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IN REPLY REFER TO
DAAG-PAP-A (M) (17 Nov 72) DAFD-OTT

4 December 1972

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Major General John H. Cushman, Commander, Delta Regional Assistance Command, Vietnam, 14 May 71 - 14 Jan 72 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) 2 July 1971.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Major General John H. Cushman, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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1. (U) Introduction. The established purpose of this report, namely "to record and utilize the experience, knowledge, and insight gained by senior officers," has led me to deviate from the suggested format and to set forth in a reflective vein certain major views held by me at tour's end. These
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result not simply from the 22 months as an advisor in the Delta which end with this report, but also from two previous Vietnam tours. The reader interested in information responsive to the suggested format is referred to other, and excellent, material already available.

2. (U) The Need for Insight. "Insight" is mentioned above. All too often insight is gained too late, and through adverse experience. I believe that great costs could have been saved in the Vietnam experience if our individual and collective insight had been better as things were developing. I claim no particular insight, but I do have some views on how insight can be gained.

Insight - or the ability to see the situation as it really is - is the most valuable asset an advisor can have. Intellect alone does not guarantee insight. Soldierly virtues such as integrity, courage, loyalty, and steadfastness are valuable indeed, but they are often not accompanied by insight. Insight comes from a willing openness to a variety of stimuli, from intellectual curiosity, from observation and reflection, from continuous evaluation and testing, from conversations and discussions, from review of assumptions, from listening to the views of outsiders, and from the indispensable ingredient of humility. Self-doubt is essential equipment for a responsible officer in this environment; the man who believes he has the situation entirely figured out is a danger to himself and to his mission.

I dwell on this because, while insight is the secret of good generalship in any situation, it is even more a requirement among the intangibles, nuances, and obscurities of a situation like Vietnam. Certainly the responsible officer must be a man of decision, willing to settle on a course of action and to follow it through. But the reflective, testing, and tentative manner in which insight is sought does not mean indecisiveness. It simply raises the likelihood that the decided course of action will be successful, because it is in harmony with the real situation that exists. I am convinced that the subjective insight into the conditions which actually prevail comes about only in the way I describe.

3. (C) The Advisor. The above puts a special demand on the selection of advisors, especially at the level of colonel and above. The qualities which might make for effective, or even outstanding, performance as a battalion or brigade commander are not necessarily those which make the best advisor. A marked empathy with others, an ability to accommodate, a
certain unmilitarily philosophical or reflective bent, a kind of waywardness or independence, and the like - these are often found in outstanding advisors, but may be frowned on in a troop chain of command situation. While it is entirely possible to find the man who excels both as commander and advisor, these men are too rare, and we need to look for good advisors who may not be all-purpose officers.

As Vietnam winds down, the natural tendency will be to pay less attention to the selection of senior officers for service there. The years ahead, however, are crucial ones and good advisors will be needed as much as, or more than, ever. An informal "selection board" or screening group, at DA level, made up of former advisors, which reviewed records and interviewed, even motivated, likely candidates, would be one way of insuring senior level advisor quality as well as indicating highest level interest. Further, the Military Assistance Institute at Fort Bragg, as the Army's repository of advisory know-how, could be the location where this "selection board" meets, where the performance of successful advisors is made a matter of record, and where periodic and interesting seminars and orientation sessions for colonel and general officer level advisors could be run.

To further describe how I view the advisory function in the Delta, I attach as Inclosure I a recent letter of instructions to the four division/special tactical zone senior advisors in MR4.

4. (C) Through Vietnamese Eyes. Of course, the advisor must try to see the situation as it looks through Vietnamese eyes; This is part of the insight he strives for - not simply understanding the way Vietnamese in general look at matters, but also how his Vietnamese, his counterpart, does. What are the biases, constraints, pressures, and so on, that make up his real world? In all of this, the American has to understand that he is not Vietnamese. He is only temporarily in the country, and he will be exceptional indeed if in his tour he understands a small fraction of how Vietnamese look at their situation and themselves. But everything he suggests should be tested against the question "how does this fit into the Vietnamese way?"

