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AUTHORITY

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HQ, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
Camp Red Devil
APO San Francisco 96477

AVEL-U

19 August 1971

SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), Period Ending 19 Aug 71, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
XXIV Corps
ATTN: AVEL-GCT
APO San Francisco 96349

Operations report for period ending
19 Aug 71.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

"NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION"

"Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal
Sanctions"

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Mission:

(1) Operation Montana Mustang was in effect at the beginning of the report period and ended 11200H Jul 71. The mission of the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) was to conduct unilateral and combined operations with RVNAF and Territorial Forces in assigned AO's to detect and destroy enemy forces, LOC's and base areas in western Quang Tri Province and along the DMZ; assist pacification and Vietnamization in Quang Tri Province; prevent enemy forces from re-establishing former Base Area 101, and conduct reaction/exploitation operations in western Quang Tri Province.

(2) On Jul 71, the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) reverted to command minus operational control of USARV and began conducting an orderly redeployment of forces and material to designated locations. Repositioning of forces and phasing of combat operations was directed in accordance with FRAGO's to current OPORD.

b. Concept of Operation:

(1) Operation Montana Mustang. The Brigade conducted operations with TF 1-61 in AO Orange, TF 1-11 in AO White, TF 1-77 in AO green.
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D/3-5 Air Cav in Recon Zone, and TF 3-5 in reserve, to locate and destroy enemy forces; eliminate VCI; conduct reaction/exploitation operations and assist in pacification and Vietnamization in Quang Tri Province. Additional AO's were granted for special missions such as AO Blue, where TF 3-5, in conjunction with RF/77 units, conducted rice field operations. During the operation, units continued to conduct Quarterly Refresher Training. This necessitated changes in control of AO's. Near the end of the operation the Brigade began a phased withdrawal from AO Orange relinquishing control to ARVN Forces.

(2) Standdown/Redeployment/Inactivation (OPLAN 183-70 (U) 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M)). The 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) was released from attachment to XXIV Corps effective D-day (1 Jul 71); to conduct standdown and execute a phased redeployment to CONUS for inactivation under the control of USAFR. Effective 111200H Jul 71, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) relinquished TACI responsibility and passed OPCON to 101st Abn Div (Ambl) for combat and security operations. This operation was conducted in six phases.

(a) Phase I: The Brigade conducted planning for standdown and redeployment.

(b) Phase II: The Brigade relinquished TACI responsibilities to 101st Abn Div (Ambl) and designated AO to OVR Forces. The Brigade continued to conduct security operations in designated AO's. As scheduled, the Brigade conducted standdown and redeployment of 1-77 Armor, 77th CombatTracker Detachment, 13d LPSO, 85th Chemical Detachment, E/5-4 Artillery, and A/4-12 Cav was relieved from 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) and assigned to XXIV Corps.

(c) Phase III: 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) continued security operations and relinquished AO responsibilities as directed. As scheduled, the Brigade executed standdown and redeployment of 1-61 Infantry (Mech) and C/5-4 Arty.

(d) Phase IV: Brigade released OPCON of 3-5 Cav; as scheduled, the Brigade executed standdown and redeployment of 1-11 Infantry, F/75 Infantry (Rangers), 5-4 Arty (-) and A/7 Engr. 101st Abn Div (Ambl) provided area security for QTR.

(e) Phase V: As scheduled, the Brigade executed standdown and redeployment of Bde HHC, 75th Spt Bn, 49th FIO, 298th Sig Co, and 517th MI Detachment.

(f) Phase VI: The Brigade Roll-up Force closes out unit records, completes after action report, and executes final clearance of responsibility and redeploy on order.

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(Nech), Period Ending 19 Aug 71, ROS CHRON - 65 (R5) (U)

(3) The major operational tasks performed by Brigade subordinate units were:

(a) 1-11 Infantry:

1. Montana Mustang. Operations consisted of search and clear, reconnaissance in force, night ambush, and rocket suppression operations in mountainous areas in AO White, north and south of NRB Ams and north of the Ba Long River. The Reconnaissance Platoon was used in an economy of force role to cover infiltration routes as well as daylight surveillance, night ambush, reconnaissance, rocket suppression and day and night sniper operations. During the period, operations were characterised by small unit operations and oriented towards area saturation attempting to interdict enemy infiltration routes and suppress rocket firing into the Quang Tri area. The Battalion CP located at NRB Ams was secured by one rifle company. The battalion retained the Bald Eagle/Sparrow Hawk mission throughout the operation. During part of the period of rice harvest, TF 1-11 was assigned responsibility for rice denial operations in AO Blue, and for this mission TF 1-11 was assigned one Cavalry Troop which operated in conjunction with Regional Forces from Mai Linh and Hai Long Districts.

2. Redeployment. Executed standoff and redeployment in Phase IV of Brigade OPLAN 183-70 (U) as scheduled (21 Jul 71 - 3 Aug 71). TF 1-11 was relieved of the responsibility of AO White and NRB Ams by the 101st Abn Div (Able). From 21-26 Jul 71, the Battalion assumed responsibility for a portion of the Quang Tri bunkerline with the mission of defense of Quang Tri Combat Base (QTCB). Also, one company was committed to guard the AIP 101 during the same time period.

(b) 1-61 Infantry (Nech):

1. Montana Mustang. TF 1-61 conducted combat operations in AO Orange along the DMZ in Northern Quang Tri Province. The Task Force conducted reconnaissance operations along the DMZ; provided security for NRB A-4 (TD 117 702) and NRB C-2 (TD 134 646); maintained at least one company size unit outside the NRB a-4 at night as a reaction force; maintained one mechanised rifle company in QTCS for maintenance and refitting, prepared for commitment, lieu equipment undergoing Q-Service, on one hour notice; and was responsible for civil affairs/civic action activities in Cam Lo District. In addition, TF 1-61 conducted daily minisweep of the access road from NRB A-4 to QL9. Elements from each of the other Task Forces were frequently placed under operational control of TF 1-61.

2. Redeployment: Executed standoff and redeployment in Phase III of Brigade OPLAN 183-70 (U) as scheduled (10-30 Jul 71), TF 1-61 continued its mission as the only United States unit deployed
along the DMZ through 10 July 71. Elements of the 1st (ARVN) Div assumed control of FSB A-1, FSB C-2 and AO Orange. TF 1-61 conducted a phased withdrawal during that two day period from AO Orange which provided the elements of the 1st (ARVN) Div with security while moving their troops into AO Orange, and the FSB's. Upon the return of 1-61 Inf to QTB, the battalion assumed control of two sections of the QTB bunkerline and provided personnel to augment another section. The 1-61 Inf bunkertline commitment terminated on 21 July 1971.

(c) 1-77 Armor:

1. Montana Mustang. TF 1-77 Arm was assigned the initial mission of Brigade Reserve and to conduct post combat maintenance. On 23 April 71, the Task Force assumed the responsibility for AO White with the mission of conducting combined operations with the Territorial Forces of Muong Hoa District to provide security to the population and installations, to locate and destroy enemy forces, supplies and base areas. TF 1-77 assumed responsibility for AO Green effective 160000H Apr 71, with one tank company becoming OPCON to TF 3-5 effective 1H Apr 71. Upon assumption of AO Green, TF 1-77 coordinated with the District Chief of Cam Lo and Mai Linh Districts to conduct combined operations in their respective areas. TF 1-77 coordinated the rotation of cavalry troops with 3-5 Cav to insure that one troop was at QTB or DRB as Brigade RFW and one troop in AO Orange at all times. The Task Force also maintained a minimum of one platoon south of FSB Pedro insuring nightly coverage with radar of the Quang Tri River area. With the Brigade Security Platoon available, the Battalion Scout Platoon was used with tank elements. TF 1-77 was required to maintain a liaison team at Cam Lo District, maintain one platoon within close proximity of 253th VNNC AO and establish coordination with 6-1 Artillery, Mai Loc District Chief and 256th VNNC Bde for a reaction plan to assist 6-1 Artillery south of Mai Loc. On 3 May 71, TF 1-77 set up a TF CP at an abandoned C113 Compound at Mai Loc. From 4 May to 21 Jun 71, TF 1-77 continued to conduct operations in the assigned AO, with emphasis placed on combined operations with the Muong Hoa Regional Forces Group. Tank and RF units were cross-attached along the tank/infantry concept and conducted numerous search and clear operations in areas recommended by the District RF Commander based upon his intelligence sources. On 25 June 1971, the TF CP returned to QTB. The VNNC assumed control of the western portion of the AO near Mai Loc, while the Task Force continued normal operation throughout the remainder of the AO. On 28 June 71, TF 1-77 was relieved of the responsibility of AO Green by TF 3-5.

2. Redeployment. Executed standoff and redeployment in Phase II of the Brigade OPPLAN 123-70 (U) as scheduled (1 - 21 Jul 71). When the battalion returned to Quang Tri Combat Base from Mai Loc on 25 Jun 71, it began maintenance operations in preparation for the
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stationed on 1 July 71. Concurrently, the battalion continued to secure the assigned OP area through 13 July 71.

(6) 3-5 Cav:

1. Montana Mustang. Initially TF 3-5 conducted search and clear operations and screening operations in A0 Green and along the Quang Tri River (Tong Thach Ben) east of YD 263 140; provided security to 15th's established within the A0, maintained one troop in DCHB for maintenance and refitting, and was responsible for civil affairs/civic action activities in Gio Linh District. Elements of the task force supported 4/7th Engr in opening the road from FSB Sharon to FSB Anne and constructing numerous tank trails throughout the area of operation. One tank company from 1-77 Armor became OPCON to TF 3-5 effective 14 April 71. On 18 April 71, TF 3-5 coordinated with TF 1-77 while moving to Dong Ha Combat Base (DCHB) to begin its quarterly refresher training. TF 3-5 was prepared to assume command of a task force of Brigade reserve elements for commitment within the Brigade TAOC. In mid-May the Task Force relieved 1-11 Inf in A0's White and Blue so they could conduct quarterly refresher training, and moved its CP south of Quang Tri City where it conducted rice denial operations in conjunction with RE/FF Forces of Mai Linh and Hai Lang Districts and provided a reaction force for the assistance of the Provincial Forces in both districts. TF 3-5 also conducted rocket suppression activities. The Task Force was relieved of responsibility for A0's White and Blue on 19 June 71 and returned its CP to DCHB and conducted search and clear operations in A0 Green with 4/4-12 Cav, to include providing security consisting of either a troop (-) or a Cav platoon for security of engineer elements of 4/7 Engr and ARVN Engr constructing a road from vic YD 0746 to FSB Surge. On 21 June 71, TF 3-5 moved to YD 0746 where it supported elements of the 2nd ARVN Regt by direct tank gun fire and acting as a blocking force in operations around FSB Fuller, under the brigade Counter-attack Plan Springboard-Bravo. After this operation, TF 3-5 moved its CP back to DCHB and continued to conduct operations in A0 green, relieving 1-77 Armor of the responsibility for the A0 on 28 June 71. D/3-5 Cav was under the operational control of the Brigade and its mission during the reporting period was to conduct aerial reconnaissance missions in the Brigade Recon Zone; interdict enemy infiltration into former Base Area 10B; detect and engage enemy forces as soon as possible after they entered South Vietnam; insert and extract Ranger teams to augment aerial reconnaissance; provide direct support to US or ARVN units within the Brigade A0; and provide a last light reconnaissance as directed.

