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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Colonel John P. Geraci, Commander, Security Assistance Force Asia, 14 Aug 71 - 6 Jul 73 (U)

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2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Colonel John P. Geraci, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 525-14, as result of subject report should be provided to the Headquarters, DA (DAMO-ODU) Washington, D.C. 20310 within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

THRU: Commander
United States Army Base Command, Okinawa
APO San Francisco 96331

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ATTN: FOR OT UT
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

Debriefing Report by: Colonel John P. Geraci
Duty Assignment: Commander, Security Assistance Force Asia
Inclusive Dates: 14 August 1971 - 6 July 1973
Date of Report: 29 June 1973

1. (U) INTRODUCTION: This report is prepared in accordance with AR 525-14 and is based on the personal impressions and observations made during the period that the undersigned commanded Security Assistance Force Asia (SAFAAsia). The following remarks are intended to provide an overview of the unit, its activities, current status and a record of conclusions drawn and lessons learned as a result of the assignment.

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11662
DECLASSIFY ON 31 DEC 1979

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2. (C-NOFORN) OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

   a. Organization. SAFAsia is composed of a nucleus of the 1st Special Forces Group with the attached units of the 1st Civil Affairs Battalion, 539th Engineer Detachment, 441st Military Intelligence Detachment and the 400th Army Security Agency Special Operations Detachment comprising the remainder of the Security Assistance Force (SAF). Task organized on a permanent basis, the unit provides a pool of highly trained skills and resources from which tailored teams can be formed and committed to designated Pacific Command (PACOM) areas to assist a U.S. command or agency in accomplishing its mission.

   b. Mission. SAFAsia's role in the PACOM is unique. The unit serves as the single USARPAC asset specifically configured, trained and oriented to conduct Internal Defense/Internal Development (ID/ID) missions and is the major PACOM Unconventional Warfare (UW) force. Although the participation of U.S. forces in hostilities in Asia is presently drawing to a close, SAFAsia, because of its unique capabilities, is continuing its vital peacetime role of training and assisting Asian allies in humanitarian, nation-building efforts. It is felt that this role will receive ever increasing importance in the future and is in judicious accord with the Nixon Doctrine. When this doctrine was announced in 1971, SAFAsia leaders were queried in the field as to the deleterious impact for future operations/training by military officers of several of the nations involved in mutual or combined SAFAsia operations. (Korea and Thailand were among these countries). SAFAsia's subsequent low profile presence in this forward line of bulwark nations has reassured asian peoples of US concern and continued moral support. Our efforts, not of a give-away nature, enhanced understanding within the host country to recognize its weaknesses and increase its efforts to improve national strengths, internal and external defense capabilities.

   c. Area of Operation. SAFAsia is capable of operating anywhere within the PACOM. Ideally stationed on Okinawa, the unit is situated in a forward centrally located position which permits deployment to virtually any area of the PACOM within three hours by jet aircraft. This current location not only facilitates rapid employment for contingencies, but also
provides easy access to training areas thereby enhancing the unit's ability to maintain continuous area orientation. Concurrent with long range planning for contingency missions should be the consideration of where to locate SAFAsia in the event Okinawa becomes untenable as a base of operations. Notwithstanding present treaties in force and potentially costly transfers, two primary locations appear suitable as a home base for SAFAsia in the 1975-80 period. In my estimation, the first choice would be the Republic of the Philippines, preferably in the Clark Air Base and Subic Bay locale. This site would provide means for immediate response to operational areas in Southeast Asia. Additionally, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay offer excellent special training locations for HALO, SCUBA and underwater demolitions. The islands, themselves, offer ideal terrain for difficult and imaginative jungle and survival operations, presently denied us here on Okinawa. A five year period of friendship and service between SAFAsia and Military/Civil officials has successfully prepared the Filipino people for face to face operations with SAFAsia personnel. Undoubtedly lengthier and more productive programs could be maintained with our forces stationed permanently in country. My second choice as a permanent base of operations would be South Korea. We have continually served with EUSA, UNC and ROK forces in the past 24 months. A strong bond of friendship, trust and mutual respect has allowed our UW training, adventure training and civic action joint efforts to prosper. Suitable airbases and numerous off shore sites offer opportunities for combined planning and rapid response.

