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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 196th Infantry Brigade, Period Ending 20 April 1972

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material, as appropriate. This report should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, ATTN: DAMO-ODU, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 196th Infantry Brigade, Period Ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

II. LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluation, and Recommendations (U).

A. (U) Personnel.

1. SUBJECT: Urinalysis Test Procedure.

   a. OBSERVATION: Proper urinalysis testing procedures are essential in assuring proper results.

   b. EVALUATION: Too much lead time in notification of units led to compromising of test dates. Lack of supervision by unit leaders allowed drug users to cheat on the test or avoid the test.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: All unit leaders (Officers and NCO's) must be present and supervise testing and that knowledge of the test be limited to those with a need to know.

   d. COMMAND ACTION: An LOI, subject: Urinalysis Testing Procedures, was published standardizing testing procedures and limiting unit notification until the last possible moment.

2. SUBJECT: Elimination Procedures.

   a. OBSERVATION: Expedient processing of administrative elimination is essential in establishing an effective drug program.

   b. EVALUATION: Confusion concerning the paperwork necessary to eliminate twice identified drug users led to magnified unit problems and an inefficient unit drug suppression program.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: Units should designate an officer with the specific responsibility of supervising administrative processing.

   d. COMMAND ACTION: A Brigade letter was prepared which had an example case file for 635-212 elimination. This letter was concise and easily understandable and was adopted for use by XXIV Corps for all units in MR 1.

3. SUBJECT: Project Transition.

   a. OBSERVATION: Project Transition offers the separating serviceman an excellent opportunity to receive training in a vocational skill that will assist him in obtaining meaningful employment in a tight job market.
b. EVALUATION: (1) The Project Transition program experienced severe growing pains during the period 1 November 1971 through 1 February 1972. No acceptances were obtained although applications were processed for almost one hundred soldiers. Four major reasons for rejection were:

(a) Applicants could not meet the requirement of 90-150 days between DEROS and ETS (thereafter extended to 75-180 days).

(b) Transition courses were not published as early as they should have been, making publicity of the program and processing of applications extremely difficult.

(c) Applicants accepted for the program were not always received in a timely manner. Several personnel were accepted but had departed the command prior to receipt of the acceptance message.

(d) Requests for training were sent to USARV via electrical message, which proved to be a slow and unreliable method. Some messages were lost enroute; others were misdirected at USARV HQ. Since 1 February 1972, all requests have been transmitted telephonically and acceptance or rejection received immediately.

(2) The MCo Pre-separation Counselling Team stationed at Camp Horn and consisting of five DA civilians proved to be an excellent means of publicity for the program. Two ladies, Miss Marsha Guy and Miss Janet Cook, were responsible for the Project Transition counselling and were primarily responsible for the success the program has enjoyed since 1 February 1972.

(3) USARV message dated 060920Z April 1972 allowed for a 60 day curtailment in the Vietnam tour of duty to attend Project Transition. Unfortunately this policy, which could have been instrumental in procuring a larger volume acceptances in the November - March time frame, was completely inapplicable when published. For example, all enlisted men with DEROS of earlier than 1 August had left or before 15 April. A 60 day drop from 1 August would set new DEROS of 1 June, ten days after the last scheduled class. It is this incongruency which has been manifest in the program and has exacerbated the willing applicant.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS: Personnel coming to RVN on short tour should be permitted to extend their ETS in order to fit the criteria for Project Transition. Since the mission of Project Transition is to ready separating servicemen for civilian life, there is no obvious reason to disqualify those men who are on the short end of the DEROS-ETS criteria.

d. COMMAND ACTION: Through close coordination with the USARV Adjutant
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General, Brigade S-1 was able to procure assignments to Project Transition on an extremely short notice. The expedient processing of application was perhaps the best publicity that the project received and led to an increased awareness of the program's value by the commanders at all levels. The most important aspect of the program's effectiveness is emphasis shown by unit commanders.


a. OBSERVATION: On 10 November 1971, the Enlisted Records Section changed the filing system of 201 files. The previous system was alphabetic by unit, which was changed to DEROS date by unit. This has corrected many existing errors in such areas as incorrect DEROS's, extensions, redeployment, assignments and lost records.

b. EVALUATION: This filing system requires each individual to depart on scheduled DEROS or for the unit to state why he did not depart on his DEROS.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the 201 files continue to be filed by DEROS.

d. COMMAND ACTION: N/A.

