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8 March 1971

(C) PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG AND THE FUTURE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE US/GVN PROGRAM TO NEUTRALIZE THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE (II)

BY

COLONEL WILLIAM L. KNAPP
FIELD ARTILLERY

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PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG AND THE FUTURE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
US/GVN PROGRAM TO NEUTRALIZE THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE (U).

AN INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH REPORT,

by

Colonel William L. Knapp
Field Artillery

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
8 March 1971

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: William L. Knapp, Colonel, FA

TITLE: Phoenix/Phung Hoang and the Future: A Critical Analysis of the US/GVN Program to Neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure.

FORMAT: Individual Research Report

This research report examines the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program that exists in Vietnam today, and assesses its ability to perform its mission in the future. The assessment is based on a comparison of the measures used to bring the Malayan Emergency to a successful conclusion, with the measures now being used in the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program to neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure. The report concludes that while there are many similarities between the two insurrections, there are important differences. A significant difference that is germane to this report is that the attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure was begun very late in the war. However, it concludes that the attack on the VCI, once launched, has been reasonably effective. Furthermore, the report concludes that, in order to meet the needs of the future, the Phung Hoang organization should be placed under greater National Police aegis and the US advisory effort should be continued, but accomplished by US FBI trained advisors.
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE 1</td>
<td>STATE AND DISTRICT WAR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE 2</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION OF THE MALAYA POLICE FORCE</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE 3</td>
<td>THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE 4</td>
<td>ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE PHUNG HOANG PLAN</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE 5</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION CHART OF PROVINCE, CITY PH COMMITTEES</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE 6</td>
<td>DIOCC ORGANIZATION CHART</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation at War's End (August, 1945)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The &quot;Emergency&quot;</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Emergency Regulations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Communist Organization</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Support Arm--The Min Yuen</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The MELA</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government Plan</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Briggs Plan</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The War Committees</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Villages</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Police Organization</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Police Special Branch</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of Victory</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT IN VIETNAM</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NLF</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mass Organization</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commo-Liaison Cadres</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phung Hoang Organization</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US Advisory (Phoenix) Effort</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN Agency Participation</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Tri Detention</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. COMPARISON</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX I. MAP OF MALAYA AND SINGAPORE</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX II. MAP OF SOUTH VIETNAM</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX III. PHUNG HOANG SCHOOL PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I (I)

INTRODUCTION

A guerrilla war is an intimate affair, fought not merely with weapons but fought in the minds of the men who live in the villages and in the hills; fought by the spirit and policy of those who run the local governments. An outsider cannot, by himself, win a guerrilla war; he can help create conditions in which it can be won; he can directly assist those prepared to fight for their independence.¹

The above remarks by Professor Rostow are intended to establish the tone and spirit of this analysis of the US/GVN program to neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure, Phoenix/Phung Hoang.² To accomplish the analysis and determine the probable future effectiveness of the program in neutralizing the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), a comparison will be drawn between the Malayan "Emergency"³ and the Vietnam insurgency. This assessment will be accomplished, first, by an examination of the Malayan Emergency, with emphasis on the measures used to defeat or neutralize the Communist guerrilla infrastructure. Then, second, an assessment will be made of the current US/GVN Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program and the VCI threat it is attempting to neutralize. With the preceding assessment as the foundation, the two insurgencies will then be compared. From that comparison, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations will be made as to how the Phung Hoang program should be organized to neutralize the VCI threat in the years ahead.

A great deal has been written and, no doubt, will be written in the future, on both of these insurgencies. Yet, insofar as the attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure is concerned, the answer as to the most
effective way of neutralizing the VCI has eluded us thus far. Perhaps there is no answer. Perhaps the United States and South Vietnamese governments do not have the strength or wisdom for the job. I believe otherwise! After nearly a year (1969-70) of directing the Phoenix Program in the III Corps Tactical Zone (now III Military Region) of Vietnam, I am convinced that, with the help of the US Government, the Government of South Vietnam can neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure. As this paper will point out, the elimination of the VCI threat will come about as much from non Phung Hoang efforts as from the program itself. Furthermore, my research on the Malayan Emergency has reinforced my belief that a solution for Vietnam can and will be found, perhaps from the Malayan lessons. I hope this paper contributes to the finding of the solution. But the task is not easy. As the former US Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson wrote:

The insurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam are very sophisticated wars. Every conceivable facet of human life and endeavor and every function and agency of government has been taken under attack by every available means. Those wars are a blend of intense political, economic, socio-psychological, and military activities—a blend conceived, practiced, and finally put into operation by experts. The result is total war, war more total in its effort on people than any ever fought before.4

There you have the totality of the problem. Let us begin to dissect it by starting with an examination of the Malayan Emergency.

2. "Phung Hoang" is a code name for the plan derived from the Vietnamese term "Phoi Hop," meaning coordination.


CHAPTER II (U)

THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

BACKGROUND

To study some of the lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, it is first necessary to consider the background and effects of the Second World War.1

Sir Robert Thompson's point above is well made indeed, particularly in the case of the Malayan Emergency, since so much of what the Communist insurgents were able to do in Malaya was the direct result of World War II. Subsumed in the above statement, but often overlooked, is a principle difference between the two insurgencies: to wit, the fact that Great Britain had a significant interest in Malaya for centuries prior to the Emergency, while the US interest in Vietnam was relatively new.2 While direct British interest in the Malay peninsula began in 1786 with her acquisition of the island of Penang in the Straits of Malacca,3 it is not my intent to recount British colonial development of the rich Malay peninsula. Suffice to say here, that for the next 100 years, the British sort of "muddled-through," and by 1895 had succeeded in establishing on the peninsula an "organized confederacy" under the British Residency System.4 Through the intervening years, up to the Japanese occupation in 1941, the Federated and Unfederated States of the peninsula gradually--through often painfully--acquired the beginnings of a sense of common destiny.5
Having secured the neutrality of Russia in April 1941, and following the German invasion of Russia two months later, Japan was free to occupy the whole of Indo-China in July, 1941. Then, following her sudden strike at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, Japan, within hours, landed troops at Kota Bharu in Kelantan and in the Thai area immediately to the north. From there, Japanese forces quickly overran the entire peninsula and, in ten weeks, captured Singapore (15 February 1942).

GROWTH OF THE MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP)

While the British were attempting to consolidate their position in Malaya, in the 1920's, a Communist movement was begun in Malaya; not under the direction of such well-known Asian Communists as Mao Tse-Tung or Ho Chi Minh, but, rather, under the direction of the Russian Communist Party's Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai. In 1928, the South Seas Communist Party, was able to organize an effective strike in Singapore. Two years later the Malayan Communist Party was formed. By 1939 an extremely capable young Vietnamese named Lai Tek had succeeded in organizing a Communist cell system that covered Malaya. That same year he was elected as the Secretary General of the MCP.

However, when Russia became an ally of the British in 1941, it became necessary for the Malayan Communist Party to reverse its position and support the British rather than agitate for their removal from Malaya. Later, when the Japanese invaded the peninsula, Lai Tek was instructed to assist the British, to include the
establishment of guerrilla warfare units in the rear of the Japanese armies. Before Singapore fell the British were able to train 200 of their men to stay-behind and train the Communist guerrillas. This was the birth of what became known as the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).  

THE MALAYAN PEOPLES ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY

The MPAJA took three years to develop. It was essentially a Chinese guerrilla force. At its peak, it contained about 7000 men organized into eight regiments. This force was supported in most aspects, except arms and ammunition, by a large number of so-called Chinese "squatters." These were refugees of sorts, who had come to the edge of the jungle, scratched out a piece of land and subsisted on it. These very same "squatters" were to play an important role in the "Emergency" in the years to come.

