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AUTHORITY

31 Dec 1979 per document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Combat Aviation Group, Period Ending 30 April 72 (U)

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material, as appropriate. This report should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

3. Information of action initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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US Army Aviation Test Activity
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (CR-LL) of the 11th Combat Aviation Group for the period ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (v).

CINCUSAR PAC, ATTN: CPOC-IT, APO 96558 (2)
CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC O DER, APO 96575 (3)
CG, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, ATTN: AVHGC, APO 96384 (2)
CG, FIRST REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND, ATTN: GC-3 ADVISOR, APO 96349 (2)

1. (C) OPERATIONS: Significant Activities
   a. Command and Organization
      (1) Command
         (b) The Deputy Group Commander, Lieutenant Colonel John D. Reiser departed this command on 25 March 1972. This position remains vacant.
         (c) On 20 March 1972, all assigned US operations missions and missions were passed from XXIV Corps to First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC). 11th Combat Aviation Group is now under operational control of FRAC and receives all mission tasking from FRAC headquarters.

   b. Organization
      (1) 11th CAG aviation assets available to support activities in Military Region I were reduced significantly during the reporting period with the departure of the aviation units listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STANDDOWN DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company</td>
<td>24 Nov 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115th Assault Helicopter Company</td>
<td>24 Nov 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203rd Assault Helicopter Company</td>
<td>5 Jan 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132nd Assault Helicopter Company</td>
<td>1 Mar 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178th Assault Support Helicopter Company</td>
<td>5 Feb 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203rd Assault Support Helicopter Company</td>
<td>1 Apr 1972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (2) The loss of aviation assets also necessitated a reduction in operational headquarters as the HHC, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion and HHC, 223rd Combat Aviation Battalion also entered standdown during the reporting period.
(3) Aviation units attached to the 11th Combat Aviation Group at the end of the reporting period include the 49th Assault Helicopter Company, 131st Military Intelligence Company (Aerial Surveillance), 62nd Aviation Company (Copter) and a platoon of the 478th Heavy Helicopter Company. The 62nd Company was modified in February to provide 20 UH-1H's, 10 OH-58's and 6 OH-47's. Fixed wing augmentation to the 62nd Company is provided by two U-21 airplanes attached from the Command Airplane Company, 12th Combat Aviation Group.

(4) Organizational structure and unit locations are at Inclosure #2.

o. Mission Related Activities

(1) During the reporting period the 11th Combat Aviation Group was engaged in combat operations throughout Military Region I, Republic of Vietnam. Operations were conducted in support of United States/Free World Military Forces, and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). Combat support provided by the 11th CAG included aerial transport of personnel and equipment, aerial weapons support to ground forces, visual and electronic reconnaissance and surveillance and other missions as assigned by higher headquarters.

(2) Although the primary mission of the 11th CAG did not change during the reporting period organizational restructuring resulted in a significant change in capabilities. While unit stand-down decreased available aviation assets within 11th CAG the area of operations greatly increased with stand-down/placement of the 16th Combat Aviation Group (23rd US Division) and the 101st Combat Aviation Group (101st US Division). This turbulence required the 11th CAG to assign aircraft to missions in order of priority, as all requests for aviation support could no longer be met, and to maintain a high degree of flexibility in utilization of remaining assets. Response to priority missions continues to be timely and efficient.

(3) The Group and subordinate units authorized and present for duty strength are in Inclosure #3.

(4) Type aircraft, number authorized and on hand for 11th CAG and subordinate units are in Inclosure #4.

(5) Results of operations conducted by subordinate units during the reporting period are in Inclosure #5.

(6) A summary of significant enemy engagements is in Inclosure #6.

(7) Decorations awarded to members of the 11th CAG are listed on Inclosure #7.

(8) Events of Historical Significance

On 26 November 1971 an OV-1H of the 131st MIQ leaving on an early morning SHAR mission crashed on take-off from the Phu Bai Airfield. Both crewmen received fatal injuries.
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On 24 December 1971, the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion was inactivated. Subordinate units of the 212th CAB were reassigned to 223rd CAB or reassigned directly to 11th CAB.

Between November 1971 and January 1972 the 131st MHC received 14 OV-1D models of the Mohawk aircraft. The new aircraft with improved sensor systems and associated support equipment were fully operational by 1 February 1972.

