FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
The Rationale of Its Development

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES DIVISION

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This report has been reviewed in the Office of Civil Defense and approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Office of Civil Defense.

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES DIVISION
FOREWORD

This Study represents part of a research program of analyses of alternative civil defense systems conducted for the Office of Civil Defense under Contract No. OCD-OS-63-134 (dated June 28, 1963). IDA studies in civil defense are being performed in the Economic and Political Studies Division under the general direction of Mr. Samuel Ewer Eastman, Project Head.

Among the co-authors of this study, Dr. Nehemiah Jordan contributed historical research and Dr. John E. Tashjean provided political analysis. Miss Adele Scaraton prepared the appendix and assisted in drafting the report. Other members of the IDA civil defense project contributed valuable insight and criticism during the preparation of this study.

Without implicating them in any of our errors of fact, interpretation, or judgment, we wish to acknowledge the assistance and support offered to us by colleagues in other research institutions and, above all, by officials in the Office of Civil Defense, both in Washington and in regional offices.

Robert A. Gessert
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SUMMARY

Early efforts to organize Federal civil defense capabilities in peacetime were prompted by the experiences of strategic bombing, the development of atomic weapons, and the Korean War emergency. The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 set civil defense within the framework of other policies and machinery of national security as established by the National Security Act of 1947 and the Defense Production Act of 1950. The Act divided responsibilities for civil defense between the Federal Government and the States and their political subdivisions, vesting primary responsibility in the latter. It further provided for stand-by emergency authority to be invoked for civil defense mobilization in the event of an attack.

The fourteen-year history of modern civil defense (1950-1964) has included two major reorganizations of Federal responsibilities and authorities. In 1958, civil defense planning was consolidated with defense mobilization planning; the objective was to integrate all non-military emergency preparedness measures. At that time, the Federal Government formally assumed joint responsibility for civil defense along with State and local governments. In 1961, a second reorganization transferred major Federal responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense with a view towards achieving greater utilization of the operational capabilities of the Department of Defense and effective coordination of civil defense planning with military defense. As a result of this reorganization, the Federal Government assumed greater responsibility for the development of protective capabilities and emergency services.

These reorganizations were precipitated by the combined impact of the development of thermonuclear weapons and intercontinental
missiles, varying views of the nature of the threat, changes in strategic doctrine, and dissatisfaction with the progress of civil defense programs. Reflecting changing concepts of civil defense organization, they have produced a level of stability in civil defense polity. Certain underlying issues affecting the organization of civil defense operations remain, however, problematic. For example, the effective organization of operations will depend heavily upon the clarity and focus of mission. And clarity of mission would be furthered by concentration on the purpose of protecting and saving lives, as opposed to national and strategic purposes of supporting a war effort, assuring national survival and recovery, and underwriting a military posture. The formulation and consideration of such national and strategic purposes and missions may best be concentrated in high-level policy machinery rather than in an operational organization properly mission-oriented.

The effective fulfillment of the life-saving mission requires development and satisfaction of four classes of operational requirements: (1) on-site protective capabilities, such as shelter and evacuation systems, and programs of public education to assure their effective use; (2) mobile emergency services readily available to provide for rescue and medical aid, fire-fighting and other damage control, and decontamination; (3) resource allocation functions based on the continuity of governmental decision-making capabilities for the use of stockpiled and other existing resources to provide relief, repair vital facilities, and restore critical services; (4) nation-wide communications systems to warn the entire population, to disseminate information, and to ensure direction and control by responsible officials. Decision as to how best to organize resources for the satisfaction of these requirements should probably be explored by cost/effectiveness analyses of alternative uses of various governmental units and agencies and private groups.
The alternative ways of organizing resources for the satisfaction of operational requirements must also be tested for feasibility against certain policy constraints. The principal constraints which have affected the organization of civil defense involve concepts of ultimate civilian control; maximum utilization of existing resources; planning based upon the cooperation and coordination of governmental units and agencies and private groups; and informal, rather than statutory, Federal peacetime authority for civil defense direction and control. Such constraints have, however, been applied rather flexibly in the past and are, themselves, subject to continuing re-examination.

Proposals have been, and continue to be, made for further substantial changes in the Federal civil defense organization. These include proposals for the creation of a Department of Civil Defense, for the federalization of civil defense programs and activities, and for the passage of new legislation making civil defense mandatory or providing statutory regulations and standards. Such sweeping changes have, to date, been resisted. Organizational decisions of such magnitude must await future decisions concerning the most effective physical systems for coping with a changing threat.
INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This study examines the Federal organization of civil defense as it has developed between passage of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 and the beginning of 1965. The objectives of this investigation have been to analyze the evolving organizational concepts, to discuss the basic issues underlying them, and to identify the principal organizational alternatives which have been considered.

The subject under examination could be broadly identified as the logic or rationale of the organization of civil defense functions of the Federal Government. The fourteen years since passage of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 have provided considerable experience with, and given a certain momentum to, activities of planning and preparing for the defense of the population and of the economy against an atomic or nuclear attack. Yet these same fourteen years have yielded little firm agreement on, or widespread understanding of, the most appropriate ways to organize either the functions of planning and preparation or the emergency operations that would be required in the event of an attack.

In order to assess the concepts, issues and choices which civil defense organization entails, a variety of documentary evidence was examined: laws, executive orders, and departmental directives; various agency reports; congressional hearings and reports; and major studies of civil defense organization. Documentary research was supplemented by general historical information on developments in the international environment, a limited
number of informal interviews and field observations, and general organization theory. The history covered included two major reorganizations of Federal civil defense responsibilities, and these provided natural points of focus for investigation. It is as important to understand the reasons for rejecting one proposal as to understand the reasons for accepting another, and both are examined in order to delineate the concepts and principles that constrain the range of organizational choice.

B. DEFINITIONS OF "ORGANIZATION"

Three common meanings of the term "organization" may be distinguished. In order to avoid confusion, these should be noted at the outset and placed in perspective. In general usage, "organization" may mean: structure of relations; a group or association, and, more narrowly, a principal agency; or the process of organizing. The problems of civil defense organization encompass all three of these meanings.

Some of the most delicate and critical issues of civil defense organization involve questions of the structure of relations among all the echelons and offices of government and between the government and private groups and citizens. Responsibility for civil defense has been divided between the Federal Government on the one hand and the States and their political subdivisions on the other. Moreover, the Federal Government's responsibilities have been diffused in varying degrees among many departments and agencies. Finally, the individual citizen has been counted upon to play various roles in his own defense.

Discussion of structural problems inevitably raises questions about the numbers and functions of the participant groups who carry responsibility for civil defense. The dependence of civil defense upon widely dispersed, loosely related offices, many of which may be manned by part-time or volunteer personnel, means that civil defense faces organizational problems which are quite different
from those faced by a modern army or business enterprise. Many of the problems of civil defense organization consist of determining which offices of government and what elements of society would be needed in a working civil defense organization under varying circumstances.

Since the offices of government and elements of society included in a working organization in emergency will not necessarily bear major responsibilities for planning and developing civil defense capabilities in peacetime, the processes of organizing or mobilizing such groups under crisis conditions constitute major problems of organization.

Generally, throughout this report, the context will make clear which meaning of "organization" is intended. Most commonly, the structure of relations will be intended as the comprehensive meaning. Proper names or descriptive phrases will frequently be used to designate participating groups, and the process of organizing will typically be discussed in more specific terms as "mobilizing" and "controlling."

C. POINT OF VIEW AND METHOD

Three broad, but not mutually exclusive, approaches to organization may be distinguished according to what the basic problem is understood to be: the first is mission-oriented, the second resource-oriented, and the third polity-oriented.

(1) Mission-oriented approach. This approach emphasizes the roles or tasks that are to be performed by organized effort; organization becomes the determination of how functions should be divided, combined, and directed in order to accomplish specific tasks. Planning for possible courses of action, based on estimates of the situation or threat to be met and the use of "planning factors" derived from experience and analysis, is the principal determinant of organizational requirements. Unity of command and concert of effort are typically highly valued goals of this type of organizational
planning and design. The post-war civil defense studies conducted in the military establishment applied this approach to civil defense organization.\(^1\)

(2) **Resource-oriented approach.** This approach emphasizes the resource-allocation problems of a complex system. The way in which a set of functions is organized both reflects and provides for decisions concerning the way in which scarce resources are to be used in developing the products and services of the system. While the latter are, of course, critical and are valued according to the purposes and mission of the system, organization is significant for how it combines resources as much as for how it integrates the outputs. Economy of effort is a major goal of organization. Because a wartime civil defense mission is apt to require vast services at a time when resources are depleted, this approach was frequently used in the reviews of civil defense organization undertaken during the fifties.\(^2\)

(3) **Polity-oriented approach.** A third approach is identifiable by its focus on jurisdictional aspects of a complex public system; organization here becomes the pattern by which responsibility and authority are divided and functions assigned. These divisions and assignments reflect the constitutional-statutory-custumary organization of government as a whole. While mission, tasks, and scarcity of resources may establish limits, matters of law, of statecraft, and of intergovernmental relations are the major determinants of

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basic organizational forms. Civil defense, as a new public function, does not yet occupy a settled place in the structure of government and is, therefore, particularly subject to analysis from this point of view. Two major studies of civil defense organization during the fifties stressed this approach.1

A complete analysis of civil defense organization must use all three approaches, sometimes simultaneously and sometimes singly. All three may be required simultaneously in order to evaluate comparatively the overall performance of alternative organizations. General performance would be a function of the degree of coordination among officials, the quality of the planning for specific operations, and the effectiveness with which public and private resources are utilized. Single applications of one or the other approach seem to be indicated for special problems such as

1. defining organizational requirements for specific civil-defense tasks (the mission-oriented approach),
2. establishing just and authoritative divisions of responsibility (the polity-oriented approach), and
3. ensuring the efficient use of resources (the resource-oriented approach).

The present study begins by examining (in Section II) the organizational concepts which have emerged during the modern history of civil defense. Since these have derived largely from polity-oriented approaches, concepts of the role of civil defense in national security policy and machinery, of Federal, State, and local responsibilities, and of emergency powers have been stressed.

In Section III the issues underlying these polity problems are considered under three main headings: the mission and purpose

of civil defense, the operational requirements for fulfilling the life-saving mission, and the policy constraints which limit the range of feasible ways to meet requirements. Cost/effectiveness analyses are suggested for initial comparisons of the alternative organizational systems for satisfying requirements for protective capabilities, emergency services, resource allocation, and communications systems.

The last section (Section IV) briefly examines broad organizational proposals which have been recommended and indicates the principal reasons for which they have been rejected.
III

EVOLVING ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS

Three sets of polity problems have dominated the organizational history of modern civil defense: (1) the place of civil defense in national security policy and machinery; (2) the division of responsibility for civil defense between the Federal Government and State and local governments; and (3) the nature of the special governmental powers, particularly for emergency, that civil defense requires. This section examines the evolution of civil defense organizational concepts in terms of these broad questions.

A. CIVIL DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

In creating the Federal Civil Defense Administration as an independent agency in the Executive Branch of the Government, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as originally enacted, established civil defense as one of the three more or less independent variables of national security. The other two were military defense as represented by the Department of Defense and defense mobilization as represented by the Office of Defense Mobilization in the Executive Office of the President. The former derived from a long history as the sword of national security and had been given a new organizational form following the Second World War by the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments of 1949, 1953 and 1959. Defense mobilization was also a familiar element of national security with an important history in both World Wars. Though the National Security Act of 1947 had created the National Security Resources Board to supervise mobilization requirements in peacetime, the Korean War found existing Government policy and machinery inadequate to meet the costly and complex demands upon the civilian economy that a long conventional war would entail. The Defense
Production Act of 1950, passed in September, placed new policy and machinery at the President's disposal to divert civilian resources to military needs. Most important of the agencies created under that Act was the Office of Defense Mobilization set up by executive order in the Executive Office of the President in December 1950. The relationships of civil defense to such agencies and subsequent ones to be discussed later in this section, are illustrated in Figure 1.

When civil defense was established as a permanent function and responsibility of government, it had no comparable history or prominence. Though civilians had helped to protect the homefront and to support the war effort by organizing local defense councils in World War I and had volunteered their services again in World War II--this time through an Office of Civil Defense--the technology of atomic bombs and long-range bombers created the first significant need for the protection of civilians against the effects of enemy attack. The Korean War was the catalyst for establishment of a peacetime civil defense agency; but the need, and interpretations as to how to meet it, are directly traceable to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

1. Separation of National Security Functions

Confronted with both a cold war and a conventional hot war, the United States began the decade of the fifties with three distinguishable functions of national security: to train, equip and deploy military forces; to supply, support, and replenish them from the civilian sector; and to provide protection to civilians in case military forces could not prevent attack upon the continental United States. The first was needed for both cold war and shooting war; and although the last two are strictly wartime functions, the technology of warfare had come to require peacetime preparation for them. Although they both involved the civilian sector directly, they were separable in that civil defense would be required only in event of extreme national emergency -- i.e., attack on the interior
1947
National Security Act

1950
Defense Production Act
Federal Civil Defense Act

1953
Reorganization Plan No 3

1958
Reorganization Plan No 1
Public Law 85-606

1961
Executive Order 10952

1964
Redelegation

FIGURE 1 Summary of Civil Defense-Organizational Changes
zone. Moreover, only civil defense might indiscriminately involve any or all of the public.