About a year after the fall of Singapore, the stay-behind British force was joined by Force 136. This was a British advisory group type organization consisting of some 90 officers and 250 enlisted men, (mostly NCO's). Their mission was to organize for and receive British arms, ammunition, and supplies for the MPAJA. Additionally, they were to prepare the guerrilla force to assist in the planned invasion of Malaya by an allied force under Lord Louis Mountbatten.
Of significance at this time was the fact that the British officers and men of the stay-behind teams and Force 136 worked with an intimate knowledge of the Communist guerrilla force. One leader in particular, Chin Peng, then 22 years old and Party Secretary in the State of Perak, was destined to become the MCP Party Secretary and lead the Communist insurgency against the British.  

However, despite the best efforts of the British, the MPAJA was never too effective against the Japanese. Leaders of the MPAJA were concerned with getting the Army well organized and equipped, which they did.

**SITUATION AT WAR'S END (AUGUST, 1945)**

When the Japanese surrendered in August of 1945, there were approximately five million people in Malaya, excluding Singapore. Ethnically, the population was approximately 49% Malay, 38% Chinese, 12% Indian and the remaining 1% was a mixture of Europeans, Eurasians, and seminomadic aborigine tribesmen who lived in the jungles that covered four-fifths of the country.

Prior to the war, it was the Chinese who worked and ran the prosperous tin mines and rubber plantations, under British and European management. However, with the Japanese occupation, all commercial
endeavors ceased. Ultimately about one-half of the Chinese rural population, (some 500,000) "squatted" on the edge of the jungle, and there they were at war's end. The British reoccupation force arrived some three weeks after the Japanese surrender and were welcomed by most of the people.

The Communists, on the other hand, were faced with a dilemma. They had previously agreed to cooperate with the British after the war and to disband the guerrilla army. This they did, with reasonable grace. Each uniformed guerrilla received a medal and 300 Malayan dollars ($100 US) in return for his previous services and his rifle. As a matter of fact, more weapons were turned in than had been issued. It seems the Chinese guerrillas had helped themselves to thousands of British weapons, in depots and armories, as they were overrun by the Japanese. This left the Chinese guerrillas, at war's end, with large concealed caches of arms and ammunition, even after the ceremonial turn-in.

A second factor of considerable significance, was the establishment by the MPAJA, of an "Old Comrades' Association." This association had branches in every town and a parallel peoples' organization.
among the "squatters" and villagers. While its overt purpose was social, its covert purpose was to keep the MPAJA in tact.22

THE "EMERGENCY"

In early June 1948, it was becoming obvious that a Chinese Communist campaign of terror had begun.23 The pressure became too much for Sir Edward Gent, the British High Commissioner, and on 16 and 17 June 1948, a "State of Emergency" was declared over the entire country.24

THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS

It is important, at the outset, to understand that these Emergency Regulations did not establish a state of martial law. Quite the contrary. "The civil government--federal, state, district, and village--exercised control throughout."25 Military forces were, from the outset, employed in support of civil authorities and civil forces.

The Emergency Regulations Ordinance, 1948, as passed by the Federal Legislature in June 1948, were revised in 1949, 1951, and again in 1953, by which time they had grown to 149 pages.26 These regulations provided extreme powers27 to police and other government forces and were used throughout the Emergency as required.

One of the most important early actions taken under the Emergency Regulations was registration of the entire population over twelve years of age and the issuance of identity cards. Contrary to the later experiences in Vietnam, the methods employed for the registration, issue and retention of the cards worked. It was effective in Malaya
because one could not exist within the law and villages without a card. The card was needed for food, a place to live, permission to build a hut in resettlement villages, and for many other necessities. Under these conditions there were ample incentives for the bearers to hang on to their cards.\(^\text{28}\)

A second aspect of the Emergency Regulations, which was of major importance, was the power to arrest and detain without trial. As in Vietnam, safeguards were employed, though abuses occurred in both places. In Malaya, a Public Review Board was established. Made up of independent citizens, it examined each case; annually at first and, later, every six months. It also handled appeals. Importantly, the Boards' activities were widely published.

An additional factor, which bears on the discussion at this point and which will have considerable relevance later in this paper, is the fact that the MCP and its front organizations were not declared illegal until 23 July 1948.\(^\text{29}\) The situation was somewhat paradoxical in that Malayan Communists were Chinese, but not Chinese Communists. One could legally be a member of the Chinese Communist Party in Singapore, but it became illegal to be Chinese and a member of the Malayan Communist Party.\(^\text{30}\) There was some method to the madness, however, in that by allowing an overt party structure to exist, it was possible for the police to keep a close watch on the party members and the people with whom the party members came in contact. This gave the police valuable leads into the covert organization. When the party was finally declared illegal the police arrested 600 known party members.\(^\text{31}\)
THE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION

To prosecute the "peoples' war" in Malaya, the MCP organized themselves in typical Russian Communist fashion. At the very top was a Central Executive Committee. It is believed to have numbered between ten and thirteen men, who were probably chairmen of State Committees. Within this group was the usual Politburo—the key leaders and brains of the organization. This group usually consisted of three men. One level below the Central Executive Committee and subservient to it was the Central Military Committee. This committee controlled the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), formerly the MPAJA. Again in true Soviet style there were political "commissars" or "instructors" at all levels of the MRLA down to and including the six-man section.

Political guidance and control of the country was exercised by three Regional Bureaus—north, central, and south—all of which were responsible to the Central Executive Committee. Under the Bureaus came (in descending order) State, District, and Branch Committees, and, at the very bottom, cells. These committees were made up of party members who could and did hold positions in the MRLA.

THE SUPPORT ARM—THE MIN YUEN

From district level on down, the party structure was divided between the MRLA and the vital supporting arm known as the Min Yuon. They were the same suppliers, informers, contacts, couriers, spies, intelligence sources, food gatherers, tax collectors, and recruiters.
that the Communist guerrillas had used against the Japanese. However in World War II the guerrillas also had outside support—the British. The Min Yuen were the "Infrastructure" of the Malayan Emergency, though they were not labeled as such. Their importance cannot be overstated.  

These people were the link between MRLA and the native community. Some were party members, some were not. As in Vietnam today with the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), the strength of the Min Yuen was difficult to estimate accurately. Estimates ran from a low of 10,000 to a high of 500,000. I believe the higher figure was closer to the mark, judging from my Vietnam experiences.

As is true in Vietnam today with the VCI, the Min Yuen was more locateable than was the MRLA. Of necessity the Min Yuen had to work in or close to the towns and villages. Yet, despite their exposure, they remained as elusive as their VCI brethren do today. The reason for this is the same in each place: security! The Min Yuen (and the VCI) depended on secrecy for their existence. The people knew who they were, but the people simply would not volunteer the information until they had faith in the Government's ability to protect them. It takes
a very low level of effort on the part of the insurgents, such as a well timed and publicized kidnapping or assassination, to keep a community in check.

As the Emergency progressed and as the police and security forces improved, the Min Yuen were forced to change their operations. Initially the Min Yuen were not armed. However, as the Min Yuen and the MRLA came under increased pressure, it became necessary to detail MRLA platoons to the District Committees for the protection of the Min Yuen. Additionally, it was found that armed Min Yuen units could effectively harass and divert the police and security forces from their anti-MRLA missions. Thus, the Min Yuen became a screening forces for the MRLA, as well as their suppliers.42

THE MRLA

While a detailed discussion of the Malayan Races' Liberation Army is not essential to this paper, a basic understanding of the Army and its modus operandi is essential. Estimates of the overall strength of the MRLA vary from 5,00043 to 7,000.44 The Army was formed into regiments, with each Malayan scate having one or more "regiments." Regiments could vary in size from 400 to 700 men.45 The regiments normally operated in company or smaller groups, which generally paralleled their day-to-day living organization.46 Their camps, in the early days (through 1949) were large (some capable of accommodating up to 600 men), well built, well concealed from aerial observation, and normally
contained a parade-ground, offices, officer's quarters, barracks, kitchens, latrines, and classrooms. In later years they were forced to use smaller bases. As much as 60% of the training day was spent in political indoctrination. New men went through a "waiting period" before they became fully-fledged members of the MRLA, during which time they were trained, observed, and criticized. Only a select few qualified for MCP membership.

The MRLA was trained to do what a guerrilla army is expected to do; conduct raids, ambushes, sabotage, kidnapings, harassment, assassinations, and to terrorize when and where necessary. They never went to big unit operations as in Vietnam. They became very adept at improvising since there was no known external support.