2. Redeployment. 3-5 Cav was relieved from attached 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Div (Mech) and attached to 101st Abn Div (Amph) on
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1 July 71, 4/4-12 Cav relieved from 1st Bde., 5th Inf. Div. (Mech) and assumed 3d Inf. Corps on 1 July 71. 5-5 Cav with 4/4-12 Cav was returned 0R/O to the Brigade on 1 July 71, and continued operations in the south and west of country to conduct screening, security and rocket suppression missions. On 30 July 71, 3d Troops were moved to ORE to assume bunkerline security and relieve the 1-12 Inf. from bunkerline responsibility. Eventually, some troops were deployed around the 44th endemic area of operations. On 30 July 71, 5-5 Cav was released from ORE to the Brigade and returned to their assigned unit, 101st Abn Div (Mech). The 5-5 Cav continued the security mission of ORE.

(c) 2/75th Rangers

1. Mission: P Company, 75th Infantry (Ranger) provided long range reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and ambush patrol capability in support of operations conducted by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech).

2. Concept of operation: Six-man ranger teams are employed and from friendly forces for a period of five to seven days. Each team is composed of a patrol leader, assistant patrol leader, one radio operator, a sensor assistant observer, and twenty observers. Missions are one or a combination of the above mentioned missions. Selection of the team reconnaissance area is based on all available intelligence, examination of past operations in the area, and anticipated future Brigade operations. An area of at least two kilometers square is the recommended size for best speed and flexibility. Selection is made jointly by the 3d, 5th, and 75th Rangers (Mech) on the basis of the 3d Inf. Conc. (Mech) and operations by the 5-5 Cav during the last year. The patrol period can be extended to two and three days in each week, each with unique missions. During the first two days and three nights, the team will conduct reconnaissance operations. It will then return to its home base to rest and recover before being rescheduled for the next operation. The last day the team selects its own rest locations and lays in wait for the unexpected enemy. Once an unexpected encounter occurs, the team will advise the company command post of the pending situation. In extraction helicopter, motorcycle, or motorcycle and, if necessary, reaction force are alerted through operational channels. When contact is initiated, the designated aircraft are directed to the location to support the team and extract the team if necessary. Assault gear is prepositioned on expected enemy locations and cover the approach of the extraction ships into the EOR. For operations within the hometerritorial area, the patrol is considered to be an ambush team. In areas to the team is operating, is prepared to react to contact and sightings of enemy forces.
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3. Summary of activities:

a. During the reporting period there were 48 single team missions and six double team missions. All insertions were heliborne. Missions aborted due to weather are not included in these figures. Shown below is a chart correlating the number of missions to their duration in time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DURATION OF OPERATION</th>
<th>0-24 hrs</th>
<th>24-48 hrs</th>
<th>48-72 hrs</th>
<th>72-96 hrs</th>
<th>&gt;96 hrs</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Missions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Results of ranger operations for the period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>PN</th>
<th>INC</th>
<th>OSNC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>*13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 8 of these 13 were treated and released from the hospital. 6 of the 23 resulted from booby traps and 7 from small arms fire.

4. Redeployment: Executed standdown and redeployment during Phase V of the Brigade OPPLAN 183-70 (U) as scheduled. The company conducted combat operations until the first week in August when it began standdown.

5. Degree of Success:

(i) Operation Montana Mustang. Though not intended to be a major operation such as the preceding operation Lam Son 719, Montana Mustang proved to be a very critical operation because of the period of time in which it occurred. Operation Lam Son 719 had just been completed. The duration and magnitude of this operation had placed great demands on both men and equipment. The operation which was to follow had to be one in which the primary mission of guarding the southern boundary of the DMZ could still be accomplished and at the same time remain in a high state of combat readiness. Enemy activity began to increase rapidly around the ARVN held FSB Fuller near the end of May and early June. Eventually, the FSB was overrun on 28 Jun 71. The rice harvest during the period mid-May to late June is a yearly attraction for VC/NVA to obtain food supplies. However, there was only minor VC/NVA taxation reported in the lowlands. The NVA increased the frequency and volume of rocket and mortar attacks on FSB's along the DMZ. The
Brigade began a phased withdrawal near the end of the operation from its anchor along the DMZ and subsequent turn-over of FSB's to ARVN forces. This all stressed the need for close cooperation and coordination between US and ARVN forces. In the case of the attack on FSB Fuller and high probability of attacks on Cam Lo, Nui Hoa and Camp Carroll, counter-attack plans were written. The counter-attack plan springboard-Bronco for assisting ARVN in the defense of FSB Fuller was the only plan that was executed. To increase FSB security, improved bunker construction was initiated in order to provide greater protection from attacks by fire. Additionally, the barriers at all FSB's were upgraded to reduce the possibility of sniper attacks.

(2) Relocation:

(a) Due to the intense enemy activity in the Brigade AO during the month of June and the early part of July, it was necessary to make a careful and thorough appraisal of how best to meet the standdown schedule and at the same time provide adequate security in a period of high enemy activity; as well as continuing to provide ARVN units with heavy fire support to assist them in stabilizing their areas of responsibility. What emerged was a condition in which combat battalions literally went from active operations on fire bases on one day to a standdown and processing situation on the next with very little time for transition between the two. This was accomplished successfully.

(b) Another unique feature of the Brigade standdown was the fact that the Keystone operation was in Da Nang some 100 miles to the south. This necessitated moving some 975 wheeled and tracked vehicles by road or by road and sea from Quang Tri to Da Nang. This was accomplished without incident and with only one accident which occurred in the outskirts of Da Nang and resulted through careless driving by a Vietnamese motorcyclist.

(c) In addition to vehicles, some 7,300 weapons and 47,699 other items of equipment and supplies were turned in as part of the Keystone operation. No significant problem areas were encountered.

(d) On the personal side, over 6,000 men were out-processed either as BCRS or reassignment to either units in Vietnam. Here again, this went smoothly despite the remoteness of Quang Tri.

(e) Beyond the turn-in of accountable equipment and unit excesses in connection with the Keystone activity, every effort was made to identify and put back into authorized supply channels US Army vehicles and equipment that were abandoned over the years at Quang Tri and Dong Ha.

(2) During the reporting period efforts were focused in several areas. These efforts included Vietnamization, improvement of US/ARVN fire support.
Coordination, drug suppression, and preparing and executing standdown/redeployment. The problems associated with this Brigade's objectives were diversified, but none proved insurmountable. The outstanding leadership and dedication exhibited at all levels of command provided the impetus for the Brigade to accomplish its missions in a professional manner.

d. Intelligence:

(1) Operation Montana Mustang.

(a) Information prior to the operation: Throughout the period ending 19 August 1971, all intelligence reporting-operations, small unit contacts with occasional attacks by large forces, employment of numerous mines and boobytraps, acts of terrorism, propaganda, proselytizing, and food gathering in the villages. Numerous bunker complexes and base areas have been found throughout the area with the largest complexes being found in the IZ area and the former base area 101.

(b) The enemy is capable of attacking friendly installations in Northern Quang Tri Province with up to three infantry regiments supported by two sapper battalions and two artillery regiments; and/or attacking Quang Tri City or other areas in Southern Quang Tri Province from the north with up to four infantry battalions supported by one sapper battalion and one rocket/artillery battalion. However, the enemy probably will continue to use attacks by fire and economy of force operations continuing its present level of activity in the catlyzing areas of the Brigade TAOI and contiguous areas, allowing increased activities in the lowlands and populated areas with the objective of disrupting the GVN pacification program. The enemy could possibly launch periodic offenses of limited scope and duration. The enemy has the capability of reinforcing its units in Quang Tri Province with two to three divisions from North Vietnam either across the DMZ or by way of the lacation panhandle.

(c) Massed enemy forces remain vulnerable to detection and destruction by tactical air, ARK, B-52 strikes, and artillery. Their base camps and bunker complexes are continuously being discovered and destroyed by Allied Forces and air reconnaissance. Infiltration routes used by the enemy forces continue to be detected and interdicted by artillery, aerial bombardment, and allied ground operations. Enemy morale is vulnerable to psychological operations, especially after the unit has been in the area for an extended period of time or has suffered defeats in battle.

d) Valuable intelligence data resulting from numerous contacts, prisoners-of-war, and captured equipment and documents provided the operators with up-to-date OB intelligence factors.
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(North), Period Ending 19 Aug 71, ROC CSFOR - 65 (R3)(U)

(2) Weather: Operation Montana Mistang was conducted during the Southwest Monsoon Season. Air operations were affected by winds and thunderstorms during the late afternoon and early evening in the mountain regions. Cloud cover hampered aerial reconnaissance in this same area. Above normal rainfall in early June, and early July (Typhoon Harriet) also affected aerial operations and reconnaissance. Throughout the operation, temperatures remained near normal.

(3) Terrain:

(a) In the northeastern portion of the Brigade AO the trafficability during both wet and dry seasons is fair for foot troops, poor to fair for tracked vehicles, and unsuit for wheeled vehicles. Vegetation consists of multi-canopy dense undergrowth forest with some settled areas and rice paddies. Sandstone and shale constitute the soil, and rolling hills characterize the topography.

(b) Trafficability in the north-central portion during the wet and dry seasons is fair to good for foot troops, fair to good for tracked vehicles and poor to fair for wheeled vehicles. Vegetation consists of single canopy, light undergrowth and brushwood. The topography is predominantly flat with occasional hills. The soil consists of sandstone and basalt rock.

(c) During the wet-dry seasons, trafficability in the north-east portion of the area of operation is fair to good for foot troops, fair for tracked vehicles and poor to fair for wheeled vehicles. Rice paddies, dunegrass, and open areas comprise the flat area of sandy soil.

(d) Trafficability in the southeastern portion during the wet and dry seasons is unsuitable to poor (except along the Chiang Tri River valley where it is fair) for foot troops and tracked vehicles, and entirely unsuitable for wheeled vehicles. Vegetation consists of multi-canopy, dense undergrowth forest and brushwood with few rice paddies and open areas adjacent to the river. The area is very mountainous with broad flat areas in the valley. The soil consists of sandstone and shale.

(e) In the south-central portion, trafficability during the wet and dry seasons is unsuitable to poor south of the Chiang Tri River and fair north of the river for foot troops and tracked vehicles, and entirely unsuitable for wheeled vehicles. Vegetation consists of multi-canopy dense undergrowth forest and brushwood. Topography: north of the river consists of rolling hills while south of the river the area is mountainous. The soil consists of sandstone and shale.
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19 August 1971

SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Rech), Period Ending 19 Aug 71, ROSS CSFOR - 65 (R3)(i)

(j) During the wet and dry seasons trafficability in the northeastern portion of the area of operation is fair to good for foot troops, fair for tracked vehicles and poor for wheeled vehicles. Rice paddies, dense grass, and open areas constitute the vegetation of this flat area of sandy soil.