4. SUBJECT: Personnel Outprocessing Center. (Multiple Stations)

a. OBSERVATION: Based on prior experience gained in the standdown of the 23d Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Mobil), it has been determined that a personnel outprocessing center manned by clerks from the Adjutant General's section and Finance section is a necessary for rapid processing of personnel.

b. EVALUATION: Single station processing consumes more time than multiple station processing because one clerk is required to perform varied tasks all of which he may not be completely familiar with.

c. RECOMMENDATION: During standdown outprocessing, a multiple station system should be used. The system allows each station clerk to become an expert in his area of responsibility and thus increases efficiency and reduces processing time. Control is established through the use of an outprocessing checklist to insure each individual processes through the correct station and in the correct order. Upon completion of processing, individuals may be moved to a secure holding area with entertainment facilities available to await transportation.

d. COMMAND ACTION: A processing site has been selected for use in the event of inactivation/redeployment and work orders to improve the facilities have been approved for implementation if necessary. A personnel outprocessing
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center can be set up and functioning within 42 hours of notification.

5. SUBJECT: Simplification of the Enlisted Promotion System

   a. OBSERVATION: Long arduous hours were required in the manual preparation of the Lineal Standing Lists and the Promotion Eligibility Report.

   b. EVALUATION: With the assistance of AM8, processing promotions would have been a relatively simple task. The amount of time required for sorting, arranging, and printing the necessary information for the Standing Lists and the monthly Eligibility Reports could be reduced considerably.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: An SO2 should be established correlating the efforts of the Promotion Section and AM8. Through the use of automated machines, all the necessary information could be readily available to the Promotions Section.

   d. COMMAND ACTION: Action has been taken by AM8 to prepare a program where keypunch cards are sorted by score to provide a lineal listing. Additions are made by simply adding keypunch cards with the information needed. This listing is then turned over to the Promotions Section for verification and final publication of the Standing List. The amount of time spent preparing this lineal listing has been reduced by seventy-five (75) percent. Also, a program has been prepared to utilise sorted keypunch cards to provide a break-out of each standing list by MOS and score, the information needed to prepare the monthly Eligibility Report. Arranging this information by machine has reduced the preparation time of the Eligibility Report by fifty (50) percent.


   a. OBSERVATION: With the additional responsibility of assigning eligible Keystone personnel, a method of operations aside from the everyday activities of the section was needed.

   b. EVALUATION: The system utilized by the Redeployment Section had to be improved to insure accurate accountability and timely publication of orders.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: To improve the method of accountability by use of data cards and rosters.

   d. COMMAND ACTION: A system was initiated to prepare redeployment data cards on each individual eligible for reassignment to CONUS were obtained from the Keystone rosters that Redeployment verified and forwarded to USARV. Assignment instructions were received via telephone from HQ, USARV in great volume which resulted in the section coming in rightly to stay on top and ahead of the operations. Upon receipt of assignment instructions, PCS orders were expeditiously
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published. Close coordination with the cells of Keystoning units aided redeployment immensely in assuring accurate accountability and timely publications of orders pertaining to all eligible personnel enroute to CONUS. The important factor in making this mission a success was utilization of personnel who had experienced Keystone Operations at the 23d Infantry Division and having their "Sense of Urgency" become a reality.

B. (U) Intelligence

1. SUBJECT: Preparation of Target Lists During Artillery Raid Operations

   a. OBSERVATION: To achieve surprise, rapid response and accuracy during the conduct of artillery raid operations, preplanned target lists must be carefully prepared.

   b. RECOMMENDATION: Once target lists have been selected, they should be prepared as follows:

      (1) All grids must be cleared prior to the arrival of the battery to preclude loss of time and the possibility of losing some targets entirely.

      (2) Data can be prechecked before the raid is actually conducted thus allowing a time savings during the adjustment phase for each target.

      (3) FACAC computers at battalion and battery fire direction centers can be programmed and checked prior to the arrival of the battery in the raid position.

      (4) The use of the template system in the artillery battalion FAC has proven valuable in the conduct of raids because it allows the use of one battery center location and one set of deflection indices, and thus preserves a high degree of accuracy and diminishes the chances of error that would prevail with the conventional construction of new centers and indices for each location.

   c. COMMAND ACTION: N/A.

