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9.
THE PROBLEM OF AIMING AND EVASION

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The general problem of a marksman versus a mobile target, with a time lag in the gunner's information as to the target's position, appears in many guises in many situations. It is a classic military problem. Formulated in terms of game theory, the desiderata are: How should the target best maneuver to confound prediction of his position? How and when should the marksman make this prediction? What hit probability is to be expected when both participants behave optimally?

This paper discusses this general class of problems and then settles on one which seems to be the simplest possible example that is not trivial. Nevertheless it is difficult. In two previous papers devoted to it, the evader's best strategy and value of the game were given. Here the emphasis is on the marksman. He has no optimal strategy, but does have an ideal strategy with the property that every near optimal strategy is close to it. He also has a class of passive strategies such that if and only if he obeys these dictates will he either come within of the best hit probability or else always remain in a position where it is possible to do so.
1. Introduction

One of the most classic of military problems is: how best to aim at a mobile target which is deliberately maneuvering so as to confound prediction of his position. The answer must be sought in the theory of games, whence we consider simultaneously the opposite question: how best should the target maneuver.

Such antagonists appear in a great variety of situations. They may be sniper against infantryman, antiaircraft gun against plane, bomber against ship. Whatever be their nature, the crucial feature these situations have in common is a time lag between the detection of the target and the arrival of the projectile. This lag may be composed of a number of summands such as the delay between detection of the target and aiming of the firing device, and the flight time of the projectile itself. But this decomposition does not concern us here; it suffices to consider the time lag as a whole.

The theory of games warns us to expect mixed strategies from both participants and a modicum of common sense confirms the warning. When a player of a game employs a mixed strategy, it means that he does not make his decisions in accordance with any predetermined, certain plan, but invokes a certain amount of randomness. A game theoretic solution prescribes not the dictates
of behavior but their exact probabilities so as respectively to minimize or maximize the probability of a hit. It is clear that this will be the case in the present type of problem. For if the target were to follow any proscribed, certain plan, it would plainly be a ruinous policy as soon as the gunner became aware of it. Likewise any fixed policy of the gunner would enable the target always to escape once he learned it. Then our goal is optimal mixed strategies or policies of best regulated randomness for each player.

So far as we know, this entire field is virtually virginal. We do not claim any deep inroads here. We deal with a single problem, described below, which is the simplest nontrivial one we could devise, yet which embodies the features discussed above. It is but the first rung of the ladder.

The circumstances that led to this problem, we think, are instructive. Originally this was its guise.

A battleship in midocean is aware of an enemy bomber's presence, but the plane is too high for precise detection. The ship is interested only in not being hit; it has no offensive means. The plane has one bomb and we suppose — to avoid extraneous factors — that the bomber's aim is excellent. The battleship knows this, but knows nothing about when or where the bomb will be dropped until after detonation. It is to maneuver so as to minimize the hit probability. We suppose that its only kinematic restriction is that it travels with a fixed speed v. There is a time lag T between the bomber's last sighting of the ship and
detonation. Thus the bomber must aim at an anticipated position of the ship.

Game theory attempts to answer the three interstitial questions:

- How best should the battleship maneuver? (Optimal strategy of player I)
- When and where should the bomber strike? (Optimal strategy of player II)
- What is the hit probability when both players use best tactics? (Value of the game)

If at a certain time the ship is sighted at a certain position, then when the bomb strikes he may be located anywhere in a disk of radius \(vT\). To minimize the chance of an immediate hit, the ship should be at all points of the disk with equal probability. For if he favored one portion of the disk, by bombing thereat the plane scores a disparately high hit probability. But there is only one path — a straight one — by which the ship can reach a peripheral point and many by which he can reach a given interior one. Thus to achieve equiprobability, the ship's mixed strategy must attach an unduly high probability to straight paths. But plainly such a course is detrimental to future positions. For if the bomber waits a little and observes this straight path tactic, nothing could be easier than an extrapolation and a certain hit. In other words, if the ship attempts equiprobability

*For peripheral positions we should make a correction if we take any inaccuracy of bomber into account. We will not do so here.
at one instant he renders his later distributions extremely unequal. The battleship must compromise between present and future and seek a probability distribution which, although it is as near uniform as possible, can be maintained indefinitely.

As simple as this problem sounds circumstantially, it is difficult technically. To gain a foothold, we simplified it further. We made the ocean one-dimensional and discrete. That is, we supposed the battleship to be located on one of a long row of points and at each unit of time he hops to one adjoining one, enjoying the sole choice of a right or left jump. The time lag was to be an integral number \( n \) of time units, or — the same thing — of jumps. This is tantamount to saying that the bomber knows all positions of the battleship which precede his present one by \( n \) jumps or more. If \( n = 1 \), the bomber knows all but the most recent of the ship's positions and there are but two possibilities for that: one space to right or left of the last observed one.

This case — \( n = 1 \) — is trivial. The ship makes each decision — left or right — by the toss of a coin. The bomber can bomb at any time and when he does he also decides between the two possibilities with a coin. Then the value of the game (hit probability) is 1/2.

* (For the game theory tyro only.) If at some time, the ship elected, say, the probabilities: Left: .6; Right: .4, the bomber need only wait for this time and bomb on the left; then hit probability = .6. Similar considerations hold vice versa. Thus the unique optimal strategies require 50-50 decisions on the parts of both players.
Our intention was now to take up \( n = 2, 3, 4, \ldots \) and, from the knowledge gained, proceed to the continuous case. Thence, we hoped to restore planarity to the ocean and approach practicality by more realistic assumptions about the ship's kinematics, accuracy of the bomber, number of bombs, etc.

But the case of \( n = 2 \) proved to be an incubus. A considerable amount of effort by several people was expended before its shell began to crack. This paper will be the third one devoted to it; see [1, 2]. We can expect the general class of aiming-and-evasion problems to be more difficult than anticipated, but by no means hopeless.

