United States National Security

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This study is intended as an aid to policy-makers, planners, researchers, and students involved in matters pertaining to the national security of the U.S.

The project was undertaken by the research staff of the Army Library upon consultation with and, when necessary, under the direction of appropriate staff agencies of the Department of the Army.

The subject of national security and defense problems is so complex that any single bibliographic study cannot pretend to show every facet nor all the factors and inter-relationships of strategy, policy, doctrines, and capabilities. This study is, therefore, an introductory presentation to be supplemented in the future.

This publication consists of approximately 1,000 unclassified titles of magazine articles, reports, books, and other materials in the holdings of the Army Library, and covers a period of two years, from early 1954 through May 1956. As a further aid to the user each title is followed by an abstract.

Because there is no index, and due to the quantity and complexity of some of the papers selected, arbitrary decisions were made to categorize the materials for subject groupings in a workable table of contents.

This bibliography has been limited to literature describing only some of the countries of the world although national security interests of the U.S. as a world power are involved in all the areas of the globe. Africa, and Latin America, for example, have been omitted because of space and time limitations, and it is anticipated that these and other areas will be treated in subsequent studies.

Because the subject of guided missiles, both U.S. and foreign, has been presented in the Army Library's Special Bibliography No. 4, 20 April 56, references to guided missiles have been excluded from this study.

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I. MILITARY POWERS OF THE WORLD

A. U.S.S.R.

1. Communist Global Strategy and Objectives


An attempt to view Soviet policy through Russian eyes. The long-term aims and objects of the Soviet Union; and the methods and means by which they can be accomplished in view of the fact that cold war has reached a stalemate and that hot war cannot be started by either side because the antagonists cannot be sure of quick and easy victory. A radical change in policy that would embrace a period of planned peace, an increased industrial might, and an elevation in Russia's standard of living is in the interest of Soviet long-range aims to destroy the capitalist world and establish a World Union of Soviet Republics with Moscow at its head.


The following articles trace, as case studies, the histories of some indigenous communist parties, outlining their successes and failures, and analyzing the nature of the appeal communism is currently making to peoples in underdeveloped areas. Titles of articles: CURRENT COMMunist STRATEGY IN NONINDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, by Bernard S. Morris and Morris Watnick; CONFLICTS WITHIN THE INDIAN CP, by Randolph Carr; COMMUNISM AND THE INTELLIGENTSIA IN BACKWARD AREAS, by G. L. Arnold; and BRAZIL'S CP: A CASE STUDY IN LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNISM, by Robert J. Alexander.


"The Soviet Union's and Communist China's primary object (at the Bandung Conference) was to estrange the US and Great Britain from this conference by advocating a policy of coexistence and severely criticizing the colonial policy of Western European nations and the aggressive policy of US and Great Britain, and to hamper the unification of the free nations' collective security system." Reviews the areas in which communist diplomacy turned out to be a failure and backfired on communist delegates. Notes that the Conference was the first of its kind and a historical event where the colored races of the world met, but considers it a grave error that the Soviet Union failed to send representatives of the five Soviet Socialist Republics of Uzbeek, Kazakh, Turkmen, Kirghis, and Tadshik, which consist of colored races.
is to keep the Western Alliance from dissolving in a one-sided "relaxation of tensions." How Russia is going about her new policy; the Western weaknesses at which this policy is aimed; and US strategy to counter Russia's latest scheme for Europe.

*NINE TIMES THE RUSSIANS BUNGLED*, by Dearen Bass, in *Saturday Evening Post*, v. 228, no. 3 (16 July 55) 25 plus.

A review of past political negotiations "at the summit" and their effects on the US attitude. Some reasons for the sudden Soviet decision to act "reasonable" and talk things over. Soviet political and military blunders since 1945.

*RUSIA'S DRIVE TO THE PACIFIC*, by Col. J. D. Hittle, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 1 (Jan 55) 41-46.

The major historical events between 1580 and 1860 in Russia's expansion eastward from the Urals to dominion of the Pacific littoral. Similarity of this expansion and colonisation to the American westward movement at approximately the same time; extension of Russian traders into Alaska and as far south as California; and the military and diplomatic conflicts with China which resulted in Russian possession of the area north of Manchuria. An understanding of how Russia obtained Vladivostok and the surrounding maritime provinces is essential background for any basic appraisal of Russian power in the Far East.


On 22 August 1955 the Soviets announced their decision to send in November 1955 a large-scale expedition to carry out geographical research on the Antarctic Continent and the seas of the Southern Polar Basin. Supposedly the Soviet expedition was to be sent in connection with the International Geophysical Year, whose program will be carried out by the joint efforts of scholars in many countries from 1 July 1957 to the end of 1958. In view of the fact that the Soviets will have almost a two-year lead over the West, and that the Antarctic research program for the International Geophysical Year was not to be agreed upon and confirmed until September 1955, the Soviet attempts to link their haste to the International Geophysical Year, sound rather absurd. The reasons behind the Soviet haste to gain a foothold in the Antarctic ahead of the West; background to Soviet claims in the Antarctic; extent of Soviet polar research and its military and strategic aspects; USSR's diplomatic campaign over its territorial rights in the Antarctic; and the basis of Soviet claims in the Antarctic. In implementing its plans in the Antarctic the USSR has in effect openly embarked upon a policy of expansion. Soviet legal scholars have begun to discuss the principle of "effective occupation" of these territories which have not yet been annexed. The Soviet standpoint, that Antarctica was discovered by Russians and is therefore Russian, could lead to serious international complications. References.

Political strategy and tactics of the Soviet Union; Soviet military-political and military-philosophical doctrines; and organisation and strength of Soviet Armed Forces. The author, formerly an engineer colonel of the Soviet Army, assisted for nearly fifteen years in the formulation and practical application of most of the fundamental military and military-technical doctrines of the USSR. Since 1940 Col. Tokarev occupied a series of increasingly important technical posts in Soviet aircraft production, and in 1946 was serving in Berlin as Soviet expert on jet and rocket problems. He and his family crossed over to the West in 1948. The military aspects of the book include information (mostly of fragmentary nature) on: Soviet military science, artillery, armor, para-ops, mechanised troops, current types of Soviet aircraft, guided missiles and atomic weapons, Soviet Navy, stockpiling of supplies, equipment research, standardisation, staff and military education, and morale and welfare of the Soviet Forces.


By peaceful co-existence the communists mean war without shooting in preparation for war with shooting and with hydrogen bombs. Since retreats and concessions in the face of communist aggression are ruled out by the West in realisation that they will not avert another war, but in the end produce it under very unfavorable circumstances to the West, there remain three possibilities of subverting communist regimes without large-scale war: (1) an attempt to stimulate discontent, short of actual armed revolt, and passive resistance in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe; (2) an effort to drive a wedge between the peoples of the Soviet Union and their communist rulers; and (3) rearming the German Federal Republic, within the framework of Western alliance. Evaluates the attempts which are being made currently in the West to exploit these three possibilities. While the first two are useful, they cannot result in the overthrow of communist regimes. On the other hand, a rearmed West Germany may have a magnetic effect on the Soviet Zone of Germany, the weakest link in Soviet empire and spur it to revolt. No German Army that is feasible in the future could very much affect the purely military balance of power, but the ideological effect that it may create in the minds of Germans in the Soviet Zone is another matter. The Soviets are aware of this factor and their main efforts have been directed not against the Western efforts to split the Soviet empire by propaganda and the stimulation of discontent, but against German rearmament.


An analysis of the changes of the international policies of communism as revealed by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, concluding that the free world must, under all circumstances, avoid an attitude of "everything is forgiven" toward the Soviet rulers.
The friendly moves by the Soviet Union in Yugoslavia and elsewhere are seen as a policy to convert territory, indispensable to Western defense, into neutral territory. How such neutral territories would jeopardize NATO and the defense of the West. The belief that Yugoslavia will not become a Soviet satellite again, and the problems that faced free Austria in her relations with USSR.

A continent-to-continent report of the cold war waged for ten years by the Soviet Union against the West and how the battles are going at present. Since 1939 the Soviet Union has extended her dominance over 740 million people and five million square miles in seventeen countries. During the same period nations of the West have given up control over 693 million people and six million square miles of territory in twenty-three countries. The weapons used by the Soviets in this war are propaganda in all forms, trade, and infiltration.

2. Military and Foreign Policy in Support of Global Strategy


Comments on the speech by Marshal Montgomery at Whitehall, London, in 1954 (before the Royal United Services Institution) and the statement by Marshal Vasilevsky printed in the 4 December 1954 issue of PRAVDA, in which the former stated that the operational plan of the NATO Forces Supreme Command is based on the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons for defense purposes, and the latter accused Montgomery of threatening USSR and preaching atomic warfare. The reviewer (Japan's Asiatic Mainland Affairs Research Institute) concludes: "The USSR wants to have atom weapons outlawed, fight with conventional arms in which the USSR excels the West, and use for surprise attacks the weapons to be secretly produced from the atomic energy supposedly intended for peaceful utilization. As for international control of atomic energy, it can be effected advantageously for the USSR if it insists that national sovereignty should be respected."

HOW "NEW" IS THE KREMLIN'S NEW LINE? by Philip E. Mosely, in Foreign Affairs, v. 33, no. 3 (Apr 55) 376-386.

This review of Soviet foreign policy in the two years since Stalin's death concludes that there has not been the slightest evidence of any substantial change in Soviet objectives and methods. For Khrushchev, as for Malenkov, "coexistence" is a temporary tactic, and episode within an all-embracing inescapable struggle between hostile and irreconcilable systems of power. Quarrels within the secretive circle of the Soviet dictatorship are concerned with persons and with tactics: at home a little more butter or a few more guns, a slight relaxing or tightening of the girths of their hard-pressed people; abroad, a few forced smiles or a slightly fiercer brandishing of Soviet armed might.

The Soviet leaders realise that the northwestern Arctic regions of the USSR present a vulnerable sector in the Russian defense system. Describes the various political and military measures that are being taken to strengthen this sector.

NEW SITUATION IN ASIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACEFUL MEANS OF DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN'S ECONOMY. Novala obstanovka v Azii i bor'ba za mirnyi put' rasvitiia ekonomiki Iaponii, by A. Volkov, in Yvoryoty Ekonomiki, no. 9 (Sept 55) 82-96. In Russian.

While other countries of Asia (China, Viet Minh, North Korea, India, Indonesia etc.) since 1945 have been making steady progress of every type, Japan has failed to follow their examples, especially in the economic field. Japan's economy is tied to US economy and this factor works against the national interests of Japan. Suggested solution to Japan's problem: closer cooperation - economic and other - with USSR and Communist China. If Japan wants such closer relations, the opportunity is available, and the "lessening of international tensions resulting from the Geneva Conference" was instrumental in providing this opportunity for Japan.


Although relations between Russia and Afghanistan are for the moment on a friendly basis, the possibilities of a Russian invasion is not lost sight of by the leading Afghans. Moreover, the interest displayed by Russia in Afghanistan has been considerably increased in recent years. Afghanistan occupies a position of extreme strategic importance vis-a-vis Russia and Pakistan. Since the Afghan Army is very deficient in small arms, a military mission will start for Czechoslovakia in the near future to remedy this situation.

soviet bid for the sea, by Rear Adm. E. M. Eller, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 61, no. 6 (June 55) 659-627.

The Soviet Union is the world's second strongest seapower with the most modern navy afloat. It is constantly growing, and will someday challenge the US directly in a contest for the control of the seas. Applying the lessons of World War II the Soviet Union is avoiding the naval mistakes of Germany and Japan and is building the type of fleet and merchant marine to give it logistical support that will be able to carry out any of the operations of modern naval combat. Admiral Eller evaluates the role and the place of the Soviet Navy in USSR's strategy for world conquest; its growth since 1930 while the rest of the world paid no heed; and the challenge and threat it presents to US where public opinion fails to comprehend that the destiny and security of America are inseparable from the sea and a strong Navy capable of protecting it.

The second Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was convened as of 3 February 1955 with the budget of USSR for the current year as one of the main topics on the agenda. There were many speeches covering a wide field with a notable exception: there was no debate of the budget itself. Increases in the various expenditures of the 1955 budget as compared to previous years; and significance of the increases. The increase of expenditures for defense by 11.8 billion rubles may be the Soviet reply to the Paris Agreements and the general consolidation of the Western Powers. In addition, there is reason to believe that the military expenditures of the USSR are not limited to the budget sums. The secret plan for developing agriculture in 1941, now in possession of US, shows that part of the resources designated for the production of arms and equipment for all three services was included in the budgets of the various Commissariats (ministries).


Develops the thesis that Soviet disarmament proposals are part of a change in policy which follows Lenin's maxim of "one step back in order to gain two steps forward." Contends that written agreements could make it possible for the USSR to appear to reduce military power yet actually be in a greater state of readiness for war than any other nation. Disarmament becomes a practical step only after the causes of tension and war have been removed.


Soviet interpretation of a closed sea as one that is enclosed by the territories of two or a limited number of states and is the exclusive concern of littoral states. Soviet efforts since 1917 to gain an independent position in the Black Sea Straits and area; and her recent demands for a special and privileged position in the Baltic.

SOVIET DRIVE FOR AIR POWER: JET TRANSPORTS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY, in Aeronautics (Gt. Britain), v. 34, no. 2 (Apr 56) 52-53.

A new determination by the Soviet government to break out of Russia's borders and extend its influence by means of air transport is shown by sending to London a Tupolev Tu-104, which is described and evaluated. Russian rulers have evidently realized that the old limitations of a land power can be surmounted by air power.
SOVIET POLITICAL TREATIES, AND VIOLATIONS; STAFF STUDY FOR THE SUB-COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION. Washington, 55. 63p. (Senate Document No. 85.)

Nearly 1,000 treaties and written agreements entered into by the Russians since 1917 were examined by the staff of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Detailed findings of that staff study show how Russia violated nearly every agreement. In a foreword to the report of the study by Senator Eastland of Mississippi, Chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, the fact was brought out that the communists are also violating the Korean armistice and the recently concluded Austrian peace treaty. The fundamental issue that faces the peoples of the world in connection with any current effort to arrive at a workable agreement with communism is - how the free world can make sure that Russia respects her part of the agreements she signs. Until an answer to this question can be found, it is useless to sign new agreements with the Soviet Union. See also WILL RUSSIA HONOR ANY NEW AGREEMENTS? by James O. Eastland, in US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, v. 39, no. 6 (5 Aug 55) 88-90.


Basic data on USSR’s geography, population, industry, agriculture, economic planning, transportation, political and administrative structure, ideology, education, police apparatus, and trade and foreign policy; an outline of the military potential and preparedness of the Soviet Union, the strength of its Armed Forces, and the extent of Soviet atomic bomb development; and information regarding Soviet expansion in Eurasia, both aims and methods of operation in western and eastern Europe, the Near and Middle East, SE Asia and ME Asia. With a chapter on the respective strategic positions of US and USSR today, the former in the role of a world policeman protecting its allies and the latter bent on destruction of US as the ultimate objective of its strategy. Bibliography.


The political strategy of the Soviet Union; and the immense strength and high quality of her Armed Forces as a decisive factor in world politics. Table showing the strength of Soviet Army and Air Force units as of January 1952 and the fall of 1953; and broad organisation of the Army. Translation available in the Army Library.

THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF THE BALTIIC, in East and West, no. 2 (Aug 54) 28-34.

Soviet strategic aims in the Baltic; strength of Soviet surface fleet in the Baltic; position of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and West Germany vis-a-vis the obvious Soviet intent to control the Baltic and eventually expand its influence in the area; and the likely pattern of Soviet attack in the area in a future conflict. With map showing the probable direction and objectives of Soviet attack in the Baltic.
TIME...AND THE BOMB, in Air Intelligence Training Bulletin, v. 6, no. 9 (Sept '54) 24-46.

The USSR will, if given sufficient time reach a "saturation level" of atomic bombs when it will have enough nuclear weapons to enforce its will on the free world. The reasons for the Soviet defeat of every attempt at international control over atomic energy until USSR achieves this level of atomic armament. There must be created a world-wide and effective system of atomic control; if Russia will not consent to such a program, she should be threatened with an atomic or hydrogen bomb attack.

THE TIME FACTOR IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, by Andrew Haven, in Problems of Communism, v. 5, no. 1 (Jan-Feb '56) 1-8.

The article includes the following: the communists, of course, are well aware of the universal appeal of disarmament, and they have consistently taken advantage of it by launching one world-wide propaganda campaign after another. The sincerity of their policy can best be determined from their own world: "from time immemorial the idea of disarmament has been one of the most favored plans of diplomatic dissimulation of the true motives and plans of those governments which have been seized by a sudden love of peace. This phenomenon is very understandable. Any proposal for the reduction of armaments could invariably count upon broad popularity and support from public opinion."

The quote is from Istoriia Diplomatii (History of Diplomacy) by E. V. Tarle. Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1945, Vol. III, pp. 708-709.

WHAT'S BEHIND SOVIET DISARMAMENT, by R. L. Garthoff, in Army Combat Forces Journal, v. 6, no. 3 (Oct '55) 22-27.

Evaluates the Soviet intentions behind their recent announcement that the Red Armed Forces will demobilize 640,000 men this year. The economic factors behind the announced demobilization; strength of Soviet Armed Forces as compared to those of US; extent of numerical superiority to be retained by the Soviet Armed Forces after the announced reductions in force are made; the extent to which the announced reduction reflects a "new look" philosophy assigning priority to air-nuclear weapons; and the Soviet military thought on the determining factors in a future global war. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union is "disarming" to "ease world tensions." It is only regrouping its available manpower to positions where it will make the Soviet Union stronger than it is today. Moreover, the modified "new look" military philosophy now adopted by the Soviets recognizes the dominant role of strategic thermo-nuclear air offense and defense, although it embraces a conception under which strong theater ground, air, and sea forces are also considered essential. Ample forces for these missions will remain after the scheduled reduction in ground strength.

Soviet imperialism; the Soviet Union as the only nation which has expanded since World War II; integration of satellite nations for the exclusive benefit of the USSR; the Soviet Union's military potential; statistical data on industrial production in the various countries of the Soviet bloc; a table listing known resources of principal minerals and petroleum; the strength of Soviet armed forces; information on intensive military and pre-military training; and a table showing the evolution of military expenditures since 1950; control of the Army by the Communist Party; Soviet practice of camouflaging military expenditures; and the need of military, political, and economic cooperation among the Western Powers.

WHY RUSSIA CAN AFFORD TO CUT HER ARMIES: REDS STILL WILL HAVE 3 DIVISIONS TO 1 FOR THE WEST, in U.S. News and World Report, v. 40, no. 21 (25 May 56) 30-32.

Armies of Russia will stay big despite cutbacks. With satellites, Russia will have 166 divisions where the West has 60. Yet recent Soviet moves have brought pressure already in Western nations to cut forces, reduce draft terms, and soften defenses. The Russians have been streamlining their forces for use of modern weapons, and emphasis is being put on mobility of Russian troops rather than on huge numbers. The Army is built around at least 65 armored and mechanized divisions - its real punching power.

3. Doctrines and Capabilities of Land, Naval, and Air Forces


Equipment, budgets, inventories, strengths, and planning policy of the World's military operations. The study examines eighty-six nations including Communist China, Soviet Satellites, and the USSR.

AIR FORCE DAY, in Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR, Bulletin (Munich), v. 1, no. 3 (June 54) 19-22. In English.

Progress report on Soviet aviation as revealed during the traditional celebration of the Air Force Day held at Tushino Airfield on 20 June 1954. The basic defect of Soviet air power - its weakness in group flights, has been eliminated. There is an increase in the number of well-trained jet airmen. There are advances in the development of helicopters. The MiG-15 is now the standard Soviet fighter. Amateur flying does not appear to have gripped the population as a whole,
despite the attempts of DOBAAF, nor does the training of Soviet amateurs seem to have improved in quality. The 36 AN-2 (Antonov) aircraft, adaptable to training, transport, mail and polar aviation services, was introduced for the first time in group formations. Strategic aviation was not represented at the air show.


An outline of the organisation and composition of Soviet military and civil air forces and a brief description of her leading operational aircraft. Table showing the code name, designers, designations, numbers of power units, span, lengths, and maximum speeds of most of the Soviet bombers, transports, fighters, and helicopters.

ALEKSANDR VASIL'EVICH SUVOROV. Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo "Iskusstvo," 52. 127 p. In Russian.

Reproductions of drawings, paintings, and sculptures devoted to the life, military career, and battles and campaigns of General Suvorov (1730-1800). Includes a short biography by Lt. Gen. I. V. Sukhomlin in which the influence of Suvorov on the development of Russian military art is described. In 1942 the Soviet Government in recognition of Suvorov's contribution to Russia's military history and the art of commandship, introduced the Order of Suvorov. Among the illustrations - posters of the Red Army during World War II showing General Suvorov as the spirit of the attack and victory, leading Red troops into battle.


An autobiography of a former Colonel in the Red Air Force who defected and found refuge in the West. The author, a North Caucasian, describes his upbringing in communist ways, life as a communist and an officer, and his disillusionment with communism. With a chapter on the organization of the Soviet Air Forces in general and the Zbukovsky Air Academy in particular.

BRITAIN APPRAISES SOVIET NAVY RISE, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 80, no. 11 (Nov 54) 1295.

A recent appreciation by the British Admiralty of the present and future Soviet Navy. Within the next two or three years the USSR will possess 30 cruisers, 150 destroyers, 500 submarines, 500 motor torpedo boats, 1,000 minesweepers, and at least 4,000 naval aircraft. The Soviet Navy's appropriations have probably been at least $33,600,000,000 since 1945. A cruiser of the SVENDLOV class can be built in about two and one-half years and a submarine in about six months.

The prerogative of the Supreme Command; functions of the State Committee for Defense; machinery for appointing the Supreme Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces; functions of the Minister of Defense; relationship of land, sea, and air forces; mission of the General Staff Headquarters, Political General Headquarters, Navy General Headquarters, and of the Army General Headquarters. (The above information is deducted from various data available to the writer.)

CONSIDERATION AND AIR POWER; A SURVEY OF POSSIBLE COMMUNIST AIR STRATEGIES, by Stefan T. Poscoy, in Air University Quarterly Review, v. 7, no. 3 (Winter 55-56) 43-54 plus.

Three patterns of atomic war which may be considered by the Soviet Union: (1) an atomic blitz, inevitably provoking massive atomic retaliation and ending in mutual suicide for the nations involved; (2) the lulling of the West into disarmament, followed by an atomic blitz to finish off the West's weakened retaliatory capability and ending in victory for the Soviet Union; and (3) a series of local atomic wars, in which possession of the initiative would enable the Soviet Union to attrite the West's retaliatory capacity to a point where global atomic war could be launched without excessive risk to the Soviet Union.

FIELD MARSHAL RUNIANTSEV; A COMPILATION OF DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS. Feld'marshal Runiantsjev; sbornik dokumentov i materialov, ed. by V. P. Korobkov. Moscow, GIZ, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoii Literatury, 47. 406 p. In Russian.

A collection of materials from the Soviet military archives revealing the role played by Field Marshal P. A. Runiantssev in: Russia's Seven-Years War with Prussia 1756-1763; Russo-Turkish War 1768-1774; Russo-Turkish War 1787-1791; and Russian Campaign against Poland, 1794. The author considers Runiantssev (1725-1796) one of the outstanding strategists and tacticians produced by Russia who greatly influenced the development of the Russian Army and the Russian military art, and who was "instrumental in removing the German doctrines from Russian military thought." Portrait of Runiantssev; and operational maps.


The development of the Soviet Armed Forces, their achievements during World War II, their present training and state of preparedness, and the importance of Komsomol to the Armed Forces. During World War II more than three million decorations were awarded to the soldiers-komsomols, seven thousand of whom were designated as heroes of the Soviet Union. The Allies
not only failed to carry out their obligations regarding the Second Front, but as "recently revealed by Churchill, organised German troops and stock-piled surrendered weapons for a stab in the back of the Red Army." Commanding the present high state of training and preparedness of the Soviet Armed Forces, Admiral Chernyshev stressed the point that in modern warfare, despite the colossal achievements in military technology, the outcome of battles will be decided by human beings, strong in spirit and accomplished in the handling of weapons.

IRON CURTAIN STRATEGY, in East and West, no. 4 (55) 16-19.

The concept of double envelopment (obkhvat) is a favored movement in the Soviet strategic doctrine. It will, in all probability, be applied when the Soviet General Staff decides upon the "H" hour. It is an axion of Soviet strategy that successful land operations must be carried out on the largest possible territory with sufficient reserve of area in the rear to fall back upon in case they are attacked or for maneuvering in preparation for their own offensive of counter-offensive operations. In this light examines military and political aspects of the central part of the East-West Front in Europe where the Soviets on their side have an immense territory of more than 9 million square miles, and the Western Powers are badly squeezed into a narrow strip of ground of just over 300,000 square miles between the Iron Curtain and the Atlantic.


US and Allied strategic capability in air, naval, and ground warfare, and Russian preparations. In part the conclusions state: "In the pattern of Russian preparations the build-up points to evolution of general purpose balanced forces.........The Russian Army is the dynamic factor in any form of all-out struggle, and with over 100 divisions at the ready in Poland, East Germany and White Russia, the numerical superiority that could soon be brought to bear is sufficient to be decisive on all pre-atomic military calculations. The Reds believe that classic military doctrine of land campaigning is still as valid as it ever was........" The paper includes an evaluation of the U.S. Navy's strategic air capability (Douglas A3D Skywarrior) as compared to USAF's, concluding: "the relative positions of the USAF and USN mission starting points are such that certain strategic targets could be as readily reached by the Navy as by the USAF, though such targets are in general located in the Far East and Pacific seaboard."


Strength and composition of the Russian Navy; the deployment of the various fleets; and their probable role in any future war. Bibliography.
RED AIR FORCE; THE WORLD'S BIGGEST, in Newsweek, v. 44, no. 8 (23 Aug 54) 28-33.

Comments by General Carl Spaatz and others on the bombers and the capabilities of the USSR Air Force. Design characteristics of the new Tu-20 intercontinental bomber as compared with those of a US B-52. The quantitative air strength of the USSR, with approximately 20,000 front-line planes, is far superior to that of the US with about 12,500. Design and performance of other Soviet bombers. The development of a Russian intercontinental bomber shows that the US is the intended target, since their other bombers are capable of reaching any point in Europe or Asia and returning.


The Soviet SU vehicles are not SP artillery as they have been labeled by some writers; they are turretless tanks. Design characteristics and capabilities of the various models in this series, and their tactical employment by the Soviets in World War II. Other types of Russian tanks, and the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviets in armored warfare. Most of the Russian armor is not modern, and a more recent "family" of Soviet tanks should be expected.


Comparison of the present and planned strength of the Soviet Navy with that of the U.S. and U.K. A survey of the salient features of Russian naval history to provide the basis for a better understanding of the nature and role of the fast growing Russian Navy that is even now posing a new and growing threat to the security of the Free World.

RUSSIA; RADAR NET. Russland: radarnetz, in Wehrtech Hefte, v. 51, no. 5 (54) 152. In German.

The Russian radar net along the Western border of the Eastern Bloc is reported to be without gaps from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Most of the stations are mobile and change their location quite often.


Strength and aircraft of: the Air Force of the Soviet Army (which is a tactical air force); the Long Range Air Force; the Fighter Air Force of the Home Air Defense Force, and the Naval Air Force. Photos of Soviet aircraft and helicopters.

Soviet air activities within the Arctic Circle since 1937 to the present; the military significance of these activities; estimated strength of the Soviet Strategic Air Force (AND - Aviatsiya Dal'nego Dastvira under the command of Major-General P. Kapitza who prior to 1934 worked closely with Lord Rutherford on atomic research); and location of Soviet Arctic bases. The vastness of the polar regions no longer affords the American continent the protection it once had. US and Canada are taking steps to meet the danger, but it will be some time before North America's back-door has the complete protection now considered essential. With polar map showing location of Soviet bases.


Development of Soviet armored formations and Soviet armor concept since the early 1930's; and organization and evaluation of present Soviet armored forces. Postwar armored formations represent one third of the Soviet Field forces and are their most effective, versatile, and mobile striking units. The division is the basic armored formation, and there are two types: the tank division with relative high proportion of tanks, and the mechanized division with preponderance of infantry. Both are closely integrated, self-contained formations of tanks and infantry with considerable fighting force.

THE SOVIET ARMY. O exercito sovietico, by Capt. Serzedelo, in Revista Militara (Portugal), v. 7, nos. 2-3 (Feb-Mar 55) 93-128.

First article of a series on: general Soviet strategy, military strategy and tactics, organization of national defense, high command, strength of armed forces, trained reserves, weapons, war industry, training of cadres and of troops, the large units, the services, recruitment, and pre- and para-military organizations.


The various stages in the evolution of Soviet Army doctrine since 1917, and the Russian generals' current adherence to the principles laid down by Stalin. One of these principles is that the Soviet Army is superior to Western armies.


Deals with: atomic defense (p.122); air defense (p.125); antiaircraft
operations (p.125); antiamphibious obstacles (p.126); air maneuver against antiaircraft defenses (p.126); antitank artillery (p.128); antimine artillery (p.137); antitank defense (p.137); antitank obstacles (p.138); and command post (p.302).

SOVIET MILITARY LITERATURE. *Die sowjetische militar-literatur*, by Bruno Maurach, in *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, v. 5, no. 6 (June 55) 255-263. In German.

The characteristics of Soviet military literature: (a) a tendency to claim superiority of "Soviet military science" over Western military science; (b) inclusion of political propaganda; (c) absence of differing opinions on defense matters; and (d) absence of any mention of the actual sources of Soviet military theory. The principal themes of current publications on Soviet military science; and a listing of pertinent books and periodicals.


Postwar development of the Soviet Navy and its present strength in: battleships, armored coast guard vessels, light and heavy cruisers, big submarines, big, oceangoing and coastal destroyers, escort, minesweepers and patrol vessels, minesweeping boats, motor torpedo boats, picket boats and submarine chasers, landing craft, and ice breakers. Lack of aircraft carriers precludes the use of Soviet surface naval forces in long-range operations. They may not operate beyond the range of Soviet fighter protection, that is approximately 250 miles from their coastline.

SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY. *Sovjets sjokrigsstrategi*, by H. Carol Uggla, in *Ny Militar Tidsskrift*, v.27, no.12 (54) 338-341. In Swedish.

Analysis of Soviet naval strategy based on operations in recent wars and on doctrines expressed by leading strategists. The Soviet Navy is traditionally intended and constructed for defensive operations in coastal waters and operations in adjacent enemy waters. Its chief mission is responsibility for protection of coastal flanks of the Red Army, a responsibility which includes offensive naval and amphibious operations. It is believed that the cruisers recently built and now under construction will have this traditional mission - including protection of the new coastal bases, and that they will operate in cooperation with naval air forces.

Lists names of ships, names of several officers, and the strength of crews, and records some of the impressions which the writer of the report received from the visit of a Soviet cruiser and two destroyers.

SOVIET UNION. Sowjetunion, in Flugzeug und Technik, v. 16, no. 11 (Nov 54) 268. In German.

The Soviet Air Force comprises fifty-six fighter and fighter-bomber divisions, eight tactical bomber divisions, and three strategic bomber divisions. Another three strategic bomber divisions could be readied for action within a month after outbreak of war. The geographical distribution of the active Air Force is reported as follows: about 1/10 each along Russia's western border, the border areas facing Turkey and Iran as well as India and Central Asia; about 5/10 in the Far East; and about 1/10 as reserve in the Ural Mountain region.

THE STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES. Die stärke der Soojet-streitkräfte, in Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 120, no. 7 (July 54) 534-555. In German.

As of August 1953 the Russians had: 63 armored divisions, 36 mechanised divisions, 52 infantry divisions, 6 airborne divisions, 6 artillery divisions, 1 artillery armored divisions, 5 cavalry divisions, and 58 artillery divisions. The Air Force was composed of: 56 pursuit and fighter-bomber divisions, 8 tactical bomber divisions, and 3 strategic bomber divisions. Three additional strategic bomber divisions could be mobilized within thirty days. Listing of seven army groups and distribution of armed forces among them. Structural and performance data concerning Russia's latest fighter airplane, the Chernovksy-M-22. More than 400 heavy bombers (of the Tu-200 and Il-28 types) and said to be stationed in northern Russia, separated from the American continent merely by the North-Polar region. About eighty airfields for long-range bombers and roughly sixty rocket launching tracks are being built in the vicinity of Murmansk and should be completed next year. A large air base with 2700-meter runways is under construction on Franz Josef Land.


Approximately one-fifth of the total Soviet expenditure on defense is spent on the growing Red Navy. Warship construction is going on in all the naval shipyards of the Soviet Union. In two or three years the strength of the Soviet Navy will probably consist of: 30 cruisers, 150 destroyers, 500 submarines, 500 M.T.B's, 1,000 minesweepers, 300 escort vessels, numerous patrol and landing craft, and 4,000 naval aircraft. The Soviet Navy is manned by three-quarters of a million officers and men, of whom some 270,000 are on ships and 85,000 in the Naval Air Force.
THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET ARMORED UNITS. Die struktur der sovjetischen panzerverbände, by F. M. von Banger und Eiterlin, in Hehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, v. 4, no. 6 (June 54) 287-294.

How the present Russian armored division compares with a Russian tank corps of the World War II period and a NATO Division as proposed for the European Defense Community.

THE STRUGGLE OF DECEMBRISTS TO ADVANCE THE RUSSIAN MILITARY ART. Bor'ba dekabristov za peredovoe russkoe voennoe iskusstvo, by E. A. Prokof'ev. In Russian.

The work is intended "to fill another gap" in the military history of Russia, and to show the "independent" character of the Russian military thought, as part of the program of the Soviet Government to promote and support the research on the "patriotic traditions" of Russian military history. Although there is much literature on the history of the Decembrist movement of Russia in the first quarter of the 19th century, "there are no works that bring out the struggle of Decembrists for progressive Russian military science and development of the Russian Army, although those revolutionaries were the generals and officers of the Russian Army." The social-economic background of the Decembrist movement; the Russian Army in the early part of the 19th Century; the wars of 1805-1812 and their effects on military science; the revolutionary program of Decembrists and its military aspects; military education and experience of Decembrists and their connection with the school of military thinking which followed the leading doctrines of Generals Suvorov and Kutusov; military reorganization which was planned by Decembrists to follow the revolution; and how the Decembrists fought within the Russian Army against those who were opposed to the doctrines of Suvorov and Kutusov.


Organization, mission, and functions of aerial reconnaissance, and the employment of tactical aviation in support of ground forces. History of air reconnaissance and tactical aviation; tactical and technical requirements of tactical aviation; functions of tactical aviation during the various stages of ground operations (e.g. during pursuit); functions of tactical aviation in combined operations with mechanized and cavalry units; and the system for control of tactical aviation by ground commanders. Tables and maps. (This edition of the work throws light on how the lessons of military operations in Spain and China influenced the tactical aviation doctrines of the Red Army.)

TANK FORCES IN THE SOVIET ARMY, by N. Gelai, in The Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, Bulletin (Munich), v.1, no.7 (Oct 54) 3-15. In English.

The importance placed by the Soviet Army on tanks and mechanized
formations during World War II, and the post-war structure of the Soviet land forces of which one-third are armored divisions, contradict the official Soviet doctrine which defines infantry as the basic branch of the Soviet forces and states that the mission of all other branches (artillery, tanks, and air force) is to support the infantry. Evaluates this discrepancy between the official doctrine and actual practices and describes the strength and development of Soviet tank forces during World War II and since then. Examines: composition of the Soviet Army in divisions in April 1945; tank corps, summer 1944; mechanized corps, summer 1944; tank division, 1951; and mechanized division, 1951. The Red Army's tank forces are the best of all the branches of the Soviet land forces and constitute their real striking force. If a war broke out, the opponents of the USSR would meet Soviet tank forces much better in quality than during the last war and considerably greater in number.


The author served in the Soviet Navy for ten years until 1949 (in the rank of Sr. Lt.). Organization of the Soviet Navy by maritime areas of the Soviet Union; shipbuilding facilities of the Soviet Union and their capabilities; naval bases of the USSR; mission of the Soviet Navy in future war; Soviet Navy's performance during World War II; personnel of the Soviet Navy, and morale.

THE WORLD'S AIR FORCES, in Flight, v. 67, no. 2416 (13 May 55) 615-668.

Their organization, strength, equipment, and, where divulged, their future plans. With photographs and tables showing characteristics of a large number of aircraft and national insignia. Includes: NATO, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Camboica, Ceylon, Chile, Communist China, Nationalist China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Lebanon, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, The Philippine Republic, Poland, Portugal, Rhodesia, Rumania, Salvador, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, USSR, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

4. Soviet Military Threat to the U.S. (Land, Naval, Air, and Unconventional Warfare)

AIR FORCE DAY, by N. Galay, in Institute for the Study of the USSR, Bulletin (Munich), v. 2, no. 7 (July 55) 39-44. In English.

The military and political significance of the Air Force Day
celebrations held in the Soviet Union on 3 July 1955. Branches of the Armed Forces that participated in the Air Force Day celebrations; types of aircraft displayed; numbers of various aircraft in formations over Tushino; Soviet achievements in aircraft construction and their strategic and tactical aspects; and the reasons why the celebrations took place in July (two weeks before "summit talks" in Geneva) and not during the May Day celebrations as in previous years. The main impression left in the West by the Tushino demonstration on Air Force Day 1955 is the first revelation of the real threat of Soviet air might to the Western world. This is doubtless the impression Soviet leaders hoped to create before the Geneva talks.


Brief report by a V.F.W. official on a series of visits with high-level officers and civilian administrators in the Pentagon. He was informed that Russia, at her present rate of ship construction, will outstrip the US Navy within two years in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines; today the USSR is operating ten times more submarines than Germany had at the beginning of World War II. The contrasting views of the V.F.W. and the Department of Defense on the usefulness of Universal Military Training.


The balance of power has shifted in favor of the free world. It examines the economic, ideological, military, and diplomatic factors that cause the Soviet Union to trail behind US. Also: Soviet preparations for an atomic war; civil defense measures (against atomic attacks) that are being taken in the Soviet Union; and Communist China's efforts to promote her own development of atomic energy.

A COMMENT ON THE TU-104, by James Bay Stevens, in Aircraft, Canada, v. 18, no. 5 (May 56) 29-30 plus.

Capabilities and characteristics of the new Soviet transport. Photos.

A FALLACY OF RED MIGHT, by Hanson W. Baldwin, in Readers Digest, v. 66, no. 398 (June 55) 129-130.

Reasons for and the adverse effect of American over-assessment of Soviet nuclear power and military potential. The military strength of the communist powers is considerable and increasing, but we outstrip them in most fields except manpower. Our stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons is probably more than 5,000, while the Soviet stockpile may be more than 500, perhaps even 1,000.
Describes certain aspects of communist psycho-social warfare, particularly in the fields of economics and statistics. It includes a brief lexicon of words which the communists use as revolutionary weapons and a classification of some of the more significant semantic booby-traps and propaganda tricks of the Kremlin. Defines the "Fifth Weapon" as a multi-leveled psychological warfare that demoralizes as it disorients and which the communists use in coordination with land, naval, air, and psychological warfare. As such the Fifth Weapon is a concept of total conflict. It allows the communists to make a covert threat to use guided missiles against Britain, accuses US of "gaza warfare," and makes a maneuver in the Economic and Social Council of the UN, all at the same time and all with one ultimate objective. Through their use of the Fifth Weapon the communists have raised warfare to a new dimension, and it may well decide the global power struggle and defeat the US.

FOURTH DIMENSIONAL WARFARE AND OUR FOREIGN POLICY, by Frank Rockwell Barnett, in Reserve Officer, v. 32, no. 2 (Feb 56) 8-18.
Various aspects of psychological warfare with emphasis on methods employed by the USSR and suggestions on how the US can counter the Soviet moves.

A GLANCE AT SOVIET AIR CAPABILITIES, in Naval Aviation News (Oct 54) 13-15.
The attack capabilities of the USSR Air Force and the performance possibilities of Soviet planes now in service. The USSR now has air bases from which they could launch attacks by conventional light bombers on Allied shipping in the English Channel, the North Sea, and upon every port in northwestern Europe.

HIGH-SPEED AVIATION. Aviatsia bol'ishikh skorostei, by E. A. Yakovlev, in Nauka i Zhizni, no. 6 (June 55) 17-20. In Russian.
The struggle for continual increases in speed is the factor that determines the development of contemporary aviation. A discussion of the aerodynamics of high speeds and the development of the various types of aircraft propulsion during the period 1930-1955. Of special interest to the further development of aviation speeds, especially to multi-engined heavy aircraft, is atomic energy. Sees no drastic changes in fundamental design of jet engines powered by atomic fuel.

HYDROGEN BOMB IN THE PRESENT ARMAMENT RACE. Bomba wodorowa w obecnym wyscigu sbrojen, by Maj. T. Lisicki, in Balona, no. 3 (July-Aug 55) 44-51. In Polish.
Some of the military aspects of hydrogen bombs, the US economic efforts since 1942 to build up the atomic energy industry, and the latest achievements in this field by the Soviets, who have two large "atomic centers,"
one around Novosibirsk producing plutonium and U235, and the other much larger near Irkutsk. The Irkutsk "center" produces deutorium and tritium. A comparison of US and USSR capabilities.

IF ATOMIC WAR BROKE OUT TOMORROW? in Interavia, v. 9, no. 8 (54) 300-331.
A series of articles on various aspects of an atomic war between the USSR and the NATO countries. The vulnerability of cities and military units to the hydrogen bomb; the "atomic sensitivity" of the US and Western Europe; the organization, location, and equipment of the air forces available to NATO; the mission and capabilities of the USAF Strategic Air Command; the comparative performance of US and Soviet strategic bombers; strength and organization of the USSR Air Force and what is known of its strategic bombers; the facilities and operation of US-Canadian air defense; the possibility of atomic attack from submarines; the training provided for NATO pilots and air crews by Canada's RCAF Training Command; and the contributions to aeronautical research made by NATO's Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development.

Our soldiers must be fully aware that in case of any future war with the Soviets, they will be facing a daring, ruthless, and cunning foe. As a result of indoctrination, training, and increased effectiveness since World War II, all indications lead to the conclusion that the Soviets are capable of employing chemical, biological, and radiological warfare, making effective use of jets and bombers and utilizing masses of men, tanks, and firepower. They possess the technical know-how to produce radar, atomic and thermonuclear weapons, and guided missiles. It is in this light that we should gear our training. We still have a short lead in technical know-how, but we cannot become complacent — we must continue to lead.

THE MARXIST-LENINIST LINE, in Aeronautics (Gt. Britain), v. 34, no. 2 (Apr 56) 38-39.
Restrictions were placed upon press inspection of the Tupolev 104 by the London Airport authorities. The consequence was incomplete information and mainly uninformative pictures of this transport. AERONAUTICS, however, presents two photos with descriptive information.

Interpretation of the probable pattern of Soviet military action in the opening stage of a future war. The possibility that the cold war may develop into a hot war by a series of almost imperceptible stages; the role of
the Soviet Navy's submarine, fast destroyer, and cruiser fleets and of the Army
and Air Force; and the beginning of a Western global strategy for defense
against communist aggression.

THE NEW AIR SITUATION, by Charles J. V. Murphy, in Fortune, v. 52,
o. 3 (Sept 55) 86-87 plus.
While Soviet diplomats pursue their new policy of peace-and-smiles,
the Soviet Air Force continues to grow in strength. Red air power is whittling
away at the US air lead. The question of how much more is required to
protect the US margin is occupying the thinking of planners in Washington.
"A new air-power debate has split Mr. Wilson's Pentagon and the technical
advisory staff of the National Security Council as no other issue has suc-
cceeded in doing ...." The evolving pattern of Soviet air weapons system and
the strategy behind it; Soviet aircraft, their capabilities, and their effect
on US estimates of comparative air strengths of both countries; the causes of
the "air-power debate" among the US planners; the budgetary problems of the
US Department of Defense in light of the Administration's policies as it
faces a national election in 1956; and what is being done at present and likely
to be done in the future to meet the growing challenge of Soviet air power.

OMINOUS GAIN FOR THE REDS, in Business Week, no. 1343 (28 May 55)
26-27.
Comments on recent disclosures that Russia's air power is
catching up with US lead. See repercussions in US domestic policies,
defense production programming, and international diplomacy, and a change
in tactics of US Strategic Air Command because of the new planes available
in Russia. Photo of the Soviet four-jet intercontinental bomber HISON
that represents an ominous gain for the Reds in their race with US for
air supremacy.

1964: AFTER TEN YEARS OF CO-EXISTENCE by Gerhart Niemeyer, in U.S. News
and World Report, v. 37, no. 21 (10 Dec 54) 60-66.
A prophecy on the outcome of the struggle between US and its Western
allies and Soviet Russia. The author - a professor of international relations
at Yale University - places himself in the year 1964; looking back to 1954 when
US was the strongest nation in the world but allowed its fear of war to over-
take its will to victory. He theorises that in 1964; Soviet Russia through its
strength in nuclear weapons and intercontinental guided missiles will force the
nations of Western Europe to give up their alliance with US and accept Soviet
domination; the balance of power will shift so overwhelmingly in favor of USSR
that US will become a second-rate power isolated in a hostile world; and that
internally US will become a divided nation because of the threat to its freedom
and its very existence and because it will have only two courses of action open
to it, peace and eventual domination by the Soviet Union, or war and total de-
struction of US. In retrospect, as he sees it in 1964, the author ponders the
factors which could have been decisive in favor of US had they been used properly at the peak of US strength, but which US diplomacy failed to exploit and convert into a lasting advantage for free-world security.

PROBLEMS OF ANALYZING AND PREDICTING SOVIET BEHAVIOR, by John S. Reshetar, Jr. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 55. 69 p. (Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science.)
An evaluation of the methods employed by Western scholars in their efforts to analyze and predict the behavior of the Soviet Union, and the factors to be considered if such studies are to be more reliable than they often are. The ideological and cultural approach to Soviet behavior; extremes of overestimation and underestimation of Soviet capabilities to influence other states and wage war successfully; the nature and use of the various sources of the Soviet Union; and the limits of reliable knowledge about the Soviet Union. Bibliography.

The Soviet Union has trained its aviation technicians along standards comparable with those of their western counterparts; Soviet research and development work has been highly efficient in exploiting and improving captured German designs; in the past ten years USSR has become independent in most fields of aeronautical engineering and no longer has to lean on stolen or copied western designs produced with the assistance of western technicians; simplicity of Soviet designs and the full utilization of the mass production potential make it possible for the Russian aircraft industry to approach the capacity of US. Means by which such progress was made by USSR; Soviet facilities for aircraft research and development; aircraft engine development and the types of new engines developed; and some of the other trends in Soviet military research and development.