There seemed to be ample basis in experience and in the immediate circumstances of 1950 for segregating responsibilities for these three functions of national security into three unequal and dissimilar agencies of the Federal Government. The oft-repeated recommendation that the Federal civil defense agency be placed within the military establishment was rejected for at least three reasons: (1) so that civil defense would not divert the military from its prime mission which included preventing attack on the interior; (2) so that civil defense would remain unequivocally under civilian control and direction; and (3) so that a military channel would not be introduced into Federal-State-local relations. The logic behind each of these reasons was debatable, and proponents of placing civil defense responsibility in the Department of Defense did not agree that the first two reasons required placing civil defense outside of that Department which was itself under civilian direction and control. On the other hand, it was argued, especially by local officials, that effective civil defense operations would be so entirely dependent upon close military liaison that State and local officials would need to have direct access to the national military leadership.

When President Truman, in 1949, assigned responsibility for civil defense planning to the National Security Resources Board, he identified civil defense with the overall mobilization function of government. But the emergency of the Korean War made it more apparent that civil defense and defense mobilization involved civilians in sufficiently different ways, and performed sufficiently different functions, that separate agencies were required. Defense mobilization drew upon vital national resources through the organized private sectors of business, industry, labor, and agriculture. Civil defense, on the other hand, was to employ a portion of national resources to be used for the protection of the
public at large, particularly in urban, critical-target areas. Especially in view of the confusion and loss of effectiveness that had resulted from the combination of "war services" and "protective services" in the wartime Office of Civilian Defense, responsible officials of State and local governments welcomed the organizational separation of civil defense and defense mobilization. Congress confirmed this separation by defining "attack" and "civil defense" in the Act so as to further dissociate the two non-military defense functions.

2. Consolidation of Civil Defense With Defense Mobilization

The reasons for the merger of civil defense and defense mobilization by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 emerged slowly during the period from 1950 to 1958 and continued to plague the assignment and location of clear-cut functions and responsibilities. In part, the consolidation may be attributed to frustration with the programs of both the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Office of Defense Mobilization. FCDA had successively emphasized programs of new shelter construction, use of shelter space in existing buildings, evacuation and survival planning, and (briefly) a massive Federal program of blast and fallout shelter construction. Each of these programs appeared either infeasible or inadequate soon after it was announced. On the other hand, the nature of ODM's assigned functions changed substantially during the same period, as the Korean War came to an end and the danger of intercontinental nuclear war seemed to take its place. With the new strategies of massive retaliation, programs of

1. The Bull Report and the Hopley Report agreed in recommending the separation of the war services and protective services. In this and other recommendations the Hopley Report, which was widely distributed, was well received by State and local governments.
mobilization for a long conventional war seemed outmoded; and "mobilization" came to include the problem of fighting a "broken-back" war - i.e., mobilization became an issue of allocating to the war effort resources that might be substantially depleted by attack.

Most of the major reviews of civil defense during the period from 1951-1958 came to view civil defense and defense mobilization as overlapping due to the growing potential of the threat. Civil defense was seen, not solely as a problem of saving lives, but, by virtue of the presumed strategic value of attacking the homefront, as an issue of national security and survival. That is, its national and strategic justification was the same as that for defense mobilization. This fact alone, however, did not require that central responsibilities for the two sets of functions be combined in a single agency, for the two still seemed to involve civilians at different levels: civil defense at a popular level and defense mobilization at the industrial level. Moreover, since civil defense would be a claimant for national resources, it was argued that Federal responsibility for it should not be placed in the office charged with allocating such resources to other national programs. However, as the successive programs of FCDA produced only limited stability and progress in achieving protection for the populace by offering guidance and assistance to state and local governments, FCDA began to give increasing attention to the emergency services of the Federal Government. FCDA's program of delegation of responsibilities to Federal agencies did not begin until 1954 and never reached the proportions of the delegation program of ODM. However, by the time of consolidation of the two offices the most commonly voiced argument for consolidation, besides the argument that the threat had made the separation anachronistic, was that the delegations programs of the two offices overlapped and confused direction of the Federal agencies for emergency preparedness.
At the level of the relation of FCDA and ODM to the civilian population, the similarity of function was older and more subtle, but it helped to make the consolidation of 1958 seem reasonable. The earliest unclassified, post-war studies of civil defense had listed dispersal of industry as a principal means of reducing civilian vulnerability. The most likely civilian targets always appeared to be the densely-populated metropolitan complexes. Shelters and evacuation might be the only measures to help protect civilians who must live in those areas, but a longer-term solution seemed to reside in breaking up the complexes themselves: this could be achieved only by dispersal of industry. On May 20, 1950, NSRB had, in fact, declared that "only a progressive decentralization or dispersion" of cities and industrial centers would constitute long-term protection against atomic attack. In the long run, then, the effectiveness of both civil defense (measured solely by life-saving potential) and defense mobilization, could be conceived to rest on policies affecting industry. The vast body of literature on dispersion and decentralization which was produced during the early 1950's lent conceptual support to the organizational combination of civil defense with defense mobilization rather than with military defense.

However, by 1958, when FCDA and ODM were combined by Reorganization Plan No. 1 to form the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), the expanding lethal radii of hydrogen bombs, plus the increasing concentration of the population in metropolitan complexes, made the long-term reduction of civilian vulnerability through dispersion seem almost hopeless. The fallout problem had also established that civilians were vulnerable to the effects of nuclear attack even if they did not live in target cities. However, this aspect of the threat seemed manageable, and OCDM concentrated

its concern with protective services on fallout-shelter construction at all levels of society, private as well as public. Stockpiling and industrial preparedness programs continued but became oriented more toward protection of in-being capabilities and facilities for survival and recovery.

3. **Consolidation of Civil With Military Defense**

Meanwhile, developing strategic discussions had related civil defense to military defense in a new way. The role of strategic forces came to be stressed as the prevention of surprise attack, major war by conventional aggression, and loss of vital interests at points of confrontation. This role, combined with the fact that adversary forces could also threaten destruction in the continental US, gave a different meaning and prominence to "strategic arguments" for civil defense. The absence of adequate civil defense appeared to be the Achilles heel of US military might. Several major strategy reviews of 1957-1958 argued that civil defense was required to underwrite the military posture and strategy of deterrence. Such strategic requirement for civil defense did not necessarily mean that responsibility for civil defense and for military defense had to be organizationally combined, but it was argued that planning for, and development of, civil defense had to go hand-in-hand with planning and developing the strategic force structure. Such arguments produced more public controversy about civil defense, for they seemed to involve the public directly in national security policy, and they were attacked especially by those citizens who were most critical of the course of that policy. These arguments were also vulnerable to another kind of attack: that they displaced the solely humane interest in saving lives through civil defense.

The more controversial aspects of strategic doctrines of deterrence and their civil defense implications aside, it became increasingly apparent during the late fifties that military forces could not, by deterrence or by interdiction, safeguard the
population from all possible ways in which an attack might occur—e.g., by accident, madness, or miscalculation. When President Kennedy, in 1961, transferred major responsibilities for civil defense from the Office of Civil Defense Mobilization to the Secretary of Defense, he made explicit the need for the life-saving potential of civil defense, independent both of a successful military deterrent and of the requirements for mobilization, or even recovery; civil defense represented "insurance." The principal reasons that were adduced for making the assignment to the Secretary of Defense were that he was the official already responsible for the defense of the continental United States, and that the Department of Defense represented a vast and relevant operational capability which could be drawn upon for civil defense.

These reasons for the reorganization of 1961, and, later, the redelegation to the Secretary of the Army, were comparable to the arguments of the late forties which had urged establishing the Federal civil defense agency in the Office of either the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Army. However, by the early sixties several new developments reinforced the logic of locating Federal civil defense responsibilities in the Department of Defense. In view of the possibility that the adversary could conceal, or otherwise reduce the vulnerability of, his strategic missile forces, it became apparent that these could not be so fully interdicted as to make civil defense unnecessary. The problems at issue in the relation of military defense and civil defense had become more clearly those of the best allocation of resources: e.g., whether it was relatively more useful to try to reduce the number of lives at risk by increasing the size of the striking forces (in the attempt to improve interdiction capability) or to allocate comparable resources to improve civil defense capabilities. During the sixties it seemed likely that strategic striking forces would develop, or had developed, to the point where civil defense became competitive with their marginal utility.
Moreover, the emerging technology of ballistic missile defense was seen to support, rather than deny, the need for civil defense. While effective ballistic missile defense might make blast shelters unnecessary in some areas, because it would defend only a limited area such a system was viewed as depending for its utility upon a system of fallout shelters. Even in the defended areas, an effective ballistic missile defense would require greatly improved capabilities for civil defense warning, movement to shelter, and other emergency operations. Thus, strategic offensive forces, active air and missile defense, and civil defense came to be viewed as related by a principle of complementarity as well as of substitution. For optimum allocations of resources among them, fully coordinated planning was required.

Finally, as the likelihood of full-scale conventional war had seemed to recede, conceptions of the mission of ground forces altered. Overseas missions, except those in Europe, seemed to require modernization and mobility more than massiveness and a mobilization base for ground forces. Combined with the changing scale of the potential threat to the continental US, these alterations made it reasonable to increase the mission of the ground forces, particularly of the interior zone armies, the reserves, and the National Guard, to support civil defense emergency operations.

1. Secretary McNamara made this point emphatically in his statement on Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces in appropriation hearings on the 1965 military budget: "For this reason, the very austere civil defense program recommended by the President, which I will discuss later, should be given priority over procurement and deployment of any major additions to the active defenses." House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H. R. 9637 No. 367, (Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1964), see especially p. 7107.

2. See, particularly, DoD Directive 3025.10 of 23 April 1963 which defines the policies and responsibilities of the armed services for military support of civil defense. See also, US Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
B. FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Changes in the division of responsibility for civil defense between the Federal Government on the one hand, and State and local governments on the other, have been less dramatic than the relocations of responsibility within the Federal Government. Moreover, such changes as have occurred in Federal-State and local relations constitute a pattern of more consistent development and progression.

1. **Primary Responsibility of States**

In view of the constitutional axiom that Congress shall provide for, and the President be responsible for the execution of policies concerning, the common defense, it is necessary to account for the policy provision in the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 as originally enacted that "this responsibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the several States and their political subdivisions."¹ When adopted, that policy seemed to be justified by the experience of two World Wars, by conceptions of how the civil defense mission could best be fulfilled, and by interpretations of the Federal tradition of American government.

In both World Wars the organization of civilians for popular participation in the war effort began at the local and State levels and achieved Federal coordination and guidance only slowly. This was particularly true of the local and State defense councils of World War I; but even in the case of civil defense units in World War II, local and State organization generally preceded, or

¹ Affairs), News Release No. 458-64 (15 June 1964), announcing a new policy regarding the role of the State Adjutants General in military support of civil defense.

1. The text of the Act as originally passed may be found in 64 Stat. 1245-57.
developed simultaneously with, the Federal organization. By experience, once war came, the public and local and State officials could be counted on to share the burdens of the common defense and to free the Federal Government to concentrate on defense of the external borders and on the overseas mission.

While the United States suffered no enemy attack on its interior zone in the World Wars, the experiences of the British, the Germans, and the Japanese with attacks on their home fronts seemed to confirm the value of assumption of responsibility by local and State officials. The effectiveness of civil defense in these countries was shown to be highly dependent upon the prior existence of organized and trained cadres to operate at the scene of attack. In none of these cases did direction or control from the central government at the time of attack prove to be of much significance. This is not to say that the central government had little responsibility for, or role in, civil defense: indeed, in the British case, where civil defense proved most effective, the central government had assumed almost exclusive responsibility for planning and developing local capabilities in advance of the war.

Post-war studies of civil defense in the United States extolled the British model and generally argued that the first principle, or basic concept, on which civil defense must rest is local self-help.1 Referring to the British experience, the studies conducted in the military complex viewed self-help as an operational necessity: in order to survive an atomic attack, the individual citizen would have to know what protective actions he could undertake for himself; his first line of assistance in emergency would

extend to and from his surviving neighbors. Beyond this, government would provide rescue and fire-fighting services, medical aid and welfare relief, maintenance of law and order, and restoration and recovery operations. These emergency services and operations would need to come from the closest levels of government, expanding to other levels as required.

This mission-oriented view of civil defense emergency operations came to be combined with resource-oriented and polity-oriented views of civil defense planning, development, and responsibilities. The National Security Resources Board promulgated a more vague conception of "expanding self-protection" that was justified by maximum economy in the utilization of vital resources and by the "inherent powers" of States, rather than primarily by the requirements of an attack situation. On these bases, "self-help" was to be relied upon for peacetime preparation and organization as well as for wartime operations.

