**UNCLASSIFIED**

**AD NUMBER**

| AD531045 |

**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

| TO:         | unclassified |
|            |             |
| FROM:      | confidential |

**LIMITATION CHANGES**

| TO: | Approved for public release, distribution unlimited |
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**AUTHORITY**

31 Dec 1978, per doc marking; OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, USA Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1972 (U)

1. Withdrawn

2. (C) LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Personnel.

(1) Leadership and Drug Abuse.

(a) Observation/Evaluation: Staff visits to USARV units revealed a strong indication of a direct correlation between the quality of unit leadership and the extent of the unit drug problem. Where commanders displayed a sincere interest in their men and made positive efforts to assist those involved with drugs, the incidence of drug abuse, in many cases, was low.

(b) Command Action: To assist the unit leader in dealing with internal unit problems or circumstances which may contribute to drug abuse, major subordinate commanders of units with high incidence rates were required to make appraisals of their drug programs. Additionally, lesson plans on drug related leadership problems were prepared and distributed. Emphasis was placed on teaching unit leaders to identify conditions contributing to higher incidence rates of drug abuse.

(2) Education and Drug Abuse.

(a) Observation/Evaluation: Education is a critical component of the endeavor to combat drug abuse and to achieve long-range success.

(b) Command Action: The ultimate goal of the Drug Abuse Program is to deter individuals from drug through education. A program for orienting all E-5's at Oakland ORS, prior to departure for RVN was begun in April 1972. A second briefing is conducted for all personnel immediately after arrival at the replacement battalion. A third orientation is given to each individual when he arrives at his unit. Each unit conducts a Drug Education Program which is designed to increase the individual's awareness of the danger of drugs. To assist the units in the conduct of their programs, lesson plans, and drug education libraries were distributed to all company size units. Additionally, each individual is issued a handbook upon arrival in RVN. A handbook was prepared for all commanders to guide them in conducting lawful searches and seizures. The four mobile education teams presented classes to over 15,000 personnel between November 1971 and March 1972. Their presentation were designed to give the facts regarding the effects of drugs and to explain command policies and procedures, with emphasis...
on the Rehabilitation Program. A drug abuse, and rehabilitation film was produced within the command and has been incorporated into the unit training programs and used as a springboard to discussion by education teams in their presentations. The USARV education program gained credibility with the soldier due to the informal, flexible and honest approach to educate him in the pitfalls of drug abuse.

(3) Curtailment Procedures.

(a) Observation: Continued withdrawals of personnel from RVN to meet imposed ceilings have demanded continual adjustments of curtailment policies. A balance between tour equity and mission requirements must be maintained while at the same time meeting ever increasing lose objectives.

(b) Evaluation.

1. Each redeployment increment has had a separate and distinct curtailment policy associated with it. The following table outlines policies used during Increments VII through XI as examples of the variety used during recent months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCREMENT</th>
<th>CURTAILMENTS USED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VII (May-Jun 71)</td>
<td>a. 90 days for officers and enlisted personnel in all redeploying and inactivating (stand down) units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. 40 days command-wide day-to-day tour equity oriented curtailment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII (Jul-Aug 71)</td>
<td>60 days for officers and enlisted personnel in all redeploying and inactivating (standdown) units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX (Sep-Nov 71)</td>
<td>60 days for officers and 90 days for enlisted personnel in all redeploying and inactivating (standdown) units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X (Dec 71-Jan 72)</td>
<td>a. 120 days for officers and enlisted personnel in all redeploying and inactivating (standdown) units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. For enlisted personnel only in units reducing in authorizations (drawdown), the following:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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INCREMENT CURTAILMENTS USED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% OF DRAWDOWN</th>
<th>CURTAILMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 - 30%</td>
<td>60 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 50%</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50%</td>
<td>120 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Up to 54 days command-wide tour equity oriented curtailment.

XI (Feb-Apr 72)

a. 180 days for officers and enlisted personnel in all redeploying and inactivating (stand down) units.

b. For enlisted personnel only in units reducing in authorization (drawdown), the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% OF DRAWDOWNS</th>
<th>CURTAILMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 - 30%</td>
<td>120 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 50%</td>
<td>150 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50%</td>
<td>180 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. February - March. A tour equity oriented curtailment of up to 90 days.

d. April. A quota system to major commands with reduced tour equity orientation, maximum command flexibility, and continued utilization of centralized control to meet ceilings.

