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**AD529228**

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AGO ltr, 25 Jan 1975; AGO ltr, 25 Jan 1975

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AD 529228

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: UNCLASSIFIED
FROM: CONFIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY:

AGG, D/A Ltr, 25 June 75

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (22 Feb 74) DAMO-ODU

Expires 12 March 1975

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 18th
Military Police Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1972

SEE DISTRIBUTION.

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in
accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure
that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit
of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training
material, as appropriate. This report should not be interpreted as
the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of
the Department of the Army.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation
should be forwarded to the HQ DA (DAMO-ODU) Washington, D.C. 20310,
within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

1 Incl

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"Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal
Sanctions"
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96375

AVHFM-9

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade, Period Ending 31 Oct 72, RCS CSFOR-65(R3)(U)

Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558
Commander, United States Army, Vietnam/MACV Support Command, ATTN: AVHDO-O, APO 96375

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation, and Recommendations.
   a. Personnel.
      (1) Control of special skill MOS (95 series) personnel during incremental withdrawals.
         (a) Observation: During incremental troop withdrawals, curtailment and reassignment of special skill MOS (95 series) personnel was controlled by USARV, rather than Brigade Headquarters. Personnel rosters prepared at unit level were forwarded to USARV Headquarters through the servicing Personnel Services Company, thus circumventing the major headquarters responsible for arriving at and maintaining the mandatory strength ceiling.
         (b) Evaluation: The aforementioned procedures increased the existing administrative workload and caused unnecessary personnel turbulence throughout the Brigade. Since personnel were reassigned from and within the Brigade based primarily on retainability, little or no consideration was given to factors such as continuity and familiarity with the area of responsibility (AOR). For example, some of the excess personnel in the 90th Military Police Detachment (PM) were reassigned to outlying military police units when they should have been reassigned to the 716th Military Police Battalion since they were already familiar with the Battalion's AOR. Similarly, personnel were reassigned from the 560th Military Police Company in MR II to the 716th Military Police Battalion when, in fact, they should have been reassigned to the 615th Military Police Company which was located in MR II at that time.
         (c) Recommendation: That curtailment and reassignment of special skill MOS (95 series) personnel be controlled by Brigade Headquarters in coordination with USARV Headquarters. With proper coordination, this policy would facilitate control and accountability of personnel, and simultaneously, lessen the turbulence associated with incremental withdrawals.

DAMO-ODU
Inclosure 722041

CLASSIFIED BY 18th Military Police Brigade
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON 31 December 1980
Further, it would give the Brigade Commander greater flexibility in redistributing his personnel assets.

(2) Personnel Suspense Roster.

(a) Observation: Personnel Suspense Rosters are not being prepared on a regular basis by servicing Personnel Services Companies.

(b) Evaluation: With the assumption of personnel records maintenance, the Personnel Services Companies were directed by DA Pamphlet 600-8 to prepare Personnel Suspense Rosters reflecting monthly requirements for individual actions (i.e., completion of officer and enlisted efficiency reports, award of the Good Conduct Medal, official photographs, audit of personnel records, various inoculations, etc.) As it stands, however, this program never got off the ground. Consequently, necessary actions were completed only on a hit or miss basis, or not at all.

(c) Recommendation: That supporting Personnel Services Companies prepare Personnel Suspense Rosters on a regular basis so that individual actions can be completed as required.

(3) Advance Overseas Returnee Report.

(a) Observation: The problem of determining whether or not all eligible personnel are listed on the appropriate Advance Overseas Returnee Report has resulted in confusion and lost time on the part of all concerned.

(b) Evaluation: As the Personnel Services Companies took over unit-personnel functions, units were unable to determine whether or not all eligible personnel were listed on the appropriate Advance Overseas Returnee Report, which is the document used by OPO to effect reassignment of personnel completing foreign service tours. Lack of this information created a cascade of inquiries and confusion, as well as amendments to the report.

