Symposium Proceedings
THE U.S. ARMY'S
LIMITED-WAR MISSION AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
MARCH 26, 27, 28, 1962

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Proceedings of the Symposium
"THE U.S. ARMY'S LIMITED-WAR MISSION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH"
26, 27, 28 March 1962

SPONSOR
Chief of Research and Development
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HOST
Special Operations Research Office
The American University

Edited by
William A. Lybrand

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
The American University
Washington 16, D.C.

June 1962
FOREWORD

Introduction

These symposium proceedings are concerned with the military establishment's limited-war mission. As used at the symposium, the term limited-war refers to forms of conflict short of all-out nuclear war and general conventional war, with stress on "wars of subversion and covert aggression" and the "Cold War." The special focus of the symposium, therefore, was on the military counter-insurgency mission for which the Department of the Army has a major responsibility.

"Social science research," as used at the symposium, refers to the disciplines which study human behavior systematically including psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, history, economics, and international relations.

The link between the Army mission and behavioral and social science research, and the need for a symposium on the linked topics, may not be immediately obvious. Therefore, the rationale for relating general social science research requirements to the mission is briefly outlined next. It is intended to provide a perspective for these proceedings and a general reading guide to their use.
Background--Increased Importance of Counterinsurgency Capabilities

The increased importance of military counterinsurgency capabilities is a matter of common knowledge. Today's world situation, and the more plausible projections of that situation into the future, have led to this shift in emphasis in the role of the United States military establishment in international affairs. Two factors are primarily responsible for this increased emphasis:

(1) The emergence of many developing nations, newly independent, which are inviting targets of subversion and covert aggression.

(2) The overwhelming destructive potential of all-out nuclear warfare.

Taken together, these factors have highlighted two interrelated functions of the military establishment: **military deterrence** and **military counterinsurgency**.

Deterrence and counterinsurgency functions are not new; they always have been a part of the traditional mission of the military establishment, particularly the United States Army. What is new is the level of importance of these functions as contrasted with that ultimate military function which has been, and is, "to close with the enemy and destroy his military power."

Components of the Military Counterinsurgency Weapon System

Along with the increased importance of the counterinsurgency role of the military establishment, there has been a change in the timing of the use of
military power and a shift in employment of components
of that power.

In terms of timing, no longer is the use of the
military war-waging potential limited to first being
utilized in traditional diplomatic interactions and
then being called upon for a direct confrontation of
physical force with an enemy if traditional diplomacy
fails. The conflict in which we are engaged today does
not allow such a neat compartmentalization and an addi-
tional sequence has evolved.

In many developing nations where there is no direct
negotiation or military confrontation with our major
antagonist, the national interest requires our military
participation when the military threat factor is but one
of the several important factors to be faced in each sit-
uation. Military involvement is required long before
events reach the stage when maximum physical force is
appropriate or required.

If employment of U.S. military forces in the
classical sense is not appropriate, nor required, other
components of the military counterinsurgency weapon must
be used. They are military capabilities and skills which
in prior wars were either ancillary or subsequent to use
of direct physical combat capabilities—psychological
operations, unconventional warfare, civic actions,
military aid and advice. These capabilities have become
the primary components of the military counterinsurgency
weapon system, retaining the direct physical combat
capabilities in a ready, indispensable, and highly
critical reserve status.
Nonmaterial Nature of Key Operational Performance Requirements

Our professional military do not assume that prior existence of a weapon system component means that the component is as operationally effective as is required, particularly if it is to be employed in new and different situations.

The major differences between past situations in which psychological operations, unconventional warfare, civic actions, and military aid and advice were used, and today's counterinsurgency situations, are recognized in broad, somewhat abstract terms. Each statement on the counterinsurgency mission, by civilian and military leaders alike, is accompanied by the axiomatic assertion that success in the counterinsurgency mission is as much dependent on political, social, economic, and psychological factors as upon purely military factors, and sometimes more so.

Lest these valid generalities mask more specific insights into the complexities of the problem, and make it more difficult to successfully accomplish that mission, it is necessary to delineate more specific factors in the counterinsurgency situation which differentiate it from past situations.

A major distinguishing feature is that the "battle" situation is primarily an internal conflict within another nation—although our major antagonist may have incited the conflict, or may be exploiting it. Our military forces rarely come into direct conflict with a formally declared enemy. Rather, the immediate targets are insurgent or other indigenous groups, and the underlying social and political conditions which contain the
sources of internal conflict. Instead of clearly defined enemy personnel, our forces face a mixture of friendly, unfriendly, and neutral (to the United States) indigenous persons.

As corollaries of this major feature, there are several specific factors that make employment of the counterinsurgency weapon system more complex.

(1) **Nonmilitary nature of sources of strength**

In the past, the primary sources of enemy strength—e.g., military personnel and equipment, major war industries—could be destroyed physically. In the counterinsurgency situation, the primary sources of insurgent strength are not a strong military organization and its technological industrial support, but the sources of discontent of the people within the nation, and thus, the people themselves.

Rather than destructive, our aims are constructive—to create internal conditions and encourage political, social, and economic systems which remove hunger, disease, poverty, oppression, and other sources of discontent. In this sense, our military establishment is a direct, positive instrument for human progress in directions that are compatible with the U.S. national interest.

The components of the counterinsurgency weapon system must be geared to this positive, constructive role of building compatible indigenous strength, rather than to their past role as an auxiliary component in a primarily destructive campaign against an open accessible enemy.

(2) **Non-U.S. action elements**

The primary instruments of action in the internal conflict situation are not U.S. troops, nor
forces under direct U.S. military authority. Rather, they are the friendly indigenous groups the United States is supporting. Therefore, the mission must be accomplished by indirect influence and not through direct control which has been appropriate in the past—direct orders for our own forces, or physical coercion of the enemy.

Whatever the specific action—whether a military counterguerrilla action, or a civic action, or a psychological operation action—it must be accomplished through indirect influence of one type or another. This is not limited to verbal persuasion alone, but includes all techniques of influencing the behavior of another person short of physical coercion and outside of command order.

The problem is further compounded by the fact that we must operate in a strange cultural environment and influence persons with different cultural values, customs, mores, beliefs, and attitudes. This was a less troublesome problem in the past when combined operations had a unitary command structure, or when physical coercion was the principal technique of influencing an enemy.

Other sets of factors in the counterinsurgency situation are quite different from the past. There is a longer timelag between execution of an action and its impact. The action must be continuous until impact is achieved—there is no "partial destruction." There is no guarantee that a successful impact will create internal conditions thereafter compatible with the U.S. national interest. In short, the end result of an action frequently does not have the degree of finality and irrevocability that physical destruction does.
For example, even if an action is successful, such as establishing stable internal security and significantly alleviating major sources of discontent, it may not be a completely sufficient condition for lasting compatibility with U.S. interests. It is, however, a necessary foundation. In this sense, there is no substitute for successful accomplishment of the counterinsurgency mission.

These radically different elements in the situation serve to explain why factors which are not military in the classical sense are considered exceptionally critical to success of the U.S. military counterinsurgency mission. They also explain why key operational performance requirements placed on the components of our counterinsurgency weapon system are quite different from those appropriate to past situations. And, finally, they show that these key performance requirements are primarily nonmateriel in nature—political, social, economic, and psychological.

Systematic study of the impact and effects of a materiel weapon system is accepted as a matter of course in order to determine its most effective strategic and tactical employment. The need is no less critical when the weapon system deals primarily with nonmateriel effects such as are described above. Rather, the need is more acute.

The same bullet will kill with just about the same effectiveness whether used against a target in the United States, Africa, or Asia. However, the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency weapon is dependent upon the specific target.
The same "ammunition" is not necessarily equally effective for all targets, but must be "tailored" for the specific impact desired, for each specific social, political, and cultural environment, for means that are appropriate to the psychological make-up of the specific people involved.

Behavioral and Social Science Research Requirements

The research and development support required logically takes the form of nonmaterial knowledge and information on the basis of which effective counterinsurgency plans and actions can be developed.

Whether one is concerned with programs to alleviate political, social, or economic sources of discontent, with techniques of indirect influence, with the social environment in which actions occur, or with the social and political factors which are targets of action, the kind of underlying knowledge required is the understanding and prediction of human behavior at the individual, political and social group, and society levels.

The systematic acquisition of such knowledge is the business of the behavioral and social sciences--psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, economics, history, and international relations.

It is beyond the purpose of this Foreword to further delineate necessary specific knowledge and information needed by the counterinsurgency weapon systems and from these to derive the specific research and development requirements. The papers in the proceedings deal in one way or another with this problem, although much more remains to be done.
Much more descriptive information about the peoples of foreign cultures is required, although there are other types of information equally critical. For example, knowledge required as a basis for effective counterinsurgency plans and actions includes such topics as: the underlying dynamics of internal warfare; the physical and skill characteristics of the people; the impact of various types of civic action programs on political stability and non-violent social evolution; the relationship among cultural factors, education level, various alternative political, social, and economic systems, and human satisfactions; the processes by which one individual or group influences the behavior of other individuals and groups.

In the same sense that a new emphasis on the counterinsurgency mission has resulted in new requirements on the military, a new emphasis is required within the behavioral and social sciences. In addition to the acquisition of relevant knowledge in the classical scientific sense, scientists must explicitly define the linkage, whether immediate or remote, of the knowledge acquired or being acquired, to specific operational problems and continually assess the import of such knowledge to solution of the problems.

Although a considerable body of applicable knowledge presently exists, it would be a mistake to assume that the behavioral and social sciences have all the knowledge which the military may require at the present time. Systematic knowledge concerning the understanding and prediction of human behavior is far from complete.

As an illustration of the inadequacy of both the underlying knowledge and its military application, the
following analogy by a political scientist working on such problems is pertinent.

Military psychological operations today are in something like the situation of artillery when it used 17th-century cannon, firing blind with inadequate observation of target before or after, using crudely primitive and guessed-at powder charges, with no ballistic or firing data, or guidelines.

An Army general officer has added the comment that Leonardo da Vinci had conceived many of the elements of modern artillery design and use by the early 16th century, but that his ideas were ignored for centuries, delaying military development of artillery.

While the analogy may not be a completely accurate reflection of today's proficiency in military psychological operations, its point is well taken, as is the additional comment. Much more knowledge needs to be acquired and applied to the counterinsurgency weapon system, and it would be self-defeating to ignore the contributions that knowledge which the behavioral and social sciences can make.

The potential contributions of the behavioral and social sciences to the counterinsurgency weapon system may be summarized in three general areas.

(1) The application of existing knowledge to military requirements.

(2) The use of existing techniques for acquiring new knowledge required that is not presently available.

(3) The development of new techniques for acquiring new knowledge required not presently available, and for which existing techniques are inadequate.
Although they are derived from the counterinsurgency mission, it is readily apparent that scientific advances in these areas will have relevance to other military missions and to activities of other national agencies with responsibilities in international affairs.

The Need and Objectives of the Symposium

The Department of the Army's responsibilities in the military counterinsurgency mission are major, continuous, and pervasive. In authoritative Army documents and manuals, and in relevant Army policy speeches by its leaders, there is a clear and detailed spelling out of the Army's counterinsurgency mission and a continual recognition of the need for human factors knowledge.

However, this understanding and recognition must extend beyond the Army, particularly to the behavioral and social science community, if the Army is to receive the research and development support it requires.

To meet this need, a 3-day symposium was conducted with three general objectives.

1. To present a clear picture of the Army's limited-war mission, with special emphasis on its counterinsurgency mission.

2. To identify the Army's requirements for behavioral and social science research and to stimulate the interest of members of the behavioral and social science community in the Army's research and development programs.

3. To promote understanding of the Army's research and development efforts and coordination with the efforts of other government agencies and departments which have similar...
or overlapping (but not duplicate) interests in counterinsurgency problems.

The symposium was conducted on the 26th, 27th, and 28th of March in Washington, D.C. Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, was the sponsor of the symposium. The Special Operations Research Office, The American University, conducted the symposium and served as host. Over 300 persons attended the symposium, with 50 participating in the program.

Attendees included high ranking officers and civilian executives of the Departments of Defense, Navy (including the Marine Corps), and Air Force, as well as the Department of the Army. Leading behavioral and social scientists of Army research activities, of other government agencies, and of university research centers, participated and attended. The complete list of attendees is appended at the end of these proceedings.

The table of contents provides an index to the proceedings of the symposium. The overall concept of the symposium program reflects the general objectives. On the first day, Army officers presented authoritative statements of the Army mission and general requirements for behavioral and social science knowledge. On the second day, leading behavioral and social scientists presented papers describing some past and ongoing research and the relevance it has to Army problems. The third day was devoted to papers describing relevant research programs and activities of various government agencies, including the Department of the Army.
A number of the papers presented at the symposium were classified CONFIDENTIAL. For some it was possible to make minor changes to remove the classification; these are included in the proceedings. For others, declassification would have involved major changes in substance and meaning. Unclassified abstracts of these papers have been prepared for these proceedings. However, qualified persons can request the CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT to the proceedings which contains the full text of the classified papers. The contribution to the symposium these papers made is not adequately reflected in the abstracts. The supplement may be requested from:

Director
Special Operations Research Office
The American University
Washington 16, D.C.

A number of minor items regarding these proceedings should be mentioned. Each contributor was given an opportunity to edit his remarks into the form in which he wanted them to appear in these proceedings. The editor's contributions, for the most part, were made prior to the symposium, although minor editing was accomplished on the returned copy. A number of the humorous "stories" used by speakers to illustrate a point were left in the text to be shared with readers. Floor discussion was limited at the symposium because of a very full program. However, it will be seen that only one person took advantage of the editor's offer, made at the symposium, to publish in these proceedings comments submitted after the symposium which might otherwise have been made from the floor. Ranks, titles, and positions of all persons are listed in the proceedings as they were at the time of the symposium.
As a final perspective, a cautionary note may be helpful. Final, definitive answers to all pressing, specific operational problems will not be found in these proceedings. The symposium was a beginning and not the end. It can be most usefully viewed in terms of stimulation and guidance, rather than solution. As with the counterinsurgency task itself, most of the research and development task still lies ahead.

Acknowledgments

As soon as the symposium proposal was approved by General Trudeau, he invited a number of leading social scientists to form an Army Symposium Advisory Group. The group provided continual advice and counsel on the planning and conduct of the symposium. The success of the symposium is largely due to their efforts.

Dr. Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr.
Dr. W. Phillips Davison
Dr. Klaus Knorr
Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger
Dr. Ithiel de Sola Pool
Dr. Roger W. Russell

Also participating on the advisory group as Army representatives and observers were the following:

Colonel D. D. Blackburn
Colonel Otis E. Hays, Jr.
Dr. Charles W. Bray
Dr. Jesse Orlansky
Dr. Carroll L. Shortle

At the Special Operations Research Office almost every member of the staff made a significant contribution to the symposium in one way or another.
Special appreciation is due to Kai E. Rasmussen, Colonel, USA (Ret.), the Director; Paul J. Black, Colonel, USA (Ret.), the Deputy Director; and Dr. Earl H. DeLong, Technical Director, for willingly and generously authorizing support and resources without which the symposium could not have been conducted.

In terms of the SORO "action" team for the symposium, the bulk of the work was done by Mr. Thomas E. Proulx, Miss Elizabeth A. Bentz, Mrs. Nancy R. Patteson, and Mr. Gerald F. Hunter.

Dr. Irwin Altman, a longtime friend and professional colleague, continually contributed to the symposium concept and program planning, as well as being a program participant. His help is gratefully acknowledged.

The initiative, encouragement, and support of the following members of the Human Factors Research Division, Army Research Office, were indispensable from the time the symposium was first proposed to the printing of these proceedings.

Colonel George J. Bayerle, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel Earl W. Ralf
Dr. Lynn E. Baker
Dr. E. Kenneth Karcher, Jr.

Finally, of course, the value of any symposium is directly related in the last analysis to the efforts of its participants. I am sure that all who find these proceedings of any use will share my deep appreciation to each program participant.

William A. Lybrand
Symposium Executive Secretary
Washington, D.C.
June 1962
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To Participants and Delegates at the Symposium on "The U.S. Army's Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research"

Gentlemen:

We are proud and pleased to sponsor this symposium and to welcome so distinguished a roster of officials and scientists to its deliberations.

As you know, a major mission of the symposium is to create improved understanding of the Army's limited-war mission and to stimulate the interest and support of social scientists in that mission. For these purposes we propose to present a substantial review of the Army's mission and the operational situations in which it conducts limited or irregular warfare, a series of scientific papers and discussions relevant to the Army's mission, and a review of the current and planned research programs of the Army and other federal government agencies which can be expected to provide direct and indirect scientific support.

The Army looks forward to receiving lasting benefits from your efforts here, now and in the future, and we await with interest the recommendations which may be generated directly by your work.

ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU
Lieutenant General, GS
Chief of Research and Development
TO PARTICIPANTS and DELEGATES

Gentlemen:

It is a distinct pleasure for me, as host, to cordially welcome each of you to this symposium on The U.S. Army's Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research.

As many of you know, we at The American University have been associated with the Department of the Army for the past five years through our Special Operations Research Office. I am particularly pleased that this symposium emerges from our association. The American University is honored to join with the Army in providing this opportunity for the mutual exchange of information among leaders of our defense establishment and social science community.

I wish each of you a stimulating experience as you deliberate the potential contributions relevant research can make to our national security in those forms of international conflict we seem destined to face for many years to come. I know I express the hope of all of us that your combined efforts ultimately will contribute to a peaceful world order compatible with our fundamental beliefs and values.

HURST R. ANDERSON
President
Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, Chief, Research and Development, Department of the Army; Dr. Hurst R. Anderson, President, The American University; Honorable Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., Secretary of the Army.
INVITED ADDRESS

THE U.S. ARMY'S LIMITED-WAR MISSION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

HONORABLE ELVIS J. STAHR, JR.
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

(Delivered After Dinner, Evening of 2nd Day of Symposium)

I particularly welcome the opportunity to take part in this symposium because it deals primarily with a matter of such critical importance in these times as the most effective means of eradicating the insidious, creeping menace of Communist guerrilla aggression and phony "wars of liberation." I want to compliment the initiative of General Trudeau, Chief of Research and Development, and his colleagues in sponsoring it, and the Special Operations Research Office of The American University as our host.

During the past two days, you have heard from distinguished experts in their respective fields who have discussed in detail the manifold aspects of the threat, the Army's major role in coping with it, and the support the Army needs to do its job. I am sure that the ground will have been quite thoroughly covered by the time the final papers have been presented tomorrow. I do not intend to go over the same ground this evening any further than necessary to pull together and underscore some of the essential considerations as I see them from the vantage point of the Secretary of the Army.
National attention has been focused long and anxiously on the awesome potential of nuclear weapons, the threatening conventional power of the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the ever-present possibility of a cataclysmic war—so long and so anxiously, in fact, that the actuality of overt aggression being carried on at a much lower level of intensity— but, nevertheless, fraught with comparable danger in the long run to our country and all it stands for—has been too largely overlooked by too many of the American people. Nevertheless, the Nation must now forthrightly face this threat and meet it with the utmost vigor and imagination, bringing to bear the best thought and effort and whatever resources, small or great, may actually be required.

Let me hasten to dispel any impression that I think for one moment that we should place decreasing emphasis on maintaining and strengthening the nuclear deterrent, or the forces necessary to fight successfully any conventional war, limited or otherwise, which might be thrust upon us. Far from it. These will remain absolutely vital to our national security for many years to come. The point is that we must place increasing concurrent emphasis on the forces and techniques necessary to cope with subversion, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare.

If we should allow our strategic nuclear power to deteriorate, we would be inviting catastrophe. But we would likewise be inviting eventual catastrophe if we failed to create and maintain the capability to deter or defeat nonnuclear aggression at any level, for all Communist effort is shrewdly and determinedly directed toward one goal—our ultimate destruction. In other words, if we were unable to prevent a succession of what might individually appear to be relatively minor Communist successes, in the
long run they would, like the proverbial "little drops of water," make an ocean which could engulf us.

Whether nuclear weapons, big or little, will ever again be used in combat; whether massive conventional forces will ever again clash on a battlefield, are matters of conjecture. There is no conjecture at all, however, about the fact that guerrilla warfare is being waged or plotted in many parts of the world at this very moment. The ultimate fate of freedom could well depend on its outcome.

Premier Khrushchev has made it perfectly clear that this is the sort of warfare the Sino-Soviet bloc intends to continue to wage against the Free World—or, at the very least, to encourage and subsidize—throughout the foreseeable future. In Khrushchev's dialectic, such wars are "wars of liberation" and he has proclaimed them not only "admirable but inevitable."

President Kennedy has made it equally clear that this Nation accepts the implicit challenge: that the specially trained forces needed to meet it are now virtually equal in importance to our strategic retaliatory and balanced conventional forces.

Beginning with the doubling of Special Forces a year ago, the principal impact of the President's decision to take positive action to deal realistically with the menace of Communist guerrilla aggression has naturally fallen upon the Army. I say "naturally" because the Army is not only uniquely qualified for this role by virtue of the wide versatility of its ground combat capabilities, but it is also the repository of an invaluable store of practical "know how" in the field of Guerrilla Warfare—"know how" based on experience extending back to early Colonial days and on through the Indian Wars, and expanded and sharpened in combat operations in the Pacific areas.
and elsewhere during World War II. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the Army in assisting indigenous forces to resist and defeat guerrilla attacks--our immediate objective--was dramatically demonstrated by General Van Fleet's American training command in Greece, which was a major factor in the success of the Greeks in their bitter struggle against Communist guerrillas after World War II.

Today the Army is again performing yeoman service in defense of the Free World by furnishing expert training and technical assistance, as well as extensive aviation support for troop transport, observation, and resupply, to the hard-pressed Vietnamese in their jungle war against the infiltrating Viet Cong forces. And, as you know, it is continuing to move forward vigorously along every line to enhance further its ability and readiness to give effective backing of this nature to any other Free World nation confronted by a similar situation.

This Army role as a military instrument to deal with guerrilla aggression is extremely important, of course. However, I do not consider it nearly as important in the long run as the role the Army is equipped to play in the deterrence or defeat of guerrilla aggression by helping to change the basic conditions which are essential to the successful conduct of guerrilla aggression--a role which has been discussed rather fully here.

One sentence in Che Guevara's famous dissertation on guerrilla warfare really tells the whole story: "All the facilities which make life easier are unfavorable for the guerrilla force."

It is noteworthy that the Communist guerrillas in Vietnam have chosen as primary targets for assassination health, education, and agricultural officials attempting to improve the condition of the people at the village
level. They have done so because they recognize full well the truth of Guevara's observation. They know that as the things which contribute to a better life are increased, the ability of the guerrilla to survive and operate is correspondingly decreased.

In struggling new nations the native armies are frequently the most stable and capable national agencies. It is a major focus of our Army's cold war effort to promote the most effective use of these forces to build up their own countries by means of such projects as the establishment of needed communications, the improvement of roads and trails, the construction of bridges, the operation of clinics, the provision of sanitary facilities, and many others vital to civic and economic advancement. By so doing we are striking at the very roots of insurgency and guerrilla activity.

In most parts of the world it is a novel concept that an army should not only be a mailed fist to strike at any enemy, but at the same time a helping hand to assist in the development of the nation it serves. As we all know, the U.S. Army has played this dual role in the life of our country ever since its birth, and the example it furnishes to other nations and other armies—together with the solid assistance it is able to provide—constitutes a most potent contribution to the deterrence or defeat of creeping Communist aggression.

The Army is fully aware of its grave responsibilities in the Cold War, perhaps the gravest it has ever borne. It knows what is required to discharge them, but it cannot do the job alone. It is a national task which demands a national response. It demands the enlistment in the cause of all elements of the American community represented
at this symposium—enlistment, as the phrase goes, "for the duration."

To prepare properly our small, specialized teams, our MAAG personnel, our area-oriented counterinsurgency forces—in short, all military representatives of the United States abroad—we need far more than military specialties. We need to know intimately the people and their habits of mind, the language, the customs, and how best to approach each individual problem. The research and compilation of all of the information we need is beyond the capability of the Army. Therefore we look to research organizations such as the Special Operations Research Office and our civilian educational institutions. Almost exclusive emphasis has been laid over the years on the development of the physical sciences as primary factors in our national defense. We have now entered an era in which greater and greater demands will be placed on the social sciences.

We are in a position, at this time, of acting, not reacting. With proper preparation and orientation and with a constant reappraisal of our requirements—a real team effort by the Army and the research organizations of our civilian educational institutions—we can disrupt Mr. Khrushchev's plan of world conquest.

We can win this war if we all get together and pool our varied resources of knowledge and experience to develop and put into effect the best possible policies and programs which we are collectively capable of devising. We will win it if we go forward together in the spirit of utmost realism and resolution, and with a sustained sense of urgency.
MONDAY, 26 MARCH 1962

SESSION 1
OPENING EXERCISES

SESSION CHAIRMAN:
Dr. Lynn E. Baker
Human Factors Research Division
Army Research Office
Office of Chief of Research and Development
Department of the Army

DR. BAKER: Gentlemen, may we please come to order.

This is the U.S. Army's symposium on its limited-war mission and the relevance of social science research to that mission.

To open our symposium I should like to call on the Reverend Dr. Edward W. Bauman to pronounce the Invocation, if you will please rise.

INVOCATION

Reverend Dr. Edward W. Bauman
Wesley Theological Seminary
The American University

REV. BAUMAN: Let us pray. Eternal God, our Father, we are deeply grateful to Thee for all the blessings of life, for the gift of life itself, the opportunities and challenges that are on all the horizons around us. We are grateful to Thee for the gift of
another springtime and the signs of new creative power that come to us in such a season. We are grateful to Thee for our families and our homes where we learn to love and to be loved.

Above all, in this meeting, we are grateful for this country and for its freedom; oh God, help us to keep from taking too much for granted this freedom. Keep us from forgetting the sacrifice, the price that was paid that we might meet in freedom here today.

We pray that Thy blessing might be upon the hours and the days ahead of this symposium, be with the speakers that they may lead us helpfully. Help us to listen with open minds and hearts. As we come together may this be more than a mere meeting, but may it be indeed a creative session of interchange, a sharing of concerns. May we all go away better for having come here to be with one another, with more clear thinking on our parts about the future, that we may continue to assume a role of leadership in creating a just and lasting peace for our time.

These things we ask for Thy own name's sake. Amen.

DR. BAKER: This symposium is sponsored by the Chief of Research and Development of the United States Army. To welcome you to the symposium it is my honor and privilege now to present General Trudeau, Chief of Research and Development.
WELCOMING ADDRESS

Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau
Chief of Research and Development
Department of the Army

Secretary Stahr,
General Decker,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Fellow Americans:

It is indeed a pleasure to be here this morning and welcome all of you to this symposium. Your presence here today attests your curiosity about, as well as the importance of, the Army's mission in limited-war and certainly your desire to help us solve some of our problems in this area. I can assure you that we solicit your ideas, we welcome your interest, and we appreciate your initiative and effort.

It is a hopeful sign to me when such an outstanding group as you--experts in many disciplines in the social sciences--dedicate yourselves to the discussion of some of the perplexing problems our Nation and its Army face worldwide. I am confident that your session here will be enjoyable as well as profitable. I hope you find it both stimulating and challenging.

I want to say right here and now--and I know that my statement will be reinforced by the able speakers who will appear before you--that our whole civilization is on trial today. Forces are loose in this world that would destroy all that we hold dear. These forces stem from a malignant organism that grows and thrives on human misery--
which reaches out its long tendrils in every field of human endeavor, seeking to strangle and destroy. You know as well as I that in our efforts to remove this Communist cancer from the world society we have relied principally on our superior advantages in the physical sciences. This has been only natural because we live in an age which, perhaps unfortunately, interprets most of the things it accomplishes in terms of the physical sciences and their related technology.

Even those of us who are so close to the business of forwarding the frontiers of research and development find it hard to really visualize the atmosphere in which we are working today.

Modern science, in the physical sense, is not yet 500 years old, and organized technology is perhaps half of that! Yet, during the past 100 years--two percent of recorded time--mankind has achieved 90 percent of his technological progress. But more meaningful to me is the fact: of all the men who have ever been trained in science and technology on both sides of the Iron and Bamboo curtains, it is estimated that nine-tenths of them are alive today.

There is no dodging the fact that the relentless advance of the physical sciences is moving forward today literally at missile speed. Certainly by virtue of scientific discovery this planet of ours has witnessed a great shrinkage. This world is nobody's plum and it will only be a shrivelled prune unless man grows wiser. Men and nations are now more closely knit due to the fact that human ingenuity has made it possible, through rapid communications and transportation, for mankind to hear more, talk more, see more, and read more. Today, no serious misfortune can befall one portion of the globe
without affecting the whole, nor can a great good be achieved by any part without benefiting the whole.

Yet, in this age of great change, the development of the social sciences—the sciences dealing with human nature—has not, in my opinion, kept pace, and these social sciences are of growing importance to our modern-day life. I say that we must put our brains to the business of reemphasizing the social sciences so that we may realize to full advantage the great benefits brought to society by this new age of science, technology, and change. In short, we must insure that the abundance we produce serves, instead of submerges, us.

Our view is that we must insure an earlier consideration of the social and economic effects of the discoveries of the physical scientist and his engineering counterpart—the technologist. Under the current system, I maintain the social scientists get into the game too late. Of course, the human factors that affect the operations of new weapons systems themselves are considered during feasibility studies. We must devise improved methods of continuous cooperation among the physical and the social scientists and engineers in our universities and in our research institutions. The social scientists must be kept better informed of what the physical scientists and engineers are doing, from the very beginning of the development.

I maintain that if the physicist and the engineer are on the trail of a new idea, the social scientist should know. As with automation back in 1948 or a few years earlier, the social scientist should have known—and should have been doing something—about it in 1948, or at least 1958, and not wait until 1962 when it poses such a tremendous problem to all segments of our society.
The machine has not betrayed us. Perhaps we are betraying the machine. Science and technology have given us the tools by which we can meet and master the Communist challenge and advance world progress. If we now prove incapable of using them for the benefit of free men everywhere, the verdict of history will surely be that we were a people self-strangled by success.

Past and current experience continually demonstrates that the concept of unity in science is essential; and this at a time when the success of science generates ever more knowledge which seemingly demands division. I maintain that our greatest achievements will result where we succeed in getting the social and physical scientists together early in the project. The cross-fertilization of all scientific disciplines will be one of the great advances that lie ahead.

If we can succeed in applying such a concept of sustained cooperation, we can more closely integrate our swiftly changing scientific processes with the policy processes which govern our national life.

This is why I have so strongly supported the application of the social sciences to the normateral area of operations research.

One illustration of that interest is the institution sponsoring this symposium--American University right here in Washington--which in cooperation with the Department of the Army is responsible for the agency we call SORO--the Special Operations Research Office.

SORO exists because we and our academic partners recognize that refinements and sophistication of hardware are fruitless without concurrent improved understanding of peoples and their societies, particularly in the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, the Middle East,
and South America. We know that the success of foreign aid, counterinsurrection, guerrilla, and counterguerrilla programs depends in large measure upon the reactions of, and interactions among, the social and political groups within which they are conducted.

When we stop to think about it, the fact is certainly obvious that conflict is so different now. Free men and peaceful nations throughout the world are under unremitting attack today, not only in the military realm by assassins, bands of guerrillas, and full battalions, but in the economic realm, and even in the psychological. Clearly the Cold War today involves meeting a multidimensional Communist challenge—in paramilitary warfare, in psychological warfare, and in the conventional and nuclear fields—in short, from zero to infinity across the military spectrum of force.

Now, the interest of this symposium is in that part of the spectrum, short of all-out nuclear devastation, geographically unlimited. We therefore are dealing with the area commonly referred to as "limited-war," and more particularly the area popularly referred to as within the province of 'Special Forces." We have sought diligently for a better term to cover this increasingly important aspect of the Army's mission, but have not found one. There are many terms in vogue which cover parts of the mission, and you are familiar with them; such expressions as "sublimited-war," "subbelligerent war," "unconventional war," "cold war," "paramilitary war," and "proxy war."

To set the stage for your discussions, let me emphasize that the term "limited-war" is not restricted to some particular aspect of nonnuclear warfare. Our use of the term encompasses both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare.
Now the characteristics of special operations in limited-war lead us to look to the social sciences for assistance in our efforts. For instance, I am concerned about the sociopsychological factors basic to concepts and techniques to be developed for successful organization and control of guerrillas and indigenous peoples by external friendly forces; also, about methods of exploitation of Communist vulnerabilities by psychological operations under varying conditions of cold warfare. And, you in this audience can name many more such profitable areas.

I think the purposes of this symposium are as important as they are clear:

First, to improve your understanding of the Army's limited-war mission;

Next, to recruit the country's best social science talents for research and development in support of that mission; and

Last, to obtain recommendations from you for continuing coordinated scientific support.

Colonel Bayerle, who follows me on this program, will go into detail concerning our thinking on how to attack these objectives.

The challenge to you is simple and clear: what can you contribute to Army Research and Development in this field?

As never before, we must think new and act new. The philosopher was right when he said: "There is no adequate defense, not even stupidity, against the impact of a new idea."
I can assure you, gentlemen, that we of Army Research and Development view our business in terms of anticipation and imagination. We need and solicit your ideas—the more, the better.

I thank you very much.

SYMPOSIUM PURPOSE AND PLAN

Colonel George J. Bayerle, Jr.
Chief, Human Factors Research Division
Army Research Office
Office, Chief of Research and Development
Department of the Army

Secretary Stahr,
General Eddleman,
General Trudeau,
Distinguished Guests:

Purpose:

General Trudeau has clearly stated for you the purposes of this symposium:
To improve your understanding of the Army's role in limited-war;
To recruit your talents for social science research and development in support of that mission; and
To obtain your recommendations for continuing coordinated scientific support.
In short, he has challenged you directly and forcefully for an answer to the question: "What can you best contribute to Army Research and Development in this field?"
**Scope:**

General Trudeau has also clearly indicated that our definition of "limited-war" for purposes of this symposium is not restricted to some particular narrow band of the spectrum of modern warfare short of the final, withering Armageddon. We are interested here in the entire range of conflict from "cold war" all the way up to (but not including) that World War III which we pray must not happen. Within this broad range, however, we suggest that you focus your major emphasis in this meeting on those types of wars which have been abundantly demonstrated to be likely to occur in the emerging, developing nations--the so-called "wars by proxy," or "subversive insurgency" wars. From such examination of selected aspects of the Army's limited-war mission we believe you may be stimulated to go on in the future to thoughtful examination of the entire gamut of warfare.

Just as the symposium cannot be expected to present comprehensively examples of all military aspects of limited-warfare, so you must not expect that we shall be able in a three-day span to bring to bear a comprehensive battery of all fields of social science. Nevertheless, although the program of this symposium has necessarily been selective, we are here to solicit your help in bringing to bear on our problem all of the behavioral and social sciences including social psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology, political science and history, and economics.

**Evidence of Need for Symposium:**

We have asked outstanding public officials and social scientists to bring to this symposium summary reviews of the programs of social science research now under way and planned in the United States. Having
heard them, you will be in position to judge whether enough is now being done and in what new directions, if any, augmented efforts might bring useful assistance to the Army's mission. Under other circumstances this might be enough.

Candor requires that I make it clear, however, that there are government officers and social scientists whose knowledge of the Army's limited-war mission has been greatly overtaken and outdistanced by events--yes, even the events which they read about in the daily newspapers.

Consider, for instance, the otherwise competent social scientist who can still hold the view that the Army's sole requirement for social science information is to assist in determining what might be said over a loudspeaker address system or printed on a surrender leaflet. If this has ever been a correct total view (which I for one would deny), it has certainly long been outmoded by the stern pressures of modern necessities.

Alternatively, consider the fact that, on more than one occasion, carefully planned research plans and proposals have been carefully coordinated throughout the Army and the other military services, only to be vetoed in the end on the ground that this or that important requirement should really be generated and satisfied by some other agency--that it lies outside the Army's mission.

Plan of the Symposium: Statement of Mission:
We have therefore resolved that we need more than the thorough staff review of requirements and critical assessment of relevant research and development programs, which is our usual staff approach to such problems. We have determined that we must invite the entire community
of social science talents and relevant responsible officers of our national government to participate in a review:

First, of the Army's limited-war mission as it is influenced by the societies and peoples among whom such a war is fought;

Second, of a response from the social science community to illustrate the fact (if it be true) that social science can generate information which will be useful to the successful accomplishment of that mission; and

Third, of the current and planned social science research activities in the Nation which might be expected to have relevance.

Following such a review of missions, relevant accomplished research, and current and future research plans, we have arranged that two "shirt-sleeves" working groups of this symposium will meet on the final afternoon to formulate recommendations to General Trudeau on:

(a) social science research (if any) which should be undertaken by the Army in support of its limited-war mission; and (b) means by which some apparatus or expeditious procedure might be developed for review of the continuous programming and conduct of such research.

Detailed Program for the Symposium Plan:

The execution of this symposium plan has already begun: General Trudeau, in his welcoming address, has presented the challenge to each of you: "What can I do to contribute to Army Research and Development in this field?"

Now, if you have your printed programs before you, you will see that the rest of this first day will be devoted to outlining the Army's limited-war mission.
First, in a general Keynote Address by General Eddleman, Vice-Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Then, an Invited Address by Admiral Lee, of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; and


Following these papers comes a roundtable discussion entitled "Reflections and Perspectives: Field Experiences and Nonmaterial Research Requirements," to be conducted under Dr. Linebarger's direction, where he and Colonel Little will be joined by the preeminently qualified Generals Volckmann and "Slam" Marshall. This discussion, I am sure, will continue fervidly during the social hour which follows.

Plan of the Symposium: Response from Social Science:

Our first session tomorrow will be aimed at linking operational needs with research. General Stilwell, in an Invited Address, will speak on "An Overview of Army Progress: Current and Projected."

Following that, Dr. Altman will present a selective review of recent research relevant to this symposium's purpose. Due to a sudden illness of Dr. Cottrell, this session will be chaired by Dr. Charles A. H. Thomson of the RAND Corporation.

Later tomorrow morning Dr. W. Phillips Davison, of the Council on Foreign Relations, will preside over the first of three sessions in which the social science community responds to the statement of the Army's mission. Dr. Davison's session will be on the general subject of
"Forces for Stability and Instability in Developing Nations," and will include papers by Dr. Lucian Pye and Dr. E. Guy Pauker. After lunch, Dr. Ithiel de Sola Pool will preside over a session on "Communicating and Working with Persons in Developing Nations," with papers by Dr. Frederick Yu and Dr. Harley O. Preston. Thereafter Dr. Klaus Knorr will conduct a session on "Aspects of Warfare in Developing Nations," in which papers will be presented by Drs. Harry Eckstein and Fred Greene. This, with appropriate interspersed discussions, will complete the response of the social science community to the earlier statement of the Army's problems.

Following these papers from the social science community, at dinner tomorrow evening we will have an address on a subject of his own choosing by a man who represents all communities to the Army and assures that the Army is truly representative of the needs and desires of all communities in the Nation—The Honorable Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., Secretary of the Army. It is worthy of note that the Secretary will be introduced by a distinguished member of his Army Scientific Advisory Panel, Dr. Roger Russell.

Plan of the Symposium: Current Research Programs and Capabilities:

Having presented the Army's mission in limited-war and a response of the social science community to this mission, we plan on the third morning that you be given a general survey of the Nation's current research programs and capabilities. For this purpose we have asked Dr. Henry Riecken to speak for the National Science Foundation, Dr. Roger Hilsman to speak for the Department of State, Dr. Leo Crespi to speak for the United States Information
Agency, and Dr. Carroll Shartle to speak for the Department of Defense.

Following these discussions of relevant social science research in other agencies of our Nation, Dr. E. Kenneth Varner will present an overview of "Army Social Science Programs and Plans," and my Boss, General Ely, will make such closing summary evaluative remarks as he may deem appropriate.

That ends the symposium for some, but not for all, of us.

Plan of the Symposium. Working Groups:

In response to our request some of you have agreed to remain through the afternoon of the symposium's third day to participate in one or the other of two working groups which will arrive at a consensus concerning recommendations to be made for General Trudeau's action. I shall name now those whom we have already requested, or do hereby request, to serve on each of these working groups, and I cordially invite any of you whom I do not name to select one or the other working group and join it.

A working group, Working Group I, on Recommendations for Army Research, will meet under my chairmanship. I hope that those of you who are particularly interested in this problem will meet and join in recommendations on this subject with me and:

- Dr. Irwin Altman - SORG
- Col. D. D. Blackburn - OCP
- Dr. Charles W. Bray - Smithsonian Institution
- Dr. Leonard S. Cottrell - Russell Sage Foundation
- Dr. W. Phillips Davison - Council on Foreign Relations
- Col. Otis Hays - ODCSGPS
- Dr. E. Kenneth Karcher - OGRD
- Dr. Klaus Knorr - Princeton University
- Dr. J.C.R. Licklider - ARPA
A second working group, Working Group II, will meet with Dr. Baker to consider Recommendations for Research Coordination. Again I hope that those of you who are particularly interested in this problem will meet and join with Dr. Baker and:

Col. Don Almy - U.S. Air Force
Mr. Paul Eckel - State Department
Dr. Glen Finch - National Academy of Sciences, NRC
Dr. Jesse Orlansky - Institute for Defense Analyses
Mr. Charles Maechling - Department of State
Dr. Francis Palmer - Social Science Research Council
Dr. Roger Russell - Army Scientific Advisory Panel
Dr. Willis Shapley - Bureau of the Budget
Dr. Carroll Shartle - Department of Defense
Dr. Denzel Smith - National Science Foundation
Mr. Dean Snyder - Department of Health, Education and Welfare
Mr. Oren M. Stephens - U.S. Information Agency
Dr. Charles A.H. Thomson - RAND
Dr. Richard Trumbull - Navy
Dr. Theodore Vallance - HumRR0

Summary:

That summarizes the symposium purpose and plan. Following General Trudeau's leadership I've tried to convey to you our purpose and plan for this symposium. To challenge your interest in, and concern with, the Army's limited-war mission;

To extend the symposium's scope to the whole gamut of limited-war and the entire resources of U.S. social science;
To give you a realistic understanding of what the Army faces in modern limited-war, and to illustrate the relevance of social science to that prospect; and

To invite your thoughtful support and assistance in bringing your talents to bear.

We have done all things which we could foresee that might facilitate your efforts on behalf of the Army. For such things as we have not foreseen, it is General Trudeau's desire on behalf of the Army that you ask for what you need so that we can do our best to supply it.

That is the symposium purpose and plan.

Thank you.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

LIMITED-WAR AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

General Clyde D. Eddleman
Vice-Chief of Staff
United States Army

Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen:

On behalf of General Decker, as well as myself, I wish to add to the welcome expressed by General Trudeau.

At no other time in our history has it been as important as it is today that military leaders and civilian scientists work together to assist in solving the challenging problems faced by our Nation. I agree completely with General Trudeau that we have done quite well in this
respect with the physical sciences, and that we need to accelerate our efforts in social science research. Such research is sorely needed not only in training and employing our own military personnel, but also in developing a mutual understanding with people in widely different areas of the world. We need to know the social, political, and economic factors that influence their actions. We need to know also how to enlist their active support in our common efforts to defeat Communist wars of covert aggression.

Research by distinguished social scientists such as yourselves—in close coordination with our military leaders—can be of great importance in this endeavor.

I have been asked to discuss the Army's role in limited and cold war, within the context of total government policy and operations.

Any discussion of today's world must recognize the significance of four factors which determine in large measure the role of our Nation and our Armed Forces in the world conflict and the form which our response must take in filling that role. The first three of these factors are relatively new on the world scene and only recently have we, as a Nation, appeared to recognize their great importance and significance.

The first factor is that our country has arrived at the pinnacle of world power. However reluctantly we assumed this mantle of leadership, we cannot relinquish it at this time without suffering disaster in the process. The non-Communist world must look to us and to us alone for leadership.

The second factor is that for the first time in our history we are engaged in a global struggle which encompasses the entire range of national power resources in both hot and cold war. The Communist power drive and
pattern of action are dynamic, global, and seek every power vacuum—thus, U.S. leadership must be continuously active and must develop the most effective combination of our resources with those of other non-Communist nations.

The third factor is the emergence of cold war as a form of world conflict equal to nuclear or conventional war in its importance and in its threat to our survival. President Kennedy has placed great emphasis on this problem. He has established a Special Group for Counter-insurgency—chaired by General Taylor—to coordinate and integrate, at the national level, the political, social, economic, and military aspects of our counterinsurgency programs. In addition, he has instructed the Secretary of Defense that "the effort devoted to this challenge should be comparable in importance to preparations for conventional warfare," and has directed that "the Department of Defense move to a new level of increased activity across the board."

The fourth factor that I bring to your attention is not new—it is as old as our national history. It is the Army's preeminent capability for the types of military operations required in cold war. Cold war is essentially a battle for the land and its peoples. The types of action that are required call for trained personnel with a wide range of skills who are organized and disciplined and able to live and function in any environment, however primitive or dangerous. These tasks are very similar to those performed by the Army from the early frontier days of our Nation's history. The administration has recognized these considerations and the Army has a major responsibility for our military efforts in the field of counterinsurgency.

The most difficult form of Communist cold war
aggression to counter effectively is that which Khrushchev has termed "wars of liberation" or "popular uprisings." He spelled out Soviet policy on these so-called "wars of liberation" in a basic speech last year and has continued to repeat these ideas. Such wars, he said, "will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists," and "they are not only admissible but inevitable." He stated that Communists "recognize such wars," and "will help the people striving for their independence."

Then, Khrushchev stated a significant conclusion: "The victory of socialism throughout the world," he announced, "is now near." But "for this victory, wars among states are not necessary."

The threat could not have been defined more clearly.

Before progressing further, I should like to define the term cold war. As a type of conflict, the Army defines it in these terms:

Cold war is the use of political, economic, technological, sociological, and military measures—short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces—to achieve national objectives.

It is low-intensity conflict that is complex, extensive, subtle, and persistent; and it is, emphatically, a struggle for national existence.

I emphasize this definition to insure that we have a common understanding of terms. Under it, what we term cold war—because U.S. combat troops are not overtly engaged—may well be limited-war from the viewpoint of the non-Communist nation in whose homeland this conflict is being fought. The Communists term these conflicts "wars of liberation." We call them "wars of subversion or covert aggression." In the Army we also
COLD WAR IS THE USE OF
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, TECHNO-
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TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL
OBJECTIVES.
use the term Special Warfare to describe the broad range of our cold war actions. All of these terms represent the same aspect of the overall problem. I suggest that you may wish to employ the definition of cold war which I have given for uniformity, at least in your initial deliberations.

As practiced by the Communists, cold war has acquired several clearly identifiable characteristics:

First, the level of provocation is kept low and ambiguous and short of an obvious act of war. Overt acts of aggression, such as the invasion of Korea, are carefully avoided. Instead, Communist cold war tactics are designed to force the opposing side into a gradual withdrawal, from point to point, through a series of moves, none of which, taken separately, seem to justify military reprisal.

Second, the major Communist powers seek to avoid participation by their own regular forces. Instead, extensive use is made of cadres of advisors and technicians to organize, train, and assist indigenous forces to engage in violence under the guise of "civil" war.

Third, although direct engagement between regular forces of the opposing major powers is carefully avoided, there is an ever-present capability to raise the conflict to progressively higher levels.

Finally, cold war is a conflict of determination and will, fought constantly under the threat that an underestimation of the enemy and his intent could result in escalation and, conceivably, could trigger a nuclear holocaust. Conversely, an overestimation of the enemy's willingness to raise the level of conflict could lead to one retreat after another, to the point of final defeat.

Today, the entire world is a cold war battleground—from highly industrialized Europe to the less-
developed areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The war is waged at varying levels of intensity. At the lowest level, Communist aggression involves a battle of ideas and a struggle for influence over an existing government. At a higher level, the physical violence of terrorism and guerrilla warfare is employed to undermine and overthrow a government which has not been persuaded to surrender.

Important as they are, we must remember that subversive efforts in underdeveloped areas represent only one portion of the cold war problem. The Communists use other forms of political, psychological, economic, and military initiatives and pressures on a broad scale. Berlin is an excellent example. Here, moves and counter-moves occur daily in an unending quest for an improved relative power position. Certainly, Berlin qualifies as a Cold War under the four characteristics which I described, for the Communists are careful to keep the level of provocation below that of an obvious act of war; they use East German proxy forces in most of their direct contacts; both sides have a capability for conflict of increasing intensity; and the situation confronts both sides with a demanding test of nerve and will.

Many other examples of cold war tactics can be found. Explorations in space; new weapons developments; displays of military force; and psychological warfare campaigns illustrate the wide range of the cold war spectrum. It is equally important that we not neglect these aspects of cold war.

However, as President Kennedy has emphasized, the key Cold War areas are principally in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These are particularly fertile areas for conflict. Here, new nations are emerging from colonial status and free people--impatient with slow reforms--are
CHARACTERISTICS OF COLD WAR...

LEVEL OF PROVOCATION IS KEPT AMBIGUOUS AND SHORT OF ACT OF WAR

MAJOR POWERS AVOID PARTICIPATION BY OWN REGULAR FORCES

OPPOSING MAJOR POWERS MAINTAIN CAPABILITY FOR CONFLICT OF PROGRESSIVELY HIGHER INTENSITY

INVOLVES CONFLICT OF DETERMINATION AND WILL, UNDER THREAT OF ESCALATION
struggling for dramatic and immediate economic and political growth. From the standpoint of their human resources alone, these areas are of vital importance in determining the outcome of the Cold War, for they contain about 46 percent of the world population.

The Communists have been remarkably successful in exploiting this ferment to their own ends. They use all elements of national power in a closely integrated pattern. Never far in the background is the carefully cultivated weapon of Communist terror and reprisal to intimidate and gain followers. Current activities in South Vietnam illustrate this pattern.

Regardless of what happens in Berlin, Vietnam, or elsewhere, we must anticipate an extended period of conflict, and we must learn to conduct successful cold war campaigns just as we have perfected our skill to engage in the more traditional forms of war.

In order to satisfy the basic needs of the people in the underdeveloped areas, and to orient them away from communism, social and economic assistance will be required on a long-term basis. Given time and opportunity, the Free World probably could bring about the social and economic growth and political stability which are needed.