2. Maximum losses through curtailment programs correlated to authorization reduction provide minimal personnel turbulence within the command. Any command-wide curtailment requires reduction in manning levels with no compensating reduction in operational requirements.

3. Personnel in standdown units not meeting curtailment criteria become reassignable assets of the command. With specialization in mission needs of the standdown unit, MOS imbalances are often created within the command to ensure tour equity minimum of these personnel beyond
the curtailment criteria.

(c) Recommendation: Curtailment policies should continue to be tailored to the dynamics of each increment.

(d) Command Action: USARV has implemented a curtailment system to meet force reduction requirements and still maintain the best possible balance between tour equity and mission requirements. This system uses the following priority listing as a basis for curtailment policy decisions.

1. Standdown curtailments for inactivating and redeploying units.

2. Drawdown curtailments proportional to authorization reductions.

3. Command-wide quota systems providing field commanders maximum flexibility with emphasis on mission requirements. Ranges of selection are provided to retain tour equity standards, and reporting procedures are enforced to insure appropriate centralized control.

4. Command-wide day-to-day curtailments oriented toward tour equity.


(a) Observation: The normal time frame of the AOR system was not responsive enough to meet the requirement of phase down operations within RVN.

(b) Evaluation: The world-wide AOR system was established on the principle of a four month advanced reporting cycle from the time of submission to the DEROS of the individual. In order to respond to the six month curtailment policy which was initiated to meet strength ceilings imposed by DA, it was necessary for Personnel Services Companies and Unit Personnel Offices to prepare and submit three AOR rosters during one 30 day period. The time required to prepare, validate and ship these rosters to DA and the time required by DA to fill these requests for assignments resulted in a very short notification period or the returning of personnel to CONUS in an unassigned status.

(c) Recommendation: That in drawdown operations that may result in large scale curtailments, DA furnish the overseas commander with block requirements (assignment instructions) by grade and MOS and allow the overseas commander to apply the names against these requirements.

(d) Command Action: The overseas commander should request block requirements by grade and MOS from DA in sufficient quantity to provide assignment instructions for all personnel.
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(5) Authorization Documentation.

(a) Observation: Delay in receiving approval of changes in TAADS documentation hampers the requisitioning and assigning of personnel. This problem becomes even more apparent during a period of force reduction and its accompanied personnel turbulence. The recent unification of USARV and MACV under the Single Army Personnel System also suffered by the lack of authorization documentation.

(b) Evaluation: Authorization documentation must be expedited at each level in order to be responsive to the personnel requirement of the command. This is especially critical during a period of force reduction.

(c) Recommendation: That approval action on authorization documentation be expedited at all levels to meet common personnel requirement.

(d) Command Action: Maximum effort is being expended to obtain approved authority on authorization documentation with the least possible delay.

(6) Extension Policy.

(a) Observation: During a period of force reduction, extension policy must remain flexible to be able to meet the needs of the command.

(b) Evaluation: The reduction of personnel is very seldom in the same ratio as the reduction of spaces. Thus, during a period of force reduction, MOS imbalances occur and priorities vary among the various MOS's. To counter this situation, extension policy must be on a selected MOS basis. Thus, personnel with critical MOS's can be retained without imperiling strength ceilings.

(c) Recommendation: That projected MOS strengths be evaluated, both authorized and assigned, and the results of this study be used to establish extension policy by MOS.

(d) Command Action: Periodic evaluation of projected MOS strengths was made and used as the basis for the USARV extension policy.

(7) Drug Control Center.

(a) Observation/Evaluation: Initially, data on positive individuals were reported to DCSP&A, HQ USARV. The Reports and Analysis Section, DCSP&A, controlled the flow of patients into DTC's in order to maintain a balance between the two centers. With the implementation of new urinalysis programs in USARV, an increasing load was placed on this section.
(b) Command Action: Two Drug Control Centers (DCC) were formed and placed under the operational control of the Special Assistant for Drug Policies and Programs. The DCC assumed control of the flow of drug abusers to the two Drug Treatment Centers. The DCC at Cam Ranh Bay closed in April with no further requirement for the operation after the closure of the Drug Treatment Center at Cam Ranh Bay. The DCC, Long Binh, also closed in April; its functions were absorbed by the Drug Treatment Center, Long Binh.

b. Intelligence: None.
c. Operations: None.
d. Organization: None.
e. Training: None.
f. Logistics.