Beginning on 10 January 1972 the 131st MHC began leaving its location at the Hue/Phu Bai airfield and redeploying to Marble Mountain Army Airfield, Da Nang. The 75 mile move was completed by 1 February 1972.

On 13 February 1972 a UH-1H from the 48th AHC crashed in the South China Sea near Hoi An. One crewman and 3 passengers were killed. The aircraft was completely destroyed.

On 25 February 1972 a UH-1H from the 62nd Aviation Company hit a railing while taking off from the U.S. Navy Destroyer Craig in Da Nang Bay. The aircraft inverted and crashed in the water. Two crew members and four passengers were killed. One passenger is missing and presumed dead.

In early March the 48th AHC participated in two combined Air Mobile Insertions (AMI's) with elements of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF). In southwest Quang Tri Province, the VNAF supported 10 UH-1H's and 4 AH-1G's from the 48th AHC with 9 UH-1H's and 4 UH-1H(G)'s for the insertion of two infantry battalions. In the second operation, in support of the 1st ARVN Division operating in central Thua Thien Province, the 48th AHC supported VNAF assets with 5 UH-1H's and 2 AH-1G's. The VNAF, in both cases, proved its ability to plan and execute significant air mobile operations without the aid or guidance of US personnel.

On 1 March 1972 HHD, 223rd Combat Aviation Battalion entered standdown operations. 11th Group assumed direct control of all remaining aviation companies.

On 31 March the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) began the offensive which is continuing through the end of the reporting period. Action centered initially in the area immediately south of the DMZ as ARVN forces evacuated a number of fire support bases (FSB) and fell back on a defensive line along the Cau Viet River. Action in Thua Thien Province escalated in the second week of April as attacks against FSB Bostagne resulted in its eventual evacuation after stubborn resistance. Continuing action in the last part of April forced evacuation of FSB's West and O'Connor in northern Quang Tri Province and a massive assault in the last week of April pushed ARVN forces out of Dong Ha and Quang Tri City. As of 30 April 1972 almost all of Quang Tri Province is in enemy hands and ARVN forces are attempting to establish defense lines in Northern and Western Thua Thien Province for the defense of Hue. 11th CAB responded during this offensive by increasing air mobile support to ARVN 3rd and 1st Infantry Divisions by providing emergency resupply aircraft and conducting emergency extraction of US advisors and other direct support.

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missions as required while maintaining the general support missions throughout Military Region I.

On 1 April 1972 a CH-47 from the 62nd Aviation Company while on an emergency resupply mission to an ARVN fire base received 16 hits from enemy ground fire and was forced to land at Quang Tri Airfield. The crew was evacuated due to enemy indirect fire at the airfield. The aircraft was recovered later in the month. Additionally a UH-1H from the 46th ARH was forced down in Quang Tri Province by enemy ground fire sustaining 30-40 hits. The crew was extracted by a VNAF UH-1H while under intense fire with 1 US crewman wounded. The crew of the VNAF slick exhibited exceptional gallantry during this operation. A total of six aircraft were hit during the day.

On 2 April 1972 a CH-47 from the 62nd Aviation Company made a successful low level extraction at Camp Carroll north of Quang Tri. The aircraft was hit numerous times but managed to rescue the 3 US advisors and about 40 ARVN soldiers just as the outpost was being surrendered to the NVA.

On 3 April 1972 F Troop, 4th Air Cavalry closed Phu Bai Airfield and came under the operational control of 11th CAG. F/4 had been conducting operations in MR III. They were initially employed in direct support of 3rd ARVN Division.

On the night of 15 April 1972 Marble Mountain Army Airfield received an attack by fire. An estimated 22 rounds of enemy 82mm mortars impacted damaging 20 aircraft belonging to the 62nd Aviation Company which were parked in revetments. All but two aircraft were repairable.

On 28 April 1972 an AH-1G from F/4 Cav while flying an armed VR east of Quang Tri City engaged PT-76 tanks. 3 enemy tanks were destroyed, however, the Cobra was shot down by a 37mm AAA gun and the pilot and copilot were killed.

Colonel Robert A. Holloman III, 11th CAG CO was wounded in the foot during a daring rescue attempt on 29 April 1972. His wound required medical evacuation to CONUS. Colonel James M. Leslie assumed command of 11th CAG on 30 April 1972.

