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CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
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AUTHORITY:

AGC, D/A Hr, 17 May 76

UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAAG-PAP-A (N)(14 May 74) DANO-ODU

28 May 1974

Expires 28 May 1975

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3rd Brigade (Separate) 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during active operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material, as appropriate. This report should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the HQ DA (DANO-ODU) Washington, D.C. 20310, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate),
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971,
RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)

THRU: Commanding General
Third Regional Assistance Command
ATTN: MACTR-GS
APO San Francisco 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluation, and Recommendations

a. Personnel: In-country Replacements

(1) OBSERVATION: In-country transferees with less than 60 days to
DEROS have been assigned to tactical units as replacements in critical
shortage MOSs.

(2) EVALUATION: Replacements with less than 60 days remaining
in-country are of little value to tactical units operating in the field.
The problem is particularly acute in shortage MOSs (e.g., Infantrymen
and combat medics) for line companies because the replacements are unable
to become fully integrated into the unit before they must return to the
rear to DEROS. The impact upon the unit is a degradation of unit
integrity and lack of confidence in the soldiers concerned.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That personnel managers at all levels insure
that replacements have sufficient time remaining in-country to be of
benefit to the units to which they are reassigned.

b. Intelligence:

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CLASSIFIED BY: 3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
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AVDAGT-DOT

13 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

(1) Electronic Intelligence:

(a) Observation: Electronic gadgetry is over relied upon by American forces in Vietnam. Too often it is the only means used for collecting information. This gadgetry includes Red Haze, SLAR, Sniffer, Sensors, and URS's.

(b) Evaluation:

(1) Red Haze is generally flown at night after the enemy has doused his evening fires and before he has started his morning fires. Red Haze seems to be unable to detect personnel through the jungle canopy. This is very understandable since it was designed to detect such things as vehicles and tanks. Its use, especially in the middle of the night does not seem applicable to the conditions in eastern MR III.

(2) SLAR seems also to be ineffective in that it works on the Doppler effect and cannot penetrate the jungle. The only practical use of SLAR in eastern MR III is to survey the rivers where the rules of engagement make it particularly difficult for American forces to engage the enemy.

(3) Sniffer is used constantly largely due to its availability. However, it has not yet provided truly accurate intelligence. Twice responding to particularly intense sniffer readouts the results were totally negative.

(4) Sensors have proven somewhat effective in determining enemy use of various areas or his non-use of these areas. However, their short life span detracts from their effectiveness and considerably increases the cost in terms of man-days spent on implanting the sensors and in securing the implant teams. Such sensors as PSID's too frequently give false activations. For this reason units have lost confidence in them.

(5) URS's are relied upon very heavily for information concerning the enemy's location and disposition. With certain enemy units the URS's are invaluable indicators; however, other enemy elements seem to avoid transmitting from their actual location. Still other enemy elements very infrequently transmit at all.

(c) Recommendations: It would seem that certain actions could be taken to improve the accuracy and timeliness of information acquired by electrical means. Red Haze, for instance, could be flown at hours when the enemy is most likely to have his fires lit - early evening and early morning. Sensors are still in their initial stage of development. Further development should aim at fewer false readings and longer life span.

(2) District or Province Intelligence Operations Centers:

(a) Observation: Presently these are not being adequately supported by American forces who operate in these Centers' area of interest.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CSPOR-65 (U)

November 1971

(h) Evaluation: American forces presently are required to evacuate all material and documents through American channels to CDEC and CHEC. Generally, these documents are reproduced and sent to the GVN Province concerned. However, it would seem far more efficient for the documents to go straight to either the DIOC or the GVN Province intelligence personnel. At either of these locations American liaison teams from the American units involved could be established. These teams would not be advisors but purely liaison groups. By such a method both the GVN and Americans could study the same documents without the necessity of reproduction. Also, there is at present a lack of communication between the GVN intelligence personnel and their American counterparts in US units. Such liaison teams could help, increase mutual respect and the free flow of information. At present the unit must deal directly with the Provinces through informal channels. This system does not provide a continuous flow of information and leads only to minimum trust on the part of both the Americans and Vietnamese because these contacts are so infrequent and mutual trust does not have the opportunity to develop.