(4) Sniffer Missions:

(a) Sniffer missions using the XM-3 were scheduled by the Brigade S2 section daily and flown by the Brigade Chemical section, whenever conditions permitted. The XM-3, an experimental piece of equipment mounted on a helicopter, will detect human activity by a technique known as condensation nucleation. During this process the device takes constant air samples to determine the amount of carbon particles in the air. A reading is then given by deflecting meters in the instrument. Four helicopters were used in flying a sniffer mission - two UH-1's, one with the XM-3 mounted on a skid and the second carrying the navigator to mark "hot spots", and two gunships for security. An area from 15 to 32 square kilometers was flown working from the downwind side to the upwind side to avoid getting readings from the helicopter exhausts.

Limiting factors were the following:

1. For obtaining maximum results the ship should fly at an altitude of 50 feet. This limitation decreased somewhat the validity of readings when mountainous boxes were flown.

2. The weather prevented many missions from being flown. Missions could not be flown in winds over 15 knots, nor when there was precipitation.

3. Valid readings could not be obtained in areas where there had been artillery or air strikes within 6-12 hours prior to the mission.

(b) Within the brigade, artillery was normally employed on the hot spots. This was not always satisfactory or even desirable since the hot spot means only that there is activity somewhere upwind from the point of detection. By analyzing the data, an area of probability can usually be determined. This area is generally large enough to preclude any accuracy with artillery weapons.

1. Combat Support:

1. Artillery:

(a) The 5th Battalion, 5th Artillery provided support artillery to the Brigade. During the operation the battalion operated in a split
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Battery configuration at all times, except for 7 days. This was necessitated by the Brigade's extensive operations west of Nai Loc, Southern AO White, and the commitment for defense of Quang Tri Combat Base and Xong Ho Combat Base.

(b) The following units were in General Support Reinforcing of the 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery:

1. 3th BN, 4th Arty (175mm/8"

2. 4th BN, 39th Arty (155mm/5"

This unit, though actually in General Support to 1st (ARVN) Div, provided additional heavy artillery support to the Brigade.

(c) Missions and Rounds Expended (Montana Mustang):

1. Missions HE WP FLL FW TOTAL

10,356 58,983 2,552 1,657 836 63,428

2. Expenditure of Ammunition by missions:

a. Contact and Illumination 3,293

b. Enemy Location 36,017

c. Active Rockets/Mortars 8,038

d. Defensive Fires, Marking Bds. 1,815

e. ARVN Support 2,429

f. Recon by Fire/Preps 7,514

g. Other (FO School, Registrations, etc.) 1,317

h. Total Rounds 63,428

(2) Aviation

(a) US Army Aviation:

1. The Brigade Aviation section provided for the scheduling and control of all aviation assets assigned, attached, and OPCON to the Brigade. 3/5 Cav conducted aerial and ground reconnaissance and surveillance missions in the Brigade Recon Zone.

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2. The Brigade Aviation section and D/3-5 Air Cav provided the following average daily support:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-58A</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVG daily</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Additional aviation support was received on a regular basis from the 158th Avn Bn and 101st Abn Div (Abl). Five (5) UH-1H and two (2) AH-1G helicopters were provided to the Brigade daily. The average daily support was 20 and 0.5 hours respectively.

4. In late June the Brigade Avn section acquired a "Firefly" illumination system for use in the vicinity of the ASP and petroleum farms. This system was used during periods of low lunar illumination. Its primary effect was as a deterrent. Following are several problem areas which were encountered while using the "Firefly" around the perimeter and in the vicinity of the ASP:

(a) Difficulty in spotting targets without marking by M-79 or other means.

(b) Low degree of effectiveness in high grass and wooded areas.

(c) Regular use of the light upset the scout dogs operating in the ASP.

5. TAC Air:

6. TAC Air support was provided by the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron.

7. Total Missions: 219

8. Sorties: 450

9. Ordnance Expenditures: 823 tons

10. Engineers:

(a) Montana Murdock: During the operation the 3rd Engr was responsible for the overall planning of engineer projects and assisted the 3rd DCS in coordinating the installation activities at ESG. A/7 Engineers in direct support of the Brigade provided engineer support to the units within the Brigade as required. 14th Engt Bn (Cbt) in general support provided combat engineer support to tactical units within the
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Brigade AO. Following are special points of interest and projects conducted by the 308 Engr, A/7 Engr and 111th Engr Bn (Cbt):

1. Construction material allocation: The Brigade Engineer processed requests from brigade units for construction materials. This included requests for BMP screen lengths of chain link fence, cut by A/7 Engr for the purpose of RG5 stand-off.

2. Water Purification: Three water points were in operation during Montana Mustang Operation. The first, between FSB C-2 and A-1, produced an average of 35,000 gallons per week in support of TF 1-6, until 8 July. The second, at Camp Roberts, produced an average of 60,000 gallons per week, in support of units at QSH and DEB until 5 June when it ceased operation due to mechanical failure. The third, at Camp Lo, produced an average of 150,000 gallons per week in support of TF 1-77 at Mai Loc until 2 June when the equipment was shut down (The GP for TF 1-77 returned to QSH at the end of June).

3. Minesweeps:

(a) The following minesweeps were conducted on a daily basis:

- C-2 to A-1 11 Apr - 8 Jul
- C-1 to C-2 11 Apr - 8 Jun

(b) The following minesweeps were conducted as required:

- C-1 to Wunder Beach
- L-3: Sharon to FSB Anna
- C-32B to FSB Scorpion
- C-1 to FSB Pedro

(c) In addition, a minesweep team from A/7 Engr was maintained on alert for employment with the Brigade’s ready reaction force (Gold Eagle/Sparrow Hawk). Numerous and assorted minesweeps in addition to the above were performed throughout the AO during the entire operation.

4. RAF Employment in Support of TF 3-5 Cav: On 25 May 71, a platoon of A/7 Engr moved in convoy to XD 278 3/63 on the Thach Han River where they constructed a 6 - Pilot reinforced raft. The raft was open until 26 June for crossing of N13 and K551 vehicles.

5. Road construction in AO White: During the operation there was upgrading of roads for wheeled vehicle traffic and construction of tank tracks. In the FSB Sharon, FSB Anna and FSB Barbara area, most...
of the projects were accomplished as a joint effort with a platoon of Army engineers.

5. Upgrade Passive Fortifications, FSB A-4 and FSB C-2:
On 21 May 71, a personnel bunker at FSB C-2 received a direct hit from a 1.15-inch rocket with a delayed fuse, resulting in multiple casualties. As a result, on 22 May 71, two rounds from A/7 Engr began an effort to upgrade all bunkers at FSB C-2 and FSB A-4 in the following priority: T00/FLD bunkers, medical bunkers, and personnel bunkers. An inspection of all bunkers at A-4 and C-2 was made by the Bde Engr. As a result, only one bunker was condemned outright, the majority of the remaining bunkers were considered to have correctable deficiencies. The upgrade effort was concentrated in these areas:

- Structural Improvements: Scabbing and diagonal bonding were placed in those bunkers which lacked them.
- Layout: To further lengthen depth of penetration and to encourage early detonation a layer of TSP or concrete was placed over those roofs which required them.
- In late May and early June, A/7 Engr began to receive assistance in and above the 14th Engr Co (Chef) of the 14th Engr Group. In addition, the 14th Engr Co produced a design for a bunker roof, and replaced five roofs at FSB C-2 which did not meet the standards of design.

6. Training: Mine detector classes were conducted by A/7 Engr for units in the brigade during the reporting period. A total of 127 individuals received training as a result. The course of instruction included instruction on the M19-653 Metal, and the FRS-7 Metallic and Non-metallic mine detector. There was a practical exercise on the use of the mine detectors which included detector maintenance, probing procedures, and conduct of a mine search in the absence of engineer support.

4. Redeployment: The Brigade Engr was responsible for the preparation and supervision of facility clearance procedures, combat base fire support base turnover procedures, and provided guidance to units concerning Engineer support during redeployment.
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f. Signal: During the reporting period the 12th Signal Group provided area communications at QTCS and NHUB; operated and maintained a radio teletype terminal in XXIV Corps radio teletype net in support of 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) HQ; and provided maintenance for the narrowband subscriber terminal. Throughout the period the 298th Signal Company continued installation, operation, and maintenance of the Brigade communications system in support of tactical operations.

g. Civic Affairs:

(1) From the beginning of the reporting period until the completion of redeployment the CQ, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) continued to execute his responsibilities as civic affairs area coordinator for Quang Tri Province.

(2) Montana Mustang:

(a) Civic Action:

1. On 25 May 1971, the pumping complex at the Cam Lo Irrigation Project Cam Lo (D), Quang Tri (F), was the site of an anti VC rally and demonstration. The rally, which was attended by approximately 3,500 people, was to protest the destruction of the pumping facilities by a sapper attack on 20 May 1971, which resulted not only in the destruction of the pump but also the death of 9 RF soldiers. 18 RF and 2 US soldiers were wounded. The rally was requested, initiated, and organized by the people of five villages in the area which were affected by the loss of water for their crops. At 0900 the day of the rally, each individual village delegation marched to the rally site carrying their respective village banner. During the proceedings, which lasted about 1 1/2 hours, village chiefs and officials made speeches denouncing the actions of the VC. A three part proposal was made and will be signed by the people as a petition. The proposals were:

a. An increased program to censor VC activity in the area.

b. A request to the government to take stronger measures against the VC.

c. A promise by all of the people to support the government against the VC.

Because of the significance of the event, Brigade PIO and VIB publicized the event through their respective channels. The destruction of the pump created such a psychological and economic impact that immediate support was needed to get the irrigation project functional as soon as possible. 2,575 $ VN from the CA/Paywar fund was contributed to cover the cost of laborers and brick layers. Brigade Payops exploited the conditions with
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ground broadcast and Volunteer Information Program (VIP) missions in the area. As a direct result of the efforts of a mechanic from 63rd Maintenance Battalion, the pump was partially operational 26 May. The pump is now fully operational.

2. The 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery assisted the people of Trieu Phong District in improving their irrigation system which involves approximately 2500 acres of land. The Battalion 8-5 provided and transported powder canisters to the area. These canisters are used to make culvert and irrigation pipe. A welder from the Battalion was employed to secure the engine to its mount. With the completion of the new system, the people of Trieu Phong should realize more yield from their crops and will have a community project in which they can take pride.

3. In the District of Gio Linh, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cav has supported the development of refugee resettlement areas. The people who were moved to this area initially had only destroyed homes or ruins in which to live. The Battalion S-5 and the District Senior Advisor (DIA), Gio Linh District, coordinated to provide materials not available through Province channels. By their assistance over 100 homes have been completed and 6 wells were recently completed. As more salvageable material became available it was used for the continued improvement of the resettlement area.

