very strained. In the unusual case, a communist party may publicly denounce a guerrilla movement as a political mistake. But more commonly, communist parties will furnish limited support to the guerrillas and some personnel, in an effort to ensure some control over them and to avoid the onus of being against those who are "fighting with weapons in their hands." The police often arrest and harry the Communists, partly because they are in fact, though perhaps reluctantly, helping the guerrillas, and partly because they are concentrated in the cities and thus easier to catch. And if the Party suffers enough, it may try to get the guerrillas to desist. As one can imagine, such alliances are fearsomely complicated, constantly shifting and almost always embittered. One suspects that there is no fixed "best" policy in any given area. Soviet Communists may disapprove of the tactics of a local party but nevertheless support it. In some cases, they and the Cubans may disagree on tactics toward a particular party in Latin America, and one or the other will have to make
concessions. Generalizations are of course perilous, but apparently the Cubans have remained more optimistic about the prospects of guerrilla movements than the Russians, and the relations between the Russians and the Cubans seem to include agreement on particular cases, concessions by one to the other, as well as agreements which one or both seek to subvert—the marks of a normal alliance, in other words. The Cubans are showing signs of greater discrimination in their support of guerrilla movements, and the Soviets still seem to be chasing the guerrilla movements leftward without being able to overcome the contempt of the guerrilla leaders for the old-line Communists.

Such a situation, while hardly ideal from the Soviets' point of view, is tolerable as long as their thesis that the guerrillas really have no chance of seizing power proves correct. If, however, in some small country where relatively few people participate in political life, a modest guerrilla force were to seize power, the Soviet Union would have to make the hard choice between supporting and scuttling a guerrilla group in power which it had previously been helping. Either choice would entail unpleasant consequences for the Soviet Union. If it supported the guerrillas' seizure of power with more than vague statements of support, it would lose heavily in prestige if the United States intervened successfully; a policy of inaction, on the other hand, would furnish ammunition to those guerrilla elements who have contended that the Soviet Union does not want them to succeed. Perhaps the Soviets are willing to risk having to make such a choice because they are convinced that the likelihood of the event is very small and that the objective of preserving their influence over the communist movement in the face of the Chinese challenge is worth such a risk.
Although Soviet attention to guerrillas has increased, in most of the populous countries of Latin America the Soviet Union has adopted a vigorous united front policy, and it is doing so also in other parts of the world. In Europe, alliances with left and moderate parties have been projected. Even rapprochement with the Catholics has been advocated in the pages of the World Marxist Review. The policy of the united front is essentially a policy of broad alliances for limited ends. Given the Soviet Union's low estimate of the likelihood, or perhaps desirability, of communist revolution at the present stage, its emphasis throughout the world is on alliances with other parties.

In Latin America the goal is clear: the isolation of the United States and an end to its influence in Latin America. In pursuit of this goal, the large communist parties all over Latin America have been instructed to give conditional support to nationalist reformist movements. For instance, the Communist Party of Chile in coalition with the Socialists, after losing the last election to the Christian Democrat Frei, has now moved to a position in support of Frei. At the last congress of the Communist Party of Chile it seemed as if the Party would have supported Frei even more vigorously if its socialist allies had permitted it. In the Soviet analysis, Frei is pursuing a triangular policy in trying to balance off the United States by making arrangements with Europe, and in this endeavor the Communists wish him well. The Soviets are aware that Latin American politicians will try to use Europeans, including the East Europeans, as a way of getting better terms in their bargaining with the United States. The Soviet Union, for one, is quite willing to be used in this
way, and the political color of the regime with which it is so dealing makes little difference. Thus, the Soviets were prepared to go along with Goulart, and are now willing to arrange trade agreements with his successor, Castello Branco. This policy has the virtue of being extremely cheap, and almost automatically assured of success because its objectives are so modest. The Soviets understand as well as do others that the most powerful political force in Latin America today is radical nationalism, which is naturally antiforeign. As a foreigner who is far away, with very little "presence" in Latin America, the Soviet Union is not the target of Latin American radical nationalism. The favorite target is the United States. The Soviet Union, therefore, simply by continuing to talk generally about national liberation movements, and by encouraging native communist parties, wherever it has influence over them, to cooperate with nationalist movements, is swimming with the tide. This is not a policy that promises the transition of the Latin American states to communism in the near or approximate future, but it has the virtue of avoiding embarrassing complications for the Soviet Union.