But time and opportunity are two conditions that the Communists do not intend to give us. Therefore, we must gain the initiative through positive measures which will enable us to anticipate, as well as to counter and defeat, Communist cold war pressures.

Military power has wide application in this endeavor. It can be calibrated to a variety of uses which range from those that are essentially peaceful—and not usually associated with the military—to those involving overt hostilities.
A brief evaluation of the military means which the United States possesses today will help determine their cold war utility in terms of the four criteria I mentioned earlier.

First, there are our nuclear strike forces, such as manned bombers, ICBM's, and POLARIS submarines, which are not normally considered as having cold war capabilities. While these systems are designed primarily to deter or prosecute general thermonuclear war, they have an indispensable role in any form of conflict. They represent the ultimate response of military power, and have a formidable psychological impact on our allies and enemies alike. However, their direct application to cold war is very limited. They are more symbolic than useful as they overwatch the cold war scene. They symbolize advanced technological development, and provide a restraint for the great powers to keep the level of conflict as low as possible in order to avoid uncontrolled escalation.

The other major elements of our military power are the land, sea, and air combat units that make up our forward-deployed forces, theater reserves, and strategic reserves. These forces are designed for both nuclear and nonnuclear combat. They are general purpose forces that would have a vital role in any conflict, including general war. Since they possess a strong conventional capability, which is steadily growing, these forces have greater direct cold war utility than the more specialized nuclear strike forces.

Where they are deployed—in Europe and in Korea—these conventional forces serve as visible evidence of U.S. willingness and ability to fight—at any level of conflict. Communism has made no territorial gains in any of the areas where such forces are deployed.
To reinforce its forward deployed units, the Army relies on strategic reserves based in the U.S. They have considerable psychological impact on our allies as well as on the Communists, and contribute much to the effectiveness of our diplomatic moves.

However, even these forces are designed primarily to deter or win conventional war rather than cold war. In addition, these conventional forces now cover only the most critical areas; gaps exist in many sensitive Cold War areas.

The United States tries to fill these gaps by helping to build indigenous military strength, using our MAAGs and Missions, whose role is to train and advise our friends and allies.

These MAAGs and Missions, however, are too small to do more than the work for which they are designed. As a result, the maximum potential of this close association with friendly nations cannot be realized in all cases.

One can conclude from this brief evaluation that while many of our conventional forces have potential for cold war operations, this potential has not been fully exploited and there are also gaps in our capabilities.

However, great progress has been made in recent months in filling these gaps. I shall review some specific steps that have been taken, and describe the Army’s concept for such operations.

Our increase in cold war capabilities must not be at the expense of our capabilities for either general or limited-war. On the contrary, we must operate from a position of strength across the entire spectrum of war, maintaining flexible forces which are adequate to deter or win war of any form.

Our cold war efforts must conform with overall
national policy and also meet local objectives. They must be tailored for each particular situation, need, and political environment in which they are applied; and they must be manageable with reasonable prospects of success without generating requirements in excess of the resources our Nation is prepared to devote to this purpose.

To meet these requirements, general guidance and planning and allocation of resources must be centralized in Washington. However, the details of individual regional and country plans and programs must be shaped by knowledgeable representatives on the ground and be responsive to changes in local situations. The U.S. country teams will need military advice and technical assistance to develop and execute these plans, and the plans and programs themselves must provide for integrating all categories of U.S. aid, together with local resources, on clearly defined, attainable objectives.

Specific objectives will vary with each country. However, the long-term goal in each country must be to achieve the clearly defined cold war objectives of the Free World. To accomplish this, there must be created a secure and stable environment for political, social, and economic growth.

This will require that, in each country, we help our allies do three things:

1. Arrest Communist expansion;
2. Gain and maintain internal security; and
3. Foster economic and social growth and political stability.

In countries such as Vietnam, priority must be placed on establishing internal security. In countries where insurgency is not an active threat, the primary need is for nation-building or civic action developments which
PREREQUISITES FOR COLD WAR CONCEPT

- Conform with U.S. national policy & world-wide and local objectives
- Appropriate to local situation
- Manageable and supportable
KEY CONSIDERATIONS

GENERAL GUIDANCE, APPROVAL OF OVERALL PLANS AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES AT NATIONAL LEVEL

AREA AND COUNTRY PLANS SHAPED ON GROUND

COUNTRY TEAMS PREPARE DETAILED PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, WITH APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE
BASIC TASKS IN COLD WAR

GAIN AND MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY

FOSTER ECONOMIC/SOCIAL GROWTH & POLITICAL STABILITY
promote economic and social growth.

Changes must be achieved through orderly, evolutionary processes. Programs must emphasize the principle of self-help. We must make it clear to host countries that these are their programs, with U.S. support, and not U.S. programs.

Indigenous military forces, with our assistance, must perform the task of maintaining internal security. The military forces also constitute a major potential source of technical engineering, medical and similar skills for the task of improving the social and economic order. In some countries, they are a major factor for support of political stability. For these reasons, control of national military forces is a primary goal of Communist action. If we prevent Communist infiltration of these forces and maintain our own access to them, we will frustrate Communist aims and also contribute to social and economic growth.

As one major step in this program, the Army is establishing small Cold War task forces, tailored for employment in specific regional areas. Elements of these task forces can be introduced into specific countries as needed. They are being organized and trained to work in cooperation with the military forces of nations requesting our assistance.

In cold war situations of low intensity—where internal security poses no great problem—a tailored task force may consist largely of engineer, medical, signal, supply, transportation, civil affairs, and light aviation elements. It would assist the indigenous forces in carrying out important civic action programs that contribute to winning the Cold War battle.
For example, field-type communications between isolated villages and districts in outlying areas can be established. Medical treatment clinics can be opened in remote areas, where first aid and field sanitation must be taught. Simple water development and land reclamation projects can be started, small dams can be built, and minor soil erosions checked. Minor roads and trails can be improved and bridges constructed.

These projects can be started either by indigenous troops with U.S. assistance or by U.S. military units trained to perform just such tasks. The U.S. units can also train local personnel eventually to take over and continue the programs, working hand-in-hand with civilian agencies of our government.

In Cold War areas of higher intensity, such as Vietnam, civic action programs alone would be inadequate and could not operate with full effectiveness because of the unstable internal security environment. In such areas, emphasis must be placed on creating and training local counterinsurgency forces and on providing them with operational and logistical assistance and increased technical training. Civic action programs are also required in such countries, but must be subordinated to counterinsurgency programs until effective internal security is regained.

If it becomes necessary, other U.S. combat and supporting units can be used to augment the Cold War task forces, after appropriate decisions at national level.

Our plans call for four of these task forces—oriented toward appropriate regional areas of the world. They are in various degrees of development and deployment at the present time. They will be language trained, and will be tailored for their specific regional areas. They
CIVIL

COMMUNICATIONS

CLINICS AND SERVICE

BASIC WATER DEVELOPMENT

SIMPLE ENGINEER
ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER INSURGENCY FORCES

OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE

INCREASED TECHNICAL AND LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPNS IN SELECTED AREAS

COMBAT PARTICIPATION AS REQUIRED
will complement and support, rather than duplicate, the efforts of other U.S. agencies such as the State Department, the Peace Corps, and the Agency for International Development.

These efforts must be accompanied by increased emphasis in other fields. For example, we must improve relationships between U.S. and indigenous military personnel. The quality and organization of the military personnel in our country teams must be improved. Host countries must be encouraged to procure equipment best suited to their particular needs, rather than the sophisticated "prestige" items which they often prefer.

Much of what I have described is already being carried out.

Here in Washington, responsibilities are being clarified, plans and programs expanded, and objectives and priorities defined more clearly.

We have strengthened and reorganized our forces in South Vietnam and, to lesser degrees, our MAAGs and Missions in other key areas.

In the field of training, we have increased our use of mobile training teams, expanded our training programs for non-U.S. personnel, established new counter-insurgency courses for each regional area, initiated orientation tours for senior officers in key trouble areas, and intensified the training of Army units and of personnel assigned to MAAG, Mission, and Attaché duty.

We have also expanded the development, test, and procurement of specialized items of equipment designed for counterinsurgency operations.

All of these actions are steps in the right direction. They must be pursued with vigor and imagination. Of particular importance are the following:
First, the need for clear-cut objectives and priorities.

Second, the need for integrated plans and programs at the national, regional, and individual country levels;

Third, the introduction of appropriate elements of our Cold War task forces into key trouble spots;

Finally, the need to further accelerate our program for improving relationships between U.S. and foreign military personnel—both here and in local countries. For Latin America, for example, we have increased school quotas, exchange visits, orientation tours by key personnel, and visits by specialized mobile training teams.

All of this will take time. We must anticipate an extended period of tensions throughout the world, and we must not expect overnight success. At the same time, each of us must do his utmost to anticipate our cold war needs and to press for measures which offer the best chance of early success. Priority properly belongs to Berlin and to Southeast Asia at this time. However, we must not become so obsessed with these current trouble spots that we fail to give suitable attention to other areas. Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East are equally important in the long-term struggle. We may be sure that the Communists will exploit vacuums in those areas if we allow them to do so.

In closing, let me reiterate these thoughts: The United States is engaged in a form of war now. This is not peaceful competition. The cold war challenge is no less perilous to our individual and collective security than traditional open war. Thus far, the Communists have maintained the initiative in this form of conflict and have succeeded in eroding Free World strength.
COLD WAR SUMMARY

1. U.S. IS ENGAGED IN WAR NOW

2. RESPONSE NOT YET FULLY EFFECTIVE, MUST ACT WITH VIGOR & CLEAR PURPOSE

3. WE CAN APPLY POWER AS SUBTLY & PERSISTENTLY AS COMMUNISTS

4. MILITARY (PARTICULARLY ARMY) POWER IS UNIQUELY SUITED FOR OUR COLD WAR NEEDS.
Our response is not yet fully effective. Many of our personnel, both military and nonmilitary, still do not understand the vastly different nature of this conflict and the requirements which it generates. We must act with vigor and clear purpose if we are to be successful.

We can develop and apply power as subtly and persistently as the Communists—if we have the will to do so. I am convinced that such action on our part will not cause automatic escalation to all-out war.

Our military power has great potential beyond those combat applications which have, heretofore, been considered normal. The Army recognizes its important role in this process. We stand ready to contribute additional forces along the lines I have described. At the same time, we must be prepared to go "all the way" with our military power, if this should become necessary in order to insure our survival.

Finally, the Army recognizes that our success depends in large part on our ability to understand and to enlist the loyalties of the people in whose areas the Cold War is being waged. In order to accomplish this, we need the best information and advice which social scientists can provide. I hope that this is only the first of many such meetings in which social scientists and military leaders can work together to solve the challenging problems which confront us.

It has been a great pleasure to be with you. Thank you.
DR. BAKER: We are all deeply grateful to you, General Eddleman, for this clear portrayal of the warfare that the Army faces throughout the world.

Now, we have invited Rear Admiral John M. Lee, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Planning and National Security Affairs, the Department of Defense.

INVITED ADDRESS

Rear Admiral John M. Lee
Director of Policy Planning Staff
Office, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense

Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a great pleasure to be here today. You are working on filling one of the most important and urgent current gaps in the military field: bringing a greatly
increased weight of social science research to bear on the problems of war and near-war.

These are great problems, of central importance to the world, and they have not yet had due academic attention. Tom Schelling wrote a couple of years ago: "Within the universities, military strategy in this country has been the product of a small number of historians and political scientists, supported on a scale that suggests that deterring the Russians from the conquest of Europe is about as important as enforcing the antitrust laws." This symposium is one of the indications that the situation is changing for the better. I am delighted to be able to make a contribution, however small, to the trend.

Theme:

For the purposes of this symposium, the term "limited-war" is being used to describe a relatively low level of intensity of conflict. If I may, however, I would like to use it more broadly. In this broader, more literal sense, all war must be limited-war.

War has always had limits of one sort or another, of course. There have been agreed limits--Geneva conventions, chivalric rules. But more significantly to our present problems, there have been, in the past, limits of capacity. Tamerlane, with the best will in the world, could only march so far, reduce so many cities, butcher so many inhabitants.

The central change from that to the present--or at least the near-term--case, is that the limitation of capacity is evaporating. Whether it be Herman Kahn's "doomsday machine," or the "cobalt bombardiers," or the more prosaic full scale, "all-out nuclear strike" directed
against populations and human resources, the tools for practical unlimitedness seem within reach, or nearly so.

And they are, almost by definition, essentially unusable for human purposes. Except as a restraint, as the ultimate, looming threat—the final, suicidal, sanction.

Warfare, conflict, challenges must therefore be managed, must be controlled, must be limited, at a level appropriate to the issue at stake, and always below that ultimate, unlimited level.

Neither we nor the Soviets can shoot the woaks.

This gives all conflict, even were dozens in the millions, something of the air of a "battle of champions," out between the lines of the drawn-up armies. The champions fight, the armies accept the verdict. Or perhaps they send out a dozen champions next. But the full, final clash of the armies is a recreation both we and the Soviets must find a way to deny ourselves.

We have then the problem of mastering the tools and techniques of these battles of champions all across the spectrum of conflict intensity, from irritated protests at one end to thermo-nuclear weapons at the other. We can no longer just rely on going to the completely unlimited case.

And, most interestingly, we have the problem of establishing controls and limits and boundaries along this intensity spectrum, to keep it from being just a smooth, continuously steeper, slide toward the precipice.

If I may, I would like to enlarge a little on both those problems: the problem of being able to deal with hostilities at all intensity levels, and the problem of finding ways to control the intensity level.
Dealing with Hostilities at Appropriate Level

First, being able to deal with all conflict levels. This is a big problem for us in this country. We have a strong bias toward the high side of the conflict spectrum, the general nuclear war extreme. This tendency flows from many causes:

- Our former nuclear monopoly, and our present relative nuclear strength,
- Our feeling of relative weakness at the conventional level,
- Our feeling that at the guerrilla and subversive level the Communists have a substantial lead and especial gifts,
- Our residual feeling that peace is peace and war is war: in the one we cooperate, in the other we do our worst, and nuclear are our worst.

But in the last few years it has become progressively clearer that concentrating on the high side of the conflict spectrum—vital though that side is—can tie our hands against other challenges. Currently, both in the Berlin and Southeast Asia problems, it has come out sharply again and again and again, that against limited, controlled, more or less ambiguous aggressions, the massive threat—while always a powerful restraint—is not a usable response. It is too disproportionate to the purpose to be achieved.

In the next few years, the effects of major nuclear exchange will become steadily more massive and more certain. The conflict area left uncovered by the nuclear deterrent will grow, not shrink. The low end of the spectrum, the area of the focus of this symposium, will be steadily more important.
I will not belabor this point. You will recall that General Eddleman has already discussed it here, and has mentioned the President's personal interest in and attention to the sublimited area. The only aspect I would like to stress is that the conventional and sub-conventional areas are not of lesser significance than the nuclear. They are slower; they are less dramatic. But they can be just as fatal if they are not dealt with. And again, we cannot cover our limitations in these fields by shifting at will to general nuclear war. Big nuclear war is for direct threats to the jugular. We must cover the whole spectrum with strength, and then fight on well-chosen terrain.

Let me quote a few paragraphs from a recent speech by Secretary McNamara:

In light of all the measures undertaken to improve our strategic striking forces—with respect to their survivability, strength, and control—it is clear that we have upgraded rather than downgraded our thermo-nuclear power. That power is essential to our strategy and tactics, indeed to our survival as a nation.

But it is equally clear that we require a wider range of practical alternatives to meet the kind of military challenges that Khrushchev has announced he has in store for us. Unless the Free World has sufficient forces organized and equipped to deal with those challenges at what appears to be the highest appropriate levels of conflict, we could be put into difficult situations by the Communists. In such situations we could lose by default; or we could lose by limiting our response to what appears to be the highest appropriate level, but a level at which we may be inferior; or we could resort to thermo-nuclear war—the level at which we are superior—but at a cost which could be out of proportion to the issues and dangers involved.
In areas where the nuclear deterrent is the only deterrent, and where the political or other issue is such that the nuclear deterrent does not appear to be fully persuasive to the Soviets, our friends ultimately could come to believe in the sincerity of Soviet threats. They could be inclined to succumb to Soviet blackmail if we had available no suitably scaled and obviously credible countermeasures.

There is no need, however, for the Free World to be vulnerable to this dangerous Soviet tactic. An adequate level of nonnuclear military strength will provide us with the means to meet a limited challenge with limited forces. We will then be in a position of being able to choose, coolly and deliberately, the level and kind of response we feel most appropriate in our own best interests; and both our enemies and our friends will know it.

We cannot, of course, lose sight of the nuclear side. There is also the problem of covering a range of contingencies at the nuclear end of the scale. Many are accustomed to think of general nuclear war as intrinsically the all-out, spasm, maximum damage attack. In the years ahead, as I argued earlier, this unlimited blow should be an ultimate threat and restraint, not a purposeful war measure. But there are workable controls in the nuclear zone that can and must be operated. Let me again quote Mr. McNamara:

"Our nuclear forces can be used in several different ways. We may have to retaliate with a single, massive attack, or we may be able to use our retaliatory forces to limit damage done to ourselves and our allies, by knocking out his bases before he has time to launch his second salvos. We may seek to terminate a war on favorable terms by using our forces as a bargaining weapon—by threatening further attack to give the enemy an incentive to avoid our cities and to stop the war. Our new policy gives us the flexibility to choose among several operational plans, but does not require that we make any advance commitment with respect to doctrine or"
targets. We shall be committed only to a system that gives us the ability to use our forces in a controlled and deliberate way, so as best to pursue the interests of the United States, our allies, and the rest of the Free World.

In summary, our goal is to respond to challenges all across the conflict spectrum—nuclear, conventional and sublimited—at a level of force which is appropriate to the issue involved and militarily favorable to our side. We must make sure that a lot more of the available levels are in fact militarily favorable to our side.

Establishing Boundaries, etc.

Let me turn now to the second problem I mentioned earlier. This is the problem of defining and establishing limits, or phase lines, or boundaries, or ladder-steps, along the curve of conflict intensity.

Korea provided a lot of examples of such limits: there were no nuclears; there were bombing sanctuaries beyond the Yalu and in Japan; there were no submarine attacks.

In the Formosa Straits we had the tacit rules about who flew where, how close to Quemoy U.S. escorts ran, the Chicom's day-on-day-off artillery rules.

In the Berlin business there is need for a whole hierarchy of boundaries. Berlin is very close to the jugular. To avoid big, sudden escalations, we have to have methods for indicating small changes in intensity, for responding appropriately to small challenge after small challenge after small challenge.

In Southeast Asia the most obvious steps on the intensity ladder are the degrees of U.S. and Communist involvement in the operations. Some of these steps have been taken already; many more are available.
In the nuclear area, as that last quotation from Secretary McNamara described, there are a variety of distinct ways of using and threatening nuclear measures, even during nuclear war.

These separate ladder-steps are basic control tools; they provide stopping points in the escalation process. Staying within a boundary, or exceeding it, is the method of holding or of lifting intensity, of conveying the appropriate degree of determination and force. Such steps are the way to give the enemy a signal, and time to act on it.

There are a number of very clear steps on the ladder. The difference between using and not using nuclear weapons, for example, is beautifully unmistakable. There is more ambiguity about other nuclear steps. Are there recognizable limits of battlefield nuclear? Would city-sparing be quickly visible to the enemy?

Below the nuclear zone there is, of course, a prominent watershed between overt conventional hostilities and sublimited operations. There are also the less clear lines of geographical, weapon, and direct involvement limitations.

The ladder-steps must be establishable and recognizable without any formal agreement with the other side. This is harder than it sounds. In a number of war games held here in Washington, with good, easy-communicating Americans on both sides, one of the most conspicuous findings was that the message that one side tried to convey by its actions simply did not get through to the other. Actions speak louder than words, perhaps, but often less precisely.
Another point: the more working, understood ladder-steps the better. The more there are, the finer control. Measures then need not be abrupt unless abruptness is desired.

At any rate there are important, by no means fully worked out, problems in this area of selecting, establishing, and using such boundaries to control the intensity level, to keep the operations proportionate to the objectives, to signal our intent to the enemy.

**Conclusion**

Let us go back a moment to the point that all war must now be limited, not because of limitations of destructive capacity, but because of deliberate restraint.

This means that, more than in the past, the military problem will be to deter, convince, persuade, constrain, rather than to entirely destroy the enemy's ability to oppose.

Generalship has always been a matter of combining force with leverage: this is not a complete bolt from the blue. But the urgency of final restraint is new.

This is what drives us to the lower levels of the conflict spectrum, and makes us seek systems of controls to manage conflicts, at a rational level within and under the final restraint.

There are large areas in these purposes where we look to the social scientist for new insights, new concepts, new techniques. The problem, after all, is to achieve objectives on social groupings, by means of social groupings. There is a certain amount of hardware involved too, of course, but men and their motives are at the heart of the matter. To my lay eye, it looks like the social scientists' business.
DR. BAKEP: Thank you, Admiral Lee. I think now Dr. Lybrand has an announcement before you disband for lunch.

DR. LYBRAND: In response to a number of inquiries, I want to announce that each attendee at the symposium will receive a copy of the unclassified proceedings. However, it will be necessary for qualified persons to request, in writing, a copy of the classified supplement. So, unless you tell us that you don't want it, you will receive the unclassified supplement automatically.
He rushed up to the peon and said, "Do you speak English?" The peon said, "Si, señor, I was wetback." The engineer said, "You wouldn't happen to know what time it is exactly?" At that the peon tipped his hat back further and looked tranquilly around. It happened that there was a magnificent cow with an enormous udder there, standing right next to the peon.

The peon took his right hand and applied it to the udder, lifting the teats very, very gently. Then, lowering his hand with equal gentleness, he said, "11:35-1/2, señor."

The engineer set his wristwatch. Then he set his chronograph to the wristwatch. He said, "Thanks," went back to his car, set his car clock. He drove about a mile and a half and came to a station which had a brand new electric clock.

He looked instinctively at his wristwatch. The time was exactly right. At that he got more nervous than ever. How on earth had the peon been able to measure time with that degree of accuracy through lifting an udder? It was scientifically utterly baffling. The poor fellow turned his car around, went back to the peon, ran up to the fence and said, "Do you remember me?"

The Mexican tipped his hat and said, "Si, señor." "How the hell did you tell the time? Has it anything to do with earth magnetism or pulse of the cow or what?" The peon said, "Señor, you asked me the time. The cow was there. I leefed her a little bit to see the church clock in the valley."

I would like to suggest by way of preface both to the papers and to the discussion that sometimes the hardest thing to budget in the federal establishment is the obvious, the simple.
It is much easier to get a fairly complicated paper and a fairly elaborate one involving critical techniques, mathematical proof, statement of model, than it is to find out which particular foot highways were used by the Kublai Khan in the final conquest of the Chinese Province of Yunnan and in the invasion of Burma.

I would like to throw out as a preface to the entire thing the question as to whether we Americans may not be handicapping ourselves by stressing the complicated and avoiding the simple, and whether part of our research may not be dedicated to overloading ourselves with terms such as special operations, special warfare, psychological operations, or counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency suggests that the antagonist is an "insurgent." So far as I know most of the bandits practicing terrorism and murder in various parts of the world are not "insurgents." should not be treated as insurgents, and probably are due for a normal civil process with the charge of homicide.

I am, myself, a son of an American judge who hanged a Philippine general for taking the oath of allegiance to the United States and going back to the bush. Not only did my father have the man hanged but he had dinner with him the night before he was hanged.

They had a pleasant conversation and the Philippine general, himself, acknowledged that the hanging was entirely proper by the laws and rules of war.

We have four topics this afternoon: An Army View of Limited-War in The Future, The New Dimensions of Special Warfare, Waging Remote Area Warfare, and Civil Actions in Developing Nations.

We then have a very rare treat following the distinguished speakers. We have some old hands, some expert practitioners in guerrilla operations who will join me on this platform for a roundtable discussion.
The first speaker is Lieutenant Colonel George W. Casey, who is at present in the Long Range Division, Long Range Analysis Group, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff of Military Operations. West Point 1945, M.A. Georgetown 1960, and an extensive vacation in Korea with regular forces, courtesy of the United States Government.

He will speak on an "Army View of Limited-War in the Future." Colonel Casey.

AN ARMY VIEW OF LIMITED-WAR IN THE FUTURE

Lieutenant Colonel George W. Casey
Long Range Analysis Group
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Department of the Army

NOTE: Lt. Col. Casey's paper is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is included in the CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT to these proceedings. The following unclassified abstract is presented to preserve continuity in these unclassified proceedings.

UNCLASSIFIED ABSTRACT

The predicted world environment of the early 1970's is described in terms of certain political and social forces expected to be at work during the next decade and the impact of these forces on 12 key regions of the world. Population growth is described as one of the key forces with a significant impact.

From the above regional analysis, certain conclusions are drawn regarding actions the United States must
take if it is to meet its challenges and responsibilities in each region. A number of the regions may present challenges in that they might be considered "limited-war-prone" areas.

Various types of warfare are discussed along the entire spectrum of warfare, and the probability of occurrence for each type discussed. A comparison is made of the probabilities of occurrence for each type for 1950 and 1975. The question of the use or nonuse of nuclear weapons in limited-war is discussed. The concept of escalation is also discussed.

Finally, the subject of forces required for limited-war is discussed in terms of type forces and deployment. The point is made that behavioral and social science research is viewed by the Army as critical to its limited-war and cold-war missions, particularly in the areas of military-political dynamics, intercultural understanding and communication, and in selection and training of personnel for overseas assignments.

DR. LINEBARGER: Thank you very much, Col. Casey, for a compact and very illuminating explanation of the Army's views and yours.

Our next speaker is a man who is entitled to be called an "old pro" in the field of Psychological Warfare and Unconventional Warfare if there ever was one. I, myself, was assigned the job of being a Sherlock Holmes by General Wedemeyer, then Deputy Chief of Staff, 15 years ago, and the mystery was who is doing what in the Department of the Army about psychological warfare as of 1947. I had 45 days as a reserve officer and civilian consultant to snoop the building thoroughly, and I discovered at the end of very exhaustive study that Colonel Kinard was doing all of it.
He is Director of Special Warfare in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, which, of course, is currently undergoing shifts and improvements of status.

He is, himself, a West Pointer, Class of 1936, M.A. Columbia University, and he knows the operating and research bureaucracy of Washington as do few men living. His subject for us this afternoon is: "The New Dimensions of Special Warfare."

It is with real pleasure that I present to you Colonel William H. Kinard, Jr.

Colonel Kinard.

THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF SPECIAL WARFARE

Colonel William H. Kinard, Jr.,
Director, Special Warfare;
Office, Army Chief of Staff for Military Operations,
Department of the Army

Thank you very much, Paul.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, to speak of the new dimensions of Special Warfare, of course, implies the existence of an earlier and a much narrower scope.

The dimensions of Special Warfare have changed, in keeping with the changing nature of war and politics. In fact, the term special warfare itself is relatively new, having been adopted by the Army as recently as 1956.

But the essential elements of Special Warfare are by no means new, either to recorded history or to the U.S. Army.
From the time when Cro-Magnon man first etched his crude figures on the cave walls of Europe, man has been trying to influence the mind of fellow man. And from the time that man first banded together to do combat, man has been waging guerrilla warfare against his enemies, against his friends, against his brother.

The principles of Special Warfare, even its tactics, have remained basically the same over the years, and these principles and tactics are equally applicable; whatever the environment—cold war, conventional war, or nuclear war.

Historically, guerrilla warfare has proved its effectiveness throughout the spectrum of conflict—in revolutions, in varying forms of insurgency, in public wars.

One valid measure of this effectiveness is the disproportionate number of conventional forces and the protracted length of time necessary to deal with the guerrilla force. In Yugoslavia and Albania, for example, in 1942, 35 German and Italian divisions were virtually immobilized by a force of 30,000 to 35,000 guerrillas.

In Yugoslavia alone during 1943, 15 German divisions and other forces totalling over 375,000 were required to cope with the guerrilla force of 35,000 to 42,000. Throughout the Balkans during 1943, more than 600,000 German troops were virtually tied down by a guerrilla force only one-twelfth as large.

In Malaya, in a war lasting 12 years, the ratio was about 24 to one. In Algiers, where the struggle has now consumed over 7 years, the ratio has been 20 or more to one. In Vietnam today the pattern appears to be the same.
Despite its long history, however, and despite its demonstrated effectiveness, it has been only in recent times that guerrilla warfare has established itself as a major element in a nation's strategy to achieve its objectives.

Earlier guerrilla warfare, together with related activities that make up the somewhat broader range of unconventional warfare, had been looked upon primarily as an adjunct to conventional military operations.

In that perspective its role was to support other more conventional—and, to many, more honorable—means of warfare. Similarly, psychological warfare was generally viewed as a handmaiden to policy, to be used or not used more according to the dictates of whim and fancy than as a part of a coordinated, conscious effort. Both were treated as if a sideshow to the primary struggle being carried on in the main arena of war and diplomacy.

Today, both unconventional and psychological warfare, which together have until recently comprised what we call Special Warfare, have become the conscious concern of governments. Both are being increasingly recognized as fundamental factors in the formulation of national policy and as major instruments in the implementation of policy.

These developments have in themselves led to another new dimension for Special Warfare. The term today is used to embrace all the military and paramilitary measures and activities related not only to psychological warfare and unconventional warfare but to the entire range and scope of counterinsurgency.

For our part we in the Army sometime ago formalized our own ability to wage these types of warfare. We have organized standard psychological warfare units and standard unconventional warfare units both in the active Army and in our reserve components.
We have taken a leaf here and there from the Swamp Fox and the Gray Ghost, from Merrill and from Volckmann, from the OSS and from the Rangers, as well as from the historical experience of both ally and enemy.

Beginning in 1951, the Army conceived, organized, and developed the basis for our current Special Warfare program.

In 1952, a center for these activities was established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, together with a school for instructing individuals in the arts and sciences of Psychological Warfare and Unconventional Warfare.

From the very outset we have invited foreign officers to attend selected courses in that school. Other U.S. personnel representing all of the military services and many of our civilian agencies and departments of the government have also regularly attended these courses.

In 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group, Airborne, was activated at Fort Bragg with a wartime mission to infiltrate into denied areas by land, sea, or air for the purpose of organizing the indigenous guerrilla potential and conducting unconventional warfare operations against the enemy.

In the following year, the 10th Special Forces was sent to Europe and another Special Forces Group activated at Fort Bragg to take its place.

Today we have four Special Forces Groups, two at Fort Bragg, one each in Europe and in the Pacific.

Beginning in 1955, our Psychological Warfare, then our Special Forces troops began to furnish advisers and mobile training teams to help our allies develop counterpart capabilities.

Much of this effort had the objective of increasing the ability of these underdeveloped nations not only to
defend themselves against outside aggression but also to maintain their own internal security.

The experience gained in these activities showed that the organization, the training, and the functions of our Special Warfare units made them especially well qualified to work with and assist the people and the armed forces of these small nations to cope with the growing dangers of the Cold War.

Accordingly, in 1959, the role of Special Warfare in the Cold War was expanded to include the additional mission of providing training advice and assistance in counterinsurgency operations to countries faced with actual or potential problems of Communist or Communist-inspired insurgency or terrorist or guerrilla activities.

The Army also took a number of other actions to enhance the ability of the United States and the Free World to deal with the increasing threat of these activities.

In October 1960, the Army established a course of instruction in counterinsurgency operations in order to provide both U.S. and foreign personnel with a better understanding of the problems facing the world today and to provide them with the knowledge of how to cope with these problems.

The first course was conducted at the United States Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg beginning in January of 1961.

In July 1961, the Army commander in the Caribbean expanded the curriculum at the Army Caribbean School to include counterinsurgency operations. This course is taught in Spanish.

It is planned that additional courses of this nature will shortly be established at Army schools in Germany and
on Okinawa. These new dimensions evolving for special warfare over the past few years have greatly expanded our responsibilities and at the same time have greatly taxed our resources.

After various ups and downs during the intervening years since the first "TO/E" for Special Forces was developed, beginning again in 1959, the strength of our Special Warfare units has gradually been increased.

A particular boost, of course, was given by the new Administration when President Kennedy, on March 28, 1961, included 3,000 personnel for Army Special Warfare in his request to Congress to increase the Army's total personnel ceiling by 5,000, from 870,000 to 875,000.

Congress approved the request, and as a result the Army was enabled to expand further its capabilities for guerrilla warfare, counterguerrilla warfare, and counterinsurgency operations--with or without war.

The President stated in his message:

We need a greater ability to deal with guerrilla forces, insurrection, and subversion. Much of our effort to create guerrilla and antiguerrilla capabilities has in the past been aimed at general war. We must be ready now to deal with any size of force, including small externally supported bands of men; and we must help train local forces to be equally effective.

In his State of the Union Address to Congress on May 24, 1961, the President stated:

The defense of freedom must rest upon effective combining of the efforts of local forces with our own plans and assistance. In areas directly threatened by overt invasion, local forces must have the capacity to hold back an aggressor until help can be provided.

The main burden of local defense against local attack, subversion, insurrection, or guerrilla warfare must of necessity rest on
local forces. Where these forces have the necessary will and capacity to cope with such threats, our intervention is rarely necessary or helpful.

Where the will is present and only capacity is lacking, our military assistance program can be of help... and military assistance can, in addition to its military purpose, make a contribution to economic progress... .

I am directing the Secretary of Defense to expand rapidly and substantially the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of nonnuclear war, paramilitary operations, and sublimited or unconventional wars... Our Special Forces and Unconventional Warfare units will be increased and reoriented.

Throughout the services new emphasis must be placed on the special skills and languages which are required to work with local populations in all of the social, economic, psychological, governmental and other efforts that are short of open conflict but necessary to counter Communist-sponsored guerrillas or insurgents.

New emphasis has been placed on Special Warfare and new emphasis has been placed within Special Warfare to attain a greater ability to operate within what Secretary McNamara has called the "twilight zone between political subversion and quasi-military action."

Today, our Special Warfare people are working with and as a part of our Military Assistance and Advisory Groups, or MAAGs, to help defeat Communist-inspired insurgency or guerrilla warfare.

Special Forces are particularly well qualified for this assignment. Their basic doctrine and their orientation are adaptable to either side of the threshold of war. Their mission has always been to work with foreign nationals, to act as instructor, as teacher, and as a partner in combat operations against the enemy. In effect,
our Special Forces have been trained to be a "HAAG behind the lines."

To give our Special Forces a greater ability to operate in the twilight zone, we are expanding our units and augmenting them with additional capabilities for engineer, medical, civil affairs, and psychological warfare activities.

Four of these organizations based on existing units are being developed to meet possible requirement in each of four major areas of concern: Southeast Asia, Latin America, Sub-Sahara Africa, and Europe and the Middle East. Each of these organizations will have as a nucleus a Special Forces group, which, together with augmentation detachments, will provide for a highly versatile counterinsurgency force from which specially tailored elements comprising a wide range of skills can be organized to meet situations of varying intensity.

These activities were described by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff in their recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. General Decker, for example, said: "The Army is rapidly expanding its capability to support civil assistance and paramilitary operations in critical areas of the world where Communist-inspired subversion, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare exist or may develop.

Our objective in using military assistance to cope with such Communist aggression is to optimize the capability of indigenous military forces to insure internal security and to promote political stability.

In short, our approach is to try to defeat Communist-inspired insurgency in each threatened country before we are faced with a fait accompli and forced to take more drastic action.
At the request of the country concerned, the Army is prepared to furnish task forces or advisory teams to give field training and guidance to local military forces. These task forces and teams are also capable of providing operational advice and of participating, if required, with our friends in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations against possible hostile forces.

This concept was outlined in some detail to the Congress by General Hamlett, the Deputy Chief of Staff of Military Operations, who, as you know, was recently designated to be the Army's new Vice-Chief of Staff.

Emphasis will be placed on the prevention of overt insurgency through assistance in the development of economic and political stability as well as military stability. This is not in itself a new role for our Army. The U.S. Army has traditionally been both the nation's protector and a major factor in the building of the nation.

From the earliest frontier days the Army has played a vital role in opening up new frontiers and in defending those frontiers. The Army, through its early surveys, mapping, railroad construction, and waterways projects, made significant contributions to civilian progress.

Names such as Lewis, Clark, Pike, and Fremont, are closely associated with such pioneer progress. In the wake of the explorers and the builders, Army garrisons consolidated what had been settled, and extended a cloak of security to the westward moving settlers.

The Army has also carried its role of nation-builder beyond the borders of the United States, wherever our national security interests have taken our Armed Forces.

Army doctors such as Walter Reed and William C. Gorgas will never be forgotten for their contributions to
the relief of disease-ridden humanity. Following the Philippine insurrection, Army personnel not only assisted in building schoolhouses but voluntarily conducted the first schools for many Filipin children until other teachers became available.

In more recent times, as has been demonstrated in Germany, Japan, Korea, and elsewhere, military units have sponsored medical centers, schools, orphanages, churches, and youth organizations.

In recent conventional wars it has been the experience that these civil assistance aspects have generally followed a vicious, violent test of arms on the battlefield. This has been true both in friendly countries liberated from the enemy and in enemy areas occupied by our own forces.

Today in the Cold War, the order may well be reversed, or at least concurrent. In underdeveloped areas of the Free World, where Communist subversion and aggression have not yet attained a foothold, the need is to build stable nations, and people are the key to success or failure.

We are today in a period of international conflict where the victor may not be the one who boasts the more sophisticated arms or equipment. We are today in a period of international conflict where the advantage may more often lie with those who are successful in obtaining the support of the people—people who are sensible of political, ideological, and sociological values and who are earnestly seeking answers to these problems, as well as people whose vision may have been blurred by the blandishments of communism; people who may be politically ignorant, politically indifferent; and people whose main concern may be tonight's rice or tomorrow's fish.

In fact, we all too often face the same problem that Adam faced when he was offered the apple by Eve. We
are indebted to Mark Twain for preserving for us Adam's rationale for his historic decision. As you know, Mark Twain translated Adam's diary from the original manuscript. Adam said, "It was against my principles, but I find that principles have no real force except when one is well fed."

It is the armed forces themselves, and the army in particular, in these underdeveloped nations that in many cases offer the best hope in gaining the support of the people.

The local army is close to the people. Its units are generally widely dispersed throughout the countryside. In some cases it offers the only reliable means of communication. Its members wear uniforms which are readily identifiable with the government. The army is regarded by the government and the people alike as the custodian of the nation's security and its ultimate guardian against aggression.

Civic action, however, which is essentially what I am talking about at this point, must be a corollary mission. The basic purpose of a military force is to defend the nation against all threats to its security, internal and external. Nevertheless, it is in the works of peace that the safeguards of security are best established in the long run.

The size of the tasks that face us in the lower spectrum of war are enormous. The implications that those tasks hold for Special Warfare operations are likewise enormous.

So, too, are the implications for research and development in the fields of social science and human factors, and in the material resources needed to meet the ever-broadening arena of war that is yet not war, at least as we have known it in the past.
We need to know the strengths and the weaknesses in all aspects of the societal structure of our allies and of our opponents. We need to know their vulnerabilities. We need to know their languages. We need to know many things: how to work with and get along with our friends; to improve the selection and training of our own personnel; to increase our own operational effectiveness; to widen and expand our knowledge in every field of human relationships.

These are the challenges, and I think this is your job as well as mine.

DR. LINEBARGER: Thank you very much, Colonel Kinard.

Ladies and gentlemen, I now take great pleasure in introducing our next speaker, who is already plugged in, Lieutenant Colonel John T. Little, a native of Rhode Island, who did not go to West Point. He went somewhere better, to Normandy, and he received a field commission in Normandy.

He went through World War II with the 82nd Airborne. He served in Korea. He served in Lebanon, and he has served in Laos from the 17th of December, 1960, to the 23rd of October, 1961.

He is a graduate of the Infantry School and of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. He is at present Deputy for Operations, Plans, and Training at the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. Colonel Little will speak to us on the subject of "Waging Remote Area Warfare."

As a last footnote before I yield the podium to Colonel Little, I would like to suggest that the lay anthropologist, Allen Broderick Houghton, who is one of England's best popular writers on anthropology, has
brought up the interesting and somewhat questionable suggestion that man has differed from other animals in two major respects.

First, his front feet have really become hands. Secondly, man through most of his experience has eaten man. Dr. Houghton points out that human flesh, particularly in remote areas is palatable, nutritious, and extremely inexpensive.

Thank you.

WAGING REMOTE AREA WARFARE

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Department Of The Army

NOTE: Lt. Col. Little's paper is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is included in the CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT to these proceedings. The following unclassified abstract is presented to preserve continuity in these unclassified proceedings.

UNCLASSIFIED ABSTRACT

Using one country as a basis for the paper, the situation facing a U.S. Special Forces commander in a counterinsurgency mission is discussed. Topics covered include: the organization of the indigenous forces; the relationship of Special Forces detachments to the indigenous forces; a description of detachment functions, with specific examples of their employment.
The author concludes by stating that his experiences have given him a deep respect for the Special Forces soldier and have convinced him that the human factor, the business of the symposium, was the most important factor in the association of our teams with the indigenous forces.

DR. LINEBARGER: Colonel Little, thank you very much. We ask you to join the roundtable which will come after the next speaker.

Our next speaker will address himself to the subject of "Civic Actions in Developing Nations." He is Col. Robert H. Slover, B.A. University of Oklahoma, M.A. Harvard University, Ph.D. Harvard University.

He entered active duty in the field artillery in 1942, he served in Europe and was awarded the Legion of Merit with Bronze Star. He was in Korea and Civil Affairs and awarded a Korean decoration therefor, and was also a member of the Draper Committee.

He has gone to the appropriate military schools and he will talk to us about one of the great breakthroughs in American military and civil policy.

The subject is "Civic Action." Colonel Slover.

CIVIC ACTIONS IN DEVELOPING NATIONS

Colonel Robert H. Slover
Deputy Chief, Plans And Doctrine Division
Office Of The Chief Of Civil Affairs
Department Of The Army

NOTE: This is a rewritten unclassified version of the CONFIDENTIAL paper delivered by Colonel Slover.
Thank you, Dr. Linebarger.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, and gentlemen. We have heard the term "civic action" used and some description given of this term today. General Trudeau, General Eddleman, and Colonel Kinard have emphasized the importance of civic action and the broader aspects of civil affairs, in which civic action is a part, as an essential adjunct of limited military operations. I am very glad to note that Colonel Kinard also mentioned the importance of this activity in the maintenance of peace.

With the introduction that they have given, my mission then will be to develop for you in more detail the civic action concept in the developing nations.

In the less developed countries, economically, sociologically, and sometimes politically, we are seeing today the desire on the part of the people for a better way of life. These are areas where a type of social revolution is under way. These are the battlegrounds in the Cold War. It must be recognized in any battle for control that the rising expectations of the people must be considered, that the side that wins support of the people will win the battle. Dr. Franklin Lindsay, one of the members of the Gaither Committee which studied National Security policy, recently summarized this principle in his article on "Unconventional Warfare" in the Foreign Affairs quarterly for January 1962, saying, "Just as control of the air has become a prerequisite for successful frontal warfare, so control of the population is a prerequisite
for successful unconventional warfare." I submit to you for consideration in this symposium that civic action is an important and valuable way of gaining that necessary control of populations.

When government forces identify themselves with the well-being of the populace by military activities directed at public welfare and involving civil affairs and civic action functions, the people tend to reciprocate. They deny assistance to the dissidents, are less receptive to enemy propaganda, and have a tendency to take more vigorous measures to thwart coercive insurgent requisitions placed upon them.

President Kennedy has recently expressed a direct interest in the civic action program and given us some guidelines. As early as last March, when at the White House he talked to the diplomatic corps of the Latin American nations, he told those present, "the new generation of military leaders have shown an increasing awareness that armies cannot only defend their countries--they can help build them."

Further directives from the National Security Council have given a definition of civic action and guidelines on its use. The definition, which is used by almost all concerned now is, "By civic action we mean using indigenous forces on projects useful to the populace at all levels in such fields as training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation, and others helpful to economic development." It has also been pointed out that in addition to military benefits, such as improvements of skills, a program can have a beneficial effect on: (a) the morale of indigenous military forces; (b) civil-military relationships within the country; and (c) popular identification with the national government.
This means then that to make full and effective use of a country's military forces, their activities and responsibilities must be expanded to include these activities. Their training must include the best methods of employing the principles of military-civil relations to insure voluntary support and cooperation of the civilian population, and they must engage in programs which will assist the people to improve their living standards. This is the military program, utilizing the capabilities and resources of the military forces to help alleviate want, poverty, and suffering and to improve the community which has been termed "civic action."

Civic action should be looked upon as both a preventive or countering measure to prevent deterioration in a country, and also as a technique of guerrilla warfare. As pointed out earlier, guerrilla warfare can never be effective unless it is supported, or at least passively accepted, by the people of the area. To fight subversion and insurgency the forces of a nation must win the people to their side and realize that the manner in which they behave toward the people greatly influences the course of events. However, civic action must not be looked upon as a substitute for military power and combat-capable forces, but as an effective device which such forces can use as their contribution, along with other governmental agencies, to the development and well-being of areas. Civic action then is almost any action which makes the soldier a brother of the people, as well as their protector. It can range from basic military courtesy and discipline up to formal projects.

The concept and practice of civic action is not new. In many developing countries, commendable programs have been and are being executed in agriculture; roads, bridges, and
other building activities; sanitation, resettlement, and other constructive channels. In Korea, the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) program has helped rehabilitate communities. In the Philippines and Burma, the military was one of the principal tools on which the government depended for the establishment of law and order, civic leadership, local improvements and developments of virgin areas by settlement. In several South and Central American countries there is an indication that a number of countries are beginning to realize the value of the civic action contributions.

The program employed by the Philippines to defeat the Huks during the years 1950-53 provides a dramatic success story of a free nation's efforts to defeat a Communist-inspired and -supported enemy within the country. The key features of President Ramon Magsaysay's campaign were: (a) development of harmonious military-civil relations, (b) civic action, particularly village development and social improvement, (c) improved organization and training for combat.

The AFAK program in Korea has proved to be a highly successful venture combining the efforts of the people and the U.S. Army, assisted by U.S. advice and assistance in community development and improvement. Schools, churches, hospitals, irrigation systems, bridges, and roads have been typical projects included in the AFAK program. Such practical and outgoing concern for Korean welfare has immeasurably improved military-civil relations in Korea and has won the sincere friendship of the population for our Armed Forces. The Korean forces are now effectively using this same program.

In the Latin American area, engineer construction battalions, supported by MAP and AID funds, have made
significant contributions to the development of the economy in Peru, Honduras, Ecuador, and Colombia. Colombia is making use of the technique in the pacification program in the guerrilla areas of the country. In one area, Belán de Umbria, the military forces, in conjunction with local agencies and groups, are helping to rebuild homes, schools and civic buildings.

Vietnam has commenced several noteworthy programs of civic action. There is a growing realization there that greater efforts must be made to expand their civic action operations in their fight against the Viet Cong.

U.S. military participation in the civic action program is based on national and defense policy directives and on legislation. The AID Act of 1961, as passed by Congress, contains a section, 505 (b), which authorizes the use of military forces in underdeveloped countries for the construction of public works and other activities helpful to economic development. Just last month, the Departments of State and Defense and AID came to a significant agreement on funding for civic action programs and a policy message was sent to Diplomatic Missions and Unified Commands.

The Department of the Army was given authority by OSD in May 1960 to promote and assist with development of the civic action program on a limited scale. This authority was broadened in September 1961 when Secretary McNamara made the Department of the Army the executive agent for all services for the civic action program. Let me outline briefly for you what has been done.

In the military assistance training program of DA we now form civic action mobile training teams to be sent on a temporary duty basis to a MAAG or Mission at the request of the country team and the concurrence of the government of the country concerned. The mission of these civic action teams is:
1. Orientation of the MAAG or Mission staffs and other members of the country team, as appropriate, on the civic action concept and the role of the MAAGs in the program.

2. Survey of the country for needs which can be met through civic action programs.

3. Development of a civic action program for the specific country.

4. When requested by the MAAG/Mission Chief, provide training and guidance for local forces and provide specific technical assistance on projects.

The actions taken to implement the civic action program are as follows:

1. By way of messages, field trips, development of procedures for carrying out the program, briefings to key commanders, and at conferences, by insertion of the concept into cold-war plans and directives, and lecturing at the Military Assistance Institute and the Strategic Intelligence School, we have informed the field of the scope of the program, stressed its importance, and given guidance on how to use it.

2. On request of the local governments concerned, civil affairs/civic action MAP mobile training teams have been furnished or are being planned as follows:

   a. Guatemala. At the request of the Ambassador and the President of the country, a team was sent to Guatemala and worked with the U.S. Country Mission and the President and his Ministry of Defense during the period November 1960 to January 1961. A civic action program for the military forces was developed, a civic action section created in the Ministry of Defense and military units are now engaged in projects which are helpful to the communities, and which have, as President Ydigoras has said, resulted in a new spirit of cooperation within the Army for community develop-
ment at the site of each military unit. A civic action advisor will be assigned to the Military Mission in Guatemala in May of 1962.

b. **Vietnam.** As a part of the overall package program developed during the visit of Vice President Johnson to South Vietnam with President Diem, a civic action team of three officers and one enlisted man worked in Vietnam with the Vietnamese Armed Forces in health, welfare, and public works activities to develop a civic action program for Vietnam.

c. **Laos.** At the request of the Country Mission in Laos, a team of three officers and two enlisted men was sent to Laos to give instruction in civil affairs/civic action to local forces and to help train the Laotian civil affairs companies and civic action teams.

d. **Iran.** A team of two officers assisted with the development of a civic action program for the Iranian military forces and sparked the creation of a civic action section in the Iranian military structure.

e. **Ecuador.** A team of five officers in the fields of civil affairs, public health, engineering, communications, and public relations, developed at the request of the Country Mission in Ecuador, arrived in Ecuador in January 1962 to train local forces in the civic action concept and to develop a civic action team.

f. Two State-DOD-DA teams have just returned from selected countries in Latin America, the Far and Middle East where they assisted in the development of civic action projects.