In 1950 comparisons were drawn between the very current problems of block-by-block defense against the effects of atomic weapons and the very passe problems of house-to-house defense against Indian raids. The new, like the old, seemed to require the mobilization of every citizen and echelon of government from the bottom up. The problem was not one of "common defense" in the narrow sense of protecting common borders; it was one of "community defense" in the sense of protecting every person, every home, every aspect of common life. In order to ensure that the Federal Government not be diverted from providing for the common defense of borders, State and local governments were to assume responsibility to provide for such community defense. Congress would "provide a

plan" and otherwise arrange for necessary assistance and for Federal coordination and guidance of State and local efforts, but responsibility for development of detailed operational planning, procurement of necessary facilities, equipment and supplies, organization of special services, and conduct of operations was vested in State and local governments.

2. Parallel Responsibilities

The assignment of primary responsibility to State and local governments was criticized almost from the beginning. As the emergency requirements of the Korean War decreased in importance, and as the potential devastation of atomic attack increased, pressures mounted for the Federal Government to assume greater responsibility. Lack of impressive accomplishment at the State and local levels under programs of Federal assistance (which never reached one-quarter of one percent of military expenditures) seemed to confirm the need for an expanded and strengthened Federal responsibility. Major reviews of civil defense undertaken inside and outside the Government were essentially unanimous in calling for an enlarged Federal role as they had been in urging consolidation of civil defense and defense mobilization functions. Arguments advanced for this enlargement were comparable to those which supported consolidation: civil defense is an essential component of non-military defense, which, in turn, represents the second vital contribution to national security alongside military defense; both non-military and military defense are responsibilities of the Federal Government.

At the same time, the idea continued to be stressed that effective civil defense would depend upon the prior existence of operational capabilities at the scene of attack and, therefore, upon contributions from all levels of government. The nature of the civil defense problem seemed to require that local and State governments not be relieved of responsibility in the mistaken belief that the Federal Government alone could develop and operate
adequate civil defense capabilities.\(^1\) When Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 was followed by Public Law 606 of the Eighty-Fifth Congress,\(^2\) civil defense was, in policy and intent, made the "joint responsibility" of the Federal Government and the States and their political subdivisions.

The alternative, that civil defense be made primarily the responsibility of the Federal Government, was explicitly rejected. Even the FCDA proposal to lift the fifty percent limitation on Federal assistance was rejected. The amendments did, however, expand the Federal contributions program to include personnel and administrative expenses of State and local offices and to authorize the provision of radiological defense instruments to State and local units.

But the principal impact of the new policy and intent was to place greater emphasis on the emergency preparedness roles of Federal departments and agencies. "Joint responsibility" in the OCDM period tended to mean parallel responsibility, with the Federal agency giving less, rather than more, attention to aiding the States in developing the operational capabilities required at that level. The new national shelter policy for fallout shelter development provided for no Federal financial assistance in shelter construction. In 1956 FCDA had issued a "National Plan for Civil Defense Against Enemy Attack" which was oriented toward guiding State and local planning; the 1958 "National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization" was oriented primarily toward Federal departments and agencies.

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2. Signed on August 8, 1958, this was the only major amendment of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.
3. **Joint Responsibility**

The dominating issue in this developing pattern of Federal-State and local relations has been determination of the nature and extent of the Federal Government's peacetime role in developing new civil defense capabilities. The FCDA had, from the beginning, been assigned responsibilities to plan for the development of nation-wide warning and communications, to establish training programs, and to disseminate information in addition to assisting and encouraging the States and local governments to develop their own operational capabilities. In addition, the FCDA was assigned stand-by authorities and responsibilities for civil defense emergencies. If enlarged Federal responsibility were to mean more than simply improving the implementation of existing programs, it would principally mean that the Federal Government was to accept a larger share in the development of protective capabilities and emergency services.

Joint responsibility, in this sense of direct responsibility for the peacetime development of protective capabilities and emergency services, has confronted the Federal Government with a second set of major organizational choices. Such development implies the commitment of Federal manpower and resources far in excess of that represented by a small, central office such as the FCDA, the OCDM or the present Office of Civil Defense. The broad utilization of Federal departments and agencies through delegations of assignments has not proved reassuring in peacetime development and its effectiveness in emergency remains open to serious doubt. Alternatives of developing an operational Department of Civil Defense either at the Cabinet level or as a fourth service within the Department of Defense have so far been rejected. The transfer of responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense in 1961, in addition to consolidating civil defense with military defense, provided a different organizational means by which the Federal Government could accept a greater share of responsibility for developing protective
capabilities and standby emergency services. The assignment of major civil defense responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense has facilitated use of the military services for fallout shelter surveys, of logistics capabilities for distribution of shelter stocks and supplies, and of the services and their reserves for standby missions of support to civilian authorities in emergency services.

4. Persistent Problems

Through each of the foregoing stages of primary responsibility in the States (parallel responsibility and joint responsibility), three problems for planning and for operations have persisted almost unaffected. These problems arise out of the fact that the American tradition of federalism and the mission requirements of civil defense bear only incidental relation to one another.

In the first place, normal lines of communications, particularly in the large metropolitan complexes, already overlap State boundaries. Of the cities which had populations greater than a half a million in 1950, for example, one-third are located at the boundary of two States; of the fifty cities which had the largest populations in 1960 (each, over a quarter of a million), more than one-fourth are located at State boundaries. The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 provided for mutual-aid compacts to be entered into by neighboring States; and there have been major efforts, such as followed the 1955 Project East River Review, to stimulate planning based on metropolitan target complexes which cross State lines. But the fact that State boundaries do not coincide with target and damage zones continues to be a major reason for proposals to federalize civil defense more completely.

A related problem of developing local capabilities (particularly in the larger cities) arises from the fact that the Federal-State-local patterns that have been adopted all place State governments in key roles in the Federal-to-local chain. This has enmeshed civil
defense planning in complex problems of State-city relations to the frequent objections of responsible spokesmen of city government.

Finally, the limited, and unevenly distributed, revenue resources of local and State governments has complicated and inhibited the use of such Federal financial contributions as have been authorized. Attempts to lift the fifty percent limitation on Federal financial contributions have so far been unsuccessful, although the Federal Government fully contributes certain surplus property, equipment, and supplies to State and local units. The full magnitude of this problem has not been experienced at the low levels of expenditures for civil defense which have so far characterized national programs.

C. SPECIAL EMERGENCY POWERS

The Korean War emergency, during which the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 was passed, made framers of the Act keenly aware that an attack on the continental United States might require the use of resources far in excess of those committed to civil defense prior to a civil defense emergency. Atomic weapons and long-range bombers had created the requirement for peacetime civil defense planning and development, and the Act provided for the growth of these under the guidance of a permanent Federal Civil Defense Administration. But if civil defense were to be needed as a result of expansion of the Korean War, the Federal Government would have to assume a much more substantial role at the time of attack. The Act, therefore, provided special standby powers which could be invoked by the proclamation of a civil defense emergency by the President or by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

In brief, these provisions--the so-called Title III powers--are of three kinds: (1) authorization of the President to direct Federal departments and agencies to make their resources available for civil defense purposes in emergency; (2) the creation of special powers (which will be described shortly) to be exercised
by the Administrator of FCDA; and (3) legal and administrative provisions including Government immunity from liability for the death or injury of Federal employees, waiver of the Administrative Procedure Act, compensation for non-governmental property acquired under Title III, and provisions for the return or disposal of such property.

These emergency authorities constitute a major set of unprecedented and untried provisions of the Act. They have, of course, never been invoked, and they have only rarely been "utilized" even in civil defense tests and exercises. Conceptions of them have, nonetheless, slowly changed as the nuclear threat has been perceived differently; and their assignment within the Executive Branch has varied accordingly. Since the 1961 reorganization, the Title III powers have been reserved to the President without designation of the agency or agencies which would exercise them as his agent.

1. Civil Defense Mobilization

The provisions of Title III are mixed in nature. They establish powers which were described as vast at the time of enactment and generated considerable Congressional concern. When the final version of the civil defense bill passed both houses of Congress, it included a section automatically terminating these standby powers on June 30, 1954. This section was the result of a compromise between the earlier House version which would have terminated the entire Act and the Senate version which contained no termination date. The compromise suggested that Title III in particular was intended to provide for a possible, immediate emergency. The compromise also guaranteed Congressional review of the nature of the emergency authorities which civil defense might require. The Title III powers were renewed in 1954 and at four-year intervals thereafter, however, with little or no further debate or clarification of their nature and purposes.
The most important and problematic of the Title III powers are the special powers originally assigned to the Administrator and, since 1961, reserved to the President. The special powers of the Administrator were set forth in Section 303 of the Act. They represented an expansion of the Administrator's peacetime authorities and roles: he would be authorized in emergency to procure (or commandeer) materials and facilities "without regard to the limitation of any existing law;" to distribute materials and services for civil defense, similarly "without regard to the limitations of existing law;" and to coordinate and direct the relief activities of the Federal department and agencies. These are the powers commonly regarded as vast. In addition, the Administrator would be authorized to reimburse States for aid to other States, to disburse financial assistance for the relief of any civilian, and temporarily to employ additional personnel "without regard to the civil-service laws."

The principal powers are "vast" primarily in a legal sense: limitations of existing laws, including appropriations, are removed from the authorities to procure and distribute resources; the Administrator is authorized to direct the manpower of Federal agencies potentially thousands-fold larger than the staff of the FCPA, the OCDM, or the OCD. However, instrumentalities for exercising such powers were not provided by the Act and did not receive comprehensive treatment until the National Plan of 1958. The lack of organizational instrumentalities to exercise these powers, together with the vagueness of the power, justify more the fear that they might have been exercised ineffectually than the fear that they would have been used ruthlessly.

Among the other two sets of national security functions, the National Security Act of 1947 had provided the permanent organization for military defense and the Defense Production Act of 1950 had provided the standby emergency authorities, policies, and machinery for mobilization to support military defense in the Korean War emergency. In the case of civil defense, both the permanent
organization and the mobilization powers were provided for in the same legislation: the former took its shape from the general need as posed by the technology of modern warfare; the latter took its shape primarily from the possible need for civil defense during the course of the Korean hostilities. Title III was the defense production act of civil defense, but without the previous history and comprehensiveness that characterized its analogue and gave rise to its more detailed policies, priorities, and procedural instruments.

The earliest programs and budgets considered by the embryonic FCDA appeared to aim at crash efforts to provide civil defense protection during the Korean War. However, as it became more apparent that lead-times of at least two or three years would be required for new shelter construction, and as dangers to the continental United States from expansion of the Korean War receded, the orientation of FCDA shifted toward the general need for peacetime development of civil defense against an attack, including a surprise attack, which might derive from events other than those of the Korean War. With such orientation, the Title III powers seemed to be less immediately relevant; in fact, if peacetime efforts were fully adequate, it would be unnecessary to rely so heavily on emergency powers.

Fifteen months after the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 was enacted, Executive Order 10346 of April 18, 1952 was issued directing all Federal departments and agencies to prepare plans for their activities in a civil defense emergency. Such plans would, of course, help to facilitate the implementation of Title III powers. Two years later, Executive Order 10529 of April 23, 1954 was issued authorizing Federal employee participation in State
and local civil defense programs. While such participation was intended to strengthen and encourage civil defense efforts, it stood in ambiguous relation to possible plans to make heavy use of Federal agencies through Title III.

Civil defense emergency planning which could facilitate the use of Title III powers received more formal attention after the 1958 consolidation of civil defense with defense mobilization. As we have indicated, one of the reasons for that consolidation was the growing sense that the Federal Government's principal roles in civil defense were those associated with emergency operations rather than with the peacetime development of protective services. The 1958 National Plan for Civil and Defense Mobilization, the National Shelter Policy of OCDM, and even the name of the Office, all indicated the shifts in the orientation of Federal civil defense activities toward developing capabilities for civil defense mobilization in emergency.

2. Civil Defense Direction and Control

As the nature of the potential nuclear threat continued to grow, "mobilization" in the 1950 sense seemed less and less applicable to civil defense as well as to military defense. Under a heavy nuclear attack, emergency operations would consist more of the wise management of resources at hand than of the marshalling of new resources. Moreover, there has been a general expectation that normal processes of government might be interrupted or might break down under the emergency conditions of an attack, and that emergency

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powers would be required for general governmental direction and control as much as for the more narrow functions of mobilizing resources to withstand attack and assure continuing support of a war effort.\(^1\) It is in this more problematic and uncertain context that civil defense Title III powers are currently viewed.

Another aspect of the current context of civil defense has required that the Title III powers be reexamined carefully. We have indicated that the 1961 reorganization facilitated greater assumption of Federal responsibility for the peacetime development of protective capabilities and emergency services. When the Secretary of Defense was assigned major responsibility for development of civil defense, OCDM was reconceived as an agency for general emergency planning. The difference between the Office of Civil Defense, as developed in the Department of Defense and then in the Department of the Army, and the OCDM reconstituted as the Office of Emergency Planning is more than a difference between an operating agency and an advisory staff. The difference also involves a division of responsibilities for the use and control of resources in emergency. The dividing line is exceedingly hard to draw in view of the demands upon resources which a heavy nuclear attack might involve. For reasons such as this, the civil defense Title III powers were reserved to the President in 1961. The policy questions posed by emergency civil defense powers (including those delegated in Title III) are important enough to warrant a continuous review to ensure that proposed solutions accurately reflect the current threat as well as current protective capabilities.