2. (C) LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

OBSERVATION: Aviation units continue to experience shortages in the following MOS: 10660 (Rotary Wing Aviator; Warrant Officer), 67N20/40 (UH-1 Helicopter Repairman), 71H20 (Personnel Specialist), 71P20 (Flight Operations Specialist), 67V20 (OH-58 Helicopter Repairman), and 68H20 (Senior Hydraulic Repairman).

EVALUATION: Due to the variety of aircraft assigned and units varied missions, it is essential that personnel critical to mission comple-
tation be maintained at or near authorized strength level. Present shortages
will become increasingly critical in the next 90 day period.

RECOMMENDATION: A redistribution of USARV and 1st Aviaton
Brigade assets should be made, if appropriate, consistent with stand-down
timetables.

COMMAND ACTION: Continue to advise higher headquarters on unit
personnel shortages.

b. Intelligence:

OBSERVATION: Timely, accurate intelligence information is extreme-
lishly difficult to obtain.

EVALUATION: There are no intelligence distribution channels
direct to 11th CAG. With the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the increasing
sophistication of enemy air defense weaponry, a lack of timely intelligence
is acutely apparent.

RECOMMENDATION: A daily summary of the preceding days signif-
icient events and enemy activities be provided 11th CAG from higher head-
quartes for redistribution to subordinate units.

COMMAND ACTION: Group S-2 in conjunction with the Tactical
Operations Center (TOC) gleans as much information as possible from available
information agencies. This information is posted on the TOC situation
maps and update as required.

c. Operations:

(1) OBSERVATION: There are no procedures for the coordination
and planning of resupply missions to fire bases or installations which
are under active enemy threat.

EVALUATION: Currently, the aircraft commander accomplishing the
resupply is given a sketchy intelligence briefing while enroute to the
drop location. By the time it can be determined if a threat exists it is
often times too late to make detailed coordination and planning for
suppressive fires. Thus the mission is either aborted or in an extreme
emergency the aircraft attempts the mission at great risk to aircraft
and crew.

RECOMMENDATION: Once it has been established that a resupply
mission must be made to an active or potentially active hostile fire area,
detailed planning and coordination should be made to increase the surviv-
ability of the aircraft and mission accomplishment. Every effort should be
to locate and suppress known or suspected enemy firing locations. All
available assets should be used, i.e.: TAC air, naval gunfire, helicopter
gunships, etc. The use of smoke for screening and even the use of CS gas
should be considered to achieve the safe accomplishment of the mission.
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COMMAND ACTION: At present every effort is being made by the 11th CAG to stay aware of the installations currently providing refueling facilities for Army aircraft within the areas our aircraft are flying.

(4) OBSERVATION: There is a propensity for higher headquarters to "dedicate" aircraft to certain missions or staff sections rather than to schedule aircraft daily on an as-required basis.

EVALUATION: In the past when there were sufficient aviation assets in Military Region 1, certain aircraft were assigned to specific missions or staff sections at XXIV Corps Headquarters on a regular basis to allow both the supported and the supporting unit better coordination and continuity on missions. With the vast reduction in aviation assets and corresponding increase in priority missions throughout MR 1, this procedure is no longer feasible. The practice of having certain aircraft on immediate stand-by severely limits unit capabilities to provide support to missions which have a greater priority.

RECOMMENDATION: That higher headquarters reevaluate its standing mission requirements and attempt to reschedule them on a task basis.

COMMAND ACTION: 11th CAG continues to provide aircraft as requested and has on numerous occasions recommended improvements which could provide better aircraft utilization and flexibility in accomplishing the missions assigned.

(5) OBSERVATION: ARVN units habitually use web "donuts" rather than metal clevises to hook up even their heaviest loads to the CH-54 helicopter.

EVALUATION: Loads above 10,000 lbs. should only be hooked up with the metal clevis. The head caused by friction between hook and "donut" can cause the "donut" to fail.

RECOMMENDATION: ARVN units should be instructed to use the metal clevis on all CH-54 loads. Clevises should be made available through ARVN supply channels.

COMMAND ACTION: A letter has been sent to higher headquarters requesting all ARVN advisory teams inform counterparts of the requirement to use metal clevises rather than "donuts" on CH-54 loads.

