APPLIED ANALYSIS OF
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

by

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ABSTRACT. U.S. participation in situations of unconventional warfare requires the ability to work through the indigenous population involved. This in turn necessitates an understanding of how the given society functions. This paper presents a method for describing a society as it presently functions and also for projecting this description into a future time period, using the patterns of change that the society has manifested in the past.

The methodology thus described was employed in the NOTS Unconventional Warfare Studies Project where it was applied to the situations in both Vietnam and Venezuela.

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FOREWORD

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INTRODUCTION

Intervention in a variety of social situations for the accomplishment of specific aims characterizes the activities of numberless public and private agencies in the modern world. These efforts raise important questions of how sufficient understanding may be gained of such situations to make intervention successful. Recently, military operations have become an area of particular concern, where it appears that scientific analysis can be of assistance in determining suitable forms of intervention.¹

A system of concepts and techniques for societal analysis that have been developed in one military-oriented research effort² (Ref. 1) is outlined here in the belief that it holds out promise of benefiting social scientists who are concerned with determining the results of social intervention in nonmilitary contexts.

STUDY OF INSURGENT WARFARE

Since World War II, the increased incidence of insurgent warfare and the subversive potentialities that it apparently offers in situations of nuclear parity has led a number of governments to study this form of conflict and how it can be either pursued or countered. Insurgent, or unconventional, warfare is a system of conflict the strategy of which is to secure control of the state by gaining control of its civilian population (Ref. 2). The insurgent relies primarily on nonmilitary and paramilitary techniques because of a lack of sufficient resources to pursue the conflict by more conventional means. Such conflicts generally have major-power sponsors who seek this means for expanding their spheres of hegemony with minimum risk of precipitating a nuclear conflict. Techniques of psychological and paramilitary conflict are used to exploit dissatisfaction among the people to the point where popular

¹ An example of this interest was the symposium on "The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research" held in Washington, D.C., 26, 27, and 28 March 1962, sponsored by the Chief, Research and Development, Department of the Army.

² Unconventional Warfare Study conducted at Brigham Young University as an interdisciplinary effort from April 1962 to September 1963, for the U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station. Attention was directed particularly to current conflict situations in South Vietnam.
opposition or apathy toward the state combined with support for the rebels will permit large-scale military or diplomatic attack. The dissatisfactions that are available for exploitation may be the result of dysfunctions in the operation of the society under attack.

Unconventional warfare and the defense against it have come to be of vital concern to the United States and to other major powers on the world scene. Yet most major powers are essentially external to most areas where this type of conflict exists or threatens to exist. In the case of the U.S., although strategic interests may require our intervention in a situation, our capability to do this in a direct manner is clearly limited. Ignoring these limits may well render unlikely any satisfactory resolution of the conflict. U.S. ability to participate in a given unconventional warfare situation is therefore largely contingent upon our ability to work through the local population in reaching mutually acceptable goals.

If the U.S. is to work successfully through a local people, it is essential that an understanding concerning how that society functions be developed on the part of our personnel involved, to enable them to anticipate correctly the results of actions they plan to take. Previous efforts to develop such understanding have been largely intuitive. A principle basic to the present research has been the belief that systematic analysis using the methods and concepts of the social sciences would yield a more uniformly satisfactory result.

A review of the literature demonstrated that while there are many valuable techniques and ideas for analysis of the kind we desired to carry out, no single system exists that would be suitable to our needs. Existing systems displayed one or more of the following weaknesses: (1) being too subjective and personal to be duplicable; (2) not utilizing available theory comprehensively; (3) being unable to incorporate new data on a continuous basis and having no mechanism for benefiting from feedback; (4) having insufficient flexibility to cope with social structures of varied size (ranging from small group to nation); and (5) not being simple enough to be carried out by non-experts while at the same time serving effectively to handle the problem. The system developed and put into use makes progress toward the elimination of all these weaknesses.