RED GAINS THREATEN "DETERRENT FORCE" by Lt. Gen. Thomas S. Power, in Aviation Week, v. 64, no. 4 (23 Jan 56) 31-34.
The Soviet race for technical supremacy of the world, and record of Soviet achievements in the areas of airplanes and missiles, electronics, nuclear energy devices, and training of scientists and engineers. What the US should do to remain ahead in the development and production of new weapons.

RUSSIA FORGING TRANS-POLAR STRIKING FORCE, in Aviation Age, v. 22, no. 3 (Sept 54) 16-23.
The Soviet Union views the polar regions as the main avenue for aerial warfare in the event of World War III. The strength of the Soviet long-range bomber striking force; the airbase structure; and types of equipment in use.
With map showing airbase structure in northern USSR supporting the growing Soviet trans-polar strategic bombing force. A list (eighty-five locations) of Soviet ground facilities and airborne units located in the Arctic and Northern Pacific coastal areas is appended.

RUSSIA'S SECRET PLAN FOR WORLD WAR III, in American Mercury, v. 82, no. 386 (Mar 56) 31-34.

The Washington correspondent of the American Mercury "reveals" what transpired at "secret conferences" between the State Department and the Pentagon which were called recently to revise earlier evaluation of the present competence of the Soviet Union to embroil the free world in World War III.


Russia is winning its technological race with US to develop superior airpower. Soviet aircraft displayed in Moscow during May Day 1955 reveal that the Red Air Force has made rapid progress in design and production of supersonic fighters and long range jet bombers. The author is critical of a statement released by the Department of Defense on 13 May 1955 (Press Release "g. 63-55) regarding the new Soviet developments in aircraft, because it is "... vague and cryptic ..." and does not indicate the true significance and implications of their advances in airpower. Types of aircraft shown in Moscow and the military implications of the Soviet progress in airpower; aircraft now available in the Soviet Air Force and USAF and a comparative production rate of these aircraft; text of the official Department of Defense statement on Russian aircraft, released 13 May 1955; text of statement made by Senator Stuart Symington regarding Soviet progress in airpower and the statement of the Department of Defense on the subject; and other reactions in the Congress on Senator Symington's resolution to investigate the comparative status of US and Russian airpower.

THE SOVIET IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES; A DELIBERATELY DISTORTED IMAGE, by Frederick C. Barghoorn, in American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals, v. 295 (Sept 54) 42-51.

The character of Soviet propaganda and its slogans and analysis of the current Kremlin-approved and Kremlin-created image of the US - its military policy, economic and political systems, and its atomic, hydrogen, and other "superweapons." On the whole, this image seems designed to create the impression that a new Soviet Union is willing to cooperate with the West but that US refuses to meet Moscow half way. While Soviet propaganda is tied to nationalism at home, abroad it identifies itself with whatever forces can be used to weaken US influence.
A brief review of the Tsarist and later Soviet naval history. The present strength of the Soviet Navy is estimated to be: three obsolete battleships; about 24 cruisers, of which about half was built after World War II; 110 to 130 destroyers; and perhaps 350 to 370 submarines. All Soviet naval aviation consisting of about 3000 to 4000 planes is land-based and aircraft are under the operational command of each fleet commander. Between 750,000 and 850,000 men of whom about 200,000 are the "hard core" service these ships and aircraft. The organization of the Soviet Navy is influenced both by Marxism and geography. The operational forces are divided into four principal fleet commands: Northern or Arctic; Baltic; Black; and Pacific or Far Eastern. Each of these has its own subordinate fleet air arm. Location of naval bases and their relation to the industrial centers; strategic concepts pertinent to each of the commands; and all over capabilities.


Basic data on USSR's geography, population, industry, agriculture, economic planning, transportation, political and administrative structure, ideology, education, police apparatus, and trade and foreign policy; and outline of the military potential and preparedness of the Soviet Union, the strength of its Armed Forces, and the extent of Soviet atomic bomb development; and information regarding Soviet expansion in Eurasia, both aims and methods of operation in western and eastern Europe, in the Near and Middle East, SE Asia, and NE Asia. With a chapter on the respective strategic positions of US and USSR today, the former in the role of a world policeman protecting its allies and the latter bent on destruction of US as the ultimate objective of its strategy. Bibliography.

SOVIET RUSSIA - ENGLAND - NEW MISSIONS FOR HEAVY CRUISERS?
Sowjetrussland - England - Neue aufgaben fur schwere kreuzer? in Wehrtechnische Hefte, v. 51, no. 6 (54) 186. In German.

Soviet Russia is currently building heavy cruisers (10,000 to 12,000 tons), whereas Great Britain has not built any of this type for a number of years. These cruisers are said to be particularly suitable as carriers of remote-controlled weapons. The question remains whether such cruisers can carry sufficient defensive weapons aboard to combat enemy aircraft and guided missiles.

SOVIET-RUSSIAN LONG-RANGE GUIDED MISSILES, Sowjetrussische fernlenkwaffen, in Flugwelt und - Technik, v. 17, no. 9 (Sept 55) 218. In German.

Within the next ten years the Russians expect to have an intercontinental ballistic missile with a speed ranging from Mach ten to twenty. This
would make it possible to reach any target in the USA in less than thirty minutes. In the near future the Russians should have a guided missile with a speed of Mach two to three which would reach most of the larger US cities within a few hours.

JOVIII SIZE UP, by Col. William W. Stickney, in Reserve Officer, v. 30, no. 9 (Sept 54) 10-11 plus.

Estimates the strength of the Soviet Army, Air Force, and Navy; the strength of satellite armies and air forces; and the offensive and defensive capabilities of the Soviet bloc. The mobility and fire-power of Soviet divisions have increased through introduction of new weapons and equipment. USSR is preparing for war, and, therefore, the US must not waste precious time but must prepare to meet the challenge and be ready to fight at home as well as abroad.


Translated from Japanese.

Summary of a round-table conference on the comparative capability of US and USSR to make a strategic bombing attack. The conference was attended by several Japanese "experts". Capabilities of American and Soviet strategic bombers; comparative availability of A and H-bombs in both countries; inferiority of the Soviet Union in aircraft instruments; methods of attack that are likely to be chosen by the strategic bombers of both countries in case of war; and what preparations Japan must make to be ready for defense against A-bomb attacks.


Although U.S. can now win "any war the Soviets might start," soon Russia will pass U.S. in striking power. Output of Soviet vs. U.S. bombers. How to deter an attack.

WHITE OUTLINES SOVIET TECHNICAL GAINS, in Aviation Week, v. 62, no. 22 (30 May 55) 16-18.

Statement made by General Thomas D. White, Vice Chief of Staff USAF, during his Armed Forces Day speech in Pittsburgh, in which he made an exposition of the relative positions of American and Russian technologies as applied to development of air-power and atomic weapons.
5. Internal Factors Bearing on Military Power


An interview with Maj. Gen. J. R. Deane, the former (1943-1945) Chief of US Military Mission to Moscow, during which he pointed to Russia's weaknesses which make it unlikely that the Soviet rulers will risk a war. These weaknesses were in great evidence during World War II when the Soviet Union relied on US planes, vehicles, locomotives, food, and fuel to help it fight the Germans. Although it is wise to overestimate the enemy, we have overdone it in the case of Russia, and our future foreign policy should be based on a complete lack of fear as to what the reaction of the Soviets would be. They are too busy with internal problems to be in a position to challenge militarily the Western World.


The dilemma faced by the Soviet leaders in satisfying demands for a better life from a better educated people without a slowdown in the industrial pace.

BEHIND THE SOVIET FACADE, by Isaac Deutscher, in Reporter, v. 12, no. 5 (10 Mar 55) 38-41.

The crucial issues over which the struggle which led to Malenkov's downfall was waged: (a) the question of the relative importance of heavy and light industries, or producer goods and consumer goods, in the new Five-Year Plan; (b) the scale of planned capital in vestment in power stations working on atomic energy; (c) the scope and character of the Soviet contribution toward the economic development of China and of Eastern Europe in 1956-1960; and (d) the size of the Soviet armament expenditure during that period with special reference to the armament of China. The appointment of Marshal Zhukov to the post of Minister of Defense indicates that the Party leaders, while yielding to the Army's pressure for more toughness in both foreign and domestic policies, are nevertheless anxious to keep at bay the more extreme, xenophobic, and politically ambitious elements of the officers' corps, the elements that presumably follow Vassilevsky's lead.

FORCES FOR CHANGE IN SOVIET SOCIETY, by Robert C. Tucker, Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corporation, 56. 54 p. (USAF Project Rand Research Memorandum RM-1636.)

Some tentative conclusions of recent research on trends of Soviet society and leadership since the death of Stalin.
GEOGRAPHY AND NATIONAL POWER. Annapolis, Md., United States Naval Institute, 53. 100 p.

A study of the major geographic facts and principles which contribute to a nation's development, power, and policies. Geographical position, physiography, area, manpower, and natural resources as elements of national power, and how these elements contribute to national strength or weakness, both political and military, of US, Latin America, the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, Europe, the Soviet Union, Near and Middle East, and Far East.

HOW SOVIET PEOPLE REACT TO THE NEWS. Reaktsii sovetskogo cheloveka na novost'; by A. Gara, in Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR Journal, (Maych), no. 3 (10) (May-June 54) 80-99. In Russian with summaries in English.

The Soviet people react to the news in accordance with the class, group, or sub-group to which they belong. The psychology and the outlook on the world is different in each group. However, despite the heterogeneity of Soviet society, general categories of reactions do exist. These categories are examined and presented in a diagram showing the particular ways in which various types of news are interpreted by persons of various classes and positions, including the military.


Excerpts from the book CLOSE CONTACT on: certain aspects of Russia's economic weaknesses; the weaknesses of her Armed Forces, of her allies, and of her intelligence reporting; the disappearance of revolutionary fervor; the strange death of Stalin and the demise of Beria; Russia's inferiority complex; social life; Soviet propaganda and its effectiveness; deficiencies of Western propaganda; how the Russians prevent desertion; Soviet vs. Western security; and the Russian Press.


Deals with the publication of reference journals at the Institute of Scientific Information, Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The Institute was established in 1952 to provide information to Soviet scientists, engineers, instructors and students of higher educational institutions, and personnel of industrial and agricultural establishments, on the achievements of science and technology throughout the world. The functions of the Institute include: publication of periodicals which systematically and thoroughly provide reference on world literature which deals with: the natural and technical branches of science; research and development work on the perfection of methods for scientific information; and compilation and publication of reference and bibliographical literature and reviews on the status of in individual branches of science and technology in the Soviet Union and foreign countries.

During the last two years the Soviet iron and steel industry has shown a marked tendency to lag. In March 1955 the Soviet Government and press began exhorting the workers in the iron and steel industry to produce more in 1955 because it became evident that the tasks set at the 19th Party Congress for the basic forms of heavy industry in 1955 would not satisfy the essential requirements of the Soviet state. The effects on Soviet heavy industry brought about by the lag in production and the growth in requirements for iron and steel. There is little doubt that the Soviet Government will take drastic steps to rectify the situation in the iron and steel industry because the development of heavy industry and consequently of Russia's war potential is being undermined. Table showing production of pig iron, steel, and rolled metal in USSR 1913-1960.


Arguments in support of the conclusion that because of the penetration of Communist Party in the Soviet Army, the latter plays no independent role in political matters.


An estimate of the effects of the February 1955 reshuffle in the Kremlin leadership on Russia's strength. The causes of Malinkov's resignation as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and "election" of Marshal Nikolai Bulganin to succeed him, and appointment of Marshal Georgi Zhukov as the Minister of Defense; the economic factors involved; the Party and the Army as the two major sources of power in USSR; and the pressure that the new leadership is likely to face in the months ahead. The reshuffle in leadership weakened the Soviet Union, revealing rifts in leadership and economic troubles. It does not mean, however, that the Soviet Union is weak. It still has the most powerful ground forces in the world; it has an industrial plant that is still growing; it has enormous manpower and material resources; and it still has an aggressive, expansionist policy together with a capability for causing US great difficulties in Asia and in Europe.


Biographical sketches of Marshals Nikolai Bulganin and Georgi Zhukov, the new Soviet premier and defense minister respectively. The political emergence of these military leaders is a break from Stalin's system of balancing the conflicting interests of the party and the Red Army and a potential threat to the Communist Party's control over the Army.
A new, up-to-date size-up of Russia's top men based on a report of Austrian officials who recently went to Moscow to negotiate peace terms in the Kremlin. According to the report the top three men in Russia are: Bulganin, Molotov, and Mikoyan. Second in importance are: Kaganovich, Pervukhin, Khrushchev, and Saburov. At the bottom are: Malenkov, Voroshilov, and Zhukov. The Vienna delegates formed the following conclusion: the rulers of Russia are old men, grown conservative with the passing years. They are in a defensive mood caused by fear of a world war, by the overextension of their power, and by a feeling of inadequacy when they compare their resources with those of the US. They are united by one common aim - to see that no one of them manages to usurp the power that was Stalin's. In these circumstances they are eager to negotiate with the West to reduce the chances of a war that could engulf them. However, they are not yet ready to make really big concessions to the West or anyone else. Some details of observations made by the Austrians while in Moscow. Photos of the top three, middle four, and bottom three rulers of the Soviet Union.

The emergence of the Red Army as a political power and of collective leadership on the top in the Soviet Union. The tensions and difficulties which have arisen from this situation; and speculations on the outcome of the leadership crisis and the ease the West will make of the present emergency.

In 1955 the Soviet Government directed the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to establish within the Academy a new research and development institute devoted to the problems of transportation and development of the complex transport network of the country. An interview with the director of the Institute of Complex Transport Problems, T. S. Khachaturov, who outlines the immediate and long-range goals of the Institute, is presented. Soviet transportation can profit if methods and practices of foreign countries are utilized. As an example, suggests the American transport methods as practiced in the ports of the Great Lakes.

A Decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 11 March 1955, eleven generals of the Soviet Army were promoted to the rank of Marshal. The simultaneous promotion of eleven persons to such a high rank is unusual because it breaks the normal postwar practice. It may mean that the Soviet Army is being reorganized. Degrees of the rank of marshal in the Soviet Union; and promotions to marshal during and after World War II. Backgrounds of the promoted
Generals: Bagrmyan, Biryumov, Grechko, Yeremenko, Moskalenko, and Chuikov (Army); Zhigarey, Rudenko, and Sudets (Aviation); and Varentsov and Kasakov (Artillery). Reasons which lead the author to believe that the promotions indicate the reorganization of the Red Army. With a list of marshals in the USSR.


Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov and the Red Army are a new force to be reckoned with in Soviet Russia. Recent promotion of Zhukov to the position of Defense Minister raises the possibility that the Red Army may some day be in a position to challenge the dominance of the Communist Party. Past experiences indicate that communist rulers cannot be sure of Red troops. Although Zhukov is a party man, he is a national hero and the Kremlin is aware of the dangers that his personal popularity represents. The rank and file of the Red Army reflecting no great admiration for the communists may look to a man of Zhukov's prestige to lead them against the communists.


PROBLEMS OF ATOMIC WARFARE AND THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES, by N. Galay, in Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR, Bulletin (Munich), v. 2, no. 4 (Apr 55) 3-10. In English.

Soviet proposals for the total prohibition of the military use of atomic energy and destruction of existing stocks of atomic weapons is based on the organic weakness of the Soviets in adapting their armed forces to the atomic era. The advent of the atomic era deprives the Soviets of the source of their former might and an instrument of aggression - mass land armies with conventional weapons and equipment. The Soviet Union is well behind US in tactical atomic weapons; it is more difficult for the Soviet Army than the West to adapt itself organizationally and tactically to atomic combat; these problems are apparent to the Soviet military leaders and compel them to strive for the complete abolition of all atomic weapons.


"Before World War II speculation in consumer goods was very common in the Soviet Union as a result of the acute shortage of many items. At the present time speculation is even more widespread." Some evidence of the extent of speculation may be found in the central daily press, political journals and illustrated magazines, which print accounts of the most varied types of
profiteering. There is one aspect to speculation in the Soviet Union, which, one would think, could under no circumstance be tolerated - profiteering in institutions which deal with military supplies. Points out the various instances of such profiteering and concludes that they reveal the following essential factors: the level of discipline in the country must have dropped considerably if even the employees of military institutions are beginning to steal and speculate; there is sufficiently acute shortage of food consumer goods in the country for it to be worth while to engage in speculation despite the risk of severe punishment if caught; and supplies for the military trading organizations must be quite inadequate.

THE RAIL TRANSPORTATION SITUATION IN THE SOVIET UNION. Novyi podzemel mdoroshnogo transporte, by V. Martsalov, in The Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR Journal (Munich), no. 6 (13) (Nov-Dec 54) 63-72. In Russian with summaries in English, German, and French.

Contrary to Soviet boasts and propaganda about the superiority of Soviet rail transportation, the Russian railways situation is actually almost catastrophic. Traffic capacity has long failed to keep up with the demands of the economy and freight long ago outstripped its technical limits. There is an acute shortage of locomotives, and passenger and freight cars, and those that are available are not utilized to the best advantage. Causes for the problems in the Soviet rail transportation; steps taken by the Soviet Government since 1954 to remedy the situation; and results achieved.

READY FOR WORK AND WAR, by Maj. M. F. Vassilieff, in An Casainoir, v. 16, no. 1 (Jan 56) 30-34.

The system of premilitary service training given to the youth of the USSR. (Translated by Capt. D. N. Brunicardi.)


If a dictator dies in office the armed forces usually emerge as the only well-knit, thoroughly organized power element in the chaos resulting from the disintegration of the other power elements. Since Stalin's death the Red Army has emerged as the one solid rock of strength with its old leaders high in power; Zhukov as Minister of Defense; Vasilevsky as First Deputy Minister of Defense; Konev as commander in chief of the consolidated forces of the Satellites; and Solovsky as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Signs of dissension and rivalry among the four leaders; and speculations on further developments in the Soviet Union.
During the past five years the volume of book exchange between the USSR Academy of Sciences and foreign institutions has increased more than three times. In 1954 the libraries of the Academy of Sciences alone conducted book exchange with more than 3,000 foreign institutions sending abroad more than 250,000 literary units and receiving about 200,000. Some of the shortcomings in the books exchange program, and suggested remedial measures.

Available information indicates that the Soviet atomic science is successfully matching much of the US work in the industrial application of atomic energy, although by no means on so broad a scale. The Russians are capable of original and complicated solutions of their own.

REPORT ON RUSSIA, in World Oil, v. 141, no. 3 (15 Aug 55) 135-147.
An analysis of the petroleum situation in the Soviet Union and the capabilities of the Red petroleum industry to supply the needs of the Soviet Armed Forces on a sustaining basis in case of a global conflict. Estimates of: the petroleum requirements of the Armed Forces of USSR; Russian oil reserves; and capacity of Russia's oil fields. Behind Russia's tremendous fighting force lies its oil weakness, and this weakness rules out any but the most foolhardy attempt to wage an aggressive war. Also information on: oil exports by the Soviet Union, and the attempts by the nations of the Red bloc to accelerate their search for petroleum.

RUSSIAN TECHNICAL LEADERS ARE PERCHED ON A SHAKY ENGINEERING BASE, BUT STUDY BY DR. LEON TRILLING OF M.I.T. FINDS SOVIETS HAVE ELITE CORPS OF AERONAUTICAL SCIENTISTS SECOND TO NONE, in U.S. Air Services, v. 41, no. 4 (Apr 56) 7-9.

The paradoxical strengths and weaknesses in the selection, training, and use of physical scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union. While application of science on a vast scale is essential to the realization of Soviet ambitions and a great effort is expended to train scientists and engineers in large numbers, the Communist Party fears them as potential subversives. Engineers and scientists are regimented and watched by inspectors and informers: premature and narrow specialization of students is enforced, and training methods are stereotyped.

The methods and organization used by the Communist Party to ensure its control of the Soviet Army. Operations of the Main Political Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense; functions of the political officers assigned to Army units from the top down to company level; and the political indoctrination given to troops. The network of informers used by the political officers to spy on their fellow soldiers. That such a system of control is necessary indicates weaknesses in Soviet solidarity which could be exploited by an enemy in time of war.


Organization of this Service, and functions of political officers, the cells of the Communist Party, the Komsomol, the Zempolit, the NVD, and SMERSH.


It is expected that 1956 will mark the beginning of the Sixth Five-Year Plan for the Economic Development of the Soviet Union. Although the text of this new plan or of its directives have not been revealed by the Soviet Government, there is enough information available, in the author's opinion, to allow a discussion in broad outline of the likely principal features of the Sixth Plan. Its main characteristics; and the probable specific goals in industry, transportation, agriculture, housing, foreign trade, and Soviet economic commitments with the communist bloc of nations. Offers the following tentative conclusions on the perspectives for Soviet economic development over the next five years: the military-economic power of the Soviet Union as represented by heavy industry and the products of heavy industry is likely to increase sharply; agriculture and consumer goods production are unlikely to improve at a rate either satisfactory to Soviet consumers or at a rate likely to be proportional to the probable increase in the volume of purchasing power in the hands of consumers, causing a continued morale problem and an inflationary threat of no mean proportion; in terms of the regime's stability, agriculture will be the key sector, and success of the virgin lands and corn programs would probably permit Khrushchev to become openly Stalin's successor; however, their failure would probably not only undermine Khrushchev's personal position but throw the country into a major crisis with incalculable consequences.

SOVIET ARMED FORCES DAY, in The Institute of History and Culture of the USSR, Bulletin (Munich), v.2, no.3 (Mar 55) 40-45. In English.

The celebrations of the Soviet Armed Forces Day this year (23 Feb-
reveal, greater honor was paid to the Armed Forces than usual; much
of the homage was paid to the higher Army leaders, who were also able to
speak of themselves and emphasize their own merits and the abilities they
had shown when the country was in danger and when they were "guarding the
peaceful labor of the Soviet people" after the war; and increased political
importance of the Army leaders in the machinery of state and also in the
highest Party organ - the Central Committee. The significance of this new
trend; and the effects it will have on Soviet military policy and internal
policies. The Armed Forces Day demonstrated that the present aim of Soviet
policy is greater speed in the armament race and increased military training.
These military preparations will soon be used by Soviet foreign policy to
intimidate the free world in the cold war, although the present show of
power is to a certain extent a bluff.

SOVIET EDUCATION: NEW CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, in Vital
Delivered by William Benton before the Association for Higher
Education, Chicago, Ill., 6 March 1956. A critical political problem
affecting education, and a critical educational problem affecting
politics. This problem gravely affects the survival of US and our
civilization, and it can only be met by a merger of politicians and
educators.

SOVIET MARSHAL CRITICIZES STALIN'S SYRACUSE, by Isamu Asai, in Tairiku
Comments on an article written by Marshal Rotmistrov of the Soviet
Tank Corps in the Red Star on 28 March 1955 in which he criticized the attitude
of Soviet strategists and called for abolition of corruption in the Soviet
military circles. In his article ENOURAGEMENT OF CREATIVE RESEARCH BY SOVIET
MILITARY SCIENCE the Marshal took issue with Soviet military authors who fail
to add their own opinion on the subject discussed and always belabor the old
theory of Lenin and Stalin although there is need for recognition of the pro-
gress made in military science and the military training required to meet the
challenge of modern warfare. Mr. Asai considers the Marshal's statements as
an indication that with Marshal Zhukov's rise to the post of Defense Minister
there is less control of speech in Soviet military circles and that there are
attempts to abolish it because it has blocked the progress of Soviet military
science.

THE SOVIET UNION AFTER STALIN, by Helene and Pierre Lazaroff, London,
Othene Press, 55. 254 p.
Life and internal conditions in the Soviet Union. Among the authors'
observations: "...The fact is that these people, though sincerely desiring
peace, are at the same time militarist and chauvinist almost beyond belief.
Nowhere else have we seen so many men in uniform or such marked respect shown
by civilians to the military, or witnessed such enthusiasm at military parades."
"...Red Star also published articles, under the signature of General B. Olisov,
stating that victory in a new war would not be decided by atomic weapons, but only by soldiers on the battlefields. 'The true possibilities of atomic weapons' wrote the General, 'have been greatly exaggerated by the enemies of peace who seek to intimidate public opinion through fear of atomic warfare. There are new effective means of defense against atomic bombs. Well-prepared and well-trained troops can, in spite of atomic weapons, achieve successful military operations'."


STRATEGIC STUDY OF RAILWAY NET IN USSR, by Lt. Col. Fred B. Porter, Fort Eustis, Va., Transportation School, 53-54, 30 p. (Transportation Officer Advanced Course Class no. 7, Report 164).

Characteristics and capabilities of Soviet railroad nets, and equipment and statistics on railway operations in comparison with those of the US. The past and present development of railroads in the USSR; types of cars and locomotives; and operational methods and techniques. The present rail net is operating at near capacity and would be inadequate in case of war; the Trans-Siberian Railroad is particularly vulnerable because the destruction of one of forty tunnels would eliminate the use of the line beyond that point; the future expansion of railroads is limited only by the expenditure of time and effort; and Russia ranks second to only the US as a railroad power - and large-scale construction is still in progress.

A TOUGHER TEAM IN THE KREMLIN, in Business Week, no. 1328 (12 Feb 55) 25-27.

The recent coup d'etat in the Soviet Union will place the Kremlin under control of a coalition comprised of the Red Army and the Communist Party. The Red Army expects to shape a tough foreign policy, one that will, above all, block rearmament of Western Germany. The Communist Party bureaucracy is determined to maintain the totalitarian system established by Stalin; and Khrushchev is equally determined to give priority to defense and heavy industry and to abandon Malenkov's plan to boost consumer goods.
WHY RUSSIA DOESN'T WANT TO GO TO WAR NOW, by Charles W. Thayer, in Look, v.19, no.8 (19 Apr 55) 43 plus.

The former Chief of the Voice of America and US attache in Moscow explains why the men in the Kremlin today are shouting "Peace" louder than ever, and mean it too. The reason: Soviet industry has failed to produce butter and bicycles at the same time it produces guns. Food supply is Kremlin's No. 1 problem, but there was a time when Russia used to be a major food exporter. Today the Soviet Union is the world's third largest buyer of meat because under the Soviet system the farms do not produce enough to meet the needs of growing population. Outside of Moscow and other big cities it is often impossible to obtain matches, salt, soap, thread, needles, buttons, kerosene, toothpaste, razors, and razor blades. A factory assigned to produce 33,000 two-tube radio sets in a six-month period actually turned out exactly ten, because of lack of radio tubes. While the Soviet industry continues to fail in producing for people's needs, the communist dream of global conquest will be stalled.
B. Soviet Satellites

1. Military Capabilities


Evolution of Eastern Germany's armed forces to their present strength of about 125,000 men, not including the security units of the general People's Police and the Frontier Police. Table: showing overall organisation and composition and armament of an armored regiment and a motorized infantry regiment.


First article of a series on (1) offensive and defensive tactics in atomic warfare, and (2) the adaptation of logistics to such warfare.


Any future defensive war should be in fact "graduated" so that the tactics and weapons employed meet adequately the scale of attack, in order to defeat each act of aggression in a minimum of time with the minimum of force necessary. It should be made clear to all potential aggressors that once an act of aggression has been committed, the United Nations reserve to themselves the right to take whatever steps may seem best to achieve that end. They would naturally use atomic cannon and atomic bombs if it seemed that they could not achieve success quickly without them.


Structure, organisation, functions, and training of the East-German Frontier Police which at present comprises about 18,000 men.
The Hungarian Army comprises thirteen fully equipped divisions, among them three armored divisions, two air force divisions, and one antiaircraft division. The Air Force has at its disposal more than forty well-constructed bases of operation. Its flying equipment consists mostly of modern tactical bombers of Russian origin and Russian MiG-15 fighters.

The People's Army in Eastern Germany, El ejercito popular en Alemania oriental, in Revista de Aeronautica, v. 15, no. 170 (Jan 55) 56, In Spanish.

Preparations are being made, under Soviet supervision, for the organization of a German People's Army by recruiting young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two. This is expected to produce a contingent of 300,000 to 350,000 men for all armed services as compared with 80,000 to 85,000 men composing the East German People's Police. A census is also being taken of all former officers and WO's of the German Army under forty-six years of age. The Air Force is estimated at 10,000 men. Each of its four air divisions comprises 110 YAK-18's and YAK-11's.


Present status of and probable goals for East German rearment. The establishment in 1948 of the Land Police, and training of selected personnel from this force to form the cadre of the Regular Army which presently numbers 110,000 and is aimed at 350,000. Recent organization of military districts and regional Army groups; and establishment of eleven military schools. Establishment and training of so-called combat groups composed of members of the Communist Party. The Border Police, the Transportation Police, the Sea Police, and the Air Police.

The Soviet-German Army. Den sovjet-tyska armen, by Herbert Alboth, in Kontakt med Krigsmakten, v. 10, no. 7 (July 54) 212-215, In Swedish.

Information culled from various sources concerning the East German Police - a regular army composed of about 100,000 Soviet trained and equipped men. The Naval People's Police has a force of 9,000 and the Air People's Police a force of 5,000. A military academy has been established by the Soviets in Dresden.

History, strength, and training of the North Korean Army prior to the outbreak of the Korean War; causes of the Army's failures in the early stages of the Korean War; its reorganization while the Chinese Army held the front and conducted operations against UN forces; increase in firepower and mechanization of infantry divisions of the North Korean Army during 1951-1952; characteristics and distinctive tactics of the North Korean Army; and its present strength and organization.

2. General Aspects as Applicable to Military Policy and Strategy of the U.S.S.R.


When an atomic weapon hits your battalion, round up the men who can still function. Take tactical action. Sympathise with your medics. It is time for worry and for action but it is not time for despair. A surgeon describes the effects, protective measures, and methods of evacuation of casualties.


How the Romanian Communist Party succeeded to neutralize the Army to prevent armed resistance to the communist takeover, and to reorganize the Romanian Army into a communist tool ready to participate in any military operations of the Soviet Union.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, in News From Behind the Iron Curtain, v. 5, no. 5 (May 56) 42-48.

A roundup of last month's important developments behind the Iron Curtain, including an analysis of Satellite regime reactions to the Twentieth Soviet Congress, a review of the Slansky, Rákó and Kostov trials, and a country-by-country survey of the current collectivization campaign in the Soviet bloc.
POLAND TODAY, by John Appleby, in Contemporary Review, no. 1063 (Sept 54) 138-142.

Speeches made by several official spokesmen at the United Workers' Party Congress and newspaper articles bring to light some of the economic difficulties, the quality of industrial products, production costs, and especially the disparity between the development of industry and agriculture; the clash with the Roman Catholic Church; and the alignment of the Polish economy with the Soviet bloc. The Polish armed forces are considered reliable because it is the national desire to hold on to the present Oder-Neisse frontier. The Polish communists have tried to avoid mistakes made in the other Satellite countries.


The command High Command of the Eastern Bloc is reported to have at its disposal about 400 divisions, including eighty Satellite divisions. Twenty-five well-trained Soviet divisions are stationed in Eastern Germany. Eighteen of these are armored divisions with jet aircraft support. Another sixty divisions are available in the other East-European states. The eighty Satellite divisions comprise three Bulgarian armored divisions, one Polish armored division, and two Polish armored brigades. Each of the other East-European armies has an armored division. About 100 modern airfields for jet aircraft are available in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Eastern Germany. Moreover, several large airports for long-range bombers are under construction in Eastern Europe.

THROUGH THE ATOMIC LOOKING GLASS, by Lt. Col. Clarence C. DeReus, in Military Review, v. 35, no. 3 (June 55) 4-11.

History teaches that the outcome of combat has been governed by firepower or maneuver. If this pattern continues it may be expected that the next war will be one in which firepower will play the predominant role. Examines the changes that appear imperative and the adaptations that must be developed in tactical doctrine caused by the requirements of atomic combat relative to: Mass, mobility, defense, retrograde movement, special operations (airborne operations, task forces of regimental combat teams, and amphibious operations), river crossings, intelligence, and logistics.
C. Communist China and Other Communist Nations in Asia

1. Communist Global Strategy and Objectives


Excerpts from the inside story of the communist take-over of China as witnessed by Mr. Stuart who was US ambassador to China during the period of Nationalists' decline and the rise of communist power. Mr. Stuart's complete book FIFTY YEARS IN CHINA is due for publication on 15 October 1954 by Random House, New York. Mr. Stuart tells of: how the Chinese situation developed and why the communist conquest succeeded; US foreign policy and aid to Nationalist Government during that time; Chiang Kai-shek as a leader; General Marshall's mission to China; and conditions in China as the communists came to power. A policy for future dealings with Red China is suggested.


Delivered as an address at the Institute of World Affairs, Riverside, Calif., 12 December 1954. What we are witnessing in China today is the fulfillment of several centuries of frustrated desire to regain a place in the sun. Beneath the Communist veneer is a solid block of Chinese nationalism which accounts for the intensity of the new Chinese imperialism. The various aspects of Chinese history, the nature of Chinese communism, and the nature of Sino-Soviet relations concluding that: China's historic ambitions are intensified and given new purpose and direction by the current communist ideology; although Communist China is at present tied militarily, politically, economically, and ideologically to the Soviet Union, it would be unrealistic and unwise either to misjudge the strength of that alliance or to underestimate its vulnerabilities; and that emergence of a second communist power center in Asia, with a huge population and an arrogate leadership, suggest that China may continue to develop in concert with the Soviet Union a massive power and ideological concentration in Asia, or she may break away from the Soviet as did Tito, or she may not break away completely from the Soviet Union but demonstrate a growing independence from the Soviet control. It is this latter possibility which permits the characterization of Chinese Communist imperialism as a new dimension to the conflict.
2. Military and Foreign Policy in Support of Global Strategy

CHANGE IN CHARACTER OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES FROM A PEOPLE'S ARMY TO A NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCE, by Kiyota Isaki, in Tairiku Mondai, (Dec 55) 1-4. Translated from Japanese. Administrative and political aspects of the Armed Forces of Communist China resulting from the Government's decision to abolish the volunteer system and replace it by conscription. Factors which influenced the need for conscription; the new line that is being drawn between the officer corps and the ranks; relations between the people and the Armed Forces; and changes to be made in the strength of the Armed Forces.


The military strength of Communist China; its emergence as a world power; and its expansion in all directions except towards Formosa. The importance of Formosa to the security structure of the US; and the military strength of the Nationalist Chinese. Predicts that there is no immediate threat of war in the area, since a limited attack by Communist China against Formosa would bring American intervention on a scale which the Communists are not yet ready to oppose.


Summary of statements made by Peng Ta-huai (Vice Premier of the State Council and concurrently Minister of National Defense of Communist China) on 16 July 1955 at the general session of the Second National People's Congress, during which he stated the reasons why the volunteer system of military service was replaced with conscription and revealed some statistical data on the military personnel situation in Communist China.


The author is Representative-in-Asia of the Free Trade Union Committee, American Federation of Labor. The overall review of the communist regime in China. With a chapter on militarism in Communist China. Photos.

Mao Tse-tung's ten military principles which have been consistently applied by the Viet Minh warlord Ho Chi-minh. The truce in Indochina now offers Ho Chi-minh an opportunity to rebuild his Army along more formal lines, form new cadre units from among his veterans, train without having to fight at the same time, and strengthen his forces logistically and technically. The Viet Minh will not neglect to capitalize on the truce period. Should the war be renewed, it could well be with an entirely new type of Viet Minh Army. Photographs.

THE TWO KINDS OF WARFARE. Die doppelte Art des Krieges, by Eberhard Kessel, in *Volkswissenschaftliche Bundesheer*, v. 4, no. 7 (54) 598-310.

Critical review and interpretation of the definition by von Clausewitz of a war conducted to conquer the enemy and a war with limited objectives.

3. Doctrines and Capabilities of Land, Naval, and Air Forces

COMMUNIST CHINA. Volksdemokratische China, in *Flugwesen und -Technik*, v. 17, no. 3 (Mar 55) 63. In German.

Communist China is contemplating passing a new law under which all men between the ages of eighteen and forty will be subject to compulsory military service. The duration of the service will be three years for the Army, four years for the Air Force, and five years for the Navy.


Evaluation of Mao Tse-tung's Army, Navy, and Air Force - their strength, equipment, and weaknesses, concluding that Communist China's armed might lies mainly in the endurance and fighting potential of its massive infantry, which may be eminently well-fitted for conventional warfare on the large land mass of China, but which cannot successfully venture off-shore. Thus, while Chinese Communist leaders talk brazenly about Formosa, they could not invade and capture the island. Photographs.

General explanation and review of the Military Service Law, Officers' Service Regulations, and Regulations Concerning the Awarding of Medals and Decorations as revealed by the revised draft of the Military Service Law of the People's Republic of China, made public by the State Council of Communist China on 15 February 1955. Among the notable features of Military Service Law of the Soviet Union; and it changes the volunteer concept to the universal compulsory service system in Communist China. With extracts of various Articles from the Military Service Law of Communist China. (This is the first two-part article.)


An exercise from Jan. 56 to 25 Feb 56 near Fairbanks, with approximately 10,000 troops participating, but not more than 4,000 at one time. Among these: the combat elements of the 71st Infantry Div. and the battalion combat team from the 5th Infantry. During the exercise, an attempt will be made *to continue to develop Infantry doctrine, determine the capability of supporting weapons, and determine our ability to move supplies with and in support of the Infantry.*


Capabilities and limitations of paratroops and helitroops, with the conclusion that helicopters could provide the mobility needed in any future war to a degree never before conceived and not yet fully realized.


Experiences of World War II show that the Soviet Command massed tanks together in the decisive direction instead of dispersing them along a whole front. Beginning with Stalingrad, the High Command put into effect new forms of attack operations, with groups of tanks in formation of many successive echelons oriented in the direction of the decisive blow. This enabled penetrations of up to 300 miles at rates of fifteen to twenty miles in twenty-four hours. Organisational structure of a present Soviet tank corps. (Translated from Russian by Capt. D. M. Brunichard.)

Mao Tse-tung's military views on the conduct of China's Civil War presented in the book were originally delivered as lectures at the Red Army College in northern Shensi. How to study war; the Chinese Communist Party and China's Revolutionary War; characteristics of China's Revolutionary War; Nationalist campaigns of "encirclement and annihilation" and communist counter-campaigns.

TASK FORCE RAZOR SHAVES BIG APPLE II, by Anthony Leviero, in Army Combat Forces Journal, v. 5, no. 11 (June 55) 38-43.

APPLE II was the Army's code name for the atomic explosion at Yucca Flat, Nev., on 5 May 1955. Minutes after the explosion, Task Force RAZOR consisting of tanks and armored personnel carriers with troops began a simulated attack through the danger area. The Task Force was unharmed and unimpeded in its operations. It was the first time that men had been above ground on the test site during an atomic explosion, and an impressive demonstration of armor's claim that it will be the decisive arm in atomic war.

The author, went along for a ride in one of the tanks of the Task Force, describes the explosion, composition of the Task Force, and how men and equipment behaved during and after the explosion. Photo of M48 tanks moving in a simulated attack across the Nevada desert eight minutes after the atomic bomb was exploded 3,200 yards from the nearest tanks.


Tactics of atomic war developed at the Infantry School are based on the concepts of dispersion, mobility, and protection. The concept of dispersion requires independent and semi-independent operations by single battalions and rapid concentration, when needed, near the enemy, which in turn requires emphasis on communications and improvement of existing security means. The concept of mobility requires modern types of ground vehicles as well as development of air mobility through use of assault transports, helicopters, and parachutes. The concept of protection places greater emphasis on movement and maneuver at night. The new doctrine of mobile defense is that of an offensive defense deploying battalion-size units of combined arms in positions of depth as strong-points or grouped on islands of resistance. Studies conducted by the Infantry School in fire-support coordination and improved assault techniques.
WARFARE IN THE JUNGLE; BAMBOO IS A STANDBY ALLY OF UNSEEN FIGHTERS, in Crowsnest, v. 7, no. 7 (May 55) 4-5.

How members of the People's Army of Viet Nam lived off the jungle during the Revolutionary War in Indochina, and the many uses they made of the bamboo tree. From them were derived: spears, torches, water, fuel, cooking utensils, and edible green shoots.


The fighting ability of Communist Chinese soldiers; and circumstances which brought it about. Chinese Communist soldiers received excellent training in fighting against superior forces during the Chinese Civil War. They know how to dig in and consolidate rapidly and have a passive attitude toward enemy aircraft.

4. Chinese Communist Threat to Asia and Potential Military Threat to U.S.


US bombers based in Japan and Okinawa are being moved to Guam. The reason behind this move is that communists are building up their air power in northeast Asia. Their bombers in increasing numbers are only seventy minutes' flying time from US bases in Japan and Okinawa. China is even reported to be getting atomic bombs from Russia. If war should break out suddenly American bombers would be much safer from an attack in Guam than Japan and Okinawa. Estimated strength of the communist air power build-up; steps taken by US to prepare for the growing communist air strength in Asia; and Russia's strategy in supplying Chinese Communists with A-bombe (the report is unconfirmed). Map.

COMMUNISM IN CHINA. Washington, Department of Defense, Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, 55. 15 p. (Know Your Communist Enemy Series). The circumstances under which the Chinese Reds came into power, how their aggression concerns the US, and how perilously it threatens world peace.
THE DEFENCE OF SOUTH EAST ASIA, by C. B. Minwood, in International Affairs, v. 31, no. 1 (Jan 55) 17-25.

The strategic, economic, and political aspects of Southeast Asia. The Chinese Communist Army has been estimated at 2,250,000 with an additional 700,000 public security troops. The problem which this Army, now the second largest in the world, presents to the SEATO nations; at present it could overrun Southeast Asia without effective opposition. The reported lease of Hainan Island to the Soviets may be an indication that a Communist Chinese attack on Formosa would be assisted by Soviet air support and submarines, great damage could therefore be done to the US Seventh Fleet. The implications of the Sino-Indian agreement on the future status of Tibet; in spite of the contradictions of Indian neutrality, that country has little in common with communism.


The present strength of the "People's Liberty Army" is approximately five million men, organised into 140 divisions of 11,000 men each. It is divided into three components: (1) the elite striking force formed of seventy divisions of veterans of the Civil War and numbering 2,300,000 men; (2) troops assigned to the six military district armies, numbering some two million men; and (3) the People's Security Force, numbering several hundred thousand men who form the political police, similar to the Soviet MVD. In addition to these three regular components is the reserve force of over twelve million People's Militia, similar in organisation and function to the American National Guard. A review of recent Chinese history explains the great influence exerted by the Communist Army upon the policies of the Communist Government. The Army is strong now and in time will become stronger.

WHO CAN SAVE ASIA? by Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn, in Collier's, v. 135, no. 7 (1 Apr 55) 46-47 plus.

The only people who can save Free Asia are the Asians themselves. However, US can do much to provide them with the means that will deter the communists. Although there is no human obstacle, no armed power is SE Asia strong enough to stop the Chinese Communists if they should send their armies rolling southward across their border, they do not plan an armed invasion. The authors, in three months of traveling around the rim of China from Japan to India, did not meet a single person - official, soldier or private citizen - who thought the Chinese Communists would invade Southeast Asia, now or soon. Infiltration is the communist plan and the real menace in SE Asia. Strategic consequences if the communists take over in SE Asia; extent and methods of communist infiltration in SE Asia; and how can the US best help SE Asia resist the threat of Red Chinese domination.

Communist China's major weakness is the lack of modern supply lines. The problem of supply that would face Red China in a full-scale war against a power such as the US; and current and planned railroad construction in Communist China. It is their weakness in transport, as much as anything else, that is forcing Chinese Communists right now to talk peace and avoid any aggression that might lead to full-scale war with US. Railroad map of Communist China.


Examines closely the possibilities of China's rise to power and attempts to forecast its effects. An accurate assessment of the effects is vitally important to the formulation of long-term foreign policies of Western Powers. China is on the road to industrialisation which nothing short of a third world war is the fairly near future will stop, and she is destined to play a major part in world affairs for many generations to come.

5. Soviet Contributions to Chinese Military Strength


First part of an article of three parts from inside communism's Asiatic stronghold revealing how China has gone overboard in its Russification.

RED CHINA'S MILITARY STRENGTH. Rotchinas militarische starke, in Schweizer Soldat, v. 30, no. 4 (31 Oct 54) 139-140. IN German.

Red China's actual combat force consists of 1,750,000 men organized into five field armies and autonomous divisions. The reserves comprise one million men distributed among eight military districts. Organization of the High Command; structure of the Army; names of field army commanders; and supplies received from Russia.

THREAT IN THE EAST, by W/Cmdr. Asher Lee, in Royal Air Force Flying Review, v. 2, no. 7 (April 56) 27-29 plus. Communist air strength in the Far East is now more than double that of Western Europe.
D. United States

1. Strategy and Objectives

AIR POWER AND FOREIGN POLICY, ESPECIALLY IN THE FAR EAST, by Thomas K. Finletter, in The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals, v. 299 (May 55) 76-86.

Review of recent US foreign policy in the Far East, stressing discrepancies between political policy and military planning, and the role of military power in our future policy for the Far East.

AMERICA'S CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP, by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., in Aeronautical Engineering Review, v. 15, no. 4 (Apr 56) 38-41 plus.

The deterrence of total war and the integrity of the free world depend upon America's capacity to maintain a position of great relative technological strength in both economic and military measures and in the countermeasures of the cold war. In view of the Soviet's steady growth in technological strength, a seven-point program is suggested to give direction and velocity to our technological advance and maximum incentive to private initiative.

AMERICA'S FUTURE, by Alexander Wiley, in Reserve Officer, v. 31, no. 2 (Feb 55) 10-11 plus.

The former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee states that World War III is not imminent nor probable. If America makes sure that it is strong and prepared to meet aggression, the aggressor will not dare to start another war. Peace is possible through vigorous, continuous preparedness; and in peace, science will jet-propel us into the most exciting and rewarding era in history. The military strength of Russia, and its dangers to US; American responsibilities of leadership in the face of Soviet threat to peace; what America must do to be prepared and strong; responsibilities in this era of peril of our citizens to our society; and the importance of Reserve Forces to US military preparedness.


If nuclear war is to be avoided, the USSR should not only be reduced to its metropolitan territories, but it should be made to feel secure
within them, for otherwise no contraction of its sphere without desperate measures is conceivable. Of course, the USSR is not likely to withdraw voluntarily at any price. Its insecurity derives, after all, from the existence of the US as a non-communist power, not from US policy. Nevertheless, a combination of a more flexible diplomacy and an increase of our military strength would substantially alter the pattern of international relations. At a minimum it would rally the free world. At a maximum it might strengthen the "peace parties" within the Soviet bloc, the groups not willing to risk everything for peripheral objectives. Thus even if a Soviet withdrawal cannot be induced, the Soviet sphere could contract as the consequence of a rift within it. Diplomatic principles are listed by which the minimum objective of rallying the free world could be harmonized with the maximum objective of reducing the Soviet sphere.

Advocates an American strategy for making all-out war less likely and restoring the initiative to the free world, based on creating a new multipower balance of power in Eurasia. The program involves the establishment of four main contact belts between ourselves and Soviet power involving the assured defense of Europe, the stabilization of an Asian sector against further Chinese Communist aggression, and the establishment of a mobile American strategic reserve in North America and the Middle East. Outlines the steps of the program and the organizational and procedural changes of the US Government which would be needed to achieve the program under US and President Eisenhower's leadership.