4. The Brigade has supported the construction of a VIS reading room in Quang Tri City. The project was completed with the addition of a PSP stairway and barbed wire protective fence donated by the Brigade. The reading room is a place in which the local civilians may obtain the latest provincial and national news. It also provides another means by which the Province Chief may contact the citizens of the Province.

5. After the return of the Brigade from Lam Son 719, The Medcap program was reinstated. Each Battalion Surgeon began to conduct Medcaps in the District for which he is responsible. In all cases, the Battalion Surgeon is instructed that the Medcap must be conducted with the District medical personnel and that the Vietnamese must perform most of the medical service. The US doctor tries to place himself in an advisory role assisting only when a diagnosis is incorrect or his assistance is requested due to lack of knowledge.

6. The 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry (Mech), S-5 has supported two major projects in Cam Lo, the creation of a memorial park in honor of the soldiers from Cam Lo who died during the war and the construction of a soccer field. The memorial park, known as Yellowstone Park, was partially completed by the Marines prior to leaving the AO. The project was completed using salvage timber donated by 1-61 Infantry. The
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pavement consists of a playground in conjunction with the memorial. Tracks from 1-61 handed fill to level off an area which will be used as a soccer field by the school of Cam Lo. With the development of soccer field and soccer teams, it is hoped that greater unity will develop in the District. Both of these projects should contribute significantly to the morale of the District.

7. Under the Sanitary Hamlet Program, efforts were made to improve the sanitary conditions of Tri Bru Hamlet in Mai Line District. In order to assist this program, the S-5, 1-77 Armor, supplied some boxes. The lumber from these boxes was used to construct small latrines. The people in the Hamlet received regular instruction in personal hygiene from both the District medical personnel and the Battalion Surgeon. Through this program the disease incident rate should go down. In that Tri Bru adjoins Quang Tri City, it is hoped that some of the improvements made in the Hamlet will carry over into the city.

8. The A/7th Engineers provided a great deal of assistance to an orphanage located in Tri Bru Hamlet near Quang Tri City. Formerly, there was a large swamp located in the rear of the orphanage which bred a great deal of mosquitoes and spread disease throughout the Hamlet. The engineers hauled truckloads of fill to the site and completely filled the swamp. They also provided enough fill to create a base for another building which will be a much needed extension for the orphanage. The engineers have also provided clothes for the children and invited them into their mess hall for a meal on a weekly basis. The children were invited to go with the company to the Brigade's recreation area at Wunder Beach during the last week in April. The Brigade Surgeon held a Medcap at the Orphanage on the engineers request. The conditions at the orphanage have been greatly improved through the efforts of the company.

9. During this reporting period the Brigade S-5 was contacted by the FRA in regards to the Buddhist Day Care Center located on the outskirts of Mai Line District. The Center is operated by Yeasible True the Buddhist leader of Quang Tri Province. The Center will be used to house orphans and to educate the children in the surrounding areas. Since over 97% of the province is Buddhist and the Center is needed in the Hamlet in which it is located, the Province Chief expressed a great deal of interest in the project. Upon the recommendation of the Brigade, S-5, the S-5 1st BN, 77th Armor decided to assume the Day Care Center as a Civic Action project. The BN S-5 supplied both excess cement and salvaged lumber to construct the Center. After a year in which the project had made no progress, these materials allowed construction to begin again.

(b) Payaps:

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1. In May the Psyops team placed emphasis on VIP (Volunteer Information Program) missions. Utilizing the IE (Audio-Visual) team from Detachment #2, 7th Psyops Battalion, the program was well publicized in the Huế District. After the publicity the IE (Audio) team and EOD personnel conducted separate missions at the request of DDA's and ANA S-5's. During the latter half of May, 6 VIP missions were conducted with the team paying a total of 22,375 $ VN for 53 pieces of ordnance. Detachment #1, 7th Psyops Battalion conducted a total of 22,5 hours of broadcast time and 2,5 hours of movie missions. Approximately 4,000 leaflets were distributed during the month.

2. During June the primary activity of the Psyops team was concentrated on VIP missions to the Cao Lãnh District since they proved to be the most productive towards the end of May. A total of 36,775 $ VN was paid out for a total of 293 pieces of ordnance. Detachment #2 also conducted 12 missions for a total of 160 hours of broadcast over half were directed to publicizing and exploiting the VIP missions.

3. During the concluding week of June and the remainder of the reporting period the Brigade Psyops section caused activity due to the need to phase out and turn over to ARVN and MACV sources the Psyops missions because of Keystone requirements. C-5 1st ARVN Division officials took over all Psyops requirements in support of tactical operations in Quang Tri Province on 15 July 1971.

4) Redeployment: The goal of the Brigade S-5 during redeployment was to secure completion of the transfer of all Civic Action projects to the local government with as little adverse impact as possible. Coordination was made to insure the continuation of psychological operations in support of units operating in Quang Tri Province. Upon notification of redeployment the Brigade S-5 made a review of Brigade sponsored projects to ensure that all were completed. Those that could use additional support were given that priority of available materials. Coordination was made with MACV Task Force 19 Advisors to insure a continuation of the support for the Civic Action Program in this area. Psychological operations concerning the redeployment of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) were conducted by Province S-5's with guidance by Brigade S-5 and support from the Vietnamese Information Service.

(c) Civic Action:

1. During the months prior to redeployment the Civic Action program of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) kept a low profile with the intention of completing all projects sponsored by unit S-5's of the Brigade. In accordance with the Combined Campaign Plan for 1971, no new projects were initiated which could not be completed in a relatively short time.
short period of time. All assistance provided was in support of Province
projects or Brigade projects which could use continued support. Because
of this type of operation all projects were completed prior to redeployment.
When subordinate units of the Brigade relinquished their areas of operation,
the support and control of these projects was officially turned over to
District, Province, and MACV officials.

2. As individual units within the Brigade began standdown,
many salvage materials and supplies became available to the Brigade S-5.
After a coordination meeting with the Province S-5 and MACV S-5 Advisor,
the decision was made to route all requests for materials through the
Province Chief for control. All individuals and organizations requesting
materials were referred to the Province Chief who either approved or dis-
approved the letter of request. Approved requests were authorized whenever
possible. Each group receiving materials or dismantling vacant
buildings were required to be accompanied by at least one US personnel to
insure base security.

(b) Psychological Operations:

1. In Quang Tri Province psychological operations have
traditionally been conducted by the Province S-5 in the populated areas
and by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Nha-Ch) in the tactical areas.
For this reason Payops and information concerning the redeployment of the
Brigade was disseminated through Province channels.

2. Prior to redeployment, one HE (audio visual) team
from Detachment #2, 7th Payop Battalion was attached to MACV Team #19 for
utilization by the Province S-5 and Advisor. This team worked a Province
wide schedule prepared by the Province S-5. During redeployment of the
Brigade, the HE team continued to work on their regular schedule. Working
with the support of the Vietnamese Information Service and the Province
S-5, the main themes used were GVN strength and the capabilities of the
GVN armed forces.

(c) Kit Carson Scouts:

1. When official notification of redeployment was re-
ceived, all recruiting of Kit Carson Scouts ceased and assignments of re-
scent Scout graduates to the units of the Brigade were discontinued. Those
at the Center, at that time, were detained for security of the Center
until the closing of the facility.

2. As each unit in the Brigade entered standdown, the
Kit Carson Scouts assigned to that unit were transferred to the Kit Carson
Scout Center. The S-5, XXIV Corps, was notified of the number of Scouts

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The Brigade would have and when they would be available for reemployment with other units. The 5th Infantry Division (Airmobile) agreed to recruit twenty Scouts. Of the Scouts interviewed only 15 were employed by the 101st Division. The remainder of the Scouts were terminated and paid severance pay where applicable.

The following is the final disposition of the Scouts employed by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Rear):

Recruited and employed by the 101st Infantry Division (Airmobile). 19

Brrg. Montagnards returned to Brrg. resettlement areas to join Province Recon Units and PzDF Units. 15

Local VC turned over to Chien Ho Center, Quang Tri City. 24

NVA turned over to National Chieu "od Center, Saigon. 5

Deployed by MACV Team #19. 4

Deployed by A Company 1/12 Cav. 6

Deployed by 3/5 Cav. 9

Scouts found to have illegal draft status and turned over to Vietnamese Military Police. 6

TOTAL 88

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

2. Personnel:

(1) Effective Operating Strength:

(a) Observations: NCOE 7-157G does not meet personnel requirements so initial operational requirements.

(b) Evaluation: Ideal operating strength for a Ranger Company assigned to a separate brigade is greater than the 50 enlisted men.
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Authorised. In order to maintain eight combat ready teams and continue to fulfill administrative requirements at least 72 men are needed. This allows men to be trained and ready to fill vacancies, on operational teams, which are caused by casualties and administrative absences.

(c) Recommendation: That Ranger Companies (HIEE 7-1570) which are assigned to separate brigade be authorised personnel to meet the administrative and operational requirement. Also, recommend that the brigade headquarters be authorised to augment the Ranger Company's strength to meet the operational needs while HIEE changes (personal) are pending.

(2) Casualty Reporting:

(a) Observation: On 21 May 71 a bunker at 0-2 containing 59 people was collapsed by a 122mm rocket, causing many casualties. One of the problem areas which resulted was accounting for and reporting casualties.

(b) Evaluation: Upon report of the mass casualties to Brigade EQ, 15th Surgical Hospital and USARI were notified. Dust-off choppers were immediately deployed and began evacuating the casualties as they were taken from the collapsed bunker. The wounded and dead were immediately evacuated to 13th Red Cross. This continued throughout the night until all casualties had been evacuated. USARV, upon notification of mass casualties, gave the brigade one telephone number to use to call in the casualty report. This line was kept open for calls from the brigade concerning the casualties.

(c) Recommendations: That a dedicated telephone line continue to be used for reporting to USARV when mass casualties occur.

(3) Drug Amnesty Program:

(a) Observation: A small drug problem was noted within a separate company assigned to the brigade by the officers and NCO's in the unit. Of the core of action considered, the method attempting to solve the problem was that of a Half-Way-House with constant supervision.

(b) Evaluation: The Half-Way-House was set up in an area apart from the normal company area. One NCO was in contact with the patients throughout the day. He lived in separate quarters adjacent to the Half-Way-House. Officers in the company were required by the company commander to visit the individuals from their platoons at least once a day and upon request of the individuals to listen and discuss with them their problems and grievances. The company medic visited and checked the men twice a day. In addition, a doctor from the area dispensary and the chaplain visited once a day to talk with the men. The commander and first sergeant also monitored the program.
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(c) Recommendations: The results of the program were somewhat encouraging; several individuals did "Kick the habit" and their actions and reception upon returning to duty did offer some encouragement to those still with the problem. Further development of the above program especially in the area of professional counseling is needed to enhance the success of this approach.

(4) Drug and Narcotic Suppression:

(a) Observation: Due to the drug problem a comprehensive three (3) phase Drug and Narcotic Suppression program was initiated at Brigade headquarters.