(c) Recommendation: That American Liaison teams for intelligence be established at either Province or District level. That all material and documents captured by American forces be brought first to these combined intelligence centers for exploitation by both GVN and American personnel.

c. Operations:

(1) Bunker Destruction:

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of C-4 explosive for destruction of enemy bunkers does not provide sufficient damage for the cost involved.

(b) EVALUATION: A more efficient and less expensive method for destruction of enemy bunkers was developed. The 40 pound cratering charge containing ammonium nitrate (cost: $15.00 per charge) was found to be more effective than C-4, (cost: $2.02 per 1 lb block) in destroying bunkers. The charge breaks the logs and destroys the hole while C-4 only cuts the logs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That cratering charges be used for destruction of enemy bunkers.

(2) Stabilization of Artillery pieces:

(a) OBSERVATION: The M102, 105mm Howitzer is unstable when employed on muddy ground. Stabilize the pad with M8A1 matting.

(b) EVALUATION: The flooring of a gun pit with M8A1 matting (PSP) was completed. The stabilization stakes were driven through the matting. Firing was conducted with no shifting of the piece.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That M8A1 matting be used as flooring in gun pits under muddy conditions.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

(3) LZ Preparation Fires:

(a) OBSERVATION: A combat assault landing zone preparation by AFA employing flechette rockets permits greater surprise, faster insertion of ground troops, and effective variance of standard insertion procedures to confuse the enemy.

(b) EVALUATION: Primarily because no adjustment of tube artillery is required, the element of surprise is enhanced by an AFA preparation. It has been found that the command and control helicopter can mark the LZ with smoke, insure that the flight leader has an accurate identification of the LZ and the wind direction, and then begin the actual insertion within a few minutes without having any helicopters in the immediate vicinity of the LZ for a prolonged period of time. The flechette rockets provide highly effective coverage of the area around the LZ. This technique contributes to operational security by varying the standard pattern of proceeding a combat assault by tube artillery adjustment (with the command and control ship orbiting near the LZ) and preparation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units occasionally employ AFA flechette LZ preparations, particularly in those instances when speed is a factor.

(4) CI sweeps of FSBs:

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of CI teams significantly reduced the number of security violations and denied the enemy the use of abandoned US materials.

(b) EVALUATION: The presence of trained CI personnel on a FSB at the time of closing provided the FSB commander with additional trained eyes to assist him during the crucial period of final closing. The use of trained personnel accompanied by untrained unit personnel provided a training vehicle that was most effective under actual field conditions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units closing either FSBs or permanent installations utilize trained CI personnel during the final phase of their standdown.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The requirement will continue to exist within the structure of the MID.

(5) Use of MSS personnel in direct support of US intelligence activities.

(a) OBSERVATION: Well trained MSS personnel, with their power of arrest and interrogation, are a distinct asset when directly assigned in support of a US MID.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

(b) EVALUATION: Although this is a relatively new program, the preliminary results indicate that it will provide better counterintelligence coverage and at the same time, reduce the amount of illegal drug traffic on the base.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That other US intelligence units in support of US tactical elements conduct liaison with their local MSS agency for similar support.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Continued supervision of the complete program and liaison with MSS.

(6) Airborne Personnel Detector:

(a) OBSERVATION: The APD could be a useful method to employ in the search for aircraft that have been lost over areas covered by dense vegetation.