Before closing, I would like for you to consider with me some possible areas of research which would be helpful in the civic action work.
We need to know more about what are the most effective programs or projects in given circumstances that will have the greatest impact on the population. Which projects will best win the population to the side of the military forces and keep them there? Perhaps this can be approached on a case study basis, which will permit certain conclusions to be drawn. Of course, with this we need to know more about the people of an area—how they live, their customs, their social structure, their needs. When we know this, perhaps we then will not run the risk of putting a square civic action project in a round social structure hole.

Another field of research lies in the most effective measure of advising or telling the people just what their military forces are doing or can do for them. We seem to have a tendency either to do nothing in keeping the people informed or else we "blow our horn" too loud.

One of the most difficult areas of decision in the civic action programs is the proper balance for a military unit—just how much civic action work should be undertaken by a unit in order to make an effective contribution, yet retain the capability for its primary mission? The National Security Council recognized there are three areas where the degree of civic action work will vary. We need to have studies which will show the effect of civic action work on a military unit in all aspects—morale, fitness, discipline, ability to fight, etc. And we need more definitive guidelines to help us judge how much time of a unit should be spent on civic action. For example, what are the criteria in a country's economic and social conditions and military posture we should look for to determine how much time a unit should spend on civic action?

Civic action projects by military forces must be desired and needed, and there must be close cooperation
between communities, governmental agencies, and the military. We may put all of this under the heading of community development and, in the research being carried out on community development, add a new factor for study—what is the best role of the military in community development? And in determining this role, we need to consider the relationships of our own foreign aid agencies to each other. How can our various programs, several administered by different U.S. governmental agencies, best cooperate together for the maximum results.

Perhaps, basic to all of these areas of research, there is a need for the compiling and publication of a good set of case studies on civic action projects which will show what military forces have been able to do, how they did it, the costs involved and the results.

These are a few of the projects which this symposium might wish to consider. I am sure there are others.

In conclusion and summary, we should look upon civic action as a program, long range in character, designed to use the capabilities of military forces as one of the means of assisting the developing nations to accomplish their development and to effect a cooperative civilian-military team. The civic action concept recognizes that the military forces can play their part, along with other governmental forces, in this development and in the achievement of economic and social stability.

Thank you very much.
DR. LINEBARGER: Thank you Colonel Slover.

At the instruction of your chairman we are proceeding directly with the roundtable on the subject, "Reflections and Perspectives: Field Experiences and Nonmateriel Research Requirements."

I have with me a very distinguished group of panelists, one of whom, Colonel Little, you have already met. He was speaker before last.

At the far right we are privileged to have a man whose memory will live after we are forgotten because he has passed into the folklore and the patriotic memories of the Philippines, Brigadier General Russell Volckmann, who led the Philippine-American guerrillas--more Filipinos than Americans--against the Japanese occupation in those very rough and very bad years. A West Pointer, class of 1934, he has served at Bataan as Colonel, first as Executive Officer, then as Commanding Officer of the 11th Infantry, and was there awarded the distinguished Service Medal with Silver Star and Combat Infantryman's badge. After capture, a capture in which so many of his comrades died, he escaped and lead guerrilla forces against the Japanese in Northern Luzon from 1943 to 1945, and for that was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal and the Legion of Merit.

But more than that, he was awarded a place in the history of the Philippines and in military history. He is a Brigadier General, Regular Army, Retired, and by sheer coincidence he is connected with the Volckman Furniture Manufacturing Company of Morrison, Illinois.

I don't know whether I have ever tried to buy a guerrilla chair but if I ever do I shall certainly write the General for one.
Next to my right is our other panelist, also a Brigadier General, this time a Brigadier General USAR. I am, myself, a writer and I confess that each of the books of Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall reduces me almost to a state of tears because as I look at his books—every single one of them—I say to myself, "How the devil does he do it? It looks so easy, and when I try to do it it is not." He served as Chief Combat Historian in the Pacific Theater and then Chief Historian, war correspondent in Korea and the Sinai War, Israel and Egypt, in Lebanon. His regular job is that of being chief editorial writer and military critic of the Detroit News.

He has two college degrees, and in addition to the college degrees, he has a very distinguished brother sitting in the second row watching him. We have both Marshalls present.

At this point I am going to call first on General Volckmann, then on General Marshall, then on Colonel Little. If there is any comment time, I shall acknowledge the fact that this is an Army meeting and shall ask for comments or questions first of all from general officers, which is a logical way of quieting the academics. Then if there is still more time left over, which I doubt, I shall throw the floor open. But at the scheduled time I shall depart for a cup of coffee, myself. It is with great pleasure that I present first General Volckmann.

BRIGADIER GENERAL VOLCKMANN: First of all I would like to start out by stating that, against a background of policy, all the human research you can do to particularly combat guerrilla warfare is pretty fruitless unless that policy goes all the way. Basically, there are three fundamental principles that have to be followed
through to successfully put down a resistance movement such as we have in South Vietnam today.

First, you have to drive a wedge between the organized resistance forces which we commonly refer to as "guerrilla forces"; in other words, separate them from the mass of the civilian population and provide them security.

The next phase, of course, is to destroy the guerrilla forces.

But we can't stop there. Those are only half measures. We recognize in all other types and forms of warfare as well as on the athletic field that the best defense is a good offense. But for some reason or another we have failed in many cases in the past to apply this principle when it comes to counterinsurgency generally, or if you wish, counterresistance activities. You must cut off the external support that holds out any hope of success to the resistance forces. Unless that is done you are going to expend a terrific amount of money, time, and manpower, and seldom then will you ever be successful.

During the period of 1949 I had the opportunity to do quite a bit of research on what other people had done in order to hold down resistance. You come up with an area number factor which ranges all the way from six to eight personnel per square mile all the way up to twelve, and in the case of the Philippines, in Northern Luzon, it varied all the way from 6 to 20 persons per square mile. I may add right at this point that in none of these cases was the force applied sufficient to cope with the resistance movement.

Now let us apply that yardstick to South Vietnam today. I have not scaled out the miles but it is roughly 80,000 square miles, I would estimate. You can see right
there a million troops, a million men. And then you end up owning only the ground you stand on or can effectively patrol. It seems to me that we are only applying half measures again.

I say we can cut off the flow of supply and support from external sources by certain actions along the borders. All you have to do is take a glance at the map of South Vietnam, the common borders of Laos and Cambodia, the extensive sea frontier and again apply the area numbers factor to even "guesstimate" what it would take to seal those borders. The only other alternative then is to attack and disrupt the source of that external support, and I don't mean by conventional means—I think it can be done by unconventional means.

Now against that background I certainly indorse very strongly what Colonel Slover had to say. Civic action is one of the most important factors for the field of research, because the basis for effective action in a country such as Vietnam or any other area of the world must be determined. Some work has been done on this and extensive work has been done in a few areas of the world under the title of area studies. We need to give our personnel, who have to go into the field, more knowledge about the people they have to work with, and primarily knowledge at the grassroot level, their very basic structure.

Regardless of how primitive the people are, whether they are still living in grass huts or more elaborate dwellings, you will find in every community a structure that has been built up over the years to control and administer the people in that area. One of the worse things we can do is to go into those areas and disregard that structure and impose a new one to our liking. We
should figure out ways and means to exploit their structure rather than impose a new one on them.

Another very important factor. Actually both guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations are a battle of intelligence and counterintelligence. This I think we have again failed to recognize in many areas. We put forces into an area (and the Japanese were guilty of this too) without a detailed plan based upon sound intelligence; we merely fanned the air and accomplished very little, if anything.

I asked a question in South Vietnam this summer to a classmate of mine who had been there for 8 months. I questioned him indirectly so as not to tip him off to what I was trying to get to and found out that the intelligence effort placed in South Vietnam was practically nil, and even less on the counterintelligence front.

It is impossible to intelligently plan or attack a problem against guerrilla forces without an elaborate system of intelligence and counterintelligence. I think a great deal of research can be channeled towards this field because the average conventional military mind cannot project itself into the situation that exists in a situation such as South Vietnam. Your normal intelligence methods and means are not applicable in many cases. So it takes very unique methods, particularly when the situation has gone as far as it has in South Vietnam, to make inroads into the populace and into these areas to establish intelligence and counterintelligence nets.

Another very important subject that warrants a great deal of research is that of group control or population control. I don't believe very much has been done on this, or at least it had not at my last reading,
and there has been a great deal accomplished by other countries in this respect. Maybe it is counter to our own principles; therefore, we have shied away from it. The Japanese, for example, used a very sound system of group control called the Hukô system, where so many families were placed under a head, and each head under another head, pyramiding up.

Where there was any trouble in an area that could not be attributed to any family, the entire group was punished. I am not advocating this as a solution to the problem but it is a possible approach to the problem of group control under the conditions that exist in areas such as South Vietnam, Laos, today.

I will pass now to General Marshall.

DR. LINEBARGER: General Marshall, may we invite your comments.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MARSHALL: Well, my presence on this panel reminds me of my favorite Mae West story. Mae was told by a woman reporter from the Los Angeles Examiner that she wanted to interview her on the subject of motherhood. Mae said, "Fine, have you ever been a mother?" The girl said, "No." Mae said, "Neither have I. I can see this is going to be a hell of an enlightening conversation."

I have never been a guerrilla. I have dealt with guerrillas in places like Mexico, Korea, Lebanon, and so on; it always surprised me to discover that they didn't wear horns, that most of them wore pants and they moved their bowels like other people. In my more recent years I have had an indirect contact with our own Special Forces people, mainly in the period when I sat on the Special Operations panel with Paul Linebarger and other social scientists, I being the only non-social scientist in the group. Believe me this was a dizzying experience.
Other members of the panel would go down and report what was being done by Special Forces. I had a different kind of errand. They would bring their reports back as to what doctrine was developing. I was just sitting there criticizing certain things that were going on as being contrary to human nature, saying that it would be impossible to get away with such things.

More recently I have been down with Special Forces under General Bill Yarborough, talking to his people, finding the most amazingly practical-minded group of men I have ever seen in an American uniform. And there is a great hope in this outfit.

Whereas, they are portrayed in our press as being brilliant young adventurers, when you get down there it is not this kind of thing at all. In our government it has become the case that if you expect to get a job in a civilian suit you have to be, if not a juvenile, at least in your salad years and preferably from Harvard. But down there the people who are expected to maintain the front line for us out in the gray areas are by-and-large the hard core, the older, more experienced, and steadier noncoms of the Army.

Their average age is around 32 and some of the best ones are around 42 and 43. So, if you are worrying about having to go to the old soldiers home some day, since you can't get a job in government, why at least there may be a place for you in Special Forces.

It is interesting to talk to these men and to find how realistic they are about their tasks. Their consensus is this, that it takes them about 6 months to really get anywhere. I think that is what the average person down there told me. Colonel Little, who has been with you, said that it takes his boys about 6 months to win the
confidence of the people with whom they are dealing. Then, they can begin to make hay. The men back from Laos went on to say that the door-opener for us, the trail breaker, the link that gets them over finally, is the medical man most of the time. It is out of his services.

But then when you talk to the medicos who have been there, they talk about the complexity of their problems. They have to learn Lao before they go out there and they think this is going to get them by, that is, they'll do all right with their basic vocabulary. When they get out there they discover that the people with whom they are dealing don't have any vocabulary for such a thing as heart and lungs and kidneys, that if they are hurting inside it is always their guts that are hurting. That is all they can talk about. They cannot describe a pain, they can just describe it as something that hurts. The Laos don't have a sufficient grasp of medical vocabulary to speak of the degree of pain or even tell where it is. The medico said that this was his major problem. It was just simply trying to get to understand what was wrong with the fellow when he could not explain it.

As I have listened through today, General Volckmann, there is one thing that bothers me.

I was talking to Bill Yarborough earlier today about it. I come so often to a meeting of this kind that I am reminded of old Tom Howard: he is dead now but he used to put on this program, "It Pays To Be Ignorant." Every once in a while he would pop up and say, "What is the question? What is the question?" It all seemed awful stupid on that program. Yet that is the thing that concerns us here. We have been
talking so much about what we can do from this side without really beginning to talk about how to get the information on the problem itself on the other side of the world—getting the basic data.

That is a great weakness in our system. I would simply throw it out to a social scientist or anthropologist as a guess of mine that the more primitive a people are the more elementary and stereotyped its habit patterns are likely to be. They are mysterious only because we have not begun to understand them.

General Truman, I have seen this happen in our Army time after time. I saw it when I went out to the Pacific in 1943. Guided by the stuff that we had picked out of our Guadacanal operation, by the time we got out there we find the enemy described as being adroit, clever, eccentric, possessed of all the guile in the world—a very, very mysterious fellow indeed. As I got into the analysis of operations I found this was not true at all. The Jap soldier was stereotyped except for a few tree snipers and "loners" of that sort.

Most of the time he could be depended on to repeat tomorrow what he had done the day before yesterday. As they came on, they followed a regular pattern.

Now the same thing happened when the Chinese came in against us in North Korea. To our people—to the troops—this was a mystifying insidious foe that did everything differently than anybody had ever done it before. Once again my task was the analysis of operations out of the assembling of data. When we got into the data we found there was nothing mysterious about it. The fellow did everything according to a previously determined pattern. Once you get that pattern you can begin to operate against him and do it effectively.
Now in recent months I have talked with various people out of Laos and out of Vietnam who have come back, scientists, soldiers and so on, and each one has a different story to tell and a somewhat different impression of the nature of the enemy and of the folk habits of the people with whom he has been in contact.

But I say to you that until we begin to develop a system by which we collate this information, we are wasting our time. This should be the beginning of our research efforts. I was suggesting to General Farbrough that this should be added to the techniques of his people and that each man should be a data collector. But beyond that we should have people—both scientists and military—out there, who have no other job than to develop the pattern of what we are up against. Also, we need to know more about the pattern of people that we are trying to keep on our side.

I throw that in because I think that too many times here in the United States, simply because we are big and powerful and we have a lot of brainy people available, we tend to put the cart in front of the horse. Since this is, as we were told this morning, a thing that is going to go on a long time (that is what they told us about the Vietnam show), maybe it applies to Laos, also. No quick victory is to be expected: I would say that the first job we should consider is how we should do research in the field, so that we can be sure of our information. That is all I have to say.

DR. LINEBARGER: Thank you very much. Colonel Little?

COLONEL LITTLE: Gentlemen, you have left me in the position where I can either reinforce or object.

I made notes while both these gentlemen were talking. One of them was motivation. We are in the business of
using people. All of us are these days. Some people don't want to be used. Maybe you can help us solve that one.

The second one is intelligence. Now, General Volckmann pointed out just exactly how difficult it is to get into a resistance system once it is set up and tight. In most cases, or at least in two cases that I have looked at, you find out that the police system of the countries involved is so weak, their means of control, centralization of information and so forth, are so poor that really they can't track down those people who have been sources of trouble in the past.

There is no way in which they collate information so that the pattern of the activity of a criminal—and for the most part that is whom you are dealing with—can be determined and active measures taken against him. I have to reinforce General Volckmann's comments on intelligence.

The other thing is leadership. When you are dealing with people who are primitive in nature it becomes very, very difficult to find someone outside a village society—who can meld small groups into larger groups so that they become effective forces. This needs looking into.

Now another note that I had was on communications, and that is simply communications between peoples. The people in the Special Forces Group trained in Laotian. When they got into Laos they were confronted with "Kha," with "Moo," and other tongues, all of which had variations on basic dialects. Their training in Laotian did them very little, if any, good. So, they could have learned two words in some cases before they left and they would have been as well off as if they had spent
months studying the language. If we can devise a simple system of communication, so that a thought can be put across easily, then you can really do us a good deal of benefit.

That is all I have to say.

DR. LINEBARGER: I wish to add for the record that two of the major issues are the Communist conquest of probability and the conquest of probable truth rather than of choice. They keep up their drum beat on what will happen instead of what they would like to happen and the theme of inevitability is one of their strongest aspects.

Another key term is that of corruption, in which they have managed to identify all capitalist acquisition as corrupt and have left the Communists as the only honest people on earth.

One of the major requirements faced in this field is that of nomenclatural reform. It is necessary that the Free World not handicap itself by adopting neutral or incomprehensible terms when the Communists have terms which in themselves provide a motivational force for the counterpart activity.

For instance, it is unnecessary to go to the extravagant lengths which the Communists carry their terminology, but there is surely a middle ground in which easy and common sense reform is practicable.

Some of the terms particularly affected are the following:

**Special Warfare** is not a self-explanatory term in standard English. It is difficult for a man to explain to his family that he is undertaking a noble crusade or a particularly patriotic and hazardous venture if he admits he has joined a Special Warfare unit.
Other terms such as irregular warfare, anti-intruder warfare, or immediate warfare might be worth considering.

But it is entirely possible that the best solutions for a new name for Special Warfare may come from the officers and enlisted men themselves if they were queried for a description of their present assignments.

Another key concept is psychological operations, which has now reached a level of almost total incomprehensibility to the ordinary newspaper reader, to the intelligence officer who is not a specialist in the field, or to the high school graduate enlisted man. Psychological warfare with all of its disadvantages in the old days nevertheless showed the culmination of attempting to combine psychology and war. The present term leaves the issue entirely neutral.

Combat propaganda is of course plain English but it has political handicaps within the U.S. domestic scene which make administrators wary of it.

In a more serious vein it can be pointed out that insurgency is much too flattering a word to be applied to the terrorism and banditry which the Communists use. Counterinsurgency is almost as bad as counterpatriotic efforts, and the use of this term itself constitutes a handicap to the Free World and an unconscious assist to the Communists.

Counterinsurgency and insurgency might both be replaced by some term more happily descriptive of the services which the Army can render the Free World.

Social science is of course a fantastic misnomer for a wide variety of disciplines which go beyond the academically recognized disciplines into the humanities and sometimes into philosophy and religion themselves.
It would be too much to seek a solution at this single meeting for the renaming of an entire field.

The standards for defining new terms should be: first, that these become clear to our own staff and leaders; second, that they provide motivational reasons for energetic action by our citizens and our enlisted men; and third, that by their own semantic force they provide a certain degree of deterrence to our antagonists.

Gentlemen, there is now time for comments or questions from the floor.

Are there any questions or comments directed to any one of our three distinguished speakers?

QUESTION: In the selection of personnel for Special Forces, is there any need for their selection not only in psychological terms, their motivation, but also in accordance with any particular physical characteristics? I mean, by that, ethnic type.

DR. LINEBARGER: Would you care to try that one, General Volckmann?

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: The screening and selection of personnel for Special Forces is of paramount importance because any of you who have been exposed to the routine training and the time that is required to train and cross train members of a Special Forces team know that it is very time consuming and very costly. So that anything that can be done to screen personnel prior to the time he is subjected to this training or even consider him for it, is very beneficial. I cite a little example:

Two demolition experts were sent in to me by submarine. I kept these gentlemen around my headquarters for about four or five days just trying to size them up. One was a very large robust, jovial individual. The other
was a very wiry individual, who, as a matter of fact, was a halfbreed Indian. After keeping them around the headquarters for sometime, I decided I would send the jovial individual to the easiest area to operate, whereas I sent the other gentleman over to a real tough area.

I could have never been more wrong in my life in judging an individual. The one whom I had counted on to do the best job turned out to be a complete failure merely because he would not integrate or live with the people he was to work with. He kept himself aloof and was more of a detriment to the area than any good. He was shortly withdrawn.

So anything that can be done to prescreen individuals before you waste a lot of time and spin your wheels in training them will be highly beneficial.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is the hardest trick of all, General Volckman. It is interesting to note, so far as the constitution of forces down at Bragg goes, and I think it is equally true of the teams overseas, that there are practically no foreign born among them. Something less than one percent of them are foreign born. Most of them are just American stock, though many are first generation Americans. But they are average guys as far as background is concerned.

COLONEL BLACKBURN: I would like to add something on this personnel side of it. I had the privilege of organizing and sending the first White Star teams into Laos. At that time it was a trial and error proposition. The thing that concerned me most was the personnel we were going to send, keeping in mind the fact that it was not only to train the Lao to fight, but to integrate the civic actions you have heard talked about, and to get
along with people. Fortunately we had 6 months before these teams were sent into Laos, and we took the very best people we thought we had in the group and organized them into 12 teams. The number of personnel totaled 107.

I should say that fortunately we had a very tough Lieutenant Colonel who assured me there would be no incidents over there to embarrass the Special Forces of the U.S. effort. He fulfilled this with the exception of one or two cases. On the return home, a fact sheet was submitted on every man. Most of the men, as General Marshall pointed out, were older, mature men; yet out of that 107 we had to get rid of 17.

What were the things that had not been brought out earlier or that we had overlooked that affected their behavior and manner of performance? There were some with family troubles, others with financial difficulties. There was the guy who under stress conditions wanted the bottle and the local wine would get the best of him.

Now one of the things that they are facing today, as I see it on occasional visits to Fort Bragg, is the fact that we are getting a lot of very young and immature people into the system. This does not imply that a youngster won't mature, but the older man in the service, who is 30 to 35 years old or say, 26 on up, at least has been a squad leader or platoon sergeant, has had certain basic experience in the Army in the leadership role, has had to assume certain responsibilities of leadership, and knows how to handle himself and subordinates. But when you get these youngsters that we are getting today, before you have them baptized somewhere, even in a conventional unit here at home, as a squad leader, when put on the outside in a situation like Laos or with a Ranger unit in Vietnam, you will find that such an individual does become somewhat of a liability at times.
That is why, when I had the group, we would insist on getting a more mature man, a man who had enough background in the Army, whom we did not have to train in the basic tactics and techniques needed. When the men arrived in Laos, they found themselves having to train artillery units and infantry in battalions. It was often the enlisted men who were doing these jobs.

Therefore, if we are going to degrade the program and bring it down to the capabilities of these youngsters, and put them out on their own on these tough missions, this places them under quite a bit of stress and I think we are going to run into a lot of trouble in the long run. I can't overemphasize, from what I have seen in Laos, seen in Vietnam, and other experiences, that personnel—quality personnel—is the key to success in such operations.

DR. LINEBARGER: Would any member of the panel care to comment on this?

COLONEL LITTLE: I would like to say a few words on this in terms of the maturity of the individual that is involved in this type of operation. We briefly discussed motivation a short time ago and maturity as well. I would like to add a third factor, stability.

I can recall one incident which I found very interesting, and I don't want to sound too clinical with respect to handling people, but this was very interesting. There was a young Captain who was assigned duty with a groupment mobile that was involved in close combat. This man found himself in an environment that he had never seen before. This man was a well-trained officer. But he did not have his chain-of-command to rely on.

He was functioning in someone else's chain-of-command. He could see things that were wrong, that needed correction, things that meant that the unit lacked security, and things
which if the enemy took advantage of could lead to that unit's defeat. Despite his efforts, despite his advice, his advice was sometimes ignored. Actually he was involved in this close combat for over a month and a half. Over that month and a half period this man's stability began to deteriorate until finally I received a message which said, "Take me out of here."

Now, I deliberately let him go this way. This was a good man but he was growing six eyes in his head. He knew that things could go wrong; he tried to do something about it and his efforts were frustrated. In consequence he lost any feeling of security that he had.

Then again everything seemed to grow a little bit larger every day until finally I had to pull him out. Now, it takes a certain type individual to function under these circumstances. It takes a man who is completely self-reliant, particularly when he can't influence the situation.

DR. LIMEBARGER: Thank you, Colonel Little.

GENERAL TRUMAN: I happen to be the G-3 of CONARC at Fort Monroe, Virginia. It is our job there to train the forces in the United States and the replacements for all of the troops overseas. As I see this problem it is one not only for the Special Forces. They are specific types of individuals who are very well- and long-trained for two missions: their primary mission is for wartime, but just lately they have assumed this other mission on the colder side, namely counterinsurgency. But now it rests on CONARC to implement this program of training the troops that we have in the United States and there are some 460,000.

To begin with our troops do not even know the term counterinsurgency. When I say the troops I mean the officers as well as the enlisted men. Last Friday
morning I had into CONARC all of the G-3s, the operations people of the Armies, the Corps, the Divisions, the ROTC people who are knowledgeable in that field, and the Directors of Instruction from all schools, including those under the cognizance of CONARC as well as the Technical Service Schools and the Technical Service Training Commands. For 4 hours in the morning we belabored the point trying to point out just exactly what the term counterinsurgency means: in other words, part of the Cold War.

Then I divided these people up into different committees with the idea that we would get from them ideas on implementation, for getting this across to the troops in the U.S., ideas on just exactly how we would do it. As I went around to the different committees to see how they were getting along, I thought we had gotten over the message fairly well. That evening I went to a cocktail party and one of the G-3s of one of the units said, "Well, General, you have done a fine job but what in hell is counterinsurgency."

So the next morning I attempted to again give the definition of just what counterinsurgency is. I feel that we at CONARC surely have to get this message across to everyone; and what I am attempting to do now through the good offices of General Yarborough, the man who has to do it down at the Special Warfare Center, is to turn out about a 50-minute movie which we can give to everyone. I can assure you we do not have the people at the present time who are trained in this to get up on a platform and explain to the people to whom they are talking exactly what the terminology counterinsurgency means, and what has been explained to you here this morning. Our people are eager. I am sure that by Saturday morning when they
left everyone was in doubt exactly as to what counter-insurgency is, but they still do not have the knowledge to impart this to the many, many people we have in the United States and surely to those that we have overseas.

At any rate, I might say that I had a very quick and dirty film of about 50 minutes which General Yarborough turned out for us, but it did not hit the mark as far as I was concerned. However, I did show this to the assembled gathering of about 160 of the G-3s there, and I told them I wanted them to be the murder board.

I already knew the film was not what I wanted, but it gave them some idea of the difficult problem we have of actually putting it into words of one syllable so that people will understand it. Now certainly I feel that that is where you can help us from your particular status in life and endeavors. How can we put this message across better?

I just wanted to bring that point up.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Isn't it true, General Truman, or anyone else who can answer this question, that in dealing with the problem of insurgency, you will find an almost exact relationship to its rise and fall according to how your regular force is meeting success or failure on the battlefield?

In other words, "guerrillaism" and terror in the interior begins to become violent when they see that the national force is not doing well. So that these problems, for instance in Vietnam, while we look at them as separate problems, are in fact joined. If the Army could enjoy a measure of success, the villages on the Mekong Delta would be a lot safer than they are now.

Now the other question is this. It enters into problems of the sort we considered a long time ago, Paul,
and it seems to me that it is a problem for the social scientist. What kind of information needs to be developed for troops going to a place like Vietnam or Laos so that the man having this in his possession fits more quickly into the climate and feels at home.

I refer to our experience in World War II where we found that kind of information necessary in sending troops overseas. Those little guides to foreign countries, which gave the boy a background of information on the country and had phrases at the end of it, and did help, crude as they were.

Isn't it possible to develop for each of these areas similar information about folkways, about weather, about the effects on the people of season, and that sort of thing which would be helpful?

COLONEL LITTLE: Yes, it would be. All of these things, the area studies, are important to these people who are going into any kind of counterinsurgency operation. One of the basic requirements for these people is to understand the peoples of the country in which they are going to operate. They have to know this. So there is a definite requirement for this kind of information.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Do you have it?

COLONEL LITTLE: In some cases, yes, in some cases, no. I know that efforts are being made to develop these studies. At the present time, there is an ad hoc intelligence committee meeting in the Pentagon to determine our requirements for this.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: What happened to all the SORO studies?

COLONEL LITTLE: We have several SORO studies on these areas. We recognize that it is impossible to get all you need immediately.
GENERAL YARBOROUGH: I had hoped to remain a spectator here, but this discussion is so intriguing and the subject so challenging, I would like to make a couple of disconnected remarks.

In the first place about personnel, this as we have brought out is a major concern. We have been fortunate in being able to pick our standards in the Special Warfare Center and have lived up to them. We have been allowed wide latitude in policing people out of the program and out of the system. Many are called and few are chosen. Some 37 percent of the people that report in there as volunteers are removed from the program for one reason or another, the major reason being lack of maturity. When this program eventually extends to the entire Army—and it is beginning to—there is no doubt in my mind that it will be able to furnish the skills that are needed for civic actions. We have the skills in great numbers.

But there is some little difficulty in my comprehending at this point how we are going to fit this training to all these individuals on a broader basis. I know we can do it but we have to set our mind to it. If it is this difficult to do for Special Forces surely it is going to be difficult to do for the body of the Army as a whole.

We recently finished training the first echelon of a group, non-Special Forces individuals, who are really follow-up troops for Special Forces who are going now into South Vietnam. This is no longer classified. These people are being given a 4-weeks course at Fort Bragg. The greatest difficulty is in the field of motivation—all the way across the board—to the extent that the individual will gladly or willingly die for the cause and for his country, and also pay enough respect to the mores, taboos,
and the religions of the local people so that he will not constitute a huge error and therefore can't get his job done for the United States.

We have labored mightily with this problem of motivation. With Special Forces it is comparatively easy because they have a "fix" on something like the Foreign Legion Legion. Our post is the Sidi Bel Abes of the Special Forces business. The Special Forces individual who goes to the "sharp edge" must come back and atone to his comrades for anything that he hasn't done or that he has done wrong. This sort of philosophy has to extend back to the Army. I am sure we can do it. We are sure of our ground in things that soldiers have used for thousands of years for motivation.

Political indoctrination on the part of the opposition is a definite strength. How they do it is a matter of record. We have studied it and we know. We know that the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao are willing to undergo all kinds of hardships for what they believe is the "cause." They will crawl over the bodies of their dead comrades to get to the Western opposition. We do not have a type of political indoctrination that manifests itself in that way. We cannot look in that direction to make our people want to fight singly or in small groups or in areas where if they die no one will even know how it happened.

But we do have within our tradition in the military something that is equally as strong. What I am pleading for is a return to that sort of motivation within the services where a man would do his damnest for his regiment, where the regimental honors are emblazoned on the drum, where the regimental colors which have no real combat value, are saved at all costs. These are things we know and can use.
Now, Special Forces as we see it in the Special Warfare Center are the advance guard, the point of the advance guard and of the many who will come after them. Special Forces are designed now to go in and seek out the various facets of the situation to find out where the flanks are, what skills have to be built, and what has to come in and follow. It is essential that the motivation and the lore of these people be passed on to those who will come. So we are going to lick all of these other problems. This one we need your help on.

Now the final thing I want to say is that every country represents a different set of complex circumstances as related to the business of counterinsurgency. Our forces heretofore have been targeted toward general areas. It is not enough to have a group aimed toward Southeast Asia. We have to have people within those groups targeted toward specific countries so that the social structure, the complex interplay of political factors and the relationship between the Army and the element in power will be understood so that they will not throw the whole counterinsurgency strategy into a tailspin. We need this information on the countries of the world that are of strategic importance to the United States.

DR. LIMEBARGER: Thank you very much, General Yarborough.

Let me now thank the members of the panel, General Volckmann, General Marshall, Colonel Little. Thank you gentlemen.
SCENES FROM SYMPOSIUM SOCIAL HOUR

Left to Right:
Col. Donald D. Blackburn, Deputy Director for
Developments in Special Warfare, OCARD, De-
partment of the Army; Maj. Gen. George W.
Power, Director of Developments, OCARD, De-
partment of the Army; Secretary Stahl; Brig.
Gen. Russell W. Volckmann, USA (Ret.); Lt.
Gen. Trudeau.

Left to Right:
Honorable Finn J. Larsen, Assistant Secretary
of the Army (R&D); Maj. Gen. Dwight E.
Beach, Deputy Chief, Research and Develop-
ment, Department of the Army; Brig. Gen.
Richard G. Stilwell, Commandant of Cadets.
In Background:

Left to Right:
Secretary Stahl; Lt. Gen. Trudeau; Dr. Will Lybrand, Special Operations Research Office,
The American University.

In Background:
Brig. Gen. Charles F. Leonard, ACSI, Department of the Army
DR. THOMSON: After Paul Linebarger's remarks yesterday, I thought I had better get you some scatology to amuse you this morning, but I couldn't come up with anything that seemed just right. If you must have scatology, a little bout with Tropic of Cancer will give you more amusement than I can.

These are not really our problems this morning. I think this is one of the most important sessions, although it is a truncated session. The reason it is important is this. Operations not only provide the linkage between social scientists and Army officers and operating people; they provide the laboratory within which social scientists can find problems that are really worth working on, and can really do their best job in helping people who have command responsibility or plans and policy responsibilities to focus most effectively on the most relevant problems.
Therefore, those people who sit with me here this morning and who will bring to us messages about this general problem of how operations are linked into social science research, have a very important contribution to make to this total business.

We start off very briefly with a man whose qualifications he summed up for me in three sentences. The sentences, which are short, read as follows: "I am a Brigadier General. I went to West Point. I am Commandant of Cadets."

I will add to that, he is a man of relevant operating experience. I give you General Stilwell.

INVITED ADDRESS

Brigadier General Richard G. Stilwell
Commandant of Cadets
United States Military Academy

I am not at all sure that my credentials are adequate for this particular presentation. I wistfully suggested to the conference chiefs that it would perhaps be more appropriate if I discussed current relations as between the Military Academy and the great State of Louisiana or its principal University in the light of certain recent developments; or, more appropriately, the outlook for the Army football team, edition 1962. I did not sell that; I didn't think I would.

Parenthetically, though, a discussion of Army football might not be entirely irrelevant to the subject of this symposium. In any game, the 33 men on the field
and the 2,500 other cadets in the stand have but one objective: that is to win the contest, which, as all yesterday's speakers echoed, is why we are here assembled.

My remarks this morning are, to ape Linebarger's apt phrase, "loosely and generally grouped" into two areas. The first (and this has very little to do with the title of my lecture), is a very summary account of what is being done at the Military Academy to equip tomorrow's tactical military leaders and eventual national decision-makers for the environment in which they will serve. The second area can best be described as a series of observations, by an onlooker, on the major roadblocks to full development of the Army's well-nigh infinite capability to further U.S. policy objectives throughout the lower half of the power conflict; and some speculations as to the chances for the removal thereof.

The courses at West Point are focused on the 1970's and 1980's for obvious reasons. Our aim is to continuously reshape the building blocks of the future officers' foundation, to the end that they keep in step with the Army's appreciation of the professional requirements ahead.

To be sure, some of the inputs are relatively insensitive to changes in the world military-political environment. The hard core of Math, Science, Engineering subjects—those designed to teach orderly analysis and sound reasoning to logical conclusions—evolve in step with the widening horizons throughout the nation in these fields of knowledge. But most others are attuned to the geo-political position in which the United States has found itself since World War II.
Thus, our expanded coverage of political and world geography; of history (and notably that of modern Asia); of Communist ideology, operational doctrine and methods; of contemporary foreign governments; of the art of self-expression in one's own and at least in one foreign tongue; and of social and managerial psychology.

A very comprehensive International Relations course is heavily oriented to extant country issues and problems and to predictable trends therein. That course is paralleled by several electives which are extremely popular with cadets. One is National Security Problems, generously supported by guest speakers from the policy areas of Washington officialdom: DOD, State, CIA, JCS, and AID. Mr. Katzenbach, in today's audience, is typical of the experts who have spoken in this course. Another elective is the Problems of Developing Nations, introduced for the first time this year, dealing in large measure with the overall subject of internal defense. The coverage of both electives is reflected, albeit in less depth, in the basic International Relations course.

In this general connection, we sent three cadets to Africa last summer (at the sacrifice of their leave) to participate in Operations Crossroad--Africa. By virtue of their recitals of experience in Nigeria, Ghana, and Rhodesia, these young men have had a whale of an impact on the entire Corps. We will repeat this experiment this summer.

In the Military Science area, for which I bear responsibility, we conduct a course in Military Psychology, and parallel it with an elective in Human Relations. These courses are attuned to the responsibilities of the officer as a unit commander, and as an advisor working alongside his foreign counterpart in whatever environment.
In the same area, we conduct a course unique to the United States Military Academy, one without duplicate in any undergraduate institution in the United States; this is Leadership, a formal course of instruction, which stands as the capstone of the cadet's four-year development from follower to leader. The course is very carefully geared to the problems involved in management of men, in and out of combat. It taps all the experience available to us from research in the Behavioral Sciences. It deals with the environment in which this young fellow will work over the next 30 years. It gives him a theory, a concept, a frame of reference on which he can successively build.

We place a great deal of stress on the American tradition of arms, the role the Army has played in both the development and continuing security of this nation, and on the meaning of the military challenge ahead to include the importance and scope of the Military Assistance Program.

The one point that emerges from this rather long recitation is the certitude that these young men are thoroughly imbued with the fact that the United States is wedded to a coalition strategy; that her security is inextricably linked with that of the Free World nations; that a sizeable segment of their individual careers will be spent in training, counselling, and advising the armed forces of the Free World; and that the role of the U.S. Army--their army--in all these areas, in declared war and short thereof, is tremendous.

Part of the cadets' education in this area, given the very close-knit nature of our community, stems from their contacts in and out of the classroom, with the officers of the station complement. My own officers, the
academic instructors, and the administrative officers have, in the aggregate, served in MAAGs, Missions, Special Forces, and Allied Headquarters the world over. We keep a running, well-publicized correspondence with officers who have recently served at West Point and recent graduates who are now deployed in the critical areas of the underdeveloped world.

In this connection, I have on hand, or on order, three of Colonel Little's comrades in arms from Laos: Parmly, Mauz, and Chance, the last of whom, incidentally, has briefed more people of four-star rank and above than any other Captain in the history of the U.S. Army.

The cadets, therefore, emerge with antennae highly sensitized to the realities of the world scene and to the integrated nature of the Communist threat. At this stage, they are a distinct leg up on a good many of their predecessors of 15, 20, 25 years ago. We would be failing in our mission if this were not so. We have a lot more to do and we aim to get on with that job.

As an aside, I would say to our friends in light and dark blue uniforms that my remarks are equally applicable to your respective Academies.

Now, before leaving this, my favorite subject—the most cohesive and spirited body of men in America—I would underscore one thing: none of the innovations that I have just recounted have in any way reduced overriding attention to and stress on the inculcation of basic integrity, of honor, of uncompromising adherence to the highest standards, of overriding passion for duty to country which stand as the hallmark of West Point. We appreciate that the threats to this nation, and the types of warfare which we must be ready to engage in, have been and are subject to constant change. But the essential
military virtues which must be possessed by men who face
the command of soldiers in battle as the ultimate
challenge remain immutable; consequently our constant
attention thereto. No effort is spared in physical
education, moral development, and summer training programs
to instill courage, aggressiveness, self-reliance, and
concept of maximum performance in any and all tasks,
whether others are looking or not.

Now, the subject of education leads me to the
second part of my remarks: those of the onlooker. As
Bill Kinard testified yesterday, the year 1961 was a full
and fast one. In the overall area of counterinsurgency,
the Army got the ball and was expected to produce immedi-
ately and in multiple directions, notwithstanding an
atrophied training base, the need to revise and expand
school curricula, the need to formulate and sell, on an
interdepartmental basis, programs and projects for funds
and personnel. It was also the year—as I assume the
guest speakers yesterday morning indicated—of a major
expansion in the U.S. Army, of a major leap upward in
operational readiness norms, of a drastic reorganization
of the overall Army structure.

The really impressive thing, to an onlooker, is
how much in fact was accomplished by way of building and
filling that indispensable pipeline. It was a year of
preparation. But one must also be impressed with the
things that need to be done as well as those which have
in fact been done.

General Truman alluded yesterday to the educational
problem. The Army is geared to this one. It has not
been easy. It has been a major task to reorient thinking
throughout the Army structure as to what we are doing
anyhow in environments which are noncombat, nonoperational
in the traditional sense. There has been a need to acquaint all ranks with the fact that this in fact is combat; that the Army, by virtue of tradition, diversity of skills, total array of assets, has unique capabilities in support of U.S. policy; that we have the key role, and that it is up to us.

Education throughout the ranks of the Army is not the only problem that faces us. There is a comparable, indeed perhaps more important, problem of education outside the Army ranks. This is where I would say we need some help to develop in others the same kind of appreciation that we hold very strongly.

In this connection, and at the risk of oversimplification, I think it would be better if we looked upon all of these things which have been discussed in the past day, not as different mechanisms for different purposes, but as simply the problem of taking qualified Army personnel, putting them alongside an indigenous military force or commander—with sleeves rolled up, sharing the same ground, the same privations, certainly the same community of interests—and getting on with the job of helping that commander in whatever his role: guardian of exposed frontiers, guarantor of internal stability, or instrument of economic and social betterment within his country. That is all it is: a new dimension of the military assistance program, and a very important one at that.

I was struck by Colonel Little's example of that young fellow in a remote village of Laos. In a sense you could say that one of his jobs was the most concrete example of civic action at work. In another, it was a MAAG role as we normally know it. In still another, it was a very pertinent Special Forces role. But the key
thing was not his insignia, or his chain-of-command, or anything else. It was that man's awareness, his ability to communicate, to instill confidence, to act as a catalytic agent in this important area.

Perhaps I stress this point too much, but it is very important to realize that whatever the special words or titles, it is merely a new, very necessary dimension of the whole panoply we know so well: aid to our allies and, in this particular instance, military aid to the local populace.

A second point is this: I think we can be very confident that the Vietnamese will win. Vietnam is an area where we have recognized a war in which we are supporting our allies, where our prestige is at stake, where we know instinctively what to do, however painful that doing may be. What concerns one is that our record will not be as good in those areas which are assessed to be less critical, where insurgency has not erupted, and which, therefore, are not handled by any planning groups or planning papers with the affixed tag of "Operational Immediate."

The worry here is in two areas; they are interrelated. The first is that we have probably made an erroneous assessment that such-and-such an area is non-critical, by failure to appreciate the true development cycle of a "war of liberation," by failure to recognize that when insurgency does erupt, it does not represent a point one-quarter or even midway along the developmental phase, but is nearly complete and the situation is about out of hand. This failure is the result of lessons unlearned or lost, lack of the hard intelligence of which General Marshall spoke, and comparable factors. It is also a product of the fact that as Americans we do very poorly with issues and are open-ended as to time and
obscure as to issue. We do much better with the hard, concrete issue; we do much better in war, in short. The problem here in these so-called "less critical" areas is vastly different from an implementing action standpoint. There is no difficulty in getting interdepartmental implementation and cooperation at the state Vietnam is in now. But such interdepartmental action is slow in coming with respect to the less critical areas. This, again, is where our research organizations, our scientific advisors, and additional connections can help us move forward in the development of the machinery for anticipatory planning.

The final point I would make deals with the very basic one of personnel because everything we have discussed depends on the right type of people in the right environment, with the right kind of leadership. The very pertinent points that General Yarborough made yesterday about the need for symbols cannot be contested. The dilemma is that the dimensions of the whole counter-insurgency area under discussion—yesterday, today and tomorrow—far outstrip the capabilities, projected or feasible, of Special Forces personnel as such. They are magnificently capable in these jobs, but we can do with others who can be given the right kind of motivation, the right kind of training.

The question of symbol is a lot more important when we are in a nonsurvival struggle, at least ostensibly so. The problem of symbols seems to disappear when everybody recognizes it as war. The problem of symbol was not so important for a small OSS detachment in any area in World War II. The symbol was country at one end of the spectrum, and the unit—squad or half-squad or whatever—at the other end.

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I was struck, looking around last night in the Francis Scott Key Room at many people I know and others I didn't know except by reputation, by the tremendous weight of talent present in that group in the area of the Behavioral, the Social, and the Applied Sciences. I was equally struck by some nostalgic remark that in World War II we had a focus. There was nothing we could not do. We could coalesce our efforts. We had direction, we knew exactly what was needed, and we did it. That experience still represents the apex of our respective careers.

Now, the real problem, I think, for all of us is to somehow find the symbol, the value. We need to recognize that this type of war is just as bitter, just as all-encompassing as the traditional one; that it needs to be waged with the same care and ruthlessness and precision; that our whole object is to defeat the enemy and that to do so requires us to be one campaign ahead of him; that we need—all of us, in uniform and out—the same dedication, the same coalescing of effort, the same reversal of trends towards fragmentation, the same unidirection which we expect and get when that magic threshold is reached.

If somehow we can do that, no problem will be of any moment at all.

Thank you.
DR. THOMSON: Thank you very much, General Stilwell.

As one of the World War II reminiscers, I would like to take issue with some of these last statements about the apex and epitome and always knowing exactly what we were doing. So help me, we didn't think so then, but we may have kidded ourselves that we think so now.

Since we are running way behind—started late and are running long—I am going to ask Dr. Altman to be as brief as possible in summarizing the major portions of his important paper. I hope there are copies of it which you will be able to peruse at leisure. It will give you a somewhat different perspective on what has been going on in the field of writing by social scientists and others who have concerned themselves with some of these enduring problems.

I must say I was impressed as I listened to General Stilwell with the enduring quality of some of the key problems which he so uniquely outlined for us.

Dr. Altman is Chief of Psychological Research at SORO. He is a social psychologist. He knows his business. I introduce him now. Dr. Altman.
The idea for this paper arose from many requests by military people who wanted to find out what social scientists were doing or thinking about that might be applicable to limited-war problems. When they started from scratch, they often became completely bogged down and unable to chart a path through the mass of information they discovered in the literature. To reduce this problem and to give you a better feel for the capabilities—and limitations—of social science, I have compiled a set of references that cover some work and thinking done in recent years that bears on limited-war questions. The list just distributed should help you begin to find your way through the very complicated social science maze.

My remaining remarks are not meant to be erudite or profound, but only to make the handout useful to military members of our audience. To do this, the items in the bibliography were grouped into the four categories that appear on the 2nd page of the handout—Conduct of Limited-War, the U.S. and Other Western World Nations, Sino-Soviet Bloc, and Developing Nations. Before talking about the references themselves, I want to say that the list is not a comprehensive coverage of all disciplines or of all the problems that social scientists have worked on related to limited-war. It is only an illustrative one put together with the help of about half a dozen
scientists who suggested inclusions. For analysis in depth you can also use several professional journals containing more recent work. Some of these are listed at the end of the handout.

The handout also does not cover classified materials. There has been a great deal of work done on limited-war that appears in the classified literature, but for ease of accessibility it was not included.

The four categories in which references were grouped stem from some basic premises. One is that the job of social science is to make inputs to the military who are faced with the problem of deciding on courses of action. These courses of action range all the way from high-level-planning decisions down to immediate, local field actions. Common to all is the very basic question--what resources, weapons, and procedures should I use to achieve my objectives? (Whether those objectives be to affect the minds of men--their attitudes, beliefs, emotions--or to affect what they do--their skills, cooperation with us, their ability to act for or against us, etc.)

This very simplified view leads to two types of inputs that social scientists can make which are implied in the four categories. The first is on building background information. What are the characteristics of the actors in limited-war (the West, the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and the developing nations)? How do their societies function? What are the people like? What do they believe? In short, what resources do they have which we must mobilize or combat? Such knowledge is not enough, however, for the planner or operator. He also needs ideas on how to act given his own and others' resources. What is the optimum organization of a civic action team in a given country? What is the best way to combat a particular
guerrilla operation? What communication and propaganda techniques should be used to help win over some dissident minority? These are questions that depend on background information, but they also require the fusing of all this information and the development of action programs. Social science can contribute toward both these general needs, although the focus in the past has been on the background information one. Please note that I am not suggesting that social scientists become decision-makers; what I am saying is that social scientists have a unique input to make to military decision-makers at all levels, beyond general background information.

This then was the context from which the four categories were derived, into which items were grouped.

The Conduct of Limited-War

Under the first category, the Conduct of Limited-War, the studies cover a wide variety of subject matter. But more important, you can note that they differ considerably in applications to military needs. Some contain information directly relevant to limited-war problems while others are very basic fundamental works not directly focused on specific operational needs. Samples of research along this whole continuum were deliberately chosen to give you a flavor for what is being done and also because some of these basic researches may have important implications for the future. Consider some examples along this continuum. The studies by Almond, Dixon, Paret, and Tanham on guerrilla warfare have much information immediately applicable to the limited-war situation. This is also true of the volumes by Dyer and Linebarger on psychological operations and propaganda. Further along down the line, Schramm's two books and Klapper's volume on mass communication are a step removed
from limited-war needs. These are reviews in the area of persuasion and influence, and mass communications.

Perhaps least applicable to immediate needs are the studies by Hovland and his associates on persuasion and communication, which were a series of basic laboratory studies. The work by Dresher, Rapoport, and Schelling on game and decision theory applied to international conflict also are fundamental studies.

As you progress down this continuum of application, it is often difficult to see exactly where such basic research studies can be applied. But, I think we can all agree that they represent the frontiers of knowledge from which more practical developments may come.

Two general comments on this category that are also appropriate to the remaining ones. The categories are at a high level of abstraction and the list of references is very broadbrush. For special problems, such as selection, training, and organization; or operations in a given country or toward a minority ethnic group, for example, you should consider these information categories and the references in them only as a springboard. We would need a completely different and certainly a more detailed system were we focusing on a special problem or were we preparing a bibliography for researchers. Also, there has been much classified work on psychological operations and unconventional warfare done in the past by defense related agencies, such as the former Operations Research Office, now Research Analysis Corporation, and the Human Resources Research Office both for the Army, and by the RAND Corporation for the Air Force. At present, much is being done by SORO at The American University. Lists of publications are available.
The United States and Other Western World Nations

The next category is research on Western Nations. To make action decisions on limited-war, the military must know about its own resources and how to organize those resources. Information is needed about our own and other people's political, psychological, sociological characteristics, how decision-making takes place, how public opinion is formed, what people believe, how they perceive the world, and so on.

Also included here is the question on how to transform this information into action plans—optimum organization of military and political resources, approaches to working with allies from command to people levels, mobilizing public opinion in our own and in other countries.

In this category the items again vary in their immediacy of application to limited-war. For example, the work by Davison and Knorr deals directly with the question of working within alliances. Speier's work on West Germany gives us some idea of how elites in other countries arrive at foreign policy decisions. In a completely different area, the studies by Janowitz on the changing shape of the American military, and Almond and Cleveland on Americans' perceptions and interactions with people of other cultures are also closely related to operational questions.

Again, there are also a series of works that were not at all focused on military questions, but which may have eventual relevance. For example, Homans' book on social behavior is extremely fundamental but has potential for giving us ideas on the whole problem of interacting
with people of other cultures. This is also true of the work by Petrullo and Bass on basic theories of leadership.

The Sino-Soviet Bloc

The next two categories—the one on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the other on the Developing Nations—contain the same type of information as were included for the Western world. These range all the way from characteristics of the social systems of the different nations, such as political and military functioning, down to the nature of the people— their beliefs, ways of looking at the world, basic behavior patterns, and so on. Not only do we need to know what the resources and capabilities of the Western alliance are, but obviously information is also needed about the other actors in the limited-war.