We have been occupied with a subject we call differential games, with pursuit games as one of its more cogent applications. A drawback is the difficulty of handling cases where the information of the players is incomplete. It is our hope that the present problem will adumbrate techniques in this field also, and we are thus guided in our nomenclature of the players:

\begin{itemize}
  \item P, the pursuer, bomber, or marksman
  \item E, the evader, battleship, or target.
\end{itemize}

We cite one innovation of technique that appears to be of some generality in games like the present one which admit of a "stationary" or steady state character. By this we mean that after a full cycle of moves (usually one by each player) the game is either terminated or a situation recurs which resembles a fresh start of the game. An initial move of one player is replaced by a chance move with
preassigned probability \( x \). Then for each \( x \) we have a new game, and the value of this game we denote by \( \phi(x) \). Often the resemblance just mentioned becomes an identity except for the value of \( x \), which circumstance enables us to write a functional equation satisfied by \( \phi(x) \). For a simple example of this method — the initial one for us — see our paper [3] dealing with a recreational game.

In the previous two papers [1, 2], dealing with the current game, E was accorded this treatment of having his initial move "channeled." Here we shall do the same for P. These alternative possibilities present a curious duality of techniques whose interrelationships may bear interesting fruit.

But methods later! Let us now return to case of \( n = 2 \) — our subject proper. The course of E can be shown conveniently on the diagram of Figure 1. His starting point is 0 and on his first move he travels to either d or e. If he went left to d, on his second move he may go to a or b and so forth. Always P knows E to be at one of three positions; if he was last observed, say, at d, and P wishes to fire he will do so at one of f, g, or h.

The same dilemma of present or future benefits that beset the battleship also confronts E, but we are now in position to examine matters more succinctly. If E is concerned only with a single instant, his best and safest course
is to make the three probabilities of where he will be when
under fire each equal to 1/3. For then P spots him with
probability 1/3 and this is clearly the lowest value E can
can hope for. Let us suppose E is guided by this consideration
alone.

On the grounds of symmetry, we suppose E to make his first
choice (d or e) with probabilities 1/2.* To cause the probabilities
of being at a, b, or c to be 1/3, E must make his second move with
probability 2/3, 1/3, 1/3, 2/3 as marked on Figure 1. If E is at
d he must similarly equalize his chances of arriving f, g, or h.
This determines some of his third move probabilities; they are
also marked on the figure. But the probability b—to-h is 1/1
Thus, should E reach b via d, P can fire then and, by splitting
his target choice between j and k, score with probability 1/2
or more.

Let us endeavor to find a less ambitious but more enduring
strategy for E. We may expect that in such a strategy each
decision will depend on prior moves. As E's course more than
two moves ago is known to his opponent, it is reasonable to
suppose that this dependence will not reach very far back. Let
us suppose the choice depends on the previous move only. Pre-
cisely let E move in the same direction as his last move with
probability 1 — x and let him make a turn with probability x.
This strategy is certainly stationary; it is expounded in
Figure 2, which diagram applies to any position except the

* The symmetrization is not necessary. The reader can verify
that our reasoning holds whatever the initial probability.
one at the very outset. Then the probabilities of E's reaching 1, 2, or 3 are respectively

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{(1-x)^2}{x} & \quad (1) \\
x & \quad (1-x) \\
x(1-x) & 
\end{align*}
\]

In accordance with the tenets of game theory, we presume that P will elect the largest of these three quantities. The best possible x for E is then that value which renders the maximum of the three polynomials (1) a minimum. Plots of (1) are sketched in Figure 3 with maximum overscored. It is minimum at \( V \), a root of

\[
x = (1-x)^2.
\]  (2)

Then

\[
V = \frac{2 - \sqrt{5}}{2} = .382 \ldots.
\]  (3)

This number is also the probability E's arriving at points 1 or 2 and so is the payoff when E plays as just described (we grant P sense enough not to fire at 3).

It turns out that V is actually the value of the game and the strategy just described, which we henceforth denote by M,
is the optimal strategy for E and indeed the only such. On the other hand, it turns out that P does not possess an optimal strategy, the situation being thus: for any \( \epsilon > 0 \), there is a (mixed) strategy for P which assures him of a hit with probability \( \geq V - \epsilon \), but no strategy insures V. A strategy of this type will be called a near optimal strategy or an \( \epsilon \)-strategy.

These results are not easy to prove. They are the subjects of papers [1, 2]. Dubins deserves the honor of priority. His paper came to our attention some months after its publication. By this time a RAND version was ready for the press; the work was done independently and the methods differed enough to warrant a second treatment.

Neither paper gave a near optimal strategy for P in the sense of furnishing him explicit playing instructions. As this facet of the problem is of obvious importance in more realistic versions, we present a third approach which stresses this aspect.

On this topic we shall later obtain the following results. In the next section our game will be imbedded in a family of games. For these games P has what we term an ideal strategy. It is for most of the family not an \( \epsilon \)-strategy, but it is true that every \( \epsilon \)-strategy is nearly the ideal strategy, the nearness increasing with the smallness of \( \epsilon \). We also delineate a class called passive \( \epsilon \)-strategies. For each \( \epsilon \) and each play of a

\* We complete the definition of M. On his very first move E may elect any probability \( p \) such that \( V \leq p \leq 1 - V \). It is easy to verify that P can still attain at most V.
game these impose well-defined restrictions on each move of $P$ such that:

If he conforms he will either attain a hit probability exceeding the value (the best possible) $- \epsilon$ or he will always be in position where, with proper subsequent play, it will be possible for him to do so. But if ever he violates the restrictions, $E$ can prevent him from coming with $\epsilon$ of the value.

The ideal strategy is a passive $\epsilon$-strategy for every $\epsilon$.

2. The "Chancified" Games

We say $P$ plays an $\alpha$-strategy when the following holds:

Let $\alpha = 1/\sqrt{5}$. Whenever $P$ decides to fire he will aim at the leftmost [rightmost] of the three points where $E$ may be with probability $\alpha$ if $E$'s last observed move was left [right] and he aims at the center point with probability $1 - \alpha$.