AN APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING: A RESEARCH NOTE, by Burton Sapin and others. Princeton, Princeton University, 54. 64p. (Foreign Policy Analysis Project, Series No. 4.)
An attempt at establishing the criteria in terms of which the question of an appropriate role of the military in foreign policy-making could be answered.

Many informed people adhere to the belief that, although there have been significant shifts in Soviet tactics and diplomatic manners, the long-range objectives of the Kremlin remain unchanged and that these objectives are incompatible with freedom as the Western World understands freedom. Therefore, we must maintain, at all costs, a posture of military strength and a determination to employ that strength if the need arises. The grave dangers associated with nuclear airpower have revolutionized our thinking and caused sober reconsideration to be given to the traditional concepts of warfare and of defense. In the area of continental defense, we are pushing out our early warning lines as far as practicable, thereby increasing our ability to intercept and engage hostile
threats as far as possible from vital targets. Such early warning will alert our retaliatory offensive forces and the civil agencies concerned with defense, and will enable our air defense forces to adjust to a maximum state of readiness. The air defense system for our homeland will not stop all attacking aircraft short of their targets, but, coupled with our offensive capabilities, it should insure survival. In fact, the very existence of these capabilities - to defend ourselves and to strike back with devastating power - are serving to keep us from being attacked today.


It is believed that the Nation's preparedness can be determined from an analysis of a small group of factors representing its political, economic, moral, industrial, and military strength. A war-readiness formula is developed on the basis of eighteen representative factors.


Evolution of tactics and techniques during the two World Wars; the importance of fire and movement; analytical review of the German "Blitzkrieg" and of the Allied counter-blitz in World War II; and how tactics and organization will be affected if tactical A-weapons are used in any future war. The general pattern of the forces required by the West is almost the opposite of the "New Look" strategy, because as long as Russia has the H-bomb and maintains large armies, we must stick to atomic weapons and maintain an army which is able to fight conventional as well as atomic-type wars, as circumstances may dictate.


Application of Clausewitz' concepts of war to modern wars of democratic nations, with particular emphasis on the thesis that all wars are fought for political reasons and that the military point of view must be subordinated to the political. The records of World Wars I and II and the Korean War indicate that political aims have been sublimated to emotional and military objectives; that democracies tend to make war in the form described by Clausewitz as "struggles of life and death from pure hatred"; and that recent wars, even if militarily successful, produce unsatisfactory political results. The need for military and political leaders to recognize the problem and to discover and apply measures to solve it.


The US should exploit its current advantage in nuclear weapons tech-
nology and delivery systems by employing them against the military forces of aggression and not against cities or civilians. The air power requirements of the US are: (1) a greater stockpile of nuclear weapons than the USSR; (2) a modernized tactical offensive capability widely dispersed and equipped with nuclear weapons; (3) an active and passive air defense system; (4) a modern air logistics system; and (5) an intelligence and reconnaissance capability geared to the rapid tempo of nuclear counter-force operations.


The US must take a courageous stand on its foreign and military policies toward the USSR in order to avoid the disaster of a defeat by communism. The major political and military considerations on which our policies should be based, which include the facts that: international control of atomic energy is not possible; nuclear weapons are now the key of military power; defeat in a nuclear war is the only thing that could be worse than such a war; and in an atomic conflict the force that plans to strike second may never be able to strike at all.


The problem of national survival in the nuclear age poses two equally vital questions: how can America maintain supremacy in the ability to wage offensive and defensive war? How can America win the Cold War by mounting a political offensive to isolate and eventually paralyze communist war-making power? Concludes that the ultimate weapon is neither military-industrial power nor psychological warfare - but the man himself - in his human courage and faith in certain unalterable moral laws.

DEFENSE: THE REVOLUTION GETS REVOLUTIONARY, by Charles J. V. Murphy, in Fortune, v. 53, no. 5 (May 56) 100-103 plus.

A three-year old Eisenhower policy, the "New Look", still governs American strategy. But its detailed implications, only now unfolding, are beginning to look more drastic than the original decision.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, by Ernest R. May, in Political Science Quarterly, v. 70, no. 2 (June 55) 161-180.

The fifty years of growth and experimentation which led to the establishment in 1947 of the National Security Council as a regular, legally established, cabinet-level agency for the coordination of political and military views on foreign policy. The inadequacies which still remain to be ironed out in regard to functions, relations with Congress, and in relation to public opinion; and the likelihood that the National Security Council will be a permanent feature of American government.

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Fundamental elements and foundational principles which underlie the policies and actions of nations in their relationships to each other. Basic factors affecting national policy and international politics. The shaping of national policy under the American presidential form of government, in the parliamentary democracy, in the Soviet Union, and in other forms of government. The projection of national policy into international policies; and establishment of international organisations and regional pacts in quest of collective security.

"MASSIVE RETALIATION" - ITS TRUE MEANING, in U.S. News and World Report, v. 37, no. 10 (3 Sept 54) 120-123.

Full text of an address by Robert Murphy - Deputy Under Secretary of State, delivered to the Air Force Association on 20 August 1954 at Omaha, Nebraska, and his answers to questions from the audience following the conclusion of his address. Mr. Murphy explained how the US policy of "massive retaliation" fits into the US defense concept, and the reasons why this policy was not applied in Korea and Indochina.


The role of the military in these challenging times when foreign policy, military power and potential must remain in balance and at the same time civil control cannot be abdicated.


The Soviet view of the military, political, and economic objectives behind the US program of overseas bases; scope of US military bases in various parts of the world; and why the Soviet Union, Communist China, and other "progressive forces of the world" consider it a threat to the peace, and what they are doing about it. Among the arguments: since the majority of overseas bases are for the US Strategic Air Force, "the contentions of US that these bases are maintained for the defense of the US are not valid; the US is violating the armistice in Korea and preparing the ground for new provocations by South Korea against North Korea"; US control of Okinawa is "unlawful"; US is arming the Philippine Army in order "to use it in the struggle against the movements of the peoples of Asia for freedom"; and the presence of US Fleet in the Mediterranean is intended for the purpose of "pressuring England and France to support US military adventures." From a military point of view the major American bases, especially those which are located close to the communist countries, are quite vulnerable, because contemporary military technology makes it possible to put a major base out of action with a single blow."

With following chapters: THE REQUIREMENTS OF DETERRENCE, by William W. Kaufmann; STRATEGIC DOCTRINES FOR NUCLEAR WAR, by Roger Hilsman; PASSIVE AIR DEFENSES FOR THE UNITED STATES, by Klaus Knorr; LIMITED WARFARE, by William W. Kaufmann; MILITARY POTENTIAL IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, by Klaus Knorr; COALITIONS AND ALLIANCES, by Roger Hilsman; NATO AND THE NEW GERMAN ARMY, by Gordon A. Craig; and FORCE AND FOREIGN POLICY, by William W. Kaufmann. Significant excerpts from the book appear in ARMY, v. 6, no. 10 (May 56) 50-56.


Delivered as an address at the Institute of World Affairs, Riverside, Calif., 15 December 1954. NATO and the Brussels Treaty Organization identically declare that an armed attack against one or more of the members shall be considered an attack against them all. Both treaties make provision for a consultative council, representative of all the members; and in both organizations the council is intended to function continuously. The difference in the pattern of military cooperation between the old traditional alliances and coalitions and the new alliances of NATO and ETO with their consultative council is that the new are permanent and institutional. These new alliances, if properly supported by US, could exercise a decisive influence of peace. However, US policies and actions often pursue separate courses (partly because of American inexperience in dealing with allies, partly because of the rigidity of the constitutional machinery of the US, and partly because domestic policies and politics often interfere with the objectives of foreign policy). Points out the areas where US actions and diplomacy failed to understand the issues in Europe and the nature of the new alliances, caused confusion in the minds of America's allies as to the real policy of US, and weakened the security of Western Europe.

A NEW POLICY FOR AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, by Oleg Anisimov, in Russian Review, v. 14, no. 3 (July 55) 175-183.

US policy makers appear to plan their psychological offensives behind the Iron Curtain in isolation from the US diplomatic moves; sometimes it even appears that American diplomacy seeks to achieve goals which are diametrically opposed to those sought by American psychological warfare strategists. This discrepancy has a more serious negative effect behind the Iron Curtain than is generally realized. Suggestions for a strategy that could be successful if it were conducted as an integral part of a broad diplomatic offensive.


The military policies of the US Secretary of Defense, Charles E.
Wilson, indicate that he agrees with those military strategists who hold that the next war will be brief, that air power will be paramount, that the use of soldiers will be limited, and that the need for elaborate industrial mobilization will be reduced. However, questions are being raised in Congress as to whether Mr. Wilson's policies provide enough defense for the nation and whether US can be sure of a short war. Reduction in the Army budget since June 1953 as compared to the Navy and Air Force budget; some of Mr. Wilson's achievements since he became Secretary of Defense; and the relationship of mutual trust and close friendship between the President and Mr. Wilson which shows that the President knows what the Secretary is doing and is backing him.

NO ARMAMENT RACE; A REPLY TO THOMAS K. FINLLETTER, by William R. Mathews, in Atlantic, v. 194, no. 5 (Nov 54) 54-56.

The suggestion made by Mr. Finletter in his article, WHEN RUSSIA IS READY, that the US engage in an armaments race with the USSR for its own protection could lead only to economic and political suicide for the American way of life. The US must retain alert and powerful armed forces; however, it is not expected that the USSR will attack the Western Powers, because the Soviets lack the food supply, railroads, and other resources to sustain a war of conquest against another great power. The USSR "government by committee" retains its popularity by stating peaceful aims, and it is doubtful if any government could successfully drag the Russian people into a war of aggression. The US should devote more attention to the organization of reserve strength in our industries and in our military forces.

OPPORTUNITY OF A LIFETIME, by Nicholas Myaradi, in Freeman, v. 5, no. 4 (Oct 54) 129-131.

In the opinion of a former Hungarian Finance minister the basic and inherent weakness of the Soviet economic system is the reason we are not yet in a shooting war with USSR. American embargo on exports to satellite countries has curbed and will continue to curb the communist war potential. By keeping up our pressure on the crumbling economic system of the Soviet Union we can win the cold war without firing a single shot.


Proposes a strategy and a system of tactics for limited warfare which would give US the advantage over Russia without extension to general or total war, and explains how the naval, ground, and air forces, as well as atomic bombs are to be employed in such a strategy.


The failure of American leaders to heed the change in the political
and military position of the US which occurred in 1949 as a result of the atomic explosion in the USSR and the defection of China to communism. The continued reliance of the Eisenhower administration upon retaliatory atomic power; and its subordination of political considerations to military requirements. Its failure to realize that an atomic war may grow out of local conflicts and that reluctance to engage in atomic warfare may be created by active defense and multiplication of targets beyond the Soviet ability to attack them. The lack of emphasis on traditional weapons as means of pursuing national objectives; and unawareness of the fact that while the problems in Europe are purely military, those in Asia are political.


The foreign and military policies of the US, their interrelationships, efforts by the Western Powers to halt the expansion of communism, and the possibility of atomic disarmament and an "enforced peace." By 1956 the USSR will have an atomic-air capability superior to that of the US; the US strategy and military forces required to make a Soviet attack unprofitable; NATO's part in US military policy; and the unsuccessful search for world peace since the end of World War II. To this a plan for atomic disarmament and military control by NATO which might be used as a basis for discussion.

THE REDS HOLD FIVE BIG CARDS - BUT WE CAN TRUMP THEM, by Edgar Ansel Mowrer, in Collier's, v. 134, no. 9 (29 O t 54) 50-51.

The five basic reasons for communist gains: (1) the Reds are not afraid of an atomic war; (2) the communists are without moral restraint; (3) they promise something to everybody; (4) communists everywhere are united; and (5) they put "guns before butter." Measures which we could take to overcome our present self-imposed handicaps include recognition of the unsatisfactory aspects of today's world order and an offer of a permanent partnership - an organization able to enforce permanent peace inside or outside the present UN. The free world might start treating all separate communist-made revolts as parts of Moscow's continuing offensive. We might boldly decide to punish any new local attacks instead of merely halting them, even at the risk of atomic destruction. Finally, our side could make the bitter choice of real military security over rising living standards.


The nature of military participation in US foreign policy and the consequences of the interdependence of foreign policy and military policy which are felt by civilian and military officials alike. Formulation of an appropriate role for the military in foreign policy, under consideration of the democratic values and the necessity for military advice and competence in the preservation of national security; and conditions under which the proper contribution of the military could be preserved without subverting the principle of civilian supremacy.
The current concept—that there is nothing worse than atomic war and that the US cannot defeat the USSR without utilizing atomic weapons—is dangerous to our military and foreign policies. Fear of atomic war by the Western Powers places the communists in a position of strength; it must be remembered that the spiritual and physical degradations of a nation that puts peace before principles are worse than war. The Western Powers can defeat the USSR without using atomic weapons if: the West does not attempt to fight an unlimited type of war; it does not attempt a deep land penetration of Russia; it establishes reasonable political objectives rather than military victory as war aims; it does fight a peripheral war; and it is willing to fight a long war if necessary.

RUSSIA FACES NEW FRUSTRATION, by John Foster Dulles, in Nation's Business, v. 44, no. 1 (Jan 56) 26-27 plus.

During 1955, the US and the other Western countries finally made the Soviet rulers recognize that their tactics of open force and intimidation were nonproductive. At present the Soviet rulers seem to be adopting the policy of stirring up controversies by inciting hatred and by offering to help one side against the other with arms, economic aid or political support. In the years ahead, the Western Powers can cause the Soviet Union to abandon the "evil aspect..." of the new tactics which they seem now to be trying out.


The US Navy's task in the alliance between the US and the Western Powers is to keep the sea lanes of the world open. This task calls for a powerful sea-air arm in being, equipped to fight in the expanded arena of ocean warfare that includes operations in the air as well as on and under the surface of the seas. An enormous array of ships and armament is required to carry out the task. Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, newly appointed Chief of Naval Operations, is well qualified to guide the Navy's ceaseless quest for superior weapons and is an ideal choice to direct all naval operations. With a biographical sketch of Adm. Burke's naval career.

SECURING PEACE THROUGH MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, by C. W. Sherwin, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, no. 5 (May 56) 159-164.

Suggestions for applying technology in such ways as to create deterrence to war.


Review of Soviet and US strategic nuclear potentials, concluding
that US mobile air-atomic strength can be the equivalent of nineteenth-century British naval power. It could make a kind of global Monroe Doctrine, countering Soviet military aggression against the free world, a political possibility. American troops now stationed in forty-nine countries of the world can be withdrawn to a major extent and stationed in this country, leaving a ring of dispersed and lightly manned standby bases around the Soviet periphery. The US can recover from its present awkward position of over-commitment of available surface forces around the world. Local national forces in Europe and Asia can carry out their share of the containment of Soviet power, backed by US air-atomic power which is committed to destroy communist-inspired forces of aggression and some of which is based in countries allied with the US as solid evidence of our commitment.


The US can muster the necessary military strength to prevent a Russian air-atomic attack on this country. To do so US must embark on a policy that allocates funds to the Armed Forces in strict accordance with the priority needs of the country's security. As yet there is no such policy, and appropriations are affected by fiscal considerations, by the moods of the international scene, and by compromises among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This results not only in waste of taxpayer's money but gives the country an inadequate military force. The administrative machinery of the Department of Defense is unable to apply a system of military priorities and make force-level decisions that are based on the realities of the air-atomic threat to US and not on inter-service compromises. Warning that US may not be able to build up its military forces after the war has begun, Mr. Finletter offers suggestions that would give the Department of Defense the necessary administrative tools to provide the nation with the type of military force-in-being which may prevent World War III.


Outlines three military situations - three wars - for which the US needs plans: (1) all-out nuclear war; (2) non-atomic global war; and (3) peripheral war characterized by successive hot spots in the cold war. The difficulty of determining the forces that will provide a reasonable security for each of the three possibilities.


Includes some aspects of the political-military strategy of US.
Statement of Senator William F. Knowland and accompanying speech on the floor of the US Senate on 15 November 1954 on the question of US policy toward the Soviet Union at this stage of the cold war. Mr. Knowland warned that Soviet talk of peaceful coexistence is a trick to relax US and give the Soviet Union an opportunity to gain a lead in the atomic race. He called on the responsible committees of Congress to summon the officials of the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to ascertain whether or not present US foreign and defense policies warrant a revision. Includes President Eisenhower's remarks on international relations in an address on 16 November 1954 to the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, and statements made by John Foster Dulles at a press conference on 16 November 1954 in which he reflected on the questions raised by Senator Knowland on the floor of the Senate.

2. Foreign Policy and Resulting Military Commitments

When Russia is Ready, by Thomas K. Finletter in Atlantic, v. 194, no. 3 (Sept 54) 29-33.

The former Secretary of the Air Force describes the dangers to the US when the atomic race with Russia reaches a point when supremacy of air-atomic power will shift from US to Russia (unless US takes immediate steps to prevent such a shift). Proposes a formula to have US so well defended and so overwhelmingly strong that the Russians would know that US could both absorb a Russian sneak attack and counterattack Russia itself. The changes in US military and foreign policies needed to implement such a program of air-atomic strength.


Attendance of Allied officers at the Command and General Staff College contributes to the development of good will, mutual understanding,
and trust so necessary in the efficient functioning of combined military endeavor of free nations. Photos.


An account of the Offshore Procurement Program which in addition to providing guns and ammunition for the NATO armies, has aided European economic recovery and helped reestablish a dispersed munitions-production base abroad.


Approximately one and one-half billion dollars' worth of US ships and equipment has been and is being transferred to friendly countries under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program which is the military assistance part of the Mutual Security Program. The US Navy's Bureau of Ships is responsible for: the construction of new vessels for transfer under the program, for contracts for building other ships in friendly countries under the offshore procurement program, and for technical advice and assistance.


Purposes, implications, and difficulties of collective security arrangements; and reasons why collective security is a necessity for the US rather than a matter of purely academic interest.


On his latest Far Eastern trip, the General visited Quemoy and Formosa. From this firsthand knowledge and appreciation of the islands value to Formosa, he presents an appraisal of the need and the chances for keeping the controversial offshore islands out of communist hands. Why Nationalist China wants to retain the offshore islands and to defend them at all costs; relationship of Quemoy and Matsu to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores; the question of Nationalist morale if the offshore islands are surrendered to the Chinese Communists; strategic advantages to be gained by Communist China in Asia if she occupies the offshore islands; and the reasons why US must defend Quemoy and Matsu if the communists attack them. The General considers that if the communists attack the offshore islands, it would present the US with good reason to shoot back with atomic weapons and annihilate the Red effort. That US needs such a specific military target in the Pacific to prove to our friends and to the enemy that US means
business and that the policy of massive retaliation is not just an empty slogan. Be doubts that such an atomic attack would bring Soviet Russia into the shooting, and that it would even cause Red China's Air Force to retaliate even with ordinary bombs against US and Nationalist Forces on Formosa, because the communists can expect that in such an eventuality US aircraft would destroy with atomic weapons the Red bases and other targets on the mainland.


The aim of our Foreign Aid Program should be to produce combat power without American technical support. To achieve this, the armies of underdeveloped countries should initiate a program of literacy training, followed by elementary, secondary, and vocational education, as well as technical training to enable the natives to operate and maintain modern equipment. Implementation of the program would be the responsibility of the native army and should eventually proceed without outside assistance. Initially, the organization and operation would follow the pattern of the US Armed Forces Education Program, adapted to the native military organization. Guidance and supervision could be provided by personnel from the US Military Mission present in the country involved.


At the end of both World Wars, US was the most powerful nation on earth, in terms of prestige, power, and ability to exert that power on the international scale. It failed to remain so. Its policies led it to suffer considerable military reverses in Korea, and allowed its enemies to maneuver it into a deadly dangerous situation in which it finds itself today. Geopolitically, the decision to limit the Korean War to a "police action" and to concentrate on the defense of Europe meant that the US considers the western end of the Eurasian axis more important than the eastern one. Evaluates the course of American diplomacy, and the functioning complexities of US foreign policy which do not always coincide with the best interests of the nation.

MAAG-TAIWAN, by Lt. (JG) Jerry Green, in Army Information Digest, v. 11, no. 6 (June 56) 2-10.

Advising, assisting, and training the Chinese Nationalists is an all-service activity of MAAG on Formosa.
MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN, by James W. Spain, in American Political Science Review, v. 48, no. 3 (Sept 54) 738-751.

With the announcement by President Eisenhower on 25 February 1954 that US had decided to give military assistance to Pakistan, a new and powerful force entered the international politics of South Asia, and another landmark of American foreign policy was set up. Because of the novelty of the area into which this policy was extended, the speed with which it was implemented, and the reactions of parties concerned (India, USSR, Great Britain), American military assistance for Pakistan constitutes an excellent case study of contemporary international relations. The events and reactions that followed the President's announcement are described with the conclusion that US-Pakistan agreement indicates the following trends in international relations: (1) the American effort to counter the threat of Soviet aggression by development of defensive strength on a world-wide basis continues and is increasing rather than decreasing in vigor; (2) for the achievement of this aim, the regional alliance rather than UN is the main instrument; (3) US is acting strongly in opposition to the development of a neutral "third block" in world politics; (4) US has assumed responsibility for the organization of defense efforts in the Middle East; (5) the focus of interest in that area is shifting from Arab-dominated West to the Turco-Pakistani-dominated East; and (6) India has been further isolated from the West, and a severe blow has been dealt to her policy of neutralism for Asia and her aspirations for leadership of that continent.


Major aspects of US foreign policy from the years just prior to the turn of the present century when various groups of American citizens envisioned US as future world power, and until 1954, after US had attained a position of world leadership. The work is largely a collection of documents and materials written or spoken by those who formed US policy, or by those whose comments are highly relevant to a better understanding of US actions. American expansionism at the end of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century; US policy in Far East, 1898-1914; Latin-American policy, 1898-1914; neutrality, 1914-1917; policy in World War I and postwar diplomacy; isolationism; policy, 1936-1939, during Hitler's rise to power; "whig" from German invasion of Poland to Pearl Harbor; Latin American policy, 1933-1954; World War II policies; and postwar policy from 1945 through the present. Bibliography.

MUST WE HAVE WAR? by Adlai Stevenson, in Look, v. 18, no. 23 (15 Nov 54) 47-55.

The weaknesses in America's present foreign and military policy. Our threat of "massive retaliation" has frightened friends rather than enemies, and pronouncements by public figures have suggested that domestic politics have priority over international responsibilities. Confusion, inconsistency, and ineptitude have not enhanced respect for American leadership.

NEW WEAPONS FOR A NEW DIPLOMACY, by Charles E. Martin and others. Los Angeles, University of Southern California, Institute of World Affairs, 53. 234 p.
The proceedings of the Institute's twenty-ninth session contain among others the following papers and reports: THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF POWER, by Tracy E. Strevey; PROSPECTS FOR A BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY, by Norman A. Grabmer; THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN CONFLICT, by Norbert N. Einstein; POLITICAL WARFARE, by Denis W. Brogan; INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DIPLOMACY, by Herbert S. Little; THE IMPACT OF MODERN WEAPONS ON DIPLOMACY, by Ernst B. Haas; OBSERVABLE WEAKNESSES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME, by Theodore Hai-En Chen; PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: A WEAPONS SYSTEM, by Vernon McKenzie; MILITARY REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, by Henry S. Aurand; and ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USE OF FORCE, by Bernard Brodie. Also round table discussions pertaining to: the use of negotiation in the "Cold War" and for the security of Western Hemisphere, Western Europe and the Pacific; the American economy and the foreign aid program; the economic conflict with the Soviet bloc; and the military and psychological struggle for Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

OBJECTIVES OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM IN ASIA, by Walter S. Robertson, in Department of State Bulletin, v. 34, no. 879 (30 Apr 56) 723-727.

Statement of the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

OUR STAKE IN THAILAND, by Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, in Fortune, v. 52, no. 1 (July 55) 94-95

The crucial importance of the traditionally independent country of Thailand - now firmly aligned with the West - in the struggle for Southeast Asia. To win it's fight against communist subversion and infiltration the Thai Government must maintain sufficient military strength, improve living standards, and awaken the Thais to the menace of communism. To aid the Thai Government in accomplishing these objectives the US has provided arms and military equipment and is helping to conduct a country-wide psychological offensive. The US should also help strengthening Thailand's economy, and use its influence to strengthen SEATO by the formation of a unified military command.


Assesses the US Army implementation of the MDAP in one country and derives therefrom such "lessons" as may be of benefit in future endeavors of this nature. A long-range program, consistent with the needs of the countries involved, is required for maximum effectiveness. It is concerned with the introduction of US military equipment and supply, its employment and maintenance with training and schooling - especially as it pertains to the employment, care, and maintenance of the American equipment furnished.

Events, territorial changes, "settlements" policies, programs, organizations, and trends involved in American world leadership since 1945, including the traditional bases and strategies of American foreign policy from 1793 to 1941; commitments following World War II; the central problem of the Soviet Union; worldwide social revolutions and the new nationalism; the new environment of American foreign policy; power politics entwined with social politics; the period of attempted cooperation from 1945 to 1947; the building of a non-Soviet world (EFTA, NATO, and EDC) misunderstanding between the US and her allies; and the conclusion that the future American policy will probably be a continuation of what it has been for several years (i.e., more emphasis on superpowers but not enough to imperil the old concept of balanced forces, some reliance on the UN but more reliance on alliances, enough deference to old allies to keep their support, aid to non-Fascist allies but not such strong or all-out aid as to alienate democratic allies, and more or less yielding to American nationalists and Imperialists but not enough yielding to jeopardize basic allied cooperation).


The increased importance of the Military Establishment in influencing foreign policy since the end of World War II; and the problems involved in striking a balance between military and political objectives. The major functions, situations, and relationships in which the military are involved; units in the Military Establishment which are concerned with foreign policy; and a critical survey of the military's views. The conditions under which the proper contribution of the military could be preserved without subverting the principle of civilian supremacy and other values.

SECRETARY DULLES GIVES RULES TO KEEP WORLD AT PEACE, in U.S. News and World Report, v. 39, no. 25 (16 Dec 55) 113-114.

The rules include the following: maintain a political warning system of defensive pacts around Russia's empire; keep this system armed, ready to retaliate with massive, mobile power; press for German unity as simple justice; and provide aid in cash, goods and know-how, public and private, for underdeveloped areas.


History and activities of the US Army Caribbean (USARCARIB) with headquarters at Fort Amador, Canal Zone. USARCARIB conducts periodic jungle warfare training exercises and instruction at the Jungle Warfare Training Center. It directs activities of the Inter-American Geodetic Survey, an agency currently surveying and mapping Latin America. It trains US and Latin American military personnel at the USARCARIB School. Recreation; troop education in civilian subjects; and the program of mutual aid carried out by US military missions and by US military assistance advisory groups in South and Central America and the Caribbean.
Arguments in favor of the modern coalition represented by NATO.

SUDDEN WAR - HOW IT CAN COME, in U.S. News and World Report, v. 37, no. 6 (6 Aug 54) 17-19.
Despite the new US policy of "coexistence" with the communist world, US Armed Forces are under orders to shoot if threatened with attack. Communists with itchy trigger fingers could touch off another war in many areas of the world where communist and US forces are facing each other. US is also committed to defend many countries of the world. A communist attack on any of these countries can touch off a war almost instantly and automatically. The US order to American Forces to shoot if threatened is meant as a warning to the communists that war will not start unless they start it, but an attack anywhere will be resisted promptly and with force, regardless of new plans for "coexistence." With a list enumerating communist air attacks on US and British aircraft April 1950 through July 1954.

When General Maxwell D. Taylor takes over on 30 June 1955 as the new Chief of Staff of the Army, his job will be to: carry out policies for the most part already made by the Administration; forge as strong an Army as possible with the men and money that these policies allow for the purpose; and soothe his Army colleagues who are perturbed at the Army's decreasing size. Personality sketch of General Taylor; and some details of his military career and record during World War II and the Korean War.

UNITED STATES MILITARY AID AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY (1945-1955), by Donovan Paul Yeuell, Jr. Washington, Georgetown University, 55. 222 p. (Unpublished M.A. thesis.)
Examines the employment and effectiveness of military assistance in support of major foreign policy objectives of US during 1945-1955, and the course of the Military Assistance Program in selected regions of the world in relation to the national security aspects of US foreign policy. The political, economic, and psychological impacts of military aid on the recipients are touched upon when necessary to keep the subject in perspective. The basis for military assistance; cooperation and containment during 1945-1950 as applied to China, Greece, and Turkey; NATO and rearmament 1950-1953; involvement in Asia 1950-1955; and military assistance as a strategic tool. Military aid has not approached its full potential because of deficiencies in the formulation and pursuit of broad American foreign policy objectives and inadequacies in the strategic capabilities of the Free World. Appended: synopsis of major legislation concerning military aid; charts of the Military Assistance Program covering the period 1950-1954; and charts of the Mutual Security Program, including military aid, for FY 1955. Bibliography.

Formosa is the military key to the future in Asia. It serves to pin down the Red armies on China's coast and reduces their threat to Korea and SE Asia. As far as US is concerned, Formosa is a key link in the whole defense chain running the length of the Asia coast. US policy for the defense of Formosa; military measures taken by US in the Pacific to assure the defense of Formosa; Communist China's strategy regarding Formosa and what its capture by them would mean to the balance of power in that part of Asia. Full text of the joint resolution by the US Senate and House of Representatives authorizing the President to employ the US Armed Forces in protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories of that area.

U.S. SENATORS INSPECT EUROPEAN ARMS PLANT, in Interavia, v. 9, no. 12 (54) 818-820.

During the period 21 February-6 March 1954 Senators Styles Bridges and W. Stuart Symington visited France, Germany, Italy, UK, and Spain to investigate the progress of the US off-shore procurement program, to survey the state of defenses of Western Europe, and the extent of communist infiltration in defense industries of Western Europe. On 20 May 1954 the two Senators submitted the report to Congress. The article reviews the highlights of their report and the recommendations made as the result of their findings, and makes the following concluding comment: "the Americans obviously have a growing feeling that Western Europe should now be able to stand on its own feet without massive aid from the USA. Beyond that - and there cannot be any doubt on this score - it seems to be contrary to current American defense policy to award manufacturing licences for up-to-date combat equipment to Europe, at least as long as Communist infiltration into some production plant continues. The Americans will not accept such infiltration, and they even fear its effects."
3. Military Policy

**AFA's Statement of Policy, 1954,** in *Air Force*, v. 37, no. 10 (Oct 54)

20-21

The conviction of the Air Force Association that US freedom can best be maintained through the proper exploitation of airpower as an instrument of national policy. The Soviets are gaining steadily on the Western Powers in the arms race, including both nuclear weapons and adequate means for their delivery; and effective diplomatic action will depend mostly on military capability. There can be no security as long as the Soviets hold the advantages of military and diplomatic initiative.


For Fiscal Year 1956 the US Air Force was allotted $15.6 billion of the overall $34 billion allotted for the three military services. Yet, even this sum does not actually meet the needs of the Air Force. The budget does not take care of USAF's needs for airlift and logistics, base construction, and research and development. The Air Force budget is actually a bare minimum needed to attain what is conceded to be a bare minimum force of 137 wings by the end of Fiscal Year 1957.

**Air Power in an Age of Peril; A Report to the American People,** Indianapolis, American Legion, National Security Commission, 54. Unpaged.

Text and illustrations appraising the requirements for achieving and maintaining adequate air power in the atomic age. The elements of such air power: constant development to meet the growing threat; a strong and expandable aircraft industry; adequate research and development programs; strong air transport and utility aviation; great numbers of skilled personnel; and adequate communications and bases. The time element an important factor in the development of air power.


The US Navy's Chief of Naval Operations states that technological developments in aircraft and submarines increase the importance of sea power in the present world situation, and that the US must keep pace with the expanding naval forces of the USSR. The shipbuilding program of the Soviets; excellent cruisers of the SVERDLOV class are being built, and the USSR efforts in this category exceed all of the cruiser building in the world. Russia is also building large and seaworthy destroyers that are the equal of those of the Western Powers.
The role of the scientist in postwar America, and problems connected with military support of basic and applied science. Neglect of basic science not directly concerned with military problems; confusion regarding the difference between open science and secret technology; and security measures. Government ineptness in encouraging science, and reasons why the Government cannot attract the best young scientists.

The Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army are prominent citizens appointed by the Secretary without pay to "effectively assist in interpreting the Army's policies and activities to the American people." The program was established in 1922 and revitalized and reorganized in 1950. Its members are expected to take active part in the Army's forthcoming drive for public recognition. List of current Civilian Aides.

ARMY SET FOR 5 DIVISION INCREASE, in Armed Forces News, v. 13, no. 2 (Nov 54) 8-10.
The Army's plans to increase its strength from nineteen to twenty-four combat divisions while continuing to trim its overall manpower and to rotate men overseas on a divisional rather than an individual basis. Achievement of the new goals by conversion of five training divisions to combat units, by transfer of personnel from service to combat duty, and by increased efficiency. The intention of having nine divisions assigned overseas, including five in Europe, three in the Far East, and one in Hawaii.

BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS AND SIDELIGHTS, in Air Force, v. 39, no. 5 (May 56) 34.

The necessity of adjusting military means to the industrial potential on the one hand, and to foreign policy objectives on the other. Factors which hinder the integration of civilian and military considerations in national policy, such as limited investigation of processes for such integration and lack of adjustment in the legislative branch of the Government, including the President's relation with Congress. The perspective of policy makers, both civilian and military, must be broadened to take account of each other's special concerns, responsibilities, and competence. They must learn to work together to make peacetime preparations for war.

If future commanders are to know the proper acceptance of responsibility and application of authority, the principles of command and other degrees of authority must be established. Neither the US statutes nor US Army regulations define the elements of "command." The lack of adequate definition has not constituted a serious problem in subdepartmental levels, but it continues to be a handicap at national level and places an unnecessary burden upon the leaders of the US defense establishment. For instance, the National Security Act of 1947 failed to establish clearly the Secretary of Defense as head of the Department of Defense with complete authority over its activities. Failure to state that the Secretary of Defense was a commander subordinate to the President, or a deputy commander to the President, precluded the establishment of a clearly defined chain of command and severely affected the efficiency of the entire Military Establishment. Review the 1949 findings of the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, the 1953 findings of the Rockefeller Committee, and the President's Reorganization Plan Number 6, which he prepared and presented to Congress following the Rockefeller report. The need for definition remains, because somehow these studies have translated into words the concept they wished to establish. The author, in his search for adequate means of describing the relationships that exist and should exist at all levels of command and authority, presents his definitions for: command, direction, control, staff supervision, and coordination.

THE CRIPPLED "FOURTH ARMY" by Comdr. Steward R. Bros, in Polaris, v.1, no.3 (July 54) 8-10.

The necessity of strengthening the US Merchant Marine which has been termed by President Eisenhower "the Fourth Arm of defense." Merchant ships and a vigorous shipbuilding program are essential to national defense and sound foreign trade. The US made the mistake after both world wars of permitting the merchant marine to deteriorate; the unfortunate effects of the hasty shipbuilding programs which had to be instituted when America entered the wars. Our crippled "Fourth Arm" is in need of drastic "surgery" if it is to function with the other three arms vital to our defense.

DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, ed. by Herbert L. Marx, Jr. New York, H. W. Wilson, 55. 192 p. (The Reference Shelf, v. 26, no. 6.)

Collection of magazine articles dealing with the "new look" in US military policy and its background; the change-over to a Republican administration, the emergence of the US and the USSR as the two dominant powers of the world, and the development of new weapons of destruction. Also, the system of alliances built up by the US and friendly nations since World War II.

DEFENSE FOR ATOMIC WAR, by Klaus Knorr, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 11, no. 3 (Mar 55) 77-81.

Critical examination of the basic assumptions underlying official
American policy on air defense - a policy which has led to concentration of offensive strategic air power and a neglect of defensive measures. The fallacy of many of the official assumptions; and arguments for a more balanced air strategy and for passive as well as active defense against atomic war, especially a gradual and substantial dispersal of the US population.


The military power which diverts the course of Soviet policy from external conquest to internal consolidation is located in North America, a continent, which has no physical contact with the communist world. The power flows outward across the seas and through the air to support the free nations around the vast communist perimeter by means of a developed system of global mobility. In this generation the Russians will not acquire global mobility or adopt a doctrine of mobile strategy. As long as the US maintains a reasonable level of armed power and keeps that power globally mobile, no Kremlin boss can consider war with the United States unless he is also thinking of political suicide.

LACK OF REAL UNIFICATION IS STILL COSTING MONEY, in Air Force, v. 38, no. 12 (Dec 55) 35.

Continued interservice rivalries and disputes in the US can be partly traced to the weaknesses of the Unification Act which depended for success on an interservice agreement and cooperation that never materialized. The services differ widely on matters of strategy and priorities. There has been no effective coordination of training or manpower utilization. The services still buy independently of each other, often competing with each other for scarce materials, stockpiling goods that other services have in surplus and paying varying prices for identical articles.


The basic shifts in US military policy and Armed Forces strength indicated by President Eisenhower's proposals to Congress. The plans provide for more planes and aircraft carriers and fewer land troops. Ground force strength would be reduced in the Far East, maintained in Europe, and increased in a mobile reserve in the US. Sea strength would be shifted to the Far East as the major force there, and air strength would be increased in Europe and in the US. The strength suggested for each of the US services.


Examines some of the capabilities of military force (among
them: offensive war capability, defense capability, deterrent capability, commitment capability, military aid, organizational capabilities, administrative capability, guerrilla capability, and civil war capability), and some of its limitations; and suggests implications for military policy based upon these capabilities and limitations. The US can afford to develop and maintain the military forces, both conventional and otherwise, that reasonably contribute to the attainment of national objectives.

**MILITARY NECESSITY VERSUS ECONOMY**, by Capt. R. E. W. Harrison, in American Society of Naval Engineers Journal, v. 67, no. 1 (Feb 55) 75-79.

History is replete with the wreckage of nations which have made the fatal error of underestimating enemy potential. Therefore, it would be wise to evaluate (1) what the Armed Forces can achieve with their available resources, (2) what the Armed Forces should have in order to achieve certain objectives, and (3) what the Armed Forces can obtain if time and cost elements are considered. With these blueprints the case should be presented to Congress so that Congress can act in common with those who foresee "the day", the need for speed when that day comes, and above all, the need for maximum "elbow room" for change and rapid type expansion in the Armed Forces and their logistical supporters.

**MILITARY POLICY AND DEFENSE OF THE "GREY AREAS"** by Henry A. Kissinger, in Foreign Affairs, v. 33, no. 3 (Apr 55) 416-428.

Urges improvement in our capacity to fight local wars not only in consideration of national strategy but as our best chance to preserve the peace. The risks involved in an all-or-nothing military policy are so fearful that if we follow it our resolution will weaken and leave the initiative to the other side. A military policy which cannot offer the uncommitted nations protection against Sino-Soviet occupation will defeat out attempts to rally them to our side and in time will even demoralize the NATO alliance.


The problem of weapon morality in regard to the hydrogen bomb. Argues that it is moral to utilize any conceivable weapon in defense against an enemy who is dedicated to destroy us by any means. In the past, military necessity dictated the choice of new weapons; and when their use became habitual, questions of weapon morality were forgotten.


Features of the Plan which provides for reenacting the existing law (which will expire in June) fixing the term of military obligation at eight
years for every young man who enters the military service. This eight-year
service provision applies to officers and volunteer enlisted men as well as
inductees. The inductee who serves two years on active duty still has six re-
mainning years of reserve duty. With a chart showing manpower sources for
active and reserve military service.

NAVAL "STRATEGIC AIR" COMMANDS MUCH NOTICE AT SECDEF WILSON'S
PENTAGON CONFERENCE, in Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, v. 93, no. 38 (19
May 56) 7.

A "NEW LOOK" FOR ARMY LOGISTICS, by Lt. Col. Prentiss B. Reed, Jr.,
in Military Review, v. 35, no. 3 (June 55) 37-41.

The factors to be considered if the US logistical system consist-
ing of the vast technological-industrial complexes is to survive in atomic
warfare. We must analyse the Zone of Interior logistical structure for
overconcentrations, single-facility operations, and excessively unified
control of operations, and initiate an immediate program to correct these
conditions in the ZI Field plant; steps must be taken to eliminate the
dangerous vulnerability of the logistical structure of our existing
overseas commands and bases; the new and forceful reasons for restoring a
military character to logistical operations must be clearly conveyed to the
officer corps, and the training of our young officers must restore major
emphasis on developing the desire to seek and carry responsibility; US must
never again become involved in a theater of operations as it did in Korea,
on an unplanned, shoestring basis, conceived in terms of the preatomic World
War II logistical scheme of operations; and the greatest single lesson in
logistics in Korea was that it demonstrated that the logistical operations
there were the last of the World War II type.

NO NEED TO BOMB CITIES TO WIN WAR; A NEW COUNTER-FORCE STRATEGY FOR AIR
WARFARE, by Col. Richard S. Leibman, in US News and World Report, v. 38,
no. 4 (28 Jan 55) 79-94.

The US should announce a military policy of the tactical use of nu-
clear weapons against attacking units in the combat zone and military installa-
tions in the theaters of operations in case of aggression against America or
our allies. Nuclear weapons would be used also against hostile air bases.
Capacity would be destroyed with nuclear weapons. Only after the cities of
the Western Powers had suffered an atomic attack, would the US retaliate with
strategic A- and H-bomb attacks. A new military organization for the US Armed
Forces is recommended that would include a Nuclear Air Command.

NO ROOM FOR ERROR, by Lt. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, in Air Force, v. 37,
no. 11 (Nov 54) 29-30 plus.

The basic doctrine of the US Air Force, as written in AFM 1-2, holds
that air forces are most likely to be the dominant forces in war. To be able to strike "at times, places, and with means of our own choosing," our military policies must make certain that we are prepared to deliver these weapons decisively. We cannot be capable of massive retaliation by scattering our effort and resources among forces for different strategies. We can have the required capability under true air doctrine which is mutually accepted. Then the military forces would have a common strategic objective. Through this unity of effort, we could take decisive and conclusive action short of war before D-Day ever came.

PEARL HARBOR: AMERICA'S MAGINOT LINE? by James D. Atkinson, in Army Combat Forces Journal, v. 6, no. 6 (Jan 56) 34-35.

In consideration that Russia employs "a more subtle, more sinister form of warfare using double-barreled weapons of limited and unconventional warfare," Americans should not be so concerned in looking backward to Pearl Harbor and fear to take the initiative in developing new methods to make warfare the servant of policy and the means toward the end product: a just and durable peace. What we now need is the kind of propaganda by deed which can be supplied only by the knowledge that there are combat-ready, highly mobile American soldiers, armed and equipped with the most advanced military tools for dealing with that communist specialty, "the little war"; above all, we must give our associates the practical assurance that they will not be eaten up piecemeal because, while we may have the will, we have not the proper means to save them.


Details of the Reserve program called for in the National Reserve Plan (H.R. 2967) now before Congress; and changes in the bill requested by the Department of Defense to provide for authority to enforce participation in Reserve training and to discharge under conditions other than honorable those individuals who fail or refuse to participate. Outline of the proposed Reserve program.


A basic change in the US military posture is shown by the plans for Department of Defense expenditures during the next few years. Military spending will level off at about 33-billion a year; plans are being made for more large aircraft carriers, fewer long-range bombers, a smaller Army, and a bigger first-line reserve. These plans reflect the Eisenhower Administration's view that chances for war are slight and that aircraft carriers are a better admonition to the communists than long-range bombers.
THE RESERVE ARMY PROBLEM CHILD, by Capt. Rodney Bonck, Jr., in Reserve Officer, v. 32, no. 4 (Apr 56) 8-11 plus.
Some of the problems and kinks in the U.S. Reserve Program, and suggested means of correction.

RESERVE FORCES ACT OF 1955, in Army Information Digest, v. 11, no. 2 (Feb 55) 1-72.
This special issue on the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 contains articles by Army representatives and some leading American citizens on: the provisions of the act; Army implementation; and the impacts of the mandatory training provisions on young men and on American life.

RESERVE FORCES FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY, by Brig. Gen. Wendell Westover, in Reserve Officer, v. 31, no. 2 (Feb 55) 14-15 plus.
Every conflict in which US participated has been won because we employed Reserve Forces. In the future the Reserves will constitute an inescapable ingredient to success. The Chairman, Reserve Program Committee, Reserve Officers Association spells out the requirements for the following six basic ingredients to effective Reserve Forces: manpower, dollars, facilities, equipment, training and a will to do.

THERE'S HOPE IN AMERICA'S PROGRAM TODAY, by Fred Seaton, in Reserve Officer, v. 31, no. 1 (Jan 55) 10-11 plus.
How America is now building for itself a military strength that can deter and defeat aggression from any source. Features the "new look", our help and aid to our allies, savings effected by the Services here and abroad, the contrast between Eastern and Western Berlin, and the prophecy that if trouble does come in a military way, the Germans will do everything they can to get on our side of the argument.

$13 BILLION SCARECROW, by Lloyd H. Norman, in Army, v. 6, no. 7 (Feb 56) 18-21.
The problem of determining how many atomic air weapons are needed to deter the Soviet Union from going to war. The possibility that in a continued race between US and Soviet Union for supremacy in atomic weapons and missiles the US will neglect the other arms which may some day be needed.

THE $34,000,000,000 QUESTIONS, by Gen. Nathan Twining, in National Defense Transportation Journal, v. 11, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 55) 35 plus.
The US is currently spending about $34,000,000,000 a year for de-
There are those who say it is too much; there are others who charge we are cutting bone and sinew from our fighting forces. General Twining presents the Air Force's position on three of the most significant questions being asked today: in view of the Geneva talks and current disarmament negotiations, are not the chances of war lessening, and is not our need for armed strength less; has the Soviet Union really pulled ahead of the US in air power; and does the Air Force contemplate any cuts in strength because of restriction in defense spending? He concludes by saying: "However much we pay to stay strong enough to prevent a devastating attack, we will have gotten history's biggest bargain."

THREE MORE SEATS AT THE TABLE, by Capt. Stephen E. Jones, in US Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 82, no. 2 (Feb 56) 180-183.

Suggests that, in the interest of Service prestige and the effects of that prestige on the current military personnel problem, all three Service Secretaries should be given seats in the President's cabinet.


Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson's determined handling of criticism of the new US military policy which is based on the deterrent effect of a strong Air Force equipped with nuclear weapons, cut-down of the other services - especially the Army, and the building up of stronger reserve forces. Also, personality sketch of Secretary Wilson.


Historical examples show that wars fought in the past for a limited objective have often been successful, whereas wars having an unlimited objective have seldom if ever succeeded in the sense of creating a world situation more favorable than if there had not been a war, and they have always caused widespread destruction and loss of life. Therefore, if we should become involved in a war against Russia, and our objective were the complete destruction of Russian power - possibly unconditional surrender - we should fail even if we gained the eventual victory, because such a victory would be worthless if in the course of the struggle we brought about the destruction of almost everything upon which our Western standards of living are based.