**THE GOVERNMENT PLAN**

It was not until April, 1950, that the British Government found the key that would lead to eventual success in the Malayan Emergency. The "key" was the appointment of Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs as Director of Operations and Executive of the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney. Briggs was fifty-five, retired from the Army, and expert in jungle warfare and a veteran of the Western Desert and Burma. He was asked "to plan, to coordinate, and direct the anti-bandit operations of the police and fighting forces."

Prior to Briggs arrival, the war was not going well for the allies. The MRLA and Min Yuen were growing, despite the fact that 50 to 60 guerrillas were being killed and 20 to 30 were surrendering each month.
The casualty rate among the soldiers was about six guerrillas to one soldier, but for the police the ratio favored the guerrillas. About 100 civilians were being murdered per month. There seemed no end to the support—ammunition, food, intelligence, recruits—available to the Communists from the "squatters."\textsuperscript{52}

Despite, or perhaps because of, the harsh measures of Regulation 17\textsuperscript{53} enemy initiated incidents continued to rise. In February 1950 they rose to 221, an increase of 80\% over the average monthly incident figure for 1949. In May, the monthly incidents rose to 534.\textsuperscript{54} Additionally, coordination between the police, the Army, and the civil administrators was not good. The Army did not like supporting the police, nor did it appreciate the methodical police operations.\textsuperscript{55}

THE BRIGGS PLAN

That was the situation that confronted General Briggs upon his arrival in Malaya. After assembling a small staff and traveling around the country for two weeks, to see for himself, he announced what became known as the Briggs Plan. It had four objectives:

a. To secure the populated areas so that, in time, information on the enemy would flow in from all sources.
b. To break up the Communist organization in the populated areas.

c. To deny the Communist access to food and support from populated areas.

d. To destroy the Communist forces by forcing him to fight.\textsuperscript{56}

To plan was bold and unique for that time and place, but much more than the plan was required.

**THE WAR COMMITTEES**

First, to insure closer cooperation between the military, police, and civil administration. General Briggs set up his office in the Federal Police Headquarters. He, himself, worked in civilian clothes. He established and chaired a War Council, consisting of the Chief Secretary of the Federation, the Commissioner of Police, and the commanders of the British Army and Air Forces. This later (1957, as independence approached) became the Emergency Operation Council (EOC) with the Prime Minister as Chairman, the Defense Minister as Deputy Chairman, and the Director of Operations as Executive Officer.\textsuperscript{57} He established in each State and District a State (SWEC) and District (DWEC) War Executive Committees, which met weekly as shown in Figure 1.\textsuperscript{58} As might be expected, there was an operations subcommittee for each SWEC and DWEC, that met daily. These meetings were short, normally of one-half hour duration, and, again, were attended by the civil, police, and military commanders, plus the Special Branch and Military Intelligence Officer.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>SWEC</th>
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<tr>
<td>State Prime Minister** or</td>
<td>District Officer**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Officer*</td>
<td>Information Officer*</td>
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<tr>
<td>**Chairman</td>
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<td>Police</td>
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<td>Head, Special Branch*</td>
<td>Special Branch Officer*</td>
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<td>Military Intelligence Officer***</td>
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<td>Home Guard Officer*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Commander</td>
<td>Battalion Commander</td>
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*Advisors Only
**Chairman
***Advisors Only, responsible to Police Special Branch. Later, community religious, racial, and labor leaders were added as advisors.

FIGURE 1

As the name suggests, operational matters of immediate concern were discussed and decided upon. To compliment the operations subcommittee and to insure continuous police-Army cooperation and coordination, General Briggs ordered the establishment of joint police-Army operations rooms in every district.
Basic to the success of the Briggs Plan was the task of separating the MRLA from its source of support. It was correctly reasoned that the support came from the half million "squatters" on the fringes of the jungle. The plan for the resettlement of these "squatters" was not easily sold to the Malay rulers, because it meant giving up valuable "Malay reservation" land to aliens. Fortunately, there were some enlightened leaders in Negri Sembilan and Johore and the plan became a reality.\textsuperscript{61} By completion of the plan in 1951, some 510 new villages were constructed and approximately 600,000 persons were resettled.\textsuperscript{62} Two to three thousand was found to be the ideal population for each village. The villages had to be defensible, near where people could work, and accessible to roads and water. Each family was given an 800 square yard plot inside the double perimeter fence on which to live and grow vegetables. Outside the illuminated fence, but nearby, each family was allowed two acres of arable land. Timber frames and roofs for houses were erected, and siding provided for erection by the new occupants. Families were compensated for crops and property left behind, and until they were settled and self sufficient. Each New Village contained a school, community center, police station, medical dispensary and playing fields.\textsuperscript{63} Importantly, General Briggs insisted on, and got a Chinese speaking British resettlement officer, assisted by two young Malayan Chinese, for each New Village.\textsuperscript{64}
The movement of the "squatters" to each New Village was a military operations of the most delicate nature. Once the village was occupied, a strict 6 p.m. to 7 a.m. curfew was established. Villagers were searched by Security Forces whenever they went outside the village fence, to prevent them from carrying any supplies to the Communist guerrillas. Each village had its Council, appointed at first, but by 1954, they were elected by universal suffrage.

The establishment of the New Villages was not without problems. There were staffing problems and logistic problems—even in the jungles of Malaya, acquiring twenty million palm leaves from one State can be a problem. The resettlement of some indigenous tribes similar to the Montagnards was attempted, but failed completely. The resettlement plan was costly—about $38.3 million dollars (US) exclusive of the cost of community facilities like schools, which were funded by the departments concerned. Initially, it cost $600,000 (US) per year just to light the perimeter fences. The enemy reacted violently to the New Villages. By mid 1951, when most of the resettlement was completed, the villages, officials, and police posts came under increasingly heavy attack. In October 1951, the guerrillas succeeded in ambushing and killing the High Commissioner himself, Sir Henry Gurney. But the villages held. Perhaps the best proof of their success was the fact that when the Emergency was over, few new villagers returned to their former "squatter" plots.
THE POLICE ORGANIZATION

Since much of the responsibility for defeating the Communist insurgents in Malaya fell on the shoulders of the police force, it is useful to examine its organization and capabilities. The overall organization is shown at Figure 2. At the outset of the Emergency there were approximately 9,000 policemen. In six months the figure went to 45,000 and at its peak the police force rose to over 60,000. Additionally, there were 30,000 in the Special Constabulary. The Special Constabulary were primarily a guard force for rubber estates, mines, and other areas where the population worked in the open. Additionally, they served as static guard posts, gate controllers, and to protect and control movement of food and other essential supplies. Initially they were trained by the planters and miners. Ultimately, 300 British ex police sergeants, were obtained mostly from Palestine to train the Constabulary. While these "Palestine Sergeants" were inclined to be a bit heavy-handed, they knew their jobs and did them. Because it was able to provide local security, the Special Constabulary was instrumental in permitting the release of Army units for hunting the guerrillas in the jungle. Thus, the Army units were able to keep the MRLA from massing into large units which could not have been handled by the village police posts and Home Guard.

In contrast to Vietnam, emphasis was placed on building up the police force very early in the conflict, as is evident from the buildup figures mentioned earlier. It generally took six months to train a police constable. The village constables were Malays, under the command of experienced regular Malay NCO policemen. Above them at district level, their
Fig. 2 Organization chart of the Royal Federation of Malaya Police Force.
(From Adkins, p. 127.)
commanders, more often than not, were British police officers of considerable experience. The Chief, or Commissioner, of The Federation Police was also British.

All villages had police posts. A new village of only 100-200 people, for example, might have as many as thirty full time policemen, plus NCO's. Therefore, security of, and in the villages, was not only due to the quality of the police available, it was also due to the quantity as well. At the start of the Emergency there was less than one policeman for every 100 supporters of the guerrillas. By 1952, at the peak of the conflict, there was nearly one police or home guardsman for every five active, or 10 potential, supporters for the guerrillas.