1. The "proclamation" of limited martial law by President Eisenhower during the Operation Alert exercise of 1955 symbolized this change in emphasis and prompted broad reexaminations of the emergency requirements and functions of Government.
D. RECAPITULATION

The fourteen-year history of peacetime civil defense has been marked by organizational experimentation and change. This experimentation and change has involved principally the division of responsibilities among component elements of government and the structuring of relations among them. During this period, the central Federal office for civil defense has been an organizing device for facilitating the development of civil defense capabilities and plans among other components of government and society which have been assumed to constitute, however amorphously, the working "organization." ¹

FCDA, OCDM, and OCD, by virtue of their place in the context of national security and in the structure of the Federal Government, have reflected different conceptions of what components of government and society should be organized for civil defense. FCDA attempted principally to organize State and local civil defense agencies. OCDM attempted more to organize Federal departments and agencies. In contrast to both, OCD has stressed organizing the resources of the Department of Defense and of the Department of the Army.

Different emphases and programs have also reflected and embodied the assumption of different degrees and kinds of responsibility for civil defense by the Federal Government. FCDA emphasized planning for, assistance to, and guidance of State and local efforts for developing protective capabilities. In parallel with State, local, and private development of protective capabilities and plans,

OCDM emphasized Federal planning for emergency. OCD has emphasized to a greater extent the use of Federal resources to develop protective capabilities and to plan military assistance for emergency services.

These changes, however, do not reflect the full extent of the organizational problems of civil defense. They have been prompted largely by the growth of the nuclear threat and by dissatisfaction with the progress of civil defense efforts. Underlying these changes and evolving concepts, the critical issues on which the organizational development of civil defense hinges have remained fairly constant. These issues have been dealt with either explicitly or implicitly throughout the history of modern civil defense and continue to present the major choices that will shape the future development of civil defense organization. In the next section, we attempt to identify these underlying issues.
Planning and organizing for civil defense has involved issues too complex to be portrayed on an organization chart. The division of responsibility among government components, the development of cadres of trained personnel to operate civil defense systems, the provision of standby authorities to marshal new resources in emergency, all hinge on basic decisions concerning the purpose and mission of civil defense, the operational requirements for dealing with the attack situation, and the constraints imposed upon civil defense efforts by policy considerations.

The problem of how to organize civil defense efforts can be clarified by identifying the issues concerning purpose and mission, operational requirements, and policy constraints. In each of these areas there has been, and will doubtless continue to be, debate and argument: concerning primary, secondary, and mixed purposes of civil defense; concerning how to provide for protective capabilities, emergency services, resource allocations, and control functions; concerning civilian-military relations, economy and concert of effort, and the nature of governmental authority in civil defense functions. Identification of the major issues in these areas is a first step in developing a conceptual framework for evaluating the organizational choices which confront national decision makers.

A. PURPOSE AND MISSION

The most general statement of the purpose of civil defense is to protect, or to save, lives and property from the effects of attack. The Declaration of Policy of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, states that "it is the policy and intent of Congress
to provide a system of civil defense for the protection of lives and property in the United States from attack." Such a statement is perhaps also the most "independent," in that it does not derive the purpose of civil defense from other purposes of society or government. Civil defense is simply viewed as an aspect of the common defense of the homeland. The earliest post-war studies of civil defense conducted in the military establishment emphasized this view. These studies held the mission of civil defense to be rather exclusively the saving of civilian lives. The Bull and Hopley reports were both critical of World War II civilian defense for mixing "war services" with "protective services."

In President Kennedy's speech of May 25, 1961 he described civil defense as insurance against the failure of deterrence, representing the single purpose of civil defense as the saving of lives. Organizationally, this view tends to associate civil defense with responsibilities for military defense as President Kennedy implied when he stated that he was assigning major responsibilities "to the top civilian authority already responsible for continental defense, the Secretary of Defense." The functional interdependence of "damage-limiting" measures, according to current defense concepts, confirms this trend toward the organizational interdependence of civil defense with military defense.

Important as the saving of lives is, other statements of civil defense purposes have also been adduced, especially with regard to Federal roles in civil defense. Civil defense has been viewed as having national or strategic purposes as well as a general humanitarian purpose. National purposes are less "independent" and have

different organizational implications in that they derive from, and explicitly relate civil defense to, other aspects of national security. Three principal national purposes have been advanced: (1) to enable the country to sustain a successful war effort; (2) to ensure the possibility of national survival and recovery from a nuclear attack; and (3) to underwrite a military posture.

1. To Sustain a Successful War Effort

The view that civil defense is necessary in order to enable the country to sustain a successful war effort is the oldest version of a statement of the national purpose of civil defense. It links civil defense with the doctrines of air warfare developed in the period between the two World Wars. According to those doctrines, the purpose of "strategic bombing" was to strike at industrial and population centers, thereby degrading support of the fighting forces and reducing the will to fight. Civil defense in Britain, Germany, and Japan during the Second World War was, in this sense, defense of the "home front." In the United States, local defense during World War I was oriented almost entirely toward war support and consisted of defense against sabotage rather than against attack. As we have indicated, the World War II Office of Civilian Defense did attempt to develop protective services along with war services, but the emphasis on civilian morale and productiveness remained.

Despite the fact that the post-war military studies had de-emphasized this strategic purpose, President Truman assigned civil defense planning responsibilities to the NSRB in 1949 on the grounds that it was the agency already responsible for civilian mobilization and support of military forces. Although FCDA was organizationally separated from defense mobilization agencies as well as from the military establishment, tendencies throughout the period from 1951 to 1958 augured the organizational consolidation of civil defense with defense mobilization primarily because civil defense was conceived of as required to sustain a war effort. However, as we have noted, by the time this consolidation took place, the conception of the nature
of a war which would require civil defense was already beginning to call into question both the possibility and the need for sustained civilian and industrial support of the war effort during wartime. For this reason, older notions of defense mobilization began to be supplanted by notions of emergency planning measures which would have to be undertaken and fully developed in advance of a war emergency. Similarly, by 1958, strategic arguments for civil defense emphasized the need for its development in advance of emergency in order to reduce the strategic vulnerability of the nation.

2. To Ensure National Survival and Recovery from Attack

With the advent of the missile age and the likelihood that international adversaries would maintain stocks of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles sufficient to threaten "unacceptable" damage to their opponents, the national issue in civil defense came to be thought of in terms of whether the nation could survive and recover from a first wave of attacks or a surprise attack. Reliance on a strategy of massive retaliation went together with the notion that any likely attack on the homeland would be a "knockout" attack. Under such views, civilians concentrated in the densely populated cities appeared to be highly valuable strategic targets.

The technology of nuclear weapons and missile systems seemed decisively to shift the "battle front" of modern warfare to the home front. Deployments in the West European forward areas were conceived as constituting a "trip-wire" which threatened, if triggered, almost automatically to lead to strategic strikes on the enemy's homeland. Under the impact of modern technology, air warfare doctrines appeared to imply that civilians were the principal targets of major military actions and that the threat of attack against civilians was a primary role of strategic forces. The national purpose of civil defense, therefore, became that of ensuring national survival and recovery from such attack. Under this view, civil defense was organizationally associated with peacetime emergency preparedness, but also appeared to require association in policy-making with the development and use of strategic forces.
3. **To Underwrite a Military Posture**

As a complement to military defense in the actual conduct of war, civil defense, like military defense, may also have cold war functions. If the military posture is relevant to the way in which the nation conducts international negotiations and diplomacy, then civil defense may also be conceived as having a possible impact on such negotiations and diplomacy.

The Munich crisis of 1938 revealed the possible dependence of negotiations on civil defense. It is sometimes argued that Prime Minister Chamberlain might have taken a different position if he had had more confidence in British civil defense measures of that time.¹ The crisis did touch off a flurry of civil defense activities which revealed at least one side of this interdependence of civil defense and international crisis.

The full implications of this kind of experience did not become widely acknowledged in the United States until after the strategy of massive retaliation had become subject to the "counter deterrence" of Russian nuclear capabilities. The years 1957 and 1958 represented a turning point in understanding of, and argument concerning, the national strategic purpose of civil defense. The Gaither Report² (1957), the RAND Corporation's Study of Non-Military Defense³ (1958), and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund study of International Security - The Military Aspect⁴ (1958) all saw civil defense as a critical need of the national military posture and strategy of deterrence.

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If the US nuclear force structure was to deter Soviet aggression other than a first strike on the continental United States, the credibility of this deterrent seemed to depend upon the capacity of the nation to withstand a retaliatory blow from Russian strategic forces. Civil defense to enhance this capacity was conceived of as necessary to underwrite the deterrent posture.

This view of civil defense has been subject to more public controversy than have other statements of the national purpose of civil defense. It led to new arguments against civil defense, principal among which have been that: (1) by underwriting the military posture, civil defense involves the public directly in cold war foreign policy; (2) as evidence of the nation's capacity and willingness to withstand retaliation, civil defense contributes to a war-acceptance psychology; and (3) as enhancing nuclear deterrence of non-nuclear threats, civil defense may tend to degrade the stability of a nuclear "balance of terror." Arguments about the national, strategic purpose of civil defense on issues such as these were complicated by emphasis on private responsibility for shelter construction. Such emphasis appeared to make individual citizens directly accountable for national policies concerning civil defense as well as for the implementation of self-protective measures.

4. The Impact on Organizational Development

Statements of the purposes of civil defense have played a dual role in the development of civil defense organization. At the level of public involvement, the direct dependence of civil defense on the voluntary participation of State and local governments, public-spirited groups, and private citizens has made it almost inevitable that the national purposes of civil defense be used as arguments for supporting civil defense efforts. It is difficult to assess the comparative effectiveness of various appeals in peacetime or in a cold war environment. During wartime, as in the cases of the local defense councils in World War I and the Office of Civilian Defense in World War II, it is fairly clear that large numbers of volunteers will
respond to appeals to support a war effort or programs to ensure national survival and recovery. However, it is not clear how such volunteers can be used effectively in the future to accomplish the purposes to which they respond.

At the level of the Federal Government, interpretations of the purposes of civil defense have played roles both in shaping divisions of responsibilities and in defining the missions to be performed by component agencies. Although the purpose of saving lives and property is general, it is concrete enough to help define specific missions and tasks to be planned and organized. The national purposes, on the other hand, while more specific are also more abstract; they affect policy uses of civil defense capabilities in crisis management more than they contribute to the definition and clarification of the civil defense mission and tasks. Their effects on the assignment of responsibilities within the Federal Government has, in part, even confused the development of clear conceptions of missions and tasks, particularly at the State and local levels which are more removed from national policy considerations and which have been less directly affected by the reorganizations of civil defense.

It seems evident, as the 1961 reorganization implied, that planning and organizing for civil defense should proceed insofar as possible on the basis of the more concrete and general purpose of developing a system for protecting and saving lives and property. This is especially important for the development of the working organization. Conversely, consideration of the planning significance of the more abstract national purposes ought to be concentrated at the highest policy levels.

B. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

To plan for and develop the organization of civil defense emergency operations, as well as to evaluate its potential effectiveness, purpose and mission must be translated into clearly identifiable operational requirements. Such a process is difficult for any large, complex organization, but civil defense involves peculiar factors which make the problem especially complicated.
Since both the threat and the civil defense mission are unprecedented, experience is not a reliable guide. Experiences with emergency operations in natural disasters are hardly analogous to the situations likely to result from large-scale nuclear attacks. Exercises and tests offer some basis for evaluations of simulated responses to hypothetical situations, but, fundamentally, planning must be based on intelligent presumption and theoretical calculations of possible damage and its effects and of the emergency operations which might be effected by various agencies or groups. Whereas military contingency planning can generally assume the nature and availability of the groups or organizations required to perform specific tasks, civil defense planning must determine what agencies and groups will be available and what the nature of such groups should be.

In 1950, the NSRB report asserted that State and local governments would provide the "field army" of civil defense. Since that time, however, three facts affecting such an "army" have become clearer: (1) an emergency would afford only very limited time in which to mobilize, train, and equip such an "army"; (2) conversion to civil defense uses of existing societal and governmental resources of men and materials, while allowing economies of effort, would nonetheless pose difficult organizational problems; and (3) resources of the Federal Government, and particularly of the military services, may greatly augment the "field army" but their use could raise additional problems of coordination and of clarity of authority and control.

Planning the organization of civil defense emergency operations is also complicated by political and economic issues which may arise independent of the civil defense purpose and mission. While plans to meet operational requirements must be tested against policy constraints deriving from economic and political matters, it is useful to take the concrete mission of saving lives and property as the starting point for identifying the operational requirements to be met by organized activity.
The general mission of civil defense will require different functions to be performed by persons numbering, perhaps, in the hundreds of thousands or millions. Current expectations anticipate the involvement of several major agencies of the Federal Government as well as of State and local government agencies. Private groups and citizens are also likely to play roles in assisting one another. Varieties of facilities, equipment, and emergency stocks would be required by various groups for different functions. The basic organizational planning problem is how best to distinguish and to combine the varieties of functions and requirements so that they may be efficiently assigned. Four broad classes of requirements have emerged and seem to provide a basis for organizing functions according to: (1) requirements for on-site protective capabilities; (2) requirements for mobile emergency services; (3) requirements for resource allocation for relief, repair, and restoration; and (4) requirements for communications systems to warn, to inform, and to facilitate direction and control.