The books by Bauer and Inkeles give an idea of the characteristics of individual Soviet citizens—their position in their society, their beliefs, attitudes, and values, their satisfactions and dissatisfactions, and so on. The volumes by Leites and Dinerstein focus at another level—the political dynamics and decision-making in the Soviet Union. Similar insight is gained from the work of Barrett on Communist Chinese decision-making prior to and after China's entry into the Korean conflict. There are, of course, many more works that have been done on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and you might use the volume by Inkeles and Geiger, which is a collection of readings, to get into this literature.

The Developing Nations

Under the last category—Developing Nations—you will find the same variation in subject matter and degree of immediacy of application as before. For example, Pye's study on communism in Malaya, Traeger's work on
Marxism in Asia, and Adams' volume on Latin America contain information that bears very closely on limited-war problems. On the other hand, there are a number of works on the list that were not focused on operational questions, such as Doob's basic study of communications in Africa, McClelland's attempt to understand economic processes in terms of basic psychological concepts, and Osgood's study on the measurement of meaning, are all fairly fundamental works that have implications, but not immediate applications to limited-war problems.

There has been a great deal of work on various areas of the world which has not been included here. However, in most of these references, you will find very adequate bibliographies that will lead you to such work. Also, you should know about the 40-plus country studies turned out by the Foreign Area Studies Division of SORO at The American University. These books contain a wealth of information on various societies. As another source, the External Research Branch of the Department of State has compiled an extensive bibliography of ongoing work in all the social sciences. They have generously reproduced this list for us and copies are available at the rear of the room. Because this State Department bibliography focuses on ongoing, as yet incompletely completed, research, it should be a useful supplement to the one I have distributed.

Before closing I would like to offer some personal observations about social science research and limited-war problems. One feeling is that the disciplines vary in the extent to which they have treated such problems. I would say that political science, history, and international relations have tackled questions very close to military needs. Their typical approach has been to deal with
"big issues" and to seek solutions to problems, even when "hard" scientific data was missing or when rigorous techniques were unavailable to collect data. This contrasts with the approach taken by psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists who, for the most part, have dealt much less with limited-war related problems perhaps because historically they focused on smaller, more tightly defined problems, about which they collected much data using more rigorous techniques. This somewhat stereotyped difference in approach that I am presenting was summarized in another context by a political scientist, James Wilson, who, on comparing his approach with that of sociologists, said, "I prefer treating major themes with limited data, rather than minor themes with exhaustive data." I think this is an apt characterization.

While I have tried to highlight gross differences, this picture is changing very dramatically. Many from all disciplines are beginning to recognize the existence and contribution of each other. Political scientists, historians, and others are drawing more and more on concepts and methods from Psychology, Sociology, and Anthropology, and discovering that they can be usefully applied to complex, broad problems. On the other side of the fence many sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists are using other approaches to their own problems, and also have experienced some success in applying their own concepts and methods to broader problems than they have studied in the past.

Now, I think that these trends are desirable and will result in significant contributions, but I also have some reservations. Because of this increasing fusion of ideas, we will probably see many "fads" such that some techniques, for example, may be seen as a panacea for
studying a whole range of problems, and may be applied indiscriminately, or when applied will be done without a real appreciation of them and their limitations. I am not overly concerned about this possibility, however, because the built-in checks and balances among researchers will eventually stabilize any violent swings of the pendulum.

I also look upon this cross-fertilization as something to be very cautious about for a different reason. While better understanding of the other disciplines may broaden perspectives, I personally hope that the majority of researchers retain their own discipline integrity and do not try to become broad generalists, because it is only through study of problems from vested-interest points of view that extensive, basic funds of knowledge will accrue. Then let a few broad-gauged thinkers put this information together to evolve cross-discipline principles, or then let a few working on military problems draw on all disciplines for ideas. But, if we all try to become generalists, I fear we will pay the price of superficiality. Beyond the philosophical point, the practical problem of keeping up with what is going on in all the social sciences is almost insurmountable.

One last thought on the topic of this session--bridging the gap between research and operational needs. This symposium will certainly help bridge that gap. But in the final analysis, the only way to do this is for social scientists who want to contribute to military needs to live with these needs for some time--to work with military people at all levels to see firsthand what difficulties they face. In short, they must get a feel for problems as they are, and not as they appear from the
armchair view. Only in this way, can the potential of social science to limited-war needs begin to be more completely utilized.
ATTACHMENT TO
MAINSTREAMS OF RESEARCH

An Introduction
to
Social Science Research Relevant to Limited-War

Dr. Irwin Altman

Special Operations Research Office
The American University
CATEGORIES OF RESEARCH APPLICATION

I The Conduct of Limited-War

U.S./Western alliance and Sino-Soviet bloc strategy and tactics toward each other and toward developing nations.

II The United States and Other Western World Nations

Functioning of aspects of societies; military, political, communications, decision-making, etc., processes; beliefs, attitudes, behavior of peoples, and elites.

Working with allies and within alliances.

III The Sino-Soviet Bloc

Functioning of aspects of societies; military, political, communications, decision-making, etc., processes; beliefs, attitudes, behavior of peoples and elites.

Working with allies and within alliances.

IV The Developing Nations

Functioning of aspects of societies; military, political, communications, decision-making, etc., processes; beliefs, attitudes, behavior of peoples and elites.

Relations and dealings between developing nations, and with West and Sino-Soviet Bloc.

The Communist Party in different countries; why people join; profile of types of party members; the process of assimilation, participation, and defection. Based on interview data, documentary sources, and content analysis of propaganda.


Review of history and recent approach by Soviets in promulgating culture and propaganda. Differences in approach under Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev.


A large collection of articles from many sources on the range of problems of psychological operations. Contributors from all social science disciplines.


Chronological analysis of the Berlin Blockade, including relations with U.S.S.R. from 1945 on, and effects on Cold War positions of the United States and U.S.S.R. in Germany. Based on variety of data including memoirs, newspaper accounts, opinion polls, and personal interviews.


Historical description of Soviet guerrilla activity against Germans in World War II.

Application of game theory to strategic and tactical air war and target prediction problems.


Broad analysis of psychological warfare and political communication covering nature, basic premises and operating principles, organizational history, etc.


Theoretical work by anthropologist on intercultural interaction and communication.


Broad overview of psychological operations concepts, planning requirements, suggestions for implementation of broad programs, etc.


Three volumes representing fundamental work on mass communication. Includes empirical research done in laboratory situations and theory on factors related to persuasion—communicator, message content, form and structure of arguments, personality factors of audience, etc.

Basic theoretical approach to study of international relations, using concepts from systems analysis, game theory, etc.


Empirical interview and questionnaire study of the role of mass media and personal influence on persuasion and influence processes.


Integration of recent literature on effects of mass media.


The political and social role of the military in Latin America and comparisons among countries. Also analyzes military aspects of U.S. policy toward Latin America.


Overview of psywar, including historical background, propaganda analysis, psywar techniques, and psywar after World War II.


A broad analysis of the nature and theory of limited-war, including history, American and Communist approaches to war, and implications for future American strategy.

Broad analysis of guerrilla warfare—evolution of theory, problems of guerrilla and antiguerilla operations, guerrillas and American policy, etc.


Study of human conflict in terms of game and decision theory, semantic and perceptual processes, etc.


Fundamental empirical and theoretical work on mass communications and persuasion, with particular emphasis on understanding the basic nature of attitudes and attitude change.


Basic concepts of mathematics and game theory applied to problems of international relations from nuclear to limited-war.


Collection of readings in mass communications based on work in several social science disciplines.


Collection of readings on mass communication with many articles focused on intercultural communication processes.

Theoretical analysis of the use of organizations and organizational practices in power struggles and analysis of Communist organizational strategy and tactics.


A broad review of past and needed research on many aspects of international relations. Extensive bibliography.


Analysis of economic development and its relation to politics in developing nations—objectives, Communist strategy and tactics, and potential U.S. directions.


Discussion of potential military, economic, diplomatic, psyops, and arms control strategies by the United States in foreign affairs.


Collection of articles by different authors to describe foreign policy objectives pursued by the United States vis-a-vis various Asian nations.


Communist strategy and tactics in all areas of the world in the Cold War and some implications for American foreign policy and actions.

Analysis of Vietminh doctrine, tactics, and organization in Indochina.


Historical events and decision processes by Communist Chinese prior to and after their entrance into the Korean conflict.

**CATEGORY II RESEARCH ON THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS**


A study of American "national character" in the Cold War and its relation to foreign policy--attitudes of people and elites, shifts in attitudes after World War II, etc.


Study of 250 Americans working overseas in all capacities. Attempt to study why they go, the adjustment problems, types of people, elements of effective performance, and implications for training.


A review of existing research on working with allies.

Study of political elites in India, Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States based on opinion surveys and interviews. An attempt to understand what goes into their decision-making and ratifying, how they perceive the world, their aspirations for their countries, frustrations and optimism for the future, and perceptions of the United States and U.S.S.R.


A theoretical and empirical basic research work on a broad range of social behaviors including influence, conformity, competition, and esteem.


A study of American beliefs, perceptions, and stereotypes of China and India as nations and of people. Interviews of U.S. government, mass media, business, etc., people.


Collection of researches on community political systems from small aggregate urban community through giant metropolis. Topics cover changes in leadership, composition of political organizations, resistance to government changes, etc.


Evolution of U.S. military officer's position during last fifty years--technology and decision-making, career patterns and motivations, military community, political values, etc. Based on empirical data.

Study of value patterns of American subcultures to understand cultural differences and to develop comparative research methods.


Collection of articles on military strategy of NATO—historical context, Soviet reactions, problems of general and limited-war, etc.


Basic analytical study of societies with emphasis on vulnerabilities to mass political movements.


Study of major patterns of parliamentary strategy and tactics in the Fourth Republic from 1951 to 1958, covering both domestic and foreign policy matters.


Broad overview of France's role in the European Defense Community with emphasis on alliance problems and internal French politics.


Major streams of basic theoretical and empirical work on leadership by psychologists and sociologists.
Speier, H. *German Rearmament and Atomic War*. Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, February 1957.

Study of views of West German political and military leaders on international affairs, future wars, and German rearmament. Material based on informal interviews with leaders and analysis of legislative proceedings and documentary materials.


Collection of articles covering many facets of West German foreign policy--political scene, foreign policy institutions, trade unions, mass media, etc.


Collection of papers presented at a symposium by sociologists, social psychologists, and anthropologists on interpersonal perceptions.

**CATEGORY III RESEARCH ON THE SINO-SOViet BLOC**


Historical analysis of peoples' perceptions of the United States, and how government propaganda is used to influence perceptions.


Study of impact of China in Asia. Topics cover political power, economic development, tactics in foreign policy, military strength, foreign policy in Korea and Japan, and Sino-Soviet alliance.

Analysis of social and psychological aspects of the Soviet system-operating characteristics of the system, the individual in Soviet society, social and psychological characteristics of specific groups, etc.


Study of psychological goals Soviet leaders are striving to achieve and manipulation techniques used within the Soviet Union.


Political-historical analysis of changes in Soviet foreign policy views on war as an instrument of foreign policy.


Documentary study of mass media and "personal agitation" in the Soviet Union and how they are used as persuasive agents. Also describes techniques and tactics, and use of various media over the years.


Analyses of interview and questionnaire data on the daily life of U.S.S.R. people, their relations to the state, sources of cleavage between people, and between the people and the state.

Articles from many sources on various aspects of Soviet society. A sociological orientation with studies on stages of Soviet development, ideology and power, economic life, everyday living, etc.


An analysis of the origin of the 1956 revolution in Hungary in terms of political and social forces. Based on documentary analysis and some interview data.


Study of the political strategy of Bolshevik elites as reflected in the speeches and writings of Lenin and Stalin. Also includes trends in operational code between 1903 and 1952.


CATEGORY IV RESEARCH ON THE DEVELOPING NATIONS


Anthropological analyses of broad social changes taking place in a number of Latin American countries (Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Mexico) with attempts to assess the meaning of these changes for U.S. foreign policy.

Two-thousand-item annotated bibliography of research in several disciplines on values. Items coded by discipline, subject matter, and geographical area.


Comparative framework of political processes in developing areas of the world with descriptions of each area and comparison among them. (Asia, Latin America, Middle East, and Africa.)


Broad review of post-World War II revolutions to uncover origins and causes, describe leaders, techniques, etc., and to explore alternative acts which might have averted outbreaks.


Analysis of nationalism—what it is and how it arises. Brings in concepts from many disciplines and suggests needed research.


Study of communication processes in Africa. Has general research framework and major variables to be considered such as communicator, media, content, audience characteristics, etc.

Use of empirical interview and questionnaire data to study Middle Eastern countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iran) in various stages of transition from traditional to modern societies.


An attempt to use concepts and methods from psychology to understand certain aspects of economic development in various cultural contexts.


Studies by several authors on developing nations—the nature and dynamics of transition from traditional to modern societies and some implications for U.S. foreign policy.


A basic approach to the study of psychological "meaning" with applications to personality and attitude measurement and communications research.


The dynamics of the Malayan Communist Party—political and social forces that contributed to its development, and an analysis, using interview data, of the persons who were members of the party from experiences prior to joining through recruitment to disaffection.

The nature and development of *Marxism* in four Southeast Asian countries (Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia).
SOME RELEVANT PROFESSIONAL JOURNALS

American Anthropologist


The American Behavioral Scientist

Articles from all social sciences, with emphasis on research that has interdisciplinary implications. Includes annotated listings of new studies and descriptions of ongoing research programs. Published at Princeton, New Jersey.

American Political Science Review

Publication of American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., on a broad range of domestic and international political affairs. Includes reviews and listings of recent books.

American Sociological Review

Publication of American Sociological Association, New York, New York, covering research in the entire field. Contains reviews and listings of recent books.

Behavioral Science

Articles on general theories of behavior with emphasis on interdisciplinary approaches. Also includes summaries of recent research. Published by Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan.

Contemporary Psychology

Reviews of recent books in all areas of Psychology. Publication of American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C.
Current Thought on Peace and War

Summaries and bibliographies of research and thinking from all social science fields which bear on problems of international relations and conflict. Published by Current Thought, Inc., Durham, North Carolina.

Foreign Affairs

Articles and essays on all phases of international relations and political science. Includes annotated summaries and lists of recent books. Published by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., New York, New York.

The Journal of Conflict Resolution

Articles and research from all social science disciplines bearing on international conflict and peace. Contains summaries of recent research. Published by Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Orbis

Articles on a broad range of international affairs and international conflict. Includes reviews and lists of recent books. Published by Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

World Politics

Articles on international relations and politics. Includes book reviews. Published by Center of International Studies, Princeton, New Jersey.

This list does not include journals focusing on particular areas of the world. There are many of these that could be consulted for such information.
DR. THOMSON. Thank you very much, Dr. Altman, and particularly for the pertinence of this last remark.

I am going to exercise the Chairman's prerogative to be nasty enough to say it is not just the social scientists who have to be willing to live in amity with the problems and the people who are faced with them. If there is some sort of welcome from the military themselves at all levels, this helps, too.

This is one of the problems which I think is particularly important for this type of gathering in which there is an opportunity for people to feel one another out and to sense the times and terms on which effective operational collaboration can be established, with full respect for the proper role of the military decision-maker, the military planner, the military operators, and the social scientists who can bring to bear the insights of a rather specialized discipline.

I also would like to point out with respect to this notion of fad: it is not just the social scientist working with society that creates fads, but also the state of the market and the kind of people he is working for. Sometimes if clients see something that looks reasonable and quite juicy, they put pressure on the social scientist who is working with them to produce something brilliant, dramatic, and real fast.

We bespeak your general indulgence and patience on this as well.

We have had a wonderful example of initiative and flexibility on the part of the management. The initial cost will be yours. You will have to postpone your coffee, doughnuts, and what-not for a little while.
We have a little more time for two distinguished commentators, the first of whom is Dr. Morris Janowitz, the second Dr. John W. Riley.

I am going to give them 10 minutes apiece. I am going to give up completely my own time because, as Chairman, I can have that if I want it really.

Morris Janowitz is not only Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago and the man to take probably the most penetrating look that a social scientist has ever taken at the changing military establishment, he is also a man who early in his career did intelligence work and did some of the most perceptive work on psychological warfare during World War II and in the year or so immediately afterwards. He has dealt with many things and thought of many things since that time.

I am going to give him 10 minutes to share some of those thoughts with you now.

REMARKS OF DR. MORRIS JANOWITZ
Department of Sociology
University of Chicago

My remarks will emphasize the theme of the difficulty of mobilizing the resources of the social scientist in a period of partial mobilization. I am concerned here with the problem of the military establishment in national building, in building new nations and modernizing old nations. I will not be dealing with the role of social science in the strategic alliance of the industrialized nations of the West under the umbrella of NATO.
Our problem always remains the problem of the balance of coercion and persuasion. How can these be balanced to achieve national objectives, how can they be balanced to achieve stable political arrangements. I emphasize that our objective in the new nations which are modernizing is to help create stable political systems.

You have three historical formats available for the balance of persuasion and coercion, integration of the political and military forces. There are obviously more, but for the purpose of my remarks three will do.

One is the political agent used in the British Colonial experience. Every tactical unit down to the lowest echelon had a political agent. This is not compatible with U.S. traditions and operating format.

The second format is the Soviet format—the integration of military force and political resources resting within a unitary-political party system, the Communist Party hierarchy.

For the United States we are dealing with two relatively separate organizations in foreign policy—the military and the diplomatic and with a great variety of coordinating and comprehensive mechanisms for balance and integration of their objectives.

As an applied social scientist, it is clear that the type of organization determines its potential for using research.

When you are dealing with a medical hospital, prison, or industrial organization, you are dealing with different types of organizational situations, than when you are dealing with the American foreign policy and national security area where you have these separate but coordinated units of action.
Under these circumstances I distinguish three types of research support. One, the strategic background required for military purposes, and here my concern is with the needs of the military establishment.

Two, we need understanding and research on limited-war or insurgency as a social and political process. This is required for the continuous practice of developing military doctrine, developing operational format, and for plans and operations.

Thirdly, we need research and understanding of the human factor in limited-warfare for training and tactical operations.

Let us look at our state of affairs at the present time.

Under the strategic background, the accomplishment has been heavy emphasis on handbooks. Well and good. But I believe there are definite limitations of handbooks in the military establishment.

Along with the handbooks of strategic background, there are requirements for basic education in social science concepts—sensitizing military officers at all levels from the academies, the ROTC's, the military schools, to cultural and social differences. This comes by a fundamental understanding of those parts of the social sciences which need to be incorporated into the instructional curriculum of the academies and the other military establishments, and also, wherever possible, an understanding of the military system as a social system.

I use as an operational index the number of copies of *The Professional Soldier* bought by the various military academies and the data is extremely interesting.
The second aspect of the strategic background is the necessity for direct exposure of the military planners with the social scientists who claim to have special interest in strategic analysis. This is a very difficult problem during periods of partial mobilization.

During World War II, it was possible to insist that the social scientists had special competence to assume responsibilities in the military establishment. Today we have a university structure which makes it difficult to have access under the best conditions between the military planners and the minds of the social scientists who are working on these problems. Nothing short of spectacular revolutionary development in organizational format will achieve this goal.

I have repeatedly suggested that we develop new kinds of seminars between military personnel and university personnel on an ongoing basis—I think this might be a very important role for SORO—so as to bring together under the appropriate circumstances in a meaningful way those social scientists who are concerned with the study of problems of nation-building on a comparative basis.

Now to the second point: limited-war as a social and political process.

I am now basing my remarks on recommendations made as early as 1948 to a defense research agency as to what was needed by way of fundamental research in the area of the understanding of limited-war as a social and political process.

It was suggested then that there should be systematic reviews of the historical experiences of World War II and other periods. This was not achieved by governmental effort. There have been some important steps forward by private researchers.
Subsequently, I recommended that only by direct observation and by close team support between research people and operational people could we have the kind of studies of limited-war operations that are required to develop a body of doctrine and research orientation.

This underlies the necessity for direct access between the researchers and real military life situations, real situations of paramilitary or insurgency, and the like. I say that at the present time we have hardly begun to move in this direction.

Part of this is due to the gross disarticulation of university resources. At the present time there are no more than six sociologists who are working on these problems, and a good number are badgered by me as my graduate students, compared to the fact that there are three hundred studying the sociology of the medical profession.

Likewise, one of the reasons we do not have the kinds of direct observation and team studies of these problems, is the basic defect of the research and development structure in the national military establishment.

I believe the research and development structure of the U.S. Government within the military establishment still reflects the necessities of the natural sciences and not the peculiar characteristics of the so-called "soft" sciences.

Of the highest priority in research is the whole question of studies of the command and control structure of insurgency operations and the control of insurgency operations. We want to see what happens to hierarchal military organizations under these circumstances.
The remarks of General Stilwell opened the groundwork for understanding that the authority structure of limited-war is much more consensual, much more team-oriented than is currently the doctrine in the military establishment. I would like also to see studies of internal warfare in the urban areas. We have emphasized the fact this is a rural aspect. I see it right today—internal warfare in the big cities of North Africa—and I believe urban-based internal warfare will be important and require study.

Likewise we want heavy emphasis on studying the political consequences of the military assistance programs all the way from what has happened in the post-combat phase in South Korea to the training of foreign personnel in the United States at the present time.

Now, I want to come to the final and last element; namely, the human factor element at the tactical level. It seems to me here at this level it is not very likely that the university-based researchers will be of great direct use.

What we need to do is to develop a new type of personnel. I am speaking, for example, of Captain R____ L____, who visited us at the University of Chicago, a paratrooper, with a Ph.D. in educational psychology. He gave a brilliant discussion of paratroop training in the best behavioral science concepts possible. It was revealing to learn how paratroop training undergoes transformation from rigid organizational structure to the most marked consensual team type as the paratroopers moved forward in their training.
In short, we need the kind of studies that General Marshall did on "Men Against Fire." We need that same kind of intimate direct observation of the nature of insurgency, counterinsurgency, which can only be gotten on the firing line.

We have to look forward to training at the lowest tactical level a group of a new kind of war historians. In World War II, we had historians on the firing line. Today the historians must bring with them the intellectual equipment of the behavioral sciences, and this must be taught at the university very rapidly.

Finally, in the development of planning for social science support for limited-warfare, we need the equivalent of the Army Medical Library, some central file of the basic documents, basic reports, life history documents and studies. They are scattered all over the military establishment, and it is very difficult for any researcher and planner to make effective use of the present scattered documentation.

Thank you.

DR. THOMSON: Thank you very much, Morris.

You know the artist is not always the scientist; the man who can do is not always the best man to say what can be done, but if those of you in the front part of the room watched that neat bit of time deception he pulled on me, maybe he should go in as an operator next time.

Jack Riley is not only a Professor of Sociology of long experience and considerable note, he is either now or is going to be the President of the American Association of Public Opinion Research. He established his wife in there as the conference chairman, so he has a lock on that particular organization. I just simply warn you on what he may do to you with his hands. He is now Director
of Research, Social Research that is, for one of the larger and more affluent insurance companies in the United States.

I will leave him time for his own commercials if he wants them.

He also looked deeply in the minds of the French and others during the latter stages of World War II. He, with Wilbur Schramm, did some very interesting stuff on what happens when the Reds take cities and do not destroy the documents when they go back out. This was in Korea. He sings Korean for you Korea buffs. He is a great collector of Japanese memorabilia.

I think you will enjoy what he has to say.

Dr. Riley.

REMARKS OF DR. JOHN W. RILEY, JR.
Second Vice-President and
Director of Social Research
Equitable Life Insurance Society

I won't answer Chuck's extravagant introduction. Let me instead come immediately to the point because I don't want to deprive you of your coffee any longer than necessary.

It seems to me that Dr. Altman has done quite a good job of identifying the main lines of relevant social science research for our problem here today.

Since, however, the Chairman has been deprived of his own time, I would insist that Dr. Altman add in his revised bibliography Thomson's definitive account of United States Information Services Overseas. It was an egregious omission, Dr. Thomson! I was also fascinated by General Stilwell's account of courses at the Academy.
To the academic mind, this annotated bibliography which you have in your hands might very well serve as the reading list for a new course in counterinsurgency! I might call this "Course 214 at the graduate level." I can almost "see" the description in the catalog: "Open only to students who have successfully passed Psychological Warfare 11-12 or who have had equivalent experience."

Quite seriously, however, of the various titles cited, many, many research problems have been posed and many of them have been solved. Many of the authors and, indeed, many of the authors cited, have made significant operational contributions. But there is perhaps one odd thing about this list. Very few of the items, if any, have much to say about how the social sciences, as such, have been put to work on an operational level. Yet perhaps this is not strange or odd when we consider the relative infancy of this scientific tradition. That, of course, is a story itself, and we cannot go into it this morning.

Let me, however, take one small exception to Dr. Altman's paper. He made the point, if you will remember, quite early in his presentation that the theoretical concepts lying behind such basic processes as persuasion or communication or decision-making are perhaps, and I quote, "least applicable to immediate needs."

Now, my position, for purposes of this very brief discussion would have to be precisely the opposite.

Had we known, for example, more about selective perception and its use as a defense mechanism during those dark days of June 1940 when the French civilian population rather consistently failed to heed our warning leaflets, many lives would have been saved and many of the
subsequent complications and complexities of civilian-military relationships in France might have been obviated.

My point is that the social scientists in the two full decades since the outbreak of World War II have made rather considerable strides in developing theoretical concepts of considerable power.

For example, it was not until after the war that Shils and my colleague, Janowitz, here, were able to unravel the process of the disintegration of the Wehrmacht through the use of such apparently unrelated concepts as primary group relationships and social cohesion, and so on.

Similarly, it took the experience of World War II, and some in Korea to boot, to enable Linebarger to conclude that the act of surrender does not depend upon the disposition of the individual enemy soldier to say "yes" or "no" to the war as a whole. Latent and complicated social and psychological structures are obviously involved, relative deprivation, for example.

Or consider another example. We need to be reminded I think, particularly today in the communications which we direct to the U.S.S.R., of Speier's dictum that the population at large is no rewarding target for conversion propaganda. Here the relatively recent notion of cross-pressures would seem to be helpful, a notion which emerges from domestic studies of voting behavior and which suggests that individuals whose loyalties are divided between groups with conflicting norms are the very ones who are most ready to shift their political views or affiliations.

Or consider the utility of the concept of, what we sociology fellows call, the reference groups, and the body of communications research which says, in effect, that the message of whatever type will be accepted or rejected
or distorted in line with the values of the significant
groups to which the recipient of the message belongs
or to which he aspires.

Bear with me for just one additional illustration, if you will.

Much recent theoretical research in the field of
social psychology centers around the concept of what is
popularly called "balance theory." If Mary doesn't like
Sally, Mary will see all kinds of faults in Sally even
though Sally objectively may be a model of perfection.
In more technical terms, what Mary has done here has been
to adjust her cognitive processes so that they balance
out with the affective ones. And this, of course,
seriously impairs the communications between Mary and
Sally. There are built-in distortions on both sides.

Now, this general theory has often been called
by its obverse designation, the "theory of dissonance."

Perhaps, if you will remember, yesterday both
General Trudeau and General Eddleman called for new ideas
and imagination. Perhaps there is some immediate rele-
vance of this theory to our current dealings with the
U.S.S.R. as well as with the uncommitted countries.

In this connection, I was particularly struck
by Admiral Lee's observation that one of our purposes has
to be to deter, to persuade, to limit, or to delay the
enemy.

Now, if we are going to succeed in such purposes,
then at least some of our messages have got to get
through.

My guess is that here we have a great advantage
over the enemy since it is much more feasible for us to
admit to and to divulge our shortcomings than it is for a
monolithic state like the Soviet Union. They simply can't
do it.
Now, the point is very simple. Certainly we shall not get nowhere as long as we perpetuate the illusion that the world powers are either all good guys or all bad guys. No one else in the world believes this. Thank Heaven, we are on the side with a kind of built-in flexibility. What this adds to, of course, is a very serious plea for something beyond the mere collection of background information which Dr. Altman was talking about--I believe he called it "development of action programs."

Certain it is that we need better and more systematic information on all of the peoples with whom we must deal now and in the future. But such knowledge is not enough.

As Dr. Altman put it, the planner and operator also need ideas. Morris Janowitz just called for the addition of concepts, especially social science concepts.

My point is this: that our research problems need not be posed either as very simple questions of fact about the characteristics and the beliefs of target populations or, at the other extreme, as discouragingly abstract or complicated issues which strike at the very heart of human motivation and human interaction. They can rather, it seems to me, be somewhere in between.

When we are able to begin to ask good questions at this range with a fair degree of regularity, it is pretty predictable that there will be some new and very shiny additions to the excellent bibliography which Dr. Altman has compiled for you.

One final comment and I am done.

There has never been, at least to my knowledge, an example in which the military have rolled out such a massive welcome mat for the professors as they have at this meeting. Now, there is a tremendous promise here,
but there is also a warning, and I would like to strike that final little note. This makes me think of my favorite definition of a professor--a person whose job it is to tell his students how to solve the very problems which he himself avoided by becoming a professor in the first place!

Well, one can only hope that the academic community of scholars, in turn, will be able to respond in some equally massive way to the military's invitation by coping successfully with at least a fraction of the problems and issues which I am sure this symposium is certain to identify for us.

Thank you very much.

DR. THOMSON: Gentlemen, I don't know how much scatology you got out of all this, but for me it has been a very rewarding and moving experience to hear from authoritative people about the nature of education at West Point, some of the problems that the Army faces in gearing itself up for a kind of combat which it has never quite faced in the same way before, a review of the literature, critique of the literature, and establishment of some very important and concrete problems which are there whether we face them or not; and finally the tolerance, the good humor and the warmth which have been exemplified particularly by our last speaker which may provide one of the essentials of the operating framework in which we can move towards some better solutions of these problems for our day and for our time.

Thank you.
SESSION 4
FORCES FOR STABILITY AND INSTABILITY
IN
DEVELOPING NATIONS

SESSION CHAIRMAN:
Dr. W. Phillips Davison
Council on Foreign Relations

DR. DAVISON: In the last session we started talking about the use of social science in connection with problems faced by the military establishment. Before proceeding further, I think it might provide a clarifying function if I say a word about one aspect of social science research method that differentiates it from methods used by physical scientists.

This difference is perhaps illustrated best by the story about the high school science teacher who wanted to know if the boys were paying attention to what he was saying. So, without further instructions, he gave four boys each a barometer and told them to find out how high the neighboring church tower was.

As it happened, the first boy was the son of an Air Force officer, and knew all about altimeters. So he climbed the tower, took a reading, went down to the bottom, took another reading, and calculated the height by the difference in atmospheric pressure.

The second boy was the son of a Naval officer. He knew about these things, too. He climbed to the top of the tower, tied a string to the barometer, lowered it to
the ground, measured the string, and got the right answer that way.

The third boy was the son of an Army officer. He knew a lot about velocity. So he took out his watch at the top of the tower, dropped the barometer over the side, clocked the number of seconds before it smashed on the ground, and calculated the height by the rate of fall formula.

The fourth boy happened to be the son of a social scientist.

He took his barometer and shined it up, went over to the church, presented the barometer to the sexton, and asked him how high the tower was.

This is one of the tried and true social science methods that is being applied in the developing nations.

We are dealing with the developing nations in several sessions, and this is only appropriate, since they make up the largest portion of the world. As several speakers pointed out yesterday, the stability of these areas is extremely important for the United States when it comes to safeguarding its own peace and freedom, and it is here that Communist forces are trying as hard as they can to promote instability. In this session, the foregoing, we are going to address ourselves to stability and instability in the developing nations.

Since this area is so large, it is difficult to take account of all of it. Our two papers, one by Dr. Pye and one by Dr. Pauker, are both based largely on experience in Southeast Asia, although many observations made there can be extrapolated to other areas. We are then going to take a quick look at some other areas in the emerging world with the aid of our three panelists: Dr. Berger, Dr. Johnstone, and Mr. Wilson. I hope that they will comment on the remarks of the two preceding
speakers in the light of conditions elsewhere in the world.

It is necessary to say very little when introducing Dr. Lucian W. Pye to this audience. He has done a great deal to promote understanding of emerging areas, particularly with respect to political aspects of military problems. His *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya* is in the bibliography that Dr. Altman let us have, and was written at a time when very few social scientists were giving attention to such problems, so it was a true pioneering study. More recently he published a study entitled *Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity*. He is Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Department of Political Science at MIT. It gives me great pleasure to introduce Dr. Pye.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Dr. Lucian W. Pye
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

It is a great pleasure to be here this morning, and I feel it something of an honor to be the lead-off man at the first session to be devoted explicitly to the social scientists. The other sessions of this very interesting conference have all been introduced by representatives of the military. I think that it would not be inappropriate for me to take this occasion to express the general appreciation of all the social scientists at this conference for the kind hospitality and respect which the military have shown to all of us.

The central theme of much of the discussion up to this point has been the search for ways in which the
social sciences might facilitate the military in achieving their missions. I would like to stress the point that this should be a reciprocal relationship. We in the social sciences have in our turn gained much from our associations over the years with the research branches of the military. Let me hasten to add that I do not have in mind just the fact that we have benefitted from the funds and other resources of the military; I would however be less than candid if I did not acknowledge that in some small measure such materialistic considerations probably play their part in the relationship we are speaking about between scholars and soldiers.

The major point I would make is that the association between these two communities has been remarkably fruitful in the past, and that we have each benefitted in our separate ways as well as in our common interests. Some of the research which the military has helped sponsor ranks as major contributions to human knowledge. For example, Stouffer's monumental study of the American soldier, some of the systematic studies in support of psychological warfare, and work in the field of operations research and systems analysis, to mention only a few, stand out as great contributions to the advancement of basic knowledge.

I am not sure whether the military appreciate the degree to which they have been able so to contribute to the enrichment of American intellectual life. I do not know how they would even appraise the specific studies I have in mind, but I do hope that we both can share a sense of respect for each other's interests and objectives. Let us all hope that in the years to come we can work out increasingly firm foundations for this mutual relationship. Dr. Janowitz mentioned this morning that in the past the relationship between the military and the social
scientist has been governed almost entirely by the pattern which emerged earlier in the relationship between the physical scientist and the military. There are certain fundamental differences and we must strive to work these out in the future. In my view in this conference and in other discussions we are groping forward to what I trust will become ever more effective relationships.

In any case, I am extremely happy to be here at this time, and I believe that I can speak for all the civilians present when I express my appreciation to you for this opportunity to discuss these important problems of mutual interest.

This session is also the first one explicitly and entirely devoted to the problems of the underdeveloped areas. In turning directly to the problems of the underdeveloped areas we come directly upon a wide range of very interesting issues which are of genuine mutual concern for both the military and the social scientists.

By way of introducing the subject, we might usefully observe the way in which the Army has gradually become increasingly involved in matters relating to political and social development. From such a survey there emerges a pattern that I feel is relevant for research.

Immediately after World War II, the Army had almost no concern with the underdeveloped areas. Only gradually as we developed a worldwide strategy did we become aware of the possible significance of the underdeveloped areas. In the beginning this concern was limited almost entirely to the problems of developing and maintaining an advanced base structure. Gradually this interest expanded to cover the problems of possible aggression in the gray areas of the world. As we became increasingly concerned with limited-war we had to look
deeper into the problems of the new countries. Questions about limited-war brought up the need for local forces, and hence the rising interest in providing U.S. military aid to underdeveloped countries.

By this point we had become deeply interested in the problems of stability in the new countries. Our military, with their MAAG and their MAP operations, had to learn rapidly a great deal about the parts of political and economic life in underdeveloped lands. Then there arose the massive problem of countersubversion and sub-limited-warfare. The U.S. Army in one form or another has become more and more deeply involved in the problems of bringing order and progress to underdeveloped countries. We now have a host of people being trained for dealing with an ever wider range of problems in not only the military but also the social, economic, and civic sides of the new countries.

I predict that in the next few years this interest will increase at an exponential rate. This is partly because of the nature of the world we live in, and the increasing importance of the underdeveloped areas as a source of crisis or sources of tension. Indeed, if we list the whole range of world crises of the last decade, all except Berlin are related in some way with underdeveloped areas.

Since the main problems of American policy are going to be tied in one way or other with the developing areas, the Army will be steadily attracted to these problems. Also, as the military moves into these areas, starting usually in terms of their very proper concern with the question of our military interests in these areas, I think they are going to find, as they deal with underdeveloped areas, that they will have to take a
broader and broader concern with all the problems of the areas and become more and more involved in the social and economic dimensions. This will be an exasperating experience in many ways. We already sense this, for it is clear that we cannot rely upon old approaches. We will have to rethink much of our procedure, and this is never an easy thing to do.

As General Stilwell mentioned a little earlier, the great need is to try to get into some of these countries at an early stage and to begin to deal with their problems before they reach a crisis level. Once we begin to do this, we will be really forward planning; but also forward planning in this sense will involve a very broad social approach to these societies. In order to head off crises we will have to deal with questions about the economic structure and the sources of political instability in such societies.

As the military become increasingly engaged in the underdeveloped areas, they are certain to discover that there is really a faulty gap in our knowledge about the problems of political development. The disturbing truth is that we lack a doctrine about how to go about nation building. In the past the social scientists have not provided all the information necessary for such a doctrine.

American social science has been concerned with explaining how different processes operate at any moment in time and not with explaining dynamic developments over time. We have been much more concerned with explaining the realities of a current situation. We have been in this sense much more statically oriented in our concern. We have tried to explain realities on the American scene and elsewhere. And also in terms of the underdeveloped
areas, our anthropological approach has been in terms of explaining how cultures have been able to preserve themselves; the stress has been on continuity rather than on change.

Thus we are not well-prepared for dealing with the question "How do you go about creating a modern nation-state?". The problem we face is that we are caught up in a very complex phase of history without adequate knowledge. We are concerned with the post-colonial effort, and with the issue of how societies can function with any degree of stability when they have great differences at technological levels, great differences in cultural attitudes.

I would submit as the military becomes more concerned with the range of problems which you now identify as counterinsurgency you are in fact going to be coming across the problems of how to build institutions and how to build the most complex of all social institutions or organizations: the modern nation-state. It is an extraordinary phenomenon we call a state. As we do this, we are going to be concerned with realizing that a lot of things cannot be left to spontaneity, cannot be left to indiscriminate development; but rather we will have to develop a certain capacity of foresight, planning, and guidance.

In this whole process, I think we are going to realize that the military will play a peculiarly important part in the underdeveloped areas themselves and, as they look to us for a model, in all societies we need to know a lot more about the relationship that the military occupies in the building of a nation-state.
If we look historically at the United States, the military has always played a very complex role. I have in mind the Corps of Army Engineers, the role the military played in terms of the opening of the West, the historical evolution as it affects our allocation of resources within our society.

In short, all societies will have military forces, and the pressing question is how will the military fit into the national effort at development. What position does it occupy in terms of the total social balances within the society and what particular sets of ideologies and doctrines will a society produce in establishing some kind of relationship in terms of the coercion and persuasion that Mr. Janowitz mentioned?

In short, we need a greater sense of historical understanding of these processes; how they work in Japan, in Turkey; how they can work in a favorable direction; and how they can work in ways that are functional to development of modern civilization.

In the last few years we have become sensitive to the way the military can perform some quasi-civil functions. We see this in the teams of the military as they took over political authority in Southeast Asia and Africa and the Middle East. There is a sense here that the military can perform certain types of functions more effectively, maybe, than can civilian institutions. We need to know why this is the case. What are the peculiar advantages? Is it the fact that the military has the guns and can point them? Or is it because the nature of the military organization itself makes it easier to create a rational organization falling into the military pattern than it has been to create civilian organizations.
following the military pattern? What are the advantages that the military may have in facilitating modernization?

We have created certain ideologies and certain feelings that the military might be helpful. There is an instinctive feeling that when the military comes to power in any of these countries a step is taken favorable to American policy.

How accurate is this? What are the peculiar advantages?

It is also important, I think, to realize the role of the military in these societies, in the sense that this gives us another peculiar advantage, which is the extent to which we can develop relationships with the military in the underdeveloped areas. It has been extremely difficult to develop the kind of rapport relationships with many of the civilian groupings in these societies. The striking thing is that out of the military tradition, sense of profession, a sense of having career patterns that go beyond just national lines, out of this history of the soldier and the role of the soldier, you have a basis for the kind of relationships, the cross-cultural, that you do not always have within the civilian area.

Also in a sense, the military in working with the underdeveloped areas have an opening wedge in these societies that does not exist for the diplomatic services and for the other people who are more related to a situation of competition with the other side rather than with working with them as they build up their whole institutions. So, here again, there is a possibility of a door being opened which can either be effectively exploited—if we know what we can do—or which can turn out to create disastrous conditions.
So in this instance again, the American military, as we see the military in underdeveloped areas, may be in a position to benefit from foresight and planning and whatever advantage the social scientists may be able to give them.

I would submit that the role the military can play in these societies and the extent to which we can take advantage of the potential role will depend upon our understanding the full position that the military can occupy in human society. This role involves far more than just meeting the civilian functions and performing them in place of the civilian.

There are certain reasons that the military itself has certain roles, I think, to play in many of these transitional societies. This may in fact be the only force that can give people who have suffered under foreign domination a sense of self-respect and self-assurance. Often the civil bureaucracy is much too closely tied to a tradition of foreign control. The tradition of the civil service is often the tradition of the foreign rule. Thus the civil bureaucracy has a compromise it has to carry over. Often the civil bureaucracy is too closely associated with the ritual of foreign rule. Thus you get a certain kind of clerk mentality within the civil bureaucracy which makes it difficult to take the initiative in the necessary positive program.

On the other hand, the politicians in many of the transitional societies are much too closely related to the nationalist phase of opposing the foreign rule. In this sense they are much more tied to the provoking of emotions, the generation of emotions, and maybe not so closely tied to relating emotions to systematic planning and organization. Here again there may be a position the
armies can perform within these societies if we can appreciate what these are and what the potential may be.

Thus the weight of my remarks comes down to this. I think within these societies the American military have an increasing sense of relationships; that the American military now stand at the top of the list in numbers of people—that is American contacts with foreigners in any kind of official capacity; that they have a potential here for instructive development; that they have a chance to do something that goes just beyond civilizing, goes beyond technical training in limited-war, that involves an understanding of how a modern society can be built.

At the same time there is always the danger, very sharp, and I would want to emphasize the negative role that the military can play—historically in most of the underdeveloped societies the military have been a serious drag on development. They have held back society. They have been a major element in the misallocation of resources, holding back.

You need only to look back to the history of Latin America and many of the Middle Eastern areas. How can the military become a constructive force and what are the reasons?

I would submit that these questions, if we try to get into them, are not going to be questions that can be answered either in terms of the set of ideologies that was appropriate for American military or the set appropriate for the medical sciences. Many of the questions and answers will turn out to conflict with our first impressions. What will be called for here is a very systematic approach and orderly approach and willingness to ask hard questions and follow them through.
Maybe this is the most important thing that we as social scientists can do: to recognize we have limited knowledge as do the military, but what we are prepared to do with the military is to try to ask these questions in an orderly, rational way and bear the consequences of whatever we discover.

Thank you.

DR. DAVISON: Thank you very much, Dr. Pye.

The paper we have just heard points out that military establishments in developing areas can play an extremely important role as a stabilizing force. Some such force has to replace the colonial administrations which are rapidly being swept away, and Dr. Pye has suggested that the military may be able to step into this gap at least partially.

There is, however, another answer as to what should replace the outgoing colonial administrations. This answer is provided by the Communist Parties and their coworkers in the emerging nations. Our next speaker, Dr. Pauker, will focus not on the sources of stability or the potential for stability in these nations, but on sources of turbulence.

I think Dr. Pauker is known to most of you. He also is a pioneer in this area, having given systematic attention to the political as well as the military role of armed forces in Southeast Asia, and in my opinion his work has had a very substantial influence. He has been Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley, and presently is head of the Asian Section of the RAND Corporation's Social Science Department.

It gives me great pleasure to introduce Dr. Pauker.
Mr. Chairman,
Gentlemen:

I realized this morning that this is the first time in perhaps 10 years that I planned to read a paper rather than to speak extemporaneously. I wonder myself what I am trying to hide.

The terms of reference of this symposium inform us that the Army's mission in advancing U.S. aims in the "underdeveloped nations" is to aid friendly governments in combatting subversion and guerrilla warfare not only directly, through military training, but also by being a primary influence for progress in these countries, in a direction compatible with U.S. national interests. In this context the need has been expressed for social science information to help the Army in its task. But one needs only to sample some of the materials used for instructional purposes at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School in order to realize that the level of sophistication achieved in Army training programs is such that broad generalities would only strike this audience as platitudes.

What can a social scientist say that you, gentlemen, do not know when in the May 1961 edition of FM 31-15 one reads:

The fundamental cause of large-scale resistance movements stems from the dissatisfaction of some portion of the population, whether real, imagined, or incited, with the prevailing political, social,
or economic conditions. This dissatisfaction is usually centered around a desire for one or more of the following:

1. National independence
2. Relief from actual or alleged oppression
3. Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation
4. Economic and social improvement
5. Elimination of corruption

What others have stated in lengthy essays, the Army has compressed into one excellent sentence:

The greatest strength of an irregular force lies in its inner political structure and identification with a popular cause, its ability to conceal itself within the civil population, the strong motivation of its members, and their knowledge of the resistance area.

What then can social science contribute to the Army's limited-war mission? I submit that what is most urgently needed is to attack fearlessly and without emotional or ideological distortions the question whether the means on which we rely to cope with the sources of turbulence in the new nations are adequate, whether we can steal our enemies' thunder.

Premier Khrushchev put the world on notice on January 6, 1961, that the Communists support what he called "just wars," wholeheartedly and without reservations. He defined these revolutionary wars as the fight of insurgent people for their right of self-determination, for their social and independent national development, as uprisings against corrupt reactionary regimes, against colonialists. But the Marxists have no monopoly on understanding what is going on in the contemporary world. President Kennedy told the nation on June 6, 1961:
It is easy to dismiss as Communist-inspired every anti-government or anti-American riot, every overthrow of a corrupt regime or every mass protest against misery and despair.

But these are not all Communist-inspired. The Communists move in to exploit them, to infiltrate their leadership, to ride their crest to victory. But the Communists did not create the conditions which caused them.

In short, the hopes of freedom in these areas which see so much poverty and illiteracy, so many children who are sick, so many children who die in the first year, so many families without homes, so many families without hope, the future for freedom in these areas rests with the local peoples and their government.

If they have the will to determine their own future, if their Governments have the support of their own people, if their honest and progressive measures helping their people have inspired confidence and zeal, then no guerrilla or insurgent action can succeed.

But where those conditions do not exist, a military guarantee against external attack from across a border offers little protection against internal decay.

What then is the cause of the difficulties we seem to encounter in our struggle for a world in which we would like to see social change take place peacefully in accordance with our fundamental beliefs in the value and dignity of man?

I submit that this is largely due to the inherent contradictions among the goals that the new nations try to achieve. These goals cannot be achieved instantaneously and simultaneously. We try to find honest solutions to problems, whereas the Communists exploit them—shamelessly. Experience shows that not all the goals that the new nations try to achieve, sometimes literally
overnight, are compatible. The Communists solve the equation simply by endorsing those solutions, phony as they may be, which promise to maximize their influence or power.

To illustrate briefly: if independence would be the only goal of resurgent nations, our policy could trace a straight line from 1776 to Latin America's emancipation in the 1820's, Central and Eastern Europe's after World War I, Asia's after World War II, and Africa's today. If this would have been the contemporary world's only major preoccupation, we could well live with a world of independent but probably agrarian traditionalist societies. But to establish by a stroke of the pen a viable constitutional democracy, is something else again. Should we then encourage so-called "national self-determination" under any circumstances, no matter what activist minority will then take over and bring the so-called "new nation" nothing but chaos or oppression, worse sometimes than the colonial one, or even make it cross over from colony to independence to satellite in two easy steps? Or, to take another example: if mankind's desire for greater abundance of material goods would have developed in a world free from nationalism, then international division of labor and free movement of capital, as advocated by classical economics, may have provided 'ister results than what is possible in a world divided by the antagonisms and suspicions of so-called "sovereign states," which have legal pretensions as equal members of the family of nations which contrast ludicrously with their incapacity to behave like sovereigns in achieving their developmental goals. Or perhaps the quest for social justice, which all great world religions share, would be nearer fulfillment if men would be less
vigorously encouraged to seek power and wealth. But the simultaneous attempt to realize all these values and many more confronts honest men with problems which seem at times insoluble.

The Communist answer is a simple one. They maximize promises so as to gain as much support as possible for the small organized elites whose mission it is to secure total power. The doctrine used for this purpose is increasingly sophisticated. The crude 19th century concept of class struggle has been developed into the contemporary doctrine of the national-liberation movement which endorses every effort to separate the new nations from the West.

An important editorial in the Soviet journal, Kommunist, of January 1962 states:

... the chief characteristic of the national-liberation movement at this stage is that it is not directed against the colonial administrative regimes alone but also against such forms of submission as economic enslavement, forced acceptance of military blocs and bases, the establishment of puppet governments, etc. Consequently the national-liberation struggle can only expand, and not merely in Africa, where there are still colonial administrative regimes in a number of countries, but also in Asia and Latin America. ...

The Communists have always looked upon the national-liberation movement as a loyal ally and close relative of the international revolutionary movement of the working class.

In other words, any government in the non-Western World that accepts political, economic, military, or cultural relations with the West is considered a new form of colonial regime. What should our answer be? I submit that it is in our interest to oppose truthfulness to deceit, reason to cheap emotionalism. We train our social scientists to study, analyze, and interpret
reality as it really is. We should not sacrifice their findings for narrow, usually misguided, short-run considerations of diplomatic expediency. To illustrate, all recent statements on guerrilla warfare assert that this form of struggle for power can only be successful if it relies on highly motivated and thoroughly indoctrinated cadres and on substantial popular support. A few recent illustrations:

Frank Lindsay, Chief of a U.S. military mission to Yugoslavia in 1945, writing in the January 1962 issue of Foreign Affairs says:

Just as control of the air has become a prerequisite for successful frontal warfare, so control of the population is a prerequisite for successful unconventional warfare.