To act at the very opening of the game, $P$ must supply $E$ with a fictitious preceding move. See Figure 4, where the dotted line is the (possibly fictitious) preceding move. We will motivate this concept in Section 7.

We coin two families of new games. For the game $F_p$, we amend our original rules:

There is a fictitious minus-first move, say, from the left, and
P is constrained to play an α-strategy. The opening move is
channeled; P is impelled to fire with a preassigned probability
r. Also E is obliged to make his first move to the left. (See
Figure 5.)

The game $H_r$ is the same except that
E makes his first move to the right.

For $F_r$, let

$$f(r) = \sup \inf \text{ (payoff)}$$

which inf extends over all strategies of
E and sup over those of P. Or, to put it
otherwise, $f(r)$ is the upper bound of all
hit probabilities that P can attain in the game $F_r$, no matter
how skillfully he is opposed.

Let $h(r)$ be defined analogously for $H_r$.

We shall obtain a pair of functional equations for $f(r), h(r)$.

Here we shall do it heuristically.

Let P elect the firing probability $c$, to be fixed later, for
the second move of $F_r$. If E's second move is leftwards, P fires
at him with probability $r$ and then hits with probability $a$. If P
does not fire, the situation is tantamount to the commencement of
the game $F_c$. Assuming that P also strives toward his upper bound

* The reader may ask: Why does the channeling process
lead to two families of games and consequently two
functional equations? It need not; see Section 9.
when playing this latter game, the hit probability under these circumstances is

\[ ra + (1-r)f(c) \]  \hspace{1cm} (4) \]

If \( E \) chooses rightwards for his second move, the hit probability is \( 1 - \alpha \) if \( P \) fires immediately. If \( P \) does not, he is faced with the game \( H_c \). Thus the chance of a hit is

\[ r(1-\alpha) + (1-r)h(c) \]  \hspace{1cm} (5) \]

Now we suppose \( E \) adroit enough so that his left–right choice selects the minimum of (4) and (5). Then \( P \), to play well, should pick \( c \) with the intent of making this minimum as large as possible. Thus

\[ f(r) = \sup_{0 \leq c \leq 1} \min \left\{ ra + (1-r)f(c), r(1-\alpha) + (1-r)h(c) \right\} \]  \hspace{1cm} (6) \]

Similar considerations applied to \( H_r \) lead to

\[ h(r) = \sup_{0 \leq d \leq 1} \min \left\{ (1-r)f(d), r(1-\alpha) + (1-r)h(d) \right\} \]  \hspace{1cm} (7) \]

The functions \( f(r) \) and \( h(r) \) appear to be extraordinarily complicated. It seems that the interval \( 0 \leq r \leq 1 \) is to be divided into infinitely subintervals with the functions possessing distinct analytic expressions on each. Furthermore to ascertain these expressions appears bafflingly difficult.
This amazing complexity is disconcerting when we bear in mind that we are still dealing with but one of the simplest versions of our problem.

We have computed plots of $f$ and $h$ which appear at the end of this paper. These were executed with naive computational techniques out with enough care so that, if data is take from the plots, they will fulfill the functional equations to within the limits of graphical accuracy. There are also plots of the $c$ and $d$ which furnish the maxima.

One would hardly suspect the involved character of $f$ and $h$ from their innocent looking graphs. Are we to conclude that there is some simple but closely approximate method of treating the present class of problems? We do not know.

RAND Report RM–1385, A Game of Aiming and Evasion: General Discussion and the Marksmen's Strategies is a mathematically more scrupulous version of the present paper. In it a number of properties of $f$ and $h$ necessary for our work are rigorously proved. We list them below. If the reader accepts our plots as close depictions of the functions, most of these properties will appear obvious. The above report also contains a rigorous derivation of the functional equations (6) and (7).

In the report it is shown that all solutions of (6) and (7) are continuous. Then the sup appearing on their right sides may be replaced by max.
We introduce the numbers
\[ R_1 = 2V, \quad R_2 = V \]
and use \( R \) to mean \( R_1 \) where we are speaking of \( F_r \) or \( f \) and \( R_2 \) when speaking of \( H_r \) or \( h \). When \( r \geq R \) and only then the functions are linear; in fact
\[ f(r) = a, \quad h(r) = a(1-r). \]
The largest maximizers here are
\[
\begin{align*}
\bar{c}(r) &= \min \left[ \frac{1-2a}{a} \frac{r}{1-r}, 1 \right] \\
\bar{d}(r) &= \min \left[ \frac{1-a}{a} \frac{r}{1-r}, 1 \right]
\end{align*}
\]
but these are not unique, as shown by the shaded portions of plots \( c \) and \( d \). Remark that
\[ \bar{c}(R_1) = \bar{d}(R_2) = R_1. \]

More interesting is the range \( r < R \). Here the maximizing \( c \) and \( d \) are unique for each \( r \) and will be denoted by \( c(r) \) and \( d(r) \). They are continuous and
\[ c(r) < R_1, \quad d(r) < R_2. \]
Further \( f(r) \) is decreasing and \( h(r) \) increasing. When \( c = c(r)[d - d(r)] \) the two lines on the left of (6)[(7)] have equal values.

* The case \( r = 1 \) corresponds to certain firing and so no significance then attaches to \( c \) or \( d \).
At $r = 0$, $f$ and $h$ are differentiable and

$$f'(0) = A = 1 - 2\alpha$$

$$h'(0) = -B = -\frac{3\alpha - 1}{2}.$$

Further $c(0) = 0$, $c'(0)$ exists and $= V$. For $0 \leq r \leq r_1 < R_1$, there exists $k = k(r_1)$ such that $c(r) \leq kr$.

We shall not use any of these results until Section 4.

It is clear from (6) and (7) that

$$h(r) \leq f(r). \quad (0 \leq r \leq 1) \quad (8)$$

Also

$$f(0) = h(0) = \sup_c \min \left\{ \frac{f(c)}{c}, \sup_c h(c) \right\} = \sup h(c) \quad (9)$$

and we will denote the common value of these four quantities by $U$.