1. **On-Site Protective Capabilities**

The selection and provision of the most effective protective systems has tended to be viewed as the heart of the civil defense problem. By protective capabilities or systems we mean those measures which, taken together, enable the population to reduce or avoid exposure to the direct effects of enemy attack. Such capabilities must be "on-site" in the sense that they must be accessible to the population within expected warning times for the weapons effects.

The number of feasible protective systems is limited and includes primarily, those with fallout shelters, blast shelters, evacuation systems, or combinations of these. But differences in systems costs and effectiveness are substantial, and choice among them involves extensive and difficult commitments of resources to programs to acquire and prepare for the use of such capabilities. Since such protective capabilities aim at enabling persons to survive on the basis of their own actions, education is a necessary part of the development of effective systems.
The organizational issues connected with the selection and provision of shelters, evacuation plans and preparations, and necessary public education tend to cluster around questions such as: what agency or agencies should determine the choice of systems for a given area? how should the systems be financed? what kind of "command-control" system may be required to make effective use of any publicly provided systems? Answers to such questions must, of course, seek to take advantage of economies of scale, but must also reflect differences among the existing powers and capabilities of the various levels of government involved, as well as projections concerning where new decision-making responsibilities should be located. For example, the matching-fund formula for the Federal financial assistance programs has frequently been criticized on the ground that State and local governments do not have available to them the revenue resources which would enable them to assume fifty per cent of civil defense costs. Arguments for a totally-Federal financial program, however, frequently overlook the fact that a matching-fund formula provides a basis for allocating a Federal budget which might otherwise require the Federal Government to make unilateral decisions that could raise exceedingly difficult political problems.

2. Mobile Emergency Services

In addition to on-site protective capabilities, the life-saving mission requires emergency services which can be applied across short distances within hours. The function of such mobile emergency services would be to reduce the number of fatalities which might otherwise result from lack of care for casualties or control of secondary effects. The principal emergency services would thus be those of rescue and medical aid and of fire-fighting and general damage control. In addition, special law and order services may be required to evacuate, or deny access to, contaminated areas and to minimize deaths and losses attributable to such aberrant behavior as might result from post-attack conditions. Such emergency services would, of course, be relevant whether or not protective capabilities existed. Generally,
the better the protective systems, the less the demands upon emergency services.

Since emergency services of rescue and medical aid, fire-fighting and damage control, and maintenance of law and order would need to be applied to a stricken area within hours after attack, it has generally been assumed that they should be the responsibility of the nearest levels of government. Moreover, local and State governments already maintain agencies or departments which fulfill such functions in cases of individual tragedy and natural disaster. Civil defense emergencies may require substantial augmentation of such agencies, but the organizational problem is simplified by the existence for other purposes of a trained, professional core. This core would require special training to enable it to function effectively in the conditions following nuclear attack.

Organizational issues concerning emergency services thus tend to cluster around questions of special training and provision for augmentation of existing resources. In addition to providing leadership for training programs, the Federal Government is in a favorable position to augment emergency services by use of military resources to assist civilian civil defense authorities.

3. Resource Allocation Functions

Following an attack, additional deaths and losses may result from the prolonged physical and social effects of disruption of normal flows of goods and services. Food, housing, and medical supplies would be needed for the relief of victims. Heavy construction and transportation equipment would be necessary for the repair of vital facilities and for the removal of debris. Power, communications, water, and sanitation systems would have to be restored as quickly as possible.

These broader functions of relief, repair, and restoration are basically resource-allocation functions which would draw heavily upon reaming industrial equipment and upon government stockpiles of critical materials, especially of medical and food supplies. Allocations of such resources in an emergency require
decision-making authorities with access to broad information and with knowledge and judgment transcending local and immediate needs. Since the misapplication of resources could endanger longer-run recovery possibilities, the organization of responsibilities and authorities for performing these functions is critical.

Organizational issues are complicated by the interests of the three levels of government, by the relations of government to industry, and by the involvement of several vital agencies of the Federal Government. How resources are apportioned to New York City, for example, directly concerns the City government, the State government, and the Federal Government. Since the heavy equipment which is useful for repair and restoration exists primarily in industry, civil defense planning must rely on the cooperation of industrial firms. Emergency use of such equipment may also require the invoking of Title III powers. Coordination of the activities of Federal agencies responsible for medical and food stockpiles and for regulation of interstate commerce would also be critical to the fulfillment of resource allocation functions.

Finally, careful organization and planning are required by the interdependence of emergency resource allocation functions with those of general resource management and continuity of government associated with longer-term post-attack recovery.

4. Communications Systems

A nation-wide warning network and a communications system have been considered essential requirements of emergency operations from the inception of civil defense programs in 1950. During the past fourteen years, however, conceptions of the functions and hardware systems for both have varied with the changing nature of the threat. As the concept of warning has been broadened to include notions of strategic warning, there is increasing justification for thinking of warning as only one of several functions of communications.
Tactical warning signals conveyed by means of outdoor sirens or by an indoor NEAR system may be only one aspect of possible and desirable warning functions. During times of growing international crisis, there may be occasions when officials would want to alert the public to take preliminary measures. In other circumstances, a population exposed to long-range fallout radiation, but not to direct weapons effects, would require still a different kind of warning. Hence various circumstances may necessitate warning messages which require the flexibility of verbal communications.

In addition to these uses for types of warning, the overall, verbal communications system provides a capacity to meet other major operational requirements. In order to use protective capabilities and emergency services effectively, information on damage assessment and situation analysis needs to flow to relevant agencies. Conversely, information on decisions made and emergency actions taken must flow to affected parties, and sheltered or evacuated populations must be informed when it is safe for them to emerge or to return to evacuated areas. Moreover, communications systems are necessary to facilitate coordination of resource allocation functions and to provide a channel for the exercise of Presidential direction and control.

Each of these functions is an organizational function, and the operational requirements connected with communications may be construed as organizational requirements. The organizational issues involved in communications are essentially issues of organizing civil defense activities of the public, of major private associations and enterprises, of local and State governments, and of the Federal Government. The available hardware systems, therefore, constrain as well as facilitate emergency organization.

C. POLICY CONSTRAINTS

Agencies at each level of government play roles in meeting operational requirements for protective capabilities, emergency services, resource allocation functions, and communications systems. Degrees of responsibility at the various governmental levels may be
significantly different for different classes of operational require-
ments: local governments, for example, may be expected to bear
heaviest responsibility for emergency services, but only little
responsibility for resource allocation functions. Degrees of re-
ponsibility for a given function may also depend on whether that
function is exercised in the pre-attack, trans-attack, or post-
attack phase: the Federal Government may take the lead in locating
and stocking fallout shelters in existing buildings, but have almost
no role in their emergency use and management.

The criteria which determine degrees of responsibility are
mixed in nature. We have suggested a process analogous to military
planning for identifying operational requirements on the basis of
threat analysis and mission determination. Within this framework,
it may be possible to develop measures of the cost and effectiveness
of alternative ways of meeting these requirements through various
organizational means. The development of such measures is beyond the
scope of this initial investigation. However, it is apparent that
issues other than those of comparisons of costs and effectiveness
have constrained the range of organizational alternatives which have
been considered feasible options. Such issues in effect constitute
policy constraints on the development of civil defense organization.

The four major kinds of policy constraints that have affected
the development of civil defense organization reflect concepts
which are imbedded in the general political milieu: (1) civilian-
military relations; (2) economy of effort; (3) concert of effort;
and (4) the nature of civil defense authority.

1. **Civilian-Military Relations**

One of the most frequently stated constraints affecting organi-
ization is that responsibility and authority for civil defense should
remain entirely under civilian control. This constraint reflects a
more general principle that the role of the military in civil affairs
should be limited.
As applied to civil defense, this has been supported by two lines of argument against increased military participation: First, that the military should not be diverted from its primary mission by being called upon to assume a large role in civil defense; and second, that civilians should not abdicate their responsibilities under the illusion that the military services would do the job for them.

Resistance to enlarging the role of the military is found among members of both the military and civilian communities and among both opponents to and advocates of civil defense. In the main, however, there has been greater willingness since 1961 to treat the issue of military participation in civil defense more flexibly.

2. Economy of Effort

In opposition to pressures for expensive programs and for the creation of a Department of Civil Defense, the economic advantage of utilizing existing resources has operated as a constraint on the development of civil defense organization. This constraint is sometimes combined with a fear of "extravagance" in governmental functions or with a desire to maximize efficiency. As applied specifically to civil defense, however, it has also been accompanied by the argument that many of the resources required for a civil defense emergency can best be developed as extensions of existing capabilities rather than by commitment of new resources.

Capabilities for performing rescue, fire-fighting, and law enforcement functions exist at levels of local government, and the responsibility of local government for corresponding emergency services has been emphasized. Similarly, responsibilities of the Federal Government for resource allocation functions have been stressed, and they have been delegated to agencies having non-civil defense responsibilities for the relevant resources.

The operation of this constraint has thus contributed to the diffusion of responsibilities for civil defense beyond what is clearly
required by the nature of the civil defense mission and has added to the organizational problem of coordinating the activities of diversified governmental agencies.

3. Concert of Effort

The counterpart to the diffusion of responsibilities among various levels and agencies of government has been the expectation of, and requirement for, cooperation and coordination among semi-autonomous components. This expectation has constrained civil defense organization to the extent that it has inhibited the development of systems of command and control for both peacetime activities and emergency operations.

Concepts of shared and joint responsibility have also inhibited the extension of the responsibility of government at one level into the areas reserved to another. Greater federalization of civil defense has been resisted as representing further growth of the Federal bureaucracy. Joint responsibility has thus tended to mean limited responsibility. While other Federal agencies have networks of field offices throughout the country, the Federal civil defense office has carefully avoided encroaching on the responsibilities of State or local governments and has limited its extension to the eight regional offices plus training centers.

Among Federal agencies, the principle of coordination operated as a constraint on the programs of both FCDA and OCDM. Since the 1961 reorganization, OCD has had more freedom to develop its programs from within the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army where it has some access, through the Departmental structures, to resources not readily available through coordination.

4. The Nature of Civil Defense Authority

Closely related to the policy constraints imposed by prevailing concepts of economy and concert of effort is a further constraint which arises from the legal basis of civil defense. It involves
concepts of Federal authority and of the legal status of responsibilities of the non-Federal components of a nation-wide system of civil defense.

The system provided for by the Federal Civil Defense Act is essentially a voluntary one. Although it was the intent of Congress that certain responsibility be vested in the States and their political subdivisions, specific means of establishing and realizing this intent were not provided by the Act. Thus, the degree of responsibility assumed by State and local governments was left to their own discretion.

The voluntary pattern as established by the Act reflects the broad Constitutional and historical character and traditions of the federal system of government. This system has been understood to mean that the Federal Government cannot, and should not be authorized to, compel State and local governments to develop their own civil defense programs. A variety of incentives is, of course, available for inducing compliance with Federal programs and standards. These mainly reinforce the informal authority of the Federal Government which is derived from the quality of the leadership it provides. However, should a particular State or local governmental unit fail to assume any responsibility for civil defense, the Federal Government can neither require that unit to assume responsibility nor step in to fill the vacuum.

The prevailing view of the informal nature of Federal civil defense authority has, furthermore, inhibited the development of national standards or regulations directly applicable to individual citizens or to private enterprises. However, standards and regulations do exist in relation to such national concerns as civil rights, interstate commerce, and the income tax system. Their development in relation to civil defense could both strengthen the national program and facilitate State and local programs.

Organizationally, this policy constraint has also meant that Federal civil defense officials have had to expend energy in promoting
civil defense. Their dependence on informal authority has, consequently, involved them in public controversies to a degree not normally required of officials who are not responsible for policy-making. Moreover, they have experienced the frustrations of carrying heavy responsibilities to develop programs, without having commensurate authority to implement them.

D. RECAPITULATION

Underlying the organizational problems and concepts which have characterized the history of civil defense are issues concerning the purpose and mission of civil defense, the determination of operational requirements and how best to meet them, and constraints imposed upon civil defense efforts as matters of policy.

Although the purpose of civil defense as defined by the Federal Civil Defense Act is to provide a system "for the protection of lives and property," national or strategic purposes of sustaining a war effort, of assuring national survival and recovery, and of underwriting a military posture have also affected development of civil defense organization. Concentration on the circumscribed purpose of protecting and saving lives contributes to the clarity of mission and thus facilitates organization planning and development. Concern with the significance of the national, strategic purposes can most profitably be concentrated at the highest policy-making levels.

Four broad categories of operational requirements may be identified on the basis of a clear and narrow definition of the mission of civil defense as the protecting and saving of lives. To fulfill such a mission requires: (1) on-site protective capabilities, (2) mobile emergency services; (3) resource allocation functions; and (4) communications systems. The determination of how to meet civil defense requirements can thus best be arrived at through the application of a resource-oriented approach, that is, by analysis of the comparative costs and effectiveness of using various governmental mixes to meet these requirements. It may be expected that different levels of government can, in varying degrees, contribute to the efficient satisfaction
of these classes of requirements and should, therefore, assume different degrees of responsibility. Provisions must be made for meeting all of these requirements with different mixes of intergovernmental responsibility; there can be no effective civil defense system if any of them is neglected.