The fallacy of America's postwar strategy which is based on the assumption that small, elite forces equipped with superior weapons can defeat almost any number of poorly armed troops. The need for large, mobile ground forces to contain local aggression; and the necessity to train these forces before an emergency arises.

The US Army should create a foreign legion for employment in small wars to avoid the political obstacles that arise from any proposed use of drafted US troops. Indochina is an example of the type of action in which such a unit would be useful. By confining the unit to infantry and by careful screening of volunteers, the threat of penetration by communists could be minimised. Suggestions for attractions that could be held out to obtain volunteers.


Reluctance to spend sufficient money for air power is the chief reason for our inability to recognise Soviet competence in aircraft technology and for our wishful thinking in regard to the military position of the USSR. The situation demands bold and forthright leadership.


The combination of MRT, Selective Service, and voluntary enlistments, which the Administration intends to lay before the Congress for approval, could seriously compromise the effectiveness of USAF. Evaluates the manpower and training provisions of the proposed program and shows that they will not satisfy USAF's needs for skilled and highly trained personnel. The "equity of service" principle which motivates the Administration's manpower program is not compatible with US strategy and foreign policy which are keyed to the strength of airpower as a deterrent. Offers some solutions.


The military appraisal behind the recent decision to make a further cut in Army strength in the Far East. It is believed that local forces in South Korea and Formosa are now strong enough to repel communist attack when backed by US air and naval support. Infiltration, not attack, is expected in Indoc.ina, and the odds are against an all-out war. The US is taking the calculated risk that - by keeping air and naval strength at a high pitch of readiness in the Far East - it can avoid communist attack in this part of the world and thus reduce its ground-force commitments.


Because the Soviet Union has the capability of attacking the
by air, submarine, sabotage, and other means, and because the combined effect of our strategic air effort and our continental air defenses can initially stop only a part of a determined enemy attack, the Army may be required to lend major support to civil defense for a period after D-day attack. Therefore it is recommended that: (1) as part of their routine training program, Army units should prepare to carry out civil defense missions appropriate to the military tasks of the organizations; (2) individual officers should become acquainted with civil defense in general and specifically with the organization and operations in nearby communities or cities; (3) installation commanders should plan for utilization of their facilities in support of civil defense in case of severe emergency; and (4) training and mobilization plans for civilian components should take into consideration their possible use in support of civil defense in the early stages of a war.

4. Statements by the President, Secretary of Defense, and the Secretaries of the Military Services

AIR LOGISTICS PLANNING IN THE ATOMIC AGE; A QUARTERLY REVIEW INTERVIEW WITH HONORABLE ROGER LEWIS, in Air University Quarterly Review, v. 7, no. 1 (spring 55) 3-7

The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Material reports on the building-up of a new air logistics system which aims to be reliable and to match the mobility, speed, and flexibility of the striking forces. The kind and size airlift needed in the AF; the general categories of aircraft required; criteria for planning new transport aircraft; and the problem of multiple missions usually assigned to transport aircraft. The revised system of air logistics includes: supply, maintenance, procurement, and transportation.


Excerpts from an address, recently delivered before Reserve officers by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Forces, emphasizing the worth of the Army's Reserve programs of instruction and the opportunities for reservists for increasing their professional military knowledge.


Excerpts from an address by the Secretary of the Army in which he reasserts the need for expanded Army aviation and at the same time emphasizes that his service does not seek to duplicate the functions of the Air Force. In addition to long and medium range AF transports and assault aircraft, the Army has a vital need for light aircraft of its own - both fixed wing planes and helicopters - to furnish battlefield support of the combat operations of a field army.
ARMY WILL BEAR WAR'S BRUNT, BE ULTIMATE FORCE FOR VICTORY, in Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, v. 93, no. 9 (29 Oct 55) 1 plus.

Army Secretary Wilber M. Brucker shunted aside the contention that the atomic age has made ground troops "relatively unnecessary" and asserted that the US Army will not only "bear the brunt of any future conflict" but "will provide the ultimate force by which victory is achieved."

BRIEFING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE. Washington, 55. 197-352. (84th Congress, 1st Session. House Armed Services Committee. Paper No. 3.)

Statements and testimonies by the Secretaries of Defense, Air Force, Navy, and Army and by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force before a briefing of the House Armed Services Committee. The briefing concerned the military aspects of the international situation, the military policies and programs of the Department of Defense, and force levels which the US should maintain.


Hearings on HR 6042, with general statements by the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, US Army, and the Undersecretary of the Army on: the Army's role in the integrated defense team; major considerations against which its monetary requirements should be evaluated; and military and operational aspects of the army program.


Delivered by the President to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, D. C., 21 April 1956.


Full text of a memorandum entitled GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR FY 1956 AND 1957 in which Defense Secretary Wilson outlines the economics that should be introduced by the military services in order to maintain a high level of effective strength within the limits of the national resources that are made available for military purposes.


Soviet doctrine is "lies, deceit, war if necessary."

A review of the mission and the readiness of the US Army.

IN THE SHADOWS OF TOMORROW, by Charles S. Thomas, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 81, no. 12 (Dec 55) 1107-1109.

Text of the 1955 graduation speech presented by the Secretary of the Navy at the US Naval Academy in which he stressed the important mission of the US Navy and the responsibility of its officers.


Statements of various US officials of the US Armed Services and of President Eisenhower.


Highlights from a speech before the National Security Industrial Association listing major accomplishments in the field of airpower as revealed by the Soviet Union during the past year and emphasizing the US Air Force's need of more funds and resources for research and development.

(THE LONG-AWAITED "NEW LOOK" PROGRAM FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES), by Charles E. Wilson and Carter Lane Burgess, in National Guardsman, v. 9, no. 2 (Feb 55) 4-11.

Details of the proposed National Reserve Plan as outlined at a press conference by the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel. The new Reserve forces will be composed of a Ready Reserve, including the National Guard; a Standby Reserve; and a pool of draft-eligible and available manpower acceptable for military service. The ready Reserve will be an appropriately organized and trained force, readily available, and constituting the reserve manpower base for the initial phases of mobilization. The new Standby Reserve will be a nonorganized, nonpaid reserve pool composed chiefly of personnel who have fulfilled their Ready Reserve obligation. The various ways in which a young man may fulfill his military obligations by serving in the Ready Reserve after completing active service or by entering the Ready Reserve directly with a ten-year obligation.

MEETING THE COLD WAR CHALLENGE, by Donald A. Quarles, in Armed Forces News, v. 18, no. 5 (Feb 56) 1.

A short statement by the Secretary of the Air Force.
MORE DEFENSE FOR EVERY DOLLAR, by Charles E. Wilson, in Nation's Business, v. 44, no. 1 (Jan 56) 30-31.

The aims and accomplishments of the U.S. Department of Defense in its program to maintain a minimum sound defensive system for the country, taking into account both U.S. retaliatory and defensive requirements and the capabilities of potential enemies.

OUR QUEST FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, in Department of State Bulletin, v. 34, no. 879 (30 April 56) 699-706.

Address by President Eisenhower before the American Society of Newspaper Editors and broadcast over radio and television, Washington, D. C., on April 21 (White House press release).


All the services - Army, Navy, and Air Force - are members of the defense team and each has a vital role to play. How each will fulfill its role will change with changing weapons and techniques, but the role of each service remains basically the same. The Army continues to be a principal instrument of national policy in cold war, creeping aggression, all-out war, and more important, in insuring that the outcome of victory will be more than a pile of rubble and ashes.


In a message to Congress on a program for mutual security, President Eisenhower pointed out that the other free nations need the US, and the US needs them, if all are to be secure. The necessary expenditures to equip and maintain US armed forces of air and land and sea at strategic points beyond our borders are never called aid. Also the necessary expenditures to enable other free nations associated with us to equip and maintain vital armed forces at these same strategic points beyond our borders should not be considered as aid. These are defense alliance expenditures clearly safeguarding in the most desirable manner, and at times in the only possible way, the security of the US and other free nations. With a map and explanatory listing of US collective defense arrangements, comprising: North Atlantic Treaty, the Rio Treaty, the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) Treaty, the Philippine Treaty, the Japanese Treaty, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) Treaty, the Southeast Asia Treaty, and the Republic of China (Formosa) Treaty.

SECRETARY WILBER BRUCKER AND THE ARMY RESERVE PROGRAM, in Reserve Officer, v. 31, no. 12 (Dec 55) 8 plus.

The following steps are being taken by the US Army to implement
the Army Reserve Program: the Army is intensifying its activities and efforts
to recruit young men directly into the Reserve Forces; it is stepping up
efforts to spread the message regarding the Reserve Forces Act of 1955
throughout the country; the training program will be drawn to provide the
best possible instruction for both the six-months training period, as well as
the inactive duty training; the need for proper coordination with the National
Guard is being kept in mind at all times; and the procurement and construction
of training facilities for Reserve components is being given proper considera-
tion.

STRATEGIC CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF THE FREE WORLD, by Charles
The Secretary of the Navy discusses the military and political
conditions which the US and the free world must achieve if we are to maintain
our freedom and security. The conditions are: (1) a posture of military
strength which makes war unappealing to a potential enemy; (2) economic
stability; (3) strong political alliances; (4) moral and physical courage;
and (5) dynamic and resolute leadership.

TEAMWORK THE STRENGTH OF THE ARMY, by Wilber M. Brucker, in Armor,
v. 65, no. 3 (May-June 56) 14-17.
The principal address before the US Armor Association's 67th
annual meeting.

WILSON CALLS REGULAR LEVELS IN ARMY, AF "COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC"
in Army-Navy-Air Force Register, v. 77, no. 3989 (19 May 56) 1 plus.
5. Statements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of Staff of the Services, and Other Senior Officials of the Army, Navy and Air Force

ADDRESS BY GENERAL C. L. BOULKE BEFORE ROA'S NATIONAL COUNCIL, in Reserve Officer, v. 31, no. 3 (Mar 55) 10-11.

The Army's Vice Chief of Staff discussed in broad terms, some of the challenging tasks facing the Army and some of the factors that influence and guide the Army in its contribution to the security of US. In particular the General cited the importance of a trained and ready Reserve at a time when the US Army is deployed throughout the world, and the advent of tactical atomic weapons which is placing reorganizational demands on our ground forces. In the event of another war, US will not have much time to mobilize, train, and transport its ground combat units in support of US forces overseas. The responsibility of reinforcements and mobilization will fall heavily upon the active Army and personnel serving in US and upon the Reserve component.

ADDRESS BY GENERAL THOMAS D. WHITE, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, USAF, in Air Force Information Service Letter, Suppl. no. 65 (1 Sept 54) 7 p.

The General outlined some of the causes that tend to retard the progress of USAF toward its ultimate potential, despite the nation-wide acceptance of the fact that our Air Force is the foremost striking arm of our military power. Stating that the capabilities and limitations of air power are not fully understood by the sister services, Congress, or the general public, the General called on USAF personnel at all levels to help build the most effective Air Force possible, and then, carry to the American people the story of the Air Force, its function, doctrines, and achievements, because "The Air Force will stand or fall upon the grass roots of public opinion."

ADMINISTRATION OF DEFENSIVE IN AIRPOWER DEBATE, by Francis J. Keenan, in American Aviation, v. 19, no. 26 (21 May 56) 31-32.

General LeMay adds fuel to Senator Symington's charges that US is losing superiority to Russian Air Force.


Extracts from the testimony by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations of the House Committee on Appropriations, as released on 2 May 1955. The
gist of the Admiral's testimony: China is weak, dependent on Russia for
guns, aircraft, tanks, fuel, and with a transportation system that
rules out fast deployment; Russia remains on a war footing, pouring more
of her efforts into armament than could ever be justified by defense needs
alone; US forces, even with planned cutbacks, will be adequate for early
stages of war, and ample for build-up.

**AF WILL NEED $1 BILLION FOR ELECTRONICS IN '57,** by Henri P. Steier,
in *American Aviation*, v. 19, no. 26 (21 May 56) 52-53.

General Blake tells House Appropriations Subcommittee why
$174 million over 1956 requirements is being sought; ground radar biggest
item.


The logistic program upon which the U.S. Air Force has embarked in
order to support "the modern combat weapon that has been in building since the
close of World War II."


The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discusses the part played
by air power in US national security. Air power may not win by itself alone,
but no major war can be won without it.


The decisive phase of any future war will end on land and whatever
the destructive effect of fire-power—and whether in the form of bullets, shells,
rockets, or bombs—there will always be the need for men on the ground to
exploit the success of that fire-power and to clinch the victory by occupying
that portion of the earth's surface from which the enemy derives the strength
to wage war.

**ARMED FORCES DAY, 1954.** Washington, Office of the Secretary of the Air
Force, Director of Information Services, 54. Various paging. (Air Force
Information Services Letter, Supplement no. 64.)

Speeches delivered on Armed Forces Day by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, the USAF Chief of Staff, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, USAF. The significance of air power in US national security; present and potential developments in military aircraft; operational and administrative problems confronting USAF; and capabilities of the USSR Air Force.


US military policy in the atomic age must attempt to foster a healthy and expanding national economy while maintaining sufficient military strength to win any war that must be forced upon us.


The Army justifies its existence as much - if not more - when it is not fighting than when war is on. Its primary purpose is to prevent war by deterring attack - only when the deterrent fails does its mission change to that of fighting a winning war. However, to develop that deterrent strength so essential to peace calls for complex activities which must go on every day of the year through many quarters of the world.

ARMY’S CHIEF BELIEVES COOPERATIVE SOLDIER-STATESMAN CAPABILITIES DETERMINE NATIONAL POLICY, by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, in Armed Forces Management, v. 1, no. 2 (Nov 54) 5-6 plus.

The duties of civilian officials and military leaders in establishing and achieving national policy. The soldier and statesman must work together in close cooperation because, while military planning must be carried out in the light of political goals, policy determination should be made in the light of military capabilities. The soldier’s responsibility lies in the professional military field and he must give his honest, objective, military advice to the civilian authorities over him.

THE ARMY’S ROLE IN THE MODERN WORLD, in Army Information Digest, v. 11, no. 1 (Jan 56) 2-5.

Statements made at the First Annual Meeting of the Association of the US Army at Fort Benning, Ga., by Secretary of the Army, Wilber H. Brucker, Army’s Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, and Chief of Research and Development Department of the Army, Lt. Gen James M. Gavin. The statements deal with the mission of the Army and what the Army must do to prepare itself to meet (1) the threat of aggression, and (2) the changing weapons and concepts of war.
ARMY WILL DOUBLE PROCUREMENT OF GUIDED MISSILES IN FISCAL 1957, by Evert Clark, Aviation Week, v. 64, no. 19 (7 May 56) 36.

Facts and figures as stated by Generals Gavin and Magruder before the House Appropriations Subcommittee.


An interview with Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, who presents his views on the present US Army in transition - its needed strength, its role in the atomic age, its plans for adapting itself to fight tomorrow's war with revolutionary new weapons and tactics.


Reprint of the MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING RELATING TO ARMY ORGANIC AVIATION, dated 4 November 1952 and signed by the men who were Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force at that time. The memorandum established the current framework for the organization and operation of the Army's air arm.


There seems little likelihood that the U.S. Army missions and commitments will be diminished in the foreseeable future. The maintenance of a modern, versatile, mobile and hard hitting Army is and will continue to be an essential aspect of America's preparedness program. In the event of aggression. The U.S. Army must be ready to fight a limited war or a large one, and it must be able to enter the fight quickly and bring it to a rapid and successful conclusion.

CARGO SHIPS PENETRATE THE ARCTIC, by Vice Adm. Francis C. Denebrink, in National Defense Transportation Journal, v. 11, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 55) 30-34.

For the first time in history cargo ships have sailed in and out of Far North waterways where only polar explorers and stout-hulled ice-breakers have dared to go before. The Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service describes its 1955 Arctic operations which represented the largest sea transportation job ever attempted beyond the Arctic Circle, employing a total of 126 ships in four separate but simultaneous projects. Most of the materials and supplies delivered to sites extending for some 3,000 miles across the northern rim of Canada and Alaska were for the construction of the DEW (Distant Early Warning) line. Details of the four projects assigned to the Navy-operated MSF;
planning; aerial reconnaissance and surveys of sites; weather conditions; types of ships used and quantities of cargo delivered; and some of the lessons learned. Map.


The former Commander of UN Forces in Korea presents his views on the dangers that US faces in Asia. The communist strategy of conquest by limited wars; the fallacy of UN policies in dealing with communist aggression in Korea; and what US and UN can do to restore their prestige in Asia and stem the communist tide which was encouraged to expand by appeasement and unwillingness of UN to face up to the real issues of the Korean War.

**THE CHALLENGE OF WEST POINT**, by General Maxwell D. Taylor, in *Army*, v. 6, no. 10 (May 56) 14-15.

Drawn from an address at the Founders' Day Dinner, West Point Society of New York, 17 March 1956. The urgency of the West Point mission in developing leaders for the modern Army.


The Chief of Staff reviews the fire power and mobility aspects of an army passing from the age of gunpowder to the age of atomic power. "The Army today is bent on reaching a condition of airborne effectiveness which we are convinced is necessary for the successful conduct of modern warfare. We want an Army with many completely air-transportable combat units, complete with sufficient weapons, vehicles, and supplies to sustain themselves in ground operations."


The reluctance on the part of obligated reservists (including members of the medical profession) to join a reserve unit voluntarily results in a lack of reserves in sufficient numbers, so organized and so trained that they could be deployed in accordance with the immediate requirements which we might easily have for them in an emergency. Our people must be convinced of the fundamental fact that reserve service, not reserve membership alone, is the only practical alternative to full-time military service on a much larger scale for much longer periods and at much greater costs. Unless our people understand this, we will never have the reserve forces we must have to deter aggressive acts against us nor achieve peace through preparedness.

The current concept of national defense includes the employment of total air forces to forestall or to halt aggression. Recent events are cited in which aggression by Soviet forces has been checked by the retaliatory threat of US long-range air forces. Basic requirements for a superior air force. The missions of long-range air forces, short-range defensive air forces, and theater air forces. Theater air forces could be used in a positive role similar to that of long-range air forces. With the same firm statement of intent to use them against the source of any aggression, properly deployed theater air forces could erect a series of secondary "firepower curtains" along the borders of all free nations.

(DOWN THE UNITED STATES AGAINST AIR ATTACK) in Air Force, v. 38, no. 4 (Apr 55) 82-90 plus.

During a recent conference sponsored by the Air Force Association at Colorado Springs, the new Continental Air Defense Command explained its mission to some 160 executives of the country's leading industrial organizations, about 200 National Guard and Air Force Reserve representatives, and several Congressmen who are members of the House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. The highlights of the Conference included addresses by Gen. Benjamin W. Chidlaw, Commander ADC, and Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Bergquist, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, ADC. General Chidlaw stressed the fact that if Russia knows that her attacking planes must fight their way to their targets, she will be less likely to strike the blow, while General Bergquist emphasized the importance of having the ability to parry the enemy's blow and then fight back. Details of the Conference, and texts of the two addresses. With an organizational photochart of the Air Defense Command.


Introduction of new weapons has expanded the US Army concepts of time and space. The combat zone in an atomic war will be vastly extended in depth. Combat action will be characterized by fluidity. Units will be dispersed in space, but through greatly increased mobility will be capable of greater concentration for concerted effort in terms of time. On the future battlefield the decisive margin of strength will fall to the side possessing superior mobility to exploit the effects of weapons yielding greatly increased firepower.

GEN. LE May GIVES RUSSIA FOUR YEARS TO OUTSTRIP U.S., by Katherine Johnsen, in Aviation Week, v. 64, no. 19 (7 May 56) 28-29.

SAC commander tells Senate committee present policies will give USSR air superiority by 1960. Includes the General's views on the ICBM.

Text of the letter addressed to the Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, to the officers of the Service on 15 September 1955, in which he stated the Army's mission and called on its officers to exert continuing efforts to have the Army recognized for the principles for which it stands and lives by, and have it presented to the public in its authentic light.


Resolutions of the Chief of Staff of the Army for the new year: (1) increased modernization in the fields of guided missiles and equipment for strategic and tactical mobility; (2) increased drive in the development of Reserve Forces; (3) improvements in living conditions and assignments of Army personnel; and (4) increase in the deterrent power of the Army by achievement of greater combat readiness of US and allied troops trained by the US Army.

GENERAL THURMAN TALKS ON THE RESERVE PROBLEM, in Reserve Officer, v. 31, no. 4 (Apr 55) 10-11 plus.

Text of statement made by the National President of the Reserve Officers Association before the House Armed Services Committee while it was holding hearings on Reserve legislation necessary for the implementation of the Administration's National Reserve Plan. The General stated that while the ROA supports fully the broad objectives and aspects of the administration's plan to strengthen the reserve forces, it disagrees with some of the details of the plan and also certain of the purposes which the plan is designed to accomplish. Among the provisions which ROA does not support: length of obligatory service; size of the total reserve; and failure to recognize the absolute need to provide an orderly flow of young reserve officers into the reserve program.


Highlights from recent statement before the Department of Defense Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Appropriations, on Soviet Capability in the air, and how the USAF is meeting the challenge.

GEN. WEYLAND EVALUATES INTEGRATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, in Army-Navy-Air Force Register, v. 76, no. 3964 (26 Nov 55) 35.

Mission, equipment, and participating units of EXERCISE SAGE BRUSH, a theater scale, joint maneuver by the Army and Air Force in Louisiana during
November and December 1955. In it, simulated atomic, and chemical, biological, and electronics weapons will have been extensively employed to test and evaluate the integration of such weapons on military concepts and structures. From an interview with the maneuver director, General O.P. Weyland, Commander of TAC.


An interview with Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations in which he describes the Navy's role in an era of H-bombs and supermissles.


A brief recapitulation of the US Army's mission in the past and present and the challenging responsibilities of the future.

**INSURANCE FOR FUTURE PRODUCTION**, by Gen. W. B. Palmer, in *Army Combat Forces Journal*, v. 6, no. 3 (Oct 55) 46.

The Vice Chief of Staff, formerly the Deputy Chief for Logistics, explains the Army's "shadow plant" program that assures US of a war production base in case of another armed conflict and which allows the Army to place its production equipment in reserve for a war emergency.


Despite the developments in military technology, it is still a basic truth that the only absolute weapon is man. Upon his determination, courage, stamina, and skill rests the issue of victory or defeat in war. Stressing his deepest convictions on the importance of the Army to the nation, the General discussed: the role of the US Army today; the privilege of service; and the officer-enlisted man relationship.


Upon the occasion of assuming the responsibilities of the Office of Chief of Staff, the General describes the mission of the Army and concludes: "... Ours is a proud institution to which it is an honor to belong, an institution of great material and spiritual resources. Reinforced by the knowledge of these reserves of strength which stem from every corner of the world where
the Army serves, I undertake the task of Chief of Staff with confidence that
the United States Army will continue to meet the requirements of the future
in the same way that it has met the challenge of the past." With a brief
resume of the military career of General Taylor.

MODERN AIR LOGISTICS; A REPORT ON THE AIR LOGISTICS CONFERENCE
SPONSORED IN DECEMBER BY THE AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION, in Air Force, v. 38,
no. 2 (Feb 55) 67-68 plus.

Excerpts from speeches before the Conference on the importance
of an adequate air logistics system for the USAF and methods by which it
could be obtained. Such a system would increase the US military
capability and would save time, manpower, equipment and dollars. The
speakers included AF Chief of Staff General Twining, Secretary of the Air
Force Harold Talbott, and representatives of the aircraft industry.

THE NAVY ... AND SURVIVAL, by Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, in Monthly News-
Letter, BuSond, v. 19, no. 1 (15 Jan 56) 14-17.

The mission of the US Navy is to control the seas so that the mili-
tary power of the US can be projected into the enemy's territory. Brief review
of the Soviet naval expansion and "some facts about today's and tomorrow's US
Navy, and the vital role of naval power in our national preservation." Photo-
graphs.

THE ONLY ABSOLUTE WEAPON, by Gen. M. B. Ridgway, in Reserve Officer,
v. 31, no. 5 (May 55) 12-13 plus.

The essential role of the Army in the successful conduct of
global wars regardless of whether or not atomic and hydrogen bombs are used;
the equally important role of the Army in geographically limited wars; and
its role as a deterrent to enemy aggression. The greater capacity afforded
by new weapons and equipment. The opportunities for useful service open
to Army officers; and good relationships between fighting men and fighting
officers who lead them as basic element in the ability to win victory in
battle.

THE PRESIDENT SAYS "WE MEET SPEAK FROM STRENGTH" by Gen. B. W. Criddle,
in Sperryoscope, v. 13, no. 7 (Fourth Quarter 54) 3-7.

The basic principles of US air defense: (1) the air defense system
must provide sufficient warning and protection for our own offensive striking
forces and our long-range strategic air effort, and must insure that the
initial enemy mass-attack or series of attacks will not reduce to an ineffective
level our own capability of delivering devastating counterblows; (2) the air
defense system must provide sufficient protection for the nation's economy -
its industries - to assure sustained support for military and industrial warfare; and (3) the defense system must provide sufficient protection for the people of the nation to assure their physical and psychological ability to carry on the operation of our industrial and military machines. Now the Continental Air Defense Command is meeting the problems posed by the communist threat.

PHotographs.


The former Chief of Naval Operations examines the pattern of sea power and the place of sea power in national policy and strategy and concludes that: "... until the seas dry up, man will be confronted with problems of achieving his own crossing and denying the crossing of his enemy, for nowhere in the future can be discerned any total substitute for the great highways of the seas".

A PROGRAM FOR THE ARMY, in Armed Forces Combat Journal, v. 6, no. 2 (Sept 55) 19-27.

Abbreviated texts of (1) a letter addressed by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway to the Secretary of Defense, and (2) an address by Gen. Matthew B. Taylor at the annual conference of Service Secretaries at Quantico, in defense of the Army as an essential part of America's deterrent forces. With comments by the Secretary of Defense, and an editorial outlining a possible program for organizing the Army into a highly mobile, strategic, ready force.


The Army's Vice Chief of Staff on the need for a strong Reserve to back up the Regular Army; and need for public understanding and support of the Reserve Forces program.

RED FLEET GROWTH "STARTLING," SAYS CNO; "WE MUST DRIVE HARD" CONGRESS TOLD, in Army-Navy-Air Forces Journal, v. 93, no. 21 (21 Jan 56) 3 plus.

Adm. Arleigh Burke told the House Armed Services Committee that "the most significant development in Soviet grand strategy since World War II, is the rapid ascendance of the Red Fleet to the position of the world's second major naval power; delays in US response to this advance could be fatal." To counter this ascendance, the US Navy proposes a shipbuilding program which would authorize the construction of 23 naval vessels, large and small, plus not over 5,000 tons of landing and service craft; the conversion of 18 existing naval vessels; the acquisition and conversion of one Mariner Class and four Liberty Class merchant ships; and the authority to commence design and advance procurement for the power plant of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier."

In the execution of national policy the statesman and the soldier are partners. The effectiveness of both is dependent on close coordination of both. The Army Chief of Staff elaborates on the advantages of such close relationship and states that the foreign policy is strengthened if it is planned in the light of military capabilities and if military planning is carried out in the light of national political goals.

STATES AND DIRECTION OF OUR AIR FORCE PROGRAM, by Maj. Gen. William E. Mall, in Reserve Officer, v. 32, no. 4 (Apr 56) 16-17 plus.

The nature of U.S.A.F.'s role in preventing a war or in fighting one, and the specific weapons available or being developed and the level of strength being built to achieve the kind and the amount of airpower the U.S. needs.

SYMPOSIUM ON CONTINENTAL DEFENSE, in Signal, v. 9, no. 1 (Sept-Oct 54) 30-38 plus.

Three of the talks at the symposium held in May 1954. Maj. Gen. Frederic W. Smith, Deputy Commander, Air Defense Command, discusses the Soviet capability of attacking the U.S., the basic principles of air defense, and improvements in communications and electronics which the Command is utilizing. Arthur S. Fleming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, outlines planning for mobilization, the necessity of closing the gaps in our present mobilization base, and the cooperation between U.S. industry and Government in preparing for a future emergency. Val Peterson, Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, describes some of the problems in civil defense and how they apply to industry.


An interview with Major General James N. Gavin during which the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans expressed his views on the new concepts of ground warfare being introduced by the advent of tactical atomic weapons. In particular he discussed: the depth of the battle zone; controlled dispersion of forces; manpower requirements; air mobility and logistics; and reorganization of the division to bring it up to the demands of atomic combat.

Extracts from an address by General Nathan F. Twining in Los Angeles on 20 May 1955 during which the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in evaluating US airpower vs. Soviet airpower stated that: Russia is building great power in the air, offensive as well as defensive; she has the capacity of producing the aircraft in large numbers; US still maintains its lead in airpower over the Soviet Union; and that a ban on atomic weapons, without real disarmament in all weapons, would mean surrender for US and victory for Russia. New Soviet advances in air power must be taken into account in the continuous review of US air strength. Additional US production is available and US output can be stepped up if required.


The U.S. Army is developing modern techniques to take full advantage of the military innovations introduced by modern technology. The ultimate extent to which machines can successfully replace men is one of the great "unknowns" in the modern world - it is so great an unknown that both the free world and its adversaries have seen fit to maintain large armies, notwithstanding the impact of new means of warfare. As long as there is a war, much of it will be fought on the ground, and that means "men and machines."

"WE WEREN'T PERMITTED TO WIN" IN KOREA, in U.S. News and World Report, v. 37, no. 10 (3 Sept 54) 81-86.


Full text of a letter addressed to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson reviewing the ratio of military power potentials of the Soviet Bloc and the Free World and the variable character which general war may assume over the next ten years. He pleads for stronger ground forces in being and against overemphasis on air power and undue reliance on nuclear weapons which may never be used. The US must be ready to fight limited, local wars and is in immediate need of a mobile, joint, hard-hitting, military force. The general's view of the proper role of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, as military advisor. For extract of letter see ORDNANCE, v. 40, no. 212 (Sept-Oct 55) 232-236
WHAT IS THE GREATEST SINGLE THREAT TO THE FREE WORLD; INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL NATHAN F. TWINING, by W. D. G. Robertson, in Aircraft, Australia, v. 33, no. 8 (May 55) 26-28.

The Chief of Staff of the US Air Force sees aggressor air forces as the greatest threat to US and Western security and the nuclear bomb-aircraft combination as our own greatest strength. He explains the new air power concept which is a combination of strategic air power and tactical airpower capable of extinguishing isolated minor aggression and believes the US has nuclear advantages over the Soviet Union. Also comments on: the coordinated effort of the US and Canada in air defense of North America; the interplay between development of offensive air weapons and anti-aircraft weapons; and advantages and possibilities of cooperation between the Air Forces of the US, Gt. Britain, and Canada.


6. Doctrines and Capabilities of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces


An offensive which is suggested by great firepower and executed with great mobility is superior to defense. The fortified zone becomes a minor obstacle if the attacker can by-pass it or cross it with great speed. The US Army has the firepower but it needs the necessary mobility to penetrate defensive positions.


The USAF Chief of Staff discusses US air strategy and military preparedness. New vehicles of the air and the weapons they can carry hold the power of life or death over nations. If we do not maintain our air-atomic capability, it is an invitation to the USSR to attack us.

THE AIR FORCE BUDGET, in Air Force, v. 38, no. 3 (Mar 55) 22.

For Fiscal Year 1956 the US Air Force was allotted $15.6 billion of the overall $34 billion allotted for the three military services. Yet, even this sum does not actually meet the needs of the Air Force. The budget does not take care of USAF’s needs for airlift and logistics, base construction, and research and development. The Air Force budget is actually a bare minimum needed to attain what is conceded to be a bare minimum force of 137 wings by the end of Fiscal Year 1957.


Listing with brief descriptions of contents of doctrinal manuals already published or to be published in the near future by US Air Force.


Although the military air establishment of the US is excellent, there is no hard core or foundation behind it. There is a lack of: air concepts, aviation, education, and of interest in air power. How we solve these problems is going to make or break the power of the Free World and the exercise of democratic government in a period as short as twenty-five years.

The Army is no longer a force that can be kept solely for the purpose of fighting wars, as has been done in the past. It has a greater, more complex mission based upon political and economic considerations in addition to the military requirements. It represents land power as an essential element of our national strength. In its cold war mission, the Army has become just as characteristic a part of the American way of life as the other elements of our national power. Like them, its greatest importance is to be realized in the political and economic fields as contrasted to its purely military role.

ARMY AVIATION, by Lt. Col. George L. Morelock, Jr., in Military Review, v. 35, no. 10 (Jan 56) 53-64.

The evolution of Army aviation; its functions: (1) aerial observation, including limited aerial photography; (2) control of armed forces; (3) command, liaison, and courier missions; (4) serial wire laying; (5) transportation of Army supplies, equipment, personnel, and small units within the combat zone; (6) aeromedical evacuation within the combat zone; and (7) artillery and topographic survey. Types of aircraft used by Army aviation. Photographs.

ARMY AVIATION IN THE SIGNAL CORPS. Fort Monmouth, N. J., Signal School, 55. 134 p. (School Text Sig. 660-64.)

The chapter on INTRODUCTION TO ARMY AVIATION discusses the types and characteristics of Army aircraft, organization, command responsibilities, training, airfields, observation, and transportation missions. Chapter on TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY AVIATION deals with: technique of employment; troop movements; offensive and defensive combat; retrograde movements; night, amphibious, airborne, jungle, desert, and mountain operations; operations in snow and extreme cold; and operations against guerrilla forces. The final chapter on SIGNAL CORPS APPLICATIONS AND TECHNIQUES covers the Signal Corps policy on Army Aviation, Signal reconnaissance, messenger service, aerial photography, tactical wire laying, radio relay, communications, and future trends. Photographs.

ARMY GETS NEW DIV.; IT WILL BE 101ST, in Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, v. 93, no. 16 (17 Dec 55) 2.

The U.S. Army has disclosed its plans for division deployment and strength through June 1957. The new program calls for nineteen tactical divisions, three of them airborne, four armored, and twelve infantry. A highlight of the revised strength will be the activation early next year of the new airborne division, which will carry the designation of the 101st Airborne Division.

The US Army's mission is that of defeating enemy forces in land combat and gaining control of the land and its people. Weapons, tactics and techniques, organizations, and support that will be required to insure success in modern atomic war.


"The Army has powerful new weapons, but it is the combination of firepower and mobility that wins wars." General Taylor defines US Army's tactical and strategic requirements for mobility, outlines the areas where the Army is making progress for mobility (Army aviation; transportation procedures; mobile ports), and points out the spheres of mobility in which much remains to be done (airborne strategic mobility, which is not entirely within the control of the Army) before the Army is able to bring its firepower to possible areas of decision in sufficient quantities at the rate required.


The importance of tactical and strategic mobility, and how the US Army is solving the problem. If we should have to meet our potential enemy on the battlefield, we must expect to be outnumbered. Therefore, we must multiply our effective strength to the maximum through ever increasing mobility combined with the increasing firepower of our Army and superior quality derived from the skill, the stamina, and the determination of our fighting men, to offset the numerical superiority of our potential enemy. However, military capacity is still effective in a large measure in proportion to the number of fighting men who can bring that military capability to bear directly upon the enemy. There always exists the need for a strong reserve of highly trained, highly organized, and readily available fighting men.


The US Seventh Army in Germany is described as an exceptionally well trained and well equipped army whose personnel are confident and prepared for any eventualities. Illustrations.


Steps taken by the US Army to develop atomic capabilities (atomic guns, guided missiles, the teaching of atomic tactics, and certain technical and scientific schools for the further education of qualified atomic technicians and scientists) in keeping with the "new look" strategy. However, since
it seems possible that there will never be an atomic war, the Army must also be ready to fulfill its mission by conventional means and to do so with a minimum of reconversions, rearming, retraining, and retooling. We will not have two separate armies, one for atomic warfare and a second to fulfill conventional requirements.

ARMY'S WEAPON PLAN INDICATES MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDUSTRY, by Claude Witze, in Aviation Week, v. 64, no. 6 (6 Feb 56) 32-33.

"US Army's increasing emphasis on research and development utilizing better planning and better coordination with operational requirements, indicates a growing role for industry in providing equipment for the foot soldier." The basic areas of interest are fire power, mobility on the battlefield, communications and reconnaissance, and logistic support.


The impact of nuclear power on the propulsion of ships; and the Navy's nuclear-power program. Two types of submarine nuclear power plants are in the advanced development stage. One is the submarine thermal reactor which will be installed in the NAUTILUS. The other is an entirely different kind of submarine nuclear power plant now being developed for the SEA WOLF. Both are described. Plans for ultimate adaptation of nuclear power to larger ships; and possibilities of application of nuclear power plants for other naval vessels.


A forecast of the trends and changes that are in sight for US sea power. Atomic propulsion for surface ships, subs, and planes; new atomic weapons for use at sea; and what these new trends and changes will mean to the capabilities and striking power of the US Navy. Includes a chart showing the Navy that Russia will have within two years in terms of submarines, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, battleships, patrol vessels, and naval aircraft.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF ARMY LIGHT AIRCRAFT IN ARCTIC OPERATIONS. Postmaster, Seattle, Wash., APO 733, Army Arctic Indoctrination School, 54. 15 p. (Field Exercise, Summer 1954, no. 16.)

Material to prepare ground commanders and their assigned pilots for subsequent Arctic military operations by familiarizing them with the military aspects of aircraft operations, the capabilities and limitations of Army aircraft in summer and winter Arctic flying, and the operational hazards of Arctic terrain and weather. Mission of light aircraft aviation; characteristics
of light aircraft; operational capabilities of light aircraft; effects of adverse weather conditions; problems of maintenance, and preflight precautions; effects of cold weather on electrical equipment; icing conditions; the problems of depth perception and visibility in the Arctic; ski-plane operation; use of helicopters; requirements for air-section operations; and tips to pilots and commanders.


The development of Marine helicopter combat tactics and techniques since 1947, and employment of combat helicopters in Marine operations in Korea. Appendix: US Marine Corps helicopter units and commanding officers, and glossary of military and aeronautical terms. Bibliography, photos, maps, sketches, charts, and diagrams.


The role of the Army and the tasks it is expected to perform if war should come. The advances in weapons systems; and the necessity of considering their capabilities, limitations, and probability of employment in Army planning. The greater emphasis on fire power, dispersion, mobility, and communications of greater range and power and of maximum compactness; and advances made in these respects. Indications that the new techniques and weapons will require more and better trained soldiers; and the urgent need for a combat-ready reserve force.

THE CITIZEN AND HIS NAVY, by Comdr. A. T. Church, Jr., in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 80, no. 9 (Sept 54) 989-997.

The influences which mold US public opinion with regard to the budget and other factors affecting the Armed Forces; and the capabilities of the Navy in fulfilling national objectives. How sea power can be employed in the achievement of objectives "short of war," and the economy and flexibility of naval forces which make them the citizen's most powerful weapon in the present world situation.


Points out that no existing types of aircraft appear to be suitable for the Army's use as fighting craft.
THE DEFENSE OF TOMORROW? by Lt. Col. Clarence C. DeReus, in Military Review, v. 34, no. 6 (Sept 54) 8-12.

The concept of mobile defense - the method of defense the US must employ today if she is to survive - discussed from the viewpoints of what, when, where, who, and why.


Current peace moves will not alter US expenditures for defense, and peace talks will not be translated into drastic cuts in the armed forces or in activities supporting them, at least for another year. There will be some changes, however, in the direction of the flow of defense dollars. Less will be spent on: pay of servicemen (because of reduction in military strength), airplanes, tanks and other vehicles, radar, radio and other communications, stockpiling, and on other major procurement. More will be spent on: gas, oil, maintenance, ships, missiles, and other weapons, research and development, atomic energy, and ammunition, military construction, reserve forces, and military aid abroad. Chart shows amount spent on the above items during the year which ended 30 June 1955, and the amounts that will be spent during the year that started 1 July 1955.

DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE, by Col. Robert C. Cassibry, in Military Review, v. 36, no. 2 (May 56) 22-34.

The Command and General Staff College is specifically charged with the development and revision of the tactical and logistical doctrine for all of the combined arms and services, including tactical employment of atomic and future weapons. With chart showing the proposed organization for development of doctrine.


Cites the 77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, N C., as a model, and elaborates on some of the intangibles that go to make up an elite outfit, such as: a uniform method of training, and a common interest in and knowledge of weapons; superb physical training and conditioning; top leadership; tested courage as well as acquired skills; pride of unit; absence of bellyaching; proper use of NCO's; and austerity in organization, equipment and training methods.


More mobility for the foot soldier will give us that one step advantage on the battlefield.

An editorial in support of General Gavin's call for mobility in the US Army which appeared in an article in the April 1954 issue of Harper's. The editorial describes the barriers that have shackled the Army to immobility and calls on the Combat Forces to work for General Gavin's goal of providing the Army with the type of mobility which is imperative in atomic warfare.


The battle damage control of US cities in thermonuclear war is too big a job for any organization except the Army. Since the primary purpose of war in the air-atomic age has become the destruction of not only the facilities but also the people of the enemy's homeland, US military defensive doctrine should recognize this fact and deploy its organized military forces to defend such targets of the future war as Washington, Detroit, and Los Angeles. Although this implies a drastic change in the mission of the Army and departure from its traditions, the Army's oath of allegiance requires it to defend and protect the people of US from all enemies foreign and domestic. It can fulfill its oath best, through the protection, rescue, and relief of US civil population and of US industrial and political facilities. Why this must be done and how it can be done.

HELIICOPTER FUTURE, by Larry M. Hewin, in Army Aviation Digest, v. 2, no. 4 (April 56) 5-12 plus.

Army's requirements for mobility and how far can the helicopter be expected to progress to meet these requirements.

LEADERSHIP: THE NAVY'S MAIN WEAPON, by Comdr. R. C. Parker, in Our Navy, v. 50, no. 16 (15 Jan 56) 8-9 plus.

Proposition that peacetime demands from officers of the US Navy a higher quality of leadership than wartime where "danger, excitement, and patriotism all combined to foster an alertness and morale which gave the superior a confidence in the subordinate such as has seldom been enjoyed under more settled conditions." An outline of leadership traits. (This article has been written in 1921.)

LET'S KEEP THE REGIMENT, by Col. Bruce Palmer, Jr., in Army Combat Forces Journal, v. 5, no. 10(May 55) 22-23.
How Infantry can be streamlined for modern combat without altering its basic structure. The organization discussed is based on operations in western Europe, where the US Army must deal with a highly mechanized enemy, heavily weighted with armor, which will be operating over ground generally favorable to his formations and tactical concepts. The proposed organizational changes: will cause minimum disruption to current personnel, training, and logistical practices in the Infantry; will retain battle-tested regimental and divisional concepts; and will produce the simplest quickest, and most economical way to effect needed reorganization.

Explanatory commentary on AFM 1-2 - USAF BASIC DOCTRINE - as the best definition of the Air Force mission.

LOGISTICS CATCHES UP, by Lt. Col. Williston B. Palmer, in QM Review, v. 34, no. 4 (Jan-Feb 55) 6-7 plus.
Benefits and improvements derived from the recent change in the logistical organization of the Army, following creation, in September 1954, of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

A combined military-civilian effort is needed for the efficient production, supply, and maintenance of modern arms and equipment. Recognizing the growing importance of logistics, US Army schools are now devoting greater attention to this subject. Recently, the Department of the Army established the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Logistics and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics - the latter exercising command over the Army's seven technical services. The plan envisages a systematic career development for logisticians which is something new to the US Army.

Estimates of the US manpower pool available for military service under alternative assumptions as to the strength of the Armed Forces and national military manpower policies. Manpower available for service of 1 July 1953; the effect on the pool of a National Security Training Program; the military manpower pool with Armed Forces strengths of 3.36 millions and 3.5 millions; and the manpower supply for both partial and full mobilization.
MOBILITY FOR THE ARMY, in Army Information Digest, v. 9, no. 10 (Oct 54) 32-35.

Photos and description of various new developments in transportation adopted by the Army to increase its mobility. Among them: a Diesel locomotive which runs on tracks of varied gauges; light-weight, compact, food, fuel, and ammunition carrier (Mechanical Mule); an aerial tramway with capacity of ten long tons; and the H21C helicopter which is capable of transporting twenty fully equipped troops or twelve litter patients with medical attendant plus the 'copter crew.

MONTGOMERY AND CONFLICTING PHILOSOPHIES OF SEA POWER, by Col. J. D. Hittle, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 18, no. 5 (May 55) 521-527.

Field Marshal Montgomery in his speech before the California Institute of Technology on 29 November 1954 stated that it is contrary to the interest of defense strategy and contemporary naval policy to dissipate the mission of naval forces into tasks for which air forces and not naval forces are best suited, and went on to say: "...if this is true, then we should at once stop building any more aircraft carriers, because they are very expensive and will not produce a dividend." Colonel Hittle (US Marine Corps) disagrees and show that Montgomery's statements reflect a "continental" point of view, such as discouraged the development of British naval aviation between World Wars I and II and left the British Navy unprepared to cope with the demands produced by World War II. In her present status of lower sea-power ranking, England does not have a sufficient organizational base in the Royal Navy to provide for and utilize carrier and amphibious forces approaching the dimension of those elements in the US Navy. This is the reason the British did not launch a carrier program similar to that underway in US. It does not follow that US should also curtail its carrier program. The rise of Russian sea-power makes it mandatory, in the interest of our national security and the safety of the free world (a great share of which is the responsibility of US Navy because of England's decline as a world ranking sea-power), to depart completely from the philosophy and pattern of British sea-power. US should continue to fashion her naval power in accordance with our own national security requirements.

NAVAL PREPAREDNESS, by Vice Adm. F. S. Low, in Ordnance, v. 40, no. 211 (July-Aug 55) 34-36.

The US Navy is keeping abreast of the enormous technological advances in armament and equipment in order to increase its striking power and mobility and maintain control of the seas for national defense. Reorganization of the Department of Defense following the recommendations of the Rockefeller Committee. The organizational concept of the Navy. Photographs.

Comments on the impact of the changes brought about by nuclear development on the organization, mission, and weapon systems of the U.S. Navy.

NO MORE PARATROOPS? by James J. Haggerty, Jr., in Collier's, v. 135, no. 6 (18 Mar 55) 23-27.

The U.S. Army is developing new tactics to fit the pattern of a future war. Within a few years it will be almost completely airborne, capable of rapid movement from one battle area to another. The development of new tactics is motivated by the requirements which atomic weapons place on modern armies, and by US manpower considerations. The airborne cavalry - as the Army calls its helicopter troops of the future - provides the answer to all its needs. The capabilities of airborne cavalry and the extent of its present development. Drawings show: the artist's concept of how helicopters would be used in a situation like that which confronted Gen. Patton in World War II, when he ran out of gas at the Rhine; and the activities at an advance helicopter field.