Consider the game like $F_r$ or $H_r$ except that the compulsion of E's first move is waived. E will exploit his new liberty in favor of a low payoff; from (8), the sup inf of the new game is $h(r)$. Now put $r = 0$. This means that P can't fire on the first move and so the game virtually starts from the second. It is thus equivalent to our original game in all ways except P's constraint to an $\alpha$-strategy. Its sup inf is clearly $U$. Remark that the election of an $\alpha$-strategy is at P's disposal; thus, in playing the original game, he can always attain a hit probability arbitrarily close to $U$. 
In the next section we prove that $U \geq V$. As we already know that $E$, by playing $M$, can attain a payoff $\leq V$, we conclude that $V$ is the value of the game.

3. The Value of the Game

We find

$$a = .447 \ldots \geq V$$

and so $U \geq a$ implies $U > V$, which cannot be. Hence $U \leq a$.

Let $\Psi$ be the set of all pairs $a, b$ such that $a > 0$ and the inequalities

$$f(r) > U + ar \quad (10.1)$$

$$h(r) > U - br \quad (10.2)$$

hold for all sufficiently small positive $r$. Note $b > 0$ or else $\sup h(r)$ would exceed $h(0)$, contradicting (9).

**Lemma 1.** $\Psi$ is not vacuous.

**Proof.** It contains the pair $\frac{1}{2} (a-U), a$. For, if $r > 0$, we put $c = 0$ in (6) and then $d = 0$ in (7):

$$f(r) \geq \min \left\{ \frac{ra+(1-r)U}{r(1-a)+(1-r)U} = \frac{ra+(1-r)U + r(a-U)}{r(1-a)+(1-r)U} > U + \frac{1}{2} (a-U)r \right\}$$

$$h(r) \geq \min \left\{ \frac{(1-r)U}{ra+(1-r)U} = U - rU > U - ar \right\}.$$
Lemma 2. If \( a, b \in \mathbb{R} \), so does \( a', b' \) where

\[
a' = 1 - a - U - \frac{b}{a+b} (1-2a) \tag{11.1}
\]
\[
b' = -(1-a-U) + \frac{b}{a+b} (1-a) \tag{11.2}
\]

Proof: Let \( R \) be the set of all \( r \) for which (10.1) holds. In (6), if we restrict the range of \( c \) to \( R \), the sup cannot increase; then we may make replacements from (10).

\[
f(r) > \max_{c \in R} \min \left\{ \begin{array} {l} \frac{ra}{1-r} + (1-r)(U+ac) \\ \frac{r(1-a)}{1-r} + (1-r)(U-bc) \end{array} \right\} \tag{12}
\]

The two lines on the right are equal when \( c = c_0 \);

\[
c_0 = \frac{r}{1-r} \frac{1-2a}{a+b} .
\]

As the upper line is an increasing function of \( c \), and the lower one decreasing, \( c_0 \) furnishes the max providing \( c_0 \in R \). But such is the case when \( \frac{r}{1-r} \), and hence \( r \), is positive and sufficiently small. When \( c = c_0 \) the common value of the two lines in (12) is

\[
U + r \left[ 1-a-U - \frac{b}{a+b} (1-2a) \right] = U + a'r .
\]

Treating \( h(r) \) analogously leads to

\[
d_0 = \frac{r}{1-r} \frac{1-a}{a+b}
\]

\[
h(r) > U - r \left[ -1+a+U + \frac{b}{a+b} (1-a) \right] = U - b'r
\]

* The underlying idea is due to Oliver Gross.
we show that iteration by \( \phi \) will ultimately lead to \( a < 0 \) and thus \( a, b \leq 0 \).

First, if \( K < 0 \), then
\[
\phi(K) < K.
\]

We show that iteration by \( \phi \) will ultimately lead to \( K \leq 0 \) and thus \( a < 0 \).

Addition of the equations (11) gives
\[
K' = \frac{b'}{a} + \frac{b}{a} = \frac{b'}{a} + b,
\]
while (11.2) yields
\[
K = \frac{b}{a}, \quad K' = \frac{b'}{a} + b.
\]

Addition of the equations (11) gives
\[
K = \frac{b}{a}, \quad K' = \frac{b'}{a} + b.
\]

Let \( a, b, a', b' \) be as in Lemma 2 and
\[
K > 0, \quad K < K.
\]

This absurdity gives our result.

Proof. Suppose \( u > v \). We will show that if we start with any member of \( y \) and construct a sequence of them by repeated applications of Lemma 2, we will be led to one with \( b < 0 \).

Finally, we show that iteration by \( \phi \) will ultimately lead to \( a < 0 \) and thus \( a, b \leq 0 \).

Lem: \( a' > 1 - a - u - (1 - 2a) = a + u > 0 \).
For (15) is true for sufficiently small positive $K$ (then $g(K) < 0 < K$) and so a violation of (15) would imply a $K_0$ such that

$$g(K_0) = K_0$$

or

$$aK_0^2 - (1-a)K_0 + (1-a-U) = 0 .$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)

But the discriminant of this quadratic is

$$(1-a)^2 - 4a(1-a-U) = 2 - 6a + 4aU = 4a(U - \frac{3-5a}{2}) = 4a(U-V) < 0 .$$

Secondly suppose, starting with any value, all the iterates of $g$ were positive. By (15) they are decreasing and so converge. The limit would be a root of (16).

**Theorem 1.** The value of the game is $V$.

**Proof.** As in the last few paragraphs of Section 2.

**Corollary 1.1.** $U = V$

**Corollary 1.2.** For each $\varepsilon > 0$, there is an $\varepsilon$-strategy for $P$ which is an $a$-strategy.

This corollary solves half the problem of the marksman's best strategies. We now know how he is to aim; the remaining question is when is he to fire. For a further discussion of the $a$-strategies see Section 7.
The work of Scarf and Shapley in [4] tells that E has an optimal strategy for all r for both $F_r$ and $H_r$, and that these games have values. It follows, from the general principles of game theory, that the values must be $f(r)$ and $h(r)$.