d. Operational Environment. SAFAsia enjoys an outstanding reputation and the importance of the unit's operational capabilities are recognized throughout PACOM by both US and Allied commanders. It presently exercises a fine and very necessary working relationship with parallel and supporting Army, Air Force and Navy units. From these considerations, SAFAsia's operational environment is ideal. The areas of SAFAsia's operational interest have remained relatively stable; however, training areas and the number and type of training and ID/ID missions have varied greatly because of everchanging political considerations beyond the control of SAFAsia. It is readily apparent, therefore, that all SAFAsia activities must be characterized by flexibility and the ability to make rapid adjustments to insure that our
activities are not counterproductive to US national interests. Despite these inhibiting circumstances, SAFAsia's employments during the past fiscal year increased some 300 percent and have included repeated deployments to Indonesia, Korea, mainland Japan, Micronesia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Training on Okinawa has become increasingly difficult since reversion; however, considering off-island training opportunities these restrictions have not markedly decreased the mission effectiveness of the unit.

3. (FOUO) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: SAFAsia is under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific (CINCPAC), with the Commander, US Army Japan (Cdr, USARJ) exercising command less operational control of SAFAsia elements located on Okinawa through the Commander, United States Army Base Command, Okinawa (Cdr, USARBCO). As a result SAFAsia receives direct operational and training guidance for other than local matters from USARPAC; however, to execute these directives the unit is dependent upon USARBCO for administrative and logistical support. In addition to providing this support, Cdr, USARBCO, because of the command relationship, closely monitors SAFAsia's deployments and mission accomplishments. This present relationship, as viewed by SAFAsia, has proven to be satisfactory from both a command and operational aspect.

4. (C-NOFORN) EXPERIENCES IN COMMAND:

   a. Concept of Operation. As outlined in Letter of Instruction, Subject: Employment of SAFAsia, HQ, USARPAC, 12 May 1972, SAFAsia constantly trains to insure that the unit can execute successfully any of its war or peacetime contingencies. Proficiency is maintained primarily through the deployment of Advisory/Training Task Forces (ATTF's), Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) and Technical Assistance Teams (TAT's) to allied host countries throughout the PACOM. This experience is supplemented with Field Training Exercises (FTX's), Command Post Exercises (CPX's), Operational Readiness Training (ORT's), on-island language training and formal area study. As a result of this viable and realistic training program SAFAsia is capable of deploying on short notice by air, land, or sea, all or any part of the unit to conduct unilateral or joint/combined operations ranging from unconventional warfare to comprehensive civic action.
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b. Command and Control. Because of the variety of missions and circumstances under which they are conducted, and the self-sufficient, cellular organization of both the Special Forces Group and the attached SAF units, the command of SAFAsia is centralized, but the control is decentralized. In this connection when a mission is received, and time permitting, the team is carefully selected and prepared prior to its departure. The final decision regarding the team's ability to accomplish the forthcoming mission is made by the Group Commander. The formal mechanism established in this decision making process is referred to as the Commander's Pre-Mission Briefback. Upon completion of the mission the team undergoes a Post Mission Briefback where lessons learned and recommendations for operational/administrative improvements are discussed. Some deployments of SAFAsia are sensitive and require a low profile on the part of the deployed force, the inherent rank structure of subordinate units coupled with individual professionalism enables SAFAsia to accomplish all missions covering the entire spectrum of cold war activities with the highest standards of excellence. This can be attested to by the numerous letters of commendation received by SAFAsia from high US and host country government officials. SAFAsia has purposely maintained a very low profile on Okinawa in the past two years primarily due to two political considerations: (1) the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty which necessitated changes in on-island training and residency policies and (2) sensitivity of the Japanese legislative body to SAFAsia operations off island. I instituted and have continued a no-publicity status here to avoid bringing limelight to this command. Although many of our off-island commitments have earned international recognition and very well, with my approval, could have produced major favorable press coverage such as disaster assistance in the Philippines in 1972, I feel that such friendly press attention would be an invitation for undue press interest in our activities elsewhere.

c. Operations. SAFAsia's significant operations conducted during the period of this report have been recorded in accordance with AR 525-15 and local historical requirements. In retrospect, these operations included:

(1) Indonesia:

(a) Continuous TAT assistance.