Furthermore, it is very important to understand "the way things move" and to take advantage of natural movement. An example: Our Vietnamese friends want to stop supplies from being infiltrated ashore in coastal fishing areas. If they do this by denying native fishermen the opportunity to fish there, where they have fished for generations, and where their livelihood lies, this is unnatural and in the end self-defeating. But if they bring
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territorial security to the coastal area, populate it, outpost it, put PF in the area, establish local government, and eventually gain the loyalty of the population. The infiltration of supplies will come to an end. Furthermore, the fish men will be on their side. Our US advisors must appreciate this type of point and make the natural forces operate to the advantage of the mission.

On the other hand, we have to recognize that the natural inclinations of the Vietnamese will on occasion work against their own objectives. An example: Village and district chiefs do not want to redeploy PF from pacified to contested areas, this is against the nature of the PF soldier, who likes to be home, and of the local authorities, who like the comfort of PF nearby. But if this redeployment outward from secure to insecure areas does not take place, the war cannot be won. So a solution must be found; however, the solution can still be a "natural," or as a minimum a "least unnatural," solution.

The chemistry of this Vietnamese/US mix — this daily mingling of the counterpart with his views and the advisor with his — is what makes advisorship so interesting, and, when it produces a durable and good result, so rewarding and worthwhile. Each advisor is really alone in his environment. Because they are so intangible, he is not, as he is in most jobs, able to share with others his frustrations and his triumphs. (There are tangible and concrete ways to make things happen as an advisor, however, paragraph 9 of this report gets to that point.)

5 (U) The Enemy. One area where insight still seems to be especially short is in our understanding of the "enemy." After all this time, he is still far from understood, and is again and again capable of surprise. A basic reason for this is that "he" is fundamentally different from "us," including the Vietnamese on our side, and we do not adequately perceive this. We know few revolutionaries, we are little in personal contact with Communists, and thus we fail to appreciate their remarkably distinct and different, and impressive qualities. The antagonist, especially the cadre, in Vietnam lives in an environment completely different from ours, but by years of adaptation, he is entirely at home, even secure and confident, in that environment. His environment is one of the hunted, yet one in which he can find protection among the people. It is an environment of night movement, clandestine communications, secret cadres, anonymity, rudimentary logistics, continual reconnaissance, careful study, patiently...
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waiting for the right conditions, near perfect intelligence about "our side," constant exhortation, a network of secret bases, discipline, fervor, dedication, adaptation to hardships, pride in not just survival but progress notwithstanding the other side's possession of artillery, sensors, helicopters, B-52's, fighter bombers, and other technical equipment of war.

Now, we should give due respect to all these qualities of his, but as we gain insight into his nature we can also perceive his vulnerabilities. Perhaps we can even come to realize that some of the more costly systems being deployed against him in the countryside are, and will always be, of little effect and we can put our energies and efforts where the payoff will be greater. For example, within MR4 the campaign to eliminate the enemy "minibases" in the countryside and to resettle formerly populated areas long contested or controlled by the enemy is striking his system in its most sensitive and vulnerable sector and will eventually be his undoing by depriving him of local guerrilla support.

6. (U) The Vietnamese Must Do It. Probably the hardest thing for an American (even for advisors) in Vietnam to grasp completely is that, if our Vietnamese friends cannot bring this thing off, it is not going to get done. We cannot, and should not, do it for them. The U.S. withdrawal has finally brought home this basic truth to our U.S. rank and file in Vietnam. But, even at this stage, it is a hard truth to understand and accept completely and the full scope of what it means to advisors is still slow to penetrate. It means not simply that "the Vietnamese must do it." It also means that we must still try to "show them how." The job of the advisor thus becomes more complex, in that he has to figure out what he has to offer at this stage of the war. He can offer a great deal - analysis, systematic programs for achievement of objectives, independent evaluation, an outsider's critique, plus friendly encouragement - all aimed at ultimate withdrawal of even his support and the Vietnamese doing almost everything on their own.

7. (U) Motivation. If the responsible advisor is reflective, has intellectual curiosity, accepts self-doubt, and the like, this will inevitably lead him to ask, "Is this a worthy cause?" This question is fundamental, especially today when the assertion by figures in respected political, academic, and media positions that the cause is unworthy, discredited, or even immoral seems often to be accepted as fact.

Without going into a discussion, I simply say that I have thought a great deal about the subject and conclude that Vietnam has been, and remains, a
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Worthy cause - worthy of the ideals, heritage, and efforts of the United States. To remain worthy of U.S. participation, the effort must be conducted along lines which are morally and ethically justifiable.