4. The Ideal Strategies for $P$

We deal with the games $F_r$ and $H_r$. They have the advantage of reducing $P$'s decisions to choices only of when to fire. As discussed earlier, his near optimal strategies for these games suffice to yield at least some such strategies for our subject game. We will see later that this yield is more consummate than at first appears.

Assume $f(r)$ and $h(r)$ have been ascertained. How do they function in determining $P$'s strategy? Consider $P$'s situation in a play of, say, $F_r$. He has no choice as to his first firing probability, it being $r$ (which we shall also call $r_0$). The derivation of the functional equation (6) makes it plausible that his next firing probability will be a value of $c$ which furnishes a maximum to the right side. Select such a value and call it $r_1$. Suppose E's next move is straight. Then, if $P$ has not yet fired, he is now faced with the game $H_{r_1}$. By the same reasoning as before, a sensible choice for his next firing probability will be a maximizing $d$ of (7) with $r = r_1$. Select one such and label it $r_2$. Proceed thus. We will denote the strategies so generated (for $H_r$ as well as $F_r$) collectively
by Q. It is clear that if P has an optimal strategy it must belong to Q. If he has not — as seems more likely — what is the role of Q?

At the conclusion of this paper will be found plots of $c(r)$ and $d(r)$, the maximizing $c$ and $d$ of (6) and (7). Playing Q amounts to successively iterating the $r_j$ from these curves using the $c$ or $d$ one according as E's last move was a straight or a turn.

We now examine a typical play.* Suppose E moves as shown in Figure 7 and that P plays Q, obtaining the firing probabilities as shown.

Put

$$\pi_n = \prod_{j=0}^{n} (1-r_j),$$

the probability that P has not fired at the first $n + 1$ opportunities. For convenience, we also define $\pi_{-1}$ as 1. Then the probability of a hit in this play is

$$\mathcal{H} = (\pi_{-1})r_0(1-\alpha) + \pi_0 r_1(1-\alpha) + \pi_1 r_2(0) + \pi_2 r_3\alpha + \pi_3 r_4(1-\alpha) + \cdots.$$  

(17)

From the way in which the $r_j$ were selected, we have

---

* Here and in later illustrations, E plays a pure strategy. Such suffices, for if P can overcome all pure strategies of E he can overcome a mixture.
\[ \begin{align*}
\min \left\{ r_0 a + (1-r_0)f(r_1), \quad f(r_0) \right\} \\
\min \left\{ r_0(1-a) + (1-r_0)h(r_1), \quad f(r_0) \right\} \\
\min \left\{ (1-r_1)f(r_2), \quad h(r_1) \right\} \\
\min \left\{ r_1(1-a) + (1-r_1)h(r_2), \quad h(r_1) \right\} \\
\min \left\{ (1-r_2)f(r_3), \quad h(r_2) \right\} \\
\min \left\{ r_2(1-a) + (1-r_2)h(r_3), \quad h(r_2) \right\} \\
\min \left\{ r_3 a + (1-r_3)f(r_4), \quad f(r_3) \right\} \\
\min \left\{ r_3(1-a) + (1-r_3)h(r_4), \quad f(r_3) \right\}
\end{align*} \tag{18} \]

and with none but a Q strategy could these equalities be attained. By a judicious selection of one of the lines on each left side, we obtain from (18):

\[ \begin{align*}
r_0(1-a) + (1-r_0)h(r_1) & \geq f(r_0) \\
r_1(1-a) + (1-r_1)h(r_2) & \geq h(r_1) \\
(1-r_2)f(r_3) & \geq h(r_2) \\
r_3 a + (1-r_3)f(r_4) & \geq f(r_3)
\end{align*} \tag{19} \]

or rearranged and multiplied by the \( r_j \):
\[ \pi_0 r_0 (1 - \alpha) \geq \pi_1 f(r_0) - \pi_0 h(r_1) \]
\[ \pi_0 r_1 (1 - \alpha) \geq \pi_0 h(r_1) - \pi_1 h(r_2) \]
\[ 0 \geq \pi_1 h(r_2) - \pi_2 f(r_3) \]
\[ \pi_2 r_3 a \geq \pi_2 f(r_3) - \pi_3 f(r_4) \]
\[ \vdots \]

The \( \mathcal{H}_n \) below are the truncations of (17). From (20)

\[ \mathcal{H}_0 = r_0 (1 - \alpha) \geq f(r) - \pi_0 h(r_1) \]
\[ \mathcal{H}_1 \geq f(r) - \pi_1 h(r_2) \]
\[ \mathcal{H}_2 \geq f(r) - \pi_2 f(r_3) \]

or in general

\[ \mathcal{H}_n \geq f(r) - \pi_n (f \text{ or } h(r_{n+1})) . \]  \hspace{1cm} (21)

We now see at once

**Theorem 2.** A sufficient condition that a Q strategy attain the best possible value for \( P \) in a particular play is
\[ \lim_{n \to \infty} \nu_n = 0. \quad (22) \]

This condition will be met should any \( r_j = 1 \) (certain firing). Otherwise — as is well known — it is tantamount to the divergence of \( \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} r_j \).

**Theorem 3.** If \( P \) has an optimal strategy at all, it must be a strategy \( Q \).

**Proof:** Suppose \( P \) plays a strategy not \( Q \). Then in at least one of (18) the sign \( = \) becomes \( < \). Let \( E \) move straight or turn on each move according as the upper or lower line on the left side of the corresponding (18) is the smaller (either way in the case of equality). Then in (19), \( \geq \) is replaced by \( = \) or \( < \), with at least one instance of the latter. Thus \( \geq \) is replaced by \( < \) in (21) for all large \( n \).

**Theorem 4.** If \( r < R \), then \( P \) has no optimal strategy.

**Proof.** Let \( P \) play \( Q \). For \( r < R \), the signs \( \leq \) of (19) become \( = \) and the same is true (21). Thus (22) is a necessary as well as a sufficient condition.