THE POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH

In addition to excellent coverage by uniformed policemen, the Malayan police force was blessed with a superb Special Branch. These detectives were usually Malayan Chinese with the rank of corporal or sergeant. They worked in plain-clothes and lived in the village police post. Normally, they were known to friend and foe alike and, therefore, had to have a reasonably secure environment within which to operate. It was these men who recruited the vital agents who, in turn, provided the really significant intelligence required to crack the Min Yuen. These detectives were also trained interrogators who could get, without counterproductive torture, maximum information from captured or surrendered enemy personnel. Obviously, these Special Branch detectives had to be trustworthy, since they were properly provided large sums of money.
with which to buy information. Normally, three or four village S.E. detectives would be supervised by a Police Inspector. At district level there would normally be an Assistant Superintendent, many of whom were British.\footnote{76}

\section*{Achievement of Victory}

I have provided a resume of the basic ingredients that were used to achieve victory in Malaya, which are germane to this discussion. There are three more events which sustained the momentum established by the measures I have discussed above. First, there was the appointment in February 1952, of General Sir Gerald Templer as High Commissioner and Director of Operations to replace the assassinated Sir Henry Gurney and the departed General Briggs. General Templer ruled with a rod iron for two years while executing the Briggs Plan. He also reiterated Britain's determination that Malaya should be independent. Furthermore, he set up the machinery for the first elections in 1955. Second, there were the abortive peace talks, in December 1955, between Tunku Abdul Rahman (by then chairman of the Emergency Operations Council) and the Malayan Communist leader Chin Peng. Tunku offered generous amnesty terms to the Communist guerrillas but would not agree to legalizing the MCP. Third, on 31 August 1957, Malaya became independent with Tunku Abdul Rahman as Prime Minister.

Still the "bandits" fought on. But by 1960, the Communist guerrillas were reduced to 400 survivors on the Thai border and the state of emergency was ended.\footnote{77}
CONCLUSIONS

What I have recounted from the Malayan Emergency are those factors, events, and forces, which led to an eventual Communist defeat. However, I have recounted only those which bear significantly on the later discussion and assessment of the Phung Hoang Program and its ability to neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure threat. Therefore, to summarize the findings from the Malayan "Emergency," we can say the following:

a. The long British involvement and rule of Malaya was a significant asset in the prosecution of the war.

b. Dynamic leadership in the persons of Generals Briggs and Templer, and the successful execution of the Briggs Plan were the cornerstones for victory.

c. Civil control throughout the Emergency insured the proper balance, emphasis, and coordination in the prosecution of war efforts.

d. The achievement of an early buildup of a qualified police force under British command, and its retention at village level throughout the "Emergency" insured an early and continuous attack on the Malayan infrastructure.

e. The skilled use of Special Branch detectives (supported by military intelligence) at village level, provided the essential intelligence to destroy the support organization.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II

5. Allen, pp. 52-70.
6. Ibid., p. 71.
7. Ibid.
8. Purcell, p. 41.
10. Ibid., p. 13.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 15.
14. Clutterbuck, p. 16.
15. Purcell, p. 73.
16. Clutterbuck, p. 16.
17. Ibid., p. 17.
18. Ibid., p. 16.
19. Ibid., p. 19.
20. Ibid., p. 21.

23. Miller, pp. 77-84. (For a discussion of the ill-fated Malayan Union and factors causing the MCP to go to an armed struggle, see Clutterbuck, p. 24.)

24. Ibid., pp. 84-85.

25. Clutterbuck, p. 36.

26. Ibid., p. 37.

27. A summary of the regulations from Adkins, pp. 148-149, follows: The police had special powers to arrest, detain, exclude people from particular areas; to impose curfews; to search people and their houses; to close roads, paths, waterways; to requisition buildings, vehicles, and boats; and to seize seditious documents and any article which they thought could be used as an offensive weapon. Death was the penalty for the unauthorized possession of firearms, ammunition, or explosives. Any person arrested under the Emergency Regulations could be detained for one year without a charge being brought, but he had every right to place his objections before a reviewing committee.

28. Clutterbuck, p. 38.

29. Ibid., p. 39.


33. Ibid., p. 103.


35. Miller, p. 103.

36. Ibid.


38. As Harry Miller put it: "The Min Yuen has become the priority target of the Security Forces, for it has been obvious that without this organization the Communist Army cannot continue to exist in the jungle. The Security Forces rate their kills of Min Yuen and 'district' and 'branch' committee members, far higher than those of the fighters in the jungles. Commanders say, 'Crack the Min Yuen and the bandits must come out to fight for food--and life.'" p. 104.
40. Clutterbuck, p. 44; Miller, p. 104.
41. Miller, p. 104.
42. Ibid., p. 106.
43. Dougherty, p. 301.
44. Miller, p. 113.
45. Ibid.
46. Clutterbuck, p. 46.
47. Miller, p. 107.
49. Ibid., p. 110.
50. Clutterbuck, p. 57.
51. Miller, p. 138. For an interesting and amusing discussion of the paradoxes in British policy, e.g., recognition of Communist China in January 1950, fighting then in Korea and Malaya and the reasons for calling the Malayan war on "Emergency and the enemy, "bandits" see Linebarger, pp. 293-294.
52. Clutterbuck, p. 55.
53. Harsh and reactive measures were applied in 1949 to keep things in check. Emergency Regulation 17D was introduced. Under this regulation the government could detain any village, area, or district where there was evidence of aiding, supporting, or assisting the Communists. Between January and October 1949, the regulation was invoked sixteen times and a total of 6343 people were thrust into detention camps. While compensation was paid for lost property and livestock, too many innocent people were swept up in the raids and hence were turned against the government, Miller, p. 134.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p. 70.
56. Ibid., p. 139.
57. Clutterbuck, p. 57.
58. Ibid., p. 58.
59. Ibid., p. 60.
60. Miller, p. 140.
61. Ibid., p. 143
62. Adkins, p. 132
63. Ibid., p. 130.
64. Clutterbuck, p. 62.
65. The delicacy of the move cannot be overstressed. For it is this sort of activity that shapes the attitudes of the people towards their government. For a moving description of the operation, see Clutterbuck, p. 62.
66. Adkins, p. 132
67. Ibid.
68. Clutterbuck, p. 72.
69. Adkins, p. 128.
70. Miller, p. 89.
71. The Home Guards were volunteer armed villagers. They may be compared with the Peoples Self Defense Force (2SDF) of today in Vietnam. They were used for night-time defense of their own village and in emergencies.
72. Clutterbuck, p. 71.
73. Adkins, p. 128.
74. Clutterbuck, p. 44.
75. Special Branch is a British term for the intelligence or investigative arm of the police force. Its closest parallel in the US at National level is the FBI.
76. Clutterbuck, p. 99.
77. Ibid., pp. 186-188.
CHAPTER III (U)

ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT IN VIETNAM

As was indicated at the beginning of Chapter II, many of the major problems facing Vietnam today have roots that stem from World War II days and before. However, insofar as US interests are concerned, they date back only to the eve of World War II when US leaders were becoming increasingly concerned about growing Japanese expansionism in Southeast Asia. While the United States and her European allies were interested to see the balance of power maintained in Southeast Asia, neither the US nor her allies were in a position to do anything about the power vacuum that then (1940) existed. Hence, Indochina was but a pawn available for the taking by Japan, particularly after the fall of France in June 1940. Japan, in addition to desiring to halt the shipment of war materials from Hanoi to Chiang Kai-shek in the interior of China, also wanted South Vietnam for staging air and ground forces for operations in the rest of Indochina.\(^1\) Thus, on 30 August 1940, Japan occupied a transit base at Haiphong and the major airfields in Tonkin. In July 1941, Japan extended her occupation to the air and naval bases of Saigon and Tourane. Surprisingly, she allowed the French internal administration and military forces, such as they were (15,000) to remain until March, 1945, whereupon Japan ruthlessly wiped them out.\(^2\)

In May 1941, as the Japanese increased their hold on Vietnam, the Indochinese Communist Party joined forces with other nationalist
(but non-Communist) groups and formed a "National Front" called the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Revolutionary League for the Independence of Vietnam). This later became known as the "Viet Minh." Its ardent anti-French leader was a nationalist call Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot). He later changed his name to Ho Chi Minh (He who Enlightens). Interestingly, the Viet Minh began as an anti-Japanese guerrilla force just as the MPAJA did.