(1) Transfer of Class V Facilities to ARVN.

(a) Observation: There are some minor problems associated with effecting the smooth transfer of the USARV Class V support mission and facilities to ARVN.

(b) Evaluation: The problems which occur relate mainly to the distribution of assets which are in short supply. In-country distribution and cross leveling of Class V stocks has been difficult due to ARVN inexperience in this field and limited transportation assets.

c. Recommendations: US liaison teams be placed at the ARVN depots to provide customer assistance to US and RVNAF units and report significant problems through US logistics channels.

d. Command Action: Effective 1 April 1972, six US liaison teams were operating at the ARVN depots supporting major concentrations of US and RVNAF throughout RVN. Close coordination between the USARV ammunition personnel and MACV Ordnance Advisory Division ammunition personnel continues to ensure that there is proper distribution of the required assets.

(2) Recording of Equipment Transfers to RVNAF.

(a) Observation: At the inception of Project 981 in August 1971, the USARV DCSLOG staff established a system of recording equipment transfers by using subordinate command reports of quantitative transfers by Federal Stock Number. It soon became apparent that this technique did not provide adequate records/audit trails to permit accurate tracking of program progress and reconciliation of transfers with MACV Technical Service Advisory Divisions.
(b) Evaluation: A highly visible, intensively managed program such as Project 981 requires accurate, real-time reporting of all phases of related maintenance and supply activities in subordinate commands. Since Project 981 entailed the transfer of specific quantities of selected equipment to the RVNAF, the key element in tracking progress and maintaining audit trails is the maintenance of detailed records on each transfer transaction. After an initial unsatisfactory experience in maintaining a simple cumulative count by FSN, in September 1971, DCSLOG staff implemented a system of recording equipment transfers by FSN, document number, location, and quantity. Master EAM card decks machine listings were maintained and updated daily. Document listings were formatted to show detailed transfer transaction data for each equipment line, e.g., each radio, vehicle, weapons type, etc. Each day, subordinate elements were required to render a FONECON report of transactions occurring within the past 24 hours. This data was then introduced into the master transfer transaction file. As transfer transactions were confirmed by the appropriate MACV Technical Service Advisory Division, the appropriate transactions in the data file were coded to reflect a MACV confirmed receipt. Thus, at any given time, the USARV DCSLOG staff could not only identify the quantities of equipment transfers made to RVNAF, but also identify those transactions not acknowledged through ARVN/MACV channels. Periodically, copies of the actual transfer documents on file at subordinate commands were duplicated and passed to USARV in order to reconcile outstanding unconfirmed transfers. Subsequently, these copies were furnished MACV as evidence of unrecorded USARV transfers. As FY 1972 progressed and the quantity of confirmed transfers increased, the practice of "calling forward" copies of transfer documents became so common that USARV established a central file of transfer documents and automatically received copies of all equipment transfer documents. In hindsight, it is obvious that such a procedure would have been effective and should have been initiated at the inception of Project 981.

(c) Recommendation: In future highly visible and intensively managed programs, such as Project 981, special attention must be paid at the inception, to the development and maintenance of an accurate and adequate procedure for measuring and reconciling progress.

(d) Command Action: None required.

(3) Redistribution of Maintenance Workload.

(a) Observation: Under Project 981, USARV was tasked to perform maintenance upgrade for a large quantity of vehicles, artillery, marine craft, construction, communications, and other types of equipment. Assets for this maintenance program came primarily from Keystone channels.
As FY 1972 progressed, a significant imbalance between asset generations and maintenance capabilities developed in the three major logistical islands within USARV.