(b) A M-60 machine gun MTT.
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(2) Korea:

(a) ATTF's all Special Forces MOS skills and in the specialized skills of HALO, SCUBA and Rough Terrain Parachuting.

(b) Foal Eagle, the annual Joint Combined Unconventional Warfare FTX.

(c) Numerous small scale FTX's.

(d) Adventure training in Recondo and Riverine techniques for the US Army, 2nd Infantry Division.

(e) Operational Readiness Training (ORT's).

(3) Mainland Japan: Cold weather training.

(4) Micronesia: Continuous Army Civic Action Team support.

(5) Philippines:

(a) Engineer Control and Advisory Detachment (ECAD) ATTF.

(b) Numerous comprehensive combined civic action missions.

(c) Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) support, "Operation Saklolo".

(d) ATTF 4-72 (School Construction).

(e) ATTF's in intelligence and communication.

(6) Taiwan:

(a) Rough Terrain parachute training.
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(b) ATTF's in Intelligence and Air Mobility.

(c) Joint Combined DART training exercises.

(7) Thailand:

(a) An Intelligence MTT.

(b) TDY Assistance.

(c) FREEDOM RUNNER TOE Assistance.

(8) Vietnam:

(a) MTT CG 1151-72X (Friday Gap).

(b) MTT 1-73 (Task Force Madden).

(9) Okinawa:

(a) Four Basic Airborne Courses (To meet operational requirements and serve as adventure training for PACOM units).

(b) Four Jumpmaster Courses in order to insure requisite qualified personnel for the many and varied type of airborne operations conducted.

(c) Rough Terrain Parachute Training on a continuous basis with a view towards qualifying all SFOD's in this technique.

(d) Four SCUBA Courses of 5 weeks duration. In this regard SAFAsia's capability to perform amphibious type UW operations is excellent.

(e) Central Area Command, charged with internal security of US Installations during prolonged work stoppages, civil disturbances and natural disasters.
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D. Intelligence. SAFAsia basic intelligence requirements are primarily met by review and extraction of applicable intelligence produced and distributed by Department of Defense or governmental agencies. With the exception of civil affairs estimates prepared by the 1st Civil Affairs Battalion, SAFAsia is not actively engaged in gathering intelligence information. However, SAFAsia units, because of their composition and deployments, possess a vast untapped opportunity to gather low level intelligence of value to higher headquarters. Additionally, the 441st Military Intelligence Detachment has and can continue to make a significant contribution to the enhancement of indigenous forces intelligence capabilities through the use of MTT's and ATTF's.

e. Training.

(1) Personnel reporting to the Special Forces Group, and in most cases the SAF units, have received extensive military occupational specialty (MOS) training in the continental United States (CONUS) prior to assignment to SAFAsia. The major exception to this is the shortage of school trained personnel available for assignment to the Civil Affairs Battalion and the Signal Company of the Group's Support Battalion.

(2) Although there is vast combat experience found in all of SAFAsia's units, the unit continuously trains its personnel to insure continued individual and unit proficiency. Realistic training within the bounds of political limitations is conducted both on and off Okinawa. The Special Forces Group emphasizes joint training with other services as well as individual MOS cross-training within the operational detachments. Perhaps the most realistic of 1st Special Forces Group training programs is our no notice Operational Readiness Training (ORT). Paired with our sister PACAF 1st Special Operations Squadron, we penetrate and test the air defenses of South Korea and then parachute one or more Special Forces Operational Detachments into harsh terrain objective areas such as the Chiri and Taebak San. From pre deployment to debriefing 96 hours later, the SFOD feels it has participated in a realistic and challenging operation.
(3) Decentralized training is conducted to the maximum extent possible; however, for the efficient utilization of resources, centralized instruction is conducted for airborne and waterborne techniques, language training, cultural relations, race relations and MAP-TOE instructor training. Due to physical training limitations on Okinawa, certain HALO and SCUBA training must be conducted elsewhere.

f. Organization.