Let us take the case of \( P_r \). Let \( E \) make all straight moves. Then

\[ r_{j+1} = c(r_j) \leq kr_j \]

and so
\[ r_j \leq k^j r \]

and so \( \Sigma r_j \) converges.

For \( H_r \), let \( E \) pick straight for his first free move. Then \( P \) is confronted by \( H_{r_1} \) with \( r_1 < R_1 \), and we revert to the preceding case.

**Theorem 5.** If \( r \geq R \), then any strategy \( Q \) is optimal.

**Proof.** Here \( r_j \geq R_1 \) and so \( \Sigma r_j \) diverges.

**Remark.** The most efficient strategy \( Q \) utilizes the functions \( \overline{c}(r) \) and \( \overline{d}(r) \). If \( r > R \), it is not hard to see that finitely many iterations, at each stage by one or the other of these functions, will lead to an \( r_j = 1 \), thus terminating the play.

If \( r = R \), Corollary 9.1 shows that \( r_1 = R_1 \). If \( E \) makes all straight moves henceforth, all the remaining \( r_j = R_1 \). This is the only instance where \( Q \) is optimal, yet cannot be made finite.

The role of \( Q \) now emerges. Aside from the uninteresting cases of larger \( r \), \( Q \) is unique and not optimal, and indeed there is none such. If \( P \) deviates appreciably from \( Q \), the inequalities, which at least some of (18) become, will be severe. Their compensation by (19) can be frustrated by \( E \), because his moves decide which line on the left of (18) is to be effective. The result will be a payoff appreciably defective. We draw the following rough conclusion (these ideas will be dissected with more precision in the next section):
In general, P has no optimal strategy, but any $\varepsilon$-strategy must be close to Q, the closeness increasing with the smallness of $\varepsilon$.

It seems apt to term a strategy with this property an ideal strategy. A precise statement is made by Theorem 7 below.

5. The Passive $\varepsilon$-Strategies

The case $r = 0$ is really our desideratum, for as we have seen in Section 2, it is, aside from the restriction to $\alpha$-strategies, the original subject game. The strategy Q for it leads to the vapid situation: all the $r_j = 0$; P never fires.

We now turn to $\varepsilon$-strategies, taking some positive $\varepsilon$ as given, with P seeking a payoff $> V - \varepsilon$. The $\varepsilon$ gives him license to depart from the sterility of the all zero $r_j$. Thus it is that we find use for $F_r$ and $H_r$ with $r > 0$.

Our procedure is a recurrent one, somewhat like that of the last section. But not only will P ascertain an $r_{j+1}$ from $r_j$, but also an $\varepsilon_{j+1}$ from $\varepsilon_j$. This $\varepsilon_j$ is that circumscription on the jth move permitted him by the preassigned $\varepsilon = \varepsilon_0$ of the outset.

Let $m_j$ be E's jth move ($j = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$ so taken that $m_0$ is the preassigned move indigenous to the game); $m_j$ = either "Straight" or "Turn." The quantities $r_0 = r$, $\varepsilon_0 = \varepsilon > 0$, and $m_0$ (deciding between $F_r$ and $H_r$) are given at the outset. At a
later stage, these will be known (of course, assuming \( P \) has not yet fired):

\[
m_0, m_1, \ldots, m_j
\]

\[
r_0, r_1, \ldots, r_j
\]

\[
\epsilon_0, \epsilon_1, \ldots, \epsilon_j
\]

It is now time for \( P \) to select \( r_{j+1} \). We will say he is playing a strategy \( Q_\epsilon \) if he does so as follows for each \( j \geq 0 \):

1) If \( r_j \geq R_1 \), he plays a strategy \( Q_\epsilon \) from this point on. Here \( R_1 \) means \( R_1 \) if \( m_j \) was Straight and \( R_2 \) if \( m_j \) was Turn.

2) If \( r_j < R_1 \) he picks \( r_{j+1} \) so that, if \( m_j \) was Straight

\[
\min \left\{ \frac{r_ja+(1-r_j)f(r_{j+1})}{r_j(1-a)+(1-r_j)h(r_{j+1})} \right\} > f(r_j) - \epsilon_j
\]

and utilizes a corresponding inequality, which the reader will readily infer, if \( m_j \) was Turn.

If \( P \) has not yet fired, \( E \) now picks \( m_{j+1} \).

If Case I held, \( P \) will have no need of further \( \epsilon_j \), but if II held, \( \epsilon_{j+1} \) must be defined. Suppose, for example, \( m_{j+1} \) was Turn. Then we take

\[
\epsilon_{j+1} = h(r_{j+1}) - h(c(r_j)) + \frac{\epsilon_j}{1-r_j}
\]

There is an analogous equation for each of the other three possibilities of \( m_j, m_{j+1} \).
The cycle is ready for repetition.

We must show that this process can be effected. First, the \( \xi_j \) obtained will always be positive. In the instance displayed above ((23) and (24)), we know from the functional equation that

\[
\xi_j(l-a) + (1-\xi_j)h(c(\xi_j)) = f(\xi_j).
\] (25)

The combination of (25) and (23), using the lower line on the left, will show that the right side of (24) is positive. If \( \xi_0 > 0 \), by induction, all the \( \xi_j \) appearing will be positive.

We observe that if Case I arises once, it does so thereafter.

Finally, we see that an \( \xi_{j+1} \) can always be found satisfying (23)(or its analogue), for \( c(\xi_j) \) is one such.