(b) Evaluation: At the inception of Project 981, new and expanded COCO maintenance activities and selected TOE maintenance units were dedicated to Keystone/Project 981 maintenance. Due to the lack of adequate space and facilities, no dedicated COCO maintenance activity was established at Da Nang; however, elements of one TOE maintenance battalion were dedicated to Keystone/981 maintenance. At Cam Ranh Bay and Long Binh, both elements of TOE maintenance units and new/expanded COCO maintenance activities were dedicated to Keystone/981 maintenance. The distribution of troop units and equipment in USARV was approximately 35 percent in the Da Nang logistical island, 15 percent in the Qui Nhon/Cam Ranh Bay islands, and 45 percent in the Long Binh island. Conversely, due to the lack of resources in the Da Nang area, the distribution of maintenance capability was approximately 20 percent in Da Nang, 35 percent in Cam Ranh Bay and 45 percent in Long Binh. As a consequence of the imbalance between asset density/generations in the Da Nang area versus maintenance capabilities, a procedure for transshipping unserviceables from Da Nang to Cam Ranh was instituted. Essentially this system involved the use of predisposition instructions for high density items such as 1/4 T trucks and as required predisposition for lower density material. This transshipment disposition procedure was centrally controlled at USARV and required constant monitoring of asset generations at Da Nang and workload and programmed maintenance capabilities at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay. Although this procedure did function somewhat effectively, bubbles did develop in the flow of unserviceables to Cam Ranh Bay. It is apparent that the stationing of one liaison officer from Cam Ranh Bay at Da Nang would have accelerated the flow of unserviceables since that officer could have maintained daily communication between Keystone operations at Da Nang and maintenance operations at Cam Ranh Bay. Thus, as assets excess to the DNG maintenance program were identified, immediate action to transship assets to CRB would have been initiated.

(c) Recommendation: That in future situations wherein rapid redistribution of maintenance workload is required, use of on-the-ground liaison personnel would speed the flow of unserviceables.

(d) Command Action: None required.

(4) Tire Declamation.

(a) Observation: Repairable tires were being turned in to Property
Disposal Activities.

(b) Evaluation: In July 1971, USARV contracted to reclassify all tires destined for sale as scrap rubber in the Property Disposal Holding Areas (PDHA's) and to move all reparable from the PDHA's to either in-country or offshore retreading facilities. The program has been successful, as more than 115,000 tires have been classified as reparable since July 1971. US Army Tank Automotive Command (USATACOM) published revised classification standards for reparable tires in March 1972, which will allow for the recovery of an estimated additional 50,000 to 60,000 tires from PDHA's which were not recovered under the previous standards.

(c) Recommendations: That all tires once classified not reparable in accordance with previous classification standards be reinspected using the revised USATACOM standards to increase the quantity of tires recovered for retreading, thereby reducing the requirements for the purchase of new tires.

(d) Command Action.

1. The tire inspection and classification contract has been modified to include reclassification of tires in accordance with the revised USATACOM standards.

2. All unserviceable tires are being inspected and classified prior to being turned into PDHA's as scrap.

3. Direct support units will be provided the revised USATACOM tire inspection and classification standards so that initial classification may be made at the time unserviceable tires are exchanged for serviceable once with using units.

(§) Level of Calibration Authorized.

(a) Observations: In October 1971, USASTRATCOM ordered the downgrade of all fixed communications support test measurement and diagnostic equipment (TMDF) in Vietnam from "A" to "C" level. This action was taken without determining whether "C" level calibration support units had the facilities and capability to provide the required services. Technical Bulletin TB 750-236 permits major command to adjust calibration requirements according to their needs. US Army Electronics Command has designed and provided the "C" level calibration facilities. The inadvertent downgrade action by USASTRATCOM requires a costly upgrade of calibration facilities.
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(b) Evaluation: The fixed communication sites in RVN did not have site equipment authorizations established not were support units provided equipment density listing showing types and quantities of equipment to be supported. After several months, support units compiled a listing of equipment which was determined to be beyond their capability to support. This list was sent to USARPAC for evaluation. USARPAC submitted this listing to USAECOM for evaluation and necessary upgrade of calibration facilities to meet support requirements. On 8 March 1972, HQ MACV established TMDE authorizations for each fixed communications site. Upon evaluation of this listing, it was determined that the authorized equipment could be supported by the support facilities with exception of the Area Maintenance and Supply Facility (AMSF).

(c) Recommendation: That commands establish equipment authorizations for each type unit/site prior to requiring support activities to provide support; that units requiring support comply with directives and furnish supporting activities with equipment density listing to enable the support unit to evaluate capabilities, establish maintenance schedules and adjust capabilities to meet support requirements; and that major commands should not inadvertently downgrade or upgrade calibration service requirements without first coordinating with support activities.

(d) Command Action: USARV directed supported units to provide density listings of equipment to be supported to the support activity; to turn in excess equipment; and, to comply with service schedules established by support activities.


(a) Observation: The accelerated troop withdrawals and drop policy experienced during the period, depleted some TOE maintenance units capabilities to provide support. To fill this shortfall in support requirements, the service was contracted.