3The question of the values of the researchers in our project in judging events in either country treated did not arise as a serious issue. The fundamental task undertaken was to develop a model that could serve to predict the results of action proposals, not to formulate such proposals. There is, however, in the nature of unconventional warfare as we have viewed it a measure of definition of "good." Since this form of conflict is based on exploitation of popular dissatisfaction, the resolution of conflict necessarily involves the reduction or elimination of those dissatisfactions. The implications of such a view and analysis for U.S. policy is that the people's desires, as reflected in their satisfaction with how the society operates, control our selection of action proposals to implement. This does not mean that the applied scientist is "aiding U.S. military repression" or "just keeping the status quo."
STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

The approach used in the study is, broadly, the structural-functional one. It takes advantage of the consensus that has been developed through scores of theoretical and experimental efforts in the social sciences, using the conceptions structure and function. With our concern centered on operations in a society, this approach seemed more useful than such alternative approaches as psychological, cultural, and historical. Other approaches would surely have yielded significant understandings of our problem not attainable by the structure-function set of ideas alone, but time, interests, and personnel limits restricted efforts to only the one.

A conscious attempt at eclecticism prevailed in the construction of the over-all model; the system is not theoretically novel at heart (Ref. 3–14). Such modifications and adaptations as were made in techniques and ideas have been done solely with the aim of solving practical analytical problems having to do with unconventional warfare in a modern nation-society.

CONCEPTS CENTRAL TO THE ANALYSIS

Human activity is best seen for this purpose in two dimensions: as a set of activities and as a set of positions. A pattern of action characteristic of a position is termed an activity. It constitutes a component in the totality of action patterns that forms the culture of a human society. A position is a locus within the pattern of social relationships that constitutes one dimension of a human society. These two fundamental dimensions combine to define the basic societal units, role and group. A role is a unit consisting of an individual occupying a position, plus the activity accompanying that position. A group is a unit that consists of a collection of individuals, and has recognized criteria for membership and internally differentiated positions whose members act together in their shared position to further one or more common interests. In every human situation both sorts of units are in interplay. Each kind of unit is composed, in the present definition, of both position and activity, not of position alone.

Man's life requires the presence of certain conditions. A function is a condition that must be produced by some combination of activities in order for the society to continue. Each function is produced in a society through a set of roles and groups whose activities tend to become integrated in its production. Such a set is a system. A given role or group commonly has position and activity in more than one system, yet each unit tends to lie predominantly within a single key system. It is, of course, the overlapping of systems that integrates the entire society. The most extensive system serving a population, which at the same time is largely self-contained and to which the members are primarily oriented, is that system that constitutes a society.
Any system may involve more than one hierarchical level. Units and the systems in which they serve differ from each other in the extent (numerical or geographical) of their membership or in the domain of their influence. The larger or more powerful the unit, the higher its hierarchical level (e.g., clan is higher than family, province than village).

These concepts are combined in a model of society in which roles and groups, as the smallest analytical units, serve in various overlapping systems that span two or more levels. Some functions and their associated systems are so vital as to be considered key functions and key systems. The four of greatest utility in unconventional warfare study are the economic, political, military, and attitude-forming systems (Fig. 1).

![Fig. 1. Four Key Systems, Treated on Various Hierarchical Levels, Are Representative of the Key Systems Operating In a Society.](image)

In addition to the concepts previously delineated, a full model must also treat those cultural features that color the conceptions of participants. Cultural factors are defined as those symbols shared within a society (or some segment thereof) that color the judgments of the participants to make them differ in their response to given position-activity situations from the response of persons with different conceptions in the face of the same situation. The definition of cultural factors derives from a view that a culture is a more or less integrated, historically derived system of symbols in the minds of the members of a society by means of which their experiences take on meaning and they are enabled to predict the behavior of their fellows.

From this general model of any society it is possible to fill out a more detailed model of a given society by learning what groups, roles, positions, activities, systems, hierarchical levels, and cultural factors exist. The first step in this type of analysis, then, is to complete a model for the society where intervention is planned by arranging data under these rubrics.
In filling out the model for a particular society, the materials of
the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) may be useful as an introduc-
tion (Ref. 15). Once a base of information has been obtained through
the traditional library search methods, such other sources as local and
national newspapers from within the society, results of participant ob-
ervation, opinion polling, oral and written literature, and biographies
may be used. Since it is desirable to have coverage of every aspect of
life in the society, interviews are valuable as a way to direct inquiries
into some areas where conventional sources are silent.

The common experience of our project in conducting literature
searches on Vietnam and Venezuela has been that the first accumula-
tion of a large bibliography (some 3,000 references for Vietnam)
yields substantive information on some but not all topics. One of the
striking experiences of this research has been a certain shock upon
realizing how deficient is the range of data available for modern
societies with literate traditions.