We now turn to the \( \mathcal{H}_n \), the hit probabilities for a finite segment of initial stages, and handle them as we did in the previous section. Like (17) we find

\[
\mathcal{H}_{n-1} = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \pi_{j-1} \xi_j a_j
\] (26)

where \( a_j \) is \( \alpha, 1-\alpha, \) or \( 0 \) according to the values of the pair \( m_j, m_{j+1} \). If we suppose that Case II has held thus far and proceed in a manner similar to the derivation of (21), we obtain

\[
\mathcal{H}_{n-1} = \left[ f(r) \text{ or } h(r) \right] - \xi - \pi_{n-1} \left( \left[ f_n(r_n) \text{ or } h_n(r_n) \right] - \xi_n \right).
\] (27)

Recall that P's objective is to obtain a payoff exceeding the first two terms on the right of (27). What (27) states is
this: If the play is interrupted so that $P$ is confronted with $F_r$ or $H_r$, he can attain his objective according as he obtains in the new subgame a payoff exceeding its value less $\varepsilon_n$.

From the initiation the reader had in the last section, he should have no trouble in completing the proof of

**Theorem 6.** Let $P$ play $Q_\varepsilon$. If at any time Case I arises, then $P$ will attain his objective; if it does not, $P$, after any finite number of moves, will be in a position such that it is possible for him to attain his objective. On the other hand, if at any time, when faced with Case II, $P$ selects his firing probability in violation of (23), then $E$ can prevent him from attaining his objective.

This theorem exposes the nature of $Q_\varepsilon$. We, of course, suppose $r < R$. Then, as long as Case II persists, we have seen that $P$ is compelled to abide by $Q_\varepsilon$ in order to play an $\varepsilon$-strategy. But the latter desideratum is by no means guaranteed. For example, we see that $Q$ is a strategy $Q_\varepsilon$ for every $\varepsilon > 0$. But we know $Q$ is not optimal; hence it is not an $\varepsilon$-strategy if $\varepsilon$ is sufficiently small. On the other hand, as long as $P$ adheres to $Q_\varepsilon$ he is safe, in that he has not forfeited the possibility of exceeding (value $- \varepsilon$) as the payoff.

His situation is much like that of a person asked to select the terms of infinite series one at a time in such a way that the series converges. After each individual selection the possibility...
of convergence has not been destroyed. But this does not mean that the entire aggregate of selections will spell convergence.

We term a strategy with the above properties a passive $\varepsilon$-strategy.

We conclude with a sharp statement that $Q$ is an ideal strategy but omit the proof. In case $r \geq R$ the strategies $Q$ (and only they) are actually optimal and nothing more need be said. We assume $r < R$. In this case we know that $Q$ is unique.

We wish to establish a measure of the closeness of two strategies. Suppose $E$ adheres to some pure strategy in a particular play. Any mixed strategy $U$ of $P$ will result in a sequence of firing probabilities $\{r_0 = r, r_1, r_2, \ldots\}$. For a second strategy $U'$, let the sequence be $\{r'_0 = r_0 = r, r'_1, r'_2, \ldots\}$. We define

$$d_n(U, U') = \max_{0 \leq j \leq n} |r_j - r'_j|$$

and $D_n(U, U')$ by $\max d_n$ over all pure strategies of $E$.*

**Theorem 7.** Given $r < R$ and one of $F_r$, $H_r$, as well as an integer $n \geq 0$ and $\delta > 0$, then we can find $\overline{\varepsilon} = \overline{\varepsilon}(\delta, n)$ so that if $U$ is $\varepsilon$-strategy for $P$ with $\varepsilon < \overline{\varepsilon}$ then

$$D_n(Q, U) < \delta.$$  

* Of course, we need consider only $E$'s first $n$ moves.
6. The ε-Strategies; The Unsolved Margin

We know that for P to play an ε-strategy with a small ε he must remain in the vicinity of a strategy $Q_\varepsilon$. But exactly how this should be done is still an open question. The following theorem and more particularly its corollary offer a lead.

**Theorem 8.** An ε-strategy can be executed in a finite number of moves.

**Proof.** If $r > R$, $Q_\varepsilon = Q$ and we know the latter terminate in finitely many moves. If $r < R$, the ε-strategy begins with Case II and is thus $Q_\varepsilon$. If it switches to Case I it can be terminated. If not, we see by (27) that P can exceed $e_n(r) - \varepsilon$ only if for some $n$, $e_n(r_n) - \varepsilon_n < 0$. But this means the desired hit probability has been achieved in finitely many moves. Thus the ensuing $r_j$ are irrelevant; we can take one of them $= 1$. (This strange situation can happen. For example, it happens at the very outset if $\varepsilon$ is taken absurdly large.) The only remaining case — the $r_j$ stay $R_1$ and E plays all straights — seems unimportant. No doubt, P can increase $R_1$ a mite and take a small loss ($< \varepsilon$) in payoff.

**Corollary 8.** Every play in which P employs an ε-strategy can be culminated with an $r_j = 1$.

A necessary condition for a strategy $Q_\varepsilon$ not to stagnate then is that we find some means of avoiding persistently small $r_j$. 
To see what happens should the $r_j$ (and also the $\varepsilon_j$) remain small, we might use linear approximations of $f$ and $h$. From Section 2 these turn out to be

$$f(r) \approx V + Ar$$

$$h(r) \approx V - Br.$$  

The expressions on the right actually are formal solutions to the functional equations with the maximizers

$$c: \quad V \frac{r}{1-r}$$

$$d: \quad 2 \frac{r}{1-r}.$$  

(The first of these is corroborated by Section 2.) However, we will linearize to the full and use

$$c(r) \approx Vr$$

$$d(r) \approx 2r.$$  

Let $\gamma_j$ be $c$ if $m_j = \text{Straight}$ and $d$ if $m_j = \text{Turn}$. Now the basic inequality (23) of $Q_\varepsilon$ condemns $r_{j+1}$ to an interval containing $\gamma_j(r_j)$. We know that use of $\gamma_j(r_j)$ itself for $r_{j+1}$ is $Q$ and not even close to optimal. In fact it fails because the $r_j$ can remain small (Theorem 4 and its proof). Therefore it seems sensible always to take $r_{j+1}$ the part of the prescribed interval lying to the right of $\gamma_j(r_j)$. Let $k_j$ be the fraction of $(r_{j+1} - \gamma_j(r_j))/(\bar{r}_{j+1} - \gamma_j(r_j))$ where $\bar{r}_{j+1}$ is
the right boundary of the interval. The task of $P$ reduces to selecting the $k_j$. Using the approximations (30) and (32), the governing equations are found to be

$$r_{j+1} = b_j r_j + \frac{k_j}{B} \xi_j$$

$$\xi_{j+1} = (1 + k_j (1 - b_{j+1})) \xi_j$$

where $b_j = V$ if $m_j$ is straight and 2 if $m_j$ is turn. We start with a given small $r_0$, $\xi_0$ and compute the later ones recurrently by (33), each time selecting $k_j (0 \leq k_j < 1)$. At the same time $E$ is selecting the $m_j$. When we apply (33) $m_0$, $m_1$, $\ldots$, $m_j$ is known, but not $m_{j+1}$. Thus the value of $b_{j+1}$ is unknown when $k_j$ is chosen. In brief, the order of choices and computations is