(b) Evaluation: Although contractors were able to recruit and provide the technical skills required to meet the maintenance shortfall, tool sets and test equipment required to be provided as Government furnished property (GFP) was not always available. The GFP listings duplicated the equipment of the TOE unit and if the unit did not stand down, and retained a support mission, the equipment was not available for transfer to the contractor. The other maintenance units standing down did not provide the equipment in a timely manner.

(c) Recommendation: In future contracting for maintenance support that was previously provided by a TOE unit, all equipment of the unit should be set aside for the exclusive use of fulfilling GFP requirements of the proposed contact. Any additional equipment not available from the TOE unit, should be located and held for the contractor.
(d) Command Action: DCSLOG, upon receipt of new procurement requests involving equipment of TOE units, whose mission is being contracted, will effect action with the requiring activity to identify and hold assets of the TOE unit, take action to obtain any equipment necessary for contractor performance to be on hand prior to contract award.

(7) POL Procedures.

(a) Observation: As a result of a series of inspections, investigations, and audits conducted by Headquarters, USARV and other agencies during the past six months, it is clearly evident that the management of bulk and package petroleum products at the wholesale, retail, and using unit levels need intensive management and command supervision to prevent diversion of the fuel and lubricants to unauthorized persons.

(b) Evaluation: Adequate controls and accounting procedures exist at all levels of command to adequately safeguard petroleum products but supervisory and operating personnel are not familiar with the procedures and do not fully exercise them.

(c) Recommendation: That the management of petroleum products be added to the USARV Inspector General's list of items requiring special emphasis during formal IG inspections.

(d) Command Action: DCSLOG has requested that the IG add this item to the Special Emphasis List.

(8) Calibration and Repair Services.

(a) Observation: Test measurement and diagnostic equipment (TMDE) calibration and repair services have been furnished under a services contract since 1966. Contract services must be placed on bid and renegotiated each year which often results in change of contractors. When this occurs, an unacceptable backlog of work is created for the successor contractor.

(b) Evaluation: Timely repair and calibration of test measurement and diagnostic equipment (TMDE) is essential for operational and maintenance support of critical communications systems, aircraft navigational and communications equipment, combat surveillance equipment, and insuring equipment operator safety through proper maintenance. USARV has an additional requirement to provide TMDE calibration repair training to ARVN technicians. The current contract was expanded to provide both "A" and "C" level calibration services and training for ARVN who are programmed to assume the mission from the contractor on 30 September 1972. Both MACV and USARV have determined that the ARVN technicians will require additional contractor provided training. Should
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

a new contractor assume this responsibility, considerable time will be lost and the continuity attained through six months of effort by the contractor will have been lost.

(c) Recommendation: That the existing contract be extended to continue current training and calibration services until the ARVN attain the proficiency necessary to assume the mission.

(d) Command Action: USARV will assist MACV in extending the contract.

(9) Retrograde of Nonperishable Subsistence.

(a) Observation: Initial plans called for retrograde of non-perishable subsistence by date of pack. This was abandoned in favor of inspection IAW AR 40-656. Products showing greater than 4% critical defects or total defects over 10% were not shipped until repacked.

(b) Evaluation: Inspection of retrograde nonperishable subsistence IAW AR 40-656 is quite feasible. If items are retrograded by date of pack alone, some poor lots will be shipped while retaining better lots in-country.

(c) Recommendation: All nonperishable subsistence be inspected IAW AR 40-656 prior to retrograde.

(d) Command Action: Continue to enforce the message requiring inspection of nonperishable subsistence.

g. Communications: None.

h. Materiel: None.

i. Other.

(1) FY 73 Procurement Plan.

(a) Observation: Separate contracts have been let for high voltage power and for facilities engineering services.

(b) Evaluation: The use of separate contracts with several contractors provided a needed flexibility during the past when numerous installations were operated throughout Vietnam. Now that the US force level has been reduced and relatively few installations remain under US control, continuation of this procurement procedure would be costly for the following reasons:
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1. Government funds are necessary to support overhead costs of individual contractors providing similar services.

2. Government personnel are necessary to evaluate the performance of each contractor and administer each contract.

3. Personnel are required by each contractor to perform identical functions resulting in duplication of effort and increased cost to the government.

4. Each contractor must maintain a stock of repair parts and equipment imposing an additional burden on the supply system.

(c) Recommendations: Contracts for facilities engineering services and high voltage power should be consolidated and awarded as a single cost-plus-fixed-fee contract on a competitive bid basis.