Such a policy is not without its costs, but they appear as minor and bearable to the Soviet Union. The events in Paraguay, although somewhat unclear yet, seem to illustrate one of the costs. The Paraguayan Communist Party, which has suffered under the attentions of the Stroessner regime, had for some time been advocating a policy of violence. Recently, the Party split on just how much violence it should employ, and the minority, who followed the more moderate Soviet line, received the blessings of the Argentine Communist Party. The latter
was thus departing from the practice of noninterference in each other's internal affairs which the communist parties seemed to have been following since the Havana Conference of 1964. The present situation appears to be that the larger section of the Paraguayan Party under the leadership of Creydt, who had been head of the Party for many years, has broken away and that only the remnant is Soviet-oriented. This represents a cost to the Soviet Union, but probably one that was unavoidable. In Argentina, the Communist Party, which has alternated between legality and illegality, lives in fear that in the general atmosphere of political uncertainty a military regime might take over and again declare the Party illegal. Given its avowed aim of an alliance with the Peronistas on radical-nationalist lines, it is important and convenient for the Communist Party to preserve its legality. Communist violence in Paraguay, together with the embarrassing problem of refugees crossing the border into Argentina, threatens to furnish the pretext for renewed suppression of the Communist Party of Argentina, a party that is more important to the Soviet Union than is the Paraguayan, which has no prospects of making a revolution or of forming a united front with other political forces in Paraguay.

Here then lies the importance of the Chinese Communists. If there were a single international communist movement, the dissatisfied and dissident factions of communist parties the world over would have no place to go, and the Soviet Union could pursue whatever policy it wished without having to pay the costs of choosing between factions. As it is, however, Soviet freedom of action is limited by the very existence of the Chinese, although the effective power of the latter in Latin America is almost nil.
The situation here described seems to have become more pronounced at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in January 1966, where the main actors—the Chinese, the Russians, the pro-Soviet communist parties, and representatives of the guerrilla groups that are in uneasy alliance with communist parties—were able to shout at each other instead of merely dispatching barbed missives. Information on the proceedings of the conference is still incomplete, and the statement of its results that follows may have to be revised in its details, and perhaps even in its essentials, when the full data are available.

The Chinese, by attacking Castro, have pushed him closer to the Soviet Union, although he is still not in agreement with the latter on all issues. Apparently, the central issue between Cuba and China has been the treatment of the guerrilla movement. The Cubans have rethought the problems of the guerrilla movements in Latin America, and the aforementioned article by Regis Debray, published in Havana on the eve of the conference, is primary evidence of their rethinking. Debray makes the general point that no models for revolution really exist, but that each revolution in the past has found its own strategy and tactics in action. Many attempts at an exact imitation of the Cuban revolution in Latin America have failed, says Debray, because they were unsuited to local conditions, but also, more generally, because the very precedent of the Cuban revolution has made its repetition difficult if not unlikely. The opponents of communist revolution in Latin America are now alert to the possibility that a noncommunist guerrilla movement may become communist after taking power. As one Colombian guerrilla leader told Debray, "Herbert Matthews
will not interview me nor will a Betancourt send me arms." Debray does not present a formula for successful revolutions growing out of guerrilla movements in Latin America; the main burden of his argument is that the formula will emerge from the struggle. "Engage the enemy and then play it by ear" is his prescription. But he foresees that battles may be lost, and he does not specify how many enemies should be engaged. One may conclude from Debray's article that the Cubans are less sanguine than they once were about the possibility of revolution but that they still favor assistance in selected cases.