2. SUBJECT: Effective Use of Target Acquisition Devices

   a. OBSERVATION: The requirement to rapidly place fire on enemy targets detected by the organic artillery battalion's target acquisition devices required a realignment of tactical and technical control.

   b. EVALUATION: Increased emphasis on employment of target acquisition devices for detecting targets in the Brigade TAD resulted in a complete
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Realignment of tactical and technical control. Internally, the artillery battalion organized an 62 operations section co-located with the fire direction center, to facilitate the responsiveness of artillery fire against targets detected, to expedite the dissemination of sightings and to facilitate control of target acquisition devices. Externally, direct communications, through ARVN interpreters at Hill 327 and Hill 55, was established with ARVN fire support coordination centers at 1st Special Brigade and Hill 55 respectively, to reduce the reaction time of ARVN artillery engaging targets which cannot be fired by US artillery. The target acquisition platoon also maintained a command post at Hill 327 for technical control of target acquisition devices and for assuming tactical control should the need arise. Procedural innovations developed to achieve maximum effective use of target acquisition devices available to the battalion included the following:

1. Confirmation of a target was achieved by the use of a second device, other than the initial one acquiring the target. This process was used whenever two devices could observe the same target. In addition to confirming the existence of the target, the target location was refined resulting in a more accurate delivery of artillery fire on the target.

2. Predicted locations of radar moving targets were used to facilitate the accurate and timely engagement of targets and to offset clearance delays. Normally, the TPS 58 provided an initial grid and direction of movement, and a 15 to 20 minute projected grid location dependent upon the anticipated time.

3. The increased TPS 58 radar surveillance capability, as well as systemized reporting procedures has resulted in a slight increase in the number of sightings and the number of targets fired.

C. (U) Operations.

1. SUBJECT: E-8 CS Riot dispensers mounted on vehicles.

a. OBSERVATION: An E-8 riot dispenser mounted on an M13A1 APC or an M151A2 provides an excellent weapon for mob control operations.

b. EVALUATION: While covering the standdown of the 23d Infantry Division, one battalion of the Brigade encountered unarmed Vietnamese civilians breaching the tactical wire in order to acquire building materials. To combat this activity E-8's were mounted and sandbagged on jeeps and APC's. A firing device was
rigged such that the E-8 could be fired from inside the vehicle. The mobility
of this innovated system provided a psychological effect that significantly de-
creased the number of incidents. In addition, there was no injury to civilian
populace.

c. RECOMMENDATION: E-8 riot dispensers mounted on jeeps and/or APC's
produces a psychological effect that should be utilized in mob control operations.

d. COMMAND ACTION: N/A.

2. SUBJECT: Mechanical Ambush Safety Measure.

a. OBSERVATION: During recent operations, several personnel were injured
by mechanical ambushes after becoming disoriented at night while moving about
the night defensive perimeter.

b. EVALUATION: As a safety measure to prevent personnel from walking into
mechanical ambushes, several combat units of the Brigade have placed a length of
commo wire about waist high around night defensive positions between the perimeter
and mechanical ambushes. This safety measure alerts disoriented personnel of the
presence of mechanical ambushes in the area.

c. RECOMMENDATION: The use of commo wire to alert disoriented personnel of
the presence of mechanical ambushes should be adopted by other combat units to
prevent mechanical ambush casualties.

d. COMMAND ACTION: N/A.


a. OBSERVATION: As a result of Typhoon Heater, a need for secondary water
and power systems developed. However, the storm seriously damaged the secondary,
as well as the primary systems requiring the use of tertiary power systems and
extensive water hauling over great distances.

b. EVALUATION: Secondary or emergency back-up systems were insufficiently
raveted to prevent damage during severe storms. The water supply system which
is dependent upon numerous pumping stations, also was severely damaged due to
inadequate ravetment.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Secondary water and power systems should be available
and operational during severe storms. Secondary communication facilities should
also be available and operational. The secondary or emergency systems should be
located and raveted to prevent severe storms from damaging them and denying their
use. Periodic tests of these systems should be scheduled.
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d. COMMAND ACTION: N/A.

4. SUBJECT: Submission of Damage Assessment Reports.

a. OBSERVATION: The submission of early damage assessment reports following Typhoon Herter was easily accomplished. However, later in the recovery effort, some criticism was made upon the changes made to recovery material needs.

b. EVALUATION: Damage assessment reports, although necessary immediately, should be considered interim and a reasonable amount of time allowed for preparation of an accurate damage assessment report. The psychological impact and the inherent confusion during storm damage emergencies preclude the preparation of an accurate assessment of total damage too soon.

c. RECOMMENDATION: As a guide, a week to ten days should be allowed for a complete damage assessment report. For initial planning purposes the interim report would suffice. However, the total recovery effort must be based on a thorough accurate damage assessment.

d. COMMAND ACTION: N/A.


a. OBSERVATION: During the monsoon season, bi-weekly resupply of units in the field are not always possible. Resupply helicopters are not always able to fly due to poor visibility and heavy rain.

b. EVALUATION: To insure a unit can continue its mission if not resupplied for several days, rations should be carried for a 7 to 10 day period.

c. RECOMMENDATION: LRRP rations, because of their light weight, can be carried in a greater abundance than 'C' rations. It is recommended that units carry half 'C' rations and half LRRP rations during the monsoon season.

d. COMMAND ACTION: N/A.