(6) OBSERVATION: The film processing kit that is to be used with the AN/APS-940 SLAR system is designed for a one time use. Due to the difficulty in obtaining the kits through supply channels to meet unit needs on a timely basis, the unit was forced to derive better system utilization from those processing kits on hand.

EVALUATION: It was determined that the film processing kits could be used on more than one mission, providing the developer, developer tray
and film were not removed from the film magazine and the film magazine was reused within two and one half hours. By changing film magazines between mission aircraft, it was possible to cut the usage factor in half without the loss of clarity in the STAR imagery.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That the procedure of reuse of STAR film processing kits be utilized until such time as the availability of the kits is increased on RVN.

COMMAND ACTION: 11th CAG presently reuses the STAR film kits.

d. Organization: None.

e. Training: None.

f. Logistics: 

OBSERVATION: The OV-1 aircraft is equipped with an oxygen system capable of performing at altitudes above 20,000 feet. AR 96-1, Para 4-5 B, restricts the OV-1 to a maximum of 10,000 feet if oxygen is not being used by the crew members. Frequently mission requirements dictate flight over territory well within range of enemy anti-aircraft systems, and the use of oxygen and higher altitudes would all but eliminate this hazard. Frequently STAR missions are aborted because the tops of the clouds in the mission areas extend above 10,000 feet. Acceptable STAR imagery without resolution loss can be obtained at altitudes to 15,000 feet. Most Infrared (IR) missions are flown at night, and a pilot's night vision suffers at least a 5% loss for every two thousand feet above four thousand feet. The breathing of oxygen even at these comparatively low altitudes would be an obvious safety factor. All aircraft have had the internal oxygen systems empty of oxygen for months and need thorough purging of the systems soon before the entire systems are ruined by wearing.

EVALUATION: The 131st MIC needs adequate oxygen support, not only in the interest of safety and mission accomplishment, but for crew survivability.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That the 131st MIC be provided oxygen servicing equipment, service all aircraft with oxygen after landing, and educate pilots, technical observers, and crew chiefs on proper utilization of oxygen.

COMMAND ACTION: The technical supply officer of the 131st MIC spoke to AMCOM in Saigon on 28 April 1972. They indicated that a request for an oxygen cart would be approved. A letter requesting this equipment was forwarded to higher headquarters in early May. It was also requested that additional items be initiated into Army supply from the Air Force on a reimbursable account. These items will be necessary for servicing aircraft and are not available through Army supply channels. On requisition are more oxygen bottles, servicing lines, connectors, and purifiers.

g. Communications: None.
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COMMAND ACTION: Resupply aircraft are given helicopter gunship cover whenever there is active hostile fire on the landing zone. The aircraft commander coordinates in the air with the ground unit and requests fire in the areas deemed potentially hostile. Normally no pre-planned artillery preparations or air strikes are planned and these are accomplished only if the assets happen to be in the area at that time. Usually, if the aircraft receives fire the mission is aborted and attempted later.

(2) OBSERVATION: The artillery/naval gunfire warning centers have become ineffective with the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

EVALUATION: With the increasing role being played by ARVN artillery, its facilities for air advisory has decreased. The ARVN unit's seem to have difficulty in passing firing information to advisory facilities. Many published ARVN artillery advisory facilities are non-operational. Aircraft of 11th Group have observed artillery impact while in flight and were unable to gain information as to gun-target line, impact grid, or height of trajectory.

RECOMMENDATION: That ARVN artillery advisory facilities be kept informed by firing units of all firings. That all published frequencies for artillery advisory facilities actually be monitored by responsible personnel.

COMMAND ACTION: ARVN artillery commanders be informed of the dangers involved for aircraft in combined airspace with artillery projectiles, and the need to pass firing information on to artillery advisory facilities. Insure published artillery advisory facilities are manned.

(3) OBSERVATION: Due to the reduction in U.S. installations in Vietnam, refueling points for Army aircraft are becoming increasingly scarce.