The drama of the conference itself and the pressure on Castro determined the form in which Castro conveyed this new line. Sino-Cuban relations reached their lowest point when China refused to continue to barter rice for sugar. This refusal would appear to have been a mistake, because Castro's estrangement from China has sharply reduced his bargaining power with the Russians, now that he can no longer play the Russians off against the Chinese. Castro is properly very sensitive about the charge that he is a Soviet puppet, and he frequently talks and acts in a way calculated to demonstrate his independence. A journalist who had talked with Castro for several hours after the Havana conference then quoted an unnamed high Cuban official as saying: "It is the USSR which has attached itself to the Cuban line."

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8Carlos Nunez, "Y ahora, en que campo está Cuba?" (And Which Camp Is Cuba in Now?), Marcha, Montevideo, February 18, 1966.
On the guerrilla movement the Cubans demonstrated their difference with the Soviets in two cases, and their agreement in another. Their varying positions most probably reflect the Cubans' appraisal of the situation, but they also serve to demonstrate Cuban independence. Let us first examine the instances of disagreement with other communist parties (including, presumably, the Soviets). Cuba was in charge of the invitations to the Tricontinental Conference. She invited, as members of the Peruvian and Venezuelan delegations, persons who were critical both of the Communists in their respective countries and of the Soviet Union. In a recent article, the Peruvian delegate, who came under the assumed name Roberto García Urrutia, is quoted as frankly admitting that the Peruvian guerrillas do not enjoy wide support and have suffered reverses. But if the guerrilla movement continues, he maintains, conditions for wider support will be created because, as the movement grows, American intervention will follow, and the guerrilla struggle will then become identified with the patriotic struggle of the whole Peruvian people. The Americans, because they fear that the Peruvian middle class will aid the guerrillas, support the conciliatory reformism of the ruling party. And the writer adds: "Certain leftist parties [read, the Communists]...have the illusion that in making an agreement with the bourgeoisie which permits them to publish four or five periodicals--which only the militants read anyhow--they have discharged their revolutionary duty. In reality this is an attitude of collaboration with imperialism...."\(^9\)

\(^9\) Marta D. Solis, "Peru, la guerrilla es su signo," (Guerrilla Warfare is Peru's Motto), *Siempre*, Mexico City, February 2, 1966.
By inviting García to the Tricontinental Conference, Castro was clearly intervening in the affairs of the Communist Party of Peru and departing from the practices of fraternal and friendly conferences among the Latin American communist parties. The Soviets were forced either to swallow this defiance or try to change Castro's mind.

In Guatemala, on the other hand, Castro has taken the opposite course. For a long time he favored the MR-13 wing of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement led by Sosa, a non-Communist who typically is more strongly committed to extensive guerrilla warfare than is the Guatemalan Communist Party. In a speech right after the Havana conference, Castro switched the Cuban position in an attack on Sosa that was much more prominent than the presence of noncommunist Venezuelan and Peruvian guerrillas at the conference had been. Castro may have attacked the more militant elements of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement because he disapproved of their policy or, more likely, because he was resentful of their connection with the Trotskyites. For Latin American Trotskyites have criticized Castro very sharply, and apparently effectively, for the change of policy which they connect with the disappearance of Che Guevara.

The Trotskyites interpret "Che" Guevara's eclipse as meaning that Castro has ceased to be a genuine revolutionary. He failed to offer vigorous opposition to the American landing in Santo Domingo, they say; perhaps he murdered Guevara; he is really opposed to guerrilla movements in Latin America; he has withdrawn arms from the militia because he is afraid that the "Guevara group" might use them to overthrow him. Nothing could be better calculated to
infuriate Castro than to be accused of having the same relationship to the guerrilla movements of Latin America that the Cuban Communist Party had to his movement. The violence of Castro's attack on the most radical wing of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement is probably to be explained by the fact that the Trotskyites exercise a great influence over the group. Presumably, however, if Castro had furnished this group very much assistance, he, not the Trotskyites, would be enjoying the predominant influence.