(d) Command Action: Permission was requested from DA to extend all present contracts for 90 days. At the end of this period, one contract will be awarded for facilities engineering services and high voltage power within RVN. Permission was received on 24 April 1972 to implement the proposed action.

(2) Control of Military Payment Certificate Evidence.

(a) Observation: A very small percentage of MPC turned over as evidence to GVN law enforcement agencies has been returned to US control.

(b) Evaluation: This money may have been a source of MPC supply for black market transactions.

(c) Recommendation: Money should be properly marked to preclude its unauthorized use.

(d) Command Action: USARV obtained approval from the Comptroller General of the Army to mutilate MPC by stamping both sides "VOID" before releasing it to GVN. All MPC is now stamped "VOID" before releasing it to GVN law enforcement agencies and a statement accompanies it indicating it may be used only as evidence.


(a) Observation: The inability to adequately trace, account for, and identify stolen motor vehicles as US Government property results in extremely high losses. Contact with the US Army Automotive Command revealed a lack of positive control measures and the inability to identify US Government vehicles in the logistical system.

(b) Evaluation: The registration system used for the control and identification of civilian motor vehicles within the United States is far superior and more functional than the system now in effect throughout the
US Army. At the present time, the only means for identification of US Army vehicles is the recording of the manufacturers' serial numbers on the reverse side of pages in the unit property records. No other positive means exist to locate or identify vehicles. Vehicles are shipped solely as a given quantity of an item, identified only by Federal Stock Number (FSN). The vast number of vehicles stolen in the Republic of Vietnam, has resulted in an extensive loss to the United States Government. Curtailment of these thefts and eventual recovery of the vehicles is dependent upon an adequate means of positive identification. The painted USA number on the body of the vehicle is too easily changed and the serial number, placed on the vehicle data plate by the manufacturer, is easily removed. These same data plates, in blank form, are available through normal supply channels.

(c) Recommendations: Department of the Army initiate a strict program to control vehicles from the time of acquisition through delivery to the using units and until the vehicle is eventually removed from the Army inventory. In addition, a system be developed to mark vehicles with the manufacturers' serial numbers to preclude the easy removal or changes of the letters and numbers. The numbers should be placed in a location where they may be easily seen by guards or military police as the vehicles pass through a gate, motor park or an installation. A system of "secret numbers" should be also initiated similar to that used in civilian vehicle manufacture, the location of which should be known only to CID.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

I. L. COTTINGHAM
CPT, AGC
ASS'T, AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, HQ United States Army, Vietnam Period Ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 3 Sep 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed with the following comments:

a. Withdrawn.

b. Para 2f(5), page 7, Level of Calibration Authorized: Concur in recommendation that all supported units provide accurate initial data on all items of TMDE which will require calibration/repair support. The support problem has been resolved through providing USARV with organic secondary transfer calibration sets.

c. Para 2f(7), page 11, POL Procedures: The control of POL has been made a matter of special interest to the IG at HQ USARPAC.

d. Para 2f(8), page 11, Calibration and Repair Services: Concur with recommendation. Procurement with DA approval, is extending the current contract for support.

e. The comments concerning motor vehicle accountability/control/security (para 2i(3), page 13, are well taken from a crime point of view as losses of government vehicles within USARPAC have been primarily responsible for the high total losses of government property. For example, FY 71 and FY 72 -- government property losses revealed the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Govt Vehicle Lost/Stolen</th>
<th>Total Govt Property Lost</th>
<th>Percent Govt Vehicle Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Qtr FY 71</td>
<td>$2,335,590</td>
<td>$4,166,582</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Qtr FY 71</td>
<td>3,076,481</td>
<td>4,671,479</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Qtr FY 71</td>
<td>3,415,403</td>
<td>4,675,375</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Qtr FY 71</td>
<td>4,024,118</td>
<td>5,844,104</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$12,851,592</td>
<td>$19,357,540</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GPOP-FD (13 Jun 72) 1st Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gov't Vehicle Lost/Stolen</th>
<th>Total Govt Property Lost</th>
<th>Percent Govt Vehicle Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Qtr FY 72</td>
<td>$3,338,650</td>
<td>$4,728,992</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Qtr FY 72</td>
<td>2,644,305</td>
<td>5,009,873</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Qtr FY 72</td>
<td>1,291,799</td>
<td>2,228,878</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$7,274,754</td>
<td>$11,967,743</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

Michael A. Welch
2LT, AGC
Army AG