EVALUATION: Many installations previously occupied by U.S. military forces have been either closed down or turned over to the ARVN. For the most part, these installations provided aviation fuel (JP4) for Army aircraft that were flying in their areas. With the turn over of these installations, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain POL. Specifically, if any of the several existing coastal refueling points is closed down it will become impossible for Army helicopters to traverse certain regions of Vietnam. This would mean that aircraft from one end of the country would have to be transported by surface means, if the aircraft has to go to the other end of the country. Cross-country trips for Army helicopters are hazardous at the present time without the additional difficulty of being stranded without fuel should one of the remaining points be closed without warning.

RECOMMENDATION: That a network of published permanent refueling facilities be established to allow Army aircraft to maneuver about the country. The installation should be manned and secured at all times. Once they have been established as permanent installations, their locations and the type of facilities available should be given the widest possible dissemination.
Material:

(1) OBSERVATION: During the months of January and February, extreme difficulties were encountered with CH-54A aircraft. Cracks were discovered on the inlet guide vanes of 7 engines. These cracks rendered the engine unserviceable. Cracks were found generally on engines that had been in service under 200 hours, but on some occasions cracks were found on initial inspection of an engine prior to installation.

EVALUATION: Delays encountered in receiving satisfactory replacement engines impaired the capability of the 478th Avn Co to perform its mission.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That inlet guide vanes on CH-54 engines be strengthened.

COMMAND ACTION: Equipment Improvement Requests (EIR) were submitted on faulty engines. Information has been received through channels that the recommendations made on EIR's are being implemented. EIR's submitted were H68109, H69110, K31705, K31700, H08195, H08194, and H08073.

(2) OBSERVATION: Authorized individual weapons are insufficient due to possibility of extended ground time in remote hostile areas in the event of precautionary/forced landing.

EVALUATION: The need to sufficiently arm crewmembers was evidenced during the recent enemy action in northern Military Region I. The sophisticated anti-aircraft capabilities that the enemy possess make it increasingly difficult to extract downed crew; therefore, the crewmembers need to be armed with weapons that are suitable for defense as well as stowing in the aircraft when in flight.

RECOMMENDATION: All crewmembers be authorized pistols. Each enlisted crewmember without machinegun and each officer crewmember authorized additionally one submachinegun 5.56, M177.

COMMAND ACTION: Presently arming crewmembers with M16 and requesting that M177's be issued in lieu of M16's for crewmembers.

1. Other: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES J. DAVIS
MAJ, IN
Adjutant
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7 Inclusions
1. Organizational Structure/Location
2. Change of Command and Staff Positions
3. Authorized/Assigned Strength
4. Aircraft Authorized/Assigned
5. Operational Statistics
6. Summary of Significant Enemy Engagements
7. Awards and Decorations
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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
AS OF 30 APRIL 72

11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO, 96349

HQ, 11TH CAG
APO, 96349

46TH ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY
APO, 96349

62ND AVIATION COMPANY (COMPS)
APO, 96349

519TH MEDICAL DETACHMENT
APO, 96349

1319TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY (APRIL SURVEILLANCE)
APO, 96349

321ST AIRFIELD DETACHMENT (DIVISION)
APO, 96308

322ND AIRFIELD DETACHMENT (DIVISION)
APO, 96349

478TH AVIATION COMPANY (HEAVY HELICOPTER)
APO, 96349

THIRD PLATOON
APO, 96291

F TROOP, 4TH AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON*
APO, 96308

INFORMATION TO 11TH CAG 1 APRIL 1972 - 30 APRIL 1972:

INCLUSION #1-A

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## 11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP

### CHANGE OF COMMAND AND STAFF POSITIONS

**1 November 1971 - 30 April 1972**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT OR STAFF POSITION</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>NAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP Commander</td>
<td>1 Nov 71-29 Apr 72</td>
<td>Robert A. Hallman, Illi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 Apr-</td>
<td>240-41-5750, COL, IN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>James M. Leslie</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>517-24-1651, COL, IN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>1 Nov 71-25 Mar 72</td>
<td>Reiser, John D.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>498-22-2920, LTC, PA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>1 Nov 71-1 Jan 72</td>
<td>Mullon, Gordon R.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 Jan 72-27 Apr 72</td>
<td>Lovett, John K.</td>
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<td>27 Apr 72-30 Apr 72</td>
<td>Rector, June K.</td>
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<td>415-54-2705, Maj, FA</td>
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<td>S-1</td>
<td>1 Nov 71-1 Jan 72</td>
<td>Casey, Douglas E.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 Jan 72-</td>
<td>424-42-4639, Maj, IN</td>
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<td>Davis, James J.</td>
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<td>453-46-0777, Maj, IN</td>
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<td>S-2</td>
<td>1 Nov 71-1 Jan 72</td>
<td>Knickerbcker, Larry D.</td>
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<td>1 Jan 72-20 Feb 72</td>
<td>Bruton, Jack E.</td>
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<td>21 Feb 72-30 Mar 72</td>
<td>Hall, George R.</td>
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<td>1 Apr 72-</td>
<td>473-53-0624, Maj, IN</td>
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<td>Pederson, Richard W.</td>
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<td>341-40-3799, CPT, FA</td>
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<td>Livingston, Claudio G.</td>
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<td>Boswell, George W.</td>
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<td>24 Nov 71-</td>
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<td>Brooks, Carter D.</td>
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<td>CO, 48th ARC</td>
<td>1 Nov 71-</td>
<td>Kingsman, Dan C., Jr.</td>
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<td>505-46-6522, Maj, IN</td>
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<td>CO, 62nd Avn Co</td>
<td>1 Nov 71-12 Dec 71</td>
<td>Klose, John D. G.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co, 62nd Avn Co</td>
<td>13 Dec 71-</td>
<td>485-36-4623, MlJ, PA</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO, 131st MI CO</td>
<td>1 Nov 71-</td>
<td>Wright, Wayne W.</td>
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<td>1 Nov 71-1 Jan 72</td>
<td>465-56-5851, MlJ, PA</td>
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<td>2 Jan 72-</td>
<td>Davis, Marion L.</td>
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<td>CO, 478th HHC</td>
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<td>Wall, Daniel D.</td>
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<td>Walton, Benny R.</td>
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INCLOSURE #2
## CONFIDENTIAL
### 11th COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
**AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH AS OF 30 APRIL 1972**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th></th>
<th>WO</th>
<th></th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASSD</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASSD</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASSD</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140th, 11th CAG</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td>48th AHC</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>273</td>
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<tr>
<td>62nd Avn Co</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>296</td>
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<tr>
<td>131st MI Co</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>214</td>
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<td>209</td>
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<tr>
<td>521st AD</td>
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<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>322nd AD</td>
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<td>478th MI</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>203</td>
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<td>519th Mod Lab</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>833</td>
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**INCLUSION 3**
**CONFIDENTIAL**

11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
OPERATIONAL STATISTICS
1 NOVEMBER 1971-30 APRIL 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nov 71</th>
<th>Dec 71</th>
<th>Jan 72</th>
<th>Feb 72</th>
<th>Mar 72</th>
<th>Apr 72</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HOURS FLOWN</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cumulative Hrs</strong></td>
<td>10,618</td>
<td>7,657</td>
<td>7,064</td>
<td>6,570</td>
<td>5,503</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sorties flown</strong></td>
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<td>95,895</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Troops Lifted</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>136,741</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cargo Lifted (Tons)</strong></td>
<td>27,850</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Enemy KIA</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Structures Damaged</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Structures Destroyed</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Sampans Damaged</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Aircraft Damaged</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aircraft Destroyed</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

INCLOSURE #5

CONFIDENTIAL
On 20 November an OH-58 from HHC, 223rd CAB while on a last light VR received heavy ground fire vicinity HT047685. The A/C took seven hits and was forced down. There were no casualties and the A/C was later recovered.

On 29 November a CH-47 of the 176th ASHC while on a logistics resupply mission took six hits from small arms fire vicinity H230515. One crewmember was WIA; however, the A/C continued its mission.

On 14 December a UH-4H from the 48th AHC took seven hits from enemy ground fire vicinity H175567. The A/C was forced to return to MMAAF.

On 13 January MMAAF received 21 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. There were no casualties nor damage.

On 21 January a UH-1H from the 173rd AHC was shot down vicinity XG73562 while on a combat assault mission. The A/C crashed in a river and one passenger was drowned. The A/C was later destroyed to prevent capture.

On 8 March gunships from the 48th AHC received small arms fire from an estimated enemy platoon at AT960330. Fire was returned and 4 enemy were killed by helicopter (KHJ).