Thus, it was the Viet-Minh that created the first anti-Japanese guerrilla forces in Vietnam, that rescued American fliers shot down in Indochina, that provided intelligence to the allies, that spread its propaganda among the civilian population, and that received all the credit for anti-Japanese activities during the war.4

Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh worked hard throughout the war consolidating their position. On the day following the first atom bomb explosion (6 August 1945), Ho Chi Minh declared his guerrillas to be the "Vietnam Liberation Army" and within a few days set up a shadow government call the Vietnam Peoples' Liberation Committee.5 Though, in the previous March, the Japanese had declared Vietnam "independent" and had set up a puppet government, it was no match for the Viet Minh. Therefore, by V-J Day, Ho Chi Minh was able to claim control of all of Vietnam.6 Even though the French reoccupied Vietnam later, and, on 6 March 1946, agreed to the existence of "the Republic of Vietnam as a free state...forming part of...the French Union,"7 France was never able to regain control. The fighting for that control began on a large scale in December 1946 and lasted until the armistice was signed at Geneva on 21 July 1954.8
History has recorded well that the struggle for power only ebbed slightly at that time.

Direct American post-war involvement can be traced to an Economic Survey Mission headed by R. Allen Griffin. He and a team of experts went to Vietnam in March 1950. The team, in its published report of May, 1950 concluded that:

a. The Viet Minh are led by Communist and the "pacified areas" are infiltrated with agents and Viet Minh sympathizers.

b. That while the French military control the population centers and lines of communications, only a "political solution" is likely to end the war.

c. Vietnam is strategically important in Southeast Asia, particularly if it should fall to the Communists.

d. The major political problem is the ending of the revolution and the reestablishment of law and order.

e. There is an urgent need for rehabilitation of pacified areas, extension of medical and health facilities, reconstruction, extension of telecommunications facilities, and balanced economic development.9

Those words are still true today, perhaps not to the extent that they were when they were written, but still, there is a ring of truth in them. The social, political, psychological, and ideological forces at work today are different perhaps.10 The Viet Minh are there under a different name—the Viet Cong. The military forces have changed both in their capacity to destroy and the colors of the banners under which they fight. Only the people remain the same, that is, if they are alive.
The suffering remains. The fight for their hearts and minds is the same. It's a wonder that anyone twenty-five years of age or over has either heart or mind left because they have had so many people vying for them. But it is not my purpose to recount the battles for those hearts and minds that have been raging since the formation of the Viet Minh on 19 May 1941. It is, rather, to examine the forces at work today that continue to perpetrate the insurgency in Vietnam, as well as how the governments of South Vietnam and the United States are organizing to neutralize those subversive forces. Let us continue, then, by first examining the VC Infrastructure.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III


5. Fall, *Osanka*, p. 255.

6. Ibid.


8. Ibid.


CHAPTER IV (U)

THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE

Before examining the Infrastructure in detail, it is essential to understand its origins. It's important not only because there has been much contradictory and confusing information written about it, but also it will assist in the later comparison with the Malayan Emergency.

There are two central points that must be remembered throughout this discussion. The first is, the Vietnamese village. "For two thousand years it has been so, and although the two cities of Saigon and Hanoi may have been regarded abroad as Vietnam, to the Vietnamese the village was his land's heart, mind, and soul."¹ The second point is that secret societies or clandestine organizations (political, religious, or otherwise) have been a regular part of Vietnamese life for centuries.² Therefore, it should not be surprising that the organizations, such as will be described later, could flourish in South Vietnam. Additionally, a unique factor was the manner in which the master organizer, Ho Chi Minh, carried out the formation of the National Liberation Front (NLF), the successor organization to the Viet Minh. This building process was greatly facilitated by the cadres, former Viet Minh guerrillas and party workers, that already existed throughout South Vietnam. Though they were admittedly weakened by the regrouping that occurred after the Geneva accords.³ It took about four years, from 1959 through 1962, to mold the tightly knit organization⁴ that has withstood ten subsequent years of constant
pressure aimed at its destruction. The Diem Government provided ample reasons for rallying to the NLF flag. The NLF rose to a strength of 300,000 by the time Diem was overthrown on 1 November 1963. Membership then dropped by 50,000 to 100,000, and then rose again to 300,000 by 1966.5

It was during the early years, 1960-1962, that the decision was made to form an admittedly Communist organization to be known as the Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP). This occurred at an NLF organizing congress on 1 January 1962. This period also marked the formation of the organizational structure that will be discussed next.6

ORGANIZATION

The overall organization for the Viet Cong Infrastructure is shown at Figure 3. From this it can be seen that the primary agency for the direction of the Viet Cong insurgency is the PRP which is the southern branch of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, the Dang Lao Dong.7 From the PRP headquarters, known as COSVN (Central Office of South Vietnam) flows the political and military direction of the war. As shown in Figure 3, the direction of the Liberation Army, on the one hand, and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (or NLF as it is commonly known), on the other hand, flows from the PRP. Additionally, the PRP maintains party control of military and political organizations from the highest to the lowest (village) level.8

At each level there is a Party Executive Committee that is responsible for all VC military and political activity at its respective echelon.
Figure 3. The Viet Cong Infrastructure, *The VCI Handbook*, p. 6.
These committees are normally composed of a Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and the chiefs of important functional sections. Additionally, each Secretary is normally the Chief of the Current Affairs Committee (the day-to-day operations group of the party) at his level. The Province Committee Secretary normally serves on the Region Party Committee. Furthermore, the Deputy Secretary will normally be the chairman of the NLF committee if one exists at his level.

The Central Executive Committee (so-called at COSVN level) makes the broad policy decisions, while the Region Party Committee will adapt the decisions handed down from COSVN, to meet their own particular requirements. Region then hands down more specific mission-type orders to the Province Committees, where they are translated into specific directives. Village Committees carry out the orders received from the District Committees. Village Committees exercised control over the local guerrillas (also known as "Local Force" units) as distinguished from "Main Force" units and "NVA" units.) Perhaps it is best to digress for a moment to clarify that distinction.

From a functional point of view, the Communist armed forces are divided into two major elements; the Liberation Army (Quan Doi Giai Phong) in South Vietnam, and; the Peoples' Army (Quan Doi Nhan Dan), that is, the DRV Army in North Vietnam (also called "NVA"), PAVN. The Liberation Army is divided into full-time military units called "Main Force" units and part-time paramilitary elements, called "Local Force" units. NLF literature frequently refers to the latter as the "Guerrilla Popular Army." These part-time guerrilla units are found at village and
hamlet level and are usually of two types, "village" and "combat." The "village guerrilla" is generally an older person (man or woman) assigned to static defense of the village (if under VC control). The "combat guerrilla," on the other hand, is younger, better armed and trained, and organized into units (up to platoon size) that can be employed outside the village, but probably within the district. The basic unit for both the village and combat guerrilla is the three-man cell. In GVN controlled areas these cells are secret. Some cells are highly trained, experienced, and motivated and are called "special activity" cells. These cells have been described as "the most dangerous element in the entire paramilitary structure," since they form the assassination teams, grenade hurlers, or suicide squads. It is evident that the local "combat guerrilla" cells provide personnel for "Local Force" units. When the larger, better trained and equipped, "Main Force" units need replacements they get them from the "Local Force" units. Hence, it is essential, when attempting to combat an insurgent force of the type found in Vietnam, to cut off the cells and supporters among the populace, from the political direction of the district committee, as well as, to prevent the cells and supporters in the population from supporting the local guerrilla units.10

Returning, once again, to the PRP organization, we find at each level the following staff sections:

a. Military Affairs.
b. Security Affairs.
c. Propaganda and Indoctrination.
d. Finance and Economy.
e. Forward Support and Reinforcement.

f. Civilian Proselyting.

g. Military Proselyting.

h. Peoples' Revolutionary Youth Association.