NOT YET TIME TO TURN IN YOUR HAT, in Army Combat Forces Journal, v. 6, no. 5 (Dec 55) 15-17.

The US Army's role in an all-out thermonuclear war, with the conclusion that as rockets and guided missiles become the dominant weapons system, the Army will continue to be the military force of ultimate decision.


Political, economic, professional, and administrative pressures that have repeatedly reduced and delayed realization of the theoretical dominance of American air power. The obstacles listed pose problems of leadership - some at the national level to be met by the President and Congress, some at Department level to be met by the Secretary of Defense, and some at Air Force level to be met by its civilian and military leaders. Since air power is an instrumentality to be entrusted to men of war-leader stature with a wartime sense of responsibility and urgency, all of the obstacles can be overcome.

OLD OUTFITS NEED NOT FADE AWAY, by Lt. Col. Elmel Schmierer, in Army, v. 6, no. 10 (May 56) 20-24.
Comment from the editors of the "Army" states in part: ".... This magazine has published many articles, cerebrations and letters on the subject. Now we are proud to present an article that reflects the present thinking of the Department of the Army General Staff. This article is not an official document and it presents only a concept, not a final solution. ARMY magazine knows that Mr. Brucker and General Taylor and all the General Staff would welcome comment on the concept." What can be done to save the Army's traditional units. The old and the new need not compete; they can complement each other for the good of the Army in this nuclear age.

ORGANIC AVIATION CAN BOOST ARMY POWER A THOUSAND FOLD, by Brig. Gen. Carl I. Borton, in Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, v. 93, no. 6 (8 Oct 55) 1 Plus. Through the use of organic aviation, the US Army has the means to increase its mobility and striking power. The Army Aviation Center, with its Aviation School, research personnel, and supporting troops, is training Army personnel in aviation duties and assisting in the aviation technological research necessary to furnish the type of organic aviation required.

ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. Fort Leavenworth, Kans., Command and General Staff College, 54, Various paging. (5008/5.) The organization for national security under the National Security Act of 1947 and the Amendments of 1949, and changes brought about by the reorganization plans of 1953. National security policies; composition of the National Security Council and coordination of its various agencies. Functions of: the President, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Resources Board, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Secretary of Defense, and various statutory agencies within the Department of Defense. The Army's part in carrying out national objectives and policies as reflected in its organization and functions. Organizational charts.

A PAPER RESERVE IS NOT ENOUGH, by Maj. Gen. Bryan L. Milburn, in Antiaircraft Journal, no. 4, v. 97 (July-Aug 54) 2-4. The effectiveness of the US Army's reserve forces lies in the answer to the question: how much mobilization time can be saved by their organization and training? A division force of pretrained reservists, properly organized and trained while in reserve status, could be mobilized and deployed in five months; a similar force without pretraining requires more than ten months. The American people must recognize that reserve service is the only practical alternative to full-time military service.
A PROGRAM TO DEVELOP MILITARY EXECUTIVES IN THE SERVICE BRANCHES OF THE U.S. ARMY, by Capt. Richard G. Sanakerley, Los Angeles, University of Southern California, 55. (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.)

PROPOSED NATIONAL RESERVE PLAN; SELECTED MILITARY MANPOWER STATISTICS. Washington, U.S. Department of Defense, Office Assistant Secretary of Defense, 55. 69 p.


New concepts of warfare have placed new demands on all segments of the US Army Transportation Corps, including research, procurement, and budgeting. Equipment needed by the various segments to perform their present functions.


A symposium in which RESEARCH ON LEADERSHIP, by Fillmore H. Sanford, discusses the problem of selecting leaders, assesses the performance of on-the-job officers, and summarizes the results of research on training leaders. The current research in leadership by the military departments is presented on briefs by (1) E. K. Taylor for the Army, (2) Howard E. Page for the Navy, and (3) Col. George E. Croker for the Air Force. Other topics presented at the symposium were: MILITARY RESEARCH ON LEADERSHIP, by Samuel Stouffer, and SUMMARY OF REPORTED RESEARCH RELATING TO MILITARY LEADERSHIP, by Avis Duncombe.


The US Army's Reserve Forces problem and some of the actions taken.


Today when the US Navy finds itself in a shooting war, it has to rely on naval reserves to fill fifty percent or more of the shipboard billets. The better trained these reserves are, the better, the
Navy will be able to do its job. Examines the strength, readiness, and the training status of US Armed Forces' Reserves, and notes that the time has come to think in terms of decades, and to consider US military strength on a continual and not on a piecemeal basis. Offers some solutions to provide the type of Reserves that the security of US demands.

THE ROLE OF THE ARMY, in Officers' Call, no. 3 (54) 2-12.
The role of the Army in achieving the national objectives of preventing war and being able to win a global war if necessary. The Army as the final and decisive element of US military power because of its ability to win land battles and control land areas - factors on which victory depends. Organization, training, and equipment of the Army for prompt and sustained combat operations. Technological changes; and the Army's need for more and better trained manpower.

THE ROLE OF THE INFANTRY. Fort Benning, Ga., Infantry School, 55. 20 p.
The importance of ground forces in past and future wars; evolution of the infantry of the US Army; characteristics of future warfare; and the future of the infantry.

On the occasion of SAC's 10th Anniversary, a summary of its activities, capabilities, and constant readiness.

Description of the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment System of air defense; how it works and its importance to national defense.

SECOND BEST IN AIR IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH: HEARINGS REVEAL U.S. WILL FALL BEHIND UNLESS WE STEP UP EFFORT TO MATCH RUSSIA IN PLANES AND MEN, in Life, v. 40, no. 20 (14 May 56) 53-56.
Gen. Curtis LeMay testified before a Senate subcommittee last week that Russian plane production is outstripping ours and warned that if Russia starts a war today, the U.S. could win but not "without this country receiving very serious damage." Plane by plane comparison between U.S. and U.S.S.R. combat planes attempting to show that U.S. Air Force trails Russia in most and that the Soviet lead will be even greater in 1958. General LeMay made three recommendations for strengthening SAC: find a way to keep technicians and combat crews in the service; build more bases; and buy more bombers and tankers to increase striking power. Manpower is considered the key problem.

A SEMINAR ON MOBILITY IN WARFARE, by 2nd Lt. David Drew Gilpatrick, in ARMY, v. 64, no. 4 (July-Aug 55) 14-17.

To assist US Military Academy cadets in developing a sound professional base, a group of officers at the Military Academy recently conducted a seminar at which the following areas were discussed: (a) the development and progress of mobility in the employment of cavalry (armor), infantry, artillery, signal, and engineers; (b) the development and progress of mobility in the employment of the tactical air-ground team; (c) the development and requirements for staff action in mobile warfare, and more specifically, the development of the mission-type order; and (d) possible characteristics of the war of the future. The mechanics of the seminar, which are described, can be readily adapted to units in the field. Such a seminar can be held at company, battalion, or combat command level. A book bibliography is appended to assist anyone interested in setting up a similar study group.


The Commanding General, Headquarters, Army Antiaircraft Command, Ft. Bliss, Texas, reviews ARAACOM's mission, role in the US air defense pattern, organization, equipment, personnel, training, and its state of readiness to defend the nation.

"SHADOW PLANTS" - OUR SECRET WEAPON, by Vernon Poser, in Collier's, v. 135, no. 11 (27 May 55) 38-35.

Under a plan of the Army Ordnance Corps, fully-equipped war-production factories throughout US are standing by ready for any emergency. The plan called "Operation Ready" is a unique conception in stockpiling. Instead of moth-balling mountains of weapons, munitions, and equipment, the plan provides for factories which are ready to produce the equipment as the need arises. It prevents the nation from finding itself in a precarious industrial position. The plan was devised and is being supervised by Brig. Gen. John B. Medaris, Chief of Ordnance's Industrial Division. Some details of "Operation Ready," and a personality sketch of General Medaris.
The establishment of SAC in 1946 and its rapid development as a combat-ready organization achieved under the leadership of General Curtis E. LeMay. Organization, functions, and equipment; the efficiency of its combat crews; and the business management of billions of dollars.

Missions and role of Tactical Air Command as one of the three major components of USAF; tactical air power as a complement to Strategic Air Command and an augmentation of Air Defense Command; and its mission tasks that cover practically the entire scope of airpower's capability. Its functions in the theater of operations as the commander's primary strategic weapons system in an all-out war or in a peripheral war; its capability of delivering nuclear and non-atomic weapons as well.

Progress of Army Aviation since 1942 when the War Department established organic air observation for the Army's Field Artillery. The role of Army Air Arm in military operations; the aircraft of Army Air Arm; and the training activities at the various schools of Army Aviation.

Reasons why the Army Forces, as land forces, are the decisive component of the military structure, as presented in a new edition of Army Field Manual 100-5, FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS: OPERATIONS.

Drastic changes in organization, tactics, and weapons currently planned and tested by the Army for ground combat in the atomic era. The new Army will be smaller and will be composed of smaller, self-contained, air-transported, and air-supplied units. In a future war there will be no front lines. Brief, violent clashes will be fought with atomic weapons over a wide area, and night combat will be widely used. New equipment includes; tactical atomic bombs, atomic artillery shells, improved missiles and tanks, TV equipped helicopters, and improved rifles with more fire power and less weight.

The US Army has personnel with the ability, education, and imagination to provide the fresh, up-to-date study, analysis, and thought it needs. However, qualified officers are burdened with paperwork and routine administration to such an extent that there is no time left for original thought. Therefore, it has become necessary to contract with civilian educational institutions, civilian research organizations, and civilian corporations to do the thinking for the Army.

Text of a statement made by the Executive Director of the Air Force Association before the House Armed Services Committee on 3 March 1955 relative to the National Reserve Plan, H.R. 2967. Mr. Straubel discussed some of the provisions in the National Reserve Plan which he believes threaten the effectiveness of the active Air Force, and recommended that they be eliminated from the bill.

USAF ALIGN INDUSTRY FOR ATOMIC WAR, by Claude Witze, in Aviation Week, v. 64, no. 1 (2 Jan 56) 18-19

The AF industrial production readiness policy, a new formula given the US aircraft industry by the AF to achieve immediate production readiness in case of an atomic war. For the aircraft industry the new policy calls for the perfection of two new capabilities: (1) the production compression capability, which will insure maximum all-out production of strategic and air defense weapons in the first sixty to ninety days of a general war, and (2) the production acceleration capability, which will provide for faster production of tactical or supporting systems to a predetermined peak rate in the shortest possible time. The program will be applied to the aircraft industry on the basis of selective planning.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE BASIC DOCTRINE. Washington, Department of the Air Force, 55. 10 p. (AFM 1-2).

Basic doctrine of the US Air Force for employing the nation's air forces during all forms of international conflict. The various instruments of national policy in an international conflict; and the forces which comprise the military instrument of national policy. Characteristics of air forces and principles for their employment. Employment of air forces in peace and war; and timely provision of adequate air power as the paramount consideration for the security and well-being of the US.
US MILITARY OFFICERS IN JAPAN - particularly senior officers - positively demonstrate initiative compared with generals in the former Japanese Army. Gen. Partridge of the Air Force piloted a jet plane himself to inspect defenses. The US officers who direct training at the Matsushima air unit are winning the respect of former Japanese staff officers for their devotion to training. They don't even take holidays. All Self-Defense Force officers who returned from US training schools expressed surprise over the severe and vigorous training there, the instructors' initiative, and the trainees' receptiveness. The US Army is working hard now for the spiritual and physical training of its troops. It is conducting basic training even more vigorously than the former Japanese Army did. It has drastically improved its combat training, such as training in close-quarter combat, and started vigorous bayonet exercises and night combat training. Even its methods in giving commands and issuing orders are similar to those of the former Japanese Army. Its tactics include charges - even battle cries are now heartily encouraged." Sees these changes resulting from US Army's experiences in Korea and the realization that although the use of atomic weapons will be a reality in a future major war, personnel is the mainstay of an army, regardless of the weapons available to it.

THE U.S. HAS A DEFENSE AGAINST ATOMIC ATTACK, by Fletcher Knebel, in Look, v. 19, no. 9 (3 May 55) 37-43.
An analysis of the strength of US air defenses and capabilities in knocking down enemy planes if they strike at US. Organization, equipment, personnel, and state of preparedness of the US Continental Air Defense Command; and the defense system that backs up the Command in its mission of defending US against an enemy attack. The advances made by the US in perfecting its air defenses during the last two years give a basis for an honest belief that a Russian attack on US would not be catastrophic now, and soon the US would be able to damage a Russian attack so severely that only a few of the Soviet bombers would get through.

Report on the status of the Marine Corps. The "three Marine divisions and aircraft wings are ready. They are precisely designed for the real war - the limited war smoldering along the periphery of the Soviet bloc."

The evolution of military doctrine from 1783 (when George Washington submitted to the Continental Congress his "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment") to the present, showing what effect the various philosophies for waging war have had upon national military policy. The
military doctrine in Washington's time; the classical doctrines of Europe and their effect upon US military doctrine; US doctrines after the Civil War; the beginnings of air doctrine; doctrine for the future; national policy and military doctrine; and the military policy of US. Appended: text of speech by John Foster Dulles before the Council of Foreign Relations, 12 January 1954, in New York in which he reviewed the relationship of US foreign policy to national security and the emergence of the basic decision... to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and in places of our choosing... Bibliography.

U.S. PROVES ARMY AVIATION INVALUABLE, by Victor Lobby, in Canadian Aviation, v. 28, no. 5 (May 55) 22-23 plus.
Functions of the U.S. Army Air Arm include: artillery observation; reconnaissance; rapid transportation of commanders and staff to and from various elements of their commands; transportation of supply, equipment, and small units; casualty evacuation; and aerial photography serving the immediate needs of ground units. The expansion of the scope of Army aviation which resulted from experimentation and improvisation in the Korean War; and types of aircraft authorized or planned for Army units. Canadian considerations of integration of aircraft into Army units.

Review of the latest edition of US Army Field Manual 100-5, FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS, OPERATIONS. According to the reviewer "it is reassuring and comforting to read its sound, forward-looking exposition of current Army doctrine." Critical comments on the following Army doctrine for leaders of the US in combat operations: "Victory alone as an aim of war cannot be justified, since, in itself, victory does not always assure the realisation of national objectives; or, in other words, a limited political objective may require a military objective which is also limited. The reviewer, however, is of the opinion that...in war a military objective must be gained by combat, and in that combat every will, effort, and energy must be directed toward victory."

Much of the dissatisfaction existing within the Army could be removed if the Army issued a statement of its fundamental doctrine. Such a statement might: (1) outline the fundamental conflict that divides the free world and the communist world; (2) discuss the role of the armed forces in
national policy, and the special position of the Army as part of the armed forces; (3) explain the position of the US in the world, and the effect of this position on the employment of the Army; (4) discuss the possible shapes of war, and the role that the Army would have in each; and (5) include a brief discussion of the principles of war and their basic application to the employment of the Army in the light of advances in technology.


Some thoughts on ROTC that the author considers as vital to the Army and the nation.


Characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of various troop carrier airplanes that provide the US Army with its strategic mobility; and the future of the cargo airplane in atomic warfare which places a high premium on mobility.
7. Interservice Cooperation and Problems

ARMY AVIATION, in Air Facts, v. 18, no. 1 (1 Apr 55) 7-18.
The inadequacy of tactical air forces for close support of Army ground forces and in regard to doctrines, command principles, tactics, equipment, and pilot qualifications. Army Aviation, as it can and should be, is a limited scope, low altitude, restricted area, small field type of flying that is completely uncompetitive with Air Force flying. The Army should be given a chance to develop a whole new system of close support flying manned by pilots who are part of the ground units they are supporting. Effective close support aircraft that can be produced cheaply and in great quantities should be developed quickly, and special pilot training for Army aviation should be made available at once.


Historical account of the more important aspects of the Army aviation program since the creation of the US Air Force in 1947. The administrative control of Army aviation; Army-Air Force relations bearing upon the Army's maintenance operation of organic aircraft; the expansion of the Army aviation program, particularly the helicopter phase; and Army airfields and training of aviation personnel.

An AIR FORCE magazine staff study on how nuclear firepower changed the Army's thinking and why this new thinking "is bad news for the taxpayer."

If war comes again, is the U. S. Navy, as well as the Air Force, to have an important role in H-bombing big targets within Russia? Argument is churning up now over this issue, with some of the overtones of the B-36 controversy of 1949. The facts are given in this article showing that the Navy's new jet bombers soon to be carrier-borne will be able to do anything the AF can, within limits of their range. Targets to be attacked, however, cannot be more than 1,000 miles from carrier bases. Numbers of these fast jet bombers will be limited, too, with 20 per super-carrier.

The confused command position in the Pacific-Far East area in which USAF finds itself divided between two unified Army-Navy commands: Commander in Chief, Pacific which is headed by an admiral and has its headquarters in Hawaii, and Commander in Chief, Far East with headquarters in Tokyo and headed by the Army. A unified command should be created for the entire Pacific-Far East area. Under this command three equal, component commands - Army, Navy, and Air Force - should be created, each possessing the theater forces of their respective services.


A rundown of the controversy arising among the Services over the relative value of different weapons and on the general concept of U.S. defense policy. Contains a summary of the basic Army position paper entitled "A Great New Debate - Problems of National Security." Compares the Budgets of the Army, Navy, and Air Force during the period 1953 to 1957.

THE NATURE OF COMMAND, by Col. J. M. Pitzer, in Army Combat Forces Journal, v. 6, no. 5 (Dec 55) 19-21 plus.

Reviews the philosophies of command held by the US Army, Navy, and Air Force today, with a view to determining the possibility and merit of a system which would be acceptable and applicable to all. Such a system could be based on the development of a class of officers without service loyalties - men who would owe their allegiance to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

PUT TAC AIR IN NAVY BLUE, by Col. George C. Reinhardt, in Army Combat Forces Journal, v. 5, no. 2 (Sept 54) 21-25.

Advocates that the Navy/Marine air arm be given the responsibility for all surface support (whether land or sea) because it is better suited to tactical operations and ground support requirements of modern warfare than the tactical arm of the Air Force. Suggests that the Air Force concentrate on strategic bombing and the air defense of US. The advantages to be gained from such an arrangement, and the conduct of tactical air operations in Korea in support of the contention that naval tactical concept, aircraft, and training are more suitable for close ground support than that of the USAF.

The agreement governing operation of water ports in overseas areas by the Army Transportation Corps for the Air Force; reasons for and advantages of this arrangement; and the success of the operations. Today the Transportation Corps is operating a score of ports and supports serving air bases in Newfoundland, Labrador, Greenland, the Azores, North Africa, and the Pacific. The floating port which consists of several self-sufficient teams and which supports a number of isolated air facilities open to sea approach for only a few weeks of the year.

SHOULD THE ARMY BUY ITS OWN PLANES? by Harry S. Baer, Jr., in American Aviation, v. 18, no. 6 (16 Aug 54) 40.

Disadvantages connected with the present system of procuring Army aircraft through Air Force or Navy channels are discussed in view of the Army’s billion dollar procurement program. The views of Col. William B. Bunker, (pioneer of the helicopter program) on complete contractual responsibility by the Army at this time. Also, study by an Army-AF committee on an Army system of depots and maintenance facilities.


Emphasizes the Army’s need for the airplane type of supporting weapon, and recommends that: (1) the Army should exert every effort at high level to obtain from the Air Force satisfactory quantities and control of close air support required by ground units engaged in combat, and should amend the doctrine accordingly; and (2) failing this, the Army should take the necessary steps to amend agreements and proceed with plans to provide its own organic close air support with aircraft, organizations, and other means especially designed for the purpose. The doctrines of the USSR, France, Gt. Britain, and the US are taken into consideration.

TROUBLE WITH CAVALRY IS, by Col. Shillelagh, in Army Combat Forces Journal, v.5, no.6 (Jan 55) 34-36.

The Army has been grievously hurt by the Unification Act. Unification took the air element, our modern cavalry, out of the Army. It divorced the long-range air weapons from the ground battle where they have a major role to play. The tactical air force operations of reconnaissance and ground support, which are as integral to the fight as division artillery, have been lost to Army thinking and Army planning. The separate Air Force can be a tolerable arrangement only if the Army is in a position of establishing air power requirements for the support of ground operations by the Strategic Air Force. It must think and plan in terms of the whole land battle. For this purpose its leaders must be thoroughly trained in the application of air power in the land battle. These tasks may be extremely difficult under our present organization, but they are absolutely essential to the full exploitation of our national defense potential.
Despite efforts of the US Air Force and Army to keep their differences from the public eye, these situations have come to light during EXERCISE SAGBRUSH: the Army will not use AF helicopters for assault missions; and the AF has challenged Army's introduction of Sky Cavalry for reconnaissance assault missions.
E. Great Britain and British Commonwealth

1. Military and Foreign Policy


The destruction of the US Pacific Fleet of Pearl Harbor demonstrated that concentrated fleets are vulnerable to air attack and that only aircraft can give adequate protection from it. Atom bomb trials indicate that the conception of large fleets must end and naval strategy and tactics must be planned on the action of small units. Small and fast ships should be built for the British Navy.


The influence of the air weapon on the possibilities of a future war between the USSR and the West. It seems unlikely that any nation would begin a war that would lead to the destruction of both sides; but we must expect the Soviets to continue to cause local conflicts. If a total war does come, atomic air power will be employed immediately. Preparations which Great Britain should make for this eventuality.


Suggestions for reorganising the British Army including: (1) conventional forces for internal security and anti-terrorist operations and for "limited" wars of the Korean type; (2) the raising of units from the overseas parts of the Commonwealth - particularly the formation of an African Army of some five divisions after the pattern of the old Indian Army; (3) a "Foreign Legion" from displaced persons and others of non-Commonwealth origin; and (4) a "three-tier" army in which the regular personnel would pass from one "tier" to the other as they advanced in age. Such a system would offer a longer military career to professional officers and NCO's.
Arguments in support of the conclusion that instead of maintaining a large proportion of the British Army overseas, it would be more economical and better for the army if overseas garrisons were reduced to a minimum, and mobile reserves were stationed in the United Kingdom with a fleet of transport aircraft available to take them wherever they were required at a short notice.

A review of commitments, forces, and deployment. The strategy depends principally upon the use of air power and hinges on the Western philosophy that the deterrent power of USAF SAC and RAF Bomber Command might avert a major war. That deterrent is also the only hope of winning the war, if it should start.

The problem of defense in the Middle East in modern times, and clarification of Britain's changed policy in the area. Britain's large share of responsibility for Middle East defense since the fall of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Factors which make such responsibility impossible for a single power today; and the urgent need for establishing an international defensive organization for the Middle East. British negotiations with Egypt for withdrawal of troops from the Suez Canal Zone; and considerations which influenced Ot. Britain's decision to sign the agreement. Appendices contain texts of Anglo-Middle East Treaties signed between 1930 and 1954.

Highlights of the British Government's "statement of Defense, 1955," with particular emphasis on manpower, on research and development in the fields of aviation and guided missiles, and on civil defense. With tables showing: (1) breakdown of the British defense budget for the financial year 1955-56; (2) current and estimated future active strength of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, and RAF); and (3) strength of volunteer reserve and auxiliary forces and national service reserves.

The development of US and British air arms since World War I and a comparison of their present policies and strategies. British
strategic policy does not exhibit a full recognition of air power, but is still overshadowed by the concept of a powerful navy based on battleships. Aerial operations against ships during World War II demonstrated that air power is superior to sea power; and no nation can expect to be strong in all arms. British air policy should be altered so that RAF can make full use of the mobility of the airplane.


Analysis of the role of the British Navy, and particularly the aircraft carrier, based on priorities dictated by the strategic situation. The resources of the Navy must be based on its offensive capacity — both as deterrent and equalizer — in a nuclear war, and secondly on its power to deal with limited wars. The aircraft carrier is the only naval weapon capable of delivering atomic weapons. It is a mobile airbase whose position is not known, capable of retaliating from an unpredictable position. In addition, it is also the most useful ship for limited wars. Because the carrier is so expensive and Britain's budget is limited, the question of constructing carriers at the possible cost of strategic bombers and in preference to conventional ships should be weighed carefully.


The cost of modern armament is becoming a crippling burden. Using as a basis the figure in the "Defence White Paper, 1955" of Great Britain, changes in Army organization which might produce greater efficiency are recommended.


The armed forces of Britain should maintain for its primary task of preventing or fighting a major war are: (1) an atomic striking force of long-range bombers which should be replaced, eventually, by missiles; and (2) an effective air defense system. In addition, because of the threat of subversive communist influence in Western Europe, Britain should maintain small numbers of lightly equipped ground forces as part of NATO ground forces.


Adequate defense measures against immediate submarine attacks and raiding by enemy cruisers have been grossly neglected in the present British defense program. An annual program should be initiated of at least four cruisers, ten destroyers, and twenty frigates together with a large Air Force including aircraft carriers under naval control.

Report on the British parliamentary debates (on use and effects of atomic weapons) which were touched off by the Government's decision to produce hydrogen bombs and by the recently published STATEMENT ON DEFENCE, 1955. It is clear from the White Paper that the Government has not yet decided what to do for home defense against thermonuclear attack. Contrary opinions were expressed in regard to use of nuclear weapons and employment of H-bombs by the British Armed Forces. The Medical Research Council will prepare report on the medical and biological aspects of nuclear energy.


The moral and practical problems posed in Gt. Britain by the recent official decision to manufacture the H-bomb and base British strategy on its deterrent possibility; and the vague and controversial statements made by military and political leaders concerning the new policy. The H-bomb offers a dubious protection to Western Europe and is only a temporary expedient. The efforts of the British Government should be directed toward reaching a political agreement and subsequent disarmament.

MR. MACMILLAN'S TASK, by Air Marshal Robert Saundby, in Aeroplane, v. 87, no. 2261 (19 Nov 54) 728-729.

The responsibilities of the new British Minister of Defense for evolving a new pattern of defense for Gt. Britain. The time has come to put first things first and to scrap or abandon obsolete weapons and units without regard for tradition and sentiment. The overriding need is for adequate air power, both as a deterrent and for fighting purposes if war should come. Next in importance are a Navy trained and equipped for its new and limited role of protecting shipping - and a new model Army able to play its part in NATO and in the defense of British territories overseas.

A NEW ORDER OF PRIORITIES, in Economist, (26 Feb 55) 723-724 plus.

These comments on the Defense White Paper relate to the strategy: to prepare for a fantastically destructive war of very short duration as the best means of ensuring that it will not happen; and to be prepared to fight peripheral limited wars over the next five or ten years until a new atomic situation emerges (e.g. the advent of a ballistic rocket). To meet this strategy Britain must establish a strict adherence to the order of priorities on the weapons to be chosen for the forces in order to obtain maximum security out of the resources available in Britain. It will be a costly matter, but Britain is a world power and she cannot avoid her responsibilities. Building a deterrent to a nuclear war is far better than fighting a conventional one.
ORGANIZATION FOR MODERN WAR, by Air Marshal Robert Saundby, in Aeroplane, v. 89, no. 2317 (16 Dec 55) 935-936.

A review and discussion of some points raised by Lord Montgomery on the nature of a future global war, the steps which Great Britain ought to take to prepare herself, and the organization needed for war in modern times. Questions on the advisability of placing the British Bomber Command under the US Strategic Air Command stem from the fear that in the complete absence (at present) of cooperation between these two groups, the striking power of US SAC might not be allocated to the destruction of those targets which are threatening the national existence of Great Britain.

THE PRICE OF LIBERTY IS ETERNAL VIGILANCE, by Lt. Col. P. M. Bennett, in Royal Engineers Journal, v. 69, no. 1 (Mar 55) 51-68.

The present armored and highly mechanized British Army is not suited to atomic warfare nor to the existing state of cold war. The type of army required is an army composed of lightly equipped, mobile, small divisions. These divisions should be air transportable and part of them should be airborne. In the existing state of cold war it is an obvious requirement that an adequate home-based strategic reserve be formed as soon as possible; and the Army must increase its influence on the development, procurement, and operational control of transport aircraft.


Broad discussion of British defense needs and the 1955 Parliamentary defense debate. The dual problem of providing nuclear weapons and air forces capable of delivering them as a deterrent against global war and at the same time providing conventional forces and weapons capable of dealing with local Commonwealth defense. The need for much wider understanding of the hydrogen bomb; and controversy in regard to use of aircraft carriers in main air offensives.

POLICY FOR DEFENCE, in Air Pictorial, v. 18, no. 4 (April 56) 109.

Problems facing the British Government in formulating a policy for defense and the type of war the nation should prepare for - atomic or conventional.

R. A. F. EQUIPMENT PLANS, by Derek E. Woodé, in Interavia, v. 9, no. 9 (54) 592.

The re-equipment and long-term development programs of British military aviation. Great Britain's air strategy is based on a small, self-contained strategic air force capable of carrying a future war back to the enemy. The types of planes now available for both bombing and interceptor missions.

Reduction in strength of the Antiaircraft Command of the British Territorial Army to a quarter of the present number of units. The reduction was made because the evolution of nuclear weapons has taken place far more quickly than expected and the type of attack which AA Command was designed to meet is no longer a major threat to the majority of targets in the UK. The reorganized AA units will perform fewer duties such as: the protection of field units from low-flying aircraft, the defense of vulnerable points from precision bombing, and the security of vital "brain centers."


An attempt to uncover the basic pattern of air war. The probability of a world conflict is briefly examined and the dangers inherent in the existing attitude of the British Armed Services are mentioned. Tactical problems are then discussed against the background of strategy and logistics.


The progress in electronics and nuclear physics has ended military strategy as the world has known it, and it ended conventional air defense, vast movements of armies, and battles at sea. These facts were underlined in the British White Paper released by the Government in 1953. The document on Britain's defense and preparedness took a sober look at the national requirements in the era of hydrogen bombs and spelled out in overall terms their effects on the strategy and tactics of the British Army, Air Force, and Navy. Some of the changes that were forecast in the White Paper are reviewed.

UNITED KINGDOM'S DEFENCE EFFORT, in An Cosantoir, v. 16, no. 4 (April 56) 163-170.

Shaping the British Army, Navy and Air Force to fit the requirements of the nuclear age.


To meet the needs of changed world conditions, Great Britain requires a small, highly disciplined, highly trained, fully equipped, war-strength professional regular army, stationed partly in Germany and being partly available as air transportable formations within easy reach of Western Europe. This Army must be ready for instant action, and must have
its reserves of equipment, ammunition, and men within immediate reach. It must be ready to fight at any time with what it has with it, and without relying on mobilization, reinforcement, or immediate supply. The air transportable formations will constitute the strategic reserves in the hands of the Supreme Commander in Western Europe. Great Britain also needs: an air transport logistic corps—using helicopters and conventional aircraft—to supply this Regular Army and enable to operate from dispersed bases at considerable distance from the battle area; a Civil Defense Army, under military discipline, with military training, well as Civil Defense training, in the United Kingdom; and a Colonial Service Army for peripheral wars—trained and equipped on conventional lines with conventional weapons. This could be partially a National Service Army with regular officers, partially an Army recruited in colonial territories, and the Gurkha Brigade.

2. Doctrines and Capabilities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force


The changes that will take place in the British Territorial Army in order to achieve skillful and accurate application of nuclear weapons and the speed in concentration and dispersal of troops necessitated by nuclear warfare. The qualities needed by leaders at all echelons; the replacement of vehicles with helicopters for transportation purposes; and training of infantrymen in use of the new FN rifle as a single-shot rifle. Capabilities of the new rifle.

THE BRITISH ARMY, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., Command and General Staff College, 2d. 12 p. (702/5.)

Organization and direction of the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom, with particular stress on the Army.

BRITISH TANK POLICIES, by Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, in Armor, v. 64, no. 1 (Jan-Feb 55) 24-28.

History of British tank policy which until recently was based on two separate categories of tanks and tank units: heavy, slow assault tanks—infantry tanks—used in conjunction with the infantry, and faster, light and medium tanks—the so-called cruiser tanks—used with or in place of cavalry. Both categories neglected the principal characteristic of the tank—its armament—and failed to recognise that the role of the tank is basically the same in all types of ground units. The present British system has a single category of armored units equipped primarily with the medium-gun Centurion backed by more powerful heavy gun tanks, intended primarily for combating hostile armor.

The British Navy is preparing itself to form "battle groups" consisting of an aircraft carrier, a cruiser, and a squadron of destroyers, where the carrier's aircraft should act as a "single strategic weapon". The role of carriers in defense and offense, in combating enemy submarines and submarine bases, and in attacking the enemy's homeland.

THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS AND BRITISH EMPIRE AND THEIR ARMED FORCES.

Composition and organization of the Commonwealth of Nations and the British Empire, and their war potential. Political Government; manpower resources; strategical problems; military liaison among the Commonwealth nations; and a list of nations which constitute component parts of the British Empire.

THE COST OF DEFENCE, by Air Marshal Robert Saundby, in Aeroplane, v. 90, no. 2322 (20 Jan 56) 82-83.

Insight into the management problems within the British Armed Forces. Despite very large monetary outlays, the British Armed Forces are in very bad "shape", largely due to inefficiency, overlapping jurisdictions of various agencies and ministries, and lack of a streamlined organization.

FIRST THINGS FIRST, in Forces Magazine, (Sept 55) 18-19.

The job of the infantry is the most important one in war, and in the final analysis all supporting weapons are only instruments which enable the infantry to do its business. The British Infantry should be increased rather than decreased.

GIVE THEM THE SHIPS, by Adm. Gerald Dickens, in Navy, v. 61, no. 1 (Jan 56) 2-4.

An appeal to expand the British Navy and to place more ships on active duty. Such action would (1) restore the falling prestige of Great Britain, (2) strengthen NATO, and (3) give the highest standard of seamanship to the officers and men of the reserve units. Table comparing the strength of US, USSR, and UK navies.


British and American views on the primary function of the heavy
carrier differ because of the different basis on which their two navies are being trained. British carriers must be fast enough to operate at the utmost speed in conjunction with modern jet fighters, fighter bombers, and anti-submarine aircraft for actions between surface ships, to provide air support for troops during amphibious operations, and to locate and destroy submarines and long-range bombers attacking British trade. The US Navy, on the other hand, is being trained to fight a land power from air-sea bases, to attack inland targets with large, heavy, and medium range bombers (thus reinforcing strategic bombing by long-range shore based aircraft), and to land troops by helicopter and aircraft. For the US, safe communications make it possible for the Navy to fight from air-sea bases and also ensure ultimate victory by safeguarding reinforcements and supplies from across the Atlantic to Europe. Were the Royal Navy to ask for 60,000 ton carriers such as the US Navy is building, there would be some justification for the current controversy on the value of the heavy carrier, because ships of 60,000 tons are sufficiently valuable to offer tempting targets for guided nuclear missiles. However, since the British are leaving strategic bombing to the Royal Air Force, it seems preferable from an operational point of view to have three carriers of about 20,000 tons - rather than one three times the size - to provide for a given number of aircraft.


If the Allied land forces are to defeat the enemy in any future war, their mobility must be increased and be made superior to that of the communist armies. The possible application of helicopters in military operations; and basic organization and types of helicopters to be developed by Great Britain if helicopters are to become an integral part of the British Army's transportation system. Until British medium or heavy types are available, permission must be sought to build in Great Britain, under licence, the best of the American models.


Arguments for a centralised British air power. Conclusion that decentralization would result in expensive duplication of effort and would frustrate that concentration of force at the decisive time and place which is the key to the successful use of air power.


It was already obvious by the end of World War II that the effort in manpower and road transport required for the administrative support of the British land forces had reached a disproportionate level, which could lead only to eventual stagnation. The advent of atomic and hydrogen weapons has greatly aggravated the problem. Land and sea communications are critically vulnerable to these new weapons. A recent pronouncement by the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff expressed the conviction, that the solution to the Army's supply problems in war lies very largely in the extended use of air transport. How Britain can provide itself with sufficient transport for military needs in peace and war, through the use of British civil air resources, and the problems that must be overcome in manpower and aircraft if Britain is to obtain an efficient air transport reserve.

THE NAVY AND THE ATOM AGE JIGSAW, by Donald Barry, in the Navy, v. 61, no. 5 (May 56) 105-106 plus.

The role of the Navy (Britain) is unchanged and as vital in the age of thermo-nuclear weapons. Many post-war achievements have been incorporated into the Navy to make it an important arm in modern warfare. These achievements are in the fields of jet aircraft, aircraft carriers, and guided weapons. This year the British Navy is the only Service which has been voted more money than last year. With charts on: ships launched in FY ending 31 Mar 56; strength of the Royal Navy; and ships accepted into H. M. Service during this FY.


Suggestions for streamlining the British Army regiment to fit it for atomic warfare: (1) the six-gun field regiment with its own light antiaircraft artillery should be adopted; (2) there should be a medium regiment, with its own light antiaircraft artillery, as part of every infantry and armored divisional artillery; and (3) light corps antiaircraft artillery should be reduced to one regiment for every corps. Advantages to be derived from these suggestions.


Arguments favoring separation of antiaircraft artillery from the British Army regiment in preparation for the future employment of guided missiles.


In spite of the introduction of nuclear weapons and the emphasis on civil defense in all its forms, the role of Britain's Territorial Army is expected to remain basically unchanged. Adjustments will undoubtedly have to be made to tactics and to equipment when the results of exercises now being carried out in the Regular Army are complete. Formation and unit training can be confidently expected to continue on normal lines for some time to come. The civil defense role of the Territorial Army will be subsidiary. There will be three echelons or groups in civil defense, two of which concern the Reserve Army. The third echelon consists of field formations of the Territorial Army which may be called upon on short notice to reinforce the Mobile Defense battalions.
"TANKS CAN'T CLIMB THAT" in Soldier, v. 11, no. 1 (June 55) 12-14.

In a recent desert exercise with the new Libyan Army, the Centurion tanks of 14/20th King's Hussars of the British Army reached the top of the Garian Jebel, the 2200-ft. plateau, eighty miles south of Tripoli, along one of the steepest and most twisting roads in Libya. General Rommel once said that it was impossible for tanks to climb the Jebel. The exercise was conducted to train the Libyan Infantry in offensive tactics with tank and artillery support. It was the first time that the British-trained Libyan Army participated in large-scale exercise with British troops. Photo of the Garian Road to the Jebel.


The phrase "maritime power" is replacing "naval power" because control of the sea today implies air control over the sea. This makes the aircraft carrier of first importance. The carrier strength of the British Navy, and characteristics of the ships and equipment.


Modern arms, planes, and ships are almost wholly lacking in Britain. Plans to build H-bombs, rebuild the air and sea fleets, and bring defense up to date have been initiated, but they are a long way from realization. American air and naval strength are the real protectors of Britain today. These weaknesses were revealed recently in British Government reports which were made public. Some of the data revealed, and the reasons why now and for some years to come there will be no effective defense in Britain except that provided by US.
F. West Germany

1. Military and Foreign Policy


Analytical review of the causes for the disappearance of the former strong foundations of the German military system, the warrior caste of leaders, and the soldierly citizenry. Despite these changed conditions the men entrusted with the organization of the new German armed service are confident that they will be able to recruit the necessary numbers of soldiers. They realize, of course, that the German forces of the future will be quite different from those that fought in the two World Wars.


A strictly German strategy, based on defense along her border and proposed by some German writers, cannot safeguard West Germany's security. The new German Army must rather participate in the overall NATO strategy, based on forces capable of both offensive and defensive missions.


The three branches (Army, Navy, and Air Force) of Germany's new Armed Forces are not to be subordinated to one another as in the past; instead modern warfare and the example set by the US and Great Britain require them to be coordinated and integrated. Officers must not only be specialists in their particular branch of service but they should also be familiar with the tactical employment, capabilities, and limitations of the other branches.

2. Military Contributions to Allied Strength


Basic features of the carefully prepared, long-range program for the rearmament of Germany which will require at least four years to be put into operation. The atomic-age Army will total 380,000, of which 150,000 will be
organized in twelve combat divisions and assigned to NATO. The remaining 230,000 will be responsible for basic training of recruits. The Air Force will be tactical, will be composed of 1,300 airplanes and 85,000 men, and will be designed to operate with ground troops. The Navy will be small and designed largely for coast defense.


The political and military reasons why Western Chiefs are compelled to look to Western Germany for manpower regardless of France's wishes on the subject. The Rhine is the center of the ideological struggle between the West and Soviet imperialism. The fate of the world may be decided there - not in Hanoi. France's national weakness and her fear of a revival of German militarism cannot be allowed to stand in the way of establishing a bulwark against communist aggression.

THE FUTURE AIR FORCE OF WESTERN GERMANY. Die zukunftige luftwaffe Westdeutschlands, in Allgemeine Schweizerische Militarzeitschrift, v. 122, no. 9 (Sept 55) 702-703. In German.

The principal mission of West Germany's future Air Force will be to support the ground forces. As presently planned, the Air Force will comprise: eight fighter wings with seventy-five aircraft each; two all-weather fighter wings with thirty-six aircraft each; six fighter-bomber wings with seventy-five aircraft each; and two air transport wings with forty-eight aircraft each; and two reconnaissance wings with fifty-four aircraft each. Total strength: about 100,000 men with 1,526 aircraft. Types of aircraft to be used.

GERMAN ARMY IS A LONG WAY OFF, in U.S. News and World Report, v. 34, no. 11 (9 Sept 55) 42-43.

The timetable for building a German Army which by 1960 should have the following strength: six armored divisions; six mechanized infantry divisions; three airborne brigades; twenty air wings; 1,326 combat planes; 180 naval ships; 370,000 men in the Army; 70,000 men in the Air Force; and 20,000 men in the Navy.


The rapid economic recovery of Western Germany; the building-up of democratic, NATO-controlled German Army; and dangers implicit in this Army. The ability of German officers to subdue their wills permanently to civilians; the ability of the Bonn Government to maintain authority and leadership over the Army; the Nazi underground movement; German nationalism; and unity with Eastern Germany, an area in
which Western Germany may decide to make its own deal with the USSR. The German Army is necessary for the security of the Western world, but the US must take the necessary precautions.


Good communication begins with having something to say. The American "campaign of truth," beamed to communist-controlled areas, has limited appeal to the victims of Soviet power, even though American psychologists offer their reaction analyses, associational correlations and other devices as proof that the broadcasts are a success. There is need for greater positive content in American propaganda based on positive US policy regarding nations now governed by the communists. The US should work out with exile and expelled friends the provisional solutions to Central and Eastern European problems which seem fairest to all concerned, and then attempt to secure maximum support for this program. Shows how (1) disunity of anti-communist forces and (2) conflicts among these exiles as to what factors and what time constitute the correct methods of liberation and selfdetermination, affect the American propaganda effort and place it in a position where the "campaign of truth" is often neither coherent nor consistent and not in accord with the interests of US.

The man behind Germany's new Army, by Frederic Sonneborn, Jr., in Reader's Digest, v. 66, no. 393 (Jan 55) 51-55.

A portrait of Theodor Blank, the Special Commissioner for Military Affairs of the German Federal Republic. The twelve divisions of the West German Army, which will make up one fourth of NATO's standing troops on the Continent, will be trained and indoctrinated according to the democratic ideas of Theodor Blank and by the German officers he has selected with care to make sure that militarism is not revived in Germany.

NATO and the new German Army, by Gordon A. Craig. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University, Center of International Studies, 55. 30 p. (Memorandum No.8.)

The military strength and democratic character planned for the new German Army; criticism of the plans within Germany, particularly in regard to legislation for parliamentary control of the Army; and difficulties expected in fitting the German Army into the NATO structure. The successful integration of German forces into NATO will depend, above all, on the confidence which the Germans have in NATO strategy. This confidence has gradually deteriorated and may result in discussions on strategy with the Germans and fundamental changes in NATO strategy.

The mission of a German Navy within the framework of NATO, and the defense of Western Europe, especially the defense of the North and of the Baltic Sea. Mission and strategy determine its necessary composition. In war time it must protect the German merchant marine, in peace represent Germany in the world, and support the German deep-sea fishing fleet and other interests. It must be developed out of an understanding for the world-wide problems of a sea power.

THE NEW GERMAN LUFTWAFFE, by William Courtemay, in Flying, v. 56, no. 3 (Mar 55) 14-15 plus.

Western Germany’s new Air Force, which will have no strategic air arm, will comprise 80,000 men and approximately 1,400 aircraft. There are to be sixty squadrons divided into twenty groups, namely: two transport groups of three squadrons each; two all-weather fighter groups of three squadrons each; two tactical reconnaissance groups of three squadrons each; and the remainder of the aircraft divided into interceptor fighters and fighter-bombers. Allowing twelve aircraft per squadron, this accounts for thirty-six in each of the two groups or seventy-two for each of the first three types of missions. This gives a total of 216 aircraft to which it would be prudent to add a fifty percent reserve with the squadrons. Thus the total available for immediate squadron use would be 324 aircraft. It leaves over 1,000 planes for interceptor and fighter-bomber roles. Assuming fifty percent are allotted to each, then Western Germany will possess about 500 interceptors and 500 fighter-bombers for close support of armies. Data on proposed organization and training.

THE NEW GERMANY, in An Comptoir, v. 14, no. 11 (Nov 54) 533-544.

The agreements reached at the London Conference, 28 September to 3 October 1954, for ending the occupation of Western Germany, for setting up the new organization to be called the Western European Union, for allowing German entry into NATO, and for strengthening the structure of NATO. The problem of French ratification. The new German Armed Forces; and the contribution which Western Germany will make to the defense of Western Europe. Soviet plans for unification of Germany upon withdrawal of US troops and for eventual conquest of the whole of Europe.


Planning in Bonn for the new German Armed Forces under the leadership of former labor leader Theodor Blank, who is in reality the defense commissioner for the West German Republic. The elimination of the traditional German General Staff; and the establishment of a corps of professional officers attached to the Government to take its place. Strength, composition, and mis-
sion of the new Army, Navy, and Air Force. Limitation placed on the manufacture of Army equipment; recruiting and training, and financing of the new German Armed Forces.

WEST GERMANY, A CANDIDATE FOR MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, by Rear Adm. Howard E. Orms, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 18, no. 5 (May 55) 515-519.

An assessment of West Germany's capabilities to contribute to collective security of the West through her membership in NATO. West Germany's geography, people, housing, industry, agriculture, shipping, fighting ability, and political trends. The assets of West Germany are such that it is important that she be on the side of NATO.


World conditions leading up to the need for an integrated defense system of Western Europe and the rearmament of Germany. What German rearmament of Germany. What German rearmament will mean to Britain and British fighting forces and to European unity.

WHAT SORT OF AN ARMY WILL GERMANY HAVE? by Reginald Paget, in Twentieth Century, v. 157, no. 935 (Jan 55) 8-14.

The probable size of the twelve divisions Western Germany will contribute to NATO, some of the generals who have been selected for posts in the Army, and political issues with the Western Powers and the USSR which may arise from rearming Germany. The presence in Western Germany of soldiers with freedom and dignity will cause wholesale desertions from the Eastern forces to the Army of the West.

WHEN GERMANY IS REARMD, in U.S. News and World Report, v. 37, no. 16 (15 Oct 54) 44 plus.