(1) The 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa currently consists of two Special Forces battalions and a Support battalion. These units are organized under a modified H series Table of Organization and Equipment (H series MTOE). The SAF units are presently operating under the G series MTOE; however, they will be converting to the H series prior to the end of fiscal year (FY) 74. To supplement these MTOE's, an equipment modified Table of Distribution and Allowances (MTDA) has been authorized to meet garrison and training requirements.

(2) Conversion from the G to H series MTOE by the Special Forces Group resulted in a savings of approximately $250,000 in personnel and equipment costs during FY 73. Additional benefits also accrued in the change of MTOE through the acquisition of a badly needed helicopter platoon, which, when fully operational, will expand the operational and training capability of SAFAsia.

(3) To execute standing Special Forces advisory missions in Korea and Taiwan, there are permanent change of station resident detachments in each location drawn from the strength of the Group on Okinawa. A SAFAsia coordinator, provided from the assets of the 1st Civil Affairs Battalion, is assigned with a permanent duty station in the Philippines to coordinate activities in that country. Although these personnel account for only a small portion of SAFAsia's strength, their presence and activities are important in keeping the lines of communication open between the allied forces of that country and SAFAsia.

g. Personnel Management.
(1) Maintenance of Unit Strength. Throughout the period of my command the strength of SAFAsia, with the exception of Signal Company, has remained both at a reasonably constant and acceptable level. There has not been a shortage of enlisted personnel possessing the basic Special Forces hard skills (i.e., operations, intelligence, weapons, etc), however, the conversion from the G to H series MTOE’s has resulted in a continuing shortage of maintenance, signal and supply MOS’s in the Group’s Support Battalion. In consequence we have been obliged to accept non airborne, non Special Forces qualified personnel in the soft skills in order to fulfill our day to day operational requirements. Currently, we have approximately 175 personnel in this category. While the majority perform their duties in an acceptable fashion, they do not exhibit the same degree of motivation and dedication as do the volunteers. A concerted effort should be made by higher headquarters to insure the enlisted personnel fill in the soft skills be, as a minimum, airborne qualified or an airborne volunteer. Although the fill of officers has been adequate, many officers are still assigned directly to the Group without Special Forces training, and few officers reporting to the Civil Affairs Battalion have formal civil affairs training. Despite the earnest efforts on the part of these officers, both they and SAFAsia are somewhat handicapped due to this lack of formal training. Since SAFAsia operations often require its officers to work with allied counterparts having rank two or three grades higher than their own, it is critical for successful mission accomplishment that only highly qualified dedicated and professional officers are assigned to this organization. Below is a profile of Majors, Captains and Lieutenants assigned to SAFAsia as of 20 June. It should be noted that less than 50% of the Majors are Regular Army with 70% meeting US Army civilian education goals. Less than 20% of my Captains are RA with fewer, approximately 60%, meeting the basic undergraduate degree requirements. The Captains are the hard chargers in this unit and usually work with foreign officers of high rank. For instance, my Resident Detachment Commander in Korea is a Captain who regularly assists a ROK Major General who has three Special Forces Brigades under his command. SAFAsia is more than 100% overstrength in Lieutenants with 11% RA and about 60% college graduates. Obviously, the shortfall lies in assignment of RA and Special Forces qualified Captains. The 90 day forecast does not at this time appear to offer any significant upgrading to this less than bright tableau.
(2) Morale, Health and Discipline. The overall morale of SAFAsia is excellent. This attitude, in my opinion, can be attributed to meaningful training, challenging TDY deployments and stabilized accompanied tours; in short, job satisfaction. The commendatory remarks resulting from the USARPAC Annual General Inspection which noted only several discrepancies in the unit has done much to bolster this feeling for supporting staff personnel. Current promotion cutbacks do not appear at this point to have adversely affected morale or reenlistments. The unit, as I am sure most others, lost some fine officers to the recent reduction-in-force (RIF). The RIF has presently caused considerable concern and uncertainty among my officers and I cannot evaluate the long term effect of this action on the remaining personnel. The health and physical condition of the unit is outstanding. The discipline of the unit is good, with military and civil violations being less than in comparable sized units on Okinawa.