The 5-by-8-inch end-punch descriptor cards, because of their
continuous expandability and of their adaptability to multiple indexing
schemes, have proved to be particularly useful in systematizing
accumulated data. A data bit, transcribed on such a card, can be coded
for several multiple-digit descriptors, referencing an equal number
of data categories. The three-digit descriptor system found in Outline of
Cultural Materials (Ref. 15) is particularly suited for this purpose in
that it provides a relatively complete listing of data categories that
have been refined over an extended period of use. While the categories
are in some respects particularly oriented for use in primitive
societies, the excellent system of indexing and cross-referencing
makes the whole a valuable tool for sorting significant data on a society.
A further advantage in using the HRAF system is that it already enjoys
fairly broad usage.

Although the use of end-punch descriptors frees one from the use
of any particular positioning of data cards in a file, the cards may with
advantage be filed according to time period. In the case of both Vietnam
and Venezuela, only information for the "current" period has thus far
been processed.

With a substantial file of data at hand that has been coded for units
and key systems, the next step is to interrogate the file concerning
specific units. Criteria have been established for choosing the most
important units, although they are not given here. Experience to this
point with the data will already have made clear at least some of the
most vital units; others will be noted subsequently as interrelationships
of the units are worked out revealing that certain roles and groups keep
recurring.
A paradigm of queries has proved useful as a means to bring together systematically comparable information about units. In the unconventional warfare project, group and role paradigms similar to those listed immediately below were employed.

**Group Paradigm**
1. What membership, wealth, and facilities does the group control?
2. Who has actual controlling power in the group?
3. How are recruiting and expulsion from membership accomplished?
4. How are leaders chosen?
5. Are there important conflicts within the group?
6. What are the aims of the group?
7. What do the group members consider problems?
8. What activities do the members perform to achieve their aims?
9. What prestige and authority does the group have?
10. Could the group act speedily and effectively if necessary?
11. What other groups and roles does this group control?
12. What other groups and roles control this group?
13. With what groups does this group compete or come into conflict?
14. Have any of the features mentioned above changed markedly in the past? When and how?
15. What are the prospects that any of the features mentioned will or could change markedly in the near future?

**Role Paradigm**
1. What is the age range and median age of the role occupants?
2. How is one trained for this role?
3. Are there internal contradictions in the role position and activities?
4. Do the role occupants have a distinctive philosophy?
5. Is there a clearly parallel role in the U.S.?
6. What occupations, if any, tend to predominate among role occupants (where the role being considered is nonoccupational)?
7. Do certain distinctive personality features appear to characterize role occupants?
8. To what groups do the occupants of this role tend to belong?

Since the role questions largely parallel those for the groups, only the ones that particularly diverge have been presented here in the role paradigm.

Using these tools, the non-expert (a graduate student, for example) can also function effectively in collecting data on units. Once the information has been collected and, using the questions listed above, descriptive accounts can be written for each important role and group. These accounts provide the information components on the units in the model.

Research responsibilities in the unconventional-warfare study were divided into two parts: Graduate assistants were assigned the job of gathering data and writing descriptive unit accounts, while the principal researchers devoted primary attention to a systems approach that consisted of examining typical important sequences of action within the four key systems to determine how they were accomplished (e.g., how is rice marketed in the Vietnamese economic system?). In this process, frequent reference was made to the units involved using the materials the research assistants were gathering. The use of question paradigms was also found to have value in the systems approach, particularly in serving as a check list of topics requiring analytical attention. The formulation of adequate systems paradigms of acceptable length was found to be extremely difficult, however.

As the limits of various systems were defined, descriptive write-ups of the key systems were composed, which, together with the pertinent unit write-ups, present a relatively complete written description of the key systems of the society.

In addition to the written description, the formulation of system diagrams using the hierarchical grid (as shown in Fig. 1) was found useful for summary purposes in the Unconventional Warfare Study (Fig. 2).

Data on cultural factors were assembled by a separate researcher in the case of the Vietnam study and by the project leader in the case of the Venezuelan work. These factors were expressed in the form of brief descriptions of significant cultural themes constituting a separate section of the report. Factors that particularly influenced the functioning of any of the key systems were also briefly summarized at the end of the appropriate key system write-up.