Major General Bela Kiraly, chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Hungarian Armed Forces in 1956, who also knew partisan warfare at firsthand in the Ukraine in World War II, wrote in a recent memo:

Support by the local population is indispensable. Support by the local population, like the discipline of partisans, is based partly on political conviction or sentiment, and partly on ruthless methods used against the partisans' own fellow countrymen.

Now, we are aware of the latter component, the terror used by the Communists. Maybe sometimes we console ourselves thinking that this is the whole explanation for what is going on in some parts of Southeast Asia. But is this the whole story?

May I quote one paragraph from the Blue Book of December, 1961, on the situation in South Vietnam which tells the world:
It is a record of progress over a few years, equaled by few young countries. It is a background against which to measure claims that what is happening in South Vietnam today is a purely internal rebellion, born of frustration and dissatisfaction and odious comparison with progress in the North. The people in South Vietnam know better; so do the Viet Cong. The economic and social advances scored by the South Vietnamese up to last year made it clear that Hanoi's program for peaceful take-over had little or no chance of success. If they were to win, the Communists had to resort to force.

Is this the whole truth? Should one assume that the population supports the Viet Cong guerrillas only because they are terrorized? I do not claim to know the answer from a distance.

I have been asked by the organizers of this symposium to work into my paper some brief reports on RAND research relevant to today's topic. This is perhaps an appropriate moment to mention that we have now in Vietnam two social scientists, one a cultural anthropologist, the other a political scientist. Both speak the local language well and have several years of experience in the country. They have been asked to study the problems generated by social change in the rural areas, to attempt to draft programs to help meet the needs thereby created, and to assist with village pacification planning.

All I am saying is that if social science is to contribute to the Army's mission in limited-wars, the findings of social scientists, such as the two men to whom I referred, should be taken very seriously wherever they come out, whether they agree with previous official position papers, or not.

To take another example. A year after the Alliance for Progress was offered to our Latin American neighbors, the voters of Argentina, to mention only one recent case,
began to drift again towards extremism, thus threatening to nip the program in the bud. Why? In an effort to help us understand the problems involved in the Alliance for Progress, one of the economists at RAND is now engaged in examining the inherent conflicts and contradictions that the program may generate, while a political scientist will soon join our staff to undertake a study of the appeal of Marxism in Latin America. I could give other examples of research that would be probably useful in the context of the present discussion, but time precludes that.

The question is not whether social science has all the answers, but whether it is given a chance to seek answers with the same detachment with which the natural scientists are attempting to solve problems. Can social science look candidly at sources of social conflict? We are already used to letting psychologists probe the human mind fearlessly and anthropologists to report to us with value-free detachment about the customs of different groups. Is it conceivable that policy-oriented studies will be accepted as objective even if they do not favor our prejudices? It is well known that the findings of modern psychology and anthropology can shock the unsophisticated. They are often considered for "adults only." Can the findings of our social scientists be regarded as "for political adults only?" We need not practice at home what may be necessary elsewhere, as we need not adopt the culture of Trobriand Islanders or the complexes of neurotics, simply because we are able to understand them. Some countries may need social revolution now; we had ours long ago. Social scientists making unpopular recommendations should be able to enjoy the same confidence that other experts do.
One need not be leftist or a Communist sympathizer to conclude that under the conditions of Cuba a radical appeal may have been a necessary prerequisite for successful popular support of an invasion. It is a matter of record that as early as April 15, 1961, Cuba's radio stations broadcast repeatedly an official government announcement: "They are coming to take away from us the land we have given to the peasants and cooperatives." How did this statement, which we were not prepared to counter with a more powerful appeal to the peasantry, affect the fortunes of the invasion? I do not claim to have the answer.

Much thought has been given since January 1961 to the problem of revolutionary war. I believe that the general outlines of the problem begin to be increasingly well understood. Some of the limited-wars fought since the end of World War II were traditional conflicts between sovereign states: the struggle for Kashmir 1947-49, the Arab-Israeli war 1948-49, the Sinai and Suez campaigns in 1956, perhaps even Korea and the events in 1958 in the Taiwan Straits. But the other limited-wars of this period were "people's struggles," conflicts which were only possible because some major social conflicts could be exploited by an organized activist minority, usually the Communists. In such cases the contending forces were not just proxies of foreign powers but groups with vital interests and sharply conflicting views in the respective country.

If we have to intervene in these conflicts in the defense of the national interest of the United States, maybe the time has come to revise our outlook on the nonmilitary weapons we use. Without trying to oversell the capabilities of social science, I submit that the
weapons systems it can devise should be regarded with the same spirit of objectivity as other weapons systems. For operational purposes, I leave my own political philosophy at home. Outside the United States I am neither for nor against land reform, rapid industrialization, higher education, parliamentary government, military rule, and so forth, in a doctrinaire fashion, being painfully aware of the fact that what thrives in one environment, withers in another; that what is necessary today is inappropriate tomorrow.

I would choose our nonmilitary instruments in the Cold War, or in sublimited conflicts, with the intent to win, knowing that the ultimate achievement of true freedom—abundance and social justice—depends on our victory. I am unable to find any good reason why we should be more sensitive to casualties among various vested interests, material or ideological, than among those on the front lines.

It is in our interest that the world does not go Communist. Turbulence is likely to increase in the world, as the process of modernization gains momentum, as the rest of the world strives to catch up with what the West has achieved since the Renaissance. Whether communism is, as Walt Rostow puts it, "a disease of the transition to modernization," or as many in the underdeveloped world see it, the "wave of the future," will be irrelevant if history will make communism the victor. What we need now is not name-calling, but purposeful, rational action. It gives me, therefore, great pleasure to participate today in this important effort of the Army and of American social science to find new ways to combat what we both consider evil.

Thank you.
PANEL DISCUSSION

DR. DAVISON: Thank you very much, Dr. Pauker.

We now have a framework which probably can be applied to many of the underdeveloped areas, and I am eager to see what our discussants have to say about it.

Our first discussant is Dr. Morroe Berger, who is Professor of Sociology at Princeton, having previously taught at Columbia and NYU. He has worked extensively in the Middle East, and many of you may know his *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt*. I understand also that a new book by him entitled *The Arab World Today* will be out very shortly. It gives me great pleasure to introduce Dr. Berger.

REMARKS OF DR. MORROE BERGER
Department of Sociology
Princeton University

From the standpoint of those interested in peace, this must be a very heartening symposium, for the Army seems to feel it necessary to supplement its military mission with a peaceful one—as if it might otherwise face technological unemployment.

It is interesting to hear high-ranking Army officers talking about the need for community development and civic action when so many social scientists talk about military strategy and nuclear policy.

The Army's challenge to the social scientists is a genuine one, I think, and this challenge demands two legitimate things of them: first, that they show what relevance their work in social science has to human
betterment, and, second, that they study those subjects that are peculiar to their disciplines—that is, the institutions that bring people together in groups and those that set them apart.

As in other cases in which such a challenge has been put forward, for example in the field of race relations, there is no doubt in my mind that, as Mr. Pauker has just suggested, social science offers, through the disinterested collection of data and analysis of behavior, the most reliable information we have and can have about human institutions.

But the real issue here is something else again, and that is: can the social sciences satisfy such demands for information and generalizations as are demanded of them? I don't mean this in some broad philosophical sense but in a very practical one.

I say this because, as one interested for 10 or 15 years in what we call area studies, I find that sociology especially, and some other disciplines relevant to the Army's interest expressed here, have not developed so rapidly as was hoped with respect to some of the areas that the Army has designated as those most appropriate for civic action in Asia and some parts of the Middle East. So it may very well be that the Army will have to stimulate the kind of studies that it needs rather than being able to walk in and pick them up in libraries.

I hope that the Army, if it stimulates such research, will encourage broad and basic studies of human behavior as well as the specific ones it may need to answer such questions as how to proceed to build a new canal in a given community. Nor would this be a new role for the Army. For among the examples of its civic
action in our own country is its sponsorship in World War II of what was called "Area and Language Studies."

To some of us in these programs they seemed then to be disorganized and only of remote relevance, but social science and many academic programs are still living off the products of the Army's specialized training program, and I might say some of the products are not living too badly either.

Of course, this indicates one advantage that the Army has. If there is an indelicate or unpleasant task to perform, the Army can simply assign people to it, whereas other agencies have to build up all sorts of incentives.

But civic action by the Army in our own country is rather different from civic action in another country.

First, it is our own land and our own Army. That is very important.

Second, civic action, especially in the past, was carried out in this country by a small Army whose subordination to the duly constituted civil authorities was never in question.

In the Middle East at least, the area that I know best, and where there is at present no insurgent Communist force, unlike in Southeast Asia, I find it very difficult to see that the native armies can become or be viewed as benevolent big brothers, beloved by the people. This picture presented here yesterday seems like nothing that I see in the Middle East. If this is true of the native armies in the Middle East, how much more true would it be of foreign armies there?

It is true, as Mr. Pye has said, that armies play a role in nation-building. So does hardship, revolution, and war. That does not mean people want to go out and
get such experience deliberately. Very often certain unpleasant institutions have favorable effects, yet no one would seek to develop them intentionally, for all their good results.

In some countries, the United States has become associated in the recent past with oppressive civilian regimes. Will it help the United States now to become associated with oppressive military regimes? Is the United States now to try to make military regimes in the Middle East or elsewhere more palatable to the peoples whom they control?

It may be politically necessary for the United States to support such regimes but this is a matter of policy and I don't think it helps us to concoct an idealistic brew to mix with such policy.

A program of civic action in underdeveloped areas may thus bolster not only unpopular regimes but, within them, military leaders who may be seeking economic and social betterment and development of their nations but at the cost of their political education.

We usually identify the military with stability, and stability is something we all like. But the armies in the Middle East are not necessarily stable. Even when they promote internal stability—and that is not necessarily favorable to Western interests—all the time—some Middle Eastern armies may promote instability in their neighbors in whose own stability the United States may have invested a great deal of hope, energy, and money.

So I want to stress three things.

First, if the Army wants to use social science, it may find that it has to direct social science towards its own problems and interests.
Second, if it does use social science, I think the Army ought, even for its own interest, to take a broad view of what social science is and may become.

Third, if the Army believes that it must go into civic action in underdeveloped areas, it ought to do so, I think, without encumbering illusions about making military regimes palatable to the people they control and without dubious analogies to the American Frontier.

Political problems are tough. So we like to avoid them. But I think we shall find that engineering projects are not a substitute for political education.

Thank you.

DR. DAVISON: At this point I find myself wishing we were able to have comments from the floor, because I think Dr. Berger's remarks have raised questions that could be very profitably discussed, especially in the context of the two previous papers. I hope we will receive more light on some of these questions from our remaining panelists.

Our next discussant is Dr. William C. Johnstone. Dr. Johnstone has had a career so long and distinguished that one cannot do justice to it in a brief introduction. He has been Dean of the School of Government at George Washington University; Chief of the Office of Public Affairs, United States Embassy, India; Chief of the Office of Educational Exchange of the Department of State; and Director of the Rangoon Center for Southeast Asian Study.

I am very happy to be able to introduce Dr. Johnstone.
Mr. Chairman, I want to make some comments along the lines of rather specific areas where I think, in view of the purpose of this conference, social scientists and the Army working together can make a contribution.

As I listened to the previous speakers, I was reminded of an experience I had in 1957 on my way out to Burma.

An old prewar Japanese friend of mine arranged a special sort of seminar one evening with about 12 Japanese. In this group were three social scientists, two Japanese from the Foreign Office, and the rest were newspaper men. There were no military men in this group. The purpose of this discussion was to take up the problem of Japan's postwar role in Southeast Asia.

After we had tossed this subject around for about an hour on top of a very good Japanese dinner, I decided I would raise the question with the Japanese and said to all of them, "I want your opinions on why Japan's Co-prosperity Sphere fell."

It took a little while to get going and there was a lot of discussion finally generated in a much freer atmosphere than I had been used to in Japan before the war.

Finally, the group agreed on two points. They said, "First of all, we don't think we understood the psychology of the peoples of that area at all. Had we understood their psychology and their attitudes better we could have done perhaps better."
Then one of the newspaper men said, "No, that is not all." He turned to a Japanese who had been in the Foreign Office and had been a civilian administrator in one of the Southeast Asian countries during the war. He said, "Now see whether you agree with me. It is because none of our military knew anything about economics or politics."

This perhaps is illustrative of what we are talking about at this conference.

I would like to suggest, first of all, two or three areas of our ignorance in which it seems to me we have to do our best, both you in the Army and we as social scientists, to fill.

In the first place, I would contend that most of the so-called "developing countries"—well, as a matter of fact, the majority of them—are ex-colonial countries, and that the period of colonialism is a vast area of ignorance among Americans. We have not studied colonialism, hardly, at all. We are beset by the special pleaders, the apologists for the colonial regimes and by the nationalists who attack the colonial regimes.

We could almost see in the case of Burma how long it takes a new nation to get over saying, "All this is the fault of the British."

It was not until 1956, in my own opinion, that the Burmese finally discovered that some of the things that were happening to them or were not being done to them were mistakes of their own fault and not the fault of the British.

We need to know a lot more about what happened during the colonial period. We need to know particularly more about what the attitudes of people were, what concepts of political behavior were injected into the
stream of the educated, politically sophisticated people of these colonial territories, most of whom are still participating in their independent governments.

There is one good example of this, I think.

When I arrived in Burma in the spring in February of 1957, I went to an industrial exhibit sponsored by the Burma government. First prize in this exhibit was a prize on poultry raising. This was the Burma Army's poultry-raising project. It got started largely because of a Burmese staff officer trained in the United States.

This last time I was in Burma in the last week of January of this year, I talked with two young Burma Army officers who had just returned with their families from Israel under a project which the Burma Army has of having 50 or 60 families trained in the Kibbutz of Israel as a sort of local defense force capable of maintaining themselves, engaging in agricultural pursuits. These families are being sent up to the northern frontier of Burma along the Chinese Communist border.

How this experiment is going to succeed, I don't know. So far as I know, no social scientist yet has gone to Burma and made a thorough study of the role of the Army in Burma—the social role, political role, and now, since the recent Army coup d'état, the economic role of the Army. It is the Army officers who are managing Burma's economy and have been managing it in effect since their previous coup d'état.

So I suggest that here you have in the Burma Army, at least injected in part—and since we have not studied this in depth, it is hard to know how far it has been injected—a concept of public service. I would go so far as to assert that in the Burma Army, it is about the only
place in Burma society where you have this concept. At least, you don't have it too much outside the Army.

Now, this is a concept we are taking for granted in many instances. The more I see of politicians, in the Asian countries at least, the more I am convinced it is a concept which is rather alien to most of the politicians in that part of the world.

I suggest also that one of the things we do not know too much about yet—Professor Pye has made a real contribution in his most recent book to this subject—we do not know too much about the politics of the newly ex-colonial countries and the relationship of politics to political structure.

When I was in Burma in January talking with at least two of the Army officers who have since been given fairly high posts in the Army Council that is running the country, they asserted that one of the first things they were going to do as soon as they could get away was to go over to Pakistan and take a look at the new Pakistan constitution.

The problem which most of these countries have is a problem of their own making in part in that most ex-colonial countries have adopted the form of government of the metropole power. The Burmese adopted a British-type system. The French colonies have followed the same pattern to some extent. And this has been adopted usually in a hurry and without too much previous experience and usually has proved rather unsatisfactory.

How do you get in a newly developing country or ex-colonial country a strong executive which can manage the economy and engage in economic planning, develop economic and social progress on a countrywide basis, at
the same time have any kind of what we would call
democratic rights or representative type of government?

I would suggest that there is another concept
we ought to investigate to see what happened during the
colonial period and whether this was a concept injected
in the mind of the people or not, and that is the con-
cept of representation. To my mind, that is one of the
key elements in our own democratic society.

When I tell Asians who are studying here in this
country that they must go on Capitol Hill, as many of
them do, and talk with Congressmen and Senators about
how they represent their constituents, I find I usually
have to explain the whole idea of representation because
this is a new and an alien concept in most of these
ex-colonial countries.

I would suggest also that we have to find out more
about the concerns and the aspirations of the people in
these ex-colonial countries. We have done a little but
not enough. This, it seems to me, is a fundamental
problem which the Army is involved in, in terms of all
of the missions that are in these countries, in terms
of all the activities.

Do we know enough of what really concerns the key
people, the politically sophisticated, the people outside
this strata, the uneducated but very often clever politi-
cians? Do we know really what concerns them, what their
aspirations are?

I have a feeling that we do not know enough and
consequently do not communicate well enough with them.
We often express our own aspirations, we express our
aspirations for them not to go Communist, and this does
not ring many bells sometimes. We also express the
conviction that the Soviet Union and Communist China are
imperialist or expansionist countries. I think we have rung the charges on this perhaps too much.

I was in Burma in the aftermath of the Hungarian crisis. I traveled to Southeast Asia, the other countries in Southeast Asia--Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore--in 1958, the early part. I found very little interest in the Hungarian crisis among the people I talked to in government and in politics. They have their own concerns. They are concerned with their own problems, their own politics. They are concerned as one might put it, not paraphrasing but quoting the title of Professor Maxwell's book, Politics, Who Gets What, When, and How. This is a major concern of most of the people we are dealing with.

I think we have to take a harder look at politics and politicians in these countries and how they view their own political structure.

I am reminded--in thinking of this problem of identifying aspirations--of a story told about Africa. Since the Chairman gave an injunction to the panel, we must go beyond Southeast Asia.

In a town in Africa, there was a little grass shack nightclub. An American official visited the nightclub. There was a singer, a dusky girl in a grass skirt, who was singing. Her song was a calypso-type song in which she sang: "I want a 'frigeful,' a 'frigeful' of caviar, I want a Jaguar, and I want a 'been-to,' a boy who has been to the U.S.A." How do you communicate with those aspirations?

Finally, I would make this suggestion. I think this kind of conference is fine. I have profited by it. But it seems to me that there is one problem that the social scientist or the Army have not yet solved in the
concerns we have over the mission that we are discussing. That is the problem of our own communications.

I have talked with many of my colleagues about the kind of research we put our graduate students to work on. Since I have lived in Washington now for 30 years and have been in and out of government—I suppose I have in part an unacademic point of view—I am concerned with the kind of graduate research which has some relevance to existing problems.

I do not object to what my friends in both the natural sciences and the social sciences call "pure" research.

On the other hand, it seems to me that maybe we cannot afford quite as much of it. But then I find I am baffled here in town. If I am baffled, my colleagues out of Washington are even more baffled. What is relevant? What is needed? It seems to me we get ideas. I am sure all of us social scientists have gotten ideas from this conference but you cannot get enough, you cannot get the specifics.

There is a lot of brain power, in my opinion, in the colleges and universities that is being wasted in terms of the mission of the Army or the mission of the United States overseas in the present situation. This brain power is being wasted not because of lack of good will, not because of the fact that professors who direct research or who themselves get involved in research are not interested in digging into the problems that are of importance and practical usefulness. It is primarily, I think, the problem of communication. I would hope this could be solved because this is not an insoluble problem at all.
The suggestion made of smaller seminars for concrete discussion of this research seems to be very practical because I would like to see some of this brain power in our universities and in our colleges used to a greater advantage.

Thank you.

DR. DAVISON: Thank you, Dr. Johnstone. I agree that the more questions that can be formulated by the Army and the other services to which social scientists can address themselves the better. We often feel as if we were trying to answer questions that have not yet been asked, and we wish somebody would ask them.

Our last panelist is Mr. Elmo C. Wilson, President of International Research Associates, Inc. He has an academic background which he usually conceals. I can reveal, however, that he has taught at Cornell and has published a substantial number of learned articles. He also writes reports that are read by fewer people, but cost considerably more.

Mr. Wilson has a long career in public opinion research on questions that are relevant to the military establishment. In fact, he was Chief of the Surveys Division of the Office of War Information during World War II, and it is one of my great regrets that I never learned how he managed to conduct his interviewing during periods of hostilities in northern France. Perhaps he will mention something about this.

It gives me great pleasure to introduce Mr. Wilson.
REMARKS OF MR. ELMO C. WILSON
President
International Research Associates

It seems to me we have recurring references in these meetings to the World War II activities of so many of us. I do not claim to be the oldest hand but I certainly can trace my first appearance back to these meetings quite a few years back. One thing I am impressed by is the amazingly more youthful appearance of the flag officers today. I do not know how this has happened in the last few years. It certainly cannot be traced to the fact that I am getting old.

I am, of course, very pleased to be here and particularly pleased that the meeting itself is being held because, even if it has not become exactly a nasty word, certainly "social science research" has not been in quite as high repute in recent years in Washington as we would like to think it was a few years back. If not actual opposition there certainly has been a certain amount of irritation between the social scientists and some of the military users.

I am reminded of a story which I do not think is particularly scatological, Paul, which points up irritation and opposition. This is the story of the father who had two sons who were constantly fighting. This bickering got to a point where he simply could not stand it any longer. He said to each of them, "Here is five hundred dollars, one of you go east and the other west and stay out of my hair, I don't want to see you again."

The boys started out. They thrived and prospered, and eventually one of them became a well-fed Cardinal in the church; the other a four-star General. Many years
later the old man was on his deathbed. He sent for the boys, who had not seen each other during this long period. They happened to meet in the Chicago airport where they were changing planes.

Unconsciously, after this long period of not seeing each other, they momentarily forgot their feud and they started to approach each other. But as they got close to each other, they both remembered the fact that they simply could not stand each other. So the Cardinal stopped and said to the General, "Porter, does this next plane go to Madison, Wisconsin?" The General replied, "Yes, it does, Madam, but in your condition I don't think you should take it."

Phil Davison told me that I could have the rest of the world to roam around in after Southeast Asia had been covered so thoroughly by previous speakers. I am not going to accept that invitation, however, because the time is getting short and also because I don't know that much about the rest of the world.

I would like to address my very few remarks to something which has been mentioned here frequently—the kind of information which we need to gain prior to the outbreak of insurgency.

I would also like to make a plea for applied research and in this connection I might add that I am certainly conditioned by the fact that so much of what we do for commercial clients is very, very applied.

Now, with those two points in mind, then let me just mention briefly a few things about a recent trip to Latin America which I think are in point.

I was in Buenos Aires a few weeks ago and prior to this last election I must say I found no one who had any feeling that the Peronistas were going to come out the way
they did in this election. Obviously this reflected the milieu in which I was traveling; it reflected the situation such as that in which two members of the Union League Club were talking about the election of President Roosevelt in 1940. Each of them was convinced that President Roosevelt could not be elected because they had not talked to anyone in their circle of friends who would vote for him.

My point is that in Argentina there was a missed opportunity. In the period prior to this election, the strength of the Peronistas should have been studied and assessed. I do not know that it was.

It seems to me that this could have given us a good deal of information about the political strengths and weaknesses which Dr. Johnstone has mentioned as something that we need to know more about in these troubled areas, such as Argentina—areas which may be in a preinsurgency situation.

Jumping from Buenos Aires to Brazil, I was in Rio at the time the Chamber of Deputies passed a law which was virtually confiscatory of the profits of foreign companies operating in Brazil.

This brought a sharp decline in new investments in Brazil and came at the same time, of course, as the Alliance for Progress was urging a more receptive attitude toward private investment in a place like Brazil.

Now, the interesting thing about this law which was passed by the Chamber of Deputies (it has not been passed by the Senate and it will probably be killed there) was that it was passed by a coalition of the extreme right and the extreme left. This is not an unheard of condition in Latin America. It happens in many places and, of course, also outside of Latin America.
But again it seems to me that this kind of situation presents a laboratory now for study of the politics and the election procedures and the issues which are important to the people of Brazil in this period before their election, which I believe is coming up early in October.

I suggest that the on-coming election in Brazil presents an opportunity which someone should take advantage of and bring to bear the many, many techniques of political research which we have developed here through the years in such studies as the Erie County Study and Elmira Study and some of the work which has been done at the University of Michigan.

These situations then, I think, should be taken advantage of. I plead then for a certain amount of flexibility in our whole research program, the kind of flexibility which enables us to jump into a situation and to take advantage of it and to get real information which can have long-term value. I am not denigrating at all the basic research concepts but I would also like to put in this appeal for applied research when it can be very helpful.

Finally, I believe there is another opportunity which should be seized; that is the situation in the Dominican Republic where we have had a fantastic series of political maneuverings which has apparently resulted in a government which is acceptable to this country. We now have a constitutional convention election coming up there in August, and we have a full-scale congressional election coming up in December.

Again it seems to me that this is a kind of laboratory which someone should take advantage of and I think that it is in the interest of the military to do so.
Finally, just let me say, because I am not attached to a university (I am in this "dirty" field called commercial research)--I would also like to suggest that there are some brains outside of universities and that they are also spread around the world. There are a number of good research organizations in unexpected areas around the globe which are able to take on assignments of a fairly sophisticated nature, and well able to come up with actionable research findings in the applied field. I can cite the experience of my organization, which, starting in 1945, went into Latin America at a time when there was absolutely no such thing as social science research, and developing from that beginning to the position where we have on-going research institutes in all of the major countries in Latin America, as well as many other areas of Western Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East.

Thank you.

DR. DAVISON: Thank you very much, Mr. Wilson. I think you have reminded us of something that perhaps has not been stressed sufficiently: namely, that the life-blood of any social science effort is the collection of facts and, unless one is able to get out and collect these facts, the whole discipline languishes. Our analytical tools do us little good if there is nothing to analyze.

I will not try to sum up what has been said, but I think it is clear that we believe social science has a capacity to provide some useful guidance about the role of military forces in assuring stability. One question which emerges prominently is how military force can play a part in preserving stability in underdeveloped areas.
without violating our ideas regarding democracy. I think Dr. Berger performed a service in raising this question. We need to know much more about the political significance of various kinds of military forces, what their relationships with the population are, and so on.

In the course of these discussions I have noticed a recurring tendency to start out by talking about what social science might be able to do to assist military missions and then to end by talking about what the military establishment might do to assist social science. Two aspects of this latter question have been raised this morning: Can the military establishment formulate questions of interest in such a manner that they can more readily be attacked by social scientists; and can the Army in particular assist in providing the opportunity for the collection of material that is needed for analysis, as it did during World War II?

I would like to end on this note and to thank the two speakers and three panelists for their contributions this morning.

Thank you.
DR. POOL: There is a general social science law that has been well-documented by numerous observations and that is that the second day of a conference after lunch is the point at which it is quite impossible to stay awake. Now, this presents some of the usual problems of the application of social science research in that the obvious solution is to abolish the afternoon of the second day. But then the problem is: How do you get to the third day?

This is a little bit like the social science research which has demonstrated that the major beneficial attitudinal effects of foreign travel come after the second trip; people who have made five or more trips showed considerably more favorable effects.

The problem was to get people on the fifth trip without letting them go on their first or second.

I suspect that we will run into a number of problems of this kind this afternoon as we talk about "Communicating and Working with Persons in Developing Nations."

I would like to start by introducing our panelists.
At my left and your right is Mr. Henry L. Miller, Jr., who is Chief of the Far East Division of the Voice of America. Mr. Miller was educated at Purdue University and has had extensive field experience in information and communication activities for the U.S. Government. He has held positions with the OWI and with the State Department. He was Chief of the Far East Service of the National Broadcasting Service. He has served as Radio Officer in Manila, as Information Officer in Hong Kong, and as Public Affairs Officer in Laos.

Next to Mr. Miller is Dr. Gerard J. Mangone. He is Professor of Political Science at the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Administration at Syracuse University. He started his education at City College of New York and received his Doctor's degree from Harvard University in 1949. He is perhaps best known to you as the coauthor with the Honorable Harland Cleveland of *The Overseas Americans*, an outstanding study of the effectiveness of American overseas personnel under different situations. He has had extensive experience with private programs of international education. He is the Director of the Maxwell Graduate Overseas Training Program, which has sent students to Italy, Japan, Nigeria, and India.

Next to Dr. Mangone is Dr. Leonard Doob, a social psychologist from Yale University, Professor of Psychology there. His education started at Dartmouth College and he, also, received his Ph.D. from Harvard University. During World War II, Dr. Doob was Chief of the Analysis Section of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. He was also chief consulting psychologist with G-2 of the War Department, Chief of the Bureau of Overseas Intelligence in the OWI, and then OWI Policy Coordinator for Overseas Programs.
He has written extensively and his most widely known books include Public Opinion and a recent book, Propaganda and Communications in Africa.

The panelists you will hear from later on.

Now I would like to introduce our first speaker of the afternoon, who is Dr. Frederick Yu.

Dr. Yu's paper will be on "Images, Ideology, and Identity." This is a topic on which he has currently been doing extensive research in Asia.

His professional post is as Associate Professor at the School of Journalism at Montana State University, where he has been for a number of years. Before that he worked on a study of propaganda and communications in Communist China, for the Human Resources Research Institute of the Air Force at the University of Southern California. On that interest, which he is continuing, he is currently doing some very important and exciting research on which, unfortunately, he will not be able to report to you this afternoon because he has only 25 minutes.

He was a Ford Fellow at Harvard University and our Center for International Studies at MIT some years ago. His initial education started at the University of Nanking, probably the only graduate of the University of Nanking present.

His Ph.D. is from the State University of Iowa.

It is a great pleasure indeed to introduce to you this afternoon Dr. Frederick Yu, who will talk about "Images, Ideology, and Identity."
Thank you very much, Ithiel.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me say first of all, it is a real pleasure and distinct honor to participate in this important symposium.

Dr. Lybrand has given me two assignments: first, to report on some of the findings of my research; second, to relate them to the problems of limited-war.

A little over a year ago I journeyed to Asia to find some answers to one question: What do Asians know and how do they feel about Asia and fellow Asians, particularly the Chinese Communists.

My 6-month odyssey took me to seven countries on the periphery of Communist China: Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, and India. In these countries I had depth interviews with 148 top communications leaders and important opinion leaders including senators, party chiefs, government spokesmen, and prominent scholars.

In those interviews I was not merely interested in the Asian leaders' expressed views; I tried to fathom their hidden images, innermost feelings, unexamined ideas, buried thoughts, and deep-seated prejudices. As it turned out, each interview was a self-examination of the interviewee, who was asked to recall, to describe, and to analyze a variety of hitherto unacknowledged images and ideas.
Time does not permit me to report on all the findings of this many-sided inquiry or even on any one phase of it in any detail. I will try only to set forth some thoughts on some of the underpinnings of Asian problems and relations by sharing with you a few sets of sharp images and ideas that have turned up in this preliminary and exploratory study.

Asian Images of Asia

There was, of course, the obvious to be confirmed during my trip: Asians simply do not know much about Asia.

Like most students of Asian affairs, I had always attributed this ironic Asian ignorance of Asia to the fact that Asians were long alienated from one another as a result of highly diverse religious traditions, variegated native heritages, varying colonial backgrounds, and formidable language barriers. But as I hopped from one Asian city to another, I began to wonder whether this ignorance could be so simply explained. Certain bits and pieces of my data compelled me to raise a rather sensitive question: Do Asians care about Asia? I doubt seriously that they do. My interviews suggest that, instead of generating any sense of Asian affinity, the word "Asia" has acquired some repellent qualities.

When asked, "What comes to your mind when you think of Asia?" several of my Japanese informants answered: "I think of backwardness, underdeveloped countries. You know, countries like China and India. But you see, we are not exactly Asians."

In the Philippines the term "Asia" inevitably reminds knowledgeable and thoughtful Filipinos once again of a problem in Asian identity. Many of them simply do not feel that they are even "related to Asia." But none expressed this feeling as pointedly as one of my informants, Mr.
Arsenio H. Lacson, the colorful and dynamic mayor of Manila. In a radio speech he asked his fellow countrymen to be "aware of the cruel irony of geography and of history that we're in Asia, but not of it."

In Thailand, several scholars and government officials choose to think of Asia in terms of a spirit--"a spirit of liberation from colonization," as one describes it. But they always quickly add: "You realize, of course, Thailand is a country that has never been colonized." Thus unconsciously and very conveniently these Thais disassociate their country from Asia.

Very few of my Indian informants have any problem of identifying themselves as Asians. "India is Asia," some of them say. But the picture of Asia which an Indian carries around in his head is physically much bigger and culturally more complex than what is vaguely but generally conceived by other Asians.

To be sure, most Indians appear to be completely aware of their so-called "leadership of Asia." But this leadership, which is generally assumed or commonly desired in the West and naively believed by Indians to be their destiny or duty, is widely disputed or vehemently rejected in most other countries in Asia. And even in India there are many persons who seem to have no more than a polite interest in Asia.

When I was in India, the nation was disturbed and distressed by the news that Indian soldiers attached to the United Nations had been beaten up in the Congo. The editor of one of the most important Indian dailies told me:

Our politicians are obsessed with the ridiculous idea of playing a leading role in world affairs, particularly in Asian politics. We sometimes beg for the thankless job of playing
peacemaker. We're badly misunderstood from all sides. What we should do is to be less involved in Asian affairs—a hopeless mess—and to mind our own business.

This Asian apathy toward Asia is further evidenced by the obviously meager interest in Asian news, in the Asian press, and the embarrassingly small number of specialists or scholars on Asian affairs in Asia. Ironically, it took a Western correspondent in Tokyo to complain openly in the Japan Quarterly of the rather "incomprehensible lack of interest of Japanese editors in news from neighboring Far Eastern countries." When I brought this to the attention of Asia's leading journalists, I was given some startlingly frank answers:

A Korean:

The common people don't really know enough about Asian affairs to want to have more Asian news, nor are they genuinely concerned with Asian politics. Here is the problem. How can you be interested in something when you know so little about it? And how can you expect to want to know very much about it when it does not exactly interest you?

A Thai:

Asians don't really have too much to learn from each other.

A Filipino:

The trouble with Asia is that there are too many problems. We have enough problems of our own and you can't really blame us for perhaps trying unconsciously to run away from problems.

In so far as I dare generalize, I am prepared to suggest that the word "Asia" sounds rather unmusical or discordant to Asian ears, that it is seen by Asians as a badge of backwardness or a sign of embarrassment, that it evokes largely wounding memories and ambivalent angers,
that the whole concept of Asia, while loudly pronounced by Asian Politicians or Western listeners, is generally meaningless to Asians, that a solidifying Asian ideology simply does not exist, and that as they renew their acquaintances and adjust their relations with Asian countries, Asians are neither inspired by a sense of Asian identity nor inclined to acquire such an identity.

The next question might well be: "Isn't nationalism a unifying or solidifying ideology of Asia?" The answer must be a qualified "No." Nationalism, as Boyd C. Shafer explains it, is what the nationalists have made it; it is not a neat, fixed concept but a varying combination of beliefs and conditions. It is not an idea which is easily discernible but rather a spirit; a kind of political, social, and racial revolt; a set of emotional reactions; a type of dynamic awareness and a sort of activism. It is undoubtedly an extremely important force, but strictly speaking, it is not exactly an ideology.

Even Nehru has to admit that "nationalism is essentially a group memory of past achievements, traditions, and experiences."

Memories of Asian countries are long and varied, but they do not include many serious thoughts of an Asian continental internationality. While it is true that the wind of nationalism has swept all over Asia, it has neither unified nor solidified Asia. It has, no doubt, generated a good deal of Asian cohesiveness. But it has also brought out more and sharper differences among the Asian countries.

F. S. C. Northrop has observed that instead of pursuing nationalist aspirations as interpreted in the West, the Asian people "are working toward the resurgence of their respective submerged civilizations." He goes on to say:
What Western reporters have described as the coming of Western nationalism to the Middle East and Asia is really the return of Islamic and Far Eastern ways and values. . . . It is culturalism rather than nationalism that is the rising fact.

The new states in Asia are trying to achieve the double end of becoming like the West with respect to their political, economic, and social life, and at the same time remaining themselves with respect to their own traditions and culture. They want to Westernize; they want to maintain their own cultural identity. To Westernize is to industrialize, to modernize, and more specifically, to learn from the West--to be un-Asian, one might say. To maintain the cultural identity, an Asian country must derive some special sense of uniqueness and superiority of its traditional heritage.

In other words, it seeks to distinguish itself from the rest of Asia, not to identify itself with any particular culture of civilization. In either of the two expressed aims of Asian countries, therefore, there is not much room for an interest in Asia. The truth of the matter is that most Asians are barely getting acquainted with their own nations. They are just beginning to develop their national ideologies and identities.

Louis Fischer, for instance, goes even further: "In Asia and Africa there is nationalism but there are no nations."

Even to a country as old as India the matter of national identity is something new. An Indian journalist had this to say:

It is ironical but true that not until the British era did the consciousness of India and of being Indian grow. In that sense, the concept of India is really a British creation.
People who once knew themselves only as Gondalis, Marathas, Shans, Kachins, Koreans, Khmers, Cantonese, Sudanese, or Madurese have come to be conscious of themselves as Indians, Burmans, Thais, Chinese, or Indonesians. But an Indian is still an Indian, a Thai is a Thai, and a Filipino is still a Filipino. For them to feel themselves as Asians in entirely something else.

Something else should be said about this matter of Asian identity. Ernest Renan once made an extremely interesting point about the concept of a nation when he wrote that "the essence of a nation is that all the individuals have many things in common and also that all have forgotten a good many things." If Asian people were to come to a unique and distinct identity, they would have to do a good deal of the remembering, sharing, and forgetting required of a common identity. But the harsh fact is that there is not much real preexistent unity for Asians to remember and that there is too much in their memories which contradicts unity. What is cherished by one proud Asian nation is often what another proud Asian nation wishes to forget. Unhappily, all nations are proud, and nationalism has only made them more so.

Asia and Red China

I now turn to the problem of Asia and Red China.

Chinese communism is not a problem that many Asians truly understand; it is not even a problem that all Asians genuinely care about, but it is a problem about which practically every Asian, at least an educated Asian, has some ready views and strong opinions. Slightly more than half of my informants told me pointblank that they did not know very much about Red China; more than a handful of them (about 8 percent) surprised me by saying that they did not really particularly care about studying the problem seriously.
Nevertheless, the absolute majority of them had very vivid images and strong feelings about the subject.

I am tempted to allegorize in this connection that, to all my informants, Communist China has as an image all the qualities and meanings of an inkblot design in a Rorschach test. They all seem to see something in it. They all see what they want to see and they all have their interpretations of what they think they see.

The picture of Communist China which most Asians carry around in their heads is shaped by endlessly varied combinations of past experience, personality traits of individuals, prejudices, local environmental factors, varieties of knowledge and degrees of ignorance that they have about China. In some cases, it is a China that ceased to exist in 1949; in others, it is a China yet to be born. To some it is a beautiful dream; to others, it is a nightmare. To almost all of them, it is simply a state of mind.

The Japanese images, for instance, suggest much less fear of, or hostility toward, Communist China than do the images of other Asians. Strange as it may seem, the Japanese sense of affinity toward China is acute and real. Moreover, there appears to be more tolerance of Marxism or communism as an ideology in spite of the general disapproval of Communist China as a nation. Very obviously, there is the strong Japanese desire to be friends with the Chinese as a people and this desire is often verbalized or implied with a deep sense of guilt. Of course, an even stronger Japanese desire is to have closer relations—in particular, trade relations—with Communist China. One more important feature of the Japanese images and one that may explain much of what I have just described about the images: there exists in Japan a real and confident feeling of "we know how to handle the Chinese."
That Japanese seem to be more tolerant of communism as an ideology than other Asians is easy to understand. Marxism, as one leading Japanese scholar told me, was and still is studied by about 80 percent of the intellectuals. But one of Japan's leading woman writers offers another even more interesting observation:

Japanese are crazy about ideology, all ideologies. It is like milk to a cat. She laps it all up. It is also like water to a duck's face. Ideology drips all over him but makes no impression. Intellectuals in Japan love to tinker with abstract ideas, and Marxism happens to be an interesting idea. Japanese intellectuals do not want Communism. But Soviet Communism and Chinese Communism, as ideologies, intrigue them.

Indian images of Red China have apparently undergone a drastic and speedy transformation. Most likely there was a period when the images could be characterized by the once popular Indian slogan: "Hindi-Chini Bhai-bhai" which means "Indian-Chinese Brother-Brother." But little trace of this fraternalism was left when I was gathering my data in India. The entire nation was indignant over the border incident, which not only puzzled but painfully hurt the Indians. Few of my informants could, or bothered to, hide their anger and anxiety over the "completely unjustifiable aggressive behavior" of the Chinese, and even some of Mr. Nehru's most faithful followers were loudly critical of his all "too soft" policy toward Peking.

Two sharply different sets of Indian images of Red China coexist: In one set appear the "aggressive" Chinese; in another, the "aggressive" Communists. Those who picture Red China as a nation of people who are by nature and for historical reasons aggressive give this kind of view: "The imperialistic strain of China will break out regardless of the political organizations." This, I must add, is a somewhat more predominant view in India.
In the other set of Indian images, Chinese appear to be just as "peace-loving" as Indians, and only the Communists are the sinister rogues. Those who possess such images are among the severe critics of the Indian government's China policy. Their reasoning:

All the loud cries of "Han expansionism" suggest only the timid attitude of the government which can't afford to antagonize the Soviet Union. To say Chinese Communists are aggressive implies that Communism is aggressive. But to say that the Chinese are traditionally expansionists is something else.

But both sets of Indian images of China share one feature: common ignorance of China and things Chinese. At least this is what is frankly admitted by the majority of my informants.

**Thoughts on Research and Limited-War**

I must now try to relate all this to our symposium. And I propose to do so by addressing myself to a problem which has emerged from this study.

At the risk of being brash, I have coined a catchy phrase for this problem: "The Three I's in Politics and Communications." The three "I's stand for: image, ideology and identity.

The concept of this problem is neither original nor new. Harold Isaacs, who has learned a great deal about formation of identity from Erik Erikson, has taught us about the "Scratches on Our Minds" and about the interplay between changing images and identities in world affairs.

Daniel Lerner has given us the theory of "empathy" and has spelled out for us the effects of media on images. lthiel Pool, Lucian Pye, William Scott, Elizabeth Todd, Guy Pauker, Daniel Levinson, and Leo Crespi have all done some serious thinking on similar or related problems.
The importance of this problem therefore does not lie in its newness. I realize only too well that the concept of image is already overworked and that all this talk we hear these days about ideology and identity has become almost trite. I am certainly aware of the vast outpouring of "image studies" manufactured largely in the precinct of Madison Avenue, and I even share, to some extent, the indignation of the writer who protests angrily in the *New York Times*:

The time has come to halt Creeping Imagism. The next time someone starts talking to you about Stevenson's egghead image or Rockefeller's progressive image, don't just sit there. Grab the image. And then stomp it to bits.

But, I am suggesting here a problem which is much broader in scope than the conventional "image research." It is a problem which involves the whole question of man, society, and ideas and it requires explorations in territories that are not normally included in the maps for students of political affairs or military science. And I venture to suggest that if we tackle this problem vigorously, wisely, and successfully, we may gain a body of totally new knowledge which we do not yet possess about the developing countries, open up new vistas in our understanding of human behavior and, conceivably, offer significant clues to our planning of limited-war.

I readily recognize the quality of vagueness of such things as image, ideology, and identity. They are intangible and elusive. As a result, they have always been unnoticed, unmentioned and, until recently, almost unmentionable in the study of international affairs. They are like those difficult-to-define things as human nature or national character which are commonly assumed to be important but rarely taken very seriously in policy making or program planning.
To realize the potential usefulness of the concepts of image, ideology, and identity, it is necessary to recognize the blunt truth that we have only the faintest idea of what is actually going on in the minds of the people in the developing states. Hadley Cantril must have had essentially this same problem in mind when he wrote recently:

"Americans must find out from people in other countries in their own terms what they are, what they are trying to do, what they are trying to become. This can never be done if the primary concern of Americans is to tell other people what they should be doing in order to be more like us.

Cantril's indictment implies much of what is intended in these concepts of image, ideology, and identity. The key questions here are: Who are these people? What do they believe? And what do they want to be?

These are enormously difficult questions because the people in the developing countries are asking these very same questions themselves. In other words, the answers are not readily available, even if we have the tools and ability to discover them. The answers remain to be developed.

Yet here is perhaps our most unusually exciting challenge: to help the people in developing countries find the answers. For the answers, once discovered and understood, will not only remove much of the barrier between the democratic communities and developing countries but also provide for the genuine unity and strength for which both have been groping.

The heart of the matter is that people in developing countries are undergoing unparalleled rapid changes and that in setting out to adjust to these changes they are constantly confronted with the problem of trying to decide on the right ideas to have, the right things to believe,
the right courses to take, and the right future to work for. They must constantly focus and refocus their views on different issues, they must find their way in the ideological maze they are in, and they must--most important of all--resolve an endless array of identity crises.

What the people in these countries need most desperately is a meaning, a reason, a purpose and a goal. The one singly important question that is asked again and again in all Asian countries is: "Where are we going?"

For instance, one leftist and popular publication in India offered 5,000 rupees for answers to this question: "What is India's national mission and purpose?"

Like our young Americans in their late adolescent years, people in the developing countries do not really know what they want to be. They are in the process of growing up. They are searching frantically for a purpose in life and a reason in the things they do, believe, and want. But they do not really know what they should do or want, except that, in a very vague way, they want to be strong, successful, great, happy, and prosperous. They are confused.

The Communists have shrewdly seized this opportunity by telling the developing countries what they should want and what they should do to get what they want.

This we cannot do. This we should not do. To be blunt, we do not have all the answers. Indeed we spend a lot of time publicly pondering our own "national purpose." We often are baffled by the complexities and contradictions in the "American Idea," "American Experiment," or "American Way of Life." Although beautiful and inspiring, it remains to be articulated and translated into action. And even if we did possess the answers, it is still prohibited for a democracy to dictate to another country what it should want or should do.
The important point here is that the developing countries have to do the growing up themselves. Our responsibility is to help them grow, help them see and understand the meaning of things they wonder about. In short, to help them discover themselves.

In helping these countries in this way we may hope that they eventually will discover, understand, and appreciate the properties of a healthy democracy and the ingredients of progress and happiness. Such discovery and understanding should result, I hope, in new and more lasting ties between the West and growing countries. Moreover, if the entire democratic world were to join in full-scale attack on the problem of helping the developing countries understand themselves, its own unity may be enhanced or inspired by a new sense of common purpose.

Now how is all this to be related to the problems of limited-war?

I do not pretend to know very much about war—limited or unlimited. But I know that I cannot be very wrong to assume that one of our main difficulties in this matter is that our actual or potential allies have yet to understand what the limited-war mission is, what it means to their countries, where they stand in this war, and, most important of all, what they are fighting for.

It is not enough to teach the Vietnamese, Laotians, or Koreans how to fight communism. An equally important task is why they should fight it. I am reminded of the statement by Nietzsche that "he who has a why to live for can bear almost any how."

This so-called "limited-war," I believe, is limited neither in space nor in time. It is limited only in the sense that we intend to keep it from growing into a world war with unlimited destruction.
What Mao Tse-tung calls "protracted war" comes to mind. The Communist plan rejects all illusions of an enduring truce, tolerates compromises only when they are necessary, and permits no substitute for the ultimate objective of eventual, total triumph of communism. And in a "protracted war," according to the Communists, ideological battles are often fought more vigorously than military ones, and man is more important than weapon.

This was the type of war which helped Mao conquer China; this appears to be the type of war which the Communists have chosen to fight in Asia, and this may well be the type of war we should be prepared to fight. For short of surrender, I see no alternative for the United States but a long, hard, tedious, continuous, and wearing conflict.

It is conceivable that this limited-war eventually will involve more people and more countries. And it is imperative that those who are already involved or are to be involved in this war should be united with us by a common purpose or goal, not just experience. They must understand us, they must understand each other and, again, they must understand why they are fighting and what they are fighting for.

This is not a task that we can hope to accomplish with clever posters, catchy slogans, entertaining films, or even convincing publications. Those who fight on our side in this limited-war must undergo a set of vigorous mental gymnastics or ideological exercises to discover for themselves the purpose of this conflict as well as their role in it. I must hasten to point out that I am not intimating anything that is remotely similar to the Communist concept of indoctrination or their scheme of propaganda,
both obviously distasteful to us. I am merely suggesting that an opportunity must be provided for those people to wrestle themselves with these vital questions, that they should do the searching themselves, and that our best hope in a limited war lies in the success of their search. This is only a hope. But this is one of the few possibilities that are available to us as a democracy. And this possibility may work.

I realize that having said all this, at least one very important question remains: What can we do in research about this concept of image, ideology, and identity?

Research possibilities in this area are virtually limitless. I can only share with you some random thoughts merely as illustrations:

We need plans to mobilize all the people in the developing countries, particularly the intellectuals, to ponder on the questions which we have discussed.

We need theoretical work on the interplay of changing images, ideologies, and identities.

We need studies to understand the whole question of communication of values, not just communication of information.

We need some serious thinking on the question of communication of politics, not just communication and politics, as has been the case.

We need all the data we can get on the ideas and images that people in the developing countries have about themselves, about their own countries, their own governments, their own leaders, and their own traditions. We need studies on similar subjects about other countries.

We need information on the ideological preparation of the military in the developing countries.
We need more knowledge on the thinking and behavior of the obviously important but somewhat overlooked social groups in the developing countries: professors, teachers, students, industrialists, the white-collar class, the village elders, the workers, the military elite, the journalists, etc.

We need research to identify the ingredients of American democracy and to translate it into the blueprint for action.

We need an assessment of this Asianism which appears to be genuinely understood by few, skillfully manipulated by some, variously interpreted or misinterpreted by many, and greatly feared by nearly all in the West.

We need research to help us discover and decide how much "human motivational capital" we can expect to get in the developing countries for this limited-war.

We need studies to look into such problems as personality and politics, national character and national policy, national character and political development, psychological characteristics and military efficiency, national types and military performances, etc.

We need far more information than we have on Communist propaganda or persuasion techniques in the developing countries.

I could go on. But my talk must end here.

In closing, I would like to tell you a story about Will Rogers as it is told by General Alfred M. Guenther:

Many years ago Will Rogers was talking about the submarine menace. He said he had the answer to that problem. "All we had to do," he said, "was bring the ocean to a boil; that would force the submarines to the top. When you get them to the top, knock them off." Someone said to Will: "How do you get the ocean to boil?" He said, "Now, just a second. I have only been outlining the general principles, and it is up to you to work out the details."
I have apparently fallen into this same trap by presenting a problem to you without specific answers. But I am sure that I can depend on you and particularly the members of this distinguished panel for the rescue. Thank you very much.