h. Logistics. SAFAsia is dependent on USARBCO for external logistical support. The present arrangement has proven responsive to the unit's requirements. SAFAsia has experienced some internal logistical problems since the unit converted to the H series MTOE because of the continuing shortage of certain MOS qualified personnel in the Group's Support Battalion. Operational experience has proven, however, that the use of a support battalion is a valid concept, so when properly manned the present shortcomings should be corrected.
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i. Civil Affairs. Although SAFAsia's organization includes a civil affairs element, the functional capabilities of the unit have been greatly curtailed due to the reduction of the unit from a group to a battalion. In my opinion, based on the 1st Civil Affairs Battalion's current organization, manning and operational experience, the unit is best utilized in PACOM in an active Army role to conduct comprehensive civic action missions. These missions have proven very popular with our Asian allies and have done much in rural Asia to upgrade health and living conditions of indigenous personnel, to expand and strengthen lines of communication and to further the Nixon Doctrine. Intentions are to modify the 1st Civil Affairs Battalion's MTOE when it converts to the H series, so that the unit will be more suitably structured to perform at an even higher standard.

j. Psychological Operations. SAFAsia does not possess an organic psychological operations capability and therefore relies on the 7th Psychological Operations Group on Okinawa for support. The two units work closely during comprehensive civic action missions, DART exercises and exercise Foal Eagle.

k. Communications.

(1) Operations. Many changes have occurred in the SAFAsia Communications/Electronics program. These changes assure the command of virtually instantaneous contact with any deployed element while providing maximum training to communications personnel. All SFOD radio traffic to SAFAsia Headquarters is transmitted by either 300 word per minute "burst", or manual CW. Continuous Wave (CW) has been changed from standard International Morse Code (IMC) to "cut numbers" in order to more readily blend with normal code practices in the Orient. All messages are encrypted. Larger deployments requiring a high-volume traffic capability are supported by AN/GRC 122 radioteletypes handling encrypted traffic. The SAFAsia base station operates continuously performing the mission it would be assigned in a wartime situation.

(2) Training. Both formal and semi-formal training has been established for our communicators. A centralized communications school is conducted on a quarterly basis. An eight hour officers orientation course...
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is conducted semi-annually. All radio operators are assigned for their first six weeks in this command to the base radio station. They become familiar with SAFAsia operating procedures and the "cut number" system. I am well satisfied with communications progress, but have urged commanders and my signal staff to continue to improve the overall communications/electronics posture.

5. (C-NOFORN) RELATIONSHIPS WITH HOST NATION FORCES?
GOVERNMENT: SAFAsia's relationships with host country military forces throughout PACOM are excellent. Governmental relations and political considerations beyond the control of SAFAsia have reduced the scope of the unit's activities in Japan (to include Okinawa) and Taiwan. Although military forces in both countries appear anxious to cooperate, political considerations in Japan have altered such activities as cold weather training, work with nuclear weapons trainers, troop foot marches, and underwater demolitions. Political considerations in Taiwan have adversely affected SAFAsia's ability to conduct HALO and rough terrain parachute operations and caused the cancellation of DART II.

6. (U) CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS: SAFAsia currently supports USARBCO for installation/facility security operations in accordance with USARBCO OPLAN 461. An overview of SAFAsia's responsibilities and methods of operation were reported in SAFAsia's Operational Report—Lessons Learned, for the period ending 30 April 1972.

7. (U) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: SAFAsia's recent involvement in research and development has been limited; however, the unit does correspond and receive publications from the U.S. Land Warfare Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. SAFAsia's deployments, however, provide a continuing means of field testing many items of equipment under varying conditions throughout Asia.

8. (C-NOFORN) AREAS IN NEED OF INCREASED EMPHASIS: It must be emphasized at the Department of the Army and Department of State level that Special Forces and their associated SAF units have a valid and most important peacetime role. This is particularly true in PACOM. Because of their rapid deployability, ability to teach and employ diverse
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skills, and inherent ability to work with indigenous personnel in their area of interest, the units are ideally suited to the furtherance of US National Objectives. Proven peacetime missions presently being executed in PACOM by SAFAsia include the DART operations, the TAT in Indonesia, the ECAD and comprehensive civic action missions in the Philippines, and the Army Civic Action Team in Micronesia. All of these nation building programs, while assisting our allies to help themselves during time of peace, also affords SAFAsia a continual opportunity to strengthen bonds of friendship, cooperation and communication that are so vital if and when SAFAsia is called upon to execute its wartime contingencies.