(b) Evaluation: The program approached the problem from three areas; education, enforcement and suppression.

1. Education: Seminars were held with elements of the command. Panel members were from the Surgeon's Office, Staff Judge Advocate and the Brigade Provost Marshal. During these seminars, the Brigade program was explained and the units encouraged to utilize the service available to them. Unit commanders were encouraged to seek help from the Military Police in conducting shake down inspections etc., additionally, the highlights of the enforcement effort were expanded on by the Provost Marshal.

2. Enforcement: Outstanding support was established between the Provost Marshal and the local Vietnamese law enforcement officials. A program of Drug and Narcotic Suppression raids by coordinated elements of the ARVN Quan Cs, Vietnamese National Police, Vietnamese Military Security Service personnel and American Military Police was initiated, in addition to almost daily combined check points on QL-1 and QL-9. The impact of the results of this operation was highlighted by the fact that for the month of June, the Quang Tri area confiscated more narcotics, drugs and marijuana than any other Province in Vietnam.

3. Suppression: Working to complement the other two phases of the program, the suppression activities allowed the Provost Marshal to apply pressure directly to the troops in their unit areas. Teams of MP's and trained dogs were dispatched on a regular basis to search and shake down unit areas. This had great impact on the troops and alleviated the pressure that might have been felt by the unit commander had he conducted the operation himself. This phase accounted for numerous confiscations of drugs, narcotics, marijuana, illegal weapons and ammunition. Additionally it developed a feeling of implied enforcement in the minds of the troops.
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4) Recommendations: That drug suppression programs which are developed - curb the drug problem in Vietnam include and educational phase as well as to soliciting assistance from the local police officials to confiscate drugs before they reach military installations.

5) Shortage of Enlisted Personnel and Subsequent reaction of Junior NCO's.

(a) Observations: Replacements in the ranks of E1 thru E5 were insufficient to meet unit requirements of A/F Engs. A great deal of the actual day to day physical work load had to be picked up by junior NCO's in order to accomplish unit missions resulting in a deterioration of morale among the junior NCO's. A great many felt that they were "E5-E6 privates".

(b) Evaluation: Counseling of the junior NCO's was undertaken to attempt to find solution to the problem as well as insuring mission completion. More emphasis was placed on officer support of junior NCO's. E5's were sent to the Red Devil NCO course. More responsibility and authority was passed down to the junior NCO. One problem that could not be solved was that of shortage of replacements in the lower enlisted grades.

(c) Recommendations: Counseling sessions between unit commanders and junior NCO's should be held frequently to air problems and share successes. A junior system of insuring higher unit strength in the lower enlisted grades is necessary.

6) Problem Personnel (Redeployment):

(a) Observations: Elimination of major problem personnel and as many drug users as possible at the beginning of standdown was undertaken to insure that problems encountered with standdown would be the problem that the standdown itself brought, not problems from within the units.

(b) Evaluation: Unit morale rose because of the lack of irritants within the unit. The personnel of the unit that were present during the standdown process were those that had a history of contributing to the unit effort. Disciplinary problems were at a minimum and the NCO's were more effectively able to work with the personnel. Personnel that normally reduced (by their problems) the NCO's time actually spent with the total unit were no longer present.

(c) Recommendations: Careful study should be made of personnel posture before standdown to insure that "problem" individuals are
eliminated as quickly as possible during stand down.

(7) Approved Extensions (Redeployment):

(a) Observations: Some of the personnel who had an approved extension for assignment received orders to another unit during redeployment.

(b) Evaluation: Some of the personnel who fell into this category were required to report to the assignment other than the one they extended for because of the difficulty in verifying personnel assignments. Correcting this problem was time consuming as well as creating a morale problem with the individuals concerned.

(c) Recommendation: Ensure that all information concerning the approval of any assignments based on a foreign service extension in Viet Nam be annotated on the roster to USARV for redeploying units.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Use of Claymore Booby Trap:

(a) Observation: During the reporting period the GMA continued to show its effectiveness when used properly. It was noted however, that knowledge of the GMA was beginning to receive increased attention by the enemy. He devised ways to avoid or reverse the weapon's effectiveness on friendly troops.

(b) Evaluation: After locating the power source the power flow was neutralised and the claymores were turned around towards the route of approach utilised by friendly units. Another way the enemy neutralised the GMA was to remove the blasting caps from the claymores which would allow them safe passage. In almost all cases it was apparent that the GMA were not found by accident but that the enemy observed friendly elements moving to GMA sites, explaining them and moving out of the area.

(c) Recommendation: That during the emplacement of the GMA that no set patterns be established to include routes to and from the emplacement sites and times for the deployment and pickup of the GMA's. That planning and evaluation of the area be made prior to selection of ambush sites. Trip flares be emplaced around and under claymores and batteries. PSID's should be located around the GMA site to alert the friendly unit if there is any movement near the GMA which could be an indication that someone has tampered with the GMA.
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(2) Radar Set AN/PPS-5:

(a) Observation: The AN/PPS-5 radar set was used extensively throughout this reporting period with very good results. When used and maintained properly it continued to function with minimum down time, however, it was noted that when the PPS-5 was used in inclement weather maintenance and the downtime rate went up.

(b) Evaluation: On several occasions PPS-5 radar sets were operated in high winds (20-35 knots) resulting in the gears on two sets being stripped. One unit sent its PPS-5 radar sets to the field regardless of weather. They later discovered that the radar set would not detect any usable targets in the rain, and such employment reduced the chance of having an operational set for the following night.

(c) Recommendation: That unit commanders closely evaluate the tactical need for operating the AN/PPS-5 radar set during inclement weather (rain and high winds, 20-30 knots) to preclude the radar set from being unnecessarily damaged and rendering this sensitive equipment unserviceable for further operations.

(3) Exchange of Intelligence information within units:

(a) Observation: The timely collection and dissemination of important intelligence information can be significantly improved.

(b) Evaluation: During the early part of the reporting period it was found that the exchange of intelligence data between the 5-2 section and Troop commanders themselves could be improved. This was accomplished by making more extensive use of the secure radio capability in the troop commander's M113A1 and "y units being relieved 'in place" whenever possible, thus allowing face-to-face exchange of intelligence information by troop commanders and subordinate leaders.

(c) Recommendation: That commands equipped with secure radio capability insure that it is utilized extensively, both for operations and intelligence and, whenever possible, relieve units in their field locations with other units to allow commanders to discuss intelligence information directly with each other.

(4) Interrogation Prisoner of War (IPW) - Liaison Contact Team:

(a) Observation: Intelligence and counterintelligence activities were not carried to maximum effectiveness due to:

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1. An incomplete utilisation, evaluation, and exploitation of all available Allied sources of information.

2. A lack of timely dissemination and exchange of information between Allied elements.

(b) Evaluation: Continued collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence and counterintelligence information obtained by various allied agencies was not made available to units in the field who required such information for immediate tactical exploitation.

(c) Command Action: The IPW Section, 517th MIB was tasked with maintaining a Contact Liaison Team which was composed of one Warrant Officer and one Interrogator/analyst accompanied by an ARVN interpreter. The Contact Liaison Team made direct, daily contact with the 02/82 and Senior Advisor to all ARVN, ARVN Marine, and Sector Headquarters in the Area of Operation and with the 02/82 of elements in adjacent Areas of Operation. This resulted in a daily exchange of information of suspected enemy locations, enemy activity, possible unit identification, and other information otherwise not reported through US Intelligence channels at section level. Also, through increased liaison, IPW was able to exploit Rolliers and Prisoners of War who were under ARVN jurisdiction, this being possible through combined interrogation.

(d) Recommendation: That Contact Liaison Teams be established and maintained to provide for the timely free exchange of information among allied elements.

(5) Debriefing of Aerial Observers - Pilot and Crew personnel:

(a) Observation: Although pilots submitted spot reports from their daily missions, certain aspects of their reports could be expanded.

(b) Evaluation: More detail as to description of items, roads (trafficability) and reports of negative activity in the Area of Operation would provide for better information as to intelligence on enemy movement and activity.

(c) Command Action: A Debriefing Team was provided at a central location which was convenient to the pilots and crew to de-brief aerial elements assigned/attached to the Brigade. Following flights, the Debriefing Team would de-brief the pilots and their crews in order to gain additional information which had previously been unreported. This Team was available throughout the day until all aerial reconnaissance had been completed.
(c) Recommendation: That Debriefing Teams be utilized to obtain previously unreported information such as negative activity and detailed information on other type serial reconnaissance reports. The team itself must be aware of the current tactical situation and must be familiar with the area of operation and the requirements of the 62/82. Use of the Debriefing Team will result in maximum information being obtained.

c. Operations:

(1) Employment of AH-1G Cobra Prep with Flechettes.

(a) Observation: The ability of the scout aircraft in a hunter-killer team to recon an area of known heavy enemy activity has been impaired due to the LOH usually receiving enemy fire as it initially begins its low-level reconnaissance.

(b) Evaluation: The employment of a gunship prep with flechettes, of the recon area, will usually neutralize the area.

(c) Recommendation: That this tactic be employed by commands concerned when using LOH's in low-level reconnaissance of areas of known heavy enemy activity.

(2) Obtaining Early Clearance to Conduct Visual Reconnaissance.

(a) Observation: Much "blade time" is lost in obtaining clearance from maneuver battalions to conduct visual reconnaissance within their areas of operation if the clearance request is transmitted after aircraft are airborne and en route to the area.

(b) Evaluation: These hours will not be wasted if clearance is requested prior to aircraft lift-off.

(c) Recommendation: That commands concerned have air mission commanders or operations personnel request desired clearance from the AO controlling unit prior to aircraft lift-off.

(3) Employment of Artillery by Hunter-Killer Teams in areas of known heavy enemy activity.

(a) Observation: Often artillery has been required in support of a downed helicopter or to engage a target of opportunity observed by helicopter crews and critical time is lost while the guns are layed to fire.
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(b) Evaluation: Effective communication with supporting artillery prior to entering an area of known heavy enemy activity provides the artillerymen the opportunity to lay their guns in the direction from which to furnish the hunter-killer team rapid supporting fire.

(c) Recommendation: That the commands concerned have air mission commanders request this action from Artillery units when they are to work in areas as described above.

(4) Elimination of Employment of the M551 Sheridan as Lead Vehicle in a Column Formation.

(a) Observation: There have been many instances, not only in this unit, but elsewhere in RVN of Sheridans being completely destroyed by fire after detonating a mine.

(b) Evaluation: The occurrence of such incidents decreased considerably when Sheridans were no longer allowed to be the lead vehicle in column formations. This reduced the number of personnel suffering from severe burns after a mine incident and also reduced the deadline ratio of the Sheridans. This was significant as no replacement Sheridans have been received for the past months.

(c) Recommendation: That Squads or separate troops equipped with the Sheridan vehicle employ this tactic.