When Germany is rearmed she will have twelve divisions, an Air Force, a Navy, and a general staff to coordinate command. Arms and equipment for the twelve-division Army are already at hand, most of it waiting in US stockpiles in Europe. The contribution to be made by West Germany to the military strength of Western Alliance; and the manner in which German Armed Forces are to be constituted.


Between the minority of young Germans who will refuse to serve at any price and the minority who would gladly serve, there still re-
 mains the group of many young Germans who will serve in the new national Army under certain conditions which are if: an enemy invades the country; there is a universal-service law; full equality among the national armies prevails; military service is humane; and if certain personal advantages for the soldier accrue from the service. Most Germans will follow orders of the authorities whether they like them or not. The fact that most young Germans will enter their Army without enthusiasm and serve it with watchful distrust may prove to be healthy. An army composed of reluctant men and regarded with skepticism by civilians is unlikely to have much chance of taking over the country, nor is it likely to attempt it.
G. Other NATO and SEATO Countries

1. Military and Foreign Policy


Strategic importance and war potential of Africa in the military organization of the French Union. This organization should comprise airborne troops and a carrier air force under a single command responsible for the security of the French Union. These contingents would be stationed in North Africa and would consist of personnel from all territories of the French Union. Moreover, each territory of the Union or group of territories should have a small local ground force, a light air force to provide tactical mobility and air support to the ground force if necessary, training centers, and strategic bases. The latter should be established with financial aid from France's allies.

AFTER GENEVA: A GREATER TASK FOR NATO, by Lester B. Pearson, in Foreign Affairs, v. 34, no. 1 (Oct 55) 14-23.

The course for NATO to follow in the more conciliatory atmosphere following the Geneva Conference is not to limit or weaken itself but to meet the challenge of reducing danger of war and make military strength unnecessary. It must continue its defense efforts, marshal the non-military as well as the military resources of its members, and develop a stronger bond of unity than common fear.

ALLIANCE FOR PEACE, by Gen. Ismay, in Forces Magazine, (Sept 54) 9-10.

History and purposes of NATO and how it is organised to do its work. The two important features of NATO: that an armed attack against one shall be considered an armed attack against the other, and the agreement of member nations to develop their individual and collective capacity for defense. The concern of member nations for strengthening economic, social, and cultural ties. The composition and organisation of the North Atlantic Council and its mission to provide a useful forum for political consultation and to support and sustain the military.


Analysis of the adequacy of the military aspects of SEACDEFO (South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty Organization), ANZUS (Australia, New
Zealand, and the US), and ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand, and Malaya). Reviews defense functions which ideally require international cooperation, and surveys the existing machinery for cooperation in relation to these standards. Describes current difficulties in achieving full cooperation between the US and the non-communist Asiatic countries as well as increased cooperation within the Commonwealth countries. Suggests certain improvements in the machinery.


Steps leading to the formation of the Allied Forces, Mediterranean Command (AFMED) on 15 March 53. Organization and responsibilities of air and naval forces of France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, UK, and US. All-over strategy, chain of command, and division of responsibilities. Map.


The NATO nations are aware that they must defend themselves together against eventual aggression, and while they have made notable progress in this respect in recent years, they have not yet created the political mechanism which should crown their military organization. They are united to fight a war which may be forced upon them, but they remain divided in making the decisions which might save them from such a war or which they would have to make once it broke out. The Atlantic nations should understand that if it as desirable to coordinate their military preparations to win a war, it would still be better to coordinate their diplomatic and political efforts in order to prevent a war. This is NATO's greatest weakness at the moment.

**ATOMIC ARMY FOR EUROPE**, in U. S. News and World Report, v. 37, no. 25 (17 Dec 54) 32.

Ministers from the fourteen NATO countries are now meeting in Paris to decide whether or not to approve a proposal from their military chiefs to base all of Western Europe's defense plans on the battlefield use of nuclear weapons. The plan calls for a drastic overhaul of NATO's military forces, strategy, tactics, and facilities to meet the requirements of atomic warfare. The paper "battles" studied during development of the plan showed that, in a war with the USSR, the Allied countries would be overrun if neither side used nuclear weapons; but if both sides used nuclear weapons the NATO forces could win.

**ATOMS, STRATEGY AND POLICY**, by Paul H. Nitze, in Foreign Affairs, v. 34, no. 2 (Jan 56) 187-196.

The policy of the Western Powers to deter war or when war comes to
destroy the Soviet Union and its Satellites should be based on a position of nuclear attack - defense superiority. This position can be maintained by the West through its atomic and weapons technology, through proper utilization of the geographic advantages of widely dispersed base systems, and through maintenance of alliances.

AN AUSTRALIAN VIEW OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY, by W. Macmahon Ball, in Far Eastern Survey, v.23, no.11 (Nov 54) 165-168.

Factors which the Australian Government has failed to consider in its efforts to achieve a firm military security agreement with the US for the Southeast Asian area. Rather than overt aggression by China, the real danger in the area is the spread of communism inside whatever defense perimeter the West may draw. It is also evident that the communists have decided to fight the battle for Southeast Asia on the economic, political, and psychological fronts. The security of the West can best be achieved by relating defense planning to economic and political realities - by positive and economic measures to meet Asia's needs.

DEFENSE FORCE IN DISPUTE. Wehrkraft im swiespalt, by Hugo C. Backhaus. Gottingen, Gottinger Verlagsanstalt, 52. 102 p. In German.

A plea for mutual understanding among the Western Powers in General and between France and Germany in particular, as a prerequisite for joint European defense.


The most important benefit which Denmark has derived from NATO is the fact that NATO has accomplished its mission of safeguarding the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of its member nations. Through NATO membership Denmark is able to build up an effective defense system and has gained the goodwill, respect, and friendship of other nations. In addition, economic aid has directly assisted the rehabilitation and expansion of Danish industry. Danish and Norwegian membership enables NATO to cover the very important northern flank of Central European NATO forces.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SHAPE, by Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster, in International Organization, v. 9, No. 2 (May 55) 257-262.

The various factors involved in the establishment and rapid growth and development of SHAPE; and problems, requirements, and deficiencies still in the process of solution. The early organization of headquarters; General Eisenhower's survey trip; the subsequent four-fold increase in quality and
quantity of Europe's fighting forces; formulation of plans for functions of commanders; and procurement of military equipment through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and the American Armed Forces. Recent problems have been concerned with: air power, air fields, logistics, rearmament of Germany, reserve forces, and the problem of working new weapons into patterns of operation.


The present Western defense system is of nebulous character. There could result from it: a disassociation of the alliances, with each of the contracting parties assuming his liberty to act alone and to hasten to his destruction; a regroupment of the peoples of the Western World into at least two associations; or a decisive tightening of the existing bonds transposing to a worldwide scale what it has been possible to realize on the Atlantic level. The defense of Western civilization depends on all free nations agreeing instead of following individually their own particular and divergent interests. To provide rapid and effective intervention at whatever point of the globe this may be necessary would require: (1) an entirely clear, mutual understanding, not only of the interests of each country but also of the various national mentalities; (2) a modus vivendi in the form of a general program; (3) an exact and complete definition of the purposes of a strictly defensive and conservative alliance aiming at peace through general prosperity; (4) common pooling of economic and financial means for ameliorating the living conditions of the least favored elements of the free world; (5) determination and respect of the zones of interest of the principal signatories or the exercise of an influence in common in certain sectors; (6) the defining of a stable strategy of policy accepted by all; (7) preparation and pursuit of a single military strategy on a world scale; (8) close coordination of ground, naval, and air forces permanently stationed in each of the large, essential strategic zones; and (9) the reconstitution of coordinated general reserves through an effort at economy in the utilization of means. (Translated and digested from REVUE GENERALE BELGE - Belgium - 15 Aug 54.)


Delivered by the Secretary of State at the annual meeting of the Associated Press, New York City, 23 April 1956.


In view of the need for some central body to plan and conduct a possible future war for the West on a global basis, it is suggested that the United Kingdom, USA, and France (the only Western countries with world-wide commitments) be selected as the team to nominate representatives to serve on the proposed global authority. Their powers would have to be restricted to meet the wishes of the smaller countries, but such a step would vastly increase the effectiveness of NATO.

Although the West has technical supremacy over the communist bloc - qualitative in almost every field, quantitative mostly in potential only, there is a preponderance of the accessible human potential of the East. The margin of safety of the West could be improved if the relation of the human potentials could also swing in favor of the West. This is attainable if the West can widen and cement the anti-communist camp, remove or at least attenuate some weak points in the exploitation and preparation of its human resources, lower the value of the communist human potential by means of a suitable and consistent policy and propaganda, adopt a bold strategy should war come, and weaken and paralyze the dangerous communist fifth column.

ITALY AND THE ATLANTIC PACT, in Italian Affairs, v.3, no. 4 (July 1954) 401-404. Italy's military contribution and objectives.


Naval Aspects of European Integration, by Anthony E. Sokol, in Military Review, v. 35, no. 3 (June 55) 26-36.

Selected excerpts from French military legislation relating to: (a) organization of French national defense; (b) the status of military and civilian personnel in France's Armed Forces; and (c) administrative aspects.


In French.

Although European military integration in the form of the EDC has failed to materialize, the need for closer cooperation among West European nations is just as urgent as ever. The problem is being recognised and is receiving the attention of statesmen and military leaders. However, while a great deal of interest has been centered on
the unification of continental armies, little consideration has been given to the naval side of the problem. The reasons why there is need for naval forces in the West's defense strategy against the Soviet Union: the political and military problems of naval integration; the strength of the navies of Western Alliance as compared with naval strength of the Soviet Union; and a proposed plan for naval integration that would serve the needs of the Western strategy, and would be militarily effective and politically acceptable. Tables show present Allied and Soviet naval strength; and the distribution of Allied naval units under the proposed integration plan.


The policy of the USSR and the determination of the western nations to resist any new Soviet aggression have been responsible for this treaty of mutual assistance between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. As a result of the participation in NATO of Greece and Turkey the automatic military action clauses of the original draft had to be toned down.

NONMATERIEL STANDARDIZATION, by Maj. Allan E. Younger, in Military Review, v. 34, no. 6 (Sept 54) 59-62.

The need and importance of nonmateriel standardization - which covers all operational staff and logistical procedures and touches on doctrine, organization, and training - among NATO nations in general, and the Armed Forces of the English speaking nations in particular.

OUR REPRESENTATION IN THE ALLIED COMMAND STRUCTURE... Var representasjon i det allierte kommandoapparat, in Ofisersbladet, v. 11, no. 1 (Jan-Feb 55) 28-32. In Norwegian.

Urges more adequate Norwegian representation in NATO commands, especially in the Northern Command which comprises Danish and Norwegian territory.


An analysis of Pakistan's chances to develop into a democracy. Its growing pains during the past 8 years of independence.

POSTSCRIPT TO E. D. C., by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, in Foreign Affairs, v. 33, no. 1 (Oct 54) 17-27.
The communist military offensive in the Far East, the political offensive in the West, and the failure of EDC, have resulted in drastic alterations in the relative strategic positions of the Allied and Soviet blocs. The West is facing a typical Clausewitz-Leninist concept of unified war in which political and military weapons are used interchangeably to divide and destroy the West. In the face of such an unrelenting Communist strategy, evaluates the strength of the Allied political fabric since it was ruptured by EDC's failure; and the means open to the West to contain communism and prevent further aggression while making it unmistakably clear to the communists that the West's desire for peace is not an indication that it will not fight to preserve its freedoms.


To meet the needs of modern total warfare, France's national defense requires: (1) permanent organization of the defense of the national territory under conditions permitting instantaneous transition from the state of peace to the state of war and ensuring at the same time the existence of the population as well as that of the combat force which depends thereon; (2) a permanent combat force, capable of being self-sufficient for a certain length of time, equipped with modern weapons, and stationed in a region favorable to action against armed enemy forces; and (3) close cooperation between civilian and military authorities.

A PROVISIONAL N.A.T.O. PLAN FOR WESTERN EUROPE'S AIR DEFENCE, in Interavia, v. 11, no. 2 (Feb 56) 103-109.

In Oct. 1955, Gen. Grun.ther had reported that "air defense was the weak spot in the Allied system, adding that the main reason for the inadequacy of this vital warning and interception instrument was its 'archaic' command system." In Dec. 1955, the Atlantic Council approved a system of "coordination" for the air defenses of NATO countries. Description of the system, which represents merely a first step in a process of evolution that must be slow, since national susceptibilities must be considered. The idea is to group the various national resources into regional organizations and then to unite the latter. Maps, photographs.


The way high officials and people in countries of the West are reacting to the glad-hand tactics of Russia's communist rulers is spreading black gloom among military planners who are responsible for defending Western Europe. Reviewed are the cuts in military budgets and reductions in troop commitments in NATO countries and the effect these developments will have on the strength and defense capabilities of the West especially since Russia is modernizing her forces as rapidly as she can.

The Indochinese War suggests general reflections on the grand strategy of the Western Powers. The principal of these reflections is that the atomic bomb reduces the risk of war. Therefore the high level policy of the West should be to avoid war and to await the development of disagreement in the enemy camp (between Russia and Communist China). On the other hand, the atomic bomb increases the risk of local conflicts in regions where the Western Powers still hold key positions. To survive, the latter must win such conflicts quickly, utilizing their scientific and technical superiority. If France wants to maintain her position among the great powers and preserve the French Union, she must not only possess the new weapons but must also adapt her army to their use. Above all, France must possess a modern offensive air force.


How the decrees on the reorganization of French national defense, published 1 February 1955, affect the French Navy; mission of the Navy and its strategic field of action; the aircraft carrier as the most important unit of the fleet; and listing and characteristics of the various categories of ships in the French Navy as of 1 January 1955.


The position of Canada's Minister of Defense within the nation's central organization for defense, and the evolutionary action taken by the Canadian Government in the amalgamation of the three Services.

THE SHIELD, in Time, v. 67, no. 6 (6 Feb 56) 24-31.

Profile and service record of General Alfred Maximilian Grunenthal; and his outstanding achievements as NATO's Supreme Commander in Europe. More particularly, the new defense strategy he developed, based on use of atomic weapons as a result of the unwillingness of member nations to supply more troops. The old strategy considered use of artillery and airplanes for ground support. The new strategy reverses this concept; the troops support an atomic strike.

The reconstruction and reorganization of the Danish Armed Forces under NATO leadership, and problems connected with the expansion. Establishment of a Ministry of Defense and an independent Air Force. Plans for: a field Army of 75,000 men divided into eleven brigades; a local defense Army of 25,000 and a Home Guard of 40,000. Problems connected with extension of military service to eighteen months, with Danish occupation of the German province of Schleswig-Holstein, and with the defense of Denmark's adjacent southern province. Agreement with the US for defense of Greenland and construction of bases there. NATO base construction in Denmark; and Denmark's refusal to permit foreign personnel on the bases in peacetime.

THE SUPREME COMMANDER SURVEYS THE SITUATION, by Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, in Forces Magazine (June 55) 6-12.

The development of SHAPE; the rapid build-up of Europe's military potential; and assessment of the military situation in Western Europe. The need for the German Armed Forces in order to resist all-out aggression; and development of NATO defense plans based on the German contribution. Evaluation of the Soviet war potential; the American responsibility for leadership; and the need for unity, wisdom, and perseverance to keep the Western alliance together.


Full text of an address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles at the annual luncheon of the Associated Press in New York, 23 April 1956, as released by the State Department.


The influence an atomic enemy attack might exert upon France's Armed Forces, and the organizational measures France must take for effective defense, provided atomic weapons will be made available to her. Emphasis is placed on the development of a strategic atomic air force, light all-weather aircraft for air defense, transport aircraft, atomic artillery, and a guerrilla army, with secondary roles assigned to conventional ground forces, field artillery, armor, and the Navy.

THE 'TOTALITY' OF NATO, in Life, v. 40, no. 19 (7 May 56) 40.

The new Soviet look, which has all but banished the fear of war from Europe, is doing more to undermine the NATO military alliance than Stalinism ever did. Though a military alliance, NATO's charter also contains in Article II an invitation for closer political and economic ties among the member nations. However, Article V, the military defense pact, is the heart and chief purpose of NATO, if not its "totality."

Report of a visit to NATO, SHAPE, and USAFE headquarters; and the accomplishments and principal problems of each. The value of NATO has not necessarily been its physical strength, but the fact that it represents a line drawn across Europe which the Soviets have been warned not to cross. NATO and Western defenses should be reexamined in light of Soviet possession of nuclear power.


The postwar years of Europe are divided into three phases: (1) the short period of optimism, (2) a longer phase of pessimism, and (3) the critical period when Western Europe could negotiate from strength. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Danish Defense Staff, reviews the politico-military developments during those three phases vis-a-vis Soviet political intentions and military capabilities.


Reasons why Denmark would gain nothing by reverting to a policy of neutrality or by seeking peace at any price as a result of the advance of nuclear weapons. Reasons why she must contribute, through NATO, to the upkeep of military forces which will deter the enemy. Why the possibility of nuclear bombing of Danish cities in a future war would be slight.


The objectives of Canada's defense policy; Canada's Armed Forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and their relation to NATO; the Canadian Mutual Aid Program; the manpower position in Canada; and the natural resources of Canada as one of the principal sources of the strategic raw materials used in the defensive equipment of all NATO countries.


Functions of mixed (civilian and military) General Staffs set up in France by decree of 29 September 1950, at the national, regional, and departmental levels to assure: (1) the organization of interior defense in peacetime, and (2) close cooperation between civilian and military authorities in wartime.
2. Doctrines and Capabilities of the Armed Forces


Arguments in support of the conclusion that with tactical air forces and tactical guided missiles equipped with atomic warheads, the Western Powers should be in a position to repel successfully any attack by superior enemy ground forces.


Recognizing the merits of armor as "the combat arm of decision," the Armed Forces of the Philippines activated the Armored School at Fort Wm. McKinley, Rizal.

**AVIATION FOR CANADA'S ARMY,** by Victor Koby, in Canadian Aviation, v. 29, no. 5 (May 56) 27-30.

"Canada's Army seeks aviation not as an offensive weapon but as a method of transportation to immediately increase its effectiveness as a mobile striking force. In Korea, Malaya, Kenya, and now French North Africa air components of U.S., British and French armies have proven the economy and efficiency of army aviation. The Soviet Army has a massive air branch. Canada's Army has only jeeps and trucks to provide mobility in an air age."

**BELGIAN PREPAREDNESS,** in AuCosainoir, v. 16, no. 1 (Jan 56) 14-17.

Description and military evolution of the Belgian Armed Forces, geography of the area, and her defensive preparations within the framework of NATO. The Belgian Army has two divisions at combat strength and one reserve division that could be mobilized almost immediately. Her Air Force of 20,000 men plans to maintain four defense and three tactical wings.

**BELGIUM.** Belgien, in Flugwahr und -Technik, v. 17, no. 6 (June 55) 140. In German.

The Belgian Air Force is being re-organized. The proposed increase in the existing six flying regiments has been abandoned. Three of these regiments will be used for the tactical support of ground troops; the other three for day- and night-fighter missions. The existing reconnaissance wing will continue in its present form. The same applies to the transportation wing, except that this wing will be reduced from forty aircraft of type C-119 to twenty-two airplanes.

Current trends in global air logistics, with emphasis on the Canadian Air Force's needs and advantages of a fleet of new long-range troop and cargo transports to aid ground forces and keep overseas air bases supplied by air quickly and safe from the submarine menace. Photographs.

CANADIAN AIR POWER, in Canadian Aviation, v. 28, no. 6 (June 55) 53-80.

Review of Canada's air defense organization and the mission of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in defense of Canada and in her role in NATO. Also training and training organizations geared to this defense concept.


An evaluation as General Lauris Norstad is taking command of Western Defense and NATO.

THE CASE FOR NAVAL AIR POWER, by B. J. Hurren, in Aircraft, Australia v. 32, no. 11 (Aug 54) 18-23 plus.

The modern aircraft carrier can wage antisubmarine warfare better than any other existing means. This is especially true for the Australian vicinity and the vast areas of the Pacific. Examples from World War II showing the superior mobility and effectiveness of carrier-based planes over those operating from land bases. Russia's naval manpower has increased from 600,000 in 1951 to 750,000, and she now has 350 submarines compared to 215 at the end of World War II. Only an Anglo-US fleet composed chiefly of aircraft carriers can counter this threat.


Economic difficulties and political opposition have forced the Danish Government to reduce its 1955/56 budget for defense. Denmark will not be able to fulfill the agreements made with NATO. The Danish defense budget has tripled since 1949/50 in addition to the 125,000 tons of material which have been received as military aid from the US.
DELAYS IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION--WEAKNESSES IN AIR DEFENSE, in 
Intervia, v. 11, no. 2 (Feb 56) 95-102.
An analysis of available data on the extent of integration of the 
aircraft industries of NATO countries, and the latest trends in Western 
Germany. With the exception of Germany (the period of Germany's integration 
began only recently and it is too early to assess its accomplishments) and 
Italy, the integration is badly lagging and it constitutes a basic weakness 
in the NATO air defenses. Photographs.

FIRST BLUEPRINT FOR ATOMIC WAR, In U. S. News and World Report, v. 38, 
No. 8 (25 Feb 55) 24-26 plus.
The new concept of Allied tactics in Europe. Under this concept, 
NATO forces will meet a Russian attack by using combined ground-air 
operations on the threshold of East Europe and seize the initiative with 
atomic firepower. The old concept of retreating behind the Rhine, then 
fighting back, is out. If the Russians choose war, their armies will be 
bolted at the Iron Curtain. NATO's war plans; availability of manpower, 
planes, guns, and missiles to support the new strategy and tactics; and 
how manpower and weapons are to be used in case of a Russian attack.

FOUNDATION FOR AIR POWER, By Group Capt. H. R. Footit, in Aircraft, 
Canada, v. 17, no. 5 (May 55) 12-14; plus.
Winston Churchill's statement, "The mistakes of years cannot be 
remedied in hours." is also applicable to research and development. The 
research and development foundation for air power must be carefully planned 
and carried out. It cannot be continually remolded by see-saw changes in 
basic policy. Ten years may elapse before the real results or the lack of 
them begin to show in the state of a nation's air power. Describes the 
price paid by Canada, USA, and Great Britain in the past because their 
research and development policies were inconsistent, or because the 
decisions made, seriously delayed the progress of aeronautical research; and 
outlines the fundamental requirements for sound planning in research and 
development for air power.

THE FRENCH ARMED FORCES, Port Leavenworth, Kans., Command and General 
Staff College, 55. Various paging. (809/5.)
Organization and direction of the Armed Forces, basic concept 
of the French organization, administrative and military partitioning of 
France, composition of the Army, and comparison between the US and French 
army and services.
SUMMARY OF A SPEECH BY THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE, ON THE IMPORTANCE OF AIR SUPERIORITY TO THE WESTERN POWERS. THE GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE WILL CONSIST OF TWELVE DIVISIONS, ABOUT 1,300 AIRCRAFT, AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF NAVAL CRAFT FOR COASTAL MISSIONS. GERMAN AIR POWER WILL NOT BEGIN TO MATERIALIZE EFFECTIVELY FOR ABOUT THREE YEARS.


WESTERN EUROPE'S DEFENSES AFTER FOUR YEARS OF BUILD-UP AT A COST OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS ARE SHAKY NOW AND ARE FACING AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE. THE WEST IS STILL THREE OR FOUR YEARS AWAY FROM BALANCING THE RED POWER. THE REAL DANGER LIES IN THE KREMLIN'S "SMILING CAMPAIGN" WHICH MAY LULL THE WEST INTO RELAXING.

THE HELICOPTER AND THE ARMY. L'HELICOPTERE ET L'ARMEE, BY GEN. BLANC, IN L'AIR, V. 36, NO. 696 (APR 55) 16. IN FRENCH.

THE FRENCH ARMY SHOULD POSSESS HELICOPTERS OF ITS OWN FOR THE FOLLOWING MISSIONS: (1) EVACUATION OF WOUNDED FROM AREAS LACKING RUNWAYS; (2) TRANSPORTATION OF SUPPLIES (RATIONS AND AMMUNITION) TO ISOLATED UNITS; (3) TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONNEL (ISOLATED COMBATANTS AND COMMANDOS); (4) COMMAND LIASON; (5) ASSISTANCE TO THE ENGINEER AND SIGNAL CORPS (TRANSPORTATION OF LOADS, LAYING SIGNAL CABLES, INSTALLATION OF RADIO RELAY IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN); (6) GUIDANCE OF RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS OF ARMORED UNITS; (7) OBSERVATION, AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY, AND ARTILLERY FIRE CONTROL; AND (8) SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF HIGHWAY TRAFFIC.

HOW MUCH DOES OUR DEFENSE COST? HVA KOSTER FÖRsvaret? BY ERIK HANLÉ, IN NORSK Luftmilitært Tidsskrift, V. 6, NO. 4 (MAY 55) 115-120 PLUS, NO. 5 (JUNE 55) 143-152. IN NORVEGIAN.

ANALYSIS OF THE NORWEIGAN DEFENSE BUDGET SINCE 1951 AND ITS RELATION TO AND EFFECT ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY OF NORWAY.

IS AVIATION ABOUT TO SUPPLANT THE TWO OTHER ARMED FORCES? STA L'AERONAUTICA PER SOPPIANTARE LE ALTRE FORZE ARMATE? BY BRUNO LUCINI, IN RIVISTA AERONAUTICA, V. 30, NO. 12 (DEC 54) 1309-1317. IN ITALIAN.

THE LIMITATIONS OF N.A.T.O. STRATEGY, by S/L D. R. Morgan, in
Hawk, no. 16 (Dec 54) 35-38.

NATO is basically a military alliance. It will stand or fall
according to its ability to defend its members against external attack
by armed forces. Examines the extent to which its strategy meets the
requirements. The strategic area within NATO's defense framework, the
strength of the potential enemy; aims of NATO strategy; and the basic
defense policy of NATO. NATO aims have been achieved in part. How-
ever, it is unavoidably defensive in nature and regional in concept.
It has not rallied to its side all those forces in Europe that are
essential to its security, nor has it developed sufficient strength in the
air, the only element from which it can attack decisively if called
upon to do so.

LITTLE GIANT IN THE NORTH, by Lt. Col. Clarke Newlon, in Pagusus, v. 23,
no. 5 (Nov 54) 1-2.

The effective and growing military machine which has been created
in Norway during the past five years with help from the US and other NATO
allies. The combined land and sea program comprises a highly trained, mobile
force of 270,000 men, including a home guard of 110,000. Major attention is
paid to the Air Force which will soon have in combat readiness eight jet
fighter squadrons, one transport squadron, one photo reconnaissance wing, and
one sea patrol wing. Most of the main air bases are already operational, and
a separate Task Force North Norway has been organized with its own ground,
sea, and air forces.

A LOOK THROUGH A WINDOW AT WORLD WAR III, by Field Marshal Montgomery, in

The strategy and organization which the NATO nations must prepare
to win a future war against the East. The dominant factor in the next war
will be air power, and command of the air weapon must be centralized on the
highest level. The day of the large warship on the surface of the sea is
over because of the range and weapons of modern aircraft. The Western Powers
require: (1) bigger air forces; (2) smaller and more immediately-ready armies
with great strategical and tactical mobility; (3) smaller navies; and (4) organi-
sation of the fighting services based on more atomic power and less manpower.

NATO, in Air Intelligence Training Bulletin, v. 6, no. 10 (Oct 54)
2-69.

The entire issue is devoted to the history and present functioning
of NATO, the military strength of the member nations and of the USSR,
and various political, economic, and military aspects of all of the
NATO nations except the US. The troop strength of the NATO forces is
approximately 3,100,000 men, and the 5,800 aircraft include 2,400 fighter
and fighter-bomber jets. Improvements in the quality and efficiency of
the USSR Armed Forces and their equipment: there are 4,750,000 men
under arms, the Soviet Army numbers 175 divisions, and the Red Air Force
has about 20,000 aircraft of all types including 9,000 jet fighters.

Last June, more than 2,500 jet combat planes of eleven allied nations participated in EXERCISE CARTE BLANCHE. Guided missiles of the USAF, simulated by jet trainers, homed onto air-field targets. More than 300 theoretical atom bombs were exploded. The Exercise was a convincing demonstration that the NATO nations have developed an effective, deterrent, tactical air arm capable of resisting atomic attack, launching its own attack, and holding until external strike forces can be brought into battle. Purpose of CARTE BLANCHE: units participating; some of the tactics employed; and some of the lessons learned.


Security of sea-routes as the essential basis of NATO defense; and organization of NATO for the accomplishment of this mission. The Atlantic area from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer is under the control of the Supreme Commander Atlantic. The waters of the British Channel and Southern North Sea have been placed under the Channel Command which is controlled by the Channel Committee, composed of naval representatives of Britain, France, Holland, and Belgium. The Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean, under the Supreme Commander, Europe, has the responsibility of coordinating the many and varied sea and air activities in the Mediterranean area in time of war.


History, organization, personnel reserves, recruitment, training, schools, Command and General Staff College, and equipment. While the Pakistan Army is small and not equipped with the latest weapons, given the opportunity and proper equipment, it is capable of rapid expansion. Should the occasion arise, it is confident that it will not be found wanting in leadership, courage, and fighting efficiency. Photographs.


Review of Italian Army doctrine.

RAAF IN JEOPARDY, in *Aircraft, Australia*, v. 24, no. 2 (Nov 55) 20 plus.

Protest against the Australian Government's new budget which did not make the pledged provision for expansion of the Air Force.

NATO's armed strength, tactical mission, and offensive capabilities of its air forces; and Western defense through deterrents which must be rendered so formidable that they need not be used. The demographic and economic structure of Europe could tolerate much larger ground forces than the European nations have thus far been willing to contribute. The risks of war must be made too great as regards not only nuclear but also conventional warfare. The only sound policy of "defense through deterrents" is to be strong in both kinds of weapons. If the NATO powers continue on their present course they will be at the mercy of the Soviet Union. The West's only hope then for survival would rest on the unlikely contingency that the present struggle for power within the Soviet Union will present its rulers from taking advantage of the dilemma into which their diplomacy is so skillfully maneuvering the West.


Since small nations generally lack the means of providing large military contingents for the defense of the West, they could contribute to the collective defense by placing at the disposal of the international Generals Staffs their outstanding scientists (biologists, psychologists, and physicists). These scientists could collaborate in working out plans for conducting the total war in fields other than strictly military. Small nations should also participate in the current "Cold War" by allowing their more powerful allies to make use of their radio broadcasting facilities for the purpose of psychological warfare. The effectiveness of this type of warfare is demonstrated by examples from World War II.

SEA POWER'S CONTROL FORCES, by Col. George A. Roll, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 80, no. 10 (Oct 54) 1073-1083.

The Western Powers have a decided superiority in sea power over the Soviet bloc, but the measure of control ashore that sea power can exert is directly related to the combat effectiveness of the landing forces. The strength and missions of US and British Marines, and the progress being made in joint amphibious exercises by NATO commands. Political leadership must decide whether or not the US Marine Corps is now large enough to provide an adequate base for expansion in case of a future war.

SOME NORWEGIAN DEFENSE PROBLEMS. Några norska forsvarens problem, by Capt. 3. Tell, in Tidsskrift for Reservofficerare, v. 30, no. 3 (Sept 54) 77-81. In Swedish.

The military setup in Norway as approved by Parliament in the summer of 1953 and conditioned by NATO membership. The strength of the Army: a field army consisting of ten mobilized and two standing combined
regiments; a local defense force of 40,000 men; and a Home Guard of 100,000. The consolidation of the field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and coast artillery into an Artillery Corps under the Chief of Staff of the Army. An Air Force of 275-300 airplanes in eleven divisions, and an inadequate Navy. Advantages and disadvantages of belonging to NATO Northern Command. Extension of length of military service to eighteen months in the Navy and Air Force. The economic difficulties involved in maintaining the Armed Forces; and strategic and operational difficulties resulting from geographic conditions and a poor communications system. Organizational chart.

SOUTH EAST ASIA, in An Cosantoir, v. 14, no. 9 (Sept 54) 434-438.
The political and military factors in SE Asia which led the nations with interests in the area to sign on 8 September 1953 the Southeast Asia Treaty; and the political and military weaknesses of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization as compared to NATO.

The build-up of the Dutch Army in cooperation with NATO; and its present strength, organization, training program, and high quality. Today Holland has a full-strength Army force consisting of one standing and two reserve divisions. 90,000 men are actively under arms and 150,000 are capable of being mobilized within three days. Practically the whole force is a conscript force; and the organization is modelled after US pattern. In addition to the Army, the Dutch have organized a territorial defense responsible for safeguarding the communications network and protecting harbors and bases against sabotage and fifth column activity.

THE TURKISH AIR FORCE, by M. J. Hardy, in Air Power, v. 2, no. 1 (Autumn 54) 30-32.
Its evolution; flying equipment; strategic importance; and role in NATO.

TURKEY AND HER DEFENSE PROBLEMS, by Knox Helm, in International Affairs, v. 30, no. 4 (Oct 54) 434-439.
The development of Turkey as a democratic state since the end of World War I, and her present military and strategic aspects. The Turkish Army has first-class human material and is on the way to becoming a modern military force; but US technical and material assistance is needed. The threat imposed by Turkey's proximity to the USSR and strategic aspects of each of her borders.

History and tradition of the Turkish Army, and Turkey's strategic position and war potential. If the Turkish Army is given adequate naval and air support, especially in the early stages of hostilities, there is little doubt that Turkey will be able to stand firm and will become not merely a "running sore" but a "grievous wound" in Russia's side.

THE 12-DAY WAR, by Clive Baxter, in Canadian Aviation, v. 29, no. 2 (Feb 56) 34-35.

The two-fold role of the RCAF 1st Air Division in Europe: (1) to gain air superiority over given areas and take part in sweeps over enemy territory, and (2) to divert and destroy enemy defense forces. The hourly possibility of a Soviet attack which the airmen must face; and the probable conditions under which they will fly into combat. NATO strategic forces will have twelve days to destroy the Soviet Union's ability to continue fighting, or to lose the war.


The NATO air forces in Europe are superior to that of the USSR in Eastern Europe in numbers of aircraft immediately available, logistic capability, and available airfields. The NATO air strength is 5,800 planes of all types on the continent of which 2,400 are jet fighters or fighter-bombers; another 1,000 jets in Great Britain would be available in an emergency. Soviet jet aircraft in Eastern Europe number about 3,000. A total of 480 civil and military airfields with runways over 5,000 feet are located in the NATO European area, and the military fields will be linked by an all-important fuel pipe-line system; the Russians have about 100 jet fighter bases in Eastern Europe and would have difficulty supplying them with jet fuel because they do not possess pipe-lines. The logistical problem of air forces is now far greater than before because of the high consumption of jet fuel.


Operational pros and cons of helicopters; suggested employment by the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and recommendation that helicopters intended for missions in support of ground forces be constructed equipped, and armed by the French Air Force and placed at the disposal of the French Army.

A YANKEE IN KING MAAKON'S BNAF, by Capt Bryce Poe II, in Pegasus, v. 23, no. 5 (Nov 54) 6-9.

The Royal Norwegian Air Force is described by an American advisor to Air Headquarters of Allied Forces Northern Europe as a hard-hitting, professional air force which compares favorably with USAF. Its personnel represents a balance between well-trained eager young pilots and seasoned commanders with World War II combat experience.
H. The Neutral Countries

1. Major Aspects of Military and Foreign Policy

AN AMERICAN ALLY WHO HAS LICKED THE COMMUNISTS, in U.S. News and World Report, v. 38, no. 17 (29 Apr 55) 68 plus.

US needs the strategic advantages which are inherent in Spain's geography and is buying them as a matter of cold military calculation. Millions of US dollars are pouring into Spain as the result of US-Spanish economic and military agreements, and millions more are to follow. After years of feudalism and poverty, Spain is beginning to perk up economically and is becoming an important and increasingly strong American Ally, who unlike most of America's friends has fought and beaten communism. Background of Francisco Franco, who at sixty-two is the one-man ruler of Spain; effect of US military expenditures on Spain's economy; and Franco's plans for Spain's economy.

BACKGROUND: THE DRIVE TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION, in Japan Reporter, v. 1, no. 7 (17 April 56) 4-7.

Major points at issue on the revision of Japan's postwar Constitution which was enacted in 1946. With some information on the maintenance of armed forces for self-defense.


A theory has been offered for the disbandment of the greater part of the present small regular Indian Army to be replaced by raising a large National Militia. The reasoning and objectives behind the proposal: economic and political conditions in India; India's dependence on foreign countries for her major military equipment; Russian and Chinese experiences with militia in their immediate post-revolution histories when their industries were just developing, as is India's industry at the present time; and better national security. As regards the employment of the militia in the field, it was proposed that "mass tactics" should be used to overwhelm the enemy by sheer weight of number. Evaluates the efficacy of the proposed militia vis-a-vis India's present politico-military requirements and the tactical employment of this militia in massed manpower against a modern army. If war comes to India, her life will be at stake, and if she wants to survive she must move with the world current and not bury her head in the sand as an ostrich to shut the danger out of sight. India's conditions (northern plains) do not lend themselves to mass tactics; and it will be a long time before she possesses the ultimate in war (hydrogen bomb) to be stronger than she is now.

To meet the requirements of greater mobility and fire power in atomic warfare, Switzerland must rely on tanks as the best antitank weapon and must reinforce its Air Force for air defense and support of the infantry accompanying the tanks.

SPAIN AND WESTERN DEFENCE, in An Cosantoir, v. 14, no. 9 (Sep 54) 426-434.

A year has passed since Spain and US signed the Spanish-American agreement. Although Spain is not a member of the UN or NATO, she is allied to two member states of NATO, the United States and Portugal. Spain's present position in Western defense; progress made in the construction of US air and naval bases in Spain under the Spanish-American Agreement; and types of military equipment shipped by US to Spain.

STRIKING FORCE, by Maj. V. P. Naib, in United Service Institution Journal (India), v. 85, no. 359 (Apr 55) 134-140.

The armored striking force is most suited to Indian conditions. Suggestions on how to organise, train, and equip such a force.

SWEDEN CAN PRODUCE ATOMIC BOMBS. Suecia puede fabricar bombas atomicas, in Revista de Aeronautica, v. 11, no. 168 (Nov 54) 900. In Spanish.

Sweden is now in a position to produce atomic bombs. While production of such bombs for Sweden's Armed Forces is not contemplated for the time being, this does not preclude the possibility of Sweden manufacturing atomic bombs for other countries.

2. Doctrines and Capabilities of the Armed Forces


Since conventional weapons would not be sufficient to assure Switzerland's national defense if the attacking enemy uses atomic weapons, Switzerland must also procure bombs and atomic artillery for tactical employment. Advantages which the Swiss Army would derive from the possession of such weapons.
From the beginning of history it has always been the foot soldier who has ultimately played the main role in land warfare. Even with every modern development and scientific discovery, he will play this role for some time to come. His importance lies in the fact that he can traverse ground impassable to any other arm, that he can move comparatively freely and silently in darkness or fog, that he can physically clear and hold an objective, and that he is easy to train, obtain, and maintain. The countries of the East have some of the finest infantry material in the world, consisting mostly of solid, frugal, and stolid farmer stock, used to hard work and adverse living conditions. Properly organized and led, they can become that highly mobile and tough combination of "cat burglar, gunman, and poacher" which was General Wavell's definition of the ideal infantryman. The lessons of the Korean War are highly significant, particularly for countries like India, industrially backward but with perennially overflowing populations.

The pros and cons of an Army Air Force vs. an independent Air Force. If air power is to be regarded merely as a highly mobile three-dimensional artillery, it would be proper to place it under command of the ground forces. However, air power, of which the forces designed for ground support role are merely a part, is the total effort required to dominate the air and consequently the entire sum total of all operations (including ground operations). Viewed in this light, an independent Air Force is the answer.

Comments by the Chief of the Swedish Army on the ten-year plan made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The recommended twelve percent cut in number of battalions will seriously affect the Army's capability of preventing an invasion of Sweden and will not be balanced by the planned improvements in material. The training program will be expanded and made more effective. The present officer corps will be retained and expanded.

Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia on the aims of the foreign policy of his country, delivered at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, India, 16 November 1956. "...Even if the economic strength of the country would permit large armed forces Indonesia cannot be defended by military strength alone. The first line of our defense is the achievement of a stable peace and a good understanding with our neighbours. We seek friendship with all and enmity with none....."
GUERRILLA WARFARE. Fria kriget, by Stig Lantz, in Ny Militær Tidsskrift, v. 27, no. 12 (54) 342-351. In Swedish.

The important role which guerrilla units could play in an invasion of Northern Sweden whose terrain is ideally suited for this type of operation. The inadequacy of present parachute ranger troops, engineers, and pioneer troops to perform guerrilla functions; and the necessity for training and organizing these troops as special guerrilla units.

JAPAN AIRPOWER COMING BACK, in Aviation Week, v. 62, no. 20, (16 May 55) 24 plus.

Last month the Rising Sun insignia appeared on military aircraft of Japan for the first time since World War II. Japan is slowly getting back into the air with both military and civil aviation. Extent of initial Japanese plans for military aircraft; types of aircraft furnished by US to Japan; and growth of the commercial Japanese air lines.

A MILITIA VERSUS A STANDING ARMY, by Brigadier G. I. S. Kullar, in United Service Institution Journal (India), v. 85, no. 358 (Jan 55) 44-54.

A theory has been offered for the disbandment of the greater part of the present small regular Indian Army to be replaced by raising a large National Militia. The reasoning and objectives behind the proposal: economic and political conditions in India; India’s dependence on foreign countries for her major military equipment; Russian and Chinese experiences with militia in their immediate post-revolution histories when their industries were just developing, as is India’s industry at the present time; and better national security. As regards the employment of the militia in the field, it was proposed that “mass tactics” should be used to overwhelm the enemy by sheer weight of number. Evaluates the efficacy of the proposed militia vis-a-vis India’s present politico-military requirements and the tactical employment of this militia against a modern army. If war comes to India, her life will be at stake, and if she wants to survive she must move with the world current and not bury her head in the sand as an ostrich to shut the danger out of sight. India’s conditions (northern plains) do not lend themselves to mass tactics; and it will be a long time before she possesses the ultimate in war (hydrogen bomb) to be stronger than she is now. However, with a militia army she will be a much weaker nation. If the present small professional Army can be streamlined in its administration and overheads, paid more generously, trained properly, armed with modern equipment, and backed by a well-organized territorial army, it will give India better national security than a half-trained peasant militia of a half dozen million amateur soldiers.


Characteristics of atomic bombs; their influence on tactical
doctrines; and defensive measures against atomic weapons, such as dispersion, camouflage, shelters, counter-intelligence, greater mobility for reserves, and special care in organizing signal communications. Armor will assume greater importance, probably at the expense of conventional artillery, so that reinforcement of the Swiss infantry by means of armor and automatic artillery would seem justified.

THE NEW SINGLE DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND GROUND FORCES IN JOINT OPERATIONS.
La nueva doctrina unica para aire y para tierra en las operaciones combinadas, by Col. Antonio de Ncrea Urrea, in EJercito, v. 16, no. 105 (June 55) 3-10. In Spanish.

Recent experience in Korea and Indochina suggests that a vital part will be played in any future war by tactical air forces in support of the ground forces. Therefore, the Spanish Air Force is urged to train its personnel in such missions and to conduct frequent exercises jointly with the ground forces.

ORGANISE TO FIGHT, in An Cosantoir, v. 15, no. 1 (Jan 55) 12-17.

Examination of the structure of the Irish Army based on likely war tasks on Irish terrain, with special emphasis on the infantry battalion and the most suitable system of command to link the battalion with GHQ field forces. An organization is suggested which would remove outdated vehicles and decrease supporting and administrative personnel, thus increasing the ratio of riflemen. The proportion of riflemen in the battalion should not exceed 700, which would mean three rifle companies instead of the present four. The most economic system of command is a basic infantry brigade group controlled directly by Field Forces and assisted by the Command HQ's.

OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE STRUCTURE, by Baka Funada, in Taiziku Mondai, (March 56) 2-3. Translated from Japanese.

Increases in the strength of Japan's Army, Navy, and Air Force.


Under the U.S. military aid to Spain, the Spanish Navy (La Marina Espanola) is to be modernized so that it can cooperate in the Mediterranean with the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The strength of the Spanish Navy and what is being done to modernise it.


Old established general principles of warfare which in the past were essential factors of success, must not be neglected in the application of new weapons. In searching for a new weapon we should not visualize a
weapon that will enable us to win a war without effort and without risk.
The weapon to look for is one that will permit us to surprise the enemy and
to seize and maintain the initiative in the operations conducted by the
whole of the armed forces in order to attain the decisive objective.

VICTORY WAS WINDS, La victoria tiene alas, by Maj. Ricardo Pialtaín de
la Pena, in Revista de Aeronautica, v. 14, no. 168 (Nov 54) 886-894. In
Spanish.

General review of US peripheral defense, with emphasis on the im-
portant role Spain can play in the Western defense system against the Soviet
bloc by providing air bases, an Air Force comprising about 40,000 men with a
large number of trained pilots, and substantial resources of vital raw mater-
ials.

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT FOR EASTERN THEATERS, by Maj. Gen. J. N. Chaudhari,
in Military Digest, India, no. 25 (Apr 55) 1-7.

Suggestions for the possible equipment and organization of a local
army that is to operate in an underdeveloped country. The importance of
simplicity, standardisation, and the minimum of equipment which either has to
be imported from abroad or can be manufactured locally in limited quantities.

THE YUGOSLAV ARMY. Den jugoslaviske armé, by Capt. Herbert Alboth,
in Officersbladet, v.10, no.8 (Oct 54) 405-415. In Norwegian.

The postwar buildup of the Yugoslav Army has required sixty percent
of the national expenditures. The Army comprises 350,000 regular officers
and men, and has a mobilisation strength of 2,000,000. Equipment was obtained
through American and Allied aid programs, and since 1948 thirty-five weapons
and ammunition factories have been established. 21,000 officers have been
trained in various types of officer schools between 1948 and 1952; and the
two-year training program for soldiers includes reading, writing, and social
studies. Discipline in the Army has been relaxed, the morale is high, and
the loyalty of the soldiers unquestionable.
I. Middle East

1. General Aspects

AIR POWER IN THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST, by Paul M. A. Lineberger, in
The American Academy of Political and Social Science. Annals, v. 299
(May 55) 109-117.