Depending on the level and complexity of the local operation, one may also find the following sections:

a. Investigation.

b. Medical/Public Health.

c. Organization (Records).

d. City Affairs.

e. Administration.

f. Base Area Protection.

g. Base Production.

h. Political Struggle (Demonstrations).

I mention these sections to indicate the depth and complexity of the organization. There are few, if any, aspects of a military support or political organization that are not the assigned responsibility of some dedicated party cadresmen. It also defies one's imagination to think that such an organization can remain largely hidden for as long as it has.

THE NLF

At COSVN level the NLF is the overt voice of the PRP and the VC under the name of "Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam" (PRG). The PRG has even been given diplomatic recognition by most
Communist governments of the world and has provided representation to some, including the Paris Peace Talks. It purports to be the voice of the "people" and has steadily maintained that it is a government in being, and could govern South Vietnam.

Additionally, there are reports that Peoples Liberation Councils have been formed at region, province, and district levels. These councils are alleged to be "elected" bodies and to have replaced the Peoples Liberation (or Revolutionary) Committees (the Party Cells) at village and hamlet level, hence they purport to represent "legitimate" local government. Their importance should not be underestimated. Where they exist—and many do exist today—they represent to the villager a form of government control. They help to carry out the well known three-pronged attack on the VC: The military struggle, the political struggle, and military proselytizing.

THE MASS ORGANIZATIONS

The business end of the VC Infrastructure is the functional liberation association. These exist only at village level and have the common objectives of bringing together people of common occupational, religious, or ethnic backgrounds, molding them into solid groups or "protective" associations, and then inducing the members to participate in the political struggle. The three most important groups are, the Liberation Farmers Association (to provide taxes, porters, labor), the Liberation Youth Association (for manpower, fighting, proselytizing, propaganda, carrying ammunition), and the Liberation Women's Association.
(to sew, prepare food and shelter, and argue with GVN officials). Other, less important, but significant organizations, or associations, that have been identified include:

a. The Liberation Worker's Association.
b. The Liberation Student Association.
c. The Liberation Cultural Association.
e. Western Highlands Peoples' Autonomy Movement.
g. South Vietnam Patriotic Teachers' Association.
i. Former Resistance Members' Association.
j. Central War Invalids' and Heroes' Association.
k. Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Association.
l. Liberation Laborers' Association.
m. The Alliance of National Democratic and Peace Forces.

Again, the important point to be gleaned from the above list is the all-encompassing nature of these organizations. Every conceivable group is organized whenever and wherever possible.

COMM-LIAISON CADRES

The links between the various levels of the organization are provided by commo-liaison agents. Normally, the agents at region, province, and district levels operate full time, while the village level agents are normally part-time operatives and rely more heavily
on verbal messages. Security is heavily enforced. Agents may have knowledge of the next higher and lower agent. More often than not, the agent will be given a pick-up or drop point. Large villages may have several commo-liaison stations. Routes are changed frequently and seldom are roads or rice paddy embankments used. Agents carrying important printed matter, or money, will usually have guerrilla protection and move only at night. Radios are used as well, but traffic is normally coded. Additionally, telephones have been discovered, but only in highly secured VC-dominated areas. 17

I have purposely avoided discussing the strength of the VCI since estimates vary widely and it is not germane to this discussion, except in gross terms. For comparison sake, the estimated strength of 75,000 (as of January 1970) may be used. It is important to note the categories of people that this figure does not include. They are:

a. Local guerrillas; the "farmer by day, fighter by night."
b. Members of military units.
c. The common soldier.
d. People who pay lip service, taxes, and perform tasks for the VC, e.g., terrorists, sappers, saboteurs, commo-liaison personnel, and tax collectors.

The reason for this is because these people perform no command or control function. It is the PRP members, officers, and cadre of the Front and Liberation organizations, councils and committees, that are considered VCI. These are the "targets" of the Phung Hoang Program. Therefore, let us now examine how that program and its advisory effort--Phoenix--works.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV

2. Ibid., pp. 8-11.
5. Ibid., p. 115.
6. Ibid.
7. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the Lao Dong Party and the PRP see, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) Newsletter #6, VC Political Infrastructure (U) CONFIDENTIAL (September 1968), pp. 4-5. (Hereafter referred to as "VCI Newsletter #6"), and Pike, pp. 136-150.
11. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, p. 31.
12. For a detailed discussion of the organization and activities of each of these sections see, VCI Newsletter #11 and the VCI Handbook.
14. VCI Newsletter #11, p. 11.
15. For a detailed discussion of the Peoples' Liberation Committees see, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, (CICV), Newsletter #8, Peoples' Liberation Committees: A Strategic Assessment (U). CONFIDENTIAL (November 1968.) (Hereafter referred to as "CICV Newsletter #8."

17. VCI Newsletter #11, p. 11.

CHAPTER V (C)

THE PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM (U)

(C) BACKGROUND (U)

Realizing the threat posed by the VC administrative, political and intelligence apparatus, MACV, in July 1967, established a joint civil CIA/military activity entitled, "Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation" (ICEX). It had the specific mission of supporting the GVN in a coordinated attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). The plan was to be supervised and administered by the GVN with only limited support being provided by the US. To control the attack on the VCI and to insure coordination with the GVN, MACV, in September 1967, assigned US personnel as "ICEX" advisors to corps, province, and district levels. This plan received little attention and support until December 1967, when, recognizing the need for a coordinated effort against the VCI, the GVN initiated the Phung Hoang Program. Accordingly, the mission of the Phoenix Program became the coordination and management of the US advisory assistance and support for the Phung Hoang Program.

The Phung Hoang Program experienced a period of operational delay due to the 1968 TET and May offensives. However, on 1 July 1968, the program received the needed "shot in the arm" with the issuance of Presidential Decree 9280-a/TT/SL by the President of the Republic of Vietnam. The decree was followed by the promulgation of a Standing Operating Procedure (SOP), signed by the Minister of the Interior. The SOP has been revised twice. The latest, SOP 3, was issued 1 February 1970.1
SOP 3 retains the Phung Hoang organization shown at Figure 4. The two documents, that is, the Presidential Decree and the SOP, provide the necessary authority to, (1) require cooperation among participating agencies at subordinate levels, and (2) establish Phung Hoang committees and facilities at all levels down to and including district.

The Central Phung Hoang Committee is chaired by the Minister of the Interior and the Vice-Chairman is the Director General of the National Police. In June 1970, the permanent office and supporting staff were made a part of the National Police Headquarters, reporting directly to the Director General, National Police.

At Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), or Military Region as it is now known, the Phung Hoang Committee is chaired by the Commanding General of the Region. The Vice-Chairman is the regional police director. As is the case with the Central Committee, the Regional Committee has a permanent office, with a supporting staff, to supervise and administer the program. Additionally, each military region operates a Phung Hoang training center to train the personnel who run region, province, and district centers. The courses are normally of two weeks duration. A typical program of instruction is at Appendix III. Specialized courses of shorter duration are also given for key province, district, and village officials.

At province/city level the Phung Hoang Committee is chaired by the Province chief/mayor. However, at this level operations-type centers, called "Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center" (PIOCC), have been established in every province and autonomous city.
Decree #280-a/TT/SL dated 1 July 1968 of the President of the Republic of Vietnam prescribed the establishment of the PHUNG HOANG Plan.

**Figure 4.**
(From Phung Hoang SOP No.3, p.2)
in South Vietnam. The PIOCC organization is shown in Figure 5.

Depending on the tactical situation and the personalities of the people involved, the Vice Chairman's post may be shared by the Province (Sector) S2 and the Province Chief of Police, or made exclusively one or the other's. Additionally, the Deputy Center Chief may be the Police Chief, Sector S2, or the Deputy Province Chief for Security. These two posts are critical in that the PIOCC is an operational establishment, responsible for operations, as well as the maintenance of a data base on province and district VCI.