(a) Observation: The training of mine detector operators by Engineers and the utilization of these personnel with the mine detectors much more frequently than has been done in the past has resulted in an appreciable decrease in the detonation of anti-tank mines.

(b) Evaluation: Mine detectors were not employed as often in the past as was desirable due to a lack of trained operators. Engineer elements provided training to two or three men from each platoon. In the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry detectors were centrally located at the Sqdn Communications ship and issued on the basis of one per platoon with priority to the element operating in the area with a history of extensive mining. This not only resulted in less mine detonations but also enabled inoperable mine detectors to be repaired much more rapidly than when they were kept at Troop level.
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(c) Recommendation: That commanders consider the applicability of this technique to their areas and methods of operation.

(e) KIA's/WIA's on or near trails:

(a) Observation: The F/39th Infgr Company observed in the period 16 Nov 70 to 23 Jul 71, that all friendly KIA and all but a few friendly WIA in their company occurred on or near trails. During the same period, almost all enemy sightings, signs of enemy activity, and enemy casualties occurred on or near trails.

(b) Evaluation: Both friendly and enemy elements frequently use trails and accordingly they are the scene of most contacts. The element that is stationary generally initiates contact upon the element moving on the trail and in general, the victor.

(c) Recommendations: That unit leaders avoid moving from one place to another on or near trails when tactically feasible.

(7) Compromise of cryptographic material and SCI's.

(a) Observation: Fire bases and/or isolated sites which are overrun by the enemy usually involve compromise of cryptographic material and SCI's.

(b) Evaluation: One incident which happened recently exemplifies the compromise of crypto equipment and SCI's. Throughout the entire day on 1 Jun 1971, Hill 950, FM Radio Relay Site "Hickory" received mortar attacks coupled with a ground attack. The signal bunker was abandoned when it collapsed from a direct hit; cryptographic material and equipment was left in the bunker. The hill was subsequently overrun and never recovered. Personnel meaning the equipment were evacuated but the amount of ground fire precluded their return to the bunker to either destroy or recover the equipment.

(c) Recommendation: Field commanders and operating personnel should be thoroughly indoctrinated in emergency destruction procedures in the event it is inevitable that a site is going to be overrun. The crypto equipment and crypto related items not absolutely necessary for the current mission should be destroyed to preclude their use by the enemy.

(d) Destruction of 5777 Fuse in heavy rain:

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(a) Observation: In heavy rainstorms, 155mm HE projectile M107 armed with Point Detonating Fuzes M577 will prematurely detonate.

(b) Evaluation: Premature bursts occurred during extremely heavy rainstorms with the M577 fuse set on Super Quick action. It was determined that the rounds exploded past the limits of "Bore Safe" (200 meters). The powder charge used was 7 White, and with the resulting high velocity the M577 fuse detonated in the rain.

(c) Recommendations: A Point Detonating Fuzes M577 not be fired with charge 7 White over any friendly elements during heavy rain.

(9) Enemy Rocket and Mortar Attacks:

(a) Observation: Enemy rocket and mortar attacks on fixed fire support bases have originated from multiple sites.

(b) Evaluation: Coordinated use of all available artillery and naval gunfire, along with aerial observer adjustments proved to be effective against indirect fire attacks. The enemy's capability to mount sustained attacks was greatly reduced. The best target acquisition means proved to be: air observers, followed by ground observers, IDS, and radar. After a few mortar and rocket attacks, it was noted that surveillance was so successful that accurate targets were located within two minutes. The multiple targets were effectively engaged employing all elements within range through the direct control of the Battalion FDC.

(c) Recommendations: Coordinated use of artillery with air observers, IDS, and radar be used to combat indirect fire attacks on fire support bases.

(10) Illuminating Projectile, M685E2, canister impact:

(a) Observation: When firing the Illuminating Projectile, M685E2, the illuminating canister impacts below the point illuminated.

(b) Evaluation: When the M685E2 Illuminating Projectile functions, a drag parachute and illuminating canister (weighing approximately 5 pounds) is expelled. After 8 seconds, a delay element burns through and another parachute and the burning illuminate container are ejected from the illuminating canister. The illuminating canister then descends to the ground.

(c) Recommendations: Units which request self illumination be informed of the danger of the illuminating canister of the M685E2
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Illuminating Projectiles and consider placing illumination rounds in the air not directly over their position.

(11) Minesweeps

(a) Observations: Daily minesweeps were held in two locations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-2 to A-4</td>
<td>11 April to 6 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gom Lo to CZ</td>
<td>11 April to 6 July</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following minesweeps were conducted as required:

- QL-1 to Wunder Beach
- LZ Sharon to FSB Anne
- QTCB to FSB Scorpion
- QTCB to FSB Pedro

A minesweep team from A/7 Engr was maintained on alert for employment with the brigade ready reaction force (Raid Eagle/Sparrow Hawk).

(b) Evaluations: Negative findings were reported on the two daily minesweeps as were the reports on the Wunder Beach sweep. The sweep to FSB Anne, FSB Scorpion, and FSB Pedro yielded numerous mines. Return sweeps on the same day often yielded additional mines that had been implanted after the sweep teams had gone through. All mines found were pressure detonated devices. Most mines were planted in one or the other track rut and were generally found visually due to ground surface disturbance. Area that these three roads passed through has long been a known area of strong Viet Cong sympathies. All mines found were of an assorted variety; i.e., made up of US or NVA assorted ordnance such as 81mm and 82mm mortar rounds, 152mm projectiles and 155mm and 105mm shells. Country was generally rolling terrain with a large number of draws and stream beds.

(c) Recommendations: Cav security should station themselves in outpost fashion along the roads during the sweep if return over the same road is to be effected the same day. Proper placement of security vehicles along the route insured visibility of most of the road. Two-way traffic could then proceed at a rapid rate with blind draws needing to be swept.

(12) Operations in support of TF 1-77 at Mai Loc from 11 April to 22 May 1971

(a) Observations: Work by A/7 Engr included construction of gun pits for supporting artillery units, construction of fighting positions and extensive fortification work, construction of a tower for use by a supporting radar unit.
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(b) Evaluation: ARVN troops deployed at Nai Loc during
Lea Son 719 had left the area unserviceable to US redeployment. Extensive
clean-up work was necessary before significant work could be done to up-
grade the area.

(c) Recommendations: Using units (ARVN & US) should conduct
a more extensive police of an area before leaving. A great deal of effort
was lost in simply cleaning up after the previous tenant.

(13) Raft Employment in support of TF 3-5 Car

(a) Observation: Bridge platoon of A/7 Engr moved to YD
27C 471 on the Thach Hau River on 25 May and established an NDP site for
the purpose of constructing a 6 - Float reinforced raft.

(b) Evaluation: Construction was begun on a 6 - Float
reinforced raft. Traffic was begun on 26 May and continued through 13
June. Capacity of the raft was three M113 or M551's. Four kilometers
of tank trail were constructed to provide access to the site from the
major road networks on either bank of the river. Raft and erection
boats were checked daily before use for sabotage. A mine boom was con-
structed 150 meters upstream of the site of 1 inch steel cable and excess
aluminum bulk to catch river debris washing down into the site. Engineers
conducted their own daily reconnaissance patrols. Several bunker complexes
and indirect artillery rounds were discovered and destroyed. On two occasions
vehicles recovery operations were also required using engineer assistance.

(c) Recommendations: Quick reaction by the Car on both
sides of the river was available through the efforts of the bridge platoon.
Legends placed on the unit could have been alliterated by closer coordination
with local security elements. Future Car operations should consider
the feasibility of using the M113 equipment in general support in fairly
static locales.

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(14) Road Construction, vicinity FSB Anne:

(a) Observations: From 12 to 15 April, two squads from A/7th Engr worked on a road from LZ Sharon to FSB Anne upgrading the road to wheeled vehicle traffic. From 15 April to 13 May two squads from A/7th Engr constructed a tank trail from FSB Anne to TD 247-359 (L2 Cobalt). From 6 May to 10 May two squads from A/7th Engr upgraded 7,000 meters of road from FSB Anne to Rte 556 (TD 270-453). From 11 May to 16 June one squad from A/7th Engr conducting a joint operation with a platoon of ARVN Engineers constructed a fair weather wheeled vehicle road from FSB Anne to FSB Barbara.

(b) Evaluations: Time delays due to culvert emplacements necessitated keeping the roads on interconnecting ridge lines to eliminate as many culverts as possible. The joint operation with the ARVN Engineers was quite successful with minor problems especially that of communications. One ARVN spoke fair English and acted as interpreter. ARVN operators were fair to good and the project progressed at a steady pace. Some difficulties, none of which were due to communications, were encountered during culvert emplacements.

(c) Recommendations: During joint operations between US and ARVN personnel two interpreters are needed: one US who speaks Vietnamese and one Vietnamese who speaks English. Having both would do a great deal toward eliminating communications problems which could easily affect the success of the mission. Extensive aerial and ground recce are necessary to establish new road routes in the local terrain. However, further effort should be made in tank trail construction to further channelize enemy avenues of approach and to provide greater access to deploying units.

(15) Rao Vinh Road Construction:

(a) Observations: From 20 Jun to 17 Jul in a joint operation with ARVN Engineers, 2 squads from A/7 Engr constructed a fair weather tank trail from TD 131-456 to TD 071-459.

(b) Evaluations: Efforts were severely hampered by three tropical storms during this period. Work was also halted due to the necessity to return the unit to QTR in preparation for unit redeployment. ARVN security also presented a problem due to lack of communications.

(c) Recommendations: Joint operations require one US and one Vietnamese interpreter. Security handled by ARVN must be closely coordinated to insure desired results.

(16) Upgrade Passive Fortifications, FSB 0-2 and A-4:

(a) Observations: On 21 May a personnel bunker at FSB 0-2 received a direct hit from a 122mm rocket with a delayed fuse, resulting in multiple casualties. Two squads from A/7 Engr with a platoon minus from...
the 14th Engr Battalion, 45th Engineer Group began an effort to upgrade all
bunkers at FSB C-2 and FSB A-1 under the following priority: TOC/PDC bunkers,
Medical bunkers, and personnel bunkers.

(b) Evaluation: Office of the Brigade Engineer made an inspection
of all bunkers. Only one was declared condemned. Upgrade effort on other
bunkers was concentrated in three areas:

1. Standoff: Tenant personnel with engineer supervision erected
layer of RPG screen three to six feet above each bunker. This layer of screen
was designed to lessen the effects of both contact and delayed fused rockets
by initiating their firing mechanisms earlier than intended.

2. Structural improvements: Scabbing and diagonal
bracing were emplaced in those bunkers which lacked them.

3. Burster layer: To further lessen depth of penetration
and to encourage early detonation a layer of PSP or concrete was placed
on those roofs which required them.

(c) Recommendations: Future bunker construction should be carefully
inspected to ascertain that all criteria are met as the structure is
being developed.

(17) Quang Tri Base Development.