DR. POOL: Thank you, Fred.

Our next speaker is Dr. Harley Preston, who, for 15 years has been with the American Institute for Research, where he is Associate Director for Research and Director of the Washington Office. His current position involves supervision of projects on selection, training, and evaluation of personnel for overseas operations.

He is one of the most experienced persons in the country in this field of selection and training of overseas personnel. He has worked on this problem not only for the Department of Defense but also for the Peace Corps. His education started at Kent State University. He received his Doctor's degree from Indiana University. He is a sociologist. His subject today will be "Gaining and Keeping Good Working Relationships Among Peoples in Developing Nations."

Dr. Preston.
There is a certain "How to do it" ring in the assigned topic, "Gaining and Keeping Good Working Relationships Among People in Developing Nations," which deserves comment at the very beginning. We know precious little about establishing and maintaining good working relations in our own society between man and wife, between management and labor, or even between the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, to take a few examples. If one then adds to the still unsolved problem the further dimension of working relationships between individuals of markedly different social and cultural backgrounds, the complexities which are introduced become appalling. But regardless of complexities, the problem must be attacked systematically since, whether we wish it or not, all U.S. foreign programs--military and civilian, public and private--ultimately funnel through indigenous persons and usually on some face-to-face basis with an American.

I do not believe we have an answer today to the practical "How to do it" problem with respect to establishing and maintaining good working relations between individual Americans and individuals in the developing nations. I do believe it worthwhile to examine today some of the research information we have on Americans who have either succeeded or failed in such relationships, since it may advance us toward that desired solution.
Many religious and charitable organizations have dealt with the human relations problem over the years, and their experience, where available, has been useful. The U.S. Civil Service Commission and the U.S. Air Force, on the civilian personnel side, have also given limited attention to working relations in selecting American personnel for overseas work. The work of E. R. Henry, for the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, must also be mentioned among the early attempts to match personnel attributes to the special demands of working with indigenous people in their own countries.

In 1957, the concept of overseasmanship was introduced into the literature by the associates of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University. The essence of overseasmanship, as defined by Cleveland, is "the building of political and social institutions." This concept was developed principally to define a useful objective for the design and evaluation of training for overseas service, but it also suggests an ultimate criterion or standard for judging whether working relations between Americans and their indigenous counterparts are, in fact, "good." That is, working relations between an American and an indigenous individual of a developing nation are good when they result in the building of viable social and political institutions. Useful as the building of social and political institutions may be as an ultimate criterion or standard, it is a difficult criterion to measure and apply in the short run and to the thousands of interpersonal relations that occur daily between individual Americans and their foreign counterparts.

A somewhat more manageable criterion for "good working relationships" in the short run, at least, is the successful accomplishment of specific missions regardless of the worthwhileness of those missions. This criterion lets us look at all kinds of daily interactions and to consider as "good" those relationships which get the job done, and as "bad," those relationships which fail to get the job done. With such a job-oriented standard, we shall undoubtedly include as good working relations certain activities that have bad social outcomes and vice versa. As an extreme example, a successful mission of smuggling would be considered as a "good" working relation, while an unsuccessful mission to inoculate an indigenous population against smallpox would be analyzed to determine if the failure were partially attributable to poor working relationships between Americans and their foreign counterparts.

Today, I shall summarize analyses of approximately 3,000 independent, personal, mission-oriented interactions between an individual American overseas and a national of the country in which that American was working. These interactions were reported as separate incidents or happenings, and were obtained in several different studies for different research sponsors and for somewhat different purposes. The incidents can be legitimately grouped together since they all describe what some American was trying to accomplish, i.e., the American's mission; what the American did in a given situation; what the indigenous person did in reacting to the American's behavior; and an interpretation by the American of why the interaction was effective or ineffective from the point of view of furthering the American's mission. Unfortunately, the incidents do not include an evaluation or interpretation by the indigenous individual. However, they were reported by
Americans who had had considerable experience in foreign countries, and while their interpretation of why indigenous persons acted or reacted may not be completely accurate, their interpretations are not entirely naive. A second unfortunate thing about the data is that these incidents occurred in 91 different countries. This means that there are insufficient incidents from any one country to reach specific conclusions on ways to gain and keep effective working relations in a particular country, such as Vietnam, Iran, Nigeria, etc. At best, our present data can give us only general and tentative conclusions.

The incidents have been analyzed for the different behavior patterns they contain. Paul Spector and I analyzed them from the point of view of the behaviors which were effective in developing human relations. Stanley Lichtenstein analyzed them from the point of view of behaviors of Americans which showed a respect for the dignity of the indigenous persons, particularly in regard to the saving of face.2/

The most useful analysis to report to this limited-war symposium would be one which summarizes what a successful American overseas must do to accomplish his varied missions. In a sense, this analysis constitutes a derivation of tentative job requirements which, after appropriate verification, may prove useful in both the selection and training of military personnel for overseas assignments. In this summary I shall depend heavily on the analysis which was made of these data for the Peace Corps by Paul Spector and Kaye Thomas.2/

2/ Both these analyses are reported in the Peace Corps publication, Working Effectively Overseas by Paul Spector and Harley O. Preston, Chapters XI and IV.

Conveys Information

It is not surprising that our data show a requirement that the American must be able to communicate with his indigenous counterpart. The American must be able to convey information about himself and his purpose. One immediately thinks of fluency in the indigenous language or in another language common to both the American and the indigenous person as the way to meet this requirement. Certainly it is one way and perhaps the best way. If one thinks, however, of the problems in interpersonal communications we have in our own country where we are all fluent in English, one will not conclude that if Americans in Vietnam or Thailand were fluent in the Vietnamese and Thai languages that all problems would be solved. Our incident data certainly indicate that fluency in the local language and dialect is most important in interpersonal relations. But they also indicate certain other abilities which help in meeting this requirement. These are:
1) a willingness to use a variety of communication vehicles;
2) an ability to reduce abstract ideas to concrete terms;
and 3) the ability to determine when a counterpart or other indigenous persons do or do not understand what the American is trying to convey. Our incidents show that effective Americans rely to a considerable extent on meaningful gestures, demonstration, and on the simple kinds of visual aids and physical models to convey ideas—somewhat as an elementary school teacher might improvise for the classroom, but used with a dignity appropriate to the status of adults involved. Perhaps if the American who showed this ability to use such demonstration models to communicate and to "concretize" their ideas had been more fluent in the indigenous language, they might not have relied on such simple demonstrations and their ideas might not have been put across so well. This, of course, is speculation.
The last ability under this general requirement is one which almost anyone with experience overseas will immediately recognize—intuiting when one is getting his message across. Our incidents about behavior in unsuccessful missions are filled with variations of the theme, "He said he understood, but I guess he didn't." Many Americans learn the hard way that in many cultures, "yes" means, "I hear you," and is an utterance of respect rather than of understanding.

Motivates Others

The second requirement on the part of the American overseas is the ability to induce others to act, to believe, or to allow him (the American) to act. Here we are speaking of the American motivating indigenous persons and not other Americans nor of motivating himself. This factor of self-motivation appears elsewhere. By comparing incidents of successful accomplishments and unsuccessful ones, we think there are two abilities that are involved in motivating others. These are: 1) the ability to determine the incentives, rewards, threats, and punishments which can motivate and which are appropriate to specific times and circumstances; and 2) the ability to employ a variety of motivators and to perceive their reinforcing effects over a period of time. Both these abilities, if indeed there are two instead of one involved, are somewhat abstractly stated. Perhaps a listing of the different behaviors in some incidents will help.

...quoted the Koran to Muslims to persuade them to cooperate in installing a new water system.
..."raced" with counterpart to demonstrate whose method of film cataloguing was most efficient.
...threatened pilferers with legal action.
...gave credit to counterpart.
Obviously, there is not a universal incentive, not even money or the fear of death, which will work everywhere and at all times. Incentives and punishments tend to be specific to the culture where their meaning was acquired. Whether or not the ability to motivate others is testable in the abstract, I do not know. It would be difficult but worthwhile to try.

Develops and Maintains Friendships and Goodwill

This requirement could be discussed at great length and was originally the topic which was assigned. Certainly a higher proportion of our incidents fall into this category than into any other.

The American's own well-being and that of almost all of the American programs overseas depend largely on the effectiveness of the individual American in his contacts with indigenous people in general and on their attitudes toward him. He represents America and attitudes toward him tend to be generalized to all Americans at home and overseas. This is not a new phenomenon, and it is discussed in all overseas training courses and in the literature given all U.S. passport holders by our State Department. As an end, indigenous friendships and goodwill are important in themselves and no further comment is needed. As a means to making and keeping good working relationships, however, indigenous friendships and goodwill need to be stressed. The indigenous counterpart of a working American overseas is often affected greatly by how the American regards, and is regarded by, other indigenous people. The American who may have originally established a good working relationship with his counterpart, can find that relationship abruptly severed if he should carelessly refer to the citizens of his counterpart's country as "bushmen," as occurred in one of our incidents in Nigeria, or complain publicly of the
"stupid red tape" involved in air travel, as occurred in incidents from several countries. By the very nature of many Americans' jobs in the developing countries, they are cast in the roles of advisors, teachers, or experts. Of necessity, their counterparts are often in psychologically, if not officially recognized, inferior roles. In such situations, tact and forbearance are traits which the American must possess in abundance. Personal friendship with one's counterpart is a great aid to working relationships. Where such personal friendships between official counterparts are not sanctioned by local custom, regulations, or even by personal choice, formal working relations between official counterparts are reinforced if the American is known to have cultivated other indigenous friendships that may be permitted in the local community or possess a genuine desire to do so.

The four main factors which are inferred from the incidents under this requirement are: 1) a willingness to make social contacts with indigenous persons; 2) a willingness to develop and/or share interests with indigenous persons; 3) a sensitivity to and respect for the needs, feelings, and opinions of indigenous persons; and 4) a willingness to render personally aid or service to indigenous persons.

Three of the four factors have been stated as attitudes to do something rather than as observable behaviors, but there is no dearth of behaviors which are highly observable in the incidents. Making social contacts are certainly observable, whether they involve mixing freely in sightseeing trips, marketing, attendance and participation in local sporting events, etc., or negatively by avoiding contacts and remaining isolated in an American compound. The same is true for sharing interests when one becomes a member of local hobby groups, teaches native groups English, or joins
a group to learn the native language, or joins in a community drive of some sort. And only slightly less observable, are the many acts of kindness, succor, and unselfishness which are performed quietly and personally. 

**Overcomes Interpersonal Conflict**

This requirement is closely related to the previous one on maintaining friendships and goodwill, since in many developing countries a certain amount of hostility toward the stereotype of the American must be overcome before friendships can even begin. But even where good working relationships exist, it is frequently necessary to reestablish them because of the occurrence of a careless, accidental, or unintentional slight or happening. Essentially, what is involved is the ability to overcome ill will which rests on a more or less strong emotional base. The incidents, out of which this tentative requirement grew, stress behaviors such as negotiating differences, reaching compromises, placating and reassuring hurt individuals, and apologizing and shouldering blame.

This is another requirement which must be met with an understanding of the cultural context in which interpersonal conflicts occur. Techniques which work in one culture may give offense in others, and one would be ill-advised to depend, for example, on offers of economic compensation to smooth ruffled feathers universally even though this might be most proper in certain societies. It is the willingness to forego or relinquish some personal advantage which seems to be basic to this requirement regardless of the specific technique used.

**Adjusts to Indigenous Customs**

Effective interpersonal relations between an overseas American and his hosts are also promoted and nourished when the American adopts various local social forms and
conventions as may be appropriate. The qualifying phrase, "as may be appropriate," needs some emphasis, however. Adopting indigenous customs indiscriminately or going completely "native," is more characteristic of the American with poor working relationships than of the one with good relationships. This is probably because the "phony," the insincere, and the showoff is quickly spotted and is almost universally shunned.

The effort to act according to local conventions and etiquette is usually appreciated and any unintentional errors in etiquette are often focal points for good-natured or even hilarious interactions. Adopting native modes of dress because of their utilitarian superiority over Western clothes is also often cited as an effective technique for promoting goodwill. Conversely, adopting native ceremonial dress or wearing ornaments which have special religious significance to the local people are cited as behaviors which are alienating.

Three factors seem to underlie the meeting of this requirement: 1) knowledge of the indigenous customs; 2) flexibility in the sense of the ability to alter old habit systems without becoming disorganized personally; and 3) a willingness to forego, from time to time, certain advantages and creature comforts which are generally available to Americans overseas such as superior living accommodations, transportation, Western-style cooking, and the like.

There remains some nine other tentative job requirements which our data suggest should be met if Americans overseas are to be successful in their assigned jobs. The ones we have discussed so far are requirements which seem to bear most directly on the problem of gaining and keeping good working relationships with indigenous people. The remaining requirements will not be discussed because of time
and because of their less direct effect on working relationships. In toto, however, these remaining requirements have a great cumulative effect on working relationships. These requirements deal with the plain, ordinary but fundamental fact of getting a job done in a successful manner in an unfamiliar physical and social environment.

These nine tentative requirements are:

...tolerates discomfort, inconvenience, and unfamiliarity,

...overcomes environmental difficulties,

...makes efficient use of available human and material resources,

...acquires familiarity with indigenous culture and tradition,

...creates or initiates new programs, procedures, equipments, etc., to substitute for lacks,

...analyzes situations for opportunities to plan and take action,

...develops new sources of satisfactions to maintain and reinforce own motivation,

...maintains a sense of proportion,

...possesses fundamental technical knowledge about his assignment.

In concluding, I should like to mention several areas of needed research in which the social sciences could and should make contributions to the Army in general and to its limited-war mission in particular.

First, as might be expected from the repetition of the word, "ten", throughout my earlier remarks, I urge a systematic program of job analysis on overseas assignments. The various assignments in the Military Assistance Program are not all alike even though they may have the same job
We have probably gone as far as we can by expertise in defining this group of very important assignments. We now need research data. The same is probably true in intelligence and other military fields. But until we know the various jobs in terms of their required behaviors, we shall never have a sound basis for personnel selection, training, assignment, or evaluation, and we shall spend countless man-years or man-centuries in speculation about over-or under-selection, over- or under-training, rotation and hardship tours, the need or lack of need for special career fields, and similar topics.

The second research area is a closely related one, and to my mind, is almost completely dependent on the first. We need more research on training for overseas assignments and for specific limited-war missions. The Army should be very proud of its system of training. Technique-wise, in my opinion, most army training is superior to comparable training in the civilian sector. But research should be expanded on the objectives of training and on the evaluation of training in terms of those objectives. This research could be undertaken profitably in any of the fields of army training, but I believe the highest priority should be given to the training of concern to this symposium on limited-war missions.

Manpower research is the third area in which the social sciences should be making more contributions. We know very little about the attitudes and abilities of indigenous populations in developing nations throughout the world, yet we have taken on commitments to train and to advise these different populations in almost every field of human endeavor as if we actually knew what their strengths and weaknesses were. I am not speaking of strengths and weaknesses in the sense of political, economic, or military posture, but in a
psychological sense. For example, how long does it take to train a military auto mechanic in Africa? Or stated another way, given 3 months time and a standard amount of training materials, what proportion of a group of trainees from a particular African nation will exceed the proficiency of a similar group of Americans, what proportion will fall below that proficiency level and how far? etc., etc. Without such manpower information on existing aptitudes and abilities of the indigenous groups we are committed to train, it seems almost futile to try to plan, program, and schedule men and materiel in any precise way.

A fourth area of needed research deals with the social structures of each of the developing nations. From the titles of papers that are scheduled for this symposium, it may be that this area has been, or will be, more than adequately covered in these 3 days of deliberations. It is important that research distinguish between a formal power structure that may only be nominal and any informal power structure that may be decisive. And until the developing countries become nations in a sociological sense as well as in a political or governmental sense, much of this research will have to be done away from the capital cities and among social, economic, and ethnic groupings in the hinterlands.

Research on the social structure of developing nations would give us "leads" to a fifth area of research. This area is the early discovery or identification of "natural leaders" or potential "comers," both political and military, in the developing countries. Early identification of future leaders or at least the early identification of the social groups and localities from which these leaders will most probably come, would be a tremendous contribution to planning many of the Army's limited-war missions. It would also be valuable in the programs which select foreign officers for
training in the United States and reduce the number of "wrong bets" we now make in trying to influence and train future leaders of various countries.

There is research to be done on language training, both among our own personnel and in the teaching of English to the indigenous counterparts overseas. This research problem goes beyond the question of the most effective techniques for teaching languages, important as techniques may be. From the Army's point of view, it would seem to me, a crucial problem is determining the minimum level of discourse that is needed for each of the various types of assignments in particular countries. Once these minimums are determined, the question of how to do this becomes more manageable.

The very term "developing nations" suggests a host of economic problems with which the economist has an interest and contributions to make. Perhaps most of these economic problems come under the cognizance of the Agency for International Development rather than under the Department of the Army. But even as a noneconomist, I would suspect that the Army has a vital interest in knowing about the economy of countries in which it may have to fight counterguerrilla actions. In addition, the impact of U.S. military aid on the economics of these developing nations is a continuing question that requires continuing, systematic assessment.

My concluding suggestion for research is one that bothers me a great deal, because it deals with what seems to be a paradox or a dilemma in counterguerrilla warfare. To counter or oppose guerrilla warfare requires a great deal of organization, cooperation, coordination, communications, and the like. Yet, and I hope I am wrong here, the very existence of an organization to counter guerrilla activity makes that activity possible and effective. Our
children learn in our elementary schools that one of the factors in the success of our Minutemen and the Continental Armies during the American Revolution was the predictability of the armed forces of the King. These forces were presumably predictable because of their organization and training. Today, as we prepare to oppose guerrilla activity in parts of the world, we are organizing ourselves to do so. We probably should take care that we do not make ourselves vulnerable by the nature of our organizing. Perhaps social scientists and operations research scientists could make a significant contribution by determining an optimal point between aspects of usual army organization and what might be termed as organized "disorganization" to counter guerrilla activity more effectively.

**PANEL DISCUSSION**

DR. POOL: Thank you, Dr. Preston.

My panelists are rather fatigued and would rather remain seated. The view of the television network is that a panel program is successful to the extent that it becomes a fight. I do not know whether there is any difference of opinion here but I will try to create one.

It seems to me that one might interpret the two papers that we have heard as representing quite different approaches to the problem of communicating with and dealing with people in underdeveloped countries.

Dr. Preston's paper explicitly stated the criterion of effectiveness to be the extent to which the American overseas is able to achieve the predefined purposes of his mission. He sets out to persuade the other people of something.
Fred Yu's paper took a quite different approach, an approach that fits the one definition of political leadership: to figure out where your followers are going and get there faster. His approach suggested that the most important problem that we face is to find out what is meaningful to the people with whom we are dealing, what purposes make sense in terms of their culture and their traditions, and then somehow to identify ourselves with those purposes.

I do not know to what extent this is a genuine difference of opinion. Let us hear from members of the panel. I think I will call first on Dr. Doob.

REMARKS OF DR. LEONARD W. DOOB
Department of Psychology
Yale University

I actually have been thinking along different lines. I rather suspected you would call on me first and, therefore, I have jotted down a few notes.

I would like to take off from one point in Mr. Preston's account when he said something that seems very obvious to all of us: if we are going to function in a developing area, regardless of what goal we are trying to seek, we have to be acquainted with indigenous customs.

For military purposes, what kind of contribution can social science make to a knowledge of indigenous customs? It seems to me that, with the possible exception this morning of Mr. Janowitz, we from the social or behavioral sciences in this symposium have not been giving our military friends here assembled the correct impression of our discipline.

How are we going to find out about indigenous customs? We can collect certain information and we have certain social
science methods to contribute. But this is what any intelligence outfit does which has been trained in the usual Army techniques. You do not need social scientists to collect information and to collate information and to analyze information. There is nothing distinctive about us in these respects: we are human beings and perhaps we can assist you in this task. It seems to me, as Mr. Janowitz mentioned in passing much too quickly, however, that our distinctive contribution to the military should reflect what we stand for, namely, a system of concepts and a system of theories.

Let me take one of the classified documents back there at the desk as an illustration. It pertains to Nigeria and at one point it highlights an unclassified bit of information, viz., that there are 200 different societies, 200 different tribes in Nigeria. Now, if we are going to help any kind of operation in Nigeria, as social scientists, we can contribute individual monographs of information about these 200 societies. Would such monographs really prove useful in a military sense? I doubt it, even if we had this information, or had time to collect it. No, we must indicate that there are certain basic concepts involved in Nigeria or any place in the world because everywhere there are human beings. With concepts from anthropology, sociology, psychology, and political science, we can help people who are going into the field to carry out any kind of mission, we can create within them a state of readiness to receive the information from monographs and then to revise it in the light of conditions in the field.

If you go to Nigeria, as I have gone, reading everything conceivable about a particular tribe, you still don't know enough when you enter a particular village. Even if you learn what you have to learn about that particular
village, you won't know what you need to know about that village a few years later or about another village at the same time or about a particular person within the village. But if you know that there is a social structure there, for example, and that you have to look for a social structure, and if you have associated with the concept of social structure very, very meaningful bits of behavior, then it seems to me you are prepared in advance. Thus we social scientists could give you military people something to look for and a theory to hang your facts upon. I speak not from a purely scientific, holier-than-thou point of view. I mean simply that the implications of the concept of social structure must be thoroughly understood. Anyone in a short period of time can learn what social structure is, but really to feel the concept, to know what status signified for people, and to appreciate the particular social structure of a given community, requires more that is not just verbal knowledge but deep understanding. This is an extremely difficult task.

In addition to acquiring theoretical and conceptual insights from us in social science, you may also profit from a psychological principle we have adduced: appreciate the fact that when one is dealing with people in underdeveloped areas, exotic peoples, you yourself in a sense are on trial. You have to examine yourself, what is it that you can and cannot tolerate in social or in military relations with the particular people in whose midst you are. Not only theoretical clarification but also self-clarification seems to me to be necessary.

On points like these, I think that we as social scientists can contribute in a very practical way to military operations; simple fact-gathering is only one of our talents. I assume fact-gathering. One must go on from there.
After that eloquent exposition, all of which I agree with, it is very difficult to form an argument, for I was going to speak somewhat along the same lines, only using the papers as illustrations of the same point.

I think, for example, Dr. Yu's great contribution lies in research that finds out that "Asians" are really a mistake in geographical expression that grew up with the Greeks who had to differentiate somewhere between East and West and used the Aegean base for their orientation. His approach, which explodes the great simplification of our time, is very, very important.

I think in a sense Dr. Doob has also touched upon this, that you simply cannot collect a series of fact and then say you understand Nigeria or Vietnam or what counter-insurgency means. What you need are tools of analysis. I would only be repeating in a far inferior way what he had already broached.

To return to Dr. Yu's paper again, one of the major problems that he has raised is the need for goals among underdeveloped peoples, not only how to do it, but why. He goes on to say that democracy can't tell them what to do or what they should want. They must "discover themselves," whatever that term means.

It reminds me of the doctrine of nonintervention. The United States is not intervening in other people's affairs. All we do is give them billions of dollars to transform their economic system, send abroad missionaries of one kind or
another, give them technical assistance that will change their mores, political advice, obtain military bases, use all the propaganda mechanisms at our disposal; but our policy is nonintervention in the affairs of other people.

What does the United States believe? What does the United States offer?

We always retreat into the slogan that we can't do things the way the Communists do them. The Communists have a living ideology, they have a firm conviction. We somehow have to help foreign peoples "discover themselves."

I would raise some very genuine theoretical questions here. This is an area of research that requires the most thorough investigation. Are we really performing our task adequately or retreating into myths about the views of people abroad? Are we hypocritical in what we are trying to achieve overseas?

Dr. Preston has given us quite a good list of things that people ought to have to perform their job effectively overseas. I would not disagree with any of them.

I remember my research when traveling all around the world and putting this question: What kind of American would you like to work overseas with you? One man, who is now an ambassador of the United States said, "Just send me a man from Wesleyan, Amherst, or Bowdoin. That is all I need to know." He was a graduate of Bowdoin, of course.

Another educator, who has spent a good deal of time in overseas training told me, "Just give me a Quaker or a Mormon and that is all I need to know." He happened to have been a member of the Society of Friends.

In Pakistan a very well-known AID administrator told me, "Send me anyone except an expert on Pakistan."

I have heard that complaint in many places. We could list all kinds of categories of the kinds of people that you need
to live and work effectively overseas and I think they are helpful. I think they give you some guides for recruitment, training, and selection.

But when you come to analyze them rather objectively, you may find that social science will help to give some theoretical information here that will avoid the pushbutton system, the do-it-by-the-numbers system. Does he have a lot of friends? He gets either Point 6, Point 5, or Point 4 on this. Does he relate to the indigenous people? He gets Point 6, Point 5, or Point 4. Then someone averages these up in some way and tries to say that this man is an effective overseas worker.

One of the serious errors, I think, in the theoretical structuring of recruitment for overseas work is the idea that you need the same kind of people abroad for all jobs. Most of the discussion today, for example, and yesterday with the Army, it seemed to me, touched on people who are going to be working with indigenous populations. I am not so sure that ambassadors have to have the same qualifications as agricultural assistance workers. I am not so sure that a comptroller of army supply has to have the same kind of qualifications as civic action groups.

I remember when I was sitting in Trieste in 1947 looking down the muzzle of a 16-inch gun of a U.S. naval vessel that was pointed at my hotel; I couldn't have cared less about the empathy of those sailors. I was just happy that the American Navy was efficient in patrolling the waters and in giving us security.

An army's function may be just to give that kind of disciplinary impression and not the big brother civic action performance.

So when we talk of sending people overseas, we are sending all kinds of people overseas to do all kinds of jobs.
Generalizations may lead us into error about our selection and training processes.

One final point. Yesterday, Mr. Shriver of the Peace Corps said he now believes that there is no differentiation betweenselection and training for overseas service. I am happy to say that this has been in the social science literature for many years and I am pleased to note that it is gradually becoming the view of all kinds of agencies seeking overseas personnel, government and private.

One of the real problems is how do you select people? Most people have begun to admit that psychological tests have limited application, that interviews have limited application, and that in the long run the only way you get to know people is to live with them. The best kind of selection program is a training program in which men are weeded out as they go along. This is costly and time-consuming, but essential.

Finally, on the matter of research, I would certainly second all the proposals that have been put forth here for research. The need is obvious, as has been ably suggested by the two pieces of research that have been presented to us.

For example, Dr. Preston talks of 3,000 incidents in 91 countries. That means on the average he had 40 incidents from a country. I submit 40 incidents from India or Japan is rather slight evidence. Within the limits of his time and money, Dr. Yu visited seven countries in 6 months. Given his particular orientation, I think he would admit that spending less than 4 weeks in any country is a rather inadequate time for social science research of a highly serious nature.

I confess to our own inadequacies in the Maxwell study in which we did intensive interviewing of 250 people abroad. This simple but essential process cost something like $60,000 and over a year's time.
So I know the limitations and I would just urge that we need more talent and more money and more cooperation with the government agencies in this direction.

Thank you.

DR. POOL: Mr. Miller

REMARKS OF MR. HENRY L. MILLER
Chief, Far East Division, Voice Of America
United States Information Agency

As a media operator in Southeast Asia for a number of years, I let my mind play a couple of tricks on me as Dr. Yu was telling the first half of his presentation about his trip through seven countries on the periphery of China to see what reaction he got as to the meaning and the concept of the word "Asia" to an Asian.

I just wondered what would happen if a Thai social scientist made the same sort of trip to find out the reaction of a North American to the concept of North America. I suspect he might get the same sort of answer from the citizens of the United States about North America as he did from an Indian about Asia.

However, I think I will disagree with the Chairman on one point. I think both Dr. Yu and Dr. Preston came very close to hitting the nail on the head, with a little different wording but the same meaning.

Dr. Yu quoted Dr. Cantril when he said Americans must find out from others on their own terms what they want and what they need. Dr. Preston said that Americans must--I have forgotten exactly how he phrased it--respect the dignity of the individual. Then he put the limitation on it and said "in order that they can save face." I would take this limitation off. When you do that I think both of these mean the same thing.
I cringed, Dr. Doob, when you used the phrase "exotic peoples." You can't use that phrase with the group that you are going in to work with. Right then and there you have drawn a barrier. This problem of sympathetic understanding of the people you are working with is one of the hardest ones to accomplish, to find people who can gain a sympathetic understanding. Many times, if you don't have this sympathetic understanding, it is almost a foregone conclusion that you will not be successful in what you are going to do.

I illustrate this with a short story from Laos. Several years ago one of the economic technicians was working in Laos. He had been there a number of months, working on some particular project--I think it was a poultry farm. He was working with his counterpart in the Ministry of Agriculture. They had a meeting every Monday morning on what was the stage of the project, what they were going to do this week, what the American was going to do, what the Lao was going to do. They were quite good friends, the American thought. They came to a complete understanding of what was going to be done, everybody was in complete agreement, so they went away.

They came back the next Monday. The American had done everything he was supposed to have done, the Lao had not done anything. So they had another conference, they smiled, parted, and went their separate ways to accomplish their task.

This went on for a number of weeks. The American finally became disgusted. He came over to our house for a cup of coffee and he was telling the story, and wondering what was wrong. He had not gotten through. So that same evening one of the Lao stopped by, also for a cup of coffee, and I repeated the story to him. He happened to be a colonel in the Lao Army.
I said, "Now, Colonel, what do you say about this?"
He said, "I tell you. Laos is a very small country. We don't have much money, we don't have many people, and most of our land is mountainous, but for centuries we have been invaded. First it was the Shans of Burma, Annamites, Cambodians, and the Thai. It has always been happening. Then the French. Now you Americans." H. said, "The only way we have been able to maintain a national identity is when we have conquerors or advisers, and we don't agree with them; we smile and say 'yes' and out-slow them."

DR. POOL: We have just a few minutes in which either of the speakers may wish to comment on the comments, or any of the members of the panel may wish to make a second remark in reply to points which have been made.

DR. PRESTON: I think that all the comments that were made, especially the critical ones, were deserved. I do feel that the Army, as many other agencies, is in the business of doing something with indigenous peoples overseas and while they are over there they do have a selection problem. It is most desirable--and in the long run I hope it is possible--to educate everyone completely for their overseas service. But, I think that a great deal can be said for the devising of efficient ways to eliminate those individuals who, because of their attributes, are not likely to succeed. Admittedly, attributes can't be measured extremely accurately by psychological test but they can be approximated. The tests eliminate a great many individuals we could not otherwise eliminate except after some costly mistake overseas. For that reason I feel that the statement of requirements for overseasmanship in specific behavioral terms is not necessarily a completely futile thing to do. As long as you keep require-
ments on the level of concepts—that they must be sympathetic people, they must be honest people, they must be patriotic people, they must be creative people—as long as you keep it on that level, I think you will find no disagreement. But I doubt if you will find very much unanimity on how to select on these concepts. Also, I am a little worried about instructors in training courses doing all of the selecting, unless their training courses are designed to produce observable behavioral outcomes which can be evaluated.

I feel there is some advantage in getting actual experiences as reported by people discreetly, in analyzing and classifying these experiences to see what successful people seem to do, and making hypotheses in behavioral terms as to why these people are successful. That is what I was trying to do.

As far as needing data on more than 40 people from each country, I certainly will agree. But I must say that a few of the countries were represented by only one or two instances in that data and that several others were represented by a thousand.

DR. POOL: Dr. Yu, do you have a comment?

DR. YU: No, I really don't have anything particularly serious to say except to add a few very brief remarks. First, my paper was originally prepared to be presented in about 35-40 minutes. It was cut several times and I finally delivered it in about 18 minutes. A number of things I just left out.

Another point I wish to add is that I did not suggest or favor in my paper anything that is remotely similar to the type of neutralism or nonintervention which Dr. Mangone has suggested. That was not my intention.
I do insist, however, that we as a democracy are in some kind of a dilemma. It is simply prohibited for a democracy to dictate to other nations what they should want or do. I think in this respect we are different from the Communist countries. But this is a difference of which we should be proud.

I do see a hope. As I hopped from one Asian country to another, I was consistently impressed by the fact that most of these countries are actually groping for the type of nation which we have. Perhaps they do not realize this yet; perhaps it is too embarrassing for them to admit even if they realize it. My feeling is that it would be more desirable and effective for us to motivate people in the developing countries to try to understand themselves and thus, hopefully, to discover what they should desire and work for, than for us to tell them bluntly: "This is what you should have."

DR. POOL: Dr. Mangore?

DR. MANGORE: I would just like to make some trouble here.

You said, Dr. Yu, and this is all in good fun, you must teach them why they fight communism, not how. How do you teach people why they fight communism without some set of values?

I don't want to get into any sophomoric argument here that we are dealing with the revealed truth. I would rather debate whether we are dealing with a revealed belief; and if you don't want to use the word "revealed," if that has theological connotations, leave it out.

But clearly, when you start talking about equality and representative government and the ways in which you think
the good society ought to develop, in my view you are dealing with beliefs.

If you are going to teach them why they fight communism, aren't you going to be starting from a premise of some kind and don't you have to affirm your beliefs, and does this disturb you? Is this indoctrination? How would you handle that question?

DR. YU: That is why I told you the story about Will Rogers!

... Laughter ...

DR. POOL: I think this is the point at which we should go and get some coffee.
SESSION 6
ASPECTS OF WARFARE IN DEVELOPING NATIONS

SESSION CHAIRMAN:
Dr. Klaus Knorr
Director
Center of International Studies
Princeton University

DR. KNORR: Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to repeat the practice of some of the chairmen of previous sessions and say that Session 6, too, is one of the most important ones of this conference. The subject, "Aspects of Warfare in Developing Nations," I do think, touches directly on the limited-warfare mission of the armed services of the United States.

I think it is fair to say, and the open literature makes it very clear, that social scientists have done an enormous amount of work on the problems of the underdeveloped and the developing countries. The problems of economic development, social development, political development, cultural change, and so on have been covered in numerous publications. This does not mean that a great deal of work on this subject does not still need to be done. On the other hand, when it comes to the political aspects of limited-warfare in the developing countries, it is my impression that the social science literature--at least the open, unclassified literature--has not so far made much of a contribution. It is a very small literature, and it is only in its beginning.
One should not infer from this that the social scientists do not have a capability for contributing more on the political aspects of limited-war in the developing countries. I think it is simply true that so far social scientists have had neither the interest, spontaneous or induced, nor the resources and access to information to do a great deal of work on this subject.

The first speaker in this session is Professor Eckstein, who will talk on "Internal Wars." Professor Eckstein was educated at Harvard University, where he was also on the faculty for several years. He is now a professor of political science, and a research associate at the Center of International Studies, at Princeton University. He is an editor of World Politics. He has published copiously in the field of comparative government. Professor Eckstein.

INTERNAL WARS

Dr. Harry Eckstein
Center of International Studies
Princeton University

Like my old friend Guy Pauker, I had intended to break a rule of many years' standing by reading a paper at you. I intend to do so no longer. The reason is that, like some previous speakers, I find that much of what I had intended to say has been preempted by other speakers. But I do not regard that as an unmitigated misfortune, partly because I think I still retain some second-strike capability, partly because the fact that so many of us
have said so many of the same things certainly denotes a large amount of agreement, and agreement is always salutary—though I cannot help feeling that this large amount of agreement is due in part to the fact that so far we have not yet really come to grips with some of the more vexing problems of insurgency.

At any rate, in view of what has been said so far, there is not much point in arguing again that internal wars are an important part of the spectrum of limited-wars, as I had intended. I find that, in a sense, this symposium has been about nothing else. I had come here with the notion that this was a point which could not be said too often; I am now inclined to change my mind. I do wonder whether we are not now overcompensating a bit for our long and disgraceful neglect of this problem.

There is no need either for me to say that internal war or insurgency is often used for international purposes, however domestic its origins may be. To this point I can only try to add emphasis by pointing out that in many periods of history the rising and dominant powers have been those most aware of the power potentialities of revolutionary ferment in the world and most successful in using it, not necessarily those with the greatest internal power or the cleverest generals and diplomats. It should be clear to you by now that revolutionary ferment is one of the most potent and also one of the cheapest forces available to states in international conflict.

There is also no need to point out again that this is important because we happen to live in a period of almost unprecedented revolutionary ferment. In any event, the table which I have asked to be distributed speaks better on this point than any words could. I do
want to add a parenthesis to the point. It seems to me that so far we have treated problems of internal warfare as if they were peculiar to the developing areas of the world. I do not think that that is quite justified. It is true that the developing areas have more than their fair share of it, that they are particularly volatile in a political sense. But it is not true that other areas, either very highly developed ones or undeveloped ones, primitive places like Somalia or Ethiopia, do not have internal wars. They are not so seriously afflicted by the disease but they are nevertheless vulnerable to it. Some highly developed areas, in fact, have a considerable history of internal warfare. I would wish that General Eddleman's map of yesterday had had a few more shady areas on it, even though it had enough to discomfit anyone. I, myself, think we should not forget Europe as a possible problem area in the range of the subject we have been discussing, however natural the temptation, in a world in which very little can be taken for granted, to take for granted as much as possible.

Finally, there is no need for me now to belabor the point that internal wars are particularly likely to have an important international dimension in this day and age, because of the interdependence of our world, because of the very great risks in international warfare, and because the Communists are particularly likely to use them for purposes of international conflict since they have a highly revolutionary ideology and, incidentally, are far ahead of us in experience of internal war and reflection on internal war. If we are ahead of them in deterrence theory, they are immeasurably farther ahead of us in
revolutionary theory. They have been in the business a very long time, and they have thought long and deeply about it.

As to the conclusion which emerges from all this, that internal wars are as grave a threat to us today as all-out nuclear war or other forms of international war, I can only say, "Amen." And so much for the first half of my talk, at least as I had intended to give it.

Fortunately, there is a great deal still to be said on the really crucial issue which this conclusion raises. The really crucial issue is, of course, how one proceeds in a dangerous revolutionary world and what one ought to know in order to proceed. I would like to address myself particularly to the second part of this question, since I am in the knowledge business and not the action business.

Let me begin with a point that has also already been made, with emphasis and in detail, but which I want to make with much more emphasis and in much greater detail because it seems to me to be absolutely fundamental. It seems to me that the belief (which I confess I thought was more common here before I came than it seems to be) that internal wars can be adequately coped with by certain kinds of novel military operations, fighting operations, is extremely unfortunate. More particularly, I do not think that the study of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla tactics is likely to prove very helpful. The reason I do not think so, the essential reason, is that in no field of human conflict is prevention so much more important than cure and cure such a very weak substitute for prevention as in internal war.

Military operational doctrines may matter a great deal to the rebels, but the fate of the other side, the counterinsurgents, seems to me to rest mainly on the
early detection of internal war symptoms and their reduction by means other than fighting.

In other words I think that civic action is not just a useful way to hedge one's bets in an internal war situation, not just a useful supplementary technique to counterrevolutionary warfare, but the key to the whole problem. I, myself, would conclude from this that counterinsurgency is consequently the primary responsibility of civilian authorities and not of the Army, however important a stake the Army has in the matter and however much it can be used by others to reduce internal war potential--though I must confess that one reason I say this is that I have an abiding democratic dislike for unanimity, particularly on a subject that I have not thought about a great deal.

I do have some reasons for taking this point of view. I will come to them later, if time permits. Here, I want first of all to take up the reasons for arguing that military operational techniques are not likely to be very helpful, because it seems to me that while the conclusion is well understood by most of us, some of the reasons are not.

The first reason I think that such military operational doctrines, rules for fighting, are not likely to be very helpful is that it is extremely difficult to win many kinds of internal wars for those on the defensive, and we are on the whole more likely to be on the defensive than the offensive in such conflicts. This is true above all of guerrilla wars where the terrain is relatively favorable to the guerrillas (and many types of terrain are) where much of the civilian population supports the guerrillas (as is likely in a revolutionary situation) and where the counterguerrilla forces command less savage
enthusiasm and have more moral scruples than the guerrillas. Under such conditions it is difficult for even the most unsophisticated guerrillas to make fatal mistakes. I think the experience of the French in their colonial territories furnishes many excellent examples, as does Cuba, and also, from a different perspective, Malaya. Guerrillas do not always win, we know that, but it does seem to take a very improbable combination of circumstances to make them lose—and I mean really lose—not to achieve periodic victories over them or a prolonged stalemate.

It might be interesting from this standpoint to go in detail into some cases of successful counterguerrilla warfare as, for example, the Greek or the Malayan case. I will be glad to do so in the discussion if anyone likes.

I want to stress a point closely related to this particularly. Even if there are sound rules of counterguerrilla warfare, it strikes me as ludicrous to think that one can fight guerrillas with guerrilla warfare. After all, an established government which has to maintain normal order in a society cannot disappear into the mountains or into cellars in guerrilla fashion. It cannot turn over the administration and regular army to the guerrillas in order to make irregular warfare upon them.

One can learn something about counterguerrilla warfare from guerrilla warfare, but essentially the two operations are different. Also, counterguerrilla warfare is very much more difficult. You only have to look at guerrilla and counterguerrilla doctrines to realize this. Guerrilla doctrine seems to be widely agreed upon and successful, but years of anguished study by counterguerrilla officers, like those pathetic French exponents of guerre révolutionnaire, seem only to have produced an
abundance of conflicting ideas, most of which have proved useless in practice.

So the first reason I think that one ought not to put too much emphasis on military operational doctrines in internal war situations is that cure is unlikely, once fighting, particularly guerrilla fighting, has begun.

The second reason (which I consider much more important) is that the costs of such warfare are enormous if it is to have any chance of success. The costs may far exceed any conceivable benefit that can be derived from defense in revolutionary warfare. You heard yesterday about the enormous material and physical costs of counter-revolutionary warfare. I, myself, do not take them quite as seriously as the officer who talked about them, because in most guerrilla wars the incumbents do in fact have enormous manpower and material advantages over the insurgents, although it may not be very nice to expend it.

Less well-understood and much more important to my mind are the intangible costs of revolutionary warfare, the moral, psychological, and the political costs.

The moral costs arise primarily because counter-insurgency often compels much more brutal methods of fighting than other kinds of warfare. I do not mean more destructive methods, but more debasing, dehumanizing methods.

Let me give you an example of what I have in mind. We all know, since we were told yesterday, that the essential problem in guerrilla warfare is intelligence--how to find out what the enemy is up to and how to keep him from finding out what you are up to. We also know that where guerrillas have the enthusiastic support of much of the population and where it is not feasible to protect antiguerilla civilians against reprisals,
obtaining intelligence requires what one gentleman on the
platform here called "unusual" methods. Not to mince
words about it, it often requires methods like the French
used in Algeria, torture and counterterrorism. For this
reason, among many others, counterinsurgent warfare tends
to brutalize even the best-intentioned of defenders. It
corrupts them. And the men whom it corrupts, supreme
irony of all, are likely to become the nucleus of
extremist movements directed against the very state in
whose service they were corrupted. Once men have tortured
and terrorized other people, once their veneer of civiliza-
tion has come off, it is very difficult for them to return
easily to humdrum civilized life. They may consequently
become an insurrectionary danger against the state them-
selves. That is the moral cost of counterinsurgency.

Psychological costs arise from the need to fight a
kind of war more elusive, ambiguous, and less resolvable
than any other kind of war. If you multiply the psycho-
logical strains we felt in the Korean war by "n," you get
a vague idea of the psychological strains and ambiguities
of revolutionary warfare, in which you often do not know
who your enemy is, where he is, what he is going to do,
and in which decisive battles are rarely fought.

The political costs arise from the moral. It is
very likely, because of the brutal method one often has
to use in counterinsurgent warfare, that one will forfeit
a great deal of goodwill in other countries who can better
afford to take a more moralistic attitude about such
warfare because they are not involved in it. If such
methods are used, one is likely also to forfeit the
support of much of one's own civilian population, as
indeed happened in France. If they are not used, one
is likely to have an aggressively frustrated army on
one's hands. Worse still, both things may happen, because if one uses brutal methods, one is likely to alienate civilians, and if one does not use them sufficiently one is likely to aggressively frustrate the army. In any of these cases the dangers are plain. The Algerian war not only cost France Algeria, but also her own government, the Fourth Republic, and it may yet cost her the Fifth.

The essential point here is that in militarily countering internal wars you may often be compelled to do things which simply create potential for more internal wars. In that case, the cost of counterinsurgency certainly exceeds the benefit. The costs are great, and the benefits are zero.

Now let us suppose that the costs are borne and that the internal war is won. Even then the matter is not finished. Internal wars tend to scar and to unsettle societies for very long periods, no matter who wins them, and no matter what the objectives of those who win. The repercussions of internal war run much deeper and longer than those of international war.

What I am saying here essentially is that internal war differs from international war in at least one crucial respect. It is never over when the enemy has been defeated. There remains the problem, which may never be solved at all, of restoring truly legitimate authority, of making loyal subjects out of defeated enemies. That problem does not exist in international war. If it is not solved, as I do not think it was solved in France at any time in the French Revolution or in much of Latin America since the first age of revolution, the same trouble will begin ever again, in the same form or in some other form.
So far, I have talked only about what sort of knowledge will not suffice to cope with the internal war danger. Let me say something now about what sort of knowledge will suffice. I will keep this brief since I have a visibly impatient chairman on my hands.

It seems to me that at least six kinds of knowledge are required for a reasonable margin of safety in a world of great insurgency. First of all, I do think we need to know how to cope militarily with internal wars. You always have to be prepared for the worst. Nothing I have said so far is meant to suggest that we dispense with military knowledge of counterinsurgency. I have only meant to suggest that such knowledge is grossly insufficient. After all, something indispensable may well also be insufficient.

Secondly, I think we desperately need knowledge of how to turn revolutionary forces to our own account, how to use revolutionary ferment. I think there has been too much talk at the symposium about counterinsurgency and too little about the fine art of insurgency or conspiracy. After all, if internal wars are all that have to be coped with, maybe we should learn to shape them instead of always surrendering one of the most volatile forces in human life to the other side. In this connection, let me make one point particularly strong. Most of us think revolutions are always made by tightly knit conspiracies. The evidence strongly militates against this point of view. The evidence suggests that in their initial stages most serious internal wars are quite inchoate. They are formless matter waiting to be shaped—unallocated political resources. Of course, conspiracy and organization soon follow. The Communists are particularly good at them. They began being good at them in the Russian
Revolution itself. I suggest that we might well also try to exploit the arts of conspiracy, if I may put it that baldly.

Now, if getting into an internal war is the worst thing that could happen, and the second worst to be identified with the side most likely to lose, the third worst is to win it. I do not mean that facetiously, because, after winning an internal war, a very important problem remains: how to reestablish legitimate authority and turn one's enemies into loyal subjects. These are in some ways the knottiest problems we face of all, and judging from what we have said here, the ones we have thought the least about. I suggest we need a good deal of knowledge on it. That is the third kind of knowledge we need.

More important than any of the kinds of knowledge I have mentioned so far is knowledge of how to prevent internal wars, how to reduce internal war potential. The essential question here, apart from the large unresolved issue of civic action, concerns the role to assign to repression or conciliation of dissident elements in a prerevolutionary situation. To what extent should one follow a hard or soft line or a combination of the two, in what ways, and under what conditions?

I cannot resist here illustrating the problem by a paraphrase from de Tocqueville's "Recollections", if the chairman will give me the two minutes required.

DR. KNORR: One.
DR. ECKSTEIN: At one point of his Recollections, de Tocqueville discusses how the last four kings of France lost their throne. Louis XVI, he points out, practiced a relatively repressive policy; burned books, exiled authors, put political dissidents into jail. The result was revolution and regicide. Louis XVIII comes along and decides to profit from Louis XVI's example. He figures that if a rather repressive policy will not work against possible insurgents, the best bet is to pursue a rather conciliatory policy and appease them. He starts a relatively liberal reign. The result is that the country is wracked by revolutionary ferment, although Louis XVIII manages to die before he actually loses his throne. Then comes Charles X, who reckons like this: If a relatively repressive policy does not work, and if a relatively conciliatory policy does not work, the way to keep your throne obviously is by a very oppressive policy, and he institutes a reactionary terror. The result: revolution, and Charles X is forced to flee the country. Then comes Louis Phillippe, who thinks as follows: If a mildly repressive or mildly conciliatory policy does not work, and if a very oppressive policy does not work, obviously what you want is a very conciliatory policy, and he institutes the bourgeois monarchy. He takes to carrying an umbrella, for example, which was then the ultimate sign of liberalism. The result, revolution again. The moral for de Tocqueville is the danger of generalizing from historical instances; for us, of course, that it is very difficult to know what kind of policy is appropriate in what sort of revolutionary situation.
The fifth kind of knowledge we need—I will just deal with it in one sentence—is knowledge of how to measure internal war potential, much as a thermometer measures the intensity of some diseases, since the policy one uses before internal wars break out depends to a very large extent on the extent of internal war potential. I could say a good deal on this issue, but I won't.

The final knowledge we need is knowledge of the causes of revolutionary ferment in order to be able to repress it at its source, or for that matter to induce it at the source. I need hardly comment on that.

Let me say in conclusion that I have listed the kinds of knowledge required both in inverse order of their difficulty and of their importance. Knowing how to gauge revolutionary potential by indirect means is not like knowing what causes internal wars. But one must know how to gauge it in order to choose among responses to it. It is better to prevent internal war than to win it. If one must be involved in internal war, it is best to be involved with the side with the best chances of winning, and if one cannot do that, one has to know how to make the best of whatever position one is in. If all this is true, it seems to follow that the problems of counter-insurgency are primarily social science problems and civilian problems.

I do not think I say this with a social scientist's conceit, because having said it I must immediately confess that, at present, social scientists have very little to contribute on any of the required areas of knowledge, and I have very little hope for the future, though I have not the time to tell you why.

DR. KNORR: Thank you, Harry.
The next speaker is Professor Fred Greene of Williams College, Professor of Political Science. He will speak to us on the subject of political factors in irregular warfare. Professor Greene received his education at the City College of New York and at Yale University, where, I seem to remember, I had something to do with his education. He has recently written a book on the Far East. He has been on the faculty of the National War College and also a consultant with the Department of State, where he has recently worked on problems of irregular warfare.

It is a pleasure to introduce Professor Greene.