On 10 March a UH-1H from the 48th AHC while on a resupply mission vicinity AT910510 received intense automatic weapons fire and was forced to land. There were no personnel injured and the A/C was recovered.

Increased enemy activity in Quang Tri Province resulted in battle damage to several 11th CAG A/C on 1 April. A CH-47 in an emergency resupply mission to an ARVN FOB sustained 15 hits from enemy small arms and 57 cal. machine gun fire. A/C was forced to land at Quang Tri and was recovered later in the month. A UH-1H, also, on a resupply mission, was shot down vicinity YI280670. The crew was engaged by the enemy in the ground and one man was slightly wounded. A VMF slick braved intense enemy fire to extract the crew. A CH-47 from the 203rd ASHC received numerous hits while on another emergency resupply mission and was forced to land at Quang Tri. The A/C received shrapnel damage while on the ground but was later repaired and flown back to MMAAF. Another CH-47 took 8 hits and was forced to return to MMAAF. The 11th CAG had six A/C hit by hostile fire on 1 April.

On 2 April a CH-47 from the 62nd Aviation Company rescued 3 US advisors and 40 ARVN from Camp Carroll just prior to its being overrun by the enemy. The CH-47 and 2 of its 3 gunship escort sustained battle damage during the extraction.

On 3 April the 11th CAG C.O. controlled 2 Light Fire Teams (LFT’s) in defense of FSB Anne. 15 probable KIA’s were reported.
On 5 April gunships from F/3 Cav. were committed 4000 meters west of FSB Bastogne to aid an ARVN armored unit attempting to break enemy contact. 1 ARVN tank and 2 A/C's were able to break out before the operation terminated due to weather.

On 8 April a F/4 Cav. team was engaged by an estimated 7.51 cal. machineguns vicinity YD620122. Gunships returned fire resulting in 3 confirmed KEB's and 5 probable.

On 14 April an AH-1G in support of the 2nd ARVN Division engaged a platoon size enemy force at AT950380. Results were 5 probable KEB's and 1 secondary explosion.

At 0240 hours, 15 April MNAF received an attack by fire consisting of 25 82mm mortar rounds. 20 A/C were damaged, however there were no personal injured.

On 19 April MNAF again sustained a mortar attack. 15 82mm mortar rounds destroyed 1 fork lift, damaged 1 A/C and three trucks.

On 21 April gunships from the 48th AHC were fired upon while escorting some slicks on an emergency resupply mission for 2nd ARVN Division. One AH-1G was shot down vicinity BD002860. The crew was successfully extracted but suffered severe burns as a result of the crash. Gunships were credited with 22 KEB's and numerous secondary explosions.

On 23 April MNAF received an attack by fire consisting of 8 107mm rockets. 11th CAG had no injuries or damage. Fortunately 3 of the rockets were duds and were destroyed by EOD teams.

On 28 April an AH-1G from F/4 Cav. was shot down by 37mm fire vicinity YD360550. Both the pilot and gunner were killed, however, they destroyed 3 enemy tanks before being shot down. A total of 7 11th CAG A/C were hit during the day, all in Quang Tri Province as the enemy offensive again gathered momentum.

On 29 April a 62nd Aviation Company OH-1H was shot down by enemy small arms fire vicinity YD204240. Colonel Halloran, 11th C.G. C.O., tried to rescue the crew of the downed A/C, but during the attempt his A/C was also shot down. A1-E's were used to suppress the enemy ground fire as the NVA went after the 2 downed crews. An AH-1G from the 48th AHC was diverted from a VIP escort mission and also provided suppressive fire at the site. 2 OH-1H's from the 62nd and 1 HH-1 from the 48th finally managed to extract the 2 crews, however, Colonel Halloran was wounded during the extraction and had to be evacuated to CONUS. All A/C received intense enemy fire during the extraction. Four personal of the 11th CAG were wounded and a passenger in one of the rescue A/C's a US LFO was killed.

Also, on 29 April an AH-1G from F/4 while an armed VR was shot down vicinity YD203500. The A/C crashed but the crew was safely extracted.

Inclulure #6
CONFIDENTIAL

11TH CIRCUIT AVIATION GROUP
AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
1 NOVEMBER 1971-30 APRIL 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers Medal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVN Cross of Gallantry</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTALS**

658
AVBAGC (15 May 72) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: ORLL of Headquarters 11th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30
April 1972.