We owe it to ourselves, our men, and our country to let discussion of the cause itself be out in the open and dealt with - so that responsible, moral, and upright men can be satisfied that their efforts are on the right track. From this enlightenment there proceeds improved motivation, and a solid and lasting basis for a sustained U.S. effort in this country.

8. (C) The Future for Vietnam. As I leave Vietnam, the North Vietnamese are once again on the offensive in Indochina - pressing hard in Laos and Cambodia and evidently building up for something in Vietnam. There will quite clearly be another time of test. As I look at the overall picture, albeit from a regional vantage point, it seems to me that, notwithstanding the current enemy offensive, there is movement today in Vietnam along lines which have a reasonable chance of bringing about a satisfactory outcome - satisfactory from a (South) Vietnamese, a U.S., a Southeast Asia, as well as a "world peace" point of view. Parts of this mix are in fair shape, on others a good deal more needs to be done. Elements of the "program" are

a. Stability of the Rear. This will come from an extension of pacification throughout the populated territory of the Republic of Vietnam, through improvement of the economic and social well being of the Vietnamese people, and through the growth of effective administration, of good local self-government, of local capacity for self-defense, and of community spirit in the hamlets and villages in the countryside.

These things are happening now, and they must be encouraged in every way possible, so as to establish a durable base from which the South Vietnamese society can deal with the threat from outside its borders.

b. Redeployment to Meet the Threat. The outside threat will remain well supported, intelligently conceived, and pressed on with strength, skill, and determination. The outside threat now represents by far the greatest threat to the security of the country. For the Vietnamese to deal effectively with this threat they must find the intellectual and moral toughness to prepare their divisions and mobile field forces for hard
fighting, to move these forces ahead of time into the right positions, and to take the tactical offensive in a war in which they are on the strategic defensive. Re-deployment also means that (at least in the Delta) RF must be used outside provinces, so as to free divisions for use on the frontiers, outside the military region, or in Cambodia or Laos, and that PF must be either re-deployed to less secure areas or eventually dissolved to support the economy, enter the PSDF, and strengthen local administration.

c. Cambodian-Vietnamese Cooperation. Two fundamental truths dictate that there must be close cooperation between the South Vietnamese and the Cambodian government. First, to the North Vietnamese the war is, and always has been, an "Indochina War" in which the theater has been not only Vietnam and Cambodia but Laos as well. Second, the security of South Vietnam's populous MR's 3 and 4 requires that Cambodia not be in the hands of the enemy. There has been an encouraging development of cooperation across the borders. Much more remains to be done. The United States is in an excellent position to be the catalyst in this chemistry. The U.S. authorities on both sides of the border are well aware of this matter and I raise the point simply to highlight its great importance.

d. Stifle Infiltration. Cooperation between South Vietnam and friendly elements in Laos may well be indicated also. In any event, some feasible and reasonably effective way must be found to limit the use of Laos territory as a supply and troop movement corridor into the open flank of South Vietnam. The war inside South Vietnam can now be dealt with, provided that the entry of troops and supplies from outside can be restricted to a fairly low level. I have no solution to offer; this has been out of my area of responsibility and familiarity. I mention it because I regard it as an essential component to a satisfactory outcome. (Coastal infiltration must also be restricted but it represents a more manageable problem.)

Movement along the above four lines will set up a long term situation in which it should be possible for the South Vietnamese to contain the threat indefinitely and for their country to grow in strength even in a time of hostilities. North Vietnam is prepared to wage war of indefinite length, in the expectation that South Vietnam is not or cannot be so
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preparation When South Vietnam shows that it is also so prepared, a shift in the likelihood of an end to it all will quite possibly take place, and this war will end. But the outcome is by no means certain.

9. Getting Things Done. While insight and that sort of subjective assessment of the way things are is important, the payoff in an advisory effort is in "getting things done" through the Vietnamese. The Delta advisory team has developed a management tool which has been fairly useful in making things happen toward desirable objectives. The nickname of this is "REVAMP," which stands for "Redoubled Viet Namization and Military Professionalism." In May 1971 we started this project by setting down the several major thrusts which made up our overall mission in the Delta. We called these "Level 1 Objectives." They were:

   a. Pacification. (or more accurately: Provide Support to GVN Community Development and Local Defense Programs.)

   b. Turnover. (By this we meant "systematically turn over to the Vietnamese those things now being done by Americans."