However, the feasibility of optimal arrangements for meeting operational requirements must be tested against the policy constraints of civilian control, utilization of existing resources, cooperation and coordination of participating units and agencies, and the nature of Federal authority. While such constraints determine the feasibility of the various options, they are, and have been, subject to flexible interpretation and application and, therefore, warrant continuing reevaluation.
Federal civil defense organization as developed in the periods of FCDA, OCDM, and CCD has depended upon a conception of the central, national office as an office for planning and organizing civil defense efforts conducted elsewhere. The relevant efforts or activities need to be carried out by citizens, private groups, and governmental units which are not under the command or control of the central office, but are dependent upon it for guidance and direction.

Within such a framework, three broad organizational questions have occupied official and non-official attention: (1) Where in the Federal structure should the central office be located so that its planning could be conducted in optimum relation to other programs of national security; (2) What elements of society and government can or should the central office count upon as instruments for meeting the operational requirements of a nation-wide system of civil defense; (3) How can the central office effectively use the limited leverage available to it for obtaining the necessary cooperation in developing and implementing the civil defense system?

Dissatisfaction with the answers to each of the foregoing questions has, as the threat has changed, helped to bring about the reorganizations of 1958 and 1961. Fear that the latter two questions, in particular, could not be answered satisfactorily has led to recurring proposals for more radical change. Such proposals have consisted chiefly of versions of the following: (1) that a Department of Civil Defense be created either as a fourth service Department within the Department of Defense or as a Cabinet Department; (2) that the Federal Government assume primary responsibility for civil defense; and
that the statutory base be altered to strengthen civil defense
and, perhaps, to make certain aspects of the program mandatory.

Proposals of the first sort stem from the judgment that civil
defense requires operational capabilities and an operational cadre
that can best be developed within a system in which civil defense
is the primary responsibility of those on whom the operation of the
system must depend. That is, there must be a sizable core of trained
personnel whose civil defense responsibilities are not merely added
to other responsibilities. Such personnel would also be under the
direct control of a senior official with authority to provide for
their training, facilities and equipment, and their logistical
support. Such proposals have been rejected for a variety of reasons.
The likelihood that the threat of attack would materialize has not
been regarded as sufficient to warrant such extensive commitment of
resources in peacetime. Simultaneously, it has been held that
resources so committed at the Federal level would be inadequate in
attack, response to which would necessarily depend more upon the
activities of State and local governments, agencies of the Federal
Government with established peacetime roles, and individual citizens
and private groups. Moreover, a lack of convincing knowledge of the
optimal allocations of resources among various possible physical systems
for active as well as passive defense has made such an approach seem
premature.

Proposals to have the Federal Government formally assume primary,
if not full, responsibility for civil defense have experienced a
similar fate. They have been made on the grounds that civil defense,
as a part of the common defense, is Constitutionally a primary
responsibility of the Federal Government more than a responsibility of
State and local governments deriving from their police powers. More
pragmatically, such proposals have been recommended because, it is
held, only the Federal Government has command of the necessary revenue
resources and the competence to judge the nature of the threat so as
to permit an optimal allocation of national resources. On the other
hand, State and local responsibility has been defended as required
both by the police power of State and local governments and by the inescapable operational necessity for on-site protective capabilities and emergency services which the Federal Government could not reasonably provide. Only a system of joint responsibility could provide both the national planning and the nation-wide capability.

Discussion of, and proposals for, new civil defense legislation have so far been equally inconclusive. At the time the Federal Civil Defense Act was enacted, it was widely acknowledged to be emergency legislation that would require careful periodic review. Although the Act has been amended eleven times, only the amendment of 1958 altered major substantive provisions. Other amendments extended the termination dates of certain provisions, including the Title III powers, and provided for administrative changes. The major reasons for review of the legislation arise not so much from the Act's specific provisions as from its general character. The Act has proved to be a flexible instrument of civil defense. As a result of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, of Executive Order 10952 of 1961, and of later Orders, the Act no longer defines the Federal organization. Moreover, the Act does not specifically authorize the development of certain programs, particularly for shelter construction, which civil defense officials have considered necessary. Finally, since the Act is permissive rather than mandatory in most of its provisions, suggestions for strengthening civil defense have sometimes sought ways of making it less dependent upon voluntary participation.

The problems to which these proposals have been addressed are not organizational problems alone. Though they deal with organizational matters they imply broader problems of civil defense which set limits to the range of organizational choice. The usefulness of proposals such as these would depend on the developing technology of physical protection, upon the potential, but limited utility of existing national resources, and upon basic national policies.
APPENDIX A

A CIVIL DEFENSE CHRONOLOGY
# Appendix A

## A Civil Defense Chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Civil Defense Events</th>
<th>Background</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1916 August 29</td>
<td>The Council of National Defense, composed of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, was created by act of Congress. This became the major Federal agency for guiding the domestic war effort, including &quot;civil defense.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918 October 1</td>
<td>A Field Division, with the Secretary of Interior as Chairman, was created under the Council of National Defense to coordinate the activities of thousands of state, local, and community &quot;local defense&quot; units which had sprung up during the war.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 11</td>
<td>The Armistice ending World War I was signed.</td>
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<td>1938 September 29</td>
<td>The Munich Conference on the Czechoslovakia crisis was held.</td>
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<td>1939 September 1</td>
<td>German Armed Forces invaded Poland.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940 May 25</td>
<td>The Office for Emergency Management was established, upon recommendation of the revived Council of National Defense, in the Executive Office of the President.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941 May 20</td>
<td>The Office of Civilian Defense was established, by Executive Order 8757, within the Office for Emergency Management. Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia was named Director.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Japanese forces attacked the United States base at Pearl Harbor. War was declared between the United States and Japan on the following day.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>War between the United States and Germany was declared.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 11</td>
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<tr>
<td>1942 February 10</td>
<td>Mayor LaGuardia resigned as Director of the Office of Civilian Defense.</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 11</td>
<td>James M. Landis, Assistant to the President, became Director of the Office of Civilian Defense.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 15</td>
<td>The responsibilities of the Office of Civilian Defense were expanded by Executive Order 9134.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945 May 7</td>
<td>Colonel General Gustav Jodl, Chief of Staff of the German Army, signed the unconditional surrender for Germany.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 30</td>
<td>The Office of Civilian Defense was abolished by Executive Order 9562.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 16</td>
<td>An experimental atomic bomb was exploded at Alamogordo, New Mexico.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 26</td>
<td>The Allies issued the Potsdam Declaration, calling upon Japan to surrender immediately and unconditionally.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 6</td>
<td>The first atomic bomb was dropped by the United States on Hiroshima.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 9</td>
<td>A second atomic bomb was dropped by the United States on Nagasaki.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 14</td>
<td>In a note to the Four Powers Japan announced its unconditional surrender.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946 March 21</td>
<td>The Strategic Air Command was established at Bolling Air Force Base.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 30</td>
<td>The United States Strategic Bombing Survey report, <em>The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki</em>, was completed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946 November 25</td>
<td>Secretary of War Patterson established a Civil Defense Board in the War Department to study the problems of civil defense. Major General Harold R. Bull was named Director.</td>
<td>In a commencement address delivered at Harvard University, Secretary of State George C. Marshall discussed the broad policy lines of what was later to be implemented as the &quot;Marshall Plan.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947 February 28</td>
<td>The Civil Defense Board submitted its report, <em>A Study of Civil Defense</em> (known as the &quot;Bull Report&quot;). This study was classified as &quot;confidential.&quot;</td>
<td>The National Security Act (PL 80-253), &quot;to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States,&quot; was signed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>The National Security Act became effective.</td>
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<td>July 26</td>
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<td>September 18</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948 February 14</td>
<td>The Bull Report was declassified and released by the National Military Establishment.</td>
<td>The final crisis which was to culminate in a Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia intensified.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
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<td>1948 March 27</td>
<td>The Office of Civil Defense Planning was established in the National Military Establishment by Secretary of Defense Forrestal. Russell J. Hopley was named as Director.</td>
<td>The crisis over access to Berlin intensified, culminating in the Air-lift.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 20-29</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 13</td>
<td>The Office of Civil Defense Planning submitted its report, Civil Defense for National Security (known as the &quot;Hopley Report&quot;), to Secretary of Defense Forrestal. The study was released to the public on the same day.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949 March 3</td>
<td>Rejecting the recommendation of the Hopley Report that an Office of Civil Defense be established in the National Military Establishment, President Truman transferred responsibility for civil defense planning to the National Security Resources Board. William A. Gill was named Coordinator of Civil Defense Planning.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949 July 25</td>
<td>After the prolonged debate which had preceded Senate ratification, President Truman signed the treaty of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 10</td>
<td>President Truman signed the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (PL 81-216), amending the National Security Act of 1947 and reorganizing the National Military Establishment into the Department of Defense.</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 23</td>
<td>President Truman announced that the Soviet Union had recently exploded an atomic device.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1</td>
<td>The establishment of the People's Republic of China was proclaimed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950 March 1</td>
<td>Paul J. Larsen became Chairman of the Civilian Mobilization Office of the National Security Resources Board.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 3</td>
<td>The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy opened Hearings on civil defense.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>June 25</td>
<td>President Truman announced the invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces and called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950 September 8</td>
<td>The report of the National Security Resources Board, United States Civil Defense (NSRB Document 128), was submitted to the President.</td>
<td>The Defense Production Act (PL 81-774), providing the powers and defining the policies to meet the needs of defense mobilization, was signed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>September 18</td>
<td>NSRB Document 128 was transmitted to the Congress for consideration and review.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 29</td>
<td>The National Security Resources Board published Survival Under Atomic Attack as the first booklet designed to educate the public in self-protection.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1</td>
<td>President Truman issued Executive Order 10186, temporarily establishing a Federal Civil Defense Administration in the Office for Emergency Management.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 6</td>
<td>Millard F. Caldwell was sworn in as Federal Civil Defense Administrator.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950 December 16</td>
<td>President Truman issued Executive Order 10193, establishing the Office of Defense Mobilization in the Executive Office of the President, and assigning to it the task of coordinating all mobilization activities of the Federal Government.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 16</td>
<td>President Truman issued Proclamation No. 2914, declaring events in Korea to &quot;constitute a grave threat&quot; and proclaiming &quot;the existence of a national emergency.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951 January 12</td>
<td>President Truman signed the Federal Civil Defense Act (PL 81-920).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952 October 3</td>
<td>Britain exploded its first experimental nuclear device at Monte Bello Island.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 31</td>
<td>The United States exploded an experimental thermonuclear device at Eniwetok.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 15</td>
<td>Millard F. Caldwell resigned as Federal Civil Defense Administrator.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952 March 4</td>
<td>Frederick V. Peterson was sworn in as Federal Civil Defense Administrator.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 5</td>
<td>The death of Joseph Stalin was announced.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953 March 13</td>
<td></td>
<td>President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10438, transferring certain functions of the National Security Resources Board to the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reorganization Plan No. 3 was issued, abolishing the National Security Resources Board and transferring its remaining functions to the Office of Defense Mobilization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 26</td>
<td></td>
<td>The &quot;cease fire&quot; in Korea became effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Soviet Union exploded a thermonuclear device.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954 January 12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in an address before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, discussed the policy and strategy of &quot;massive retaliation.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 31</td>
<td>The new headquarters of the Federal Civil Defense Administration was formally opened in Battle Creek, Michigan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955 February 15</td>
<td></td>
<td>In response to growing public demands, the Atomic Energy Commission issued a press release describing fallout from a multimegaton thermonuclear device exploded by the United States at Bikini Atoll on 1 March 1954.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 22- June 20</td>
<td>In light of the newly-disclosed fallout problem, the Subcommittee on Civil Defense (Senator Kefauver, Chairman) of the Senate Armed Services Committee held a series of major hearings on the operations and policies of the Civil Defense Program.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 9</td>
<td>President Eisenhower created a new Civil Defense Coordinating Board within the Federal Government, and appointed Federal Civil Defense Administrator Peterson as Chairman.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 15-17</td>
<td>During a major test of the nation's defenses (the second &quot;Operation Alert&quot;) President Eisenhower &quot;declared&quot; martial law, precipitating a reassessment of military-civilian relations in civil defense.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 18-23</td>
<td>The Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union conferred at Geneva on the unification of Germany, disarmament, and the security of Europe.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955 August 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>PL 84-364 was signed, authorizing the States to organize and maintain State Defense Forces which, unlike National Guard units, would be exempt from federalization in time of emergency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 January-</td>
<td>The Subcommittee on Military Operations (Representative Chet Holifield, Chairman), of the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives, held major hearings on &quot;Civil Defense for National Survival.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Suez Crisis, precipitated by President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal led to an invasion of Egypt by Israeli, British, and French forces which was terminated by a cease-fire on 6 November.</td>
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<td>July 26-</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956 October 23- November 4</td>
<td>The Hungarian crisis and anti-Communist revolt intensified, culminating in the second (and decisive) massive Soviet military intervention.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1957 July 19</td>
<td>Leo A. Hoegh was sworn in as Federal Civil Defense Administrator, succeeding Frederick V. Peterson.</td>
<td>The Soviet Union launched Sputnik I.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958 April 24</td>
<td>President Eisenhower sent Reorganization Plan No. 1 to Congress, transferring all responsibilities of the Federal Civil Defense Administrator and of the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization to the President, and consolidating the FCDA and ODM into a new Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization in the Executive Office of the President.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May 12- July 15</td>
<td>The crisis in Lebanon intensified, leading to a military coup on 14 July, and the landing of United States Marines on 15 July.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1</td>
<td>Reorganization Plan No. 1 (see previous items) became law.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958 July 1</td>
<td>President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10773, delegating all functions and responsibilities transferred to the President by Reorganization Plan No. 1 to the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (later renamed the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization).</td>
<td>The Department of Defense Reorganization Act (PL 85-599) became law, amending the National Security Act of 1947, and strengthening, inter alia, the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6</td>
<td>PL 85-606, the principal amendment to the Federal Civil Defense Act, was signed, making civil defense a joint responsibility of the Federal Government and State and local governments, expanding the program of Federal financial assistance, and providing for the distribution of radiological defense instruments to State and local units.</td>
<td>The crisis over Communist China's shelling and blockade of Quemoy and Matsu intensified.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958 October 31</td>
<td>An international conference on the banning</td>
<td>An international conference on the banning of atomic weapons tests and on surprise nuclear attack was convened at Geneva.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of atomic weapons tests and on surprise nuclear attack was convened at Geneva.</td>
<td>Castro forces entered Havana, ending the long struggle for the overthrow of the Batista regime.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959 January 1</td>
<td>Castro forces entered Havana, ending the long struggle for the overthrow of the Batista regime.</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 25-27</td>
<td>President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev conferred at Camp David.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960 February 13</td>
<td>France exploded its first nuclear device at Reggan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1</td>
<td>A U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union, resulting in the cancellation of a proposed Summit Conference.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961 March 7</td>
<td>Frank Ellis was confirmed as Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 17</td>
<td>Cuban exiles unsuccessfully attempted a landing at the Bay of Pigs.</td>
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<td>May 25</td>
<td>In an address to Congress on &quot;urgent national needs,&quot; President Kennedy indicated his intention to place civil defense in the Department of Defense.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961 June 3-4</td>
<td>President Kennedy conferred with Premier Khrushchev in Vienna on a number of international issues.</td>
<td>The Berlin Crisis precipitated by the Soviet demand for a Germany Peace Treaty, intensified, culminating in the erection of the Berlin Wall (beginning 15 August).</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 4-</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 17</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 20</td>
<td>President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10952, assigning civil defense responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense. This provided further for the later creation of the Office of Civil Defense by the transfer of certain property, facilities, personnel, and funds from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization to the Department of Defense, and for the reorganization of OCDM as a smaller advisory agency to be named the Office of Emergency Planning.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 25</td>
<td>In a television address to the nation, President Kennedy announced the reorganization of the civil defense program.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961 September 1</td>
<td>The White House announced that the Soviet Union had resumed the testing of nuclear weapons, thereby ending the self-imposed Three Power moratorium which had begun on 31 October 1958.</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 15</td>
<td>The appointment of Steuart L. Pittman as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense was confirmed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 5</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary Pittman announced that the former staff of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization which had been transferred to the new Office of Civil Defense in the Department of Defense would be moved from Battle Creek back to Washington, D. C.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1962 March 2</td>
<td>President Kennedy announced that the United States would resume atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons in late April, unless the Soviet Union agreed to a test-ban treaty prior to that time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 16</td>
<td>In a commencement address delivered at the University of Michigan, Secretary of Defense McNamara described the programs and policies necessary to provide a flexible defense posture.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Civil Defense Events</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962 October 22-29</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Cuban missile crisis, announced to the nation on October 22 in a television address by President Kennedy, came to a climax.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963 May 28</td>
<td>A Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services (Edward Hebert, Chairman) held major hearings on the fallout shelter program and on proposed amendments to the Federal Civil Defense Act.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 11</td>
<td></td>
<td>President Kennedy delivered a major policy speech at the American University, proposing a &quot;strategy of peace,&quot; and announcing high-level Three Power talks on a nuclear test ban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>President Kennedy signed the instruments of ratification of the Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964 March 31</td>
<td>Upon the resignation of Assistant Secretary Pittman, civil defense responsibilities were redelegated to the Secretary of the Army, and the Office of Civil Defense was transferred to the Department of the Army.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| April 7      | William P. Durkee was designated Director of the Office of Civil Defense.             | 75 }
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Civil Defense Events</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964 October 15</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Soviet Union announced the removal of Nikita Khrushchev from his offices in the Party and in the Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16</td>
<td></td>
<td>Communist China exploded its first nuclear device.</td>
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APPENDIX B