A technique that was employed in the course of the cultural factors analysis but that was not incorporated in the model as it was finally written up was a drawing of a scale or continuum for each cultural factor (Fig. 3). Groups were arranged with regard to the factor of espousal of "situational ethics" as opposed to universal principles in Vietnamese society. This technique possibly deserves additional attention and analysis.
As has already been noted, experience has revealed appreciable gaps in the available data on the two societies so far considered. Almost nothing was found, for instance, on either the workings of commercial distribution in Venezuela or on gambling and crime in present-day Vietnam. This experience points up the need for interaction between the analyst and on-the-scene observers in order to gather data to fill these gaps. The present system of analysis has been designed to be continuously updated. Information on the units and systems can be continuously fed into the data files, and the resulting unit and system writeups can be periodically updated. By this very process of periodic revision, an account of the transition of the society to a new state can be kept, recorded in the trajectories of change revealed by the descriptions of the same societal segment at various points in time.
SOCIAL INTEGRATION

The techniques discussed to this point have dealt with the dissection of the society and its description in terms of the components thus revealed. This is merely a device of analytical convenience. It is more useful, however, to view society as integrated. Such a view draws the variety of activities and positions into a unity that is the life of the individual or the group. Any occupant or group member simultaneously occupies other roles or belongs to other groups, thus mutually interacting as part of a number of systems. Because of these interconnections, every change in one position perturbs the whole structure. To display the integrated working of the whole society, it becomes necessary to utilize some thread-of-action patterns that wind among and so involve all the key systems. We have chosen to call these basic activities of society. They are the patterns that are given priority in decision-making by members of the society, setting limits to the manner of performance of a wide range of other activities. These basic activities are defined operationally largely in terms of frequency of occurrence in a variety of situations. In the case of Vietnam, for example, a basic activity is that of rice farming. The limits of many of the other activities of rural Vietnam are determined by the nature of this one. It not only forms the basis of the economy but also looms large in attitude formation and political relationships. In Venezuela conuco (slash and burn) farming is a basic activity for a substantial minority of that society in a like manner.

Once such an activity is identified, analysis proceeds by finding which other activities are connected to it, together with their associated units. Tracing of the patterns of integration proceeds by successively asking the following series of questions:

1. What units participate most directly in this activity?

2. What other (auxiliary) activities within the key system in which this activity occurs are directly connected to its performance?

3. What units are involved in the performance of these auxiliary activities?

4. What activities in other key systems relate to the basic activity in its performance?

5. What units are involved in the performance of these latter?

(Ref. 16)

Once the units associated with the first basic activity have been specified, the process is repeated for other basic activities discovered within the society. In this way a picture is obtained of how the society fits together. The failure of analysis to take these interrelations into consideration systematically is to risk inability to identify the impact of one key system upon another. The analytical method outlined above permits tracing, for example, the impact of increased foreign aid upon the patterns of attitude formation within the family. Although the entire phenomenon of integration is of such a scale as to prohibit exhaustive specification, this method can provide an insight into some of the phenomena that loom most important in this regard.
PROJECTION OF SOCIETY

With few exceptions, societal change is gradual. Changes, whether planned or fortuitous, are limited in their extent and permanence by pre-existing conditions in the society. By analyzing the configuration of a society and its patterns of transition over a period of time, one can extrapolate its pattern of change. Hence the model of present society, projected into the future, becomes a model of the future general configuration, delineating the limits within which more specific changes are likely to occur. For the purposes of the unconventional warfare study, a projection of three years was considered sufficient. Some features of the model are, of course, not projectable even that far, while others could be extrapolated much further with confidence.

The basis for the projection is linear extrapolation of certain societal indicators. While the specific indicators chosen may vary somewhat with the culture of the society and with the available data (for example, there are no gross-national-product figures available for Vietnam since 1956), a determination of the measures of the following factors is suggested as a possibility for monitoring the key systems of a society:

**Economic**

1. Per capita production
2. Population growth rate
3. Rate of capital investment
4. Percentage of unemployment
5. Cost of living per average wage ratio
6. Rate of taxation

**Attitude-Forming**

1. Proportion of school discontinuances
2. Church adherence or activity
3. Rate of defection to the insurgents
4. Degree of government control over information media (any changes)
5. Incidence of terror
6. Incidence of civilian requests for assistance from the military
7. Incidence of rumors

**Political**

1. Degree of uniformity of content of political news
2. Incidence of bribery and graft
3. Degree of reliance upon informal means to govern rather than formal structure
4. Number of political prisoners
5. Rate of rotation of high officers in government or party
6. Incidence of demonstrations and riots against the government
7. Incidence of abstentions from participating in government-sponsored activities. (Also the tone of the participation forthcoming whether perfunctory or enthusiastic)

Military
1. Incidence of armed actions
2. Incidence of casualties
3. Numerical strength of government and opposition forces
4. Organizational configuration of each side, types of armaments
5. Availability of intelligence on insurgents

The indicators or monitors, presented here have been formulated specifically with the problems of unconventional warfare in mind; however, many of them are basic to the analysis of other situations as well.