The district level organization is shown at Figure 6. There is a DIOCC in every district in Vietnam. The DIOCC's are designed to collect, process, and exploit intelligence in the district. The District Chief is responsible for all Phung Hoang activity in his district. In my experience, the districts in which the VCI had been effectively neutralized were those in which the District Chief had taken an active daily interest in the operation of the DIOCC.

(C) THE US ADVISORY (PHOENIX) EFFORT (U)

The US role with respect to the Phung Hoang Program is one of advice and assistance. The advisory relationship starts at national level and is present at every level to and including district. Most of the advisors are US Army personnel who may or may not have received training in the Phung Hoang Program. There is a program underway at this time to train US Army Phoenix advisors prior to their arrival in Vietnam. Previously, training was conducted, in-country, at a seven to ten day course.
CONFIDENTIAL

ORGANIZATION CHART OF PROVINCE,
CITY PHUNG HOANG COMMITTEES

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PROVINCE, CITY PHUNG
HOANG COMMITTEES

CHAIRMAN:
- Province Chief
- City Mayor

VICE CHAIRMAN:
- Chief of HP Service
- Chief of Sector 52

PERMANENT CENTER

COORDINATOR

DEPUTY CENTER

CHIEF

MESSAGE SECTION

SITUATION SECTION

PLANNING & OPERATIONS SECTION

INFORMATION

SUB-SECTION

SCREENING, INTERRO-

GATION & LEGAL PRO-

CESSING SUB-SECTION

POLICE FIELD

FORCES

FSU

Figure 5.
(From SOP No. 3, p. 19)

CONFIDENTIAL
operated by the Phoenix Directorate of MACCords. While the advisory effort at national and regional level was generally adequate, the province and district levels advisors often left a great deal to be desired. This was generally not so much the fault of the individual as it was his lack of seniority and experience, and his inability to provide needed support, e.g., money, transportation, airlift and printing support, on a timely basis. Additionally, support and cooperation from US and ARVN combat and intelligence units could have been better. During my tenure in Vietnam, there were sufficient US and ARVN units that had excellent anti-VCI programs going in coordination with their local PIOCC's and DIOCC's, to prove that it could be done. While the "one war" concept was constantly preached by General Abrams, the ARVN Corps Commanders, and their subordinate commanders, all too frequently, the bureaucratic inertial of the various staffs was such that something less than wholehearted support was given to the Program.

(C) GVN AGENCY PARTICIPATION (U)

A necessary aspect of the organizational philosophy behind the make-up of the PIOCC's and DIOCC's was to get every conceivable GVN and ARVN agency involved in the program that could possibly make a contribution. As a result one often found the following agencies represented in the PIOCC's and DIOCC's:


b. National Police Special Branch (SB).

c. National Police Field Forces (NPFF).
d. Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF).
e. Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU).
f. Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC).
g. Military Security Service (MSS).
h. Sector/Subsector S2.
i. Sector/Subsector S3.
j. Chieu Hoi (CH).
l. Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG).
m. Armed Propaganda Team (APT).
n. ARVN Unit Liaison Officer.
o. US Army Unit Liaison Officer.

With the exception of the last four, the above organizations were normally required to provide permanent representation in the local PIOCC or DIOCC, as appropriate. Very few if any of these agencies had an abundance of talented people. Therefore, the program nearly always got an untrained man, (the one who could be spared the most) and was very apt to get an unmotivated man as well. Considering the above, it is a wonder that neutralizations occurred at all. Indeed, there were times during my tenure in Vietnam that neutralizations occurred in spite of the program rather than because of it. However, that period is generally behind the program now. There is now a wide general awareness of the program on the part of all government agencies. The National Police Force has grown to the extent that the PIOCC's and DIOCC's can and should start thinning out to a lean, skilled organization, manned
primarily by National Policemen. This was starting in the summer of 1970 and should be allowed to continue.

(C) OPERATIONS (U)

Now that we have examined the Phung Hoang organization a few words about the operation of the system are in order. The program should be, as of this writing, completing a transition from a mass, or collective, approach to neutralizing VCI, to the "specific targeting" of individual VCI. The former wide-spread practices of massive "cordon and search" operations or "search and destroy" are no longer appropriate in most of the inhabited areas of South Vietnam. On the contrary, it is now necessary to use modern, skilled, police techniques to go after individual VCI, or as its called, "specific targeting." The PIOCC's and DIOCC's are set up to facilitate this method of operation.3

Specific targeting requires trained and dedicated personnel, and well organized data bases to be effective. Both aspects have been and will continue to be problems. While the South Vietnamese are prodigious book and record keepers, they seldom use the records that they have so neatly kept, for any useful purpose. To get them to correlate ID cards with wallet photos; military events with civilian kidnappings; activities of like nature in neighboring provinces or districts; or other factors seemingly unrelated; was a major problem for advisors. However, through training and constant efforts it is being done.

Additionally there was, and probably still is, considerable jealousy and hoarding of information between the member agencies. This seems to
be a particularly strong characteristic of intelligence and police organizations. It is quite understandable however, and in some instances, desirable. It must be remembered that knowledge is power. When one is involved in a program, like Phung Hoang, that deals heavily in political intelligence, and that program is operated in an environment like Vietnam today, the possession or control of information is a life and death matter to every one from the President of the Republic down to the peasant in the field. But, for the program to be effective, information must be shared in the PIOCC's and DIOCC's.

An additional consideration in the operations area is the question of reaction forces available to the PIOCC's and DIOCC's. It will be noted, on Figures 5 and 6, that Police Field Forces (NPFF), Provincial Recom Units (PRU) and Regional Forces (RF) are shown. The PFF and PRU are now under National Police control, and, they do have powers of arrest. They were and are useful where squad and platoon-sized operations are required. However, their operations, as well as Phung Hoang operations, need to be more closely integrated with and under the National Police. During my tenure in Vietnam this was not being done.

A final aspect of the operations picture is the problem of police power vs the power of the Province Chief. Province Chiefs (ARVN officers) are appointed by the President of the Republic. Province Police Chiefs are responsible to the Director General of the National Police through the Regional Director of National Police. Additionally, the Province Chiefs are responsible to the Military Region Commander, normally an ARVN Lt. Gen., for the security of their provinces. It is easy to
see how jealousies could and do develop and what competition there can be for resources. This is particularly true if military resources are required for Phung Hoang operations. More often than not, Phung Hoang does not get supported.

(C) **AN TRI DETENTION** *(U)*

(C) "An Tri" detention is the term used to describe the procedures under which apprehended VCI are incarcerated for up to two years, and longer, if deemed appropriate upon review. The legal basis for this procedure stems from three national decrees. The first was an Ordinance by President Thieu, dated 24 June 1965 whereby he proclaimed a state of emergency throughout South Vietnam. Under the terms of this Ordinance the Central Executive Committee was delegated the power to take appropriate measures for safeguarding the territory of South Vietnam, and the public security and order. This may be compared with the Malayan Emergency Regulation of 1948. However, the two measures which codify the precise measures to be taken with VCI are Ministry of the Interior Circulars No. 757, dated 21 March 1969, and No. 2212, dated 20 August 1969.  

(U) Circular No. 757 established three classifications of VCI offenders—A, B, and C—and specified mandatory sentences for them. Class A offenders are any PRP member at any echelon; all section chiefs; and all committee members in the NLF or Liberation Committees, councils or associations, at any level. The mandatory sentence for Class A offenders is two years. Sentences may be extended upon review of
the case at national level just prior to the end of the sentence.

Class B offenders are "cadre," (trained and capable of assuming command) who do not exercise command but are voluntary members of sections, or other elements of the infrastructure. The mandatory sentence for this class offender is one to two years. Class C offenders are VCI supporters not included above. The mandatory sentence for this class is not more than one year and can vary with extenuating circumstances.5

(C) Each case is judged by a Province Security Committee (PSC) in each province. The individual committees are made up of several prominent citizens, generally with legal backgrounds. The Province Chief may, or may not, be a member. The committees are required to meet at least monthly. When a VCI suspect is apprehended, his dossier6 is finalized and turned over to the PSC. The PSC reviews the dossier and hands down the punishment. The suspect will more than likely not be called before the PSC if there is sufficient evidence against him.