A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CIVIL DEFENSE
APPENDIX B
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CIVIL DEFENSE

B.1 RELEVANT OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS ON CURRENT PROGRAMS

Federal Civil Defense Guide
A collection of documents prepared by OCD for guidance of State and local civil defense personnel. The Guide describes the Federal program, recommends actions to be taken at the State and local levels, and serves as a major source of technical and administrative information. It is divided into eight major sections: Introduction (including documents on Federal responsibilities and authorities); Organization, Planning and Programming; Shelter Development; Shelter Utilization; Emergency Services; Preattack Supporting Programs; Preparing Emergency Operations Plans; and Reports.

OCD Instructions and Manuals
A collection of documents prepared by OCD to provide authoritative guidance for personnel in the national and regional offices of the Office of Civil Defense. These documents deal both with matters of administration and with specific aspects of the program. The fourteen general subject areas are: (1) personnel; (2) planning and readiness; (3) supply management; (4) warning; (5) general administration; (6) publications; (7) organization and functions; (8) security; (9) office and administrative services; (10) comptrollership; (11) shelter; (12) shelter support; (13) training and education; and (14) federal assistance.

National Plan for Emergency Preparedness
Prepared by the Office of Emergency Planning, revising and superseding sections of the 1958 National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization. The new Plan consists of 18 chapters which together establish policy guidelines for, and outline the emergency programs and functions of, Federal departments and agencies. Chapter I is entitled, and outlines, "Basic Principles."
RELEVANT OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS ON CURRENT PROGRAMS - continued

The remaining 17 chapters deal mainly with such specific functions as civil defense, transportation, telecommunications, resource management, etc.

Digest of Federal Emergency Measures

In preparation by the Office of Emergency Planning to replace earlier classified plans. Plan C had been developed for use in limited war and to improve readiness for general war; plan D-minus had been prepared for use in the event of an all-out nuclear attack on the United States. The classified Digest is intended to consolidate plans C and D-minus into a single plan covering cold war, limited war, and nuclear attack contingencies. It is anticipated that it will provide for increased flexibility and efficiency in the selection of emergency measures.


B.2 MAJOR STUDIES DEALING WITH CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
(Listed Chronologically)


This was the first civil defense planning study prompted by developments in atomic weaponry. It was undertaken almost simultaneously with the United States Strategic Bombing Surveys, and utilized findings of those Surveys as well as the more general body of information on the experience with civil defense during the war. The study was classified and never released, but it provided much of the background material for both the Bull and Hopley reports.

In spite of its significance as the first study, public references to it are rare. The above annotation was prepared on the basis of citations in three places: page 34 of Appendix B to the declassified Bull Report (cites the study under a listing of documentary references), page 2 of the Hopley Report (mentions that the


Completed as a classified study in 1947, this study was declassified and publicly released in 1948. Known as the "Bull Report" (after Major General Harold R. Bull, Director of the Civil Defense Board), it built on the work of the earlier study by the Office of the Provost Marshal General. The Report called for, and outlined, major steps in planning and legislation to establish a civilian civil defense agency within the proposed unified Department of Defense. Its proposals were based on a review of the World War II civil defense organizations of Great Britain, Germany, and Japan, and an examination of wartime civil defense activities in this country.


This report, known as the "Hopley Report" (after Russell J. Hopley, Director of the Office), attempted to detail the basic ideas presented in the Bull Report. It offered a comprehensive analysis of civil defense functions and services, and of the various organizational patterns for fulfilling these functions. This study specifically recommended the adoption of a permanent, peacetime civil defense system, favoring its establishment within the National Military Establishment.


This report, known as the "Blue Book," focused on civil defense planning and legislation, stressing "self-
MAJOR STUDIES DEALING WITH CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION - continued

"protection" and "economy," and emphasized the operational roles of the States and their political subdivisions. It was accepted by President Truman and then transmitted to Congress, providing the basis for the deliberations which led to passage of the Federal Civil Defense Act.

Associated Universities, Inc. Project East River. New York, 1952

This study constituted a major review of civil defense. It was broadly critical of the lack of coordination in the national defense effort as between both military and non-military defense and civil defense and defense mobilization. The report specifically recommended the consolidation of the latter two functions into a single office.


This study consisted, in part, of a review of civil defense during the three-year period since the completion of Project East River, and offered a series of recommendations based upon that review. It stressed the need for planning and organization on the basis of metropolitan target zones, restated the necessity for improved coordination of military and non-military defense functions, for reduction of urban vulnerability, and for industrial dispersion, and recommended a strengthening of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.


This study, known as the "Kestnbaum Report" (after Meyer Kestnbaum, Chairman of the Commission), was highly critical of the organizational, financial, and jurisdictional aspects of the civil defense program. It recommended that action be taken to make civil defense a joint Federal - State and local responsibility, thus removing primary responsibility from the States and their political subdivisions.

In its report, the Committee recommended that provision be made for centralized coordination and direction of the non-military defense program of the Federal Government, and that a temporary Non-military Defense Commission be created to explore ways of accomplishing this coordination. The accompanying report by William H. Stead dealt more specifically with the nature of the threat and with current planning assumptions. It included a proposal for a non-military defense program, focused on essential tasks and task-achievement, and examined the responsibilities of Federal, State, and local governments in the overall civil defense program. The Appendix to Mr. Stead's report discussed the present status of non-military defense planning in certain Federal agencies and departments, and of industrial non-military defense planning.

These reports of the Special Committee of the National Planning Association are included as Exhibits 11, 12, and 13 (Appendix) in US Senate, Subcommittee on Civil Defense of the Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Operations and Policies of the Civil Defense Program, Part II and Appendix. 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955.


Part I of the McKinsey study examined existing non-military defense plans and programs, defined the nature of the organizational problems, and offered proposals to deal with these problems. It particularly called attention to the role of the President, and recommended that he issue a message stressing the
importance of non-military defense and announcing a reexamination of organizational arrangements.

The major recommendations of Part II of the McKinsey Report were: that established agencies and departments be utilized more fully and that their civil defense assignments be clarified; that ODM and FCDA be abolished and that there be established a new agency in the Executive Office of the President; and that FCDA regional offices be reorganized under the consolidated agency to assist State and local units and to coordinate their efforts with Federal preparedness activities. These and other recommendations were based upon analysis of the nature of non-military defense preparedness functions, consideration of alternatives for their assignment within the Federal Government and for their direction and coordination, and examination of organizational arrangements necessary to stimulate and assist State and local activities and to coordinate these with Federal efforts.


This classified report was submitted to the President by Mr. Frank B. Ellis, Director of OCDM. In commenting on this study, House Report No. 1249 (US House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations. New Civil Defense Program. Ninth Report, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 21 September 1961), pp. 15-16, indicated that it criticized OCDM as having become too "operational" while neglecting the direction and coordination functions of non-military defense efforts. It further noted that Mr. Ellis both stressed the importance of delegating civil defense functions to
existing agencies and departments, and recommended
that emergency preparedness orders be reissued as
Executive Orders.

A Report to the Secretary of Defense on the Organizational Questions Involved If Major Civil Defense Functions are Assigned to the Department of Defense. Washington, D. C., 10 June 1961

This classified report was submitted to the Secretary of Defense. In commenting on this study, House Report No. 1249 (pp. 16-19) noted that it was prompted by consideration of the desirability and feasibility of delegating major civil defense operating functions to the Secretary of Defense. The Report further indicated that the General Counsel's study considered organizational alternatives, assuming such a transfer of responsibilities, and apparently favored the organizational option of establishing a new civil defense Administrator on a par with the service secretaries.


In this study, submitted to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the McKinsey Corporation was called upon to review and evaluate alternative approaches to the transfer of civil defense responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense. The report supported the transfer and advanced three approaches to improving non-military defense, one of which was substantially adopted in Executive Order 10952. This alternative was to assign to the Department of Defense major responsibility for "planning and developing" a national shelter program.


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MAJOR STUDIES DEALING WITH CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION - continued


This report on the effects of enemy attack and on problems of civil defense was submitted to the Office of Civil Defense by a National Academy of Sciences Study Group. This study, conducted by a group of scientists and engineers, examined the requirements for survival, assessing weapons effects, and stressing the need for intensive focus on problems of post-attack recovery. The group recommended the adoption of an extensive, long-range civil defense program, and suggested that the Federal Government assume primary responsibility for the planning, development, and operation of such a non-military defense program.