   c. Training. (Training is part of all Level 1 Objectives. In addition, we set it out separately because of its great importance and to achieve more emphasis.)

   d. Improving RVNAF Military Operations. (All aspects of RVNAF military operations need improvement. Here our intention was to select a relatively small number of lines of action which had high priority and high payoff possibilities.)

   e. Cambodia Cooperation. (Included because of its decisive importance to mission accomplishment in the Delta.)

   f. Orderly Phasedown of the U.S. Effort. (All of the above were to be conducted in a time of reduction of the U.S. presence in the Delta, both support forces and advisors, which reduction was itself to be done in a planned, orderly, and systematic manner. This is in large part what set up the interesting management problem.)

   g. Professionalism in the Command. (Finally, and during all of the above, it was necessary to insure that the mission orientation, well being,
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The overall performance and support of U.S. troops, both advisory and non-advisory, was at the highest standard. This was necessary not only for our own sake, but also to set an example to the Vietnamese.

Level 1 Objectives were broken down into several Level 2 Objectives and subordinate Level 3 Objectives were developed for most of these. A uniform and systematic approach was established toward the analysis and execution of programs for these Level 2 and 3 Objectives, as well as a system for controlling the overall program.

REVAMP has been a successful management program and a useful tool for Delta mission accomplishment.

Those who are interested in further information on this management method may address their inquiries to the Chief of Staff, Delta Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96215.

10 (C) The Situation in the Delta. Finally, on my departure from Vietnam, I find the situation in the Delta encouraging in some respects, troubling in others, and satisfactory overall.

The Delta strategic plan is along sound lines, and the organization is good. Pacification is at work in the countryside and, if pressed on into the less populated and other still highly contested areas, will inexorably erode the enemy's guerrilla strength without which he cannot survive. Leadership is generally good - superior at Corps, satisfactory overall at division/STZ, and, with only one serious exception, reasonably good at provinces. Problems exist - for example, redeployment lags in provinces, districts, and villages; shifts in tactics are not coming rapidly enough, infiltration continues, the village and hamlet levels of administration are still weak, training of forces is far below standard; and development is hampered by unnecessary and self-imposed bureaucratic entanglement. Unless there is a serious turn for the worse in Cambodia, a governmental upheaval in Saigon, precipitate withdrawal of U.S. support, or some similar fundamental adverse change in the situation, I foresee continued progress in the Delta and eventual full mission accomplishment.

The best way to describe my views on the situation and outlook for Military Region 4 is (provided at the end) for comparison purposes, extracts of two letters written by me in recent months to Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, Commanding General, IV Corps and Military Region 4. The latter letter was my "farewell assessment.

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MACDR Co. 14 January 1972

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I would state in conclusion that my association as an advisor with LTG Tran, has been highly rewarding. That this outstanding officer has gained increasing responsibility within the Vietnamese armed forces over the years is one reason for my belief that there is a good likelihood that our Vietnam War may be successful in the long run.

J. H. CUSHMAN
Major General, U.S. Army
Senior Advisor, IV Corps/MR4

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1. (U) This letter of instructions contains my basic guidance for the execution of your responsibilities as senior advisor. It assembles and expands upon guidance already issued in other forms.

2. (U) Your mission: You are responsible for advice and assistance, as appropriate and within your means, to your counterpart and his command across the entire range of his responsibilities. Although you are to be concerned with the effectiveness of day to day operations, your basic objective is to bring about substantive and sustained improvement in the advised command and its subordinate elements so that it can perform its mission well with minimum U.S. combat support and eventually with none.

3. (U) You are to keep always in mind that the key to mission accomplishment in the Delta is pacification. You will thus consider the basic function of your advised command to be support to pacification. This concept is described in the various RVNAF and MR4 campaign plans, with which I expect you to be fully familiar. Your advice on unit employment, on the disposition of artillery, engineers, and other combat support, on operational methods, on the use of firepower, and the like, must be offered in full appreciation of the ultimate objective - the successful pacification of MR4.
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4 (U) Although you have neither command nor other jurisdiction over province advisory teams in your TAOR, I expect you to assist them in every possible way. You should provide a focal point for necessary coordination of military operations. You should find ways to support the efforts of these teams, and for your advised command to assist the province and district chiefs in its TAOR. You must lead and encourage your counter-part to visit district and province chiefs, to listen to what they have to say, to understand their problems, to contribute to the solution of these problems, and to counsel them as necessary. While your specific responsibilities in the field of pacification are limited, your understanding and support of the total pacification program must be thorough.