DA Headquarters, 1st Avn Bde, APO San Francisco 96364

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam/MACV Support Command, ATTN:
AVHCG-DST, APO San Francisco 96375

1. After review of the ORLL for the 11th CAG the following comments are submitted.

2. Comments on paragraph 2a are as follows:

a. The 11th CAG does not have all of the warrant officers, MOS 100B0, author-
ized, but company grade commissioned officers were assigned in lieu of the warrant
aviators. During the reporting period covered by this OR-LL, the 11th CAG had over
100 per cent fill of company grade/warrant aviators authorized. The distribution
of warrant aviators has been equitably distributed to all groups. Current aviator
assets of the 11th CAG are at the 96 per cent fill level currently authorized.

b. Shortages of enlisted personnel in MOS's 67420/40, 71H20, 71P20, 67V20 and
68H20 do exist in USARV and the 11th Aviation Brigade. Strengths of these critical
skills are continually redistributed to maintain an equitable fill between groups
with less than 2 per cent disparity. It has been observed that several personnel
with these critical MOS skills are being utilized in other less critical skill areas.
Reassignment of existing assets within the group will provide additional relief.
Emergency requisitions have been submitted to obtain the necessary fill of these
skills.

c. The schedule and phasing of unit stand downs will continue to cause undes-
irable imbalances in MOS skills.

3. Reference: OR-LL, 11th CAG

Paragraph 2f, page 7, discusses the oxygen system used on the OV-1 aircraft.
It was determined that the OV-1 aircraft did need a functional oxygen system. To
accomplish this, action was taken by the 131st MIC to acquire the necessary
equipment. On 8 May 72 this office received a letter from the 131st MIC request-
ing personnel lowering devices and oxygen fittings. On 13 May 72 a letter con-
cerning this letter was sent to USARV, ATTN: AVHPLTT-8 requesting an ISSA with
the Air Force be initiated to procure the required oxygen fittings. After the fittings
were procured they will be shipped to the 131st MIC. In addition to this action a message to USAAMC, St Louis, Mo.
is being prepared to inquire if there is a possibility that these fittings could be
obtained in a more expeditious manner than thru Air Force channels. This message
will be dispatched as soon as additional information is received.
AVBAGC (15 May 72) 1st Inf 5 July 1972


4. Reference: OR-LL, 11th CAG

Paragraph 6h(1) page 9 discusses difficulties encountered with the turbine engines used on the CH-54 helicopter during the months of January and February. The T73 engine is still a problem area. Informal investigation has revealed that the major problem has been cracked inlet guide vanes, which was caused in most cases by flux under the weld. This information together with a request for assistance to eliminate the problem was forwarded to CG, USAAVSCOM by AVHAV-LOG message 260906Z May 72.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

B.F. L. Webster
CMZ, USA
Assistant AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (OCLL) of the 11th Combat Aviation Group for the Period Ending 30 April 1972, MSG GOFOR-65 (U2) (U)

headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam/OSG SUPCOM, APO Jan Francisco 96375

X: Commander-In-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPCP-FD, APO Jan Francisco 96938

This headquarters has reviewed the subject OCLL and submits the following comments:

a. Nonconcur with paragraph 2a, and concur with paragraph 2, lst Ind.

This Headquarters continues to work with Department of the Army to obtain personnel in shortage MOS. Standdown/drawdown unit assets are screened to ensure needed personnel are reassigned within this command.

b. Concur with paragraph 2b.

As US forces withdraw from the SVN, the collection, production and dissemination of timely intelligence, especially at the lower level, will remain an ever increasing problem.

c. Concur with paragraph 2h(2).

MOS's should be modified to reflect new individual weapon authorization.

For the COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Capt, AS, A&G

CFA:
2- A&GFDL, DA, Wash, DC 20310
CONFIDENTIAL

GFOP-FD (10 May 72) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ 11th Combat Aviation Group, Period Ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 21 SEP 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

M. L. Darby

LT, AGC

Ass't AG

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

1. REPORT TITLE
Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Combat Aviation Group, Period Ending 30 April 72 (U)

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations

5. REPORT DATE
17 January 1973

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
N/A

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
HQ DA, DAFD, Washington, D.C. 20310

13. ABSTRACT

This page is unclassified.

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