(a) Observation: The following base development projects were
undertaken by A/7 Engr to enhance the living conditions at QTBC:
Construction of unit basketball courts, filling and grading unit softball fields, construc-
tion of facilities in the Special Services area to include volleyball courts,
shower building and driving range, construction of tactical fences to improve
physical security of unit areas, filling and grading unit motor pools, repair
of QTBC perimeter bunkers and clearing fields of fire; engineer repair of
typhoon damaged buildings, moving of buildings in support of unit relocations
and fire losses.

(b) Evaluation: Decreases in facility support due to cuts in
funding by Congress necessitated engineer support of community projects in
order to insure completion. Projects enabled many new equipment operators
to get needed experience by OJT.

(c) Recommendations: Due to decreases in units in Vietnam and
corresponding decreases in facilities funding increased engineer support on the
community level will be necessary to insure maximum facilities usage by
tenant units.
(18) S-5/Civic Actions Projects

(a) Observations: On several occasions A/7 Engineers assisted the Brigade S-5 and the native community projects by hauling fill and construction material. On a regular basis the company supported the local orphanage.

(b) Evaluation: Construction help to the local community especially to the orphanage was troop morale booster. Personnel gave of their own time to build playground equipment and repair living quarters. Personnel also escorted the orphans to Wunder Beach for an outing.

(c) Recommendations: All units in Vietnam should be encouraged to work with the local populace to better living conditions. Community relations may aid in detection of enemy efforts in the AO.

(19) Fire Support Agencies:

(a) Observation: The employment of all available fire support agencies, to include United States and ARVN artillery, United States Naval Gunfire and United States Strategic and Tactical Air Support, to assist in destroying enemy bases and troop concentrations was a prime objective. However, attaining the objective was restricted because of an inherent problem existing within the ARVN command structure.

(b) Evaluation: Basically, the problem was twofold:

1. The direct support artillery battalion of one ARVN Regiment does not normally provide general/reinforcing artillery support for another regiment. Consequently, coordinated and integrated fire support plans did not exist. Daily liaison and coordination meetings between this Brigade's Fire Support Agency and ARVN Fire Support Agencies solved this problem and resulted in integrated and coordinated fire support plans becoming available daily. It should be noted that ARVN, seldom, if ever, failed to utilize XXIV Corps heavy artillery support.

2. The attack on FB Fuller on 23 June 1971, precipitated the second problem. Essentially, the ARVN 1st Div (GOC) command post established at La Vang in addition to the existing 1st ARVN Div Command Post (Forward) at Dong Ha. The 1st ARVN Div (Tactical) Command Post at La Vang was the controlling headquarters for Vietnamese Marine Forces and one ARVN Infantry Regiment and the 1st ARVN Div (Forward) Command Post retained its traditional control on one ARVN Regiment and one
armored cavalry squadron which were deployed along the DMZ. The establishment of two separate and distinct 1st ARVN Division level command posts hampered the effective utilization, coordination and integration of all available fire support. Eventually, through our efforts, both command posts were consolidated at Dong Ha resulting in effective utilization of resources and coordinated fire support planning and execution. Additionally, daily ARC LIGHT targeting meetings were conducted with representatives from the Brigade, 101st Avn Div (Amb), 1st ARVN Div and XXIV Corps. These targeting meetings proved to be invaluable for the following reasons:

a. Exchange of intelligence data between represented headquarters was facilitated.

b. Target priorities, established by representatives, eliminated competition for available strikes.

c. Recommendations: That there be a consolidated Fire Control Agency within any TAOI to maximize the utilization of all available fire support assets.

(20) Operation of Support Battalion during redeployment:

(a) Observation: During reporting period there was an increase of enemy activity around Quang Tri Combat Base. Providing additional base security has proven difficult for this battalion because of the increased logistical support required to support standdown operations.

(b) Evaluation: Support units must continue direct logistical support to supported units throughout most of the brigade's standdown. Increased transportation commitments, retrograde operations, inspections, SCRAM coding, repair parts recuply as well as standdown of organic units has strained resources severely. To accept additional bunkerline responsibility severely hampers the battalion's capability to perform its missions. A light Infantry battalion could be used to secure the bunkerline during the critical time while having less MTO to prepare for turn-in. This would enhance both logistical support to the brigade and external security.

(c) Recommendations: That in the future, the support battalion not be the last unit to standdown and that base security be detailed to the last infantry battalion to standdown.

(21) Operations of the Engineer Company assigned to the Brigade prior to and during redeployment:
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(a) Observations: Problems encountered during redeployment concerned transportation for shipping to Da Nang and local haul. A Co., 7th Engr also had tactical requirements until 20 July and further base commitments until 29 July.

(b) Evaluation: Local haul transportation available simply was not adequate to meet all requirements. There was not enough transportation within the brigade itself to handle PTO returns, local Keystone returns, and admin operations of two or three units who were in standdown simultaneously. Help from without the brigade was not authorized for local hauls. After turning in one's own vehicles to meet turn-in date criteria, lack of local haul transportation caused considerable delays in turn-in of salvage, P&S property, and admin operations. Hauling to Da Nang with transportation not organic but in general support to the brigade also was a difficult area. Non-organic transportation frequently would refuse to haul directly to Da Nang. Cargoes were delayed 1 to 2 weeks, up to 10 days. Cargoes were shuttled in depots along the way and pigeon-holed which further delayed standdown stand-in. Non-organic transportation insisted on running their own transportation convoys which gave the sender further coordination problems. Often one carrier would be employed to haul from Quang Tri to Phu Bai where a second carrier would haul the cargo to Da Nang where a third carrier would be necessary to haul the item from Da Nang to the Keystone processing facility. In order to insure that each load arrive in Da Nang, liaison personnel had to be placed on each vehicle with instructions to insure its delivery. Traffic to the Tan My ramp also was a problem. Unless liaison personnel accompanied the cargo to the ramp and aboard the boat the loads were often pushed aside and left unnoticed until prompted several times by this headquarters. Having one or more units in the field until 4 days immediately before standdown places an unnecessary burden on the redeploying unit. Securing of equipment and personnel for standdown is all but impossible to accomplish in a satisfaction fashion under these conditions. Use of A Co., 7th Engr minesweep teams further delayed redeployment.

(c) Recommendations: The major unit redeploying should have transportation assets assigned in direct support to it. Coordination problems, lost shipments, and extensive time delays could easily be eliminated. Further assets should be assigned just to handle local haul problems. A unit redeploying must be released from all operational commitments a reasonable length of time before actual unit standdown in order to give all portions of that unit adequate preparation time prior to redeployment.

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12th Div. Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 5th Inf Div

(a) Organization: None

(b) Training

(1) Employment of Scout Dogs, Mine Dogs, and Tracker Dogs.

(a) Observation: It was noted by the Scout Dog Phase training leader that with the turn-over in command personnel and the fact that the new commanders had little knowledge of the proper deployment of dogs this vital asset was not used to the extent it should have been by unit commanders.

(b) Education Classes were given within the Brigade to unit commanders (and at the replacement center) to teach them the proper
utilization for the different teams and the missions which each team can
effectively accomplish. After a few classes the employment and overall
effectiveness of the dog teams support so using units increased.

(c) Recommendations: That all newly assigned personnel, especially
the command element personnel, be given a complete briefing as to the
mission, capabilities and proper deployment of Scout Dogs, Mine Dogs, and
Tracker Teams.

(2) Mine detector training.

(a) Observations: Mine detector classes were held by A/I
Engineer for units of 1/7 (K) on six occasions with a total of 117 people
receiving training.

(b) Observation: Use of several mine detectors, notably the
167-A, 367-A, and the 70-7 Metallic and Non-metallic. Course of
instruction was broken into two one hour blocks. The first hour was consi-
dered unit operating instruction for the two types of detectors and the
second hour was a practical exercise involving the use of the detectors.
Areas covered within the course of instruction included detector mainte-
ance, dearming procedures, and conduct of a sweep in absence of engineer support.

(c) Recommendations: Mine detectors are organic to each of
the units in construction of the Brigade. Periodic classes both as refreshers and
courses on duty should be continued at frequent intervals to cut down on the
quantity of mining incidents through better understanding of the equipment
and techniques available.

(2) Logistics.

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AVEL-C

19 August 1971

SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), Period Ending 19 Aug 71, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

(1) Conex Containers:

(a) Observation: Due to the bulk and quantity of conexes that had to be transported out of the Quang Tri Combat Base, a problem of transportation arose.

(b) Evaluation: The Brigade at the beginning of standdown had an excess for 700 conexes which had to be moved from the combat base in order that it be cleared.

(c) Recommendation: To elevate the problem of conexes, an area was established where conexes could be centralized by the three criteria of Unserviceable, Repairable and Serviceable. This centralization enabled support transportation to go to a central location to transport conexes South.

(2) Discarded Property:

(a) Observation: Units throughout standdown had to discard property which should have been returned to the supply system.

(b) Evaluation: As units began the process of standing down, excess equipment began to appear in unauthorized areas which should have been turned in through normal supply channels.

(c) Recommendation: The Brigade instructed each unit to establish an amnesty area in which any equipment could be placed. The headquarters of each unit then prepared the necessary paperwork and turned in all equipment.

(3) Lost Vehicles in Transit:

(a) Observation: Vehicles hauled by transportation other than organic transportation became lost for excessive period of time.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the distance the Brigade was required to travel to turn in equipment, 125 miles, non-organic transportation was used extensively to move inoperative vehicles to Da Nang. As a result of these moves, vehicles became lost in transit for periods of time.

(c) Recommendations: Two possible solutions were utilized to prevent such losses. One, non-organic vehicle were placed in unit convoys to be under the control of the unit, or two, an individual from the unit accompanied the truck to insure the equipment arrived at its destination.
AVHL-C
SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), Period Ending 19 Aug '71, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3)(U)

(1) Transfer of Post, Camp and Station Property to ARVN:

(a) Observation: A point was established by the Area Logistics Command to accept post, camp and station property from the Keystone Processing Center on a "no cost" basis. Problems in control of supplies was observed.

(b) Evaluation: HQs, USARV agreed to transfer post, camp and station property to ARVN. Arrangements were made whereby property designated to go to ARVN would be inspected by Keystone personnel in place and then transported directly to the ARVN turn-in point. There it was accepted by a MACV advisor and turn-in credit was given to the unit and to the Keystone Processing Center. The majority of the time only one advisor was present for duty. During peak work periods he was unable to control shipping, receiving and accounting for supplies. This conditioned resulted in lack of adequate controls to ensure property storage and accountability.

(c) Recommendations: That future operations of this nature be staffed with sufficient advisory staff to adequately control the accountability and distribution of supplies.

  g. Communications: None.
  h. Material: None.
  i. Other:

(1) Malaria Cases:

(a) Observations: During the start of the dry season a large number of malaria cases were noted especially of vivax type. Most of these patients admitted inadequate prophylaxis.

(b) Evaluation: Careful supervision and checks of malaria rosters should be followed. Because of the lack of malaria cases during the rainy season, and absence of visible mosquitos they felt the need to take the other pills was diminished despite command emphasis.