(U) The procedures are well defined, but the application of them is not as neat and tidy as the description implies. Until the PSC members and PIOCC/DIOCC's were trained in procedures and dossier preparation respectively, PRC's were releasing too many people, or not following prescribed sentences, or, in some places, letting cases pile up for months. However, by mid-1970, PSC's were functioning fairly well and improving each month.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V

1. Republic of Vietnam, Phung Hoa SOP 3 (U), (February 1970) CONFIDENTIAL.

2. "Neutralizing" as used throughout this paper means the elimination of the member(s) of the VCI by killing or capturing him or her; causing him or her to "rally" to the GVN through the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program; or, rendering the individual(s) useless to the VCI through exposure, compromise, or psychological operations.

3. Phung Hoang SOP 3, pp. 82-92.

4. Full titles of the circula are:


6. A dossier is established on every suspect VCI in accordance with Circular No. 2212. As information on the individual comes in to the DIOCC or PIOCC it is placed in the dossier. A case is built which should lead to the individual's capture. When the suspect is captured, any new evidence is added and the dossier is turned over to the Province Security Committee within thirty days.

CHAPTER VI (U)

COMPARISON

Now that the basic facts have been laid out, let us compare what was done in Malaya, that succeeded, with what was done in Vietnam.

The first point that comes to mind is the long British involvement vs the relatively short period of time that the US has taken an active role in Vietnam. More importantly, because Malaya was their colony, the British were able to run the operation from the outset. Additionally, the British recognized very early in the Emergency what sort of war they had on their hands and organized to defeat it.¹ Such was not the case in Vietnam, when the enemy was a manageable size.

Secondly, the British had dynamic civil leadership and a plan applicable to Malaya, which was carried out. Vietnam on the other hand, was troubled by changing leadership, indecision over what to do and who should do it, and vacillation between civil and martial law.² To add further problems they tried to apply the Malayan plan, without the necessary modification to make it work.⁴

Additionally, the differences in social, political, and ethnic aspects are terribly significant. First there is the fact that Malaya had no common border with, nor supplies from, a neighboring Communist country. Secondly, because of the ethnic split in Malaya and the fact that the Communist guerrillas and their support came from the Chinese elements, it made the problem of allegiances much more manageable than in Vietnam.⁵
In the application of police power, it is evident that the early buildup of the police under skilled British advisors and commanders insured an early and continuous attack on the Min Yuen at village level. Those facts, coupled with effective isolation of the Min Yuen and an effective ID card program, kept the enemy threat manageable and attritable. Such was not the case in Vietnam. However, the Malayan police did not have a special organization, like Phung Hoang, to neutralize the Min Yuen.

Though I had much more detailed information available and personal knowledge concerning Vietnam, nevertheless, I believe that the Min Yuen were never as dedicated nor as highly organized as the VCI. Consequently, the job in Vietnam is now a tougher one and will doubtlessly take longer.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VI


2. For example of martial law proclamation see Fall, pp. 454-455.

3. I am referring particularly to the Strategic Hamlet Program with the goal of building 12,000 hamlets by the end of 1963. The program fell behind, was not well conceived and was doomed to failure in at least one aspect, which was to deny the VC food. It worked in Malaya because it is a food-deficit area. Such is not the case in Vietnam. For more detail see Fall, pp. 373-379.

4. Ibid., p. 339.
CHAPTER VII (U)

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

From my study of the Malayan "Emergency," and my personal experience with the Phung Hoang Program, as well as my study of the Vietnam War, I have come to the conclusion that the Phung Hoang Program has served a useful purpose, is on the right track, but is in need of modification.

First, I strongly recommend that the organization be absorbed more and more into the National Police Force. This has been done at the National Level, now it needs to be done at province and district levels. By absorption, I mean control, physical plant, and principle operatives under the National Police. The excessive number of contributing agencies not only increases the likelihood of security leaks, but also breeds inefficiency. However, those agencies, particularly Chieu Hoi, must be required to keep a constant flow of information coming into the Phung Hoang facility.

Second, if the US is going to continue to advise the Program, and I think it should, as the security situation continues to improve, the US Army advisors, should be replaced by FBI trained professional investigators. In short, buildup the Special Branch. The military advisors have served with distinction, but their utility is diminishing. The VCI are going to be more difficult to get, consequently more skill will be needed than is presently being imparted by military advisors.
Third, and most important, the program will only succeed if pacification, in its broadest sense, succeeds. Unless the GVN can lift the yoke of terror from the villagers and, at the same time, show the villagers that it is a government capable of not only protecting them but serving their interests as well, no amount of effort in the Phung Hoang Program will succeed. This is what is meant by, and why it must be, "one war" waged in the village.

WILLIAM L. KNAPP
Colonel, FA
BIBLIOGRAPHY


63


17. Miller, Harry. *The Communist Menace in Malaya*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. (DS596 M4) (An extremely comprehensive work on the early part of the Emergency. Author was in Malaya at the time.)


APPENDIX I

MALAYA and SINGAPORE

MINERALS
- Tin
- Iron
- Bauxite

CULTIVATED CROPS
- Rubber
- Rice
- Coconuts (copra)

Legend:
- Road
- Railroad
- State boundary
- State capital
- Airfield

Scale:
- 0 25 50 75 Kilometers
- 0 25 50 75 Miles

SINGAPORE (U.K.)

INDONESIA

36166 4-62

67
TWO WEEK COURSE

FIRST WEEK

MON 0800-1000 Admission procedure/Opening ceremony
      1000-1200 SOPs 1, 2, 3.
      1400-1600 Intel collation, filing and VCI targeting
              (academic)

TUES 0800-1200 Intel collation, filing and VCI targeting
       (academic)
       1400-1800 VCI organization

WED 0800-1000 Intel collation, filing, VCI targeting
    (academic/practice)
    1000-1200 People's intel net
    1400-1600 Intel collation, filing, VCI targeting
             (practice)
    1600-1800 Making arrests and house searching procedures

THU 0800-1000 Reporting procedures
     1000-1200 Intel collation, filing and VCI targeting
     1400-1600 VIE role in PH program
     1700-1800 Chieu VCI role in PH

FRI 0800-1000 Interrogation technique
     1000-1200 Intel collation, filing and VCI targeting
     1400-1600 Interrogation technique

SAT 0800-0900 NPFF role in PH program
     0900-1000 US coordinator in PH Center
     1000-1200 Intel collation, filing, VCI targeting
              (PRU Role in PH)
     1400-1600 Case method
     1600-1800 Interrogation technique

SECOND WEEK

MON 0800-1000 Staff functioning
     1000-1200 Intel collation, filing, VCI targeting
     1400-1600 Interrogation technique

TUES 0800-1200 Reporting procedures, basic elements
       1400-1600 Security principles

WED 0800-1200 Agent handling
     1400-1800 Intel collation, filing and VCI targeting
THU  0800-1200  Intel collation, filing and VCI targeting
      1400-1600  End-of-course aptitude test
      1600-1800  Critique/Seminar

PRI  ALL DAY  Field trip to PIOCC, DIOCC and VIOCCs.

SAT  0900-1100  Closing ceremony

MON, WED and FRI night of 1st week, from 2000-2200 hours:
supervised seminar on lessons learned.
Also on MON and WED nights of 2nd week. OTHERS, free time.
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<thead>
<tr>
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<td>0800-1700</td>
<td>Admission procedure/Opening ceremony</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1000-1200</td>
<td>SOPs 1, 2, 3 and role of VIOCC in PH Program</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1400-1800</td>
<td>Collation, Filing and VCI targeting (academic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUES</td>
<td>0800-1200</td>
<td>Collation, Filing and VCI targeting (academic)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1400-1500</td>
<td>PH reports, types and formats</td>
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<td>WED</td>
<td>0800-1200</td>
<td>People's Intel Net</td>
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MON and WED nights: 2000-2200 hours Collation, Filing, VCI targeting (critique and seminar)

FRI night: End of course aptitude test

TUES and THURS: Free time

1 week course: for NP Chiefs at Village level
Village Chiefs
Village Deputies for Security

(This page is unclassified)