In the case of Vietnam, data sufficient to project all of the indicators, or even a majority of them, were not available. Thus the projection had to be made on the basis of a very few factors, thus the result was somewhat generalized. Once the indicators had been projected, their implications in terms of the systems that they reflected were taken into account. Pictures were drawn of the prospective agricultural system, urban manufacturing, patterns of trade, and foreign aid.

Possible catastrophic factors that might alter the normal limits as already projected were then considered. In the case of the Vietnamese economy the possible impact of the reduction or withdrawal of U.S. economic assistance and its likelihood of occurrence were considered.

This systems projection was supplemented by an examination of the patterns of change likely for the societal units, and use was made of the questions in the units paradigms, which draw attention to past or possible patterns of change in the unit configurations. Once a trajectory of unit change had been established, the impact of these modifications upon the systems projection was taken into account in the light of the total model. For example, the relatively slow conversion rate to Catholicism in Vietnam and the increased tendencies for the Buddhists to drift toward greater national organization and unity were noted as unit (group) trends. The possibility was recognized from this that the political system projection might have to pay greater attention to this set of units as a possible emerging focus of opposition to the Diem regime. This was particularly significant in light of the ineffectual past performance of strictly politically organized opposition groups.

This dual approach to projection manifests a characteristic of the analytical system found extremely useful throughout the unconventional warfare study. By asking both questions of who accomplishes things in
the society (the units approach) and of how things are accomplished
(the systems approach), important insights were gained that would not
have been possible by using either of the approaches singly. As can be
seen, these two approaches were used in sequence to accomplish a type
of second-order iteration; if a phenomenon was first analyzed through
a units approach its systems implications were subsequently considered,
and vice versa.

Finally, the patterns thus projected were considered for consistency
in the light of the cultural factors. In this manner, additional refinement
in the projection was gained.

In considering the general process of projection it should be noted
that these were essentially social or "type" projections. While, in the
case of Vietnam, for example, it was felt necessary to project the
actions of specific personalities in some cases (notably those of
President Diem and his immediate family), in general these were the
areas of greatest uneasiness. This was principally due to the limited
amount of information available on these people. It was also felt that
the model did, in general, provide a mechanism for a useful synthesis
of the social and the psychological or personality-oriented approaches
to the study of a nation's structure. Although great leaders may well
make extremely important contributions to the future of a society, their
success is determined to a large degree by the extent to which they are
able to perceive and act within the realities of the social situation in
which they find themselves.

ANALYSIS OF ACTION PROPOSALS

The analytical system for the description and projection of a
society outlined to this point provides a mechanism for the identifica-
tion of the probable societal consequences of proposed action programs.
Once these have been identified, executives in the situation will be in a
better position to evaluate the utility of the projected results and hence
of the proposed program. The identification per se of the societal im-
lications involves judgments of utility only to the extent that it reveals
situations of dysfunction. Such dysfunctions must subsequently be
weighed against the other factors bearing upon the situation.

In order to analyze an action proposal, the society (particularl,
that segment most directly involved) is first projected, assuming that
the action proposal is not initiated. The resultant configuration is then
compared with the picture of the society that results from the incor-
poration of the action proposal into the projection. In the latter case,
the action proposal can be incorporated by examining both its influence
upon the system indicators, scaled appropriately to the magnitude of
the problem (village, province, nation), and its impact upon those units
that it directly influences. These factors can then be considered in an
integration, along with those that have already been identified as tend-
ing to produce change in the society. As with the initial projection of
the society, the influences of the action proposal must be considered in the light of the cultural factors for compatibility with the existing culture.