The Middle East (including the Arab states of Arabia proper and
the Persian Gulf, together with all the states of the Levant, including Tur-
key, Israel, and Egypt) is still a passive area in a world air strategy.
Although press reports from time to time indicate that Egypt is planning
to undertake the manufacture of aircraft with the aid of German technicians,
at present no Middle Eastern state has undertaken the manufacture of mili-
tary or civil aircraft. Limited aircraft manufacture is probably feasible in
Turkey. Israel possesses the human and technological resources for the
production of aircraft. However, neither there nor in Egypt, and in the more
backward Arab states are aircraft actually being produced or likely to be
produced. Air power in the Middle East can probably hold its present status
for years or decades, provided: (a) that the Western World remains economi-
cally viable enough to prevent catastrophic local depressions in the Middle
East; (b) that the Western World suffers no overwhelming diplomatic or mili-
tary defeats in other parts of the world; (c) that the Western World adopts
corrective action if any one of the Middle Eastern states begins to disinteg-
rate into communism or to fall under the sway of a pro-Moscow government;
and (d) that the Indian and neutralist world is unable to structure its
leadership so sharply and so effectively as to present a workable "third
c bloc" of sovereign powers as a reality in world strategy.

THE BIG NEWS OF THE WORLD - INSIDE STORY AS TOLD BY THE OVERSEAS EDITORS
OF U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT AT A 2-DAY CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON, in U.S.

Is war coming in the Middle East? Will U.S. fight in the Far East?
Will oil be shut off from Europe? Is rebellion ahead for France? Will Germany
stick with the East? Which side is Nehru on?

DEFENSE OF THE NEAR EAST, by Danheurt A. Rustov, Foreign Affairs,
v. 34, no. 2 (Jan 56) 271-286.

Among the factors affecting the defense of the Near East are:
- geography (surface configuration of areas from the Black Sea to Pakistan),
- natural resources (the quest of the USSR to control the oil resources),
- the psychological effect of Near Eastern relations with the West and
- East, and Soviet intentions and capabilities in the area. Map.


The historical development of the Middle East petroleum industry is described based on official documents and pertinent books and articles. Its impact on social and economic conditions of the area, and the political implications and international rivalries. Covers: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey. Tables and maps. Bibliography.


Political, demographic, strategic, and economic aspects. (From an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1955).


The arms deal with Egypt was the beginning of a profound political maneuver which can be regarded as a Soviet breakthrough in the Near East. The motives and methods of Soviet penetration, and the implications.


With Egypt's suddenly announced decision to buy arms from Czechoslovakia and the USSR, the Kremlin has succeeded in extending its influence directly into the Middle East. Discussion of the impact of this expansion on the Western Powers and the need for a post-Geneva containment strategy.
SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, in *World Today*, v. 11, no. 12 (Dec 55) 518-529.

All signs point to the likelihood that the present Soviet offensive in the Middle East will be continued. Even if it should not come to a local war, Russia's alignment with Egypt, and to a lesser degree with Syria and Saudi Arabia, is highly important for Moscow because it may disrupt Western defense schemes. The Egyptian leaders are beyond doubt perfectly honest in their protestations that they want communist arms, not ideas. However, the very idea that they will be able to get them without the other points either to megalomania or to an extraordinary degree of naivety and lack of experience and political imagination.

THE WEST AND THE DEFENSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST, by J. S. Raleigh, in *Middle Eastern Affairs*, v. 6, no. 6-7 (June-July 55) 177-184.

The Soviet Union is striving to dominate the Middle East either through expansion of world communism, or through "cold war" tactics and infiltrations, or in the course of a future full-fledged war. Political, economic, and strategic considerations that motivate the free world to counteract Soviet ambitions in the Middle East and to defend it; requirements for the defense of Middle East; capabilities of the countries and peoples of the Middle East to meet the requirements necessary for the defense of their own countries; what the West can do to develop the capabilities of the countries of the Middle East to defend themselves; causes of unrest and instability in the Middle East; and the steps that must be taken by the West to overcome the mistrust and unwillingness of the Middle East countries to cooperate in their own defense.
II. MODERN WARFARE AND FUTURE TRENDS

A. General Aspects


Principles; moral values and material means; methods and instruments of warfare; influence of technical progress; characteristics of modern warfare; elements of the military policy of States; organization of ground forces; unconventional forms of warfare: the Cold War and underground movements; importance of services; and the psychology of the combatants.

CAMOUFLAGE AS AN EXAMPLE OF SCIENTIFIC WARFARE. Wissenschaftliche kriegsführung am beispiel der tarnung, by Joachim Lutzow, in Wehrtechnische Hefte, v. 51, nos. 7-8 (54) 193-199. In German.

After defining scientific warfare as operations in which scientific-technical measures are capable of influencing the fighting power of troops, the article discusses the possibility of camouflaging against detection by infrared radiation and radar and how such camouflage may be achieved.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR, by Col. Frank J. Sackton, in Military Review, v. 34, no. 8 (Nov 54) 52-62.

The impact of atomic energy on the art of war. The existence of atomic weapons makes possible the complete destruction of nations, and since this destructive capability is available to both great power blocs, it is reasonable to assume that a stalemate in their use will exist as long as both blocs maintain rationality, or until some time in the distant future when a complete defense against these weapons has been developed by either side. The possibility of limited war, such as the Korean conflict, calls for re-evaluation of the organization of modern military forces and study in the tactical employment of atomic weapons so that military victory can be achieved promptly on the battlefield. Victory will come to the side which can best grasp the significance of the changing nature of war, and plan for attainment of maximum benefits from the diplomatic, strategic, and tactical arts.


Europeans, contemplating the employment of air power in World War II, believe that air power, reinforced by nuclear weapons, has guided mankind into a fatal path which must lead to the ultimate destruction of one or all of the belligerents. The pressing question which such a state of affairs poses is
how to define a strategy suitable for the waging of a conflict that must not be settled by resort to total war. What arms can be employed effectively in local hot wars? And what are the chances of the West's preventing communist expansion in times of cold war? Europeans are perhaps more deeply convinced than the American people that history has reached a crisis. Nearness of danger often distorts judgment; it also sharpens awareness of the essential. (Translated from French).

GEOPHYSICS AND WARFARE, by Helmut E. Landsberg. Washington, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development), Research and Development Coordinating Committee on General Sciences, 54. 68 p. (CGS 202/1, RDB 142/1 rev.)

The role of geophysical sciences in relation to modern total war; advances made in applying these sciences to the military machine; and the need for long-term research and development activities in this area. The following sciences are considered: meteorology; oceanography; hydrology; terrestrial magnetism and electricity; geodesy and cartography; seismology; volcanology; soil mechanics; and geology.


The possible totality which characterizes future war as envisioned today is linked directly to the results of the nuclear explosion and its power to destroy. Whether delivered by gun, airplane, missile, submarine, or satchel, it is the nuclear explosion, not the form of delivery, which is responsible for totality of destruction. The capability of delivering nuclear explosions is not nor will it be the exclusive capability of air forces. The airplane's special strength is its ability to carry not only weapons but fighting men farther and faster in a shorter time than by any other means. To whatever extent it is capable of aiding the fighting man to gain control of land and people, either with weapons or with transportation or with both, the airplane contributes its maximum effect to total military power.

HOW WAR BECAME ABSURD, in Harper's, v. 211, no. 1265 (Oct 55) 33-46.

In this collection of three articles, Bernard Brodie in STRATEGY HITS A DEAD END points out the futility of future wars in the light of the present know-how of nuclear weapons. Richard S. Maryman in THE GUARDIANS describes the life and duties of a bomber crew of the Strategic Air Command, whose mission is "massive retaliation." THE NOISELESS WEAPON by Hans Thirring sketches briefly the future war fought with radioisotopes.

ICBM: PRELUDE TO PUSHPARTON PILOTS, by Arthur Widder, Jr., in National Guardian, v. 10, no. 6 (May 56)

"The tremendous destructive power of the nuclear weapon, and the advent, in due course, of long-range and short-range ballistic missiles, will eventually call for a decrease in the number of manned aircraft."
LAND POWER AS AN ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER, by Hanson W. Baldwin, in Army Combat Forces Journal, v. 6, no. 6 (Jan 56) 16-21.

The limitations of atomic weapons; the roles of land power in limited war, in larger conflicts, and in atomic war; and the necessity for our military planners to organize and maintain armed forces capable of fighting any kind of war anywhere. No matter what his instruments and weapons, it is man, "with his feet in the mud, sweating, and bleeding," who fights land wars with the objective of dispossessing other men from a particular area of earth, to control and dominate the battlefield - the land itself.


Fighting forces are no better than the logistical system that supports them, and logistical planning must be oriented accordingly. However, changes in organization for sake of change must be avoided. The author asks what course must the strategic commander and his logisticians take in planning during a cold war to prepare for both nonnuclear and limited nuclear war, or possibly thermonuclear war, and then proposes a new approach to logistics based on: (1) careful screening of our equipment needs, (2) full use of all applicable developments in the field of communications, (3) more airlift for the support of ground force operations, (4) radical improvements in the overland capabilities of land transport, and (5) logistical reorganization designed to exploit all the possibilities which exist from the most modern to the most primitive, because both may be required.


In our development of weapons we must remember that in the final analysis they are operated by the minds of men. Research in psychological science is not the luxury of the college professor but the necessity of the services. Wars of the future will be won by that nation which best understands the function of the human mind and through able military leadership, most thoroughly utilized the available potential. This points to the fact that an accelerated program of research in the field of psychological sciences must be undertaken. Several examples illustrate how research in psychological science enhances the utilization of military personnel to best advantage.

MODERN MILITARY LEADERSHIP, by General Maxwell D. Taylor, in Military Engineer, v. 48, no. 323, (May-June 56) 195.

Requirements for leadership in modern war in general and for leadership in the US Army in particular.


Papers presented at the Military-Industrial Conference of the Society of American Military Engineers which was held in Chicago in


Changes in the art of war during the past 25 years and their meaning. New ways of using ground forces; modifications in naval tactics; progress in air tactics; and the strategy of US amidst the changes in the art of war.

NEW FEATURES IN MILITARY STRATEGY by Fletcher Pratt, in Virginia Quarterly Review, v. 30, no. 4 (Oct 54) 520-526.

The new and broader concept of strategy, and factors which have contributed to the new complexity. The effect on strategy of atomic and other new weapons, and the effect of new techniques, notably perfected guerrilla warfare. Problems posed by the political objectives of Soviet strategic thinking and by the complete control and broad definition of communications in communist states. Speed of movement as one of the basic facts of modern strategy; and the increased need for strategic and tactical dispersion which in turn demand greater attention to communications and greater concentration on intelligence. The change in the status of sea power which meets perfectly the conditions of great mobility and the capability for extreme dispersion; and the combination of sea and land strategy as parts of a single complex.

OPERATION WORLD PEACE, by Eugene E. Wilson, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 81, no. 6 (June 55) 652-657.

Man's principles of war, revealed through his study of the influence of seapower upon history, are equally applicable on land as well
as in the air; they also lend themselves to the solution of related problems in politics and economics. Reviews the impact of Mahan's doctrine upon air policy, suggests an analogy in the problem of controlling the new weapons of destruction, and points the way to applying the processes of Mahan's fundamental thinking to the problem of world peace.


The psychological reaction to air power, and the contribution psychological warfare can make to the achievement of our national objectives which are: (1) to maintain a Government that ensures the basic freedoms, dignity, and responsibility of man; (2) to secure the peace and security of our citizens through the maintenance of our economic strength, political liberties, social philosophy, and our institutions, principles, and leaders; and (3) to gain understanding and support for US policies, ideology, and objectives by the people of the world. Lessons of communist propaganda; and rules of psychological operation.


Although the principles of war are still sound, it is doubtful whether they should be presented as unexceptionable principles, unalterable maxims, and established axioms. Exceptions, modifications, or improvements may be found for every one of them. No idea should be too fantastic or too unorthodox to be rejected without a fair hearing. Any military instruction which curbs the development of bold imagination should be modified. That includes presentations of the principles of war.


Dispersion, mobility and speed are the keynote of tomorrow's logistics and the criteria which will guide all transportation planning. New concepts of warfare have placed new demands on all segments of the Transportation Corps, including research, procurement and budgeting.


General review of the evolution of automation and of the future employment of robots in industry and warfare.
SCIENCE IN WAR, by Dr. R. Cockburn, in Royal United Service Institution Journal, v. 101, no. 601 (Feb 56) 23-35.

The strategy of defense and the problems associated with the forward planning of research and development since military strategy is becoming dependent on scientific developments more than is generally realized. The machinery of defense science, the new strategy, the logic of retaliation, and the momentum of research.

"SQUEEZE 'EM AN' BLAST 'EM" by Lt. Col. George B. Pickett, Jr., in Military Review, v. 35, no. 6 (Sept 55) 56-60.

With the tempo of change in the atomic age we must change our thinking and consider tactics, techniques, and strategy as a continuing "operational process" where process 1954 is not the same as process 1955 but is constantly being reviewed, revised, and adapted to keep pace with changes in weapons, national culture, political concepts, production means, and the many other variables that affect both the delivery and use of weapons on a battlefield and the willingness of the public to permit the use of those weapons.

3-DIMENSIONAL WARFARE, by Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg, in Armor, v. 64, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 55) 4-8.

Predicts that warfare will be revolutionized by development of vehicles which have locomotion in air as well as on ground. Such vehicles would be flying tanks, flying armored personnel carriers, and flying armored logistical carriers. Artillery will assume two forms. It will employ guided missiles for long range support and multiple-gunn aircraft for close support. By 1970 the influence of terrain on combat may be reduced by seventy percent.

TRENDS IN LOGISTICS, by Lt. Col. Lawrence R. St. John, in Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, v. 1, no. 3 (Sept 54) 182-190.

How the probable nature of a future, large-scale war would affect supply, medical service, transportation, construction, and management in the light of current trends toward economy, speed, dependability of the flow of supplies, and development of indigenous resources. Concludes that more supplies, service, transportation - more of everything - will be needed.


The political effects of the H-bomb are compared to the effects of gunpowder in an earlier age. Gunpowder destroyed the aristocratic order, and by destroying it changed the entire method of war from inter-feudal warfare to organized international warfare. The H-bomb will act as a deterrent to the organized international war of the bourgeois age, will deprive it of political significance, and will change warfare to a cold war fought by the masses. The cold war is a combination of psychological war, the weapons of which are the emotions of man, and the most primitive type of war, guerrilla war, which throughout history has been the military instrument of the masses.
B. Atomic Warfare

1. Offensive and Defensive Aspects Including Deterrence


Critical analysis of the tactical applications of nuclear weapons. Traces the three revolutions in warfare caused by the invention of the atomic bomb: (1) the period of atomic scarcity when only the most vital targets were worth an atomic bomb; (2) the era of atomic plenty when the Army and Navy claimed atomic weapons and regarded them as powerful explosives which could be applied to conventional battle patterns; and (3) the era of the thermonuclear bomb which spells the end of ground warfare. In a thermonuclear war, airpower, defensive and offensive, along with other defensive weapons against air attack, is the critical element, and there is small place for armies and navies. However, unless atomic weapons are released for war or an agreement is reached to prevent use of them, our Armed Forces will be half-atomic and half-conventional and will make our survival, individually and nationally, a matter of chance.


In French.

The destructive capacity of atomic bombs is bound to exert a moderating influence upon the instigators of war. No doubt, it will reduce and perhaps even eliminate the chances of a total war. The very existence of atomic weapons could be more favorable to world peace than premature attempts at disarmament conducted in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and bitterness.

Why both belligerents the USSR and the NATO powers in a future European war, may find it in their interest to limit their choice of weapons as well as their choice of targets against which to employ nuclear weapons. A war in Europe need not become total.

DEFENSE IN ATOMIC WAR, by Dr. John von Neumann, in Ordnance, v. 40, no. 216 (May-June 56) 1090-1092.

It will not be sufficient to know that the enemy has only fifty possible tricks and that we can counter every one of them, but we must be able to counter them almost at the very instant they occur.

DESIGN FOR DETERRENCE, by Warren Amster, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, no. 5 (May 56) 164-165.

Deterrent capabilities of guided missiles.


There will be no such thing as an indefinite atomic stalemate. It is wishful thinking to expect that there will be a stalemate simply because opposing nations will have equal degrees of destructive atomic power. The idea that mutual fear will halt war is a novel one and not readily apparent in history. Sooner or later one side considers the fear unbearable and will go to any length to relieve it. When the lethal and accurate revolver was invented, duels between individuals did not cease, because each of the antagonists believed in his own chance to survive through his skill and the elements of surprise, speed, and deception. The same is true with atomic weapons. Possessing them in equal degrees of destructiveness will not forestall nations from going to war. However, if atomic firepower is to become a constant factor there are still other variables in the equation of war that can lead to success (just as the variables in a duel). These are: skill, technique, tactics, strategy, discipline, knowledge, morale, and courage. They all add up to one word - quality. Quality becomes America's major hope in survival. It means top-notch quality in military and civilian effort of US - to be ready and prepared to fight and win another war.

THE GREAT DETERRENT AND ITS LIMITATIONS, by Sir John Slessor, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, no. 5 (May 56) 140-146.

What can the great deterrent deter? How long will the deterrent be valid? Would a democracy use the H-bomb first? Are economies possible in defense costs? The new functions of conventional forces; weaknesses of graduated deterrence theory; graduated retaliation in local wars; tactical weapons in limited wars.

The problems to be faced in the West during the era of atomic equality with the Soviet Union.

IF YOU WAIT TO BE HIT YOU MAY NEVER HIT BACK, in US News and World Report, v. 39, no. 23 (2 Dec 55) 26-27.

The agreement reached by military observers of the initial phase of EXERCISE SAGE BRUSH is that the side which gets hit first in a future war may never get a chance to hit back. As the maneuvers began - even with interceptor forces ready and standing by - a sudden attack by "aggressor" forces using simulated atomic bombs succeeded. From the time of first warning it was only seventeen minutes before "atom bombs" were dropping. In the next twenty-three minutes nearly all US air bases and half of the US striking forces were knocked out.

THE INFLUENCE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS ON MILITARY THOUGHT AND ACTION. Der einfluss der atomwaffen auf militarisches denken und handeln, by Friedrich Wirth, in Waffen-technische Hefte, v. 51, no. 2 (54) 33-39, no. 3 (54) 65-68. In German.

Means of conveying atomic weapons to the enemy; effects of atomic explosions; active and passive defense against atomic weapons; missions of the Radiological Service; changes in US defense strategy as a result of atomic weapons; US strategic reserve; strength and location of US forces in Germany; the European defense system and strength of British, French, Italian, and Belgian armies; and proposed German contribution to European defense.


Examines the policies and tactics of all major participants in World War II and finds that their records are full of blunders. The blunders of US resulted in needless loss of American lives. As for the future, the author is of the opinion that one blunder the US cannot afford is that of permitting a potential enemy to strike the first blow as Japan did at Pearl Harbor, and gives the reasons why the US must strike first. The major policy mistakes made by the US and other countries prior to and during World War II; the "suicidal" policy of the US today; and how to avoid future mistakes. Captain Puleston does not advocate preventive war. He proposes that "in order to make atomic retaliation effective as a deterrent to aggression, we must decide now and prepare to strike first whenever we have positive evidence that an attack is being mounted against the United States." Bibliography.

Under conditions of atomic warfare, field forces must learn to operate with smaller inventories. "Department store" depots will be a necessity, instead of requisitioning according to technical-service responsibility. Such overspecialization is wasteful of manpower and effort and exposes to potential destruction the entire supply of a given item or type of item. The greater dispersion between units will require sweeping organizational changes for combat as well as logistical troops. Units must become smaller and more self-contained. All staff units and individuals will need training in greater responsibilities and nuclear technical skills so that they can function under conditions of atomic warfare.

MASSIVE RETALIATION AND GRADUATED DETERRENCE, by Rear Adm. Sir Anthony W. Buzzard, (Royal Navy, Ret) in World Politics, v. 8, no. 2 (Jan 56) 228-237.

The policy of graduated deterrence might gradually lead toward the elimination of the hydrogen bomb's threat to civilization.


Denouncement of "massive retaliation" as a doctrine based on the theory that the threat of terrorism will destroy the enemy's will to aggression. The "new look" as an administrative policy intended to provide the weapons to implement the deterrent strategy, and not to provide weapons necessary to win a war. Developments in atomic and hydrogen weapons; and the advantages of the USSR over the US in an all-out atomic war.


MORALITY AND WAR; A BRITISH VIEW, by Air Marshal Robert Staundby, in Air University Quarterly Review, v. 7, no. 2 (Summer 54) 3-11.

The widespread repugnance against the A- and H-bomb; and the faulty logic which has been evident in attempts to control or abolish nuclear weapons. The necessity for retaining nuclear weapons in the present world situation; and the chance that a resolute and farsighted development of these weapons may offer the Western world the most humanitarian goal - the end of war.
A comparison of the economic and demographic potentials of the Western and Soviet blocs shows that the general potential of the Western bloc under present conditions is twice that of the Soviet bloc. The ratio in favor of the West is increased further by the US productive capacity of atomic bombs. Taking into account the availability of fissionable materials and the yield of existing atomic installations, the annual world production of atomic bombs is estimated at 2,500. At least seventy-five percent of these could be produced by the US. A temporary advantage could be gained by an aggressor through an atomic surprise attack against the West. However, a rapid strategic counter-offensive and tactical defense with atomic weapons would quickly reestablish the equilibrium.

The advantages of aircraft and submarines over surface naval craft with respect to vulnerability in H-bomb warfare.

The effect of nuclear weapons in the event of an attack by Russian forces on certain areas of Europe. The strength of the Soviet Armed Forces is based on extensive evaluation of Soviet inventories and either observed or known Red deployments. Mathematical calculations to determine the number of Atomic and H-bombs necessary to neutralize the Soviets.

2. Strategic and Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons

A Spanish Army officer, who witnessed atomic maneuvers recently conducted by US Army units in Germany, gives his version of the influence of atomic artillery upon the tactical employment of ground forces.

A French Army general's concept of how future military
operations will be governed by the use of atomic weapons and the development of mobility, particularly the type of mobility provided by aircraft.

THE DAY THE SKY HELD, by Capt. Carl W. Borchellor, in Infantry School Quarterly, v. 45, no. 3 (July 55) 6-16.
The possible influence of atomic weapons on US Army offensive tactics is illustrated by a fictitious account, including pertinent operation order, of what might have happened at Anzio in the Spring of 1944, had such weapons been in use at that time.

ENGINEERS IN ATOMIC WARFARE. Fort Belvoir, Engineer School, 54. 23 p. (ST 5-7-1.)
Effects of atomic weapons, free rockets, and guided missiles (with either conventional or atomic warheads) against tactical and logistic installations in a theater of operations. General and specific effects of these weapons from the viewpoint of engineer combat and combat support operations.

50 ATOM BLASTS: WHAT THEY HAVE PROVED, in U.S. News and World Report, v. 38, no. 17 (29 Apr 55) 23-25
The 1955 series of A-bomb tests bring the total of US postwar A and H-weapons tests to nearly fifty. The objectives of the twelve tests carried out from 18 February to 15 April 1955, and type of explosion made in each of the tests. Among the facts learned: a theoretical solution is in sight now on how to knock down large numbers of fast, high-flying, jet bombers in a hurry; atomic sabotage is feasible, and the advantage of training saboteurs to operate in time of war, with suitcase-type atomic weapons behind the Iron Curtain, becomes evident now; in comparison with US, the Russians, in the new weapons race, are far behind and are more probably losing ground. Photos of some of the 1955 tests including the explosion of the "suitcase" bomb.

Characteristics of atomic weapons. The impact of tactical atomic weapons on concepts of warfare. The effects on the theater of operations, on defensive and offensive battles, and on organization and administration of ground units.

The advent of tactical atomic weapons requires a change in ground tactics. The influence of atomic weapons on ground tactics; requirements for
mobility and dispersion; employment of units in defense mobility and dispersion; employment of units in defense and offense and the requirements for intervals between units; intelligence requirements; and factors to be considered in training troops for atomic warfare.

THE INFLUENCE OF TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS ON THE CONDUCT OF BATTLE AND ORGANIZATION OF ARMY UNITS. Die auswirkung taktischer atomwaffen auf die kampfführung und gliederung von heeresverbünden, by Hans Hinrichs, in Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, v. 5, no. 11 (Nov 55) 508-517. In German.

Offensive and defensive tactics, and suggestions on the organization and equipment of combat units. With a table showing radii of effectiveness for atomic explosives with energy equipments ranging from two to 500 kilotons.

THE MISSIONS OF TACTICAL AVIATION IN ATOMIC WARFARE. Les missions de l'aviation tactique en guerre atomique, by Camille Rougeron, in Forces Aeriennes Francaisses, no. 103 (Apr 55) 617-631. In French.

The effects of atomic and thermonuclear bombs and radioactivity; the role of aircraft in direct support concentrated about fifty kilometers behind the front and with the mission of covering the sector with hundreds of radioactive craters; and responsible for indirect support by means of strategic bombing with thermonuclear bombs delivered by guided missiles and heavy fighter-bombers.


The behavior of soldiers under attack by nuclear weapons may be similar to that of British units during the first gas attacks of World War I when whole formations dissolved in the face of a seemingly irresistible force. The psychological effects of atomic weapons should be studied by military planners and scientists.


An analysis of the present international tensions and of the Soviet plans for continuous expansion. Advances a strategic concept in which nuclear weapons and air power play a dominant role.

THE PISTOL AND THE CLAW; A NEW MILITARY POLICY FOR THE AGE OF ATOM DEADLOCK, in Time, v. 65, no. 2 (10 Jan 55) 16-17.

The approaching atomic deadlock between the US and the USSR resembles two men inches apart with their fingers on pistol triggers; if either fires,
both will be killed. Therefore, a new US military policy has been accepted, at least in theory, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a tactical claw for use in local aggressions will be added to the strategic atomic attack. The future characteristics of US air, sea, and land forces organized for establishing a tactical deterrent. The US Tactical Air Force will rely on strike squadrons that will be self-sufficient logistically for thirty days and heavily armed with atomic bombs and rockets. The Navy task force of the future will be composed probably of no more than twelve ships centered around a supercarrier and widely dispersed. The Army planners have evolved a "cellular" - as opposed to the traditional linear - system of offensive; it will permit only 2,000 men in an area formerly occupied by perhaps 10,000 and will rely heavily on "battlefield surveillance" - the location and tracking of ground and air movements by sonic and electronic detection devices.

"POINT OF NO RETURN" by Maj. F. Le. G. Whitting, in Journal of Royal Artillery, v. 82, no. 2 (Apr 55) 81-94. Characteristics and effects of the atomic bomb; deployment of infantry and armor on a wide front in atomic war; factors affecting artillery in defense; present artillery weapons in the light of atomic warfare; recommended changes in the organization of infantry and armored divisions; and deployment of the artillery, incorporating recommended organizational changes.
1. Types of Operations and Tactical Methods

**AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TOMORROW**, by Col. Robert E. Cushman, Jr., in *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 4 (Apr '55) 30-34.

Concept of modern amphibious warfare: (1) offensive action by small, air-mobile groups in conjunction with massed destructive firepower; (2) seizure and defense of relatively large strategic areas by a combination of air support, air movement, and concentration of small battalion combat teams, and effective air defense; and (3) logistic support by means of fast-moving water-air lines of communication which do not become concentrated or congested. Photographs.

**ARE ANTITANK WEAPONS RINGING THE DEATH KNEEL OF TANKS?** Les armes antichars ont-elles sonne le glas des chars? by Col. Leridon, in *Rivue de la Cavalerie Blindée*, no. 9 (1st Quarter '55) 51-60. In French.

Arguments supporting the effectiveness of tanks in the face of modern antitank weapons, provided the tanks are protected by artillery fire, infantry mortars, second echelon tanks, and aircraft. Interesting new possibilities of employment will be available to tanks in atomic warfare, owing to the fact that their armor offers protection against atomic radiation.


To meet the threat of atomic shells, young officers should be trained for guerrilla tactics applied by small groups of all arms, each so mobile that it cannot be pinned down and fixed for atomic treatment, and each working and moving in an area large enough to make atomic harassing fire too expensive.


Recent armor developments; current status of armor within the armed forces of the Soviet Union; and the US tank family as the weapon most capable of dealing with enemy armor, featuring the capabilities of the light M-41 and the medium M-46, M-47, and M-48. Complementing this family is the armored-infantry personnel carrier, which has the mission of safely delivering the infantry soldiers - who form an integral part of the highly mobile armored team - to the objective. Photographs of the M-41 and M-48.

Armor must prepare to conduct sustained offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations; it may no longer enjoy the luxury of frequent reserve or rehabilitation periods it knew in World War II. Reviews some of the general lessons learned in recent wars, establishes basic assumptions on the use of atomic weapons, and the tactical concepts that will suit US Armor best for its future mission if it has to face the Soviet Army.

ARMOURED INFANTRY AND ATOMIC WAR, by Capt. N. A. Shackleton, in *Canadian Army Journal*, v. 10, no. 2 (Apr 56) 10-23.

In a speech entitled THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR, delivered to the Royal United Services Institution, Field Marshal Montgomery declared that the problem of future tactics and organization must be studied against the new background created by the possible use of atomic and nuclear weapons, and that our armies must become streamlined, achieve greater mobility and be capable of being maintained on a system of supply based on an airlift. With these considerations in mind, the author of this article attempts to determine the size and composition of the formation best suited to fight in an atomic war.


The requirements of the battles of the future and the doctrine of Western staffs on the employment of divisions are not compatible. The divisional system in its organisational aspects and from the point of view of firepower and mobility is not balanced enough to measure up to the various demands of future combat. Translated and digested from Wehrkunde, June 1955.


Examples of area defense in jungle warfare during World War II; and lessons learned from these experiences. Area defense in jungle warfare, such as in the open theaters of the Middle East, could not have succeeded without local command of the air which made air supply a possible alternative to land communication.
The possibilities for tactical employment of helicopters is illustrated in a hypothetical operation during which a squadron of helicopters carrying Rangers raided and destroyed the enemy's Army CP which was located in an area inaccessible either to tactical jet aircraft or bombers.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER IN MALAYA, by Dr. R. Seth, in India Quarterly, v. 11, no. 2 (Apr-June 55) 174-179.
The use of air power in direct support of ground troops in the jungle is limited due to the difficulties in identifying the targets and due to the diminished effect of bombs. All operations against the guerrillas are dependent on air supply by periodic drops into properly marked drop zones. Casualty evacuation by helicopters. Reconnaissance by slow-moving aircraft or helicopters.

A US Army concept which conceives the use or threatened use of tactical atomic weapons to force the enemy to dispersed formations. This will require him to accept grave risks in massing for offensive or defensive operations. The employment of non-atomic weapons, together with superior mobility would defeat him in detail with mobile forces.

FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF AIRBORNE FORCES, in Royal United Service Institution Journal, v. 100, no. 598 (May 55) 236-240.
An argument is advanced that the scope of employment of airborne forces in both an atomic war and also in local wars and police operations will be widened. Current opinions on tactical and strategic employment, and future developments.

GROUND DEFENSE IN THE ATOMIC ERA, in Tairiku Mondai (March 56) 12-20. Translated from Japanese.
Digest of a round-table conference held recently by the Asiatic Mainland Research Society. Some of the subjects discussed: army forces in the atomic era; new weapons and tactics; new strategy of the US and USSR in the atomic age.

HELIICOPTERS FOR THE ARMY, in Royal United Service Institution Journal, v. 100, no. 597 (Feb 55) 69-72.
The helicopter as a cross-country vehicle which will eventually replace trucks in land warfare. Armored helicopters carrying guns and rifles could be used for tactical purposes in guerrilla operations.

An appraisal of the effect of atomic weapons, employed both offensively and defensively, on airborne operations. The impact of atomic warfare on the following three principal phases of an airborne operation: marshalling, movement to the objective area, and operations in the airhead. The greatest threat to an airborne operation, from the standpoint of enemy atomic capabilities, occurs after the airborne force has been delivered into the airhead, and not during the marshalling or movement phases.

INFANTRY IN MODERN BATTLE, in Military Review, v. 34, no. 10 (Jan 55) 73-79.

Digested from an article by General Richard W. Gale in the British Army Annual, July 1954. It is impossible to have a good army without good infantry. To be good, the infantry must prepare itself for the requirements of the battlefield of the future. Effects of nuclear weapons on land battle; the role of air superiority, armor, and antitank defense; and infantry training and tactics.

IS AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE DEAD? by Capt Nicholas A. Cansona, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 81, no. 9 (Sept 55) 987-991.

After reviewing the status of amphibious warfare in the era of electronics and nuclear power the author concludes: "Korea and Indochina should be sufficient proof that technology alone will never win a war. Amphibious operations are one means by which applied science aids man in closing with and defeating an enemy; they form the bridge over which decision advances from air and water to land and victory."


Inclusion of high-performance aircraft in the organization of ground troops would increase the effectiveness of medium and heavy artillery and would permit the division and corps commanders to take the war deeper into the enemy's rear.

MOBILE CONCEPT, in Military Review, v. 34, no. 9 (Dec 54) 3-10.

Our present ground formations are based largely upon infantry forces supported by tanks, artillery, and air. The tempo and range of our operations are, therefore, geared in general to the infantry soldier. Since the important factor is relative mobility, it is obvious that is massed, mechanized, and tank forces are met, they will possess the superior mobility. The solution lies, therefore, in the creation and training of large, highly mobile formations based upon the characteristics inherent in armored formations of
corps and, perhaps, field army size. We should have available sufficient armored divisions and corps headquarters to provide the training and nuclei around which large offensive ground formations can be built in time for a strategic offensive designed to bring any possible war forced upon it to a very rapid and successful conclusion.

MOBILITY AS A FACTOR IN WAR, by Col. Rajinder Singh, in United Services Institution Journal (India), v. 84, no. 356 (July 54) 256-267.

Historical background of mobility; the various factors that closely affect mobility; and modern aids to mobility, such as infrared equipment, earth moving and bridging equipment, standardization of equipment, and air transportation. To achieve success in battle through mobility, it is essential that the fastest means are made available to carry troops and a sufficient quantity quantity of weapons and equipment. The air arm is found to play the most important role in any future war in the achievement of mobility for one's own forces and for the denial of mobility to the enemy forces.

MOBILITY - KEY TO VICTORY, by Maj. William G. Sell, in Ordnance, v. 39, no. 208 (Jan-Feb 55) 557-560.

The advantages of armor over infantry in future atomic warfare, and changes which should be made in the organization of US ground forces to increase the strength of its armor. The psychological and other factors which make soldiers protected by armor more effective than infantry. The tactical use of atomic weapons will multiply the value of mobility in combat because it is essential to dispersion and rapid concentration. The U.S. Army places more emphasis on armor than does the US; of the thirty-one divisions in East Germany, there are eighteen armored, four infantry, and nine artillery or antiaircraft. The armor is estimated to include 5,500 tanks of which some 2,000 are said to be Joseph Stalin III's.


The situation in the spring of 1862 when Gen. Robert E. Lee, commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, executed a decisive military maneuver against Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, commanding the Army of the Potomac. By skillful use of all means at his command, Maj. Gen. Jackson accomplished superior mobility on the battlefield and provided Lee with the margin of strength needed at the critical time and place to take advantage of McClellan's faulty position and drive his superior force from the field. With similar vision in planning for new, light, mobile equipment and boldness in execution, Allied Forces of the future, dispersed as they must be to avoid being atomic targets and positioned so as to gain the most profitable military posture, may be concentrated swiftly and effectively to provide the margin of strength at a critical time and place to counter any massive strike by the Soviet forces. Because of recent heavy tank development, mobility has been lost through the addition of excessive weight. The future of armor and the success of our arms in an atomic war

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depend almost entirely upon the relative superior mobility which can be attained by our forces. In fact, our success will be in direct proportion to the ability of our military leaders of today to plan boldly for new equipment to restore to armor relative superior mobility on the battlefield.

**OUTLINE OF THE ACTION OF AIR FORCES IN GUERRILLA WARFARE.** Apercus sur l'action des forces aériennes dans la guerre, by Col. F. Groysillier, in Forces Aériennes Françaises, no. 104 (May 55) 801-820. In French.

Discussion of the capabilities and limitations of air power in guerrilla warfare.

**PIPELINE IN THE SKY,** by Capt. John C. Burney, Jr., in Armor, v. 63, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 54) 6-10.

Aerial resupply of fuel for armor. Some of the shortcomings of aerial delivery of gasoline during the Korean War; importance of continuous fuel supply to mobility of ground forces in future war; the ability of cargo airplanes as compared to cargo trucks in providing logistical support to armor; and results achieved in various operations when armor's fuel needs were supplied by cargo airplanes. At present the Army does not have the necessary organization, equipment, and techniques to give armor the fuel it needs by aerial resupply, and the problem must be solved if armor's slashing attacks and lengthy exploitations are to be employed to the fullest advantage.


Earlier and modern concepts of guerrilla warfare; circumstances favoring this type of warfare; natural conditions of the Iberian Peninsula suital. for guerrilla warfare; how to organize and train; and the means (weapons, intelligence, and supplies) for conducting guerrilla warfare.


In order to remain ahead in the art and science of war, we must take into account the probable effect of atomic weapons and integrate our basic ideas with our proved methods, add certain assumptions, and then develop new equipment, techniques, and tactics accordingly. The precepts on which any exploring into the future must be based are: (1) successful operations by large scale ground forces are not now possible unless something approaching parity in the air is assured; (2) technical developments and weapons of unusual destructiveness have increasingly forced ground troops to deploy, separate, and disperse; this dispersion can no longer be considered a passive defensive measure but is now a fundamental condition; (3) the
capability of rapid movement must be built into every arm of the ground forces to make it possible to fight and move in a dispersed manner or to concentrate; (4) each unit of the ground force must be so designed as to permit the maximum flexibility in its employment; (5) commanders must be prepared to operate without definite detailed orders but in conformance with a general overall plan; and (6) dispersion, mobility, and flexibility must also apply to administrative and logistical organizations.

Amphibious operations and future atomic warfare are not incompatible as some military writers have suggested; it may be that by combining the two types of warfare the US will discover the key to victory. Basic considerations of an amphibious operation which could employ atomic weapons of all types and, at the same time, be threatened by them. Although tactics and logistics for such an operation would differ from those which have taken place, the mobility and flexibility of amphibious movement and landing will not be radically changed.
D. Aerial Warfare

1. Air Power Doctrines


The Air Force Association's statement emphasizes undisputed command of the air as the only sure way to prevent war or even insure our own survival as a free nation. It was unanimously adopted by the delegates to the Ninth Annual Convention, on 13 August 1955, in San Francisco, Calif.


A review of the recently published study by Brig. Gen. Dale O. Smith, titled *US Military Doctrine*. Both reviewers point out that Gen. Smith in assessing the current US military doctrine placed too much emphasis on the theory of "instant and massive retaliation" to be carried out by the US Air Force and not enough on the role of the US Army in future conflicts.


Emphasizes the global capabilities of modern air power and the fact that their global impact must be fully evaluated if air forces are to be properly understood and exploited. Analyzes arguments and misconceptions involving air power's effectiveness in Korea against the yardstick of the global nature of air power as set forth in the *United States Air Force Basic Doctrine*, AFA 1-2.


Air forces provide the ideal weapons for limited war. However, to be most effective, the political restrictions applied to a limited war must favor the air weapon. No restrictions should be placed on the kinds of munitions which are best applied from the air. One atomic bomb, for example, could eliminate an enemy airfield. Why not use it instead of tricking in TPT day after day to do the same job? Nor should any air sanctuary be permitted. Hot pursuit of invaders should not be halted at an arbitrary line, and enemy airfields and supply depots used in the limited war should all be fair game.
Definition of air power as the ability to use the air spaces for offensive, defensive, and supply services. Control of accessibility (the ability to go directly from any one point in the world to any other in the same vehicle without reliance upon highways, seaways, or railways) as its most important characteristic - a characteristic which makes air power the primary weapon in modern warfare. Versatility, cost, and limitations of air power.

Arguments supporting the conclusion that without a powerful air-combat force capable of autonomous offensive and defensive actions to achieve air superiority, any ground action, even when supported by aircraft, is ineffectual. In the face of the atomic bomb, air support and ground combat will assume minor roles even though they will continue to be indispensable to modern warfare.

The defense of Great Britain's sea communications in a future war will depend primarily upon the initial struggle for command of the air over the home island and over the life lines across the seas. The changes in bombing capabilities, air-to-surface homing missiles, and submarine warfare constitute a threat against such targets as battleships and large aircraft carriers. The air battle must be won before warships can control the seas and convoys can be protected.

Development and capabilities of US strategic air power which can be operated as a global force tied to no one theater, which can be shifted with great speed from one continent to another, and which can deliver powerful weapons against targets of our own choice. Problems connected with air defense, such as improved and increased numbers of interceptors, more underground protection, and far greater dispersion of bases. The broader and more extensive missions of airpower - strategic, tactical, offensive, and defensive; and the interdependence of all phases of air power. The increased striking power and the many types of missions of short-range airplanes.

Taking exception to the statement by a general officer of the US Army who called upon a principle of war to demonstrate that the role of the Army in the foreseeable future will be basically the same it has played since man started fighting wars, the writer points out that the principles of war are not the exclusive property of the armies or navies. The real final determinant of military victory is that element of war which dominates all others. Military men agree that air power or the air element is dominant over the surface elements. Everything depends upon air supremacy; everything else must take second place. With control of the air, control of the sea and land follows.

MILITARY AVIATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF WAPFARE. Montgomery, Ala., Air University, Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Corps, 54. 102 p. (Air Science 4, v. 4.)

Analysis of the principles of war in the light of modern weapons and air power capabilities now and in the immediate future. Recounting of those portions of the history of land, naval, and air warfare which illustrate the principles and dictate present alignment of the components of military might. Air-power, in its fullest meaning, is the only hope for deterring an attack or for meeting an aerial attack on at least equal terms, and air power must receive highest priority in military planning.

NATIONAL DEFENSE WITHOUT NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY; an answer to General Ridgway, by Gen. Carl Spaatz, in Newsweek, v. 47, no. 5 (30 Jan 56) 24-25.

US global defense strategy does not depend upon massive ground forces but on air-atomic striking power supplemented by small garrisons spaced around the perimeter of Soviet territory. In the cold war ahead the free world must rely primarily on economic staying power, shielded by superior air power. Inter-service competition and rivalry prevent true economy in military spending. To obtain maximum value in military power for the defense dollars appropriated, true unification of the US Armed Forces is needed.


The inadequacy of the 1957 Air Force budget recommended by the Administration will hamper urgent developments, result in a second-best Air Force, and delay the target date for a modern, combat-ready 137-wing Air Force. The responsibility for the calculated risk of military insecurity is now up to Congress.
The concept: only air power can defend US against air and guided missile attack. The Army and Navy are still essential, but.....

Air power has exactly fulfilled the doctrine of Gen. Douhet written 35 years ago. Highlights of his doctrine and its effect on the development of air power in US and other countries.


Air power is an instrument of national policy, and unified air power - incorporating all strategic, tactical, and defense air forces - must be considered a prime organizational requisite for economic preparation for both World War III and such "brush fire" wars to which Americans and Allied military forces may be committed.

SOME NOTES ON THE EVOLUTION OF AIR DOCTRINE, by Bernard Brodie, in World Politics, v. 7, no. 3 (Apr 55) 349-370.  
The air doctrine developed by the Italian general Giulio Douhet, 1869-1930, and its influence on USAF air doctrine. Douhet placed great emphasis on strategic bombing and held that victory could be won quickly by the side which was able to get command of the air and attack the opponent's sources of strength at home. He de-emphasized fighters, whether for defense or for escort of bombers, and placed corresponding emphasis on destroying the enemy air force at its bases. How World War II proved Douhet wrong on many points; and the necessity for revising his doctrine.

British strategy should be fashioned according to the three cardinal national aims - the prevention of war, the maintenance of the economic structure, and the maintenance of Britain as a world power. It should be designed with the twofold object of deterring the Soviets from war and preventing communist expansion in cold war. For an effective deterrent strategy, Great Britain must develop her nuclear capability, foster her strategic bomber force, and maintain her Army in Europe and a balanced fleet. To prevent communist expansion in cold war, the main need will be for land forces which should be given increased mobility and flexibility by expansion of Transport Command and the Air Force. Reorganisation needed in the Army and Air Force, and how it could be financed by adjustments in other areas.

TRADITION VERSUS PROGRESS, by Field Marshal Montgomery, in Air Force, v. 38, no. 11 (Nov 55) 31-34 plus.

Because air power is the dominant factor in modern war, progress must give way to tradition in building-up an organisation of the fighting forces for maximum strength within limits of economic possibilities. Air power must be released from its bondages and forged into one mighty weapon and the air forces of the western alliance should be organised and controlled as one single mighty weapon. Present organisation of tactical air forces and logistics should be recasted completely; and the services should be brought more closely together even to the extent of combining them into one service.

2. Air Support, Air Lift, Air-Ground Problems

AIR FORCE SUPPORT IN GROUND COMBAT. Luftwaffenunterstutzung im erdoerfall, by Waldemar Beck, in Wissenschaftliche Rundschau, v. 4, no. 11 (54) 536-541. In German.

Missions and importance of tactical air forces in modern warfare. With a table listing type and assignment of low-level attack aircraft currently available in Great Britain, US, Sweden, France, and USSR.


Includes an article by Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby titled: THE FUTURE OF MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT.

Critical review of the U.S. Government's fiscal policy as it affects the Air Force. Concludes that we are planning on a second-best Air Force and gambling that it will never have to be used. If the gamble pays off, we will have saved a great deal of money. If it fails, we will have lost everything.


In German.

The declining role of fighter aircraft which will be superseded by antiaircraft rockets as the air defense weapon of the future.


The use of air power in direct support of ground troops in the jungle is limited due to the difficulties in identifying the targets and due to the diminished effect of bombs. All operations against the guerrillas are dependent on air supply by periodic drops into properly marked drop zones. Casualty evacuation by helicopters. Reconnaisance by slow-moving aircraft or helicopters.


The evolution of tactical aircraft; their employment in World War II; differing opinions as to characteristics required of this type of aircraft; current and probable future trends which include: (a) heavy fighter-bombers for launching atomic or thermonuclear air-to-ground missiles, (b)
light, low-flying aircraft for direct and indirect support, generally with atomic or thermonuclear weapons, (c) helicopters for close direct support with conventional explosives, and (d) supersonic aircraft for high or medium altitudes flying at speeds comparable to those of guided missiles.

THE FUTURE OF MILITARY AIR LOGISTICS, in Interavia, v.11, no. 4 (April 56) 263-266.

"Even if, as the strategists maintain, a future war were very short, transport operations would be needed over a long period to exploit the active phase of hostilities and above all for the long months of recovery and reconstruction which would inevitably follow the phase of mass destruction." Some figures on the air transport capacity needed to meet the requirements of the US Armed Forces.


Interdiction is almost a by-product of the tactical air effort. It belongs properly to the Air Force because of this and because it can be accomplished with stand Air Force equipment. The interruption of communications, the attainment of air superiority, and the strategic bombing effort all contribute to interdiction. Close support by analogy should be an Army function. It is an integral part of the ground battle, and it must be completely responsive to the will of the commander. Aircraft for this mission do not duplicate the tactical aircraft of the Air Force. The distinction between interdiction and close support has gradually become apparent through combat experience. A revision of the functions to confirm the Air Force's dominance in the interdiction role and to establish the Army's dominance in the close support role would end the confusion and the bickering that have marked the attempts to make the present system work.