(b) EVALUATION: Since the APD operates by sensing changes in particle concentrations in the air, it could be an effective means for searching for downed aircraft by picking up the dust and debris that is scattered by the craft at the crash site or by picking up smoke particles if the plane is still burning or smoldering. The search operation with the sniffer would have to be employed within a few hours after the aircraft accident, however,

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the APD be employed in the search for missing aircraft.

d. Organization:

(1) Engineer Squad Organization:

(a) OBSERVATION: Engineer squads under 5-217TP501 do not have an assistant Squad Leader.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that the squad operates less effectively without a Sergeant (E-5) Assistant Squad Leader. Squad Leaders are unable to divide their squads into two effective work parties.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That Sergeant (E-5) MOS 12B40 be substituted for one combat demolition specialist (E-4) MOS 12B30.

(2) Organization of Chaplain Section:

(a) OBSERVATION: Organization of the Chaplain Section for a Separate Brigade should be tailored to the operational situation.
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SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

(b) EVALUATION: The standard procedure in which Brigade Chaplains provide religious coverage as a team working out of the Brigade Headquarters does not function well in a Vietnam environment. The large area of operations and the large number (8) of chaplains assigned make it difficult for the Brigade Chaplain to maintain daily contact and thus reduces the effectiveness of centrally administered and controlled religious coverage.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. That clear attainable religious coverage objectives for the Brigade be established and accepted by all Chaplains and Commanders.

2. That assistant Brigade Chaplains be attached to both maneuver and support battalions. Special instructions in each attaching order assign responsibility for additional basic religious group (Protestant or Roman Catholic) coverage to battalions whose attached Chaplain is of another basic religious group.

3. That OER preparation procedures be established in which each assistant brigade chaplain is rated by the CO or XO of the battalion to which he is attached.

(d) COMMAND ACTION - All of the above recommendations have been implemented in the 3rd Brigade (Sep).

e. Training: Pilot training.

(1) Observation: Pilot training must be a constant process of coherent, consistent effort. Insuring the availability and professionalism of top quality pilots and aircraft commanders is a primary mission of this unit.

(2) Evaluation: To prevent any deficiencies in aviator training a cohesive and constantly updated training program, involving all available personnel and resources must be kept in effect.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) That this unit continue to maintain pilot training and progress records on each pilot and that these logs be reviewed by the CO and the training officer regularly and by all aircraft commanders after each day's flight.

(b) That this unit's aircraft commanders continue to meet informally weekly to review pilot progress and reevaluate the unit training program.

(c) That the policy of assigning each pilot an aircraft commander as a "sponsor", the primary source and monitor of his training, he continued.

Change 1
13 December 1971
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13 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CSFOR-65

f. Logistics: Log Day

(1) Observation: LZ construction kits should be utilized in preparing
Log Pads.

(2) Evaluation: Most of the daylight hours of Log Day are lost and a
considerable expense is incurred through the use of C4 in preparing a Log
Pad. In addition, an LZ construction kit consisting of: three axes, one chain
saw, three bush axes, and five machetes would produce a safer log pad due
to the lack of wood splinters with planned placement of fallen trees.

(3) Recommendations: An LZ construction kit be dropped into the company
once the LZ is determined. This kit can be returned to the company rear on
the resupply helicopter.

g. Communications:

(1) Aircraft FM Radios:

(a) Observation: Aircraft currently assigned are equipped with two types
of FM radios, either the AN/ARC-131 with a transmitting power of 17 watts or
the AN/ARC-54 radio with a transmitting power of 8½ watts.

(b) Evaluation: The increased range provided by the AN/ARC-131 radio
greatly enhances the communications capability of all aircraft. In addition,
it will accept (X-mode) secure traffic without modification while the AN/ARC-
54 radio requires the application of MWO #11-5821-3012 prior to operating
in the secure mode.

(c) Recommendation: That all aircraft be converted to the AN/ARC-131
radio.

(2) Signal Mirrors:

(a) Observation: Use of smoke grenades may compromise unit location.

(b) Evaluation: It is possible that noise of a smoke grenade may
compromise a unit's location. Such smoke may be observed by the enemy on
high ground in the area.