$m_0$, $r_0$, $\xi_0$ — given

$k_0$ chosen by $P$

$r_1$ computed

$m_1$ chosen by $E$ (deciding $b_1$)

$\xi_1$ computed

$k_1$ chosen by $P$

$r_2$ computed

etc.
The problem: To devise a scheme for selecting the \( k_j \) so that no matter how \( E \) picks the \( m_j \), the \( r_j \) will not remain small.

We have been unable to solve it.

At the least, the solution will point the way to \( \varepsilon \)-strategies. Very likely, after developing some results that would furnish bounds to errors arising from (30) and (32), it would actually supply the \( \varepsilon \)-strategies. There exists an exact version of (33), but, due to the complicated nature of \( f \) and \( h \), it would be difficult to write the right sides explicitly. Remark that our previous results guarantee that the problem has a solution.

7. Motivation for the \( \omega \)-strategies

Let us consider a miniature game in which \( P \) has but one chance to fire and three choices of where to aim. He uses a mixed strategy taking \( a, b, c \) as the probabilities as shown in Figure 8.

![Figure 8](image_url)
with probability \( \theta \) for a turn; he does nought but select \( \theta \).

There is a fictitious move preceding the first so that straight and turn may be distinguished there.

The payoff is

\[
a(1-\theta)^2 + \theta b + \theta(1-\theta)c.
\]

The computation is omitted, but the solution is

\[
\text{opt. strat. for } P: \quad a = \alpha, \quad b = 1 - \alpha, \quad c = 0
\]

\[
\text{opt. strat. for } E: \quad \theta = V
\]

Value: \( V \).

It follows that if in the original game we wish to fix the aiming probabilities at all, they can only be fixed at the values above. For otherwise \( E \) could find a \( \theta \) in the little game rendering him a payoff \(< V \). In the original game, then, \( E \) could play a strategy like \( M \) but using this \( \theta \) instead of \( V \) and attain the same payoff.

Let us bear in mind that generally the parameters entailed in an \( \varepsilon \)-strategy are not sharply delineated. For the player may choose to play an \( \varepsilon' \)-strategy with \( \varepsilon' < \varepsilon \). He can exploit the margin in payoff by slight alterations in the quantities he controls.

Applying this principle to our case, we see that \( P \) will have \( \varepsilon \)-strategies that are not \( \alpha \)-strategies but close to \( \alpha \)-strategies. Has he any that are not close? If the answer is no, as seems likely, the following conjecture seems reasonable.
Conjecture — Q is an ideal strategy not only among the α-strategies but among all the strategies of P.

8. The Truncated Versions

We can apply a technique here that proved useful in [2]; we amend the rules by requiring that P can fire only on the first n moves. The max min functions will be replaced by \( f_n(r) \) and \( h_n(r) \). The functional equations (6) and (7) become recurrence relations; we affix to each \( f \) or \( h \) the subscript \( n + 1 \) when it appears on the left side and \( n \) when it appears on the right. We may take \( f_0(r) \) and \( h_0(r) \) as 0; all the functions are then determined recurrently.

We may proceed as in [2]. The truncated games fall under the general tenets of game theory and we know at once that both players have optimal strategies. The functions \( f_n(r) \), \( h_n(r) \) increase with \( n \), for P can apply an optimal strategy for the case with a small \( n \) to the case with a larger, filling in the residual moves arbitrarily. The proof of Lemma 5 is easily modified to show that the \( f_n(r) \) and \( h_n(r) \) are equi-continuous. Thus the \( f_n(r) \) \( [h_n(r)] \) converge uniformly to \( f(r) \) \( [h(r)] \).

One conclusion is evident:

Theorem 9. An \( \epsilon \)-strategy can be found which terminates in \( n \) moves, the \( n \) depending only on \( \epsilon \).

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9. **The General "Chancified" Game and Functional Equation**

We now relinquish P's constraint to \(a\)-strategies. We chancify as follows: P shall fire initially with probability \(r\) and his aiming probabilities shall be as shown in Figure (8). As before, a fictitious pre-initial move is requisite. It is required that E make his initial move straight (to the left in Figure 8). The \(\max \min\) (or value) we denote by \(\varphi(r, a, b)\).

![Figure 9](image-url)

If we demand E make a turn initially, the corresponding function is \(\varphi(r, b, a)\). The functional equation for \(\varphi\) is derived along lines we have seen before; it is

\[
\varphi(r,a,b) = \max_{c,x,y} \min \left\{ \begin{array}{c}
ra + (1-r)\varphi(c,x,y) \\
(1-a-b) + (1-r)\varphi(c,y,x)
\end{array} \right. .
\]

Here the maximizers are of course subject to

\[
0 \leq c \leq 1, \ x \geq 0, \ y \geq 0, \ x + y \leq 1 .
\]
The connection with our earlier work lies in

\[ f(r) = \varphi(r, a, 0), \quad h(r) = \varphi(r, 0, a) \]

and in these special cases (34) reduces to (6) or (7).
REFERENCES


The functions $f(r)$ and $h(r)$.
The Maximizing c and d

The shaded areas represent cases where the functions are not single valued. The 45° line is included to facilitate iteration.