(c) Recommendation: That a policy be adopted whereby the unit concerned is provided with a copy of the pertinent portion of the Advance Overseas Returnee Report prepared by the Personnel Services Company for information and verification.

b. Intelligence. None.

c. Operations:

(1) Integration of US and Vietnamese police personnel into effective patrol operations.
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AVFPW-0

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 18th MP Brigade, Period Ending 31 Oct 72, RCS CSFOR-65(R3)(U)

(a) Observation: The integration of US military police and Vietnamese National and Military Police into combined patrols economizes manpower and, at the same time, increases police presence.

(b) Evaluation: Through integration of police patrolmen, the commitment of US personnel is reduced significantly but the scope of the patrol is increased. Additionally, each patrolman gradually absorbs knowledge from his counterparts during the practical training inherent in operational patrolling.

(c) Recommendation: That patrols be integrated with Vietnamese National and Military Police personnel to the maximum extent possible.


(a) Observation: US Forces have entered into numerous contractual agreements with commercial cargo carriers. As it stands, the contracts hold contractors responsible only if they are grossly negligent. Gross negligence is almost impossible to prove; thus, some contractors have failed to take the proper security precautions.

(b) Evaluation: Commercial carriers have long been utilized in RVN to augment military cargo carriers. However, the contracts generally do not provide for sufficient security of US Government vehicles and cargo. With the continuing drawdown of US Forces personnel in RVN, there has been a significant increase in the larceny and hijacking of contractor operated vehicles, particularly 5-ton tractors. In many cases, the contractors have failed to take necessary security measures to thwart larcenies and hijackings. Nevertheless, contractors have little fear of having to pay for losses, for gross negligence, as presently defined, is very difficult to prove. Thus, the monetary loss is absorbed by the US Government or, more specifically, the US taxpayer, while the contractor accrues no loss.

(c) Recommendation: That contracts be negotiated so as to require the contractor to take more active steps to safeguard cargo and vehicles, and that contractor liability be redefined making contractors in RVN liable for more than gross negligence as presently written.

d. Organization. Problems associated with continued centralized command and control of military police resources during Increments XIII and XIV.

(1) Observation: The decision to retain military police resources under centralized command and control of the Brigade led to greater reductions in the military police force structure than might have been made had Area Commanders been given the responsibility for discipline, law and order functions on an area basis.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 18th MP Brigade, Period Ending 31 Oct 72, RCS CSFOR-65(R3)(U)

(2) Evaluation: As the total Army strength rapidly decreased in Vietnam, the need for centralized command and control of military police resources also diminished considerably. After the once fluid tactical situation became relatively stable and the Vietnamese Armed Forces assumed the bulk of the ground combat mission, military policy activities reverted primarily to combat service support functions. The vast majority of Army elements remaining in country consolidated around the principal population centers, suggesting the desirability of an area command doctrine, whereby most military police units would be assigned or attached to Area Commanders. Concern for the problems that Area Commanders, with their limited staffs, could be expected to encounter in the event of a rapid redeployment from Vietnam, however, together with high level interest in specialized law enforcement, programs such as drug abuse suppression, customs control and physical security, resulted in the decision not to decentralize. Since the Brigade then retained responsibility for balancing reductions made in the military police structure throughout the country, more reductions were sometimes imposed than Area Commanders might have opted for had they commanded all Army elements in their respective areas, and thus had the ability to trade off spaces from other supporting forces for additional military policemen.

(3) Recommendation: That renewed consideration be given to the possibility of decentralization of military police assets in the event that continued US presence in Vietnam appears likely.

e. Training. None.

f. Logistics. Logistical and maintenance support.

(1) Observation: The drawdown of troops left some outlying military police units without adequate logistical and maintenance support.