POLITICAL FACTORS: MODERNIZATION
AND RELATED PROBLEMS IN
DEVELOPING NATIONS

Dr. Fred Greene
Department of Political Science
Williams College

The Chairman of our panel should remember me as a student because his advice then was: keep it short, you can cut a quarter of it without losing anything. He said the same thing in the hall just a little while ago, which just shows that some students don't learn a darn thing in 16 years.

I would like to use as my legitimizing factor a statement made earlier by General Trudeau. He said that one of the things we must do is understand the cultures we are dealing with, and the wants of the people. He also
said that it is important to have them know, and for us to know, what they are fighting for.

With this as a point of departure, I want to take up the problem of modernization as a source of considerable turmoil and tension. We must recognize that modernization is going to happen, and look at it as a source of opportunity as well as difficulty (now that the age of nationalist rebellions is drawing to an end). Focusing on this point will help us to some extent in studying the fine art of prevention, which was just discussed. This is an important topic, also, because the problems of modernization spark wars, and often propel wars in certain directions.

Anybody who reads the headlines in today's paper, the New York Times, for example, realizes that modernization is a very slow process. I refer to the Supreme Court decision to change the apportionment of state legislative districts. We are having trouble modernizing our own government. So this should not seem to us surprising that we have difficulty elsewhere.

Now what I want to do from this original point of departure is to note a series of specific issues. I will present these issues as propositions or positive points of view. They are really questions, but I want to take an affirmative stand today because I understand the people in the audience like an affirmative stand on occasion from social scientists. I do not know how firm this is. I do not expect it to last the year. The answers I am proposing I hope just get me through the next hour.

With the triumph of independence and self-rule, save for a few vital exceptions, political issues in the emerging nations center around internal stability and progress in achieving avowed objectives of reform and
modernization. One great conflict exists between those elements desiring change and those anxious to sustain the traditional order to the fullest extent possible. But the advocates of change themselves may be favoring different things: that is, modernization and reform may well mirror antagonistic concepts, with ideals and objectives in conflict with one another. The interplay of such forces contributes to the chronic political difficulties besetting these lands and presents a major underlying cause for their susceptibility to violence and guerrilla warfare.

The modernists are committed to economic and social development, for, as revolutionary nationalists, they had promised the people a better life with freedom, knowing that this required industrialization and social change. Yet the traditionalist leaders, and the bulk of the people who are still tied to them in many lands, are, at best, lukewarm to these objectives. They favor improvements, perhaps, but do not want to sacrifice their way of life for these ends. Nor do they see that such sacrifice is necessary.

The Modernizers

With the threat of violence constantly in the air, it does not take much for political conflict to degenerate into warfare. The Communists thrive in such an environment, exploiting and deepening these modernizer-reformist-traditionalist conflicts to divide a country and gain power. I should like to approach this topic from the perspective of the modernizers, the "cutting edge" of change in both the nationalist anti-colonial phase now drawing to a close and in the present struggle to reorder these communities. Above all, we should avoid estimating their importance by their limited numbers. Their past
leadership, intense devotion, articulateness and literacy all underline their critical role and require us to examine their objectives and the possible consequences of their programs.

What they lack and want most to create is the type of state that we take for granted. This includes (1) a high degree of administrative competence in a staff of loyal civil servants imbued with the spirit of public service and (2) a loyal population committed to the new state in the modern sense of a nationalis' attachment.

The modernizing elite, of course, hopes to control this engine at both the political and administrative levels in order to modernize the economy, create a better society, and fashion a powerful entity that can stand up as a real equal in a world of sovereign powers.

The importance of this major objective is matched by the uncertainty of the results that emerge from even the most strenuous effort. One grave difficulty is the clash of interests with the peasantry, which seeks and supports reform but not modernization, and which is congenitally suspicious of the state. All too often the weakness of the state begets further weakness in this encounter, and a collapse of public order. Let us look at certain problems that flow from the three requirements (a) dealing with the upper echelons of the indigenous society, (b) creating a modern state, and (c) attracting the loyalty of the people.

Problems With Modern and Traditional Elites

Tensions within the modernizing group. Education poses a great opportunity and burden for the modernizers because it is an expensive and slow means to eliminate mass illiteracy and indoctrinate the entire nation in the new nationalism. However, they face an equally serious
problem at the top levels of training, where they need and lack both the technically skilled and the more broadly educated. The handicap cuts in both directions, for engineers and doctors often find themselves drawn into political or general administrative careers. The absence of a large business-industrial-managerial group leaves the middle class with a primarily professional and service orientation, including the civil servants and military officers as key segments of this group. In this situation, it becomes difficult to disassociate oneself from intimate connections with the government or to assume the pose of a responsible loyal opposition. The leadership sees noninvolvement or political opposition as near-treachery, since it needs all the skills it can muster to strengthen the state and deal with traditionalist antagonists. Differences within the modernizing camp between moderates and extremists over such problems as cultural nationalism, relations with the West, and economic planning, intensify this dilemma. The sharp frictions and acts of political suppression in lands like Ghana and Indonesia illustrate how dangerous the tensions within the modernizing elite can become.

The old elite. In many of the lands outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, there exists a traditional middle class as well as an aristocracy of a tribal type. These traditionalists in provincial cities consider themselves representatives of the old order, in the cultural and religious sense as well as in the economic spheres of land ownership or commerce. In many instances their views are in direct conflict with the modernizers, as the different consequences in both parts of the UAR demonstrated last year.
There were occasions in the past when the old landed elite and the newer urban elements worked together, though without necessarily leading to greater stability, reform, improved ties with the West, or a broad-based program of economic development. The experience of the past generation in Egypt shows that bitter fruits can come from such a collaboration, which terminated in the rise of Nasser. What path a country like Pakistan might follow under democratic rule as its rising business class encounters the old order also remains to be seen. In Iran recent riots by leftist students reportedly had the support of traditionalist landowners who oppose the Amini government's land reform--still another variation making for instability and violence.

The State: Problems of Economic and Foreign Policy

Economic development and planning. The new ideology revolves about economic growth, with such points of reference as percentages of gross national product invested, annual rates of growth, equilibrium in the balance of payments, concentration on industrial development, and investment in capital goods. Modernizing governments ever since the Meiji Restoration have realized that this requires extensive public control over agricultural produce, usually through heavy taxation. Plans for industrial growth also entail restrictions on popular access to raw materials and consumer goods, and so involve strict taxation of the masses in the urban areas as well as the rural communities.

This policy, however, requires a considerable amount of capital and brain power invested in agriculture, a conclusion at which many modernizers balk. Even where agriculture is recognized as vital, as in India, the funds, personnel, and the scope of the planning have
been inferior. This is reflected in such matters as the layout of roads, the distribution of fertilizer, irrigation, the arrangements of new plots, the establishment of credit facilities, the development of markets. Much of Communist China's trouble in sustaining overall growth stems directly from recent agricultural stagnation. The farm is the source of raw materials for industry, provides food for industrial workers, and has been a primary source of scarce foreign exchange.

The subordination of agricultural policy in the service of industrial development became almost universal during the 1950's. As a consequence raw economic antagonisms arose between the modernizers and the mass of the people, usually in a situation where differing attitudes to cultural traditions had already caused considerable alienation. Even the long-established political entities of Latin America have encountered difficulties with their austerity programs, as recent difficulties in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina attest. Riots in British Guiana started out with the same economic motivation, only to spark a racial uprising before coming under control. This is only a recent instance in which antagonism toward such economic sacrifices swiftly imposes itself upon other basic cleavages that invariably exist in these unstable political systems (race, religion, region, language, and so forth), setting off a chain reaction of mounting violence.

Foreign policy. The cast of thinking of most modernizers inclines them toward a position of coolness to the Western states. An orientation toward central economic planning, a cultural nationalism in revulsion from Western ways, and antagonism toward all foreign military bases and alliances are some of the major
ingredients in this mixture. This extends to the foreign economic policies of trade, investment, and financial assistance. A most extreme example concerns those African states that depend heavily on French economic assistance for their routine expenses as well as for development. In fact, France is making a tremendous effort in this regard, in the neighborhood of $300 million a year. But when these countries go so far as to keep Algerians away from an African conference (as they did last month), the result is to fan anti-Western sentiment on all fronts. Nigeria lost face, as the state in the middle, and not just with the extremist Casablanca group; it could not even get Sudan, Libya, or Tunisia to attend. Such incidents lend credence to the Communist argument that Western economic assistance, even after the elimination of political rule, is really a form of neocolonialism. The Communists seek to eliminate all economic ties with the West, averring repeatedly that the Soviet Bloc alone has a disinterested aid program.

Some of the consequences of this anti-Western orientation can be most damaging in terms of preventing internal war or responding to its threat. An undiluted trend toward statism prevents the rise of a modern business element that can moderate the ideological orientation of an intellectual-dominated middle class. Thus a government's economic and foreign policy can play a pivotal, often determining, role regarding the class composition of the modern sector of its society.

Two important effects of anti-Western sentiment have a direct bearing on the internal security situation. One is our inability to establish military alliances or even training programs, as we have experienced in Burma and Indonesia. It is true that other armies with whom we have
close ties have been puzzles to us (e.g., Turkey, Pakistan, and South Korea), but this in itself is not an argument in favor of further estrangement such as has occurred in British-Ghanaian relations. The invocation of a cultural tradition as part of an emotional reaction to a degrading colonial experience creates another difficulty. For it provokes ethnic antagonisms and fears in the numerous lands that contain more than one cultural community.

The last point to note in this connection is the most dangerous—the remnant colonial lands and the areas dominated by European settlers. As long as these remain, without serious amelioration of native conditions, they will make it increasingly difficult for moderate pro-Western groups to retain power, particularly in African states. It is not inconceivable to imagine a military crusade in the form of an invasion or infiltration of colonial-settler lands in Africa in the near future, as soon as the new states gather their forces. Nor will the more prudent Nigerians find it possible to let the Ghanas and the Guineas get ahead of them in such admittedly dangerous ventures. The very number and growing strength of the ex-colonial peoples, the extreme difficulty of the situation in the lands in question, and the vulnerability to Communist pressure of anyone taking a passive position all point to a policy of action.

The Problem of Popular Support

The peasantry. The peasant mass, as we have seen, has aspirations that bring it into conflict with the modernizers. This goes beyond the potent questions of taxation and the allocation of resources to agricultural development. The peasant wants reform, not
modernization and fundamental change. That is, he prefers the old order if possible, but with the cruelty and the exploitation removed, and with social justice in its place. Modernization to a peasant is an alien doctrine, perhaps a plaything of city folk, that creates such great disturbances that he can at best only tolerate it. Furthermore the entire process means a more powerful state, with more effective control and so better tax powers over the countryside.

Lack of mass loyalty. Traditional peasant antagonism to government is about as old as the state itself. From time immemorial government has been a tax collecting agency and little else. Just rule at best to a peasant meant moderate assessments for which he received, on rare occasions, peace and order in return. Tax collection went on in any event, often rising as law and order declined. Consequently as government moved in a cycle from indigenous to European and back to indigenous, the attitude of the farmer remained aloof, alienated, or hostile. Perhaps he resembles the antagonistic French farmer of recent years, but with far greater cause.

Such people cannot be considered basically loyal to the state. They cannot be counted on to rally behind a government, even when the enemy is a destructive guerrilla force who endangers both their lives and the survival of the state. If anything, the appearance of a force that the government cannot handle will drive the peasants into acquiescence and silence in the face of guerrilla power.

Nationalism. To some extent nationalism has enabled governments to rally popular loyalty and begin to mold a cohesive public opinion. But many who respond to such nationalist appeals, against the West for example, act as the Moroccan Berbers did, to preserve their traditional
religion and social customs. Such appeals therefore can intensify cleavages within a state once a foreign ruler or influence is gone. And, in too many lands, a dominant regional or ethnic group makes the others feel that the new nationalism is merely a local version of imperialism. Javanese dominance in Indonesia or the Western wing's predominant role in Pakistan are painful regional illustrations. Ethnic groups that do not accept the new dispensation seem to exist everywhere, cropping up wherever there is a vulnerable spot in the government's armor. The Montagnards in Vietnam or the border people of northeast Thailand are merely the most recent to gain notoriety.

Similar antagonisms, in fact, have kept too many areas fractioned into small sovereign entities that consequently become all the more vulnerable to subversion. The collapse of Mali, the failure of the projected West Indian Federation, or the unwillingness of Gabon or the Ivory Coast to pool their wealth with their less fortunate neighbors illustrate the emergence of this large number of unviable micro-states. Elsewhere, nationalism loses its cohesive force because governmental leaders in large areas of the world believe neither in states nor in state sovereignty, as we understand these terms. Boundary lines run perpendicular to the geographic and tribal structure of West Africa, making it very difficult for leaders there to take seriously the permanence of the present order. As a consequence they perpetually seek to undermine one another, sponsor subversives, and even go so far as to bribe or keep on their payroll political opponents of regimes in power. The slogans of "African unity" or the "Arab nation" are not merely political double talk, for they strike an emotional response among
the people. The leaders talk of unity, practice independent sovereignty, and intervene in their neighbor's affairs.

Urban-Rural Relationships

It is true that once modernization gets started, the better pay and essentially better life pulls people to the cities all over the world. But under contemporary conditions, this too makes for instability. For one thing, the dominant urban elements are often of a different race, ethnic group, tribe, or social order, thereby creating a physical-cultural "apartness" regarding the newly arrived residents. South Africa is but the most extreme instance of differences that exist on all continents.

Then too, there are the costly burdens of housing, civic order, and sanitation; these states lack the personnel, funds, and will to supply the required facilities. Such a social welfare program weighs very heavily upon states that can cover their routine expenditures only with grave difficulty, and cannot as yet accumulate capital for economic development.

Though we must stress the alienation of the peasant from the new urban elite, this should not lead us to associate guerrilla warfare strictly with the countryside. Both the city and its relationship to the countryside are of fundamental importance. We cannot, for example, develop a coherent political counterguerrilla program by following the doctrine of assuaging peasant discontent and isolating the radical malcontents in their urban settings. The modernists are too strong to be bypassed and form too dynamic an element in the pivotal nationalist-revolutionary movement to be ridden out of the scene that simply.
In many lands the city plays a predominant role and its seizure by a revolutionary coup can bring the less dynamic countryside into line, even though the peasantry might be lukewarm or even antagonistic to the change. The Middle East and Latin America have many states whose main cities literally dominate the political scene. Urban antagonism to a regime--because it is too authoritarian, or too pro-Western, or not amenable to rapid modernization--can have a most unsettling effect. We have witnessed serious agitation and disaffection, for one or a combination of these reasons, in the cities of West Pakistan, in Saigon, the modern cities of Morocco, and in Teheran.

The urban and rural areas are intimately related if only because a disaffected city group can take to the hills and begin guerrilla operations. The Castro experience follows this pattern. The leadership was urban as was most of the small following; the basic support came from cities whose middle class became alienated from the brutal Batista rule. For all Guevara's claims, this was not primarily a peasant operation in original motivation or source of sustained power. Nor are rebels indifferent to control of the cities: Manila played an important part, as a communication center, in the Huk operation. The Lebanese affair of 1958 was heavily urban in orientation.

Equally significant is the impact of the urban migration that now marks our time. It has created a vast number of intimate family connections between country and town, so that difficulties in one area can find rapid sympathetic responses in the other. Large numbers of unemployed recent arrivals from the countryside find leaders in those aspirants who failed to pass the academic hurdles to respected membership in the establishment.
In addition, many rural youths from economically well-off families feel that their future belongs in the city, and they go there without the education or training for advancement. But they too possess the social background to staff the lower levels of leadership of the city crowds. Such a situation exists even in such moderately stable lands as Nigeria. It is most significant that Communist organizational efforts in the more advanced lands—such as Latin America—now concentrate on bringing together under one organization the lowest economic level in the city and countryside. Their efforts to group landless laborers with unemployed or part-time city workers, as well as to lead tenant farmers in seizures of land and foster activist policies by mining or factory unions, are all part of this approach.

**Current Patterns and Problems**

On balance, the basic Communist image of workers and peasants desperately anxious to overthrow oppressive governments does not hold good. Rather, the overwhelming majority of people remain essentially uncommitted. Of those that do choose sides, adherents of the government generally equal or surpass the number who oppose the regime, but the margins are too small in any event to make an appreciable quantitative difference. Only by repeated demonstration of strength and consistent reform efforts can a government reduce popular suspicions and rally the people to its side. In other words, there exists in most of the underdeveloped countries a political vacuum, a characteristic that does so much to differentiate these lands from the developed societies. It is one basic reason why guerrilla warfare is more
likely to occur in such countries rather than in a Western state, even a highly vulnerable one like France.

**Local Communists.** A major Communist political tactic is to perpetuate and extend all existing social divisions and to foster new ones. Communists must alienate the modernists from the peasantry and separate the extremists from the moderates if possible. Apparently, a situation in which all groups are isolated from one another, with the left-modernists in power, is the Soviet ideal of an intermediary step toward communism. To complete the isolation, Communist doctrine views neutralism as a near-total separation of these states from the West. This goes far beyond rejection of alliances, bases, or close political associations. It actually calls for cultural and economic disassociation between the underdeveloped lands and the West. A part of this campaign is the denunciation of all Western aid as neocolonial exploitation, with racial problems, colonial remnants, and fears of Western intervention used to back up this argument.

Such an isolated leadership could well be driven further to left or at least into acts of violence against its outraged opponents, thereby enhancing the Communist opportunities for gaining power in the ensuing turmoil. Since modernization is so difficult and the government may well be inept or corrupt, this tactic appears reasonably hopeful to the Communists. Even when they support a regime, as in Indonesia, they simultaneously work to establish widespread peasant support, while disassociating themselves from the government's errors and alienating the people from it by harping on its inadequacies.
The officer corps. Some analysts have suggested that the officer corps in these lands might serve as a Western-oriented counterweight to the Communists. This is a dubious proposition at best. As members of the modern intellectual community, they are exposed to the same pattern of cross-currents as their civilian counterparts. The recent record bears this out. Where military leaders have seized power we find left neutralist regimes (Egypt, Iraq), moderate neutrals (Sudan, Burma) and pro-Western groups (Turkey, Pakistan, South Korea). Moreover, within each armed force, competing views are often in conflict. When these disagreements occur along service lines, public disclosure and open violence result. Internal military tensions exist in Indonesia, Turkey, Iraq, Ecuador, and South Vietnam, and have revealed themselves in many other lands, particularly in Latin America, during the past decade. Very often an apparently moderate military leadership, as in Indonesia, will remain in the service of a regime that is quite acceptable to the Communists.

We must also realize that when a military group seizes power, at least in those lands friendly enough to the West to allow us to observe the political consequences, we do not see an abatement of the basic tensions within the modern sector of the society. Hostility to continued military rule is prevalent in the urban centers of Sudan, Pakistan, South Korea, and Burma, where the last election went against candidates favored by the army. This is not to say that military coups do not provide better government or greater stability in the short run, for they often do. But it does not seem wise to center a policy on encouraging the armed forces to take power or to consider themselves an alternate emergency government,
in light of these events. We need only consider the effects of such a policy on other civilian governments whose stability we wish to enhance.

**Other sources of instability.** There are, of course, many issues other than the impact of modernization that have an unsettling effect on a country's stability and make it amenable to guerrilla warfare. Two of the most common are the regional differences and ethnic cleavages already noted. Equally important are the remaining colonial lands and the more intractable issue of those areas dominated by European communities. A grave debilitating crisis often centers around the breakdown of a constitutional order or consensus. In Colombia, the cleavage in the middle class and its two major parties in the late 1940's led to a decade of war and 250,000 casualties, with Communist enclaves flourishing in the countryside. Turkey is now riven between modernists and traditionalists, with the former divided even further by the rise of a more extreme group within the armed forces that has already made an unsuccessful bid for power.

Then there are various areas of the world in which banditry is prevalent. These include the Philippines, Burma, Colombia, and Indonesia. Here the collapse of law and order causes peasant disaffection and further alienation from the state, no matter who is in control. The Communists further chaos and develop their own strength sometimes by simulating bandit activities. By thus diminishing public order, extending their own area of control, and establishing some security within their own sector, they enhance their chances of ultimately seizing power.
Concluding Observations

There are several important political contributions that the U.S. Army can make in its mission against irregular and internal war. The challenge is to formulate concepts and plans that go beyond the deterrence or defeat of insurgents and contribute to the solution of chronic political weaknesses. Such efforts can be and are being made at both the school-training and field-operations ends of our program. For example, the requirement not to encourage officer corps to revolt essentially sets an outer limit, defining a boundary to our activities. There is much that we can do to orient indigenous officers training in the United States toward ameliorative reforms and nation-building activities. This enables them to appreciate the importance of such programs to their nation as a whole and to important elements in their society. However, it is equally vital that they develop this concept for a constructive role within the framework of the existing political order whose leadership and initiative they recognize and encourage.

We must also work to cultivate all ties with indigenous security forces wherever possible. Where governments are hostile to Western alliances, these connections can be cultivated on a more informal basis via traditional diplomatic channels. Very often, police elements will not be restricted from accepting American materiel and training aids and offer an important line of access. Still another approach can be the cultivation of those officers who come to the United States for training; this affords us an excellent opportunity to learn what and how they think, cultivate friendships, and keep in close touch with them as they continue their careers.
In field operations, the opportunities to strengthen reform movements in the countryside arise at unexpected occasions and are directly related to our ability to gauge peasant attitudes toward their own military forces and governments. If diplomatically handled, such efforts conducted through the local armed forces can further our understanding of an underlying political situation and enhance the cause of stability. We can also enhance physical progress by using every possible occasion—in addition to formal assignments to civic action teams and the like—to augment the reservoir of civilian skills, still woefully lacking at the most rudimentary levels in many rural communities, and develop the infrastructure of the countryside.

Above all, we have an obligation to see that indigenous forces conducting internal war must bear in mind that the populace is not an enemy but the actual objective of the struggle, to be treated with consideration and kept friendly toward the government. This is especially vital when the military force is under pressure or operating under provocative conditions, and when ethnic minority groups are the people vulnerable to guerrilla pressure.

In short, field operations can succeed only through close coordination with basic political requirements just as, on a larger scale, strategic plans are most effective as part of a national policy that confronts the basic political dilemmas plaguing today's emergent states.

Thank you.
DR. KNORR: The distinguished members of our panel are physically tougher than those of the previous one. They are willing to stand up while they speak, so they can be seen as well as heard. The first one I would like to call on is Dr. Daniel Lerner, who is Professor of Sociology and a Senior Research Associate, Center for International Studies at MIT.

Professor Lerner, as most of you know, has done very extensive work on social science methods, on propaganda and psychological warfare, and many other subjects. He has been a member of the faculty at Stanford, at Columbia, and at Paris University. He has written many distinguished books. The one that is perhaps most pertinent to the subject of today has the title, The Passing of Traditional Society. Dan Lerner.

REMARKS OF DR. DANIEL LERNER
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

I have one comment on each paper.

Dr. Eckstein is right in saying the problem of his paper is that it was presented to this symposium in the wrong sequence. It should have been presented the day before yesterday. The reason is that it had an eloquent and persuasive plea that the Army should take serious account of the political-sociological context of limited-warfare, insurgency, and so on. If he had done this the day before yesterday, then when General Eddleman started
off yesterday, he would have said, "Yes, Dr. Eckstein, we are going to do it, we are doing it." Then we could have all done as social scientists are supposed to do—that is, begin to wonder if this is the right answer. Once the Army said "yes," social scientists could worry whether the answer should not be "no"!

We would have gotten a lot of material yesterday for worrying about this. One source of worry would have been the way in which the Army seems to be defining its mission. We have all said and heard many times that one of America's great weaknesses in the Cold War is that we don't have the functional equivalent of a Communist Party to work for us where we need it. The Army's mission seems to be, singlehandedly, to supply an American equivalent for the Communist Party in the Free World.

It is a very good Army, and I am all for it, and I was in it for a lot of years—but this may not be a feasible mission! So we heard from a number of people, and I don't need to repeat their preoccupations—why many of us are worried about this conception of the Army mission. Just what does this "political stability" mean? Would the Army really like to be responsible for political stability in Argentina this week? I don't think so. I don't think the Army is naive enough to think so either.

There is difficulty in defining the mission with respect to several types of situations that have been outlined. I am going to leave that point and go on to note that the social scientists here have also been preoccupied by what their role is to be if the Army conceives its role as maintenance of "political stability."

A number of people, culminating with the eloquent statement of Leonard Doob this afternoon, have suggested that much of social science is not relevant to some
conceptions of this Army mission. I, myself, feel that if we try to accommodate some elements of the Army mission, as it has been defined, we will get to a kind of social science which is not recognizable to me. This is a concept of research findings which Paul Linebarger some years ago baptized "Idots." It All Depends On The Situation. When research sinks to that level of particularism, there are some old-fashioned anthropologists that may qualify, but I would rule myself out.

So I am glad that Fred Greene, coming to my comment on his paper, suggested the social sciences are mainly concerned with regularities and generalizations. I want to underline—for myself and for the brand of social scientist with whom I get along well—that this is the kind of effort that we are naturally best at. Social scientists—or most of them that I know—do this type of work better than we do a firingline investigation of life histories. I think that the kind of emphasis that Fred Greene gave us on urbanization is a good lead. Another lead, in my judgment, would be the "new literates" in the world. I suggest this topic to indicate a type of research that seems to be feasible, and possibly useful, in terms of the Army mission.

The United Nations estimated in 1950 that 25 million new literates were being added to the world population each year. That means, over the last decade, over a quarter of a billion new literates. The rate of increase has been going up logarithimically, as indicated by some of our current research at MIT. I am inclined to believe that there is a high degree of association between that rising rate of literacy and the rising rate of insurgency. I would, in any case, want to look for this as a regular tie. What connection between literacy and insurgency
exists as a regular thing around the world? If there is a connection, as I think, exploring this, articulating it, elaborating it, and explaining it might help a lot to clarify the Army's mission. If this mission brings the Army up against the so-called "revolution of rising expectations," the Army should know this.

It would be in the Army's interest to consider whether this kind of research would really be helpful. Thank you.

DR. KNOPR: Our next panelist will be Mr. James Cross, who is currently Research Associate of the Institute of Defense Analyses. Mr. Cross was educated and trained at Yale University and the University of Virginia. During the war he was a member of OSS and saw service in Europe. For a time he was associated with the Center for International Studies, at MIT. More recently he has again been connected with the government, was a member of the Gaither Committee, and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy from 1958 to 1961.

I think most of you know Mr. Cross; he has been working on this problem of irregular war for a long time. I don't know of a better way to introduce him than to say he is a walking encyclopedia about irregular warfare. Mr. Cross.
This is the time of the afternoon when the normal man's tailbone is completely numb so I am extremely grateful that Professor Knorr decided to have the speakers stand up. I will do my best to make my comments brief and to provide equivalent relief to you as soon as I can.

I have only two points I want to touch on. Generally speaking, I wish to reinforce what has already been said and to present two problems arising from the earlier comments. These are problems which the American Army must face, and on which social science may be able to give help.

I wonder whether the political self-restraint of the officer corps of many of the underdeveloped nations now threatened by insurrection, is not being placed under an almost intolerable strain.

Certainly from what I have seen of the training we provide these officers when they come to this country, the Anglo-American concept of civilian control, which is so much a part of our way of thinking, is transmitted in some measure to these gentlemen. I am afraid it has very little meaning for many of them. We tend to forget that one of the reasons for this long-established tradition of civilian control is the fact that by and large the political leadership has always commanded the respect of the military. This is not the case in many of the countries we are now considering.
There, the military frequently constitutes the best educated, the most traveled, and generally the most sophisticated social group in the nation. They see an inexperienced, frequently incompetent, and all too often highly corrupt political leadership which they are expected to serve. They also realize that the battle they are in is primarily a political one. It is only natural that they are greatly tempted to move in and take over the running of the nation.

As has been pointed out, we have seen this happen in Iraq, Egypt, and Korea. Burma is in the third round of military rule. Turkey has been governed this way off and on for 30 years.

Army rule, without question, has some very real short-term advantages; for the long run, I am not so sure. It is almost impossible to develop a broad-based political structure under military rule.

Now, I will say right off I don't know what the solution is. Magsaysays are rather hard to find. Indeed, they turn up about once in a generation, although we hope to see a few more like him.

What are the alternatives? Should the U.S. Army attempt to train civilians in the problems of civilian management and more particularly the problems of democratic political administration? This is certainly outside of the U.S. Army’s traditional role.

Should other branches of our government undertake to mount a civilian equivalent of the military course? This seems a little dubious to me because the ghost of colonialism would inevitably sit in every classroom.

I would simply point out this afternoon that the excellent and well-rounded training that we are providing to many military officers of the underdeveloped countries
is throwing the balance of political and military capability in these regions further out of whack than it was to begin with. This is a point which calls for some serious study.

The second point I would like to touch on is Dr. Eckstein's "third kind of knowledge." That is the knowledge needed for rehabilitation after serious internal war. The underdeveloped states ultimately must face the problem of binding up their own wounds. Lincoln might have been able to solve this one after our Civil War, had he lived. It took us a long time to do this job without him.

First of all, the government has to arouse sufficient enthusiasm against the guerrillas to fight the battle effectively, and then it has to reverse the process and prepare the people for a reunion. Now in guerrilla warfare the last few men are the hardest to kill, and the government must consider all possible ways of speeding and easing the transition from violence to peace.

This is a hard one, for, as pointed out, it involves bringing not only the active rebels, but their supporters within the population, back into the peaceful family. In the Philippines this job was done, I think, with great skill, but as has been pointed out a number of times, the Philippines are a remarkably forgiving people.

I, for one, would like to see a study made of conditions in Cyprus today. It appears that the Greek and Turkish elements there have made a workable reconciliation surprisingly quickly, but I have not found very much written on it.

The problems of rehabilitation should be considered in the training which our officers and men provide the military forces of threatened states. They
must appreciate the need to reduce bitterness as quickly as possible so that their country can go on with the continuing tasks of modernization. Those tasks present problems which will continue long after the Communist threat has passed.

Here, I believe that the social scientists, particularly the psychologists, have an important role to play. It is hard to ask a professional military man, whose primary job is to teach these people to fight each other, to teach them at the same time to love each other. The soldiers may need a little help on that one. Thank you.

DR. KNORR: Our final panelist is Dr. Hans Speier, who like Professor Lerner is a sociologist. He has been for many years Chief of the Social Science Division at RAND, supervising a great many different kinds of research that the RAND Corporation has been undertaking, and is now Chairman of the Research Council there.

Dr. Speier has done a great deal of research on problems of propaganda and psychological warfare. His latest book has been on Soviet strategy and tactics in Berlin. It is a pleasure to introduce Dr. Hans Speier.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make two brief remarks, one on operational research to be done by social scientists and one on policy-oriented research.

Let me say first, however, that I agree with much of what Professor Eckstein told us, although I do not share his pessimism; nor can I subscribe to all of the specific statements he made. While I was listening to the first part of his talk, it occurred to me that from the viewpoint of social science fighting terrorists in third areas is not very different from fighting gangsters in a civilized society. Gangsters, too, are elusive and it takes resolute, if not brutal, methods to wipe them out, but, as you know from "The Untouchables," it can be done (and Mr. Ness is an honorable man in my eyes).

To be more serious, in Professor Eckstein's presentation there was an undercurrent of sentiment that is frequently encountered in modern social science, namely, that conflict and social ills and evils can be avoided by reforms and proper adjustments. Perhaps, many Americans secretly believe that foreign policy problems, too, can be removed by help and aid and compromise, and once they are removed, then everything will stay fine forever. Conflict in this view is not an essential part of social and political life. I do not think that this view is right.
Incidentally, when Professor Eckstein mentioned that France has not recovered yet from the consequences of the French Revolution I was asking myself, should the French Revolution have been avoided?

There is not only a need for trying to cure society of the conditions which give rise to insurgency, but I think there is also a need for operational research of social scientists on the military aspects of counter-insurgency operations. I fully subscribe to what General Marshall said yesterday: such operational research has to be done in the field and cannot be done adequately at home.

Social science research is different from weapons research or research in the natural and physical sciences. Often when you have a principle in social science, you do not know how it ought to be applied to the special circumstances of a given case. For example, the principle that civic action is an important ingredient of counter-insurgency does not tell you what program can be instituted in South Vietnam. For that you must examine the social and political structure in that country, the existing institutions of authority, degree and distribution of illiteracy, ethnic and economic factors in the society, etc.

Or take the case of intelligence that was mentioned yesterday. In counterinsurgency operations intelligence poses one of the most difficult problems. In past counter-insurgency operations intelligence has been obtained, among other things, from captured insurgents. The means of getting information have varied from rather extravagant rewards to spectacularly simple techniques of conversion in addition to the brutal methods Professor Eckstein referred to. In Malaya the British succeeded in this
regard by shocking captured terrorists through treating them to a very good meal and a cigarette. When the insurgents expected to be tortured or killed they were treated with unexpected consideration and kindness. This shock treatment was so effective that many of the captured terrorists became valuable sources of intelligence. The British had similarly spectacular success in the final phase of the campaign against the Mau Mau in Kenya. It sometimes took as little as a couple of days to turn a captured terrorist into a pseudo-terrorist, that could be sent back into the jungle to fight the very same terrorists he belonged to only a few days earlier.

Why this was so I do not know, but I propose that a qualified social scientist is able to turn certain principles of his discipline—his general knowledge of human nature, of persuasion, of conversion, etc.—to good account in any given environment and thus help the military to obtain intelligence. But this must be done in the field, because attention must be given to the special circumstances and conditions at a given time and place.

Now a few remarks about policy-oriented research. By policy-oriented research I mean research which does not necessarily take the mission of the military for granted and admits the possibility that U.S. policy may be wrong.

By way of illustration, let me start with an observation on terminology. We have a whole array of terms that are very quaint including "counterinsurgency" and "sublimated war." The former comes close to "counter-revolution" and the latter invites puns. I have heard supposedly funny references to "sublimal war" and "sublimated war." You can't pun about "wars of liberation," and that is not unimportant. Terminology is not an
irrelevant matter. The danger attending official U.S. terminology is that not only terminologically, but also propagandistically the cause of social justice will be surrendered to the Russians. They speak of "wars of liberation." We are not against liberty, we are "for it," but our speech does not reflect it. Our terminology is poor for propaganda abroad, and it has also certain undesirable political repercussions at home, because it raises questions about the distinction between "counter-insurgency," undeclared war and declared war.

Now when it comes to the causes of insurgency, it has been said by the President that we have to look beyond Communist instigation; often it is distress and suffering that gives rise to popular dissatisfaction, which is then exploited by the Communists. I think many of us will agree with this judgment. I think one ought to add, however, that there are other causes of insurgency that cannot be neglected. For example, mention must be made of the Atlantic Charter. It was declared during the war and had the effect of fanning nationalism in less developed countries, particularly in Africa. To many people in these countries the Charter constituted an important contact with the West and furthered their intellectual modernization.

Another point that needs to be made in this connection is this. The revolutionary wars which cause us much political and military trouble today are the price we pay for the effectiveness of our deterrence, i.e., the deterrence of total war and of wars that are less limited than are guerrilla operations. I would go so far as to say that deterrence even plays a role in keeping guerrilla operations down to a relatively low level of violence, not permitting them to reach the stage
of regular warfare. This limitation of violence is not caused by kindness on the part of the guerrillas or their Communist supporters, but ultimately by fear of U.S. deterrent power, fear of broadening the conflict by escalation that would involve the sponsoring Communists more intensely and dangerously.

Finally, I would like to say that the political scientist ought to be free to examine the premises of economic and of civic action programs. He should be free to examine the common belief that lifting the standard of living will lead to internal stability in the countries that are being aided. Is this actually true? Is it true that economic aid leads to the formation of democratic institutions? Is it true that it leads to peace? In short, is economic aid in our national interest? I am not saying that I have the answer or that I would answer these questions in the negative. I am saying that policy-oriented research must be free to raise such questions and must be permitted possibly to come up with answers that are heretical.

Mr. Pauker said this morning that social scientists concentrating on the political and economic roots of turbulence in third areas must be allowed to present their findings, even though they may, on the face of it, be unpopular. For example, if they find that economic distress or political injustice of the local government rather than Communist instigation is the cause of turbulence, they ought to be free to say so. Mr. Pauker said that the audience of social science research must be presumed to consist of political adults rather than political adolescents. That is quite right, and I am merely making the point that this observation cuts both ways. Policy-oriented research must be permitted to deviate
from prejudice in a "conservative" as well as a "liberal" direction. If a social scientist were to question seriously the advisability of economic aid, nobody, other social scientists included, should revert from political adulthood to adolescence. The researcher should not be told that he is callous, does not believe in human progress or argue against higher standards of living in general. In short, he ought to be free to argue that certain social evils have to be accepted in the interest of national security rather than be repaired regardless of undesirable long range effects on national security.

Thank you very much.
SCENES FROM SYMPOSIUM DINNER

At Head Table, from Left to Right:
Dr. Lybrand; Maj. Gen. R. B. Lincoln, Jr., Deputy Chief, Transportation Corps; Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall, USAR (Ret.), The Detroit News; Lt. Gen. Trudeau; Secretary Stahr; Dr. Roger Russell, Chairman, Human Factors Sub-Panel, Army Scientific Advisory Panel.

At Head Table, from Left to Right:

At Head Table, from Left to Right:

At Head Table, from Left to Right:
President Anderson; Honorable Finn J. Larson; Mr. Harold E. Haugrud, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs.
DR. KING: In his address last night the Secretary of the Army reaffirmed the role of the Army in the almost certain continued international importance of what has in various forms been referred to as subliminal war, guerrilla war, problems concerned with emerging nations, and political and social upheavals. Of particular significance to this symposium was his statement of the greater and greater demand on the social sciences to act and not just to react and that a real team effort by the Army and research organizations can disrupt Mr. Khrushchev's plans. Secretary Stahr emphasized that this is a national task and one which demands a national response.

During the first 2 days of this symposium we have heard statements of military requirements, of operational and organizational plans. We have also learned of problems and factors concerned with the many facets of emerging nations. This morning we will have an opportunity to hear about programs, plans, or capabilities—...
concepts—as appropriate from representatives of several U.S. Government agencies. I would like now to introduce the first speaker, Dr. Henry W. Riecken.

Dr. Riecken is the Assistant Director for Social Sciences of the National Science Foundation. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University, is a former professor at the University of Minnesota and Harvard. He has been a consultant to the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and Ford Foundation. Dr. Riecken has published in the field of interpersonal relations, attitudes, and behavior change. He will speak about the "National Resources in the Social Sciences."

Dr. Riecken.

NATIONAL RESOURCES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Dr. Henry W. Riecken
Assistant Director for Social Sciences
National Science Foundation

I am asked to talk on U.S. resources in social sciences, but in some sense I feel that my assignment has an inappropriate title because for the past two days you have been exposed to the widest variety of American resources in the social and behavioral sciences and you will continue to be exposed to them in the talks that follow mine this morning. The resources that this country has in the social sciences are its social scientists. Many of you know, I am sure, that in the social sciences, equipment and physical facilities are far less important than the people engaged in the enterprise.
So, when I look over a program that contains representatives who have already talked to you from the School of International Studies of Johns Hopkins, from the Center for International Studies at MIT, and from the Center of International Studies at Princeton (I do not know how they managed to get the titles so close and yet keep them discriminable), the National Institute of Research of the Maxwell School, the Departments of Sociology and Political Science at Yale, Princeton, Chicago, and so on, I wonder what I can add to what they have already said about U.S. resources in the social and behavioral sciences.

I shall not try to tell you anything about U.S. resources that are represented by such agencies as the State Department, the USIA, or the Office of Psychology and Social Sciences of the Department of Defense, or the behavioral sciences branch of the U.S. Army. I shall talk to you simply about some representative activities of the National Science Foundation and, to the extent that I know them, of the National Institutes of Health in one very broad area, namely: basic research in social and behavioral sciences which I regard, perhaps parochially, as one of our most important national resources.

Research, compared to all other activities in the social and behavioral sciences, is a relatively small sort of thing. For example, in Fiscal Year 1962 it is estimated that all Federal agencies will spend approximately 37.8 million dollars for intramural and extramural activities in social and behavioral sciences. Of this amount, the largest share will be disbursed by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare--some $16 million.
The Department of Defense is listed in the NSF figures as disbursing somewhere in the neighborhood of $15 million in psychology and the other social sciences, with psychology receiving over $14.5 million. The Navy will spend $6 million, all in psychology; the Air Force, close to $4 million, most of it in psychology, but with $250,000 in other social sciences; the Army, some $5.2 million, with $4.9 million of it in psychology. The National Science Foundation will spend somewhere in the neighborhood of $10 million in social sciences and in psychology.

For what will these sums of money be spent? They will be spent for a variety of activities whose names sound quite distant from guerrilla activities or cold warfare and on topics in which Khrushchev's name hardly ever appears. We will be talking about problems of information diffusion, decision-making and problem solving, communication, signal detection where there is multiple classification, and latent attitude analysis. Let me choose one of these topics and try to explain in a little more detail.

Certainly communication is one of the most important and most characteristic kinds of human activity, and social scientists find much to investigate in this area. Whether a communication consists of exchanging information, giving orders, or attempting to persuade another, there are abundant problems of a scientific nature to be met. Among the more dramatic problems from the point of view of basic research is that of persuasive communication and its consequences—changes in opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. These are of great importance, whether they are connected with warfare, foreign nations, or with purely domestic problems, including the persuasion of students, patients, or television audiences.
For some time now it has been clear that early notions about mass communications at least were quite incorrect. The early notion that there was a uniform impact of mass communication on all individuals in the audience seems to be overly simple-minded. Rather it is clear that there is selective exposure to communication, and those who are least ready to change their opinions and attitudes are least likely to pay attention to such communication, and, once exposed, are least likely to understand the message. There is a kind of deliberate misunderstanding of the message on the part of people who are not ready to listen to a persuasive message or at least are not ready to change their opinions. When exposure cannot be avoided and when the message is clear, some opinions and some individuals seem to change more readily than others. One especially interesting class of beliefs are what we might call cultural truisms, beliefs which the person and his associates accept as so obviously true as to be beyond debate.

For example, it would be commonly accepted that every person should have a chance to have an X-ray every year; or, that most forms of mental illness are not contagious; or that everybody should brush his teeth after every meal. Most experience has shown that such beliefs are especially vulnerable to change through persuasion. Especially vulnerable, perhaps, because the person has had little practice in defending such beliefs and is accordingly poorly equipped to resist counterarguments when he is exposed to them.

Some current research is concerned with what might be called a disease model of inhibiting persuasion—that is, with investigating means by which resistance to
change can be strengthened as well as the factors, including personality traits and intelligence, which lead to weakness or instability in such beliefs. One clear finding so far is that in the case of the cultural truism a belief is rendered more resistant to strong attack if the holder of it is exposed initially to weak forms of counterargument which, by threatening the belief, motivate the person to learn material which supports his original position.

If these findings can be generalized beyond the examples provided, we will be able to understand, to predict, and sometimes to take countermeasures in such areas as political beliefs about our democratic form of government, and I think you can see the relevance of this to many of our international problems.

Where controversial beliefs are involved, the findings that I have just reported to you seem not to be identical and the same strategies are not so effective. The person holding beliefs which are culturally controversial is apparently more practiced in the defense of his case and in seeking out supporting material for his position.

Let me talk about one other aspect of communication to exemplify the way in which I think basic research on generalized problems is beginning to fit together. A very interesting kind of sociological problem is the question of how information and particularly new ideas diffuse through society. How do physicians learn about and adopt new drugs? How do farmers decide to try out a new practice in agriculture? How do political ideas filter through a public? How are people persuaded to accept safety belts in automobiles, and so forth? Research on these topics has shown that networks of
interpersonal relationships are of extraordinary importance in affecting the path and rate of diffusion of an item. It is quite evident that the mass media of communication plays some part in diffusion but it seems likely their part is to arouse interest and to make known the existence and availability of an invention or a new idea. The actual adoption of the innovation is much more likely to result from personal contact and personal communication.

It is easy to see, therefore, the importance of social organization in this process and the great importance of some sort of small groups and face-to-face contacts in carrying messages to possible recipients. Furthermore, one begins to see a connection now between this sort of problem and some fundamental research that the National Science Foundation has been supporting on problems of social structure, especially the question of the range of an individual's acquaintanceship and the frequency of contact with acquaintances as well as the interconnections among networks of acquaintances.

Let me propose to you the following question as an abstract one. It is the question that is under study in the research that I have just mentioned on networks on acquaintanceship. Take some criterion of acquaintance such as "knows well enough to call by first name," and let us assume now that we will define two people as acquainted if they can mutually satisfy this criterion.

Now I ask you to consider for any two people in a population how many acquaintances does it take to link them? That is, we will pick out now two unknown people, mutually unknown, and ask what is the length of chain of acquaintanceship by which these two people could be linked only through acquaintances. Given a population
like that of the United States, I suspect this will turn out to be a relatively small number of acquaintances for a relatively large number of people.

I do not know whether it will be two, three, or four, but I am pretty sure it will be under 10 for a very large share of our population. Such problems when first propounded have aspects which cause many people to smile. It seems perhaps trifling to ask how many acquaintances connect the man who delivers milk to my doorstep with a nightclub performer in San Francisco.

In terms of this example it may be a trivial question, but when we think of the results of studies of diffusion of information, when we assess the importance of personal relationships, when we consider how fast rumors spread, when we look at all sorts of fundamental epidemiological problems, our problem of acquaintance networks is a serious one, for it is these networks that carry some of the most significant communication that affects beliefs and attitudes.

If I have any message it is that at the National Science Foundation we think the most important thing we can do at present is to provide continuous—not intermittent—but steady, continuous support to fundamental research, especially on methodological problems: problems of measurement, problems of data analysis, problems of doing experiments well; and also research on such fundamental questions as I am talking about here today. I have picked out only a couple of exemplary ones, and have only touched upon one of many basic research areas in social science. We think it is important because there is a great deal to be learned about human behavior and about society, and much of it, in my own opinion, begins with the unlearning of common sense mistakes, the
unlearning of traditional assumptions about how and why people behave as they do; and the relearning in a new light of what are some of the wellsprings of motivation and causation in human affairs.

Thank you.

DR. KING: Thank you, Dr. Riecken.

The next speaker, Dr. Roger Hilsman, will give an Invited Address on "Recent Trends in Department of State Research."

Dr. Hilsman is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and received his Ph.D. from Yale University. During World War II he was an officer in Merrill's Marauders. He also commanded OSS detachments in the China-Burma-India Theater. He has been associated with the Joint American Military Advisory Group in London, The Center of International Studies at Princeton University, the Library of Congress, and the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research.

Dr. Hilsman is author of Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions and coauthor of Military Policy and National Security: Alliance Policy in the Cold War, in addition to his contributions to the professional journals. It gives me great pleasure, now, to introduce to you Dr. Roger Hilsman.
I welcome this conference and its subject, not only as an official of the Department of State, which, of course, is concerned with the theory and reality of limited-war, but as an individual. I was first involved in this subject at The Princeton Center of International Studies, and was proud to have been associated with that group which was among the first to "discover" limited-war in 1954.

In the time available today I would like to focus on two general points: first, the notion of political deterrence to limited-war; and, second, the political aspects of guerrilla warfare. I have also been asked to describe the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and our interests in research.

I think that in the early periods of the development of limited-war concepts many, both inside and outside the government, strayed off the track somewhat. For a time the analysis of deterres to limited-war concentrated on military phenomena. Little attention was paid to the important deterres which are political, and even today these are probably due more stress than they have received.

What are these deterres? And how do they operate? I can best illustrate them by example. Let us take the defense against a Bloc attack on a country on the periphery of the Soviet Union, on a country that is particularly vulnerable to a lightning attack with conventional weapons.
Restricting our consideration to military deterrents for the moment, we have of course the deterrent value of the fear of "massive retaliation." How large a consideration this would be in the minds of the attackers I am not prepared to say, but I do feel it is unsafe to assume it is an absolute deterrent.

Then there would be the possibility of countering the attack with conventional means. And, on this point, there is a certain element of deterrence in a capacity to bring ground forces to bear. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine areas in which the logistic problems for the West would be so formidable as to make it extremely difficult to launch an effective counterattack in time.

But we must not stop here in our search for deterrents. Deterrence of a conventional strike is a mixture of these military elements and a variety of political consequences. And I think the Soviet Union could be expected to consider all of them.

A Soviet estimate of the political or quasi-political consequences of a lightning conventional blow might proceed along the following lines:

We Soviets can be sure that the whole mood of the West will change, and very quickly. The United States will increase its military budget and its military power in being, including conventional forces. It will ask for conventional bases in the area of the country attacked, and countries which could be expected to refuse such a request before the attack may be willing, some even eager, to grant bases thereafter. The West will certainly increase its military presence. Some countries will more closely align themselves with the West.
In sum, the Soviet leadership might conclude that, while they might reasonably expect to subdue the country attacked, they would create a change in the power balance of the area as well as in other parts of the world which would be extremely costly to them in both military and political terms.

I recognize that, like any example, this one has defects. I do not want to convey an impression that I consider political deterrents are more important, or indeed in some instances as important, as military deterrents. However, the point stands that any analysis of the deterrents to limited-war must be based on political as well as military concepts, and the former may well tip the balance between deterrence and nondeterrence.

To turn to guerrilla warfare, or, as I sometimes prefer, internal war, I want to make a point related to what I have said above and to the subject of this conference. Any counterguerrilla offensive must be conceived in political as well as military terms.

In situations such as exist in South Vietnam, for example, purely military sweeps against guerrillas will not work. Somewhat like the sorcerer's apprentice, the military commander is faced with the fact that the more he sweeps out guerrillas at one point the more they flow in at another.

Military measures must be accompanied by civil and political action or the struggle will be lost. By civil action I mean giving a civil structure to the villages--which are the primary guerrilla targets--providing them physical security, tying them in with the national government.
There is an additional consideration concerning civil action which I would like to stress. Recently, when I was speaking to the Council on Foreign Relations about the situation in South Vietnam, a member of the audience complained that public information had been tried in South Vietnam once, that a strategic village had been tried once, in fact about everything had been tried once. His complaint was well founded, but not necessarily for the right reason. What is important is not to take these measures in isolation. They must go hand-in-hand. If a public information program is started without giving the villages physical security, police protection, agricultural and similar assistance, to name a few, the information program is going to fail. Not only will it fail to accomplish what it is meant to do, it will call attention to the fact that these other programs are not being provided.