D. (U) Organization.

1. SUBJECT: Reorganization of Support Battalion.

a. OBSERVATION: The draw down of the Brigade due to Increment XI redeployment activities brought about decreased support requirements within the Brigade. In recognition of this fact and to offset USARV-wide curtailment policies, a reorganization of the Support Battalion was required.
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b. EVALUATION: The Support Battalion was modified by reorganizing the
Maintenance Company, Supply and Transport Company, and HHC into one unit with
a MTOE tailored to the Brigade's reduced support requirements. The elimination
of the administrative overhead of the two company headquarters streamlined operations.
The elimination of the Brigade Supply Office and the incorporation of its functions
into the 83 office consolidated activities and integrated all support missions
along with saving personnel spaces. The Medical Company was also reduced to
detachment size. Upon completion of reorganization, the Support Battalion was
organized with a battalion headquarters, Medical Detachment, Admin Company and
a support company consisting of a transportation platoon, supply platoon, and
maintenance platoon.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That during the conduct of draw down activities, support
battalions of separate brigades be organized as indicated above.

d. COMMAND ACTION: N/A.

2. SUBJECT: Inadequate Personnel for Electronics Shop Office.

a. OBSERVATION: The current TOE for a Maintenance Company supporting a
separate Infantry Brigade does not authorize TOE personnel to operate a separate
shop office, records section, and shop supply for the Electronics Maintenance
Platoon.

b. EVALUATION: Due to the larger volume of work requests for electronic
type equipment and the equipment having to be inspected for acceptance at the
signal shop, a separate shop office should be established by TOE. Also, a
separate shop office which handles the records and repair parts would make
the records and repair parts more accessible and records easier to maintain.

c. RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the TOE for a Maintenance
Company supporting a separate Infantry Brigade be modified to include a separate
shop office for the Electronics shop.

d. COMMAND ACTION: Personnel required to operate an Electronic Shop
Office are taken from positions with mission type MOS's.

3. SUBJECT: Inadequate Personnel Authorization for the Information Section of
a Separate Infantry Brigade.

a. OBSERVATION: The personnel authorization for the Information Office
was cut considerably when the division office was inactivated and the Brigade
Office established. At the same time, many of the same functions were required
of the Brigade Office, e.g., publication of a newspaper and reporting and photo-
graphing Brigade activities.
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b. EVALUATION: Prior to the activation of a Brigade Information section, the 10th Public Information Detachment was covering Brigade activities and reporting to the division information office. Staffing of the Brigade Information office with a major, a master sergeant and a clerk-typist does not provide for publication of a newspaper or for photographic support.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the Brigade Information section TOE be modified to include a CI officer, and four combat correspondents.

d. COMMAND ACTION: N/A.

E. (U) Training.

1. SUBJECT: Quick Fire Techniques.

a. OBSERVATION: During recent combat operations, combat units have had a number of encounters with the enemy at ranges of less than one hundred meters with negative conclusive results. As a result, the enemy has managed to successfully evade.

b. EVALUATION: The low level of enemy activity over the last six months and the resultant lack of continued contact engagements with the enemy have not allowed combat personnel to maintain maximum proficiency with their respective weapons. Additionally, the majority of the personnel, below the rank of platoon sergeant, and many officers, have never been in hostile contact. As a result of this lack of experience, personnel have reacted slowly to these situations. Every effort has been made, with the time available, to insure the zero of personal weapons, and the conduct of training on a Quick Fire Range.

c. RECOMMENDATION: A Quick Fire Range including demolition pits, smoke pots and weapons simulators is ideally suited to insure a more realistic simulation of a combat environment. These ranges should be constructed by all combat units involved in a counterinsurgency environment.

d. COMMAND ACTION: The 196th Infantry Brigade constructed and utilized a Quick Fire Range for the above purpose.

F. (U) Logistics. None.

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G. (U) Communications, None.

H. (U) Material, None.

I. (U) Other, None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

LTC, INF
Executive Officer

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LTC Lyna James

18 May 73

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