B.3 MAJOR REVIEWS OF THE US DEFENSE POSTURE, INCLUDING NON-MILITARY DEFENSE


A study commissioned by President Eisenhower and submitted to him at a meeting of the National Security Council on 7 November 1957. This "top-secret" study was prepared by a team of prominent citizens and an advisory panel of scientists and educators, headed by H. Rowan Gaither, a former chairman of the board of the Ford Foundation. The Committee was originally established to review plans for active and passive defense against nuclear attack. Its assignment was prompted by the recommendation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration that a $40,000,000,000 blast and fallout shelter program be undertaken by the Federal Government.

In its Report, the Committee recommended broadly that: (1) the United States undertake a sustained build-up of its offensive and defensive power to deter attack, and (2) that a long-term $22,000,000,000 program of shelter construction for protection against radioactive fallout be initiated. Although never declassified and released to the public, sections of the study's findings "leaked out" and precipitated considerable controversy and debate.
MAJOR REVIEWS OF THE US DEFENSE POSTURE, INCLUDING NON-MILITARY DEFENSE - continued

The above annotation is derived from newspaper sources, especially the December 21, 22, 25, and 29 issues of the New York Times, 1957.


The contents of this study were based on two assumptions: (1) that effective non-military defense measures could alleviate the consequences of nuclear attack and sustain the recovery effort, and (2) that such measures would increase United States' flexibility in the areas of foreign policy decision-making and implementation of a deterrent strategy. The study considered such specific aspects of non-military defense as types and performance of shelters, radiation consequences, and problems of recovery. It further offered cost estimates of alternative, varying performance-level programs, discussed the interrelationships of military and non-military defense systems, and presented a series of conclusions and recommendations based on its findings. A major conclusion of the study was that extensive governmental research, development, and long-term planning in the field of non-military defense was critical. It further recommended that a civil defense program be oriented primarily towards domestic civilian protection, survival, and recovery, rather than towards war production mobilization in support of a large overseas army.


The report of the Panel stressed the interrelationships of military and non-military defense. It broadly examined the civil defense program and concluded that deterrence is totally ineffective as a strategy in the absence of an effective non-military defense effort. In the words of the Panel, "In the age of the ballistic missile the known capability of a society to withstand attack will become an increasingly important deterrent." (p. 46).

B.4 CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS (Listed Chronologically by Committee)


This Conference Report is historically important for the discussions which it contains of the House and Senate deliberations on, and versions of, the bill, and for its presentation of the final form in which the Act was passed. The recommendations of the Conference Committee resolving the conflict over the earlier House version of the Act, rendering it temporary and the later Senate version, making it permanent, are of special relevance.


CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS - continued


. New Civil Defense Program. House Report No. 1249, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 21 Sep-


The periodic investigations and reviews of the civil defense program undertaken by the Holifield Subcommittee resulted in the publication of the above-noted reports. With the exception of House Report No. 300 (a Staff study), these reports together constitute a continuous examination and history of civil defense in this country. House Reports 1874 (1958) and 1249 (1961) provide especially valuable analyses of the reorganizations of 1958 and 1961.

US Senate, Subcommittee on Civil Defense of the Committee on Armed Services (Senator Estes Kefauver, Chairman). Interim Report on Civil Defense. 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955

This rather brief Interim Report covered the first phase of the 1955 hearings which had been prompted by widespread debate on the problems of fallout. No final report was issued by the Kefauver Subcommittee.


This Report recommended passage of H. R. 7576, a Committee bill proposed as a substitute for an FCDA-sponsored amendment. In redrafting the amendment, the Committee adopted the FCDA proposal to amend the Act to establish civil defense as a joint responsibility of the Federal Government and the States and their political
subdivisions, but rejected its proposal to lift the "50% of cost" limitation on Federal financial assistance.


This Report on the proposed legislation to amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, As Amended, contained an analysis of the entire shelter program, included a discussion of the role of the military in the civil defense program, and examined the relationship of civil defense personnel and organizations to natural disaster relief. It is especially interesting to note that this Report described the process by which the members of the Subcommittee changed their positions and attitudes from "instinctive rejection" to "firm belief in and support of" the fallout shelter program, and incidentally provided arguments in support of the entire civil defense program.

B.5 REPORTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION (Listed Chronologically)

US Congress, Joint Committee on Defense Production.


The Annual Reports of the Joint Committee contain summaries of the programs and operations of all departments and agencies related to defense production. Three of these Reports are especially interesting: The Eighth Annual Report provided valuable data on the reorganization of 1958; the Eleventh Annual Report contained information on, and analysis of, the 1961 reorganization; and the Thirteenth Annual Report includes the most comprehensive and authoritative statement of current assignments in the field of non-military defense to be collected in a single document.

B.6 MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON CIVIL DEFENSE
(Listed Chronologically)

US Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Hearings on Civil Defense Against Enemy Attack. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 1950

These were the first major hearings on civil defense. They treated extensively of the planning activities of the National Security Resources Board and were important to the report issued by the Board later in the year and entitled, United States Civil Defense.
The Congressional hearings on the proposed Federal Civil Defense Act were distinctive for their general acceptance of its basic intent; there was little debate on the broad provision for civil defense under Federal guidance. The hearings did, however, result in reorganization of the proposed Act, the clarification of its limits and intent, the addition to it of a section of "definitions," and the provision of a termination date for the emergency authorities (Title III) established under the Act.

These were the first hearings held after the Federal Civil Defense Administration began operations and were primarily concerned with the relationship of the Department of Defense to civil defense and to the FCDA.

The hearings of the Kefauver Subcommittee, growing out of the discovery of large-scale fallout radiation, constituted a major examination of the entire civil defense program. Two articles by Dr. Ralph E. Lapp, which prompted public debate on the problem, are included as Exhibits 16 and 17 of the Appendix to Part I. The report of the National Planning Association, A Program for the Non-Military Defense of the United States, accompanied by a report by William H. Stead, entitled: The Tasks of Non-Military Defense of the Present Status of Planning (with Appendix), are included as Exhibits 11, 12, and 13 of the Appendix to Part II.
The 1956 hearings of the Holifield Subcommittee are, by far, the most extensive to date. They dealt with all facets of the civil defense program, including testimonies of numerous witnesses, discussions of the civil defense programs in key cities, and letters from Governors, Mayors, and State and local civil defense personnel commenting on the overall program, its needs, areas for change, and spheres of responsibility.

These hearings dealt with the FCDA proposals to amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, As Amended, establishing civil defense as the joint responsibility of the Federal Government and the States and their political subdivisions, and increasing Federal financial assistance.

The 1958 hearings of the Holifield Subcommittee dealt first with atomic explosion effects on test shelters. In the course of the investigation, a large body of authoritative technical information was introduced regarding atomic shelter designs and structures, and the basic policy considerations of a nation-wide shelter system were reviewed.

MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON CIVIL DEFENSE - continued

Corporation, A Study of Non-military Defense, are included as Exhibits A and B of the Appendix to Part II.


These brief hearings are the only ones which led directly to a significant change in the Federal Civil Defense Act. There was little opposition to the principal features of the House-approved amendment (passed a year earlier) which, among other things, made civil defense a joint responsibility of the Federal Government and of the States and their political subdivisions.


The 1960 hearings of the Holifield Subcommittee reviewed the announced 1958 national shelter policy, pointing repeatedly to the general lack of progress made in its implementation. Appendix I to the hearings contains the text of the Subcommittee questionnaire on shelter construction and the replies of Governors and Mayors to that questionnaire.

87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961

The 1961 hearings of the Holifield Subcommittee reviewed the status and achievements of the civil defense program, and considered the implications of Executive Order 10952, transferring civil defense responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense and providing for the creation of the Office of Civil Defense and the reorganization of OCDM.

87th Congress, 2nd Session, 1962

The 1962 hearings examined the civil defense program of the Department of Defense, reviewing the implementation of the reorganization of 1961 and the
Department's operations under Executive Order 10952. The new national fallout shelter program, including surveys of existing spaces, was examined in detail.

US House of Representatives, Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on Armed Services (Representative F. Edward Hebert, Chairman). Hearings, Civil Defense - Fallout Shelter Program (Pursuant to H. R. 3516). Part I (No. II) and Part II, Vols. I and II (No. 20), 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963

The hearings of Subcommittee No. 3, prompted by OCD proposed legislation to develop new fallout shelter spaces, constituted a major examination of the entire civil defense program. They more broadly considered the entire range of opinions on civil defense in general, and on the shelter program in particular, calling on numerous witnesses representing all points of view.


The hearings before the full Committee followed those of Subcommittee No. 3 and were held to receive the report of the Hebert Subcommittee on the civil defense fallout shelter program, and to consider the provisions of the bill.

B.7 ANNUAL REPORTS ON CIVIL DEFENSE


The Annual Reports of FCDA, OCDM, and OCD provide information on, but little analysis of, the on-going programs and activities of civil defense. They contain details on the status of various aspects of the overall program (e.g., the shelter program) and on such activities as civil defense training and education. The Appendices to these Reports generally include the
ANNUAL REPORTS ON CIVIL DEFENSE - continued

texts of such relevant documents as Executive Orders, Directives, and various conference reports.

B.8 MISCELLANEOUS (Listed Alphabetically)


This working draft of a final report undertakes to provide a framework for the development of alternative civil defense training programs, to advance a theory of instruction, and to design plans for evaluation and testing.


This brief working paper reviewed some of the principal documents assigning responsibilities, developed a check-list of functions, and called for a clarification of assignments relating to civil defense.


A recent Report which outlines alternative civil defense programs ranging in cost from $.2 to $50-100 billion per year. It deals principally with "hardware" systems, rather than with organizational aspects of civil defense.


An excellent study of the civil defense responsibilities and activities of municipal governments. The authors undertook to describe these responsibilities as they are defined by Federal programs and policies, with
special reference to the fallout shelter program. They selected six cities for detailed examination of the ways in which resources have been organized to meet responsibilities, preparations made to cope with the effects of attack, and volunteers and non-governmental agencies, organizations, and institutions utilized to supplement municipal forces. The study further identified major problems encountered by the cities in building their civil defense capabilities (dealing particularly with their relationships with other governmental jurisdictions), and offered recommendations designed to overcome these difficulties.


Encyclopaedic in nature, this work, originally intended to focus on legal and constitutional aspects of civil defense, includes discussions of strategic and operational problems as well. Written as a dissertation, the study is valuable primarily as a reference work and includes an exhaustive (unannotated and unselected) bibliography.


A thorough and scholarly examination of the history of the organization and workings of the military establishment from 1903 to 1960. It provides an interesting background for, and perspective from which to view, the problems of organizing civil defense capabilities and operations.


An unpublished history of civilian defense during World War II, written by an official of the Office of Civilian Defense. This study stressed the protective, as opposed to the war services of civil defense, and argued for the maintenance of a permanent Office of Civilian Defense.
MISCELLANEOUS - continued


A general discussion of civil defense problems and programs written for use in an introductory, graduate-level course.


A brief, somewhat "partisan," and not always reliable history of civil defense from 1950 to 1962. Mr. Modell largely attributes the failures of the civil defense program to Congress and to members of the Republican administration.


The definitive, most comprehensive history of the British civil defense effort from its beginnings in 1924 to the end of World War II. The book is especially useful in view of the extent to which the early American efforts at organizing for civil defense made use of British patterns.


This book deals with the "growing power of the President" with respect to such various fields as non-military defense, labor relations, and racial equality. Included in its overall treatment of non-military defense are a succinct history of civil defense efforts and programs as well as useful discussions of martial law and of Title III emergency powers of the Federal Civil Defense Act.

Rome, Beatrice and Sydney. Communications and Large Organizations. SP-1690/000/00, System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1964

Two lectures presented at the Air Force Office of Scientific Research Summer Seminar on Communication
Cybernetics. The on-going computer experiments in the theory and logic of large, complex organizations, reported on in these lectures, represent a creative and philosophical approach to organization theory.


Despite the fact that this study only covered the period up to 1958 and is rather uneven in regard to the quality of its presentation, it is valuable as a general and comprehensive history of United States civil defense.


This Report presented an approach to the organization of non-military defense based upon clarification of program objectives and "program packaging."


The legislative history provided useful background information for interpreting the intent of Congress concerning provisions of the Act. Included is a succinct chronology of civil defense events to that time.


A comprehensive statement of the legislative history of the Act from the time of the major amendments of
MISCELLANEOUS - continued

1958 through the Appropriations Act of 1961, including excerpts from relevant hearings and reports.


This study provided a comprehensive discussion of the legal aspects of the organization of civilian defense (including the US Office of Civilian Defense and State and Local Defense Councils). It analyzed the relation of military authority to civilian defense and the problems of liability associated with civilian defense activities. It further included extensive documentation on organizational and legal aspects of the World War II civilian defense effort.


This study contained the results of a comprehensive investigation of the effects of the atomic bombs dropped on Japanese cities during World War II. It offered detailed data on radiation and blast effects, on the extent of the damage done to various types of construction, and on lives lost as attributable to the attacks. The findings of the Survey were especially important to the classified study completed by the Office of the Provost Marshal General in 1946 (Defense Against Enemy Actions Directed at Civilians) and to succeeding post-war studies of civil defense.