Often, it seems our enemies are the ones who tell us the truth about what we are doing wrong. General Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnam's Vice Premier and Defense Minister, furnished us an example of this when he summarized what he believed was a basic mistake of the French in North Vietnam with the comment: "The French lost North Vietnam when they decided to separate the civil war from the military war." This is my point—civil and military measures must go hand-in-hand.

I promised to speak briefly of the organization of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department. The Secretary wants what he calls "policy-oriented" research. By this term we mean research which not only contributes to foreign policy formulation but which provides a systematic exploration of policy alternatives. In this connection, the Bureau does not
have the operational responsibilities of the regional Bureaus; consequently, it has resources to play devil's advocate.

In addition to policy-oriented research, we have introduced a program of external research. We have organized this program in such a way as to be able to tap the brains and expertise of the academic and research community on major research projects and to solicit the views of members of that community on a day-to-day basis.

Organized in this manner our external research program becomes a two-way street. We can assist the academic world by pinpointing the issues that are concerning the government. We also can call attention to areas where the supply of theory or concept is either lacking or deficient, areas that need more academic attention than they are receiving. Then, of course, we can make a contribution to our external research consultants by giving them information and analysis. In return we are the beneficiaries of experience, judgment, knowledge, and new ideas and theories.

The Bureau's external research program is 1 year old, and it has been fruitful; more so, I think, than anyone dared hope—and, Congress willing, we expect to broaden our horizons in the coming months.

I will use my remaining time for questions.

QUESTION: Roger, something very close to my heart for years of which I have seen very little has been the request by U.S. Government agencies to counterpart agencies in friendly foreign governments for the performance of descriptive research or basic research in fields of community to both of us. A request, for example, that might be put to the Japanese Government concerning
the transportation network of Red China, a request to the West German Government for their assessment of East European economic growth, and that kind of thing.

Is there any serious prospect of increasing this during your tenure at State?

DR. HILSMAN: There really is a great deal of exchange going on. It is perhaps not quite so formal as you might expect. However, there are representatives here in town, from most of the Commonwealth countries and others, and a considerable exchange goes on between them and our agencies. It is a point, though, that I will look into some more.

QUESTION: Roger, you made mention of the fact that this problem of limited-war is of interdepartmental character. Have you any evidence that the research on these wars is done in a truly interdepartmental way in which all elements having concern with the problem get into the act?

Do you see any evidence that the government is improving its ability to actively wage a conflict in an integrated fashion particularly in areas where the military and the economic clearly have to be coordinated?

DR. HILSMAN: Well, on any given set of data you can argue both sides of the question. The trouble is that if you raise this point in government, you may end up with a committee, which is not always the most helpful way to attack a problem. The best way to attack it, I think, is to get the different skills inside the same skull so that a military skull has political knowledge and military know-how in it and a State Department skull has some military as well as political know-how in it.

This presents an educational problem. There are some encouraging signs. It is really remarkable to me to
In the last few months, how almost all the departments of the government have focused on the problem of internal war in specific places, like Vietnam, and have developed a doctrine.

But getting back to the question of political knowledge in the military mind, and vice versa, you can see many encouraging signs. The number of people in the State Department who have been down to Fort Bragg, lecturing, talking, as guests, is significant, and vice versa. This is a problem that I see no simple solution for.

QUESTION: It seems to me with 350 men you still have a very formidable organization?

DR. HILSMAN: Agreed.

QUESTION: We see at least in my opinion relatively little that comes out of it. I wonder first through what channels should one outside the government look for products of your organization and is there any chance of increasing the flow?

DR. HILSMAN: I am not surprising to me that little comes out to you. Most of it is highly classified. On this I can offer you no hope whatsoever.

QUESTION: Part of what Bill Kintner asked a while ago was not answered. I want to ask it differently. Maybe I am not translating his curiosity correctly but this is mine anyway. You have talked of the interdepartmental nature of research. A number of us are very curious about the interdisciplinary nature of that task which reflects the interdepartmental structure. Are you making any effort to assign your research efforts to put them out in ways and means and packages which will result in all disciplines being brought to bear at the same time on it?
DR. HILSMAN: I am sure that we are guilty of not recognizing what the contribution of some more esoteric disciplines are of which I have no knowledge. Certainly we are making an effort. In fact this may be a gamble but I have asked two psychiatrists to be consultants to the Bureau. If you have any ideas how we can do this better I would be grateful to you.

QUESTION: Are you also farming out the job of bringing together these skills or are you attempting to do all of the bringing together within your own research program?

DR. HILSMAN: Well, to the extent that we can find people who will take this on, yes. But again you do the best you can. Sometimes it works very well, sometimes not so well.

QUESTION: What is the State's attitude toward the Army's civic actions program?

DR. HILSMAN: I think it is great, myself. The only problem I have is that we now have a semantic problem. We have to find another word for the general activities of, let us say, tying villages in with the national government, because if you use civic action and you are talking to somebody who has been subject to the Army's briefing they say, "Oh, what you mean by civic action is getting soldiers out to do these things." We have to find some word for USIA activity, AID activity, and so on. Our main problem is a semantic one.
In a number of places you can already see the impact of the civic action program, in Thailand, for example. Here the Thailand Army civic action program, launched at our suggestion, is having some very useful results.

QUESTION: Will you describe how the external research work is set up?

DR. HILSMAN: Well, the Department of State has long had an external research division whose mission has been to locate everything that is done in the outside world, everything that is published or is in process of research, to make it available to those of us inside government. It has had an interdepartmental mission. It has performed this function for Defense and other agencies as well as State. It also attempts to be aware of and knowledgeable about government-sponsored research and to inform other departments of the government of this research.

I think it is the judgment of all agencies that it has been a very useful project. This year we started on a program of outside research in its true sense, as I described earlier. Next year we hope to have even more money. Hopefully some day we will be in a position to fund some truly basic research, in addition to research on specific questions.

We are not at that stage yet; we don't have that kind of money yet. We have not built up that kind of recognition yet. We have only been going on this 8 months.
QUESTION: I want to ask you whether it is really true that the problem of civic action in these internal war situations is entirely a semantic problem. I wonder if it is not really primarily a problem of direction. By direction I don't mean coordination of the different activities, but the purpose with which particular actions are concerned. I don't mean by purpose that we want to get a lot of people on a particular side, that is clear, but how one infers or how one predicts that a particular type action or several types of actions, panels of actions, will have particular specifiable consequences? How can one know this?

This is where I have a great deal of intellectual trouble with this whole notion of civic action in the internal war situation.

DR. HILSMAN: When I said semantics I was really making the same point you are. The word civic action has been preempted for the activity of soldiers in helping the civil population. What I am concerned with is that a tag word is lacking, since this one has been preempted, for the overall political direction of the whole range of public information, of education, of government services, of feeder roads, of communications, all of which are designed to implement national unity. Creating a sense in the people of identification with a central government is perhaps the overall purpose of this.

In northeast Thailand, for example, 8 million people out of a population of 28 million speak a dialect which is much closer to Lao than it is to Thai. As a result of this and their geographic location, if you were to go to these villages and ask who is the prime minister
of Thailand you would find some who would say Souvanna Phouma.

I think you are quite right that we have not fixed the responsibility in this government for coordinating assistance to our allies in these parts of the world. This ought to be done with an overall political direction. I would say that I am not terribly discouraged because I think a lot of people here and in the field are aware of this now and are going to do something about it.

I think I have exceeded my time. Thank you very much.

DR. KING: Thank you very much, Dr. Hilsman.

The next speaker will be Dr. Leo P. Crespi, Chief of the Survey Research Division of the Research and Reference Service of the United States Information Agency. Dr. Crespi received his doctorate from Princeton University and for many years was on the faculty at Princeton. He was also Associate Director of The Office of Public Opinion Research. Before coming to USIA, he directed much of the U.S. Government opinion research operations in Germany. He has also authored numerous publications in the field of public opinion analysis and in social psychology. Dr. Crespi will speak about "Some Social Science Research Activities in the USIA."

Dr. Crespi.
NOTE: Dr. Crespi's paper is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is included in the CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT to these proceedings. The following unclassified abstract is presented to preserve continuity in these unclassified proceedings.

UNCLASSIFIED ABSTRACT

USIA activities with which Dr. Crespi is concerned attempt to use the best scientific techniques available for guidance and evaluation. Conventional survey techniques, appropriately modified, are used, with an ever-watchful eye on cross-cultural problems. Criticism of the survey techniques, particularly from proponents of motivation research, is discussed and answered.

A number of areas of emphasis of USIA research of relevance to the Army mission are reviewed. These include basic aspirations, climate of opinion, image of America, and troop-civilian relations. The discussion is supported by survey data-summary charts.

A question and answer period follows the presentation touching on a number of substantive and methodological points, including the possible use of USIA data by university scholars.
DR. KING: Thank you, Dr. Crespi.

The next speaker will be Dr. Carroll L. Shartle, of the Office of Science, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Shartle is an Ohio State University Ph.D. and former faculty member at Michigan State College and Ohio State, where he was Professor and Chairman of the Personnel Research Board. He has long been active in government in positions in the Department of Labor, The Social Security Board, the War Manpower Commission, and as Director of Research, the Human Resources Research Institute, U.S. Air Force. Dr. Shartle has had extensive consultant and advisory relationships with various agencies--Office of Secretary of Defense, National Research Council, Social Science Research Council, and the President's Committee on Occupational Deferment.

Dr. Shartle will now present "Selected DOD Programs in Social Science Research."
SELECTED DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS
IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

Dr. Carroll L. Shartle
Chief, Psychology and Social Science Division
Office of Science
Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Office of the Secretary of Defense

In these critical times the social sciences are being called upon more and more for inputs into our decision-making systems. The decision may involve the behavior of one person, a small group, or it may include a huge system of several nations and cultures. This paper will introduce most of the social science research programs in the Department of Defense outside of the Army.

The Army will be covered in the next paper. I shall attempt to mention the portions of the various programs that should be of greatest interest to the group here today. There is certainly carry-over of usefulness across programs. In some instances, I shall give a bit of an historical introduction so that one may see the research within a time perspective.

Navy

In the Department of the Navy, for example, it might be well to look back to a panel report of the Office of Naval Research, dated October 1946, in which the following areas of research were proposed:

1. Comparative study of different cultures: to provide a basis for understanding the behavior and goals of groups, research in the economic, political, cultural, psychological, and
sociological structure of nationality grouping is ... essential. These factors condition and set limits upon the extent to which cooperation is possible between national groups. This series of research studies should also include the description of the motives, habits of mind, and strong social values that various cultures pass on to their individual members ... .

2. Structure and function of groups: It is apparent that our society calls upon the individual to operate efficiently as a member of a wide range of groups varying in size, purpose, structure, and interest.

3. Problems of communication of ideas, policies, and values: Between nations, between groups within a nation, and between individuals within a group, the effectiveness of communication is of paramount importance. Not only do we deal with problems of different languages, but even where the language is common to all participants, the meaning of words, the values being sought, and the receptivity of individuals often combine to create misunderstanding, mistrust, and conflict.

4. Leadership: Just as all individuals at some time must operate within a group, so these groups operate under various forms of leadership. Whether the leader is selected by higher authority, elected from within the group, or emerges spontaneously under pressure of combat or immediate crisis, his contribution is often a determining factor in the group's effectiveness.
5. **Growth and development of the individual:**

   While it is generally true that the individual is molded by the culture and society in which he holds membership, he still brings to that relation considerable individual variability as a functioning member of his society.

   In the 1950 ONR Symposium at Dearborn, Michigan, the program had one paper on cultures with the rest of the 20 papers devoted to group behavior, leadership, and individual behaviors in group contexts. In the paper on cultures, Margaret Mead described a series of research seminars in which several cultures were described and compared (including pre-Soviet Russia, Czech, Polish, French, and Chinese). The emphasis of these projects was on developing methods for studying cultures "at a distance."

   There was one study on communications, "Predicting Who Learns Factual Information from the Mass Media" by Charles E. Swanson, University of Minnesota.

   The papers were published in book form, *Groups, Leadership, and Men*, 1951 Carnegie Press, edited by Harold Guetzkow. However, there was additional work going on which was not reported in this volume. As early as 1943, ONR had supported the Cross-Cultural Survey at Yale. From 1951 to 1953 ONR supported part of the Human Relations Area files—a sequel to the Cross-Cultural Survey. The last anthropological project supported by ONR was *Japanese and Far Eastern Economic Structures* by John Bennet, which ended in 1953.

   In 1947 anthropologists were supported by the Geography Branch on ONR in studies in the Marshalls, Carolinas, and Mariana Islands. The Geography Branch has also supported anthropological work in the Arctic.
By 1956 we notice no projects in studies of comparative cultures being supported and an area of psychological warfare had no projects although five had been dropped from this classification.

At present there are several studies in social geography. Two studies in particular involve social science, principally economics. They are studies of North American Port Hinterlands and the geography of Canary, Madeira, and Cape Verde Islands.

In the present ONR program the Group Psychology Branch of the Psychological Services Division has a series of studies in "Group Effectiveness," and "Group Interaction."

The methods and techniques used include (1) the development of fundamental principles and theoretical models of group and organizational structure, function and development; (2) the study of variables such as size of group, communication procedures, and training techniques, to determine their relevance to group productivity; (3) the development of mathematical techniques which permit dependable description and analysis of the performance of the groups; (4) the construction of tests for determining the effectiveness of groups; (5) cross-cultural studies; (6) analyses of persuasion and motivation techniques in group, national, and cultural settings.

The Office of Naval Research is supporting more than 50 studies covering such topics as cross-cultural studies of attitude change (E. McGinnies' work in U.S.A. and Japan); coalition formation and communication (E. Vinacke at the University of Hawaii); productivity and cohesiveness in culturally heterogeneous groups (I. Katz at N.Y.U.); social influence (B. Raven at UCLA); cognition and attitude change (M. Rosenberg at Ohio...
State). It is expected that this work will be stepped up (through new in-service laboratories and additional contract support) to include more research on conflict and negotiation, group cohesiveness and disruption, psychological warfare, and related projects relevant to cold war, stress, special aspects of space psychology, and other areas.

**Project Michelson**

Project Michelson is an expression of this increased emphasis in social science research in the Navy. This project was started at the Naval Ordnance Test Station at China Lake 3 or 4 years ago, largely because of Navy interest in deterrence and in planning. This program now has 36 projects.

The principal design of the studies may be described in terms of independent variables, intervening variables, and dependent variables.

The independent variables include weapon systems, population growth, research and development, and political military actions.

The intervening variables include situational aspects, such as crisis or noncrisis, structural variables such as alliances and nature of international systems. Another class of intervening variables can be considered informational filters and includes attitudes, anticipations, and values. Information studies, for example, include "Comparison of Soviet-American Values," by Angell and Hoffman at the University of Michigan, and "European Attitudes Toward Weapons Systems Characteristics," by D. Lerner at MIT.
Crisis variables include studies by Halperin at Harvard and Rountree at Ohio State.

The dependent variables are stated in degrees of war.

The various projects can be grouped under the headings of variables, interrelation of variables, formulating hypotheses, and testing hypotheses.

Two studies on formulating hypotheses are:

Other Michelson studies include: "Pilot Simulation of World War I," Guetzkow at Northwestern; "Public Opinion as a Limiting Factor in Deterrence," Schramm at Stanford; "Factor-Analytic Structure of Deterrence Theory," O'Sullivan at ITEK; and "Evaluation of Analytic and Synthetic Propositions of Deterrence Theory," Brody at NOTS.

The work of the Naval in-service laboratories as well as contract support of studies in group behavior, social geography, organizational theory, analysis of cultural determinants, conflict and deterrence strategies etc., shows a clear trend of increasing Naval support of social science research and utilization of research products.

Air Force

By way of history, the Air Force inaugurated a full-fledged social sciences research institute at Air University in 1949. It was known as the Human Resources Research Institute, and during a 4-year period did several million dollars in research. The largest project was with Harvard University entitled "A Working Model of
Soviet Society." Other studies included Yugoslavia, Communist China, overseas public opinion, and field work in Korea. When the Institute was merged with the Human Resources Research Center in 1954, much of the work was curtailed although an office of social science was continued.

The Center was later discontinued as an organization, but some of its laboratories remained in other contexts. The present Personnel Research Laboratory is an example.

In 1956 the Behavioral Sciences Division was established in Research and Development Command in the Washington area. Its first contract was a "Behavioral Sciences Interdisciplinary Task Group Research Program." The first conference was held at the University of New Mexico in 1957, where 32 social scientists met for 8 weeks and prepared research papers. A second conference was held in 1958. The 1957 and 1958 conferences gave considerable stimulus to the development of the program.

The Behavioral Sciences Division of the Air Force in its current program has a total of 44 contracts.

Of particular interest to the group here today are research tasks related to Air Force interests in persuasion, motivation, and intercultural communication. Work is in progress, for example, on a study of the effects of variations in levels of stimulation on subject reaction in interviews by Dr. Herbert Zimmer, University of Georgia.

An interservice support contract is in progress with the External Research Division, Department of State, to provide periodic inventories of U.S. research projects, conducted on foreign areas and cultures, international communications, and national security problems.
At the University of Pittsburgh, Nehnevajsa is investigating the comparative impact of anticipated versus actual events on the attitudes of representative samples of foreign elites and the potential decisions which political leaders would make under specified conditions.

Dr. Harold Guetzkow of Northwestern University is conducting research on simulation of the interaction between nations with emphasis upon the modeling of the decision-making processes. Resulting models of interaction should provide methodological tools for analytical and predictive purposes.

It is planned to expand work under this task in FY 63 on the basic mechanisms of intercultural communication and persuasion.

Psychological and sociological studies on individual and group reactions to generally stressful conditions in military and industrial activities that have been, and are being, produced, are theoretically important. They are not, however, adequate or pertinent to the understanding of pressures exerted upon captured and detained personnel, or personnel stationed in sensitive foreign areas. It is, therefore, proposed to augment research in these topics.

Under contract with the Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc., Washington, D.C., Biderman and Klausner are conducting research on the various types of self-control, auto-suggestion, self-hypnosis. The objective is to identify those procedures which are suitable for experimental testing and for their usefulness in improving performance of military personnel under stressful conditions in strange environments, captivity, and survival situations.
Dr. Martin T. Orne, Harvard Medical School and Massachusetts Mental Health Center, has a 4-year study of the nature and uses of hypnosis in military applications.

Research on analytical models of foreign social systems is in progress. The primary objective of this research is to provide basic knowledge toward the construction of models or schematic frameworks to facilitate analysis of the quantifiable elements of foreign social systems which are most crucial to estimating and predicting the war-making and war-sustaining capabilities of such nations.

Work under this task, for example, is in progress with Human Sciences Research, Inc., by Nordlie, on the preparation of an analytical model for integrating the physical and social effects of destructive forces on a society.

Work is planned on the following aspects of this task on which proposals for research have been received: (a) computer simulation of thinking and decision processes; and (b) quantitative assessment of socio-political climates.

"Peel-Offs" of social science research either in terms of research findings as a guide to further research or as information or techniques for operations are expected to be particularly important in these areas that have direct application to the management of cold war activities and planning for limited-war.

In areas of group and organizational and communication behavior, the Air Force has important research in progress.
Individual team performance of tasks in man-machine context is being investigated by Fitts at the University of Michigan.

A research effort directed by Borgatta of the University of Wisconsin is exploring the scope and inclusiveness of variables which are relevant to the understanding of individual and group behavior in group interaction.

The Behavioral Sciences Laboratory at Wright Patterson Air Force Base has considerable research in progress. The work on man-machine systems in command and control and on human factors in space flight involves social science concepts of group and organizational behavior. The Personnel Laboratory at Lackland Air Force Base likewise is engaged in a number of studies that are within a social science framework.

Project RAND

One of the best known social sciences capabilities of the Air Force is Project RAND which was established in 1946. The project read:

to perform a program of study and research on the broad subject of intercontinental warfare, other than surface, with the object of recommending to the Air Force preferred techniques and instrumentalities for this purpose.

"Project RAND" represents an Air Force investment in long range objective research and analysis. To preserve this objectivity the RAND Corporation management is given maximum freedom in planning their research program and work schedule. Their program is reviewed periodically by the Air Force Advisory Group.
In a report to the Air Force Advisory Group in June 1961, for official use only, Project RAND includes activities in social science areas, primarily economics and political science. Some of these follow:

Future plans for the work at RAND on Sino-Soviet economic potential call for concentration on foreign economic activities of the USSR and China to appraise their probable impact on the Cold War. It is expected that initial emphasis will be on Soviet Bloc economic activities in underdeveloped areas—Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (roughly in this order of priority).

Work on the military, political, economic, and geographic factors of the weapons system environment in areas outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc includes an analysis of the political context of Japanese rearmament and Communist strategy in Japan, studying factors that mold political choices in the Middle East and attempting to estimate their pace and direction.

Studies will be initiated on the economic development of Turkey and a comparison of the Constantine Plan in Algeria with operation BOOTSTRAP in Puerto Rico.

Emphasis has been given to the national Cold War effort and the role of the Air Force in it. The case of West Berlin has received considerable attention as an explicit analysis of ways in which the United States generated a successful counterstrategy to Russian blackmail over Berlin.

Seminars are held on issues related to U.S. strategic objectives and national security. Much of the debate about general war—the various kinds and degrees of deterrence and war—fighting capabilities, for example—takes place in this forum.
A study of the use of statistical indices for the control of large and complex organizations has been completed. This work examines the mathematical procedure necessary to describe the elements of a control system and provides a framework for the evaluation of such systems.

Research on Soviet foreign and military policy includes analyses of Soviet military doctrine, the current focus of this effort being on Soviet plans for areas likely to be vulnerable to Soviet pressures.

Studies of Chinese Communist military and foreign policy continue to address the foreign policy objectives of the Chinese Communist regime, including the calculations and underlying conditions which affect these objectives, and to estimate the effectiveness of techniques available to, or employed by, the regime for achieving their purposes. Attempts are being made to develop more accurate and refined methods for analyzing Chinese Communist foreign policy.

The present plan is to build up new areas such as Southeast Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, and to increase work in sublimited-war.

RAND products include research reports, memoranda on research appers, and translations.

Research papers and translations are in all social science disciplines but primarily economics with emphasis on an interdisciplinary approach. Some recent publications include:

- The Political Consequences of a Hypothetical Arms Control Agreement, by H. Goldhamer.
- Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia, by G. J. Parkway.
Office of the Secretary of Defense

In the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, there have been several significant developments which give a new emphasis to social science research.

A report, "Research on Psychological and Political Effects of Military Postures," by Pool, Davison, and Riecken (May 5, 1959; revised July 1959), Confidential, made recommendations for studies of international opinion and elite attitudes. Civilian-military relations in foreign countries were also considered pertinent. This report (often called the Pool Report) was approved by the Defense Science Board in September 1959. The report, along with a report, "Proposal for Research on Mass Psychology," initiated by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research were updated in a study by the Institute for Defense Analyses. New topics were recommended.
The second development was the report on nonmateriel research for limited-warfare. A task group of Davison, Dyer, Knorr, Millikan, Orlansky, and Pool prepared the report for Dr. Alvarez. Recommendations included the following survey of available foreign area information:

1. Political dynamics of developing nations.

2. Adapting patterns of action to individual societies.

3. Functioning of local military establishments.

4. Motivation of existing and potential enemies.

5. Problem of combined operations.

6. Images of the United States.

7. Political constraints on weapons systems.

8. Quick reaction capabilities.

9. The development of super-simplified material inventory and control system.

10. Methods for rapid language training.

11. Training required in combined field operations with indigenous military forces.

A third important development in OSD was the Smithsonian Report. In the Office of Science, ODDR&E,
an ONR contract with the Smithsonian Institution has fostered a major planning study under the leadership of Dr. Dael Wolfle, Chairman of the Defense Advisory Panel in Psychology and Social Sciences. A group of 36 leading psychologists and social scientists working with Dr. C.W. Bray, prepared a report, "The Technology of Human Behavior," Recommendations for Defense Support of Research in Psychology and Social Sciences, dated July 1960.

The report examines the needs of the military establishment for long range effort in psychology and the social sciences. The basic general requirement is for a technology of human behavior suited to assist the "managers" of military effort in decision making about people.

The report describes three important areas which are "ready" for advance:

1. Establish a prime contract for a long range program of research on Human Performance in order to:
   a. Create a Man-Machine System Laboratory for the use of simulation in research on the information processing performance of men when serving as system components.
   b. Create an Intellectual Skills Laboratory for basic research on standards of human intellectual performance and the processes of decision-making in the individual.
   c. Create a Team Performance Laboratory for research on the performance of men when working together in small groups.
2. Establish an Institute of Organization Research for a long range program of basic comparative research on military organization.

3. Establish a program of continuing centers of research on Persuasion and Motivation by making grants to several selected contractors now engaged in research in this field.

4. Provide to the scientists employed in the above programs continuity of support, stability of employment, freedom from the distraction of frequent rejustification, and freedom to pursue in their own way the development of a technology of human behavior.

The Report was considered in detail and at length by the Coordinating Committee on Science in the Department of Defense and recommendations for implementation were approved and submitted to the Defense Science Board. The Defense Science Board approved the recommendations and referred the plan to the Advanced Research Projects Agency for consideration.

A Behavioral Science Council in ARPA has been established with representation from each of the services, the Office of Science, and ARPA. In the meantime, an ad hoc group has proceeded to look at the existing programs to review projects received thus far and to draw up recommendations for ARPA consideration.

The Smithsonian Report of 1960 did not give sufficient attention to certain of the social sciences. A second report is in progress which includes such papers as:
The research aspects of the papers will be discussed in a chapter by Ithiel de Sola Pool who is Chairman of the group.

A fourth development is in the area of arms control. In the social science area, a task group engaged by the Smithsonian Institution prepared a list of recommendations in a draft document, "Proposed Arms-Control Research for Sponsorship by the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering," January 1962, Official Use Only. In this draft a number of social science studies were recommended including theoretical models of arms races, gaming in competitive situations, statistical sampling, nonrational and irrational elements in
decision-making, and political and social role of secrecy in relation to arms control.

Short range studies are currently under way. These include: conditions of communications, crisis situations and arms control implications, international force problems, and internal security force problems. Longer range contracts are being formulated.

**Advanced Research Projects Agency**

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was established 7 February 1958 as a separate operating agency within the Department of Defense, and later that year was placed under the supervision of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. Its project assignments are generally: (1) research not identified with a specific military requirement, (2) research which relates to the primary functions of two or more of the military services, or (3) research which for specific reasons is better handled by an agency other than one of the military services.

ARPA's interest in research in the behavioral sciences is described as including human performance and persuasion, motivation, relationship of attitudes to behavior, rationality in decision-making, group relations, communications, and the relation of cultural differences to persuasion. Earlier discussions with the three services indicated that the area of persuasion and motivation should receive highest priority. Programs and projects are now being considered by a representative group under the Chairmanship of Dr. Licklider, who will head ARPA programs in Behavioral Sciences and Command and Control. Command and control research involves behavioral
scientists and in part meets the recommendations for man-machine systems research outlined in the Smithsonian Report.

ARPA may also pursue social science research in Project Agile—its program of research and development in remote area conflict.

Civil Defense

The largest and one of our latest social science programs in the Department of Defense is Civil Defense. Social science research is responsible for (1) developing knowledge of the effects of war and tension upon society and its institutions; (2) determining the reactions of people to conditions before, during, and after attack; (3) providing data for developing measures such as shelter and dispersion, for protecting the population; (4) developing data for planning relief and rehabilitation programs, embracing essential community and government functions; (5) determining effective means of securing active cooperation of people in promoting civil emergency planning measures throughout the nation.

The research covers a wide range of topics and includes evaluation of training and leader selection. Perhaps best known are the disaster studies sponsored by the Disaster Research Group of the National Research Council. A sociological review of disaster studies has been prepared and a book is forthcoming called "Men and Society in Disaster." Examples of other current studies which should be of interest to the group include:

1. A master project with Columbia University on morale and behavior studies in the general area of communications and persuasion. The
research will develop a general overall pattern of communication strategy.

2. A communications process study with Michigan State University is partially completed. The research includes the responses to communication and the identity of major variables which seem to make important differences in behavior responses.

3. A study on public attitudes toward the making and stocking of shelters is in progress.

4. Command and control studies are planned including warning decisions, voice sound systems, and population response.

5. Studies relative to post-attack include survey of reconstruction experiences in other countries since World War II and the study of indirect social and psychological effects of thermonuclear attack.

**NATO**

This picture would not be complete without mention of NATO. We have a NATO Advisory Group on Defense Psychology. Under the auspices of this group a symposium was held in 1960 and 1961 in Europe. In addition to personnel and human engineering problems, group theory, leadership, military social structure, and the place of values relating to national defense are among the topics which have been discussed. A classified report on long-term studies has recently been prepared at NATO and discussed by this group. We expect this report will result in new studies at the NATO level.
Summary and Comment

In these few minutes I have done considerable injustice to all programs. One could have easily devoted a full day to each and then have given only an introduction.

It is quite obvious that social science research is considered important and has appeared again and again in research plans. However, two difficulties arise. One is that many of the recommendations are never initiated—at least within a reasonable time. Second, research projects and even programs that are begun often do not have sufficient longevity. Longevity is, of course, a problem in any science and it is probably true that social science research has as much longevity as some areas in biological and physical science.

Planned social science programs such as those in the Air Force and Navy have a way of changing emphasis in order to survive or to be revived after a serious curtailment. Programs must, of course, adjust to changes in requirements. I would say, however, that lack of systematic continuance rather than too much stability has been characteristic of past social science research.

Of the programs I have described, the ONR Research Group has achieved considerable recognition and stability even though it has departed considerably from the original ONR 1946 published plans.

The Behavioral Sciences Division of the Air Force has gained considerable stature during its few years of existence and can be strengthened.

In terms of overall contribution, particularly for the theme of this symposium, RAND is the most conspicuous for its quality, longevity, and utility. In spite of weaknesses about which any RAND staff member will tell you, RAND has shown strength and will, no doubt, increase its capability.
Looking at our overall programs from a discipline point of view, we find a prominence of psychology and of political science. I would suggest that the relative emphasis of sociology and anthropology should be greater. When we add Civil Defense programs to our sample for examination, the overall balance for sociology is much better. In fact, sociology is the prominent discipline in Civil Defense social science research. However, for basic research in the rest of the Department, sociology should contribute relatively more as should anthropology.

In basic research we tend to become fragmented and support many small projects rather than a few larger ones. Support of competent individual scholars who have research interests that fall within the framework of Defense is important and has shown substantial dividends in both research output and prestige. These must be vigorously continued with payoffs made available as they are produced. We must look realistically beyond this pattern, however, and initiate a bold attack on several defined problem areas with sufficient capability of research breadth and depth and over a sufficient length of time to make significant and continuous contributions in these human performance areas.

The Behavioral Sciences Program to be supported by ARPA and what will be proposed by the Department of the Army here today are the key programs which can bring about a balanced overall capability in Defense social science which we have never had in the past but which is needed now as never before.
It was not one of the purposes of this symposium to present detailed descriptions of current Army research programs; nor was the purpose to present detailed planning concepts for future research. However, in the Office of the Chief, Research and Development, we are aware that the many contributions which have been made here should be reflected in the future research. To make maximum use of the symposium as soon as possible we in OCRD have accomplished some initial planning. I think it fitting that the last paper should share these thoughts with you, our many distinguished guests and participants in this symposium.

It is indeed a pleasure to introduce to you a fellow member of OCRD and a colleague of mine for many years, Dr. E. Kenneth Karcher, who will speak about "Army Social Science Programs and Plans," which have specific reference to this symposium.

ARMY SOCIAL SCIENCE PROGRAMS AND PLANS

Dr. E. K. Karcher, Jr.
Office, Chief, Research and Development

In this rather brief presentation of the Army's research programs and plans I will first discuss the overall current human factor research capabilities of the Army. With this information as background I will present the social science research objectives of the Army, which is the primary consideration of this symposium.
I think it is well that we keep in mind that the current concepts of limited-warfare place a research requirement on all the behavioral and human-factors scientists. As a consequence, all the human-factors research organizations of the Army are placing an emphasis on the needs of limited-warfare. The major human-factors research organizations of the Army are as follows:

1. The U.S. Army Personnel Research Office which is located in Washington, D.C. conducts research in the area of personnel selection, utilization, classification, and assignment. One of the first organizations of the military establishment conducting human factors research, the organization is well known for its capability in psychological measurement and evaluation.

2. The Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO) of George Washington University is concerned with research on problems of training, motivation, morale and leadership. Six research units are located throughout the United States to facilitate the conduct of research on specific military problems. I am certain that you are all familiar with HumRRO and its excellent research in the field of training.

3. The Special Operations Research Office of American University was established in 1956 with the specific mission of supporting the expanding requirements of Special Warfare.

4. Human Engineering Laboratories and Psychophysiological Laboratories are conducting research with some direct and a great deal of indirect bearing on the limited-war mission.

In order to appreciate the impact of these organizations on the limited-war mission I would like to cite only a few of the studies with which they are
concerned. When the training of Special Forces personnel by the Army was still an extremely modest effort, a very thorough and detailed 3-year study was conducted on the selection of personnel for training. The three tests developed were completed in 1960. This test battery represents one of the most valid selection procedures the Army has developed when the criterion of successful prediction was simulated field performance. Let me hasten to add very quickly that this battery selects men with a great potential for the combat performance needed in Special Forces and does not measure the variety of other complex factors or abilities, which have been discussed at the symposium and were referred to particularly in the paper by Dr. Preston. Psychological factors related to successful work with foreign personnel will be given more consideration by the Army Personnel Research Office and the possibility of psychological screening tests for use by friendly foreign forces is currently under study.

HumRRO has been conducting studies for some time on the development of accelerated language training, a problem which is most acute for Special Forces and unconventional warfare operations. Research has recently been undertaken on the training problems associated with operations in foreign areas where the interaction with indigenous personnel occurs daily and the potential cultural conflict is intense.

The psychological handbooks and studies of guerrilla and unconventional warfare are the products of SORO. These studies are more directly the products of social science and relate to the concern of the symposium. The value of these studies has been thoroughly acknowledged and work of this type will continue. How this research
FIGURE 1

U.S. ARMY'S HUMAN FACTORS RESEARCH CAPABILITIES

U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL RESEARCH OFFICE
... SELECTION
... UTILIZATION

HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE
... TRAINING
... MOTIVATION

SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
... FOREIGN AREA STUDIES
... UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE STUDIES

HUMAN ENGINEERING AND PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY LABORATORIES
... MAN-MACHINE COMPATIBILITIES
... HUMAN PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

FIGURE 2

NONMATERIEL RESEARCH IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL

THE SPECIAL FORCES SELECTION BATTERY

PSYCHOLOGICAL SCREENING TESTS FOR USE BY FRIENDLY FORCES

ACCELERATED LANGUAGE TRAINING TECHNIQUES

TRAINING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL

HANDBOOKS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SYMBOLS AND INFORMATION INFILTRATION

SPECIAL STUDIES OF GUERRILLA AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
will be expanded to include a program more responsive to the many diverse social science military problems is the subject of the presentation which follows.

Recognition of the need for social science research within the military establishment is quite widespread today. With the exception of political science, which has dealt with subjects like international strategy, power politics, and the dynamics of deterrence, the current conviction that the assistance of the social scientist will be valuable is not based on the past performance of the scientists themselves or the important contributions they have already made. Social scientists have, in fact, been somewhat conspicuous by their absence in military research programs. Consequently, the belief that social science will make important contributions relevant to the needs of the military establishment is to a great extent only an hypothesis. The ultimate worth of social science for the military is not an established fact based on documented results or even testimonials from military leaders. We do, of course, recognize the work of ORO, now RAC, and HumRRO in these areas during the past years. But even with their fine work the total social science effort within the defense establishment has been most modest.

The growing interest in social science research stems primarily from the recognition that many of the needs and requirements of the military in the present-day world situation relate to areas of information and investigation that are the traditional concern of the social scientist. Today we are faced with the uncertainty of whether social science will be able to substantiate its importance and worth to the military establishment in the immediate years ahead.
The Army's Office of the Chief of Research and Development has the fullest confidence in the ability of the social scientists to confirm the importance of their research. Deliberations on the future of social science oriented toward military problems led to this very symposium. The same deliberations led to a critical evaluation of the potential role of the social scientist in the Army's research program. This concern naturally led to a consideration of the potential military end-products of social science research. Tangible research end-products are likely to be limited in number. The other types of human factors research programs previously described will have more observable and obvious products. The "bread and butter" social science offering will no doubt continue to be handbooks dealing with various types of military operations in specified foreign areas. These products are not new to the Army's research program but neither do they represent imaginative social science research. Based on a higher order of scientific investigation and experimentation we may expect the social scientist to evolve a variety of techniques and procedures. These research reports might be described as military social science strategy which is based on established social science principles or the experimental investigation of new hypotheses. These technique or procedure research reports may deal with a very wide range of subjects. Their content may range from the use of informal communication networks to accomplish specific types of goals to methods for securing civilian support for guerrilla forces in varied types of underdeveloped economies.
While both the "handbook" and "strategy" type reports will be of invaluable assistance to the military establishment, we believe that they are not sufficient to guarantee a continued high level of support for a military social science research program. The necessary ingredient for an adequately sponsored program is not esoteric. It is staff advice and consultative assistance. The ability to secure enlightened social science judgment and opinion on a timely basis is probably the most valuable end-product the social scientist currently has to offer. Advice and brief staff studies from the social scientists are essential to assist in the multitude of military decisions which involve ever-changing conditions and circumstances in the remote and underdeveloped areas of the world. The need to support the Department of the Army's requirement for consultative service has been recognized and met in the established areas of the Army's human factors program. We believe the requirement for immediate aid and advice will be much greater from social science which supports a limited-war mission. Taking this factor into account, we propose that the development of the Army's social science capabilities must stress the following:

1. Acquisition and training of a staff for research management which is thoroughly familiar with the operation of the military establishment, both organizationally and functionally.

2. Acquisition and training of research scientists who will be thoroughly conversant with military operations and understand the relation between programed research and military objectives.
3. Development of procedures for continuing liaison between Department of Army staff offices and related research organizations. As indicated on the chart this last objective will insure research based on recognized military requirements. It will also facilitate the consultative advice which we consider so necessary.

FIGURE 3

**BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR A MILITARY SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PROGRAM**

A STAFF FOR RESEARCH MANAGEMENT THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE OPERATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT--ORGANIZATIONALLY AND FUNCTIONALLY

A RESOURCE OF RESEARCH SCIENTISTS THOROUGHLY CONVERSANT WITH MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH NEEDS

A RESEARCH PROGRAM THAT WILL:

... REFLECT RECOGNIZED MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND LONG RANGE OBJECTIVES

... SATISFY MILITARY NEEDS FOR CONSULTATIVE ASSISTANCE AND STAFF ADVICE
The desire to achieve these three goals clearly dictates research units or organizations dedicated entirely to the problems of military social science. These organizations must additionally have an adequate continuity of research staff.

The Office of the Chief of Research and Development has developed a long range planning concept for the expansion of the Army's social science research capabilities. It has long been a matter of discussion as to whether military research achieves maximum effectiveness when organized strictly in accordance with the content of the research from a disciplinary aspect, or organized around major military operational problems. This discussion is still with us. The organization of research is always a compromise and maximum effectiveness dictates a considerable degree of flexibility. The Army's present plans have taken these factors into account and the outline which follows is far from rigid at this juncture.

For ease and clarity of presentation I will, nevertheless, present our thinking in a semiorganizational framework. The total social science requirement to support the Army's limited-war mission would fall into three major categories:

1. Psychological and Unconventional Warfare Research.
2. Socio-Military Environmental Research.
3. Remote Area Research Units and Field Developments.
Psychological and Unconventional Warfare Research will be oriented toward guerrilla and counterinsurgency operations which are a very visible aspect of the Army's overall mission. Special operations handbooks would continue to represent a considerable effort. The handbooks would be concerned with foreign area studies from a wide variety of aspects. Although handbooks are largely descriptive in nature we might expect a greater inclusion of analytical material in the future.

The extent and criticality of intercultural communication has reached such proportions today that an entire research effort could be devoted to this area. Communication research is the very foundation for successful persuasion and involves extensive analysis of the information process within various types of social...
structures and an understanding of cultural values and aspirations as determinants of behavior.

Socio-Military Environmental Research is the second major proposed organizational element. Research in this area is based on the belief that guerrilla and unconventional warfare is as much a matter of local politics and conflicts within a social order as it is a matter of weapons and fire power. The press and magazines are replete these days with a recognition of the fact that warfare in remote and underdeveloped countries must ultimately be solved on the socio-economic and political level. There is no need to elaborate on this point. There are many persons, however, who have probably wondered why the U.S. Army should be concerned with social organization and political affairs. Some bewilderment on this topic has existed even within the military establishment. The Army is not assuming responsibility for areas that are the appropriate concern of other agencies of the government. I believe Dr. Lucian Pye gave us an excellent exposition of how the Army has come to find itself concerned with these types of problems. Allow me to cite several critical points which we believe help to dispel confusion on this point.

In many, if not all, of the remote or underdeveloped countries of the world the local military organizations exert a tremendous daily influence on all aspects of national life within the country. This stems from a variety of factors. The foreign military organization may contain a large portion of the country’s technically trained and skilled personnel. The military may be in possession of a large portion of the country’s advanced equipment. Sometimes the local military organizations do not have a great vested interest in the traditional
social structure and thereby are more receptive to social change or reform. In some countries the military are more sensitive to the international situation and actually have greater contact and interaction with foreign personnel. Lastly, it is an undeniable fact that many military personnel of the developing countries have a natural preference for dealing with other military men. The obvious conclusion is that in the decades immediately ahead the military establishment, whether by choice or not, will be greatly concerned with aspects of socio-economic and political change throughout large areas of the world.

Within the broad area of socio-military environmental research there are two major areas of emphasis. The first concerns the civic action programs which are currently underway and being programmed. Several such programs and associated problems have already been discussed at the symposium. The second area of emphasis is oriented toward a consideration of internal wars and insurgency. In this area we are most concerned with the problems of social change and the internal and external factors which bring about conflict within a given country. We are concerned not only with the analysis of the status quo but the actual prediction of events under specified conditions. Social science, it is believed, has the capability to accomplish such research. First, however, there must be a reexamination of the traditional concepts of evolutionary social change based on the ex-post-facto analysis of Western-European development. Internal war and insurgency research must be analyzed from a long range point of view. The Army must be able to anticipate its military problems and future military requirements in many
diverse areas of the world which present extremely heterogeneous conditions.

The third major proposed organizational element of research concerns Remote Area Research Teams and Field Developments. One purpose of social science field units or teams would be to support much of the research previously outlined. The data for the limited-war social scientist exist in the foreign areas. Much of this raw data cannot be secured on a mail-order basis or requisitioned from a library. Remote area field units or teams will provide the research personnel with the close relationship to both the data they need and the military problems generating their research. At the very minimum there is a basic requirement for operations in three major areas of the world. First and foremost is Southeast Asia, where the problems are pressing and immediate. Research teams concerned with Latin America and Africa are probably equally important from a long range point of view.

It is anticipated that units operating overseas would have a broader mission than strictly social science research. All the traditional human factors research problems that bear on limited-warfare may be integrated and coordinated at these units. There are numerous training research programs relating to both U.S. and indigenous forces that require on-site data collection or try out. It is even possible that these units will facilitate the solution of various types of human engineering problems involving unconventional warfare equipment.

In addition, the remote area research units would be charged with the responsibility for what may be described as "field developments." If the Army research program is to be successful there must be products or
results which are fed back to the military units, MAAGs, and Missions assigned to the remote areas. The most basic and elementary consideration is the packaging of foreign area materials. The translation of research findings or information into usable materials that are valuable for military personnel is not an activity that can be taken for granted. Field tryout and evaluation is constantly required.

In the presentation of the concept for military social science research we are fully cognizant of the requirement for an adequate balance between basic and applied research. Within each of the three major areas of research discussed there is provision for fundamental or basic research studies which would support the more applied considerations. A variety of studies has been categorized on the chart as either primarily basic or primarily applied research. To a limited extent the content of the investigation itself dictates the relative level of basic research. We cannot rely entirely on accumulated knowledge or even established research procedures when considering such areas as intercultural communications and the problems of internal wars. Basic research in these areas is absolutely essential and yet, the applied payoff for military programs may sometimes be quite immediate.
SELECTED ASPECTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE MILITARY
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PROGRAM

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<th>FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH STUDIES</th>
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<td>INTERCULTURAL FACTORS IN COMMUNICATIONS AND LINGUISTICS</td>
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<td>AREA STUDIES OF POWER ELITES AND MILITARY OPERATIONS</td>
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<td>MILITARY ROLES IN THE RAPID SOCIAL CHANGE OF DEVELOPING NATIONS</td>
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I would like to make one other observation concerning the overall concept for social science research. We anticipate that such a research program must necessarily draw on the skills of all the social science disciplines. It might be a misnomer to call the proposed program interdisciplinary but there is a requirement for the sociologist and anthropologist; the psychologist and the political scientist. Not to be overlooked is the statistician, historian, and economist—and of course the trained competence of the professional soldier.
The program which has been outlined is obviously ambitious. It is not a program that can be fully implemented at one time. It must be expanded in a manner consistent with the development of capabilities and acquired experience. It is a program for which we will need and solicit guidance. One of the objectives of the present symposium is to present an overview of the limited-war area and obtain some of our early guidance.

In conclusion I want to indicate that we believe that the Army's military social science research programs are an absolutely essential part of the ability of the United States to meet the widespread threats of "wars of liberation." The Army has been given an important role in responding to the demands for social and economic changes throughout the world as part of the necessity to create and protect conditions which are favorable for free and democratic governments. Let there be no doubt, however, that we have been describing a social science research program. The emphasis is on research. We are in pursuit of facts and knowledge. Social and political philosophies as determinants of behavior may be facts, and when appropriate they will not be ignored. However, military social scientists will not be engaged in debates on social philosophy or engaged in political commentary. We feel that a military social science research program will receive long-term support only if it emphasizes the conduct of research and refrains from journalistic comments on world affairs.

DR. KING: Thank you, Dr. Karcher.

General William J. Ely will next add some closing remarks. General Ely is the Director of Army Research. I think it is indicative of his great personal interest in the subject presented at this symposium that he has
attended all sessions which it was possible for him to attend. It is now my pleasure and honor to introduce General Ely.

CLOSING REMARKS

Major General William J. Ely
Director, Army Research Office
Office, Chief of Research and Development
Department of the Army

Gentlemen:

We have already had numerous informal comments from you, both scientists and soldiers, which indicate that this symposium has been an outstanding success in initiating an improved understanding of the Army's mission in limited-war, and in recruiting increased interest among social scientists in devoting your talents to Army requirements.

I cannot in justice comment in this manner on the success of the symposium without calling your attention to the fact that we all owe a large measure of gratitude to Colonel Kai Rasmussen's fine organization, to Colonel Black of that organization, and to The American University, our hosts, who have made this meeting truly a creative experience for us all.

In particular I would call your attention to the energetic and imaginative manner in which Dr. William A. Lybrand, Executive Secretary of the Army Symposium Advisory Group, has in a short months done a planning and executive job to which we normally would devote an entire year of preparation. He could not have done it,
of course, without the help of that Advisory Group, all of whom are named on the back cover of the Symposium Program, which is in your hands; and his compatriot, Dr. Irwin Altman.

In addition, I must name specifically: Mr. Thomas E. Proulx, Miss Elizabeth A. Bentz, and Mrs. Nancy Patteson who provided the innumerable specifics of program management and the efficient group of charming young ladies whom Colonel Black, of SORO, provided for administrative support.

I have said that the symposium has already clearly been a success in increasing understanding for and interest in the Army's limited-war mission. The work of the symposium is not quite done, however. From the presentation given here in the last 3 days it is clear to me, as I think it is to all of us, that the Army has got a job of research coordination to do. As regards the programming and research priorities, we look to Working Group I, under Colonel George Bayerle, to give us a consensus of your best current thinking.

As to coordination on a national level, I quote the substance of a comment made to you yesterday by General Stilwell. He said, if I have the wording correctly, "There has been no difficulty in the past in achieving interdepartmental coordination when things reach the status of a Korea, a Laos, or a Vietnam. Where the Army needs your help is in achieving the same thing for anticipatory planning for areas which may for the moment be deemed less critical."

We earnestly solicit the best thoughts of Working Group II in this second matter.
On behalf of the Chief, Research and Development, General Trudeau; and President Anderson, The American University; as well as myself, I thank you for your attendance.

I now declare this symposium officially closed.
POST-SYMPOSIUM COMMENTS

SUBMITTED

FOR

INCLUSION
In implementing its responsibilities to maintain the mental and physical health of troops, the U.S. Army Medical Department has a body of knowledge and interests paralleling those of this conference. In terms of the limited-war mission may I remind the members here assembled that wars of whatever size and in whatever terrain are still as subject to being won and lost through disease as they ever were.

The type of military activity being here considered is even more subject to the ravages of disease than average. Furthermore, to consider the use of an armed force in civic action and indoctrination roles would seem to me to require more attention to medical phenomenon than has been mentioned thus far. For example, accepting that it is desirable to obtain cooperative and friendly attitudes from local populations, how better could we obtain this than through the alleviation of blindness in a child, the rescue of a population from tuberculosis (to mention only a few of a host of what are already widely recognized needs felt by these local populations)?

Secondly, the Army psychiatrist, as a division psychiatrist or chief of a Mental Hygiene Consultation Service, has become increasingly aware of the importance of preventive and social psychiatric tools. For example, he has had to learn how to teach a group to handle more adequately the maladjustment tendencies of its members. He has been required to learn new
techniques and to develop new concepts to the point that he is now less prone to hold the individual "responsible" for all his ills. He is learning how to guide a group towards methods of relating among members which methods have therapeutic benefit. In short, a body of knowledge has been accumulated, much of which has yet to be formally written down and organized.

It is my strong recommendation that the closest possible cooperation be maintained between social science and medical research, in order not only that both gain from the relationship but that neither miss crucial considerations simply because they lack communication with each other.

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