(c) Recommendation: Signal Mirrors should be used to mark friendly
locations when applicable. Concurrently positive communications must be
established with the aircraft or the friendly element contacted. If
not feasible, it is then recommended that the tape be removed from the
bottom of the smoke grenade to reduce the noise level when discharged.
AVDAGT-DOT 13 November 1971
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CSFOR-65

h. Material:

(1) Organic Transportation:

(a) OBSERVATION: The airmobile engineer company is not equipped for moving its heavy equipment by road.

(b) EVALUATION: Reliance on non-organic road haul means for movement of heavy equipment has often resulted in delayed engineer support for Brigade requirements which can be reached by road. Provision for organic transportation would improve engineer response.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Separate Brigade Combat Engineer Company be given at least 2, 10-ton tractors and 1, 25-ton low bed semi-trailer.

(2) Factory parts:

(a) OBSERVATION: Another problem area which has recently been developing is in the quality of some factory components. These components have been arriving at the unit level with the maximum allowable tolerances already evident in these component life.

(b) EVALUATION: If a factory component is tested and found to have present in a new condition, the maximum tolerances allowable for safe flight, then the part cannot be expected to stay within tolerance for the entire forecast component life.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the quality control element inform the manufacturers of the problem developing, and request higher standards be set for new parts to insure maximum component life.

i. Other: Construction of culvert/bunkers.

(a) OBSERVATION: Culvert/bunker construction does not provide adequate protection if there is no overhead cover between bunker and blast wall.

(b) EVALUATION: From experience on FSB Pace it was noted that 82mm rounds were falling between culvert/bunkers and the blast walls.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That overhead cover be constructed between the blast wall and the culvert/bunker utilizing two pieces of joined perforated steel plates (PSP) then sandbagged.
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AVDAGT-DOT

13 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate),
Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS
CS FOR-65 (R')

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DENNIS S. POGANY
CPT, IN
Acting Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

MACTR-GJP (31 Oct 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3d Brigade (Separate), 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile), for period ending 31 October 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO SF 96266

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Command, ATTN: AVHDO-DO,
APO SF 96375

Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GBOP-DT,
APO SF 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from 3d Brigade
(Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

KENNETH A. PAYANT
Major, AGO
Deputy Adjutant General
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHDO-DO (13 Nov 71) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 7 APR 1972

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned from Headquarters, 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division and concurs with the exception of paragraph 2b(2), page 2. Nonconcur. MACV Directive 381-57 (dated 16 Sep 70) and 381-24 (dated 13 Nov 70) provide for the exploitation of captured material and documents. The directives provide for the evacuation of any item through logistical or command channels to the combined centers. Captured documents or equipment may be exploited at brigade or division by organic personnel for information of immediate tactical value. The proposal would require evacuation of equipment to activities (PIOC and DIOC) which are in the normal evacuation channels. Further, it would require staffing the DIOC or PIOC with technical intelligence personnel. While there is nothing to preclude tactical units from sending liaison personnel to the PIOC or DIOC now, it does not appear to be consistent with current drawdown of forces to provide additional spaces for liaison personnel for the units and technical intelligence spaces to man the PIOC and DIOC.

2. Additional comments follow:
   a. Reference paragraph 2c(3), page 4: This headquarters concurs with the recommendation, however, the tactical situation and availability of artillery assets will dictate the procedures used for L2 preparation.
   b. Reference paragraph 2h(2), page 6: Concur, however, the problem of quality control of factory components cannot be evaluated at this level. Recommend the problem be brought to the attention of higher echelons.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

T.T. COTTINGHAM
CPT, ASC
ASS'T. AG

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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned**, 3rd Brigade (Separate) 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971

**Authors:**
Dennis S. Pogany, CPT

**Report Date:**
13 November 1971

**Distribution Statement:**

**Supplementary Notes:**
N/A

**Sponsoring Military Activity:**
HQ DA (DAMO-ODU), Washington, D.C. 20310

**Abstract:**

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