Quotations from speeches by responsible Air Force leaders stressing the need and advantages of greater utilization of air transport.


In view of recent progress in armament and the evolution of tactical operations, the concept of air support under French doctrine has recently been
changed from "support of an army" to "participation in a joint battle." This provides a clearer distinction between the two types of action (autonomous and joint) which the French Air Force can implement within the scope of a given mission involving all armed forces.

STRAIGHT THRU TO KYUSHU, by Maj. Joseph P. Tracy and Capt. John H. Moore, Jr., in Flying Safety, v. 11, no. 9 (Sept 55) 4-11.

The story of how 4000 men were airlifted via OPERATION GYROSCOPE when in July 1955 the Army decided to transfer the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team from US to Kyushu, Japan to replace the 187th ARCT. Planning the airlift; safety factors considered; briefing the troops; number of aircraft used; weights carried; and other details. The close liaison between the Army and the Air Force during OPERATION GYROSCOPE has been an eye-opener. The Operation may well pave the way toward a completely new era in safe, mass transportation of armies from any point in the globe to home and back again. Photos.


Activities of the Army's 7278th GU Transportation Terminal Command in supporting USAF operations in the Far North. From the nerve center of Army Transportation at McAndrew Air Force Base, Newfoundland, 7278th headquarters controls cargo discharge operations at half a dozen major Air Force installations through an area of 3,500,000 square miles. Equipment used, hardships endured, and seasonal problems faced and overcome.


A contribution by an Army officer in the long-standing debate on control of AF units employed in support of ground forces. Argues that control of these forces should remain with the AF commander for reasons of principles of war - particularly those of mass, economy of forces, and unity of command. Compares air-ground operations with naval support in amphibious operations in which Navy control is generally accepted.

US AIR FORCE BASIC DATA. Fort Leavenworth, Kans., Command and General Staff College, 52. 65 p. (ST 31-35-1.)

Organisation and operation of theater air forces at all levels of command. Limited to a general summary of the principles, doctrine, tactics, and techniques of the principles, doctrine, tactics, and techniques of the combat phase of tactical air operations as they affect surface operations. Appendix: charts showing organisation of USAF and major commands; World War II
Army comments on the effects of tactical air support; joint Army-Air Force agreement on air control teams; new terminology used in joint air-ground operations; numbers of aircraft assigned to various types of units (war strength); standardization factors for use in map maneuvers; guide to aircraft employment; ground target damage assessment chart; tactical air missions chart; and procedures for obtaining offensive air support and tactical air reconnaissance.


Modern jet airplanes are too fast and their flights are of too short a duration to operate effectively against guerillas in such terrain as Malaya or Korea. Rather than produce special aircraft for such missions, the RAF should adapt communications or transport planes for these attack/reconnaissance roles.


New logistic ideas and methods must be developed and tested in consonance with revised strategy and tactics in future combat with a view to drastic reductions in the world-wide division slice. General Mark Clark in his comments upon the Korean War stated: "Our men, even at the front, became accustomed to luxuries we will never be able to afford again. We behind the man with the gun. Since the Communists outnumber us and our allies, we must reverse the trend." All frills must be eliminated. The theory that the American soldier is entitled to anything to make him safe as well as comfortable, is subject to searching re-examination. In war, safety and the essentials for combat are the yardsticks of comfort. Our desire to import the American standard of living to the battlefield, desirable though it may be, in a future global war would probably lead to national bankruptcy and defeat.

**A WORLD WITH BULK CARGO AIRCRAFT**, by Rear Admiral John D. Hayes (US Navy Ret.) in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 82, no. 5 (May 56) 497-503.

A theory of air power to be sound and lasting will have to be based on the transport airplane rather than on the bomber. The advent of the bulk cargo airplane and the consequences it will bring.
E. Naval Warfare

1. Lines of Communication

WHAT'S DOING NEAR NORTH POLE, in U.S. News and World Report, v. 37, no. 11 (10 Sept 54) 52.

In the summer of 1954, two U.S. icebreakers penetrated the "Northwest Passage" from the Atlantic to the Pacific via the ice-choked Arctic. Strategic importance of the new sea route in terms of U.S. and allied logistics, offensive operations against Russia in case of war, and defense of U.S. and the general importance of the new sea route to the solution of various problems of Arctic warfare. Map showing the new route from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

2. Combat Operations


This discussion of the effects of thermonuclear bombs on surface ships concludes that the Navy's only chance of survival resides in the employment of submarines.


A review of the submarine's capabilities; and five general forms of antisubmarine action laid down by naval strategists which would be used by the US Navy to maintain control of the seas. They are: (1) enemy submarine bases and building yards would be attacked by aircraft; (2) enemy harbors and channels leading to the open sea would be mined by aircraft or submarines; (3) our own "killer" submarines would be stationed across the enemy submarine transit lanes to attack from ambush; (4) hunter killer groups of various combinations of ships and planes would isolate and destroy submarines where found on the high seas; and (5) as a defensive measure, convoys and fleet formations would be protected by air and surface escorts.

Means available for detecting and destroying submarines.

GREAT BRITAIN'S NAVY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, by J. F. L. Thomas, in Compass, v. 7, no. 6 (Apr 55) 7-8.

The First Lord of the Admiralty states: "whatever the scope of a
future war and whatever the nature of the weapons used, the task of the Navy will still be to control the sea, to assure the safe passage of supplies and to support the other armed forces. Air power at sea is not something which replaces the Navy, but is the instrument by which the Navy today so largely exercises its sea power. The aircraft today is both the striking power of the Fleet (largely replacing the 15-inch gun of the battleship) and the eyes of the Fleet (largely replacing the cruiser in this respect). Dismissing nuclear war as improbable (mutually suicidal) he sees a continuation of uneasy peace punctuated with military actions such as took place in Korea and Indochina. The fleet Britain needs today is one required to meet her worldwide commitments in support of the Commonwealth interests and trade in such local wars as may occur during the uneasy peace, and such ships and aircraft as are necessary to ensure that Britain can play her part in NATO as a deterrent to nuclear war and in retaliation if the deterrent fails.

HELICOPTERS VERSUS SUBMARINES, in Naval Aviation News, (Feb 55) 1-5.
The capabilities of sonar-equipped helicopters in anti-submarine warfare; and their advantages, in some respects, over destroyers in such operations. Helicopters have a tremendous potential in: (1) reducing time lag to datum; (2) positively identifying the contact; (3) tenacity in holding contact; and (4) ability to regain contact with speed. Typical helicopter operations from a US aircraft carrier.

German experiences in World War II and technical developments achieved in recent years together with further improvements to be expected in the near future, support the conclusion that submarines will continue to play an important part in future wars, although that part may not prove to be more decisive than in the past.

3. Doctrines

"If the historians of the future ever have the tragic tasks of writing the story of World War III, I am confident that they will then add another favorable endorsement to Mahan's conclusions." The Chief of Naval Operations shows how US became a beneficiary in the past, is reaping the advantages at present, and will profit in the future, from the application of Alfred Thayer Mahan's principles on sea power. The addition of two new dimensions -air and sub-surface- have not affected the soundness of Mahan's conclusions. This was demonstrated in World War II and is being demonstrated
at present in the cold war. Allied control of the seas made the NATO and the
Manila Pact a reality, and Allied strategy will continue to be inextricably
tied to freedom of movements of the sea. The Soviet Union has realized
that its major stumbling block to expansion has been its sea impotency.
Soviet expansionist movement has a significant pattern of weakness. Not
one single conquest was made by Russia in the whole of Africa, in the entire
Western Hemisphere, nor in any part of the Far East which is separated from
the Asiatic mainland from water which is controlled by Allied sea power.
Determined to overcome this stumbling block, Russia is now building all
types of surface ships, more submarines than the rest of the world put

together, and is practicing amphibious landings in an obvious effort to
compete for the mastery of the sea. It would be the greatest blunder if US
by relying too much on warfare with new weapons weakens the advantages
inherent in its sea power.

**HEAVY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS - LONG RANGE OF SHORE-BASED AIRCRAFT HAS MADE
THEM OBSOLETE,** by Air Marshal Robert Saumby, in *Air Pictorial*, v. 17, no. 2
(Feb 55) 34-36.

A contribution to the British controversy concerning the role of
aircraft carriers in modern warfare. Contends that in the future, control of
the seas will be the responsibility of air power and that the long range of
shore-based aircraft has made slow-moving aircraft carriers obsolete.

"IN ANY OPERATION" - AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, by Capt. T. U. Sisson, in
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 81, no. 3 (Mar 55) 257-261.

The role of aircraft carriers in denying the enemy control of
the sea; the interdependence of bombers - whose mission is control of the
air - and aircraft carriers - whose mission is control of the sea; and
the need for both types of weapons.

**MOBILE SEA BASE SYSTEMS IN NUCLEAR WARFARE,** by James H. Smith, Jr.,
in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 81, no. 2 (Feb 55) 131-135.

The characteristics and capabilities in nuclear warfare of
mobile bases composed of aircraft carriers and ships. The advantages of
such bases over stationary airfields and other ground installations. In
three days' time a mobile task force could launch concentrated attacks
on military targets 3,000 or more miles apart; and those attacks could be
supplemented by simultaneous strikes by submarine-launched guided missiles
or jet seaplanes. The author is Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Air).

**THE NAVAL SITUATION,** by Adm. J. Hughes-Hallett, in *Navy*, v. 60, no. 11
(Nov 55) 338-341.

The prime role of the British Navy in a future war - which will be
of short duration - will be to participate actively in the prime operation of
the war, that is, in attacking the enemy with nuclear weapons. Why the Navy
is admirably fitted for this mission. In order to accomplish the mission the
Navy must be entirely refitted with carriers, rocket ships, guided missile
ships, and a thoroughly up-to-date fleet train. Financing of the project can
be accomplished by reducing reserves, store and ammunition depots, bases, and
stockyards.

THE NAVY'S ROLE IN A LIMITED WAR: KOREA CLEAR EXAMPLE OF THE VALUE OF SEA
POWER TODAY, in The Crownet, v. 8, no. 6 (Apr 56) 25-26.

The question has been raised as to whether sea power would be equally
effective in an atomic global war. First Lord of the Admiralty, Viscount
Cilcennin has stated that whether we invest more heavily in a naval power for
war purposes hinges in whether we envisage that a future full-scale war would
last beyond the stages of all-out thermonuclear exchanges. After the first
stunning blows would fall, the navies alone might remain undamaged and able to
carry on the battle. "As things stand today, if the navies lose control of
the seas the Western Alliance would have to go out of business.

THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD SEA POWER, ed. by E. B. Potter. Englewood

A history of US and international sea power, developing six main
themes: (1) the influence of sea power upon history, (2) the rationale of
strategic decision, (3) the characteristics of successful leadership, (4)
the development of naval weapons, (5) the evolution of naval tactics, and
(6) the evolution of amphibious doctrine. Emphasis is placed on the pro-
blems posed in each period of history by new weapons and new conditions,
and on the solutions worked out for each by the navies of the world. Among
the chapters: the origins of Western sea power; the Seven Years' War;
the American Revolution; the Trafalgar Campaign 1805; the American Civil War;
naval developments of the late 19th Century; the rise of sea power in the
Far East; the naval battles of World War I; doctrinal evolution between
World Wars; US and Allied naval battles and campaigns of World War II; defeat
of Germany and the dissolution of the Japanese Empire; naval operations in
the Korean War; and the political and military aspects of the cold war and
hot peace of the post-Korean era. Until tested in the crucible of combat
no weapon can be written off. Sea power has not come to the end of its
usefulness as a military weapon as insisted upon by some. On the contrary,
in another global conflict, the navies of the world may yet prove to be
decisive. Bibliography.
F. Unconventional Warfare

1. General Aspects


It is no longer enough for generals and diplomats to have an intellectual grasp of political warfare. In the world where the stakes are as tremendous as freedom versus slavery, it is imperative that many more Americans understand what is meant by political warfare. To this end the author communicates the basic understanding of political warfare and explains: the nature of war; types and media of political warfare; present battlefields of political warfare (e.g., French North Africa); role of intelligence in political warfare; Soviet potential and Soviet political intentions, Soviet experience in political warfare (the Party, counterespionage, political warfare strategy); and American political warfare efforts (notably the failure of US to understand and exploit the uprising in Eastern Germany on 17 June 1953). Bibliography.

(PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SCHOOL STUDENT SUMMARIES.) Fort Bragg, N.C., Psychological Warfare School, 54-

A group of Student Summaries used by the School covering courses in various phases of psychological warfare. Some of these materials will be superseded by the Field Manuals: FM 31-21, GUERRILLA WARFARE: FM 33-10, PSYWAR OPERATIONS; and FM 31-20, SPECIAL FORCES GROUP.

2. CBR

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE. Bakteriologicheskaia voina, ed. by S. I. Vavilov, in Bol'shala Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, v. 4 (50) 84-85. In Russian.

Soviet view on bacteriological warfare: Japan engaged in bacteriological warfare in 1939; Germany was contemplating the use of BW agents during World War II; US was conducting extensive research in BW during World War II; in 1949 this work in US assumed a secrecy greater than the work on atomic weapons; US "deliberately" did not join in the international banning of bacteriological warfare; and the Soviet Union is the "champion" against the use of BW agents. "The mighty movement of the peoples toward peace, and the consolidation of the democratic camp headed by the USSR are gigantic forces which are able to frustrate the plans of the aggressors and the perfidious schemes of using monstrous means for the extermination of peoples." (This volume of the Soviet Encyclopedia, which contains this present paper, went to press 31 August 1950. Full English translation of the Russian text on this paper on Bacteriological Warfare is available in the Army Library.)
CBR WARFARE, by Harvey Miller, in Military Engineer, v. 48, no. 3 (Mar-Apr 55) 125-126.

Characteristics of CBR agents; CBR warfare and defense in brief; and development of protective measures which in the majority of cases will be effective for all three types of CBR warfare.


Scope of CBR instruction at the Command and General Staff College: the first step is an orientation on national policy regarding this type of warfare, definition of chemical warfare, biological warfare, and radiological warfare, and the interrelationship of development and operational techniques among the three. Some principles of employment are presented as a basis for further study. Subsequent instruction is conducted as an integral part of exercises, map exercise, and map maneuvers. New manuals which will soon be ready for issue, present a substantially increased coverage of CBR warfare doctrine, and more thoroughly delineate the position of the Staff Chemical Officer.


The Army's Chief Chemical Officer describes the objectives, methods, and weapons of biological warfare and what it can do to a nation unprepared to defend itself against BW if the enemy decides to use it as a weapon of attack. Because the Soviets today have the scientists, facilities, and materials necessary for producing a variety of BW agents for operations against the population, livestock, or crops in US, America must be as strong in biological warfare as in any other type of warfare. The most effective defense against an enemy as cunning, ruthless, and unprincipled as the Soviet Union, is the deterrent effect of offensive and defensive capability.

CHEMICAL CORPS TO BE REVAMPED; HAS "WILL-SAPPING" SECRET WEAPON, in Army-Navy-Air Force Register, v. 76, no. 11 (12 Nov 55) 1 plus.

Major contents of a report prepared by a special committee which investigated the administration and organisation of the Army Chemical Corps. Major recommendations included: (1) improved public relations; (2) streamlined organization, including the establishment of three separate commands for research and development, engineering, and material, and the appointment of a general officer to a new post, Assistant Chief Chemical Officer in charge of Planning and Doctrine; (3) emphasis on career management and planning; (4) free exchange between universities and industrial laboratories; and (5) imaginative long-range research. The report revealed that the Chemical Corps is working on secret weapons which destroy the enemy's will to fight without permanent injury.

Address delivered by the CO Chemical Corps Biological Warfare Laboratories, Fort Detrick, Md., at the Second Military-Industrial Conference of the Society of American Military Engineers, held in Chicago, 9-10 February 1956.


Civilian (Miller) committee recommends emphasis on research and recognition of corps' warfare potential and points out the unique advantages of chemical and biological warfare weapons. Unlike atomic or H-bombs, they can bring an enemy to his knees without widespread destruction. Such weapons can weaken the will to fight without causing loss of lives or permanent injury.

3. Psychological

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, by Thomas O. Andrews and others, in Journal of Applied Psychology, v. 38, no. 3 (June 54) 240-244.

Standardized interviews with North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war were carried out to test the relative importance of several attitudes and experiences in determining defection attitudes and willingness to surrender. Among the experiences assessed was the amount of tactical psychological warfare the troops had received before becoming prisoners of war. Results of the study appeared to confirm the major hypothesis that psychological warfare is effective in changing behavior, but its effects are mainly of a precipitating nature that varies according to the morale and previous experiences of the individual. Psychological warfare methods used.


Based on the experiences of the author who worked for five years both as civilian expert and as Army officer in American psychological warfare facilities - at every level from the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff planning phase down to the preparation of spot leaflets. Definition and history of psychological warfare; propaganda analysis and intelligence; organisation for psychological warfare; plans and planning; operations for civilians; operations against troops; and psychological warfare operations after World War II. Appended: military psywar operations 1950-53. With illustrations of the various types of propaganda.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE; an introduction to ideological propaganda and the techniques of psychological warfare by Bala Srouryegh. New York, William Frederick Press, 55. 432 p.

Psychological principles of propaganda; problems and principles of controlling the masses; and the language of propaganda; protective measures; and justification and organization of psychological warfare. A concluding chapter explains the failures and backwardness of the West in psychological warfare as against the power and success of communist propaganda.


Strong points, weaknesses, problems, and operations of Radio Free Europe, a privately operated radio station which has been engaged since 1950 in refuting communist lies, exposing cases of injustices, and ridiculing regimes. As the idea of co-existence spreads, RFE plans to reorient its approach of applying pressure to the Satellite regimes.

4. Cold War and Methods


Urges the Western Powers to fight the Soviet Union by all and every means available to them, short of an open armed conflict, in order to win the cold war before Russia wins it. So far the Western Powers are fighting no more than a holding action against Soviet strategy of world conquest, but in cold war as in hot the only answer to penetration is counter-penetration. The West must also realize that cocktail diplomacy and the alternation of propaganda bellowings and apologetic gestures of appeasement do not work against communism. Pointing out the soft underbelly of the communist body politics, the author outlines the means by which the West can strike at it, defeat it on its own ground, and put an end to this uneasy age in which we live.


Objective account of the development and causes of the current hostile relationship between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union, together with her communist allies; and steps which both sides would have to take in order to reach a peaceful settlement.

LET'S QUIT TALKING NONSENSE ABOUT THE COLD WAR, by Hanson W. Baldwin, in Saturday Evening Post, v. 227, no. 11 (11 Sept 54) 25 plus.
Predictions of the inevitability of war and other popular pessimistic statements which crop up in the West from time to time (e.g. "the French won't fight"; "there is no defense against A-bombs"; "the navies are finished") are not based on fact. Most of these predictions do harm to the West's cause because they presuppose that the communists have won the cold war and that Russia cannot be licked without A-bombs. The author examines some of these predictions concluding that they "are pure baloney" because the West can win the cold war and in that case there will be no need for World War III, and that in case of another war there are means other than nuclear weapons to defeat the Soviet Union.

A NEW PLAN TO DEFEAT COMMUNISM, in U.S. News and World Report, v. 38, no. 21 (27 May 55) 134-143.

Full text of a memorandum by Brig. Gen. David Sarnoff, board chairman of the Radio Corporation of America, presented to the White House on 5 April 1955. The main points of the plan proposed in the memorandum: establishment of a high-command for fighting the cold war; giving it cabinet status and able planners; launching a world-wide propaganda effort; making available everywhere cheap, lightweight radios, able to pick up US programs; distributing millions of simple phonographs and cardboard propaganda records; and using mobile, big-screen TV units to get the US message across in non-Red areas.
G. Lessons and Examples of Previous Wars


First article of a series on the important role and accomplishments of US aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft in the fields of tactics and logistics.


How the helicopter proved its ability as a transport vehicle in Korea by supplying an entire division for six days and by supplying a regimental combat unit cut off on a ridge and not accessible by other means. Post-Korean developments in Army employment of helicopters include: training activities and steps to create an attractive career program for pilots and maintenance personnel; development of new types of helicopters capable of carrying larger payloads; and construction of an airport built exclusively for military helicopters.


The aftermath of the historic victory in March 1862 of the Union's monitor over the Confederate VIRGINIA (originally the MERRIMAC) is described as an outstanding example of the fallacy of allowing politics to influence judgment about the real effectiveness of weapons.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA 1941-42, by Field Marshal von Manstein, in Marine Corps Gazette, v. 40, no. 5 (May 56) 32-47.

This campaign is reviewed in light of the "spectre of a possible clash with the Soviet Union and her tremendous manpower" supported by heavy armor and modern air. The author, who was the commander of the German Eleventh Army) with no armor and lacking continual air support, defeated an enemy who was not numerically superior, but also had great strength in armor, prepared positions to fight from, command of the air and control of the sea. As far back as 1941-42 the Soviet military establishment was capable of mounting an amphibious operation in over 2-division strength and effecting a landing. The German victory is attributed to skillful leadership and sound planning. This article is condensed from the author's book, LAST VICTORIES (Athenae Press, Bad Godesberg).

Comments on the Code of Conduct resulting from experience with POW's in Korea, discipline, and other post-Korean trends in the US Army.

COMBATING SOVIET GUERRILLAS, by Ernst von Dohnanyi, in Marine Corps Gazette, v. 39, no. 2 (Feb 55) 50-61.

A former officer of the German Army describes the Russian organisation and tactics for guerrilla warfare and German antiguerillia operations. Examples of Soviet guerrilla methods and tactics; lack of success of the early German attempts to eliminate partisans; and the unorthodox tactics of several operations which were successful. Guerrillas must be fought by specially trained troops and with unusual methods of combat; and they cannot survive in an area where they are deprived of food, supply and freedom of movement. Suggests the organisation, equipment, and training for an antiguerilla battalion.


The legal problems presented by the development of international institutions designed to permit the most effective utilization of military forces furnished by the cooperating states. The examples commented upon are: Combined Chiefs of Staff and unified commands during World War II, occupation administrations, the UN forces in Korea, NATO, and the European Defence Community.

DEATH OF AN ARMY, by Col. Virgil Ney, in Army Combat Forces Journal, v. 6, no. 3 (Oct 55) 38-42.

The causes of dissolution of the Imperial Russian Army in 1917; conditions which resulted in desertion, surrender, mutiny, murder of officers, and which led to the overthrow of the Imperial Government and establishment of the Bolshevist regime; the military lesson of the collapse of discipline in the Imperial Army; and the Bolshevist propaganda and rumors directed at the soldiers with the objective of breaking down their spirit and will to fight.


Documentary evidence shows that Hitler's decision, on 21 May 1940 to discontinue the advance on Dunkirk by converting von Rundstedt's partial halt into a definite halt, was due to a combination of motives and influences to which the following can be clearly traced: (a) his
desire to ensure that the maximum possible tank strength should be
conserved for the next offensive southward; (b) his anxiety lest the
tanks should become bogged down in Flanders - an anxiety arising from
his own memories of that marshy area in the previous war, and re-
inforced by Jodl's misgivings on that score; (c) Goering's desire that
his Air Force should have the glory of finishing off the British
Expeditionary Force, and his assurance that this could be effectively
achieved from the air without the Army's help; and (d) Hitler's prefer-
ence for letting Goering have his way in the matter.

**EMEY ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES IN NORTH KOREA**, by Maj. Andrew T. Soltys,
in Air University Quarterly Review, v. 7, no. 1 (Spring 54) 75-81.
Weakness of overall effectiveness of enemy antiaircraft defenses
in Korean War. Equipment and tactics used by communists. Lesson learned is
that antiaircraft artillery defenses cannot repel determined air attack.

**FAITHFUL TO OUR TRUST**, in Army Combat Forces Journal, v. 5, no. 5
(Dec 54) 18-21.
Improper measures due to misplaced emphasis on administration
during the Korean War are cited to illustrate that the "soul" of our Army
is in danger of being corrupted. Suggested remedies designed to: (a) elim-
inate any procedure or policy at any level which deviates from established
doctrines and which does not "repose special trust and confidence in the
valor, fidelity, and abilities" of an officer; (b) eliminate any officer
who gives evidence that he does not merit such trust or will not extend it
to others; and (c) insist that noncommissioned officers have equally high
standards. When "honor," "patriotism," and "glory" are no longer sissy or
dirty words, when subordinates are given maximum trust and minimum super-
vision, and when all efforts are directed toward doing the right thing and
doing it right rather than keeping "covered," the rest will fall into place.

**THE FATAL DECISIONS**, ed. by Seymour Freidin and William Richardson,
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN, by the General of the Air Force, Werner Kreipe;
THE BATTLE OF MOSCOW, by General Gunther Blumentritt; EL ALAMEIN, by General
Fritz Bayerlein; STALINGRAD, by Colonel General Kurt Zeitzler; FRANCE, 1944,
An informed critique of failure in the boldest aggression of our times. Maps.

**FIFTEEN DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WORLD**, by Edward S. Cressy, Harrisburg,
Marathon, 490 B.C.; Syracuse, 413 B.C.; Arbela, 331 B.C.; Matinus
207 B.C.; Arminius, A.D. 9; Chalons, 451; Tours, 732; Hastings, 1066; Orleans.
1429; Spanish Armada, 1588; Blenheim, 1704; Pultowa, 1709; Saratoga, 1777; Valky, 1792; and Waterloo, 1815 (the last great battle known to the author who died in 1872). Maps.

THE FIGHTER-BOMBER IN KOREA, by Col. Charles G. Teschner, in Air University Quarterly Review, v. 7, no. 2 (Summer 54) 71-80.
Summary of problems and controversies connected with employment of fighter-bombers in Korea; and account of fighter-bomber operations during five phases of the Korean War: (1) the retreat to Pusan, 25 June-25 September 1950; (2) the advance to Yalu, 26 September-25 November 1950; (3) the second retreat, 26 November 1950-5 January 1951; (4) the stabilization of the main line of resistance, 6 January-25 June 1951; and (5) the period characterized as air pressure for peace, 26 June 1951-27 July 1953.

THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN ARMY; a lesson in military organization, by Carey Brewr, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 82, No. 2 (Feb 56) 157-166.
Descriptive analysis of the German Army General Staff system. The survey deals with those factors primarily responsible for the German failure to achieve the desired balance in the use of the three services, as well as with those factors which tended to strengthen the internal staff system. Intended as an illustration of the inadequacy of a single-service supreme general staff for the direction of multi-service forces. Historical development; characteristics prior to 1914; and the German General Staff during World Wars I and II.

The former Chief of Staff to the Commander of German Naval Forces at Brest describes how OPERATION TUNON was planned and carried out by battle cruisers SCHARNHORST, GNEISENAU, and PRINZ EUGEN, which were ordered in early 1942 to make a dash from Brest up the English Channel to German ports. Because the operation was planned in complete secrecy, the British were unable to prevent this German surprise maneuver, and their belated attacks on the German ships by coast artillery, destroyers, and RAF planes, because of their unorganized nature, failed to cause serious damage. The three battle cruisers arrived in German ports as planned. The objectives of the dash: to move these ships from Germany to Norway for operations in the area of the North Cape and to bring strategic pressure on Allied line of communications in the Atlantic and Western approaches of the British Islands.

An examination of Mahan's, Mackinder's, Spykman's, and Seversky's views of global politics and strategy.
GUIDE TO FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES 1945-54. Headquarters, United States Army, Europe; Historical Division, 54th. 253 p.

A catalog and index to the manuscripts produced under the Foreign Military Studies Program of the Historical Division, USAREUR, and of predecessor commands since 1945. Most of the manuscripts were prepared by former high-ranking officers of the German Armed Forces. Originally the mission of the Foreign Military Studies Program was only to obtain information on enemy operations in the European Theater for use in the preparation of an official history of the US Army in World War II. In 1946 the program was broadened to include the Mediterranean and Russian theaters. In 1947 emphasis was placed on preparation of operational studies for use by US Army planning and training agencies and service schools. Many of the more recent studies have analyzed the German military experiences for their useful lessons. The guide contains three indexes - by topic, by military unit, and by author. Most entries include a short statement describing the contents and usefulness of the study. Appended: glossary of abbreviations and foreign terms. Charts: illustrate scope, status, and size of the various manuscript series; give dates and physical locations of writing, translating, and administrative activity 1945-1954; list studies that have been or will be published as Department of the Army pamphlets; and list manuscripts published in the ECOM-USAREUR Foreign Military Studies series.


The place of the Army in US history, and its influence upon the various aspects of American life during: 1607-1775 and the Colonial Wars; 1775-1833 and the Revolutionary War; 1812-1815 and the War of 1812; 1846-1848 and the Mexican War; 1845-1865 and the Civil War; 1865-1891 and Reconstruction and Indian Wars; 1891-1901 and Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection; 1901-1914 and World War I; 1919-1945 and World War II; and 1945-1954 and the Korean War. The accomplishments of the US Army in both war and peace have been outstanding. Aside from its military tasks it has also made important contributions in education, exploration, relief, domestic order, government, diplomacy, engineering, sanitation, medicine, transportation, communications, and aviation. It has always been imbued with the spirit of the people from which it springs. Since 1775, it has been the servant of the people, toiling and sacrificing for the common good. With a table of Army casualties in major wars. For the same text (plus illustrations) see UNITED STATES ARMY: PROTECTOR OF OUR LIBERTIES, by Brig. Gen. P. M. Robinett, in Army Information Digest, v. 10, no. 6 (June 55) 36 p.


An interpretation of the factor of space in modern strategy. Germany lost her campaign in Russia because she misunderstood this strategic factor. Attempting to apply to Russia's geography the concepts that proved successful on the Western front, Germany exposed herself to a com-
bination of factors that worked in favor of Russia and steadily drained the strength from the German Armed Forces. These factors—space, defense-in-depth, and weather—still apply to Russia today and must be considered by those who plan national strategy.


The outstanding leadership characteristics common to both Civil War commanders were: (a) forceful personalities, (b) moral courage, and (c) military ability. The American Civil War shows that the following conditions must be met if an army commander is to carry out his mission successfully: (1) the troops must be disciplined and well trained; (2) capable and loyal subordinate commanders must assist the top commander; (3) personnel replacements and supplies must be adequate; and (4) the responsibilities of political and military leaders must be clearly defined, kept separate, and mutually respected.

LEARNING FROM THE KOREAN WAR, by Maj. B. M. Majumdar, in Sainik Samachar, v. 1, no. 26 (26 Sep 54) 7-8, no. 27 (3 Oct 54) 7-8.

First two installments of an article dealing with lessons which the professional soldier can learn from the Korean War. Costly withdrawals by UN forces could have been avoided with better information on Korean terrain, climate, and characteristics of the North Korean people. The war showed that primitive weapons and methods are more suitable in an Asian battlefield than mechanized units and that the Soviets have advanced further in design and armament of tanks than the Western countries. The success of Chinese massed infantry is attributed to superior infantry technique in rugged terrain and employment of guerrillas and partisans. The Korean War served to underline both the potentialities and limitations of air power.

LEARNING FROM THE WAR IN INDOCHINA, by L. M. Chassin, in East and West, no. 5 (55) 9-15.

A review of the events leading to the defeat of the French in Indochina. This shows that there is nothing to be gained by giving men the most modern weapons and equipment if they are not prepared militarily to make use of them, and if they are not prepared mentally and psychologically to defend their country. Tactics employed by Mao Tse-tung in China and Giap in Indochina.

LOGISTICS AND WORLD WAR II ARMY STRATEGY, by Col. H. F. Sykes, Jr., in Military Review, v. 35, no. 2 (Feb 56) 47-54.

Explores the interplay between the grand strategic and logistic decisions of the US Army during World War II and concludes that the projection
of military requirements must be on the broadest possible basis allow for flexibility and alternative courses of action. The idea that a single set of requirements tied to a single strategic plan furnishes a proper basis for wartime production should be shunned. What is needed is a pattern of production which can support many courses of action while precisely fitted to no one of them.

MOBILITY IN THE JUNGLE, in Air University Quarterly Review, v. 7, no. 3 (Winter 54-55) 32-42.

Account of the first airborne invasion in history which was conducted in the Burma Campaign in 1944 by British Brigadier Orde C. Wingate and AAF (Australian) Colonel Philip G. Cochran and their specially trained air commandos. Troops and supplies were flown from India in C-47 gliders over Japanese lines, and air heads were established in enemy rear areas in Burmese jungle clearings. The operation is an interesting precedent for successful air-ground operations in potential areas of war with terrain similar to Burma's. It also illustrates the need for mobility in combating guerrilla operations.

NORMANDY, 1944, in Military Review, v. 34, no. 11 (Nov 55) 86-93.

The German side of the story of the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944. Weather played an important part in the initial stages of the invasion. When General Eisenhower made his historic decision and ordered the assembled mass of men, machines, and ships to proceed with the invasion plans despite the bad weather, the Germans suspected nothing. Although they had long expected Allied landings, the unfavorable weather on the day the landing was carried out led the German High Command to believe that there was no danger of an invasion on that day. The Allied transport fleet of over 6,000 ships left their ports in broad daylight and assembled at sea only 60 nautical miles from the French coastline. It was not observed and nothing happened to it until it was within sight of the French coast and it was too late for the Germans to do anything. Considering the fact that the Germans had reconnaissance aviation, fast sea vessels, and highly developed technical intelligence, the undetected Allied invasion, and failure of German forces to engage the invading armies until it was too late merits an explanation. To this end examine: the state of German reconnaissance on 4-6 June 1944; how the Germans disregarded intelligence tips that the invasion was under way; and other German blunders that led to the collapse of their defense front against the Allied invasion forces. Map. (Translated and digested from an article by former Rear Admiral Kurt Assmann in DEUTSCHE SOLDATEN ZEITUNG, 1 July 1954.)

THE OLD EUROPEAN ARM, by W. F. Jackson Knight, in Forces Magazine, (Mar 55) 8-10.

Characteristics of the Roman Army which secured peace and order in the vast territory of the Roman Empire and contributed to the longest period
of peace mankind had ever experienced in historical times. Emphasis on the
legions, or the regular branch of the Army and its standard of excellence in
regard to organization, operational capability, training, discipline, and
esprit de corps.

ON THE IMPORTANCE AND UNIMPORTANCE OF WAR EXPERIENCE. Über den wert und
unwert von kriegererfahrungen, by Hans Doerr, in Wehrwissenschaftliche
Rundschau, v. 4, no. 9 (Sept 54) 393-400. In German.

The danger of drawing conclusions from individual experiences instead
of basing them on principles applying to all situations. Germany neglected to
consider and study Bolshevist tactics after World War I (e.g. a German division
was defeated at Bataisk in June 1918). At present, the Western Powers over-
emphasize weapons and weapons systems and give too much credit to their superior
leadership. German doctrine as written up in Gen. Beck's TRUPPENFÜHRUNG was
outstanding and would have been successful without Hitler's interference. The
records of the German Army should be returned for analysis and adequate exploita-
tion by Germans. It is a mistake to believe that a superior air force could
defeat a modern army. In the case of the USSR who will have adequate air
support in a future engagement such an outcome is unlikely. Further studies
should consider: future naval warfare service actions in joint land opera-
tions, and the possible influence of the Nuremberg Trials on the conduct of
war.

PERIPHERAL WARS, by Brig. Gen. Paul M. Robinett, in Military Review,
v. 35, no. 12 (Mar 56) 44-47.

The politico-military histories of the Roman Empire, Nazi
Germany, Soviet Union, Japan, and Great Britain show that "containment,
accompanied by little wars on the periphery of enemy-held or domi-
nated territory, is only a tactic and not a form of warfare. It is a de-
laying action which cannot win a decision."

THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY OF MAO TZE-TUNG, by Edward L. Katzenbach and
Gene Z. Haaslahen, in Political Science Quarterly, v. 70, no. 3 (Sept 55)
321-340.

A review of Mao's strategy employed during the Sino-Japanese, Civil,
Korean, and Indochina Wars. The cornerstone of his military planning was the
"politico-revolutionary sense of time" evolving around the concept of how to
gain time in contrast to the concept of his adversaries who always attempted
to find military solutions in shortest time possible. The three stages of
warfare pursued by Mao in the past were strategic defensive, stalemate phase,
and counter-offensive. Specific historical examples of these stages.

ROUND-THE-CLOCK CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, by Maj. Bruce J. Matheson, in Marine
Corps Gazette, v. 38, no. 9 (Sept 54) 12-15.

It must be assumed that future US Marine Corps operations will
follow some of the trends of the Korean conflict, and one of the most not:

able being the increased ground action during darkness and bad weather. Marine Corps
aviation should provide planes and training for around-the-clock ground support.
Night aerial operations in Korea and the lessons learned from them; the desired
optimum in all-weather operations; and improvements needed to transform
possibilities into capabilities.

SHIPS, SALVAGE, AND SINIEWS OF WAR; THE STORY OF FLEET LOGISTICS
AFLOAT IN ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN WATERS DURING WORLD WAR II, by Rear
Adm. Worrall Reed Carter and Elmer Ellsworth Duvall. Washington, Depart-
ment of the Navy, 54, 533 p.

Organization, problems, and operations of logistics support for
World War II naval operations in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Africa, and
Europe. Deals primarily with logistics support incident to principal
operations and emphasizes support which was rendered from ships and other
floating equipment. Logistics support for the Battle of the Atlantic
during the first two years of the war, in which long distances were cover-
ed and in which not only fuel, food, and ammunition, but salvage, repair,
recreation, mail, clothing, and medical services were included. Separate
outlines for logistics operations covering the North African, Sicilian,
Italian, and French landings. Maps and photographs.

STRATEGY; THE INDIRECT APPROACH, by B. H. Liddell Hart. New York,
Praeger, 54, 420 p.

Strategy of the decisive wars from 490 B.C. to 1945; the great
strategists from the Greeks to Hitler; and emphasis throughout this
historical account that the essence of strategy is the "indirect approach."
The true aim of a strategist is to seek an advantageous strategic situa-
tion, and this is best achieved by dislocating the enemy's balance and
taking the "line of least expectation"; in contrast, to move directly on
an opponent consolidates his physical and psychological balance and
increases his power to resist. The strengths and weaknesses of some of the
great generals in the light of this thesis. The strategy of Hitler; he
gave a new depth to the "indirect approach" and was successful until his
strategy and tactics degenerated into direct and expected moves. Criticism
of Clausewitz; and comments on present Russian and US strategies.

TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN A FUTURE WAR, by Group Capt. E. W. Pinto,

Conclusions drawn from World War II experiences with respect to
the employment of tactical airpower in the following missions: (1) gaining
and maintaining air superiority in the theater of operations; (2) inter-
diction of the battle area to deny movement of enemy troops and supplies;
(3) provision of close air support to the land forces in the battle area;
and (4) air reconnaissance (strategic reconnaissance for both ground and
air force needs, tactical reconnaissance mainly for the ground forces, and
artillery reconnaissance). The integrated organization of the tactical air
force (which will hold good in any future war) with its own command and
coequal with the ground forces has demonstrated the strength and versatility
of air power.

Successful night operations by tanks, during World War II and in Korea and the probability that in any future war night operations will equal or exceed daylight operations, indicate the necessity for emphasizing this type of training. A doctrine should be established which will provide the infantry commander with knowledge of the tank-infantry team's capabilities in night attack.


First of two articles presenting arguments, supported by statistics to the effect that the World War II employment of Douhet's concept of total aerial warfare proved erroneous, since it failed to produce the expected psychological effect. What actually forced Germany to capitulate was the destruction of her petroleum-producing facilities and means of transportation, rather than the indiscriminate bombing of German cities.


Raids conducted by British Army Commandos during World War II in many theaters of operation, and Army-Marine Commando operations as infantry units during the latter part of the war. How personnel for the Special Service were raised and trained, and organisational changes.

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER RECONSIDERED, by John L. Chase, in Political Science Quarterly, v. 70, no. 2 (June 55) 258-279.

The tactical and strategic purposes served by President Roosevelt's much criticized policy of unconditional surrender toward the Axis Powers during World War II. This policy prevented Russian recrimination in spite of the further postponement of the promised second front. It served notice on all concerned that there would be no compromise or deals with the Axis governments by any of the Allies. It reinforced the ban on discussion of postwar territorial issues, thus preserving a measure of international harmony. It unified American public opinion on the need of winning the war and laid the basis for postwar cooperation between the Allies by preserving American freedom of action with regard to postwar policy in Germany.


The commander of one of the largest units of the communist partisans
in Ukraine during World War II (twice Hero of the Soviet Union), narrates some of the experiences of the Chernigov and Volhynia partisans against the German Army of Occupation. The communist unit under his command: killed 25,000 Germans; derailed 683 trains with troops and military equipment; blasted 47 railway bridges, 26 oil bases and fuel stores, and 39 ammunition depots; and destroyed 12 tanks and 87 trucks. Initial preparations of the Communist Party in Chernigov to organize a partisan movement; recruitment of partisans; support given by the population to the partisans; and tactics employed in various raids on German forces. The work is fragmentary on organization and tactics, liaison with the Red Army, and the support given by Soviet Government.


In the foreword General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., states: "Had it not been for the intervention of Chinese Communist Army, the offensive generated by the Inchon attack would have resulted in a complete victory for our arms in Korea. A study of the record of this operation will disclose, with arresting clarity, the decisive power that is to be found in highly trained amphibious forces when their strength is applied at the critical place and time." This is primarily a Marine Corps story. Activities of other services are presented in sufficient detail only to set this operation in its proper perspective. Appended: comments on close air support provided by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.


Arguments for and against World War III. Opinions from the Church and the Bible. Deductions: (1) It is unwise to suppose that a major war will be prevented by the threat of complete destruction on both sides with H-bombs. (2) Wars are largely dependent on the extent to which people are deserving of permanent peace. (3) Some twenty civilizations perished in the past, and in every case they decayed from within before they were smitten from without.
III. INTERNATIONAL MEASURES FOR PEACE AND DISARMAMENT

THE ARMS STALEMATE ENDS, by David F. Cavers, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 11, no. 1 (Jan 55) 9-12.

Efforts made by the UN during 1954 toward disarmament and international control of atomic energy. A stalemate of seven years ended in September when the Soviets accepted, as a basis for negotiation, the disarmament proposals of the British and French. The major aspects of these proposals and of the Soviet proposals. Only three of the issues which remain to be settled seem difficult: (1) how are conventional arms to be cut back, (2) how are stockpiles to be safeguarded, and (3) will inspection be sufficiently free?


Ten years ago the US joined the UN with a hope and a prayer for peace. At the same time the Soviet Union joined the UN with a plan to use its legal framework as a screen for illegal activities aimed at smashing capitalism and creating a world dictatorship under Kremlin control. Today socialists and communists hold many key positions in the UN Headquarters Secretariat in New York City and in the various UN councils, committees, and specialized agencies. Socialists and communists also hold key positions in many of the more than two hundred national and international organizations accredited to the Economic and Social Council. The task of these socialist and communists: to smash capitalism and US as the main bulwark of free competitive enterprise in the world today. Described are the methods and tactics of these enemies of US within the UN.


In this discussion of the technical difficulties of armament control, it is pointed out that the problem is relatively simple in connection with classical weapons. On the other hand, it would be easy to elude investigation in the case of atomic and thermonuclear weapons which pack enormous destructive power into little weight and a small volume. Even greater difficulties would be encountered in connection with biological weapons which can be produced secretly in small laboratories.

BOMB CONTROL AND WORLD GOVERNMENT, by Herbert Tingsten, in East and West, no. 2 (54) 7-9.

The talk of atomic-bomb control is an illusion. The debate that is going on around the world by political parties, statesmen, newspapers, churches, and other organizations is based on false and unrealistic premises.
Shows the fallacy of those who call for the "banning" of atomic and hydrogen bombs by describing the functions of a hypothetical control organization in the face of Soviet veto in the UN Security Council. Such control cannot be exercised unless a world government is established first. Until the day when it is established, democracies must meet reality face to face and not call for the abolition of a weapon that gives them (through US) the only superiority over the Soviet Union.

Analyzes the recent agreement among the members of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee to negotiate a prohibition of the use rather than possession of nuclear weapons.

THE HELICOPTERS IN INDOCHINA. Les helicopteres en Indochina, in Forces Aéroennes Françaises, v. 10 no. 100 (Jan 55) 227-231. In French.
Types and performance of helicopters used by the French Expeditionary Forces during the Indochinese War. Although employed chiefly in the evacuation of wounded and the rescue of pilots, the SIKORSKY S-55 has been found highly satisfactory for any kind of mission in all types of terrain (rice paddies, and plains). Photographs.

IF PEACE DID BREAK OUT ..., by Anton Ruber, in Interavia, v. 10, no. 12 (Dec 55) 899-905.
The US, Soviet, British, and French proposals on disarmament in order to reduce the international tensions and prevent surprise aggression. Analysis of these proposals points out the fact that "the problem of disarmament and total peace will not be solved within the next few years. In fact, the question of armed forces, whether atomic or conventional, is of secondary importance compared with the political, economic, and social factors essential to general agreement." Photographs, maps, tables.

Evaluation of the UN on the occasion of its ten-year anniversary.
Conceived in San Francisco as a global body equipped with its own strong police force, the UN has developed - largely through the influence of Dulles and other American statesmen - into a town meeting of the world. It is no more influential than the League of Nations was in 1936.

New USAF tools and equipment for aerial reconnaissance; how SAC and TAC aerial reconnaissance units would accomplish the mapping of USFR; and how much the President's plan could reveal the Soviet Union's military intentions. New AF photoplanes include SAC's eight-jet RB-52 and TAC's supersonic RF-101 Voodoo.


Refutes theories that hydrogen and atomic warfare will never be resorted to, and gives reasons why the use of these weapons is a real possibility in a future all-out war. The danger of world destruction may be near unless a new approach is made to world problems. Causes of international disagreements should be discussed, rather than use of weapons, but the outcome of these discussions would depend upon acceptance of the need for tolerance and upon renunciation of all attempts to force creeds on other people.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DISARMAMENT, by Paul Martin, in International Journal, v. 11, no. 2 (Spring 1956) 79-84.

The Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the Tenth Session of the UN General Assembly on the problem of disarmament.

SELECTED DOCUMENTS OF THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 55. 35 p.

Texts of selected speeches and final communique of the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia, April 18-24, 1955. Speech by President Soekarno of the Republic of Indonesia; opening speech by Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon, April 18; opening statement of Carlos P. Romulo of the Republic of the Philippines; supplementary speech by Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China, April 19, as well as his statement to the Political Committee, April 23; and final communique of the Conference, April 24.


Includes: a review of Soviet policy on disarmament; a review of the stand taken by Western Powers during the various past conferences on disarmament; and proposals made by both UESR and Western Powers during the 1955 Big Four Conference in Geneva.

Analysis and appraisal of the functioning of the UN system for maintenance of international peace and security. Covers: the procedures that have been developed under the Charter for peaceful settlement or adjustment of disputes and situations; the use of collective measures in threats to or breaches of the peace; and efforts to regulate armaments. One of a series of seven studies on the UN.