Though the Cubans appear to be more discriminating in their support of guerrilla movements than they used to be, they are less restrained than the Soviets. Only time will tell whether the uneasy Cuban-Soviet agreement on policy toward insurrection can be maintained at the present level or whether it will deteriorate.

In the above pages, Soviet foreign policy objectives in Latin America have been described as more limited and realistic today than in the period before the missile crisis. Soviet Latin American policy is of a piece with the changes in Soviet policy the world over. The Soviet Union has lowered its sights and now aims for more modest but more realistic goals. The question in Latin America as in the rest of the world is whether this is a temporary, a medium-range, or a long-range trend. Given a Soviet military inferiority that is now recognized as likely to continue, and given the Soviet Union's preoccupation with an unsatisfactory domestic political situation and with the Chinese problem, one would expect this tendency to be of longer rather than of shorter duration. But these projections are always uncertain because, in the Soviet-American
confrontation, events unexpected by either side, sometimes undesired by either side, often push matters into new directions.

It is on this note of caution and ambivalence that this Memorandum ends. Although the Russians may prefer and expect to pursue policy-limited objectives in Latin America, unexpected events could force them to take sides in an unanticipated crisis in Latin America.
Appendix

AUTHOR'S NOTE ON SOURCES AND METHOD

A large Soviet literature on underdeveloped countries in general, and on Latin America in particular, is available. This literature is a new phenomenon. Books and articles on foreign countries used to be largely expansions of the party line in Pravda or in Kommunist. Now there are books and articles, especially in the magazine World Economics and International Affairs, that deal with many subjects not touched upon in the more general press. This is a literature of specialists who disagree with one another and who have conferences at which differences of opinion are freely discussed. No longer does the reader have to read between the lines to deduce such differences from subtle changes in formulas; they are open. But what is the significance of this material, and how is it to be used?

We have little information about the influence of the scholarly institutes on practical policy. Looking back over a few years, however, we can see that many of their propositions have come to be accepted as general policy. A single example will suffice. One of the novelties of Soviet doctrine about underdeveloped countries is that a socialist revolution can be made by a class, or a combination of classes, in which the proletariat is not dominant, and that therefore it can occur in spite of the designs of its makers. In 1961 Vernon Aspaturian presented a paper to the American Political Science Association on general principles in which he suggested that this might be the Soviet assessment. Stimulated by Aspaturian's hypothesis,
I found material in the literature supporting it, and published these findings in the summer of 1962. In 1964 Ponomarev, a major Soviet ideologist, stated the idea as a general principle, and most recently, in 1965, the Chinese Communists have concentrated their fire on this point.

Perhaps not all such new departures will gain official acceptance, but so far the average has been high. It can be surmised that Soviet writers who have no executive authority are aware of official thinking and float new ideas when they believe that these will find some support. A perusal of Soviet writings no longer reveals only a single line. Rather, it yields what in this country would be called a range of policy alternatives.
## SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

### 10. ABSTRACT

An examination of Soviet policy for the last ten years in underdeveloped countries in general and in Latin America in particular. Two factors have motivated the Soviet Union to modify its traditional attitude toward the transition to communism in underdeveloped countries: (1) Soviet leaders have accepted the idea of peaceful transition to socialism on the assumption that it will eventually become communism; and (2) the Cuban revolution and its aftermath have shown that traditional methods are not necessarily viable models for the present. Soviet foreign policy objectives in Latin America now appear more limited and realistic than in the period before the missile crisis; current efforts are directed toward strengthening Latin American nationalism.

### Key Words
- USSR
- Foreign policy
- Latin America
- International relations
- Underdeveloped countries
- Communism