(2) Evaluation: As units stood down, there was a concomitant decrease in maintenance and logistical support activities/facilities. As a consequence, some units were left without adequate maintenance and logistical support, and had to make special arrangements on their own. For example, the 560th Military Police Company in MR II had to supplement available organizational maintenance with COP hire mechanics and support agreements with local TMP's, LSA's and civilian contractors. The problem of maintenance was compounded further by a shortage of replacement part (i.e., batteries, ignition systems, universal joints, and shock absorbers) for ½ ton vehicles.

(3) Recommendation: That future plans allow for appropriate logistical and maintenance support, to include replenishment of repair parts.

g. Communications. None.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 18th Military Police Brigade for Period Ending 31 October 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam/MACV Support Command, APO San Francisco 96375

To: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO San Francisco 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the subject ORLL and submits the following comments:

Nonconcur with Section 2, paragraph 2a(1). Control of Special Skill MOS (95 series) Personnel during Incremental Withdrawals.

While it is true that increment rosters were consolidated at this headquarters, assignments of 95 series personnel for Increment XIV were made under the personal supervision of the Brigade S-1. This is the procedure which will be used in any future increments. Unit has been advised.

Nonconcur with Section 2, paragraph 2a(2) - Personnel Suspense Roster

The personnel suspense rosters are produced from the PERMACAP file. However, that roster has not been incorporated into PERMACAP processing in RVN. Rapid turnover and the one-year tour cast doubt on the utility of the roster. With drawdown activities, constant personnel turbulence and withdrawal of machine capability from all but one Personnel Service Company, the accent has been on personnel accounting, timely strength reporting and maintenance of key personnel management data such as name, grade, PMOS, DMOS, and DEROS. Given the distance and communications difficulties between units, servicing PSG and the single PERMACAP Data Service Center, the concentration on this aspect is considered essential. Personnel Service NCO's maintain personnel data cards which contain the information necessary to maintain the suspense items for individual actions. Unit will be notified.

Concur with Section 2, paragraph 2a(3).

Because of planning incident to a possible total withdrawal, Advance Overseas Returnee (AOR) reports were submitted for all enlisted personnel in RVN as of November 1972. Names of personnel arriving subsequent to that date are submitted as they arrive and are inprocessed. Should the regular AOR schedule resume, units will be provided copies of the report applicable to that unit.
The question at hand at this time in Vietnam, however, is to define "necessary security measures" and "take more active steps" as cited in the inclosure. Contractors have been directed to contact the Provost Marshal and request physical security surveys which should include total security recommendations. Contractors will then request authorization to implement the additional security requirements, i.e., fencing, lighting, security guards etc. The contracts will then be modified accordingly. The question of gross or simple negligence is one of judgment and interpretation by both lawyers and laymen, and simply changing the degree of negligence will not achieve the degree of security required. Any attempt to modify present contracts to adjust the degree of negligence to determine liability will require a supplemental agreement subject to increase in prices for still an undetermined degree of security. Some additional security measures now being considered for implementation, with emphasis on vehicular security, are as follows:

a. Each vehicle will be equipped with a lock and chain device which will render the steering wheel or steering wheel and clutch inoperative. This device will be employed anytime a vehicle is left unattended. This is to include rest stops, in motor pools, when repairs are being performed, etc.

b. Each M-Series cargo or special purpose vehicle will have an operator and an assistant any time the vehicle is operated outside the installation or compound and contractors will have vehicles travel in convoys whenever possible. When vehicles are traveling in convoys, only lead and trail vehicles are required to have assistants except M52 series 5 ton tractors. All such tractors will have an operator and assistant operator when operated off the installation or compound. If a vehicle breaks down, the driver or the assistant will remain with the vehicle until help arrives and the vehicle either is repaired or towed to the contractor's maintenance facility or motor pool.

c. During non-duty hours, vehicles will be secured inside a fenced compound as a minimum and, if possible, inside a locked building. The contractor will have the vehicle area patrolled by a TCN during non-duty
hours. If TCN's are not available for hire by the contractor, reliable local nationals may be utilized. When the vehicle is secured for the night, the lock and chain device will be utilized as outlined in para 2a and the keys to the lock will be turned in to the dispatcher and secured. In addition, the contractor will take some positive measure to immobilize the vehicle. Suggested methods include:

1. Multifuel trucks: Remove the delivery valve and spring assembly.

2. Five and ten ton trucks: Disconnect the starter wire.

3. One quarter and three quarter ton trucks: Remove the rotor from the distributor.

4. All vehicles: Remove the battery.

The actual part to be disconnected or removed will be determined by the contractor and the COR so as to provide effective immobilization but minimum interference with the contractor's operation. Parts removed from vehicles will be stored in a secure area and marked to identify the vehicle from which they were removed. Contractors also will insure that adequate security is provided within the compound during periods of reduced activity (e.g. during mealtime, coffee breaks, shift changes, weekends and holidays, etc).

d. Contractors will utilize a TCN if possible at the motor pool entrance and/or exit to insure that vehicles leaving are on proper dispatch. Where necessary a TCN guard also will be used at the installation exist to check all contractor vehicles for proper dispatch and to insure the assistant operator provisions are observed. The gate guard should also check the driver's identification against the dispatch to insure he is the authorized operator of the vehicle.

e. Each contractor operated vehicle will be marked with distinctive markings, preferably in International Orange, to facilitate recognition of the vehicle and assist in spotting the vehicle from the air. Contractor will notify the local area PM of what the distinctive markings are to facilitate recognition of vehicles by PM personnel.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 18th Military Police Brigade for Period Ending 31 October 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

f. Contractors will keep the local military police unit advised of vehicle movements off post. Procedures for such liaison are to be agreed upon by the contractor and the MP unit.

g. To aid in the recovery of stolen vehicles, contractors will stamp or otherwise impress into the metal of the vehicle frame the USA number of the vehicle. The location of this marking should not be publicized to the drivers.

h. A current inventory or listing of vehicles located within the contractor's compound or installation will be maintained by type vehicle and USA number so that missing vehicles can be quickly identified. This inventory or listing will be maintained by the dispatcher. When it is discovered that a vehicle is lost or stolen, this fact will be immediately reported to the area provost marshal office. Report will include identification of which contractor the vehicle belongs to, where and when vehicle A was last seen, type vehicle, USA number of the vehicle, and the location on the frame where the USA number can be found.

i. Contractors will take any and all other measures they deem necessary to protect government equipment.

Contractors must also be advised that existing controls should be modified to ensure that internal security is provided commensurate with the actual or anticipated vulnerability of personnel and government equipment in the custody of contractors. The USARV Installation Security Evaluation Team-Assistance (ISET-A) from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) is conducting visits to contractors on a limited basis in order to assist the contractor security officers in evaluating their security requirements. Each contractor is strongly encouraged to evaluate and upgrade the security of each site prior to the arrival of the ISET-A. In this manner the ISET-A can evaluate improvements made and render support should it be necessary to add security measures that would require contract modification.

As an adjunct to the actions to be taken in paras above, contracting officers and property administrators will take positive, aggressive action to replace, to the greatest extent possible, all contractor-operated M-series vehicles with commercial design vehicles for use in MR III. If sufficient commercial
vehicles are not readily available in MR III, the contracting officer will direct the contractors to transfer his vehicles between locations so that commercial vehicles are used in MR III and M-Series vehicles in the other MRs. If necessary, the contracting officer(s) will direct exchange of like vehicles among various contractors in order to get as many contractors as possible to use only commercial vehicles in MR III.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

James Fleming
C-1, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs., 18th MP Brigade
Period Ending 31 Oct 72

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 18th MP Brigade
Period Ending 31 Oct 72

18th Military Police Brigade
Henry H. Gerecke, Colonel

5 Feb 74

N/A

N/A

HQ DA(DAMO-ODU) Washington, D.C. 20310