The capabilities of the method in the identification of the consequences of action programs in a society are dependent upon the scale of the data available about the segment of the society in question. They are also dependent upon the societal magnitude of the phenomenon under consideration. For both of these reasons, the authors would feel, for example, considerably more confident in projecting the results of the strategic hamlet program in Vietnam than in a consideration of the societal consequences of the introduction of a particular new weapon type there.

While the method described will doubtlessly lead to inaccuracies in many cases, it is felt that through further systematization of methodology, making explicit the hypotheses upon which the projection is based, and of learning from the repeated projection of various situations in a society, and observing their subsequent development, the capability to perform this type of analysis will be continuously improved.

CONCLUSIONS

The method just outlined has already been carried out twice, with results that justify a modest enthusiasm for its value. In the process of its use, several qualifications, limitations, possibilities, and extensions have appeared that should also be reported.

First, the model can be applied to situations of varied scale. In the context of unconventional warfare this means that a military advisor to a company of soldiers can analyze his situation in terms of groups, roles, and systems in order to maneuver more effectively in the training of his group. Or a whole village or region could be studied using the same basic process. Whatever the hierarchical level or the scope of the structure examined, it can be related conceptually to units smaller or larger by means of the concepts of system and levels.

Second, the concepts and the data-handling procedures are such that they are readily usable by persons trained in a number of disciplines. In fact, experience shows that many of the data manipulations can be handled even by students who have rather limited training in any field. At least the scheme provides a framework within which scholars from economics, area study, anthropology, history, political science, geography, and mathematics have been able to share information and ideas without fragmenting the results along normal disciplinary lines.

A corollary of this flexibility is that the method allows the cumulating of operational experience in a fruitful way. At the present time, scholarship is faced with the problem of making data cumulatively valuable. We undoubtedly know a good deal about Venezuela, for example, but the existing literature is chaotic, and human memory is the only cumulating
device at work in summing what we know of a given area. Furthermore, such contributions to descriptive knowledge as the literature contains turn out with distressing frequency to be so isolated from other data on that area that they remain discrete, never touching each other to make integrated sense. The inefficiencies of gathering information randomly give rise to strong arguments for the setting up of academic-based research centers to keep current national and continental data files based on methodology similar to that used in this study. The benefits to a scientific study of human behavior in such a project are clear; so are the penalties science must pay if such data cumulation is not carried out.

Third is a feature of the method again referring to data. As serious gaps became visible in our materials on Vietnam and Venezuela, the necessity for a system of answering came into focus. If questions in the paradigms for data-handling could not be answered from information at hand, could inquiries not be directed to the field to elicit the needed data? The complete method would, therefore, utilize a network of informants to whom operationalized data requests would aid in supplementing and updating existing data in the literature. By such means the model of a given society would be kept current, thus cumulative, for the study of process in the society under investigation.

A fourth consideration is that since the method is intended to be applied on a continuous rather than one-shot basis, it becomes possible to enjoy some benefits of feedback. As a projection worked out on the basis of the method outlined above comes to be fact, the element of control can be taken advantage of in order to ask the question "How, and why, did the projection go wrong where it did go wrong?" Theory of groups, roles, systems, functions, etc., would surely benefit if this question were asked often in situations where a concrete answer could be given.

It is proposed, in the fifth place, that certain indicators might be used to monitor the approach of a society to thresholds of instability. In the case of unconventional warfare, such monitoring would periodically "take the temperature" of such features as violence, political opposition, crime, censorship, income versus prices, and health and mortality. When examined in the light of the cultural factors coloring the particular situation, these indicators would be expected to show when popular dissatisfactions, presumably based upon increasing dysfunction in the society, were approaching insurgency. An effort would be made to quantify the indices as far as possible. While details of the monitoring system have never yet been applied, it seems to have promise as a tool in applied research.

A final point is that the method works quickly. The work on Venezuelan society was a test case of the method as it had been developed for Vietnam. In a period of only 3 months a group of four professional scholars and half a dozen graduate students completed
an analysis of Venezuelan society that continues to stand up with experience as sound in its essentials despite certain gaps in information on particular points. The clear specification of tasks and the interchangeability of the processed data in meeting a variety of needs that the method involves were the chief factors making this accomplishment possible.

In conclusion it is to be noted that only a method has been described, not the method. Undoubtedly many different procedures can be used in this sort of analytical and synthetic task, yet those techniques and concepts found useful in the study of unconventional warfare may well prove of value to others whose tasks are related.
REFERENCES