(c) Recommendation: Company Commanders should:

  1. Be advised of the dangers of faulty prophylaxis.
  2. Medications should be taken at formations while the units are in rear areas for maintenance.
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SUBJECT: Operations Report – Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div
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(2) Prevention of Heat Casualties:

(a) Observation: With the advent of the dry season we had
witnessed almost epidemic attacks of individuals with heat exhaustion,
some of which were quite severe and distressing to the frightened person-
nel. In one case, seven personnel were removed from one platoon leaving
a skeleton crew in the field.

(b) Evaluation: These cases were seen by the battalion surgeon.
Interviews and history revealed that each was acclimated to the tropical
climate, but were drinking only small amounts of water (between 1-2 quarts
daily). Each claimed to have been thirsty despite adequate amounts of water
available. When they were called upon to function in extreme heat they
became exhausted. It was clear in speaking with those patients, and later
with the company commanders that a false and vague picture on cause of
heat casualties was prevalent.

(c) Recommendations: Heat casualties are prevented by the following:

1. Proper acclimatization of troops with good water and
   salt discipline.

2. Water is most important against heat exhaustion (more
   than salt). Troops may require 2-3 gallons daily (12 canteens daily).
   No one can be trained to do without water.

3. Water should be taken not only to quench thirst but
to keep adequate hydration to allow one to urinate approximately every
   six hours.

4. Acclimatized troops on normal diet and in steady state
   need no extra salt. C-Ration meals contain adequate salt. Salt tablets
   may be taken only under extreme stress and salt in food is better than the
   use of salt tablets.

(3) Base security during deactivation.

(a) Observation: One of the Battalions was required to maintain
approximately one hundred men on the bunker line and to provide a 60 man
reaction force throughout the first half of the standoff period. This
forced the unit to retain enough weapons for all personnel instead of pre-
paring them for turn-in to Keystone. Likewise they had to retain additional
personnel for guard rather than reducing their strength and vacating large
portions of the cantonment area for the clean-up crews.
AVBL-C  


(b) Evaluation: Standdown and deactivation would have been much more efficient if the battalions had been relieved of all tactical responsibilities at the start of the standdown period.

(c) Recommendations: That redeploying and deactivating units be secured by other friendly units while they are closing out. Security commitments should be limited to interior guard.

(4) Redeployment of Scout Dog Platoon.

(a) Observation: Redeployment of platoon size units are faced with a situation of not having MOS qualified personnel in the supply and maintenance areas to assist in standdown.

(b) Evaluation: Throughout standdown the processing of paperwork for personnel and dog assignments and turn-in of unit equipment at the Keystone area was accomplished with the limited personnel assets available to the platoon based on its MTOE.

(c) Recommendation: That platoon size units such as scout dog platoons be augmented with personnel qualified in the areas of supply, maintenance and personnel action to assist in standdown or attach the platoon to a Battalion size unit redeploying at the same time for the purpose of assisting the platoon in standdown.

(5) USACDC OR/SA Officer Program

(a) Observation: Utilization of the OR/SA Officer assigned to the Brigade during the reporting period.

(b) Evaluation:

1. The OR/SA Officer was assigned to the duty position of Special Assistant to the Brigade Executive Officer on 4 May 71. The Commanding General at that time felt that an OR/SA officer would be more effective as a member of the command group, than as an S3 staff officer. The OR/SA officer's first two weeks were devoted to an intensive orientation program since he had not previously been assigned to a tactical unit. At the end of the two weeks a list of problem areas was prepared and presented to the Brigade XO for approval. The problems the OR/SA officer listed were chosen on the basis of information available for use in the studies, and an intuitive feel he had for the time required to produce useful results.
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2. Prior to beginning any proposed G3/G4 projects, the G3/G4 officer was directed to prepare an G3 Staff Study on "Organizational modifications to Compensate for Personnel Shortages." The objective of the study was to determine what changes could be made at unit level to conserve and conserve manpower while maintaining combat effectiveness during a protracted period of personnel shortages. This was not an G3/G4 oriented study.

3. In mid-May, the Brigade established a Redeployment Planning Group (RPG) to prepare contingency plans for possible redeployments. Following completion of the G3 Staff Study in sub-paragraph "2.," above, the G3/G4 officer was placed on the RPG. By 1 Jun 71, there were strong indications that the Brigade would be included in Increment Eight Redeployments. As a result, his primary duties were shifted to RPG. On 8 Jun 71, he became the chief, RPG and continued in that capacity throughout redeployment.

4. Although the function of the G3/G4 officer in the context of the G3/G4 program was overtaken by the events surrounding redeployment there was a prior history of quantitative analysis techniques used in the Brigade. B0 Hill took advantage of the fact that there were personnel with statistical and business management backgrounds within the command. Three of these personnel formed a maintenance analysis team which conducted elementary statistical studies in order to improve the maintenance effort of the Brigade. This effort was reported in previous June's and B0 Hill's Senior Officer Debriefing.

(c) Recommendations: The capability for quantitative/qualitative analysis to G3/G4 units has merit. However, at separate brigade level it is felt that it would be more appropriate to utilize the profit "60" rather than MOS 3700 (G3/G4 Officer). In the field, facilities and resources available for G3/G4 studies are primitive at best, thereby negating the more advanced techniques which MOS 3700 personnel are expected to employ.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

[Name]

1st Inf Div

2. Task Organization

[Signature]

JOSEPH G. WILSON

NCO, AGC

May 40

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AVII-GCT (19 Aug 71) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div
(Mech), Period Ending 19 Aug 71, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, APO 96349

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons
Learned for the period ending 19 August 1971 from Headquarters, 1st
Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and concurs with
the report except as indicated in paragraph 2 below.

2. (U) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Effective Operating Strength," page
21, paragraph 2a (1): Nonconcur. If surveillance missions assigned this
unit exceed the normal reconnaissance requirements for a separate brigade,
the unit should have submitted an MTO2 change based on operational
mission requirements. Administrative absences and casualties should not
be considered in personnel authorization documentation.

b. Reference item concerning "Detonation of M577 Fuse in Heavy Rain,"
page 30-31, paragraph 2 c(8): Concur. However, the fuse concerned is the
Fuse Point Detonating M557 not the M577. This lesson learned has been
previously published as a warning in TM 9-1300-203, Artillery Ammunition,
April 1967.

c. Reference item concerning "Upgrade Passive Fortifications, USS
C-2 and A-4," page 34, paragraph 2 c(16): Nonconcur.

(1) The value of stand-off screens erected three to six feet above
bunkers is unknown and may create a greater hazard to personnel in the
open. These screens may cause fuse initiation of super quick fuses at
a distance that increases the lethal bursting radius. The effect on
fuse delay will be insignificant because of the speed of the projectile.

(2) Current manuals do not contain engineer technical data for con-
struction of bunkers designed to negate the 122mm rocket projectile.
Therefore, empirical data has been used for bunker construction with no
assurance that adequate protection is afforded. Recommend technical
data be developed to provide bunker protection against the 122mm rocket
projectile. This recommendation has been forwarded separately by letter
to the Chief of Engineers, Headquarters DA on 18 June 1971.

d. Reference item concerning "Quang Tri Base Development," page 35,
paragraph 2 c(17): Nonconcur. The use of combat engineer troops to
accomplish base construction projects is a violation of USARV Regulation
415-1 and a waste of combat support resources. Instances of new or
e. Reference item concerning "Operation of Support Battalion during redeployment," page 37, paragraph 2c (20): Nonconcur. Infantry operations are required in areas such as known rocket/mortar belts and suspect enemy locations throughout the standdown period. Concurrently the administrative and maintenance support provided by the support battalion is also necessary throughout the standdown period. Therefore as the remaining support requirement decreases, the support battalion could be proportionally reduced in strength prior to final standdown.

f. Reference item concerning "Redeployment of Scout Dog Platoon," page 43, paragraph 2i (4): Nonconcur. Necessary administrative and maintenance support is available from the brigade's support battalion. Therefore, personnel augmentation or unit attachment to a battalion size unit is not necessary.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl.

no
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AVHDO-DO (19 Aug 71) 2nd Ind


Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 18 FEB 1972

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 19 August 1971 from Headquarters, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) and concurs with the exception of paragraph 2a(1), page 21. If mission requirements continually exceeded unit capability, an MTOE requesting appropriate increases should have been submitted. Administrative absences and projected casualties should not be considered in personnel authorization document.

2. Additional comments follow:


   b. Reference item concerning "Casualty Reporting," paragraph 2a(2), page 22. Concur with action taken and recommendation. The use of an "open" telephone line in the event mass casualties occur is SOP in the Casualty Branch, USARV AG.

   c. Reference item concerning "Shortage of Enlisted Personnel and Subsequent reation of Junior NCO's," paragraph 2a(5), page 24. Assignment procedures of this headquarters dictate that all units receive a proportionate share of available personnel assets.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl nc

CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn: XXIV Corps 1/5th Inf Div

CONFIDENTIAL
GPOP-ED (19 Aug 71) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), Period Ending 19 August 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558  6 APR 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. MAH
LT, AGC
Asst AG

1 Incl
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ENCLOSURE 1 (Task Organization) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (I), Period Ending 19 Aug 71, ROS OCPOR = 65 (R3) (U)

1. (G) Montana Mustang Task Organization for the beginning of the report period. The composition of a task force varied depending on the assigned mission.

**TF 1-11**

1-11 Inf (-)

**BRIGADE CONTROL**

5-4 Arty (D):
75th Spt Bn
D/3-5 Air Cav (OCPOR)
A/7 Engs
F/77th Inf
229th Sig Co
43rd Sect Dog Plt
Det 2/7th MORT Plt (ATCF)
86th Chems Det
407th Med
517th Med (ATCF)
Bde Sec Plt
Bde Avn Sect
Avn Sec Plt, 101st Abn Div (OCPOR)
Bde TACP (O:AF)

**TF 1-61**

1-61 Inf (H)
B/5-5 Cav
A/1-77 Arm
D/1-11 Inf

**TF 1-77**

1-77 Arm (-)
A/1-32 (ATCF)

**TF 1-25**

3-5 Cav (-)

2. (G) Task organization for counterattack plan Springboard - Drave.

**TF 1-11**

1-11 Inf
Trn/3-5 Cav

**TF 1-61**

1-61 Inf (H)
1 Co/1-77 Arm
1 Trn/3-5 Cav

**TF 1-77**

1-77 Arm (-)
A/3-12 Cav

**TF 1-25**

3-5 Cav (-)
1 Co/1-77 Arm
1 Co/1-61 Inf (H)
1 Dtry/4-4 Arty

**BRIGADE CONTROL**

5-4 Arty (-)
75th Spt Bn
D/3-5 Cav
F/77th Inf
229th Sig Co
43rd Sect Dog Plt
Det 2/7th MORT Plt (ATCF)
86th Chems Det
407th Med
517th Med (ATCF)
Bde Sec Plt
Bde Avn Sect
Avn Sec Plt, 101st Abn Div (OCPOR)
Bde TACP (O:AF)

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