9. (U) CONCLUSIONS:

a. I anticipate that SAFAsia's deployment for the foreseeable future will be more in the realm of nation building type assignments rather than hot war type missions. Further, it is recognized that SAFAsia is not a credible deterrent force, per se, as are the nuclear capable units; however, SAFAsia's location on Okinawa does provide for a visible U.S. presence in the Western Pacific and does provide USARPAC with an organization which is capable of helping to achieve US national objectives in this area of the world. There is no question, Special Forces and their associated SAF units have a valid peacetime mission.

b. The performance by SAFAsia has been best characterized by the assignment of dedicated, highly qualified officers and soldiers. However, the attrition rate has been high in the past two years due to Reduction in Force and realignment of officer strengths/priorities in CONUS. For SAFAsia to continue its high excellence a more experienced professional fill is required.

c. The rapid expansion of SAFAsia missions since August 1971 may be attributed in large measure to decentralization of control incorporating policy guidance from my office. I was fortunate in having highly motivated and greatly experienced subordinate commanders who skillfully carried out my mission type orders. SAFAsia was also helped immensely by key knowledgeable action officers at CINCUSARPAC, CINCPAC, MAC THAI, MEDTC and UNC Headquarters. The relevant experience of these action officers plus their personal knowledge and confidence in each other allowed us to plan and move rapidly when a challenging situation arose. I would
be remiss in not crediting them for their active and professional support.

10. (C-NOFORN) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Political proscriptions notwithstanding, meaningful and realistic training can be conducted both on and off Okinawa.

b. A constant educational process is necessary at all levels of higher command to illustrate the capabilities of SAFAsia units or individuals. Our rapid response to imperative situations has been a result of commanders or staff officers of other commands being aware of our capabilities. The periodic turnover of key officers in these commands requires that a continuity of learned knowledge about SAFAsia be passed along or new briefings presented.

c. SAFAsia must be prepared for any type mission whether directly relevant to our mission or not. Our activities have included presenting close in security procedures to Nike Hercules Batteries in Korea in reaction to an international threat by the Black September Group, to refresher training of ARVN infantry battalions in Vietnam July - November 1972. SAFAsia is basically a unit of trainers.

d. SAFAsia must be prepared to shift priorities and realign forces already committed to formal exercises; for example; the welcomed, but unexpected commitments to Thailand in October 1971, caused a substantial last minute shift in exercise play during Foal Eagle 72 in order to fill both requirements.

JOHN P. GERACI
COL, IN
Commanding
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: OT UT, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

(C) USARPAC agrees with COL Geraci's report and has taken the following actions in regard to his significant observations. These actions have been keyed to paragraphs in the report.

a. Para 2c. COL Geraci proposes the Philippines and Korea as possible alternative sites for SAFASIA in the event Okinawa becomes untenable. This proposal was previously studied by this headquarters and rejected because removal to any location in PACOM would eventually result in similar problems of tenure except where the American flag is firmly planted. Organizations with politically objectionable missions should not be moved except to locations where they can operate under US political control. Retention of SAFASIA on Okinawa remains the first priority objective with the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) as the alternative site for SAFASIA basing.

b. Para 4g(1). Every effort is being made to obtain qualified officer and enlisted personnel for SAFASIA. Request DA assistance in obtaining the goals pointed out in the report.

c. Para 8. Concur in the desire for increased awareness at the national level of SAFASIA's vital role in furthering US national objectives in PACOM.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

ROBERT R. WILLIAMS
Lieutenant General, USA
Chief of Staff
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**Senior Officer Debriefing Report:** Colonel John P. Geraci, Commander, Security Assistance Force Asia, 14 Aug 71 - 6 Jul 71

**AUTHOR(S):**

Colonel John P. Geraci

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