5. (C) For certain military matters, your advised command, and your advisory team, are in the operational chain between MR4 headquarters and the sectors, these matters include allocation and control of U.S. Army aviation assets, tactical air requests, and operational reporting among others. In such matters, I expect you to establish professional operating procedures and, working with the province senior advisors, to provide leadership and supervision so that these various systems operate smoothly and efficiently. In these fields, as well as others, the way to the desired results is good professional understanding of the problem, plus communication and a willingness to work out a solution.

6. (C) U.S. Army helicopter assets operating in the Delta are opcon to me as Senior Advisor, IV Corps/MR4, and I in turn make them opcon to you. They become opcon to you upon reporting for their mission. You are authorized to make them in turn opcon to regimental/group/brigade senior advisors or province senior advisors/deputy senior advisors, or their duly authorized representatives. When these assets are under your opcon, I hold you responsible for what they do. Before making the assets opcon, you will insure that lower level senior advisors are properly trained and oriented to accept the responsibilities that go with this opcon. You and they will always have available the advice of the air mission commander, and/or the aviation task force (battalion/squadron) commander. Listen carefully to this advice; disregard it at your great risk. In matters of safety of flight and weather limitations, the senior aviation commander present has the decisive word.

7. (U) I hold you responsible for meticulous compliance with prescribed Rules of Engagement. You must take extraordinary measures to insure that personnel who have responsibilities in these matters are thoroughly
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briefed, periodically tested, and continuously supervised. Further, you are to convey to your counterpart this same concern for the protection of noncombatants.

8. (C) We are engaged in a strong and systematic program for the improvement of the VNAF, and of ARVN/VNAF working relationships. I expect you to take a personal interest in moving this program in your advised command. This is a multi-faceted effort involving every type of VNAF support, and an intricate web of ARVN/VNAF operating procedures, command arrangements, and staff techniques. It involves the total US military advisory effort in the Delta. No aspect of your task is more important than this. The clearly foreseeable reduction in US aviation assets makes this effort essential to mission accomplishment in the Delta.

9. (U) You are to consider yourself as a trainer much more than an operator. You should carefully observe the operations of your advised command, evaluate its basic deficiencies, establish systematic programs to assist your counterpart in the correction of these deficiencies, and then measure progress and report it to him. Specifically, you will work toward improving command techniques, staff operations, coordination of combined arms and supporting operations, and the day-to-day training and command supervision of infantry platoons and companies and artillery batteries. Your counterpart should look on you as a consultant on these and other aspects of his responsibility, and not primarily as a channel through which he receives support of various kinds. This training emphasis and your function as consultant are a considerably greater challenge to your professional qualifications and advisor abilities than is the more limited function of "operator". You must consider that, through your years of professional preparation, and as a representative of the United States, you have important assistance to offer your counterpart and his command. At the same time you must approach the job with a certain humility, realizing that he knows a great deal more about Vietnam and his own situation than do you.

10. (U) The Vietnamese are moving to an era of more austerity. We must teach them to economize, to do more with less, and to find substitutes. This is going to mean some tough decisions on tactics, methods, priorities, and allocations, and more primitive ways in many respects. Dedicated trained manpower, moving on the ground, will have to do the jobs of
machines and technical gear. One of your main tasks is to develop a realistic approach by your counterpart of these realities, plus the toughness to meet the situation with less in the face of a determined enemy.

11. (U) There is one coordinated effort in the Delta. There is not an 'ARVN War,' a 'Sector War,' a 'Navy War,' or "pacification" separate from other efforts. There is simply a single effort toward overall mission accomplishment. It falls to you, as the senior advisor to the major tactical command in your TAOR, to see to it that all aspects of this total effort are coordinated, especially as to military operations. You and your staff must provide a coordinating advisory focal point - reaching out to the advisors of VNN, VNAF, provinces, and others, and bringing about mutual exchange of views, discussion of problem areas, and solutions. You must impart the same spirit to your counterpart and his staff. The RVNAF command relationships are complex and often unclear. The secret to success is not to fall back on the written charters and to deal with problems in a bureaucratic way, but to concentrate on practical workable solutions to concrete problems in a spirit of mutual cooperation. To achieve this will be a test of your professional ability, and to bring about this spirit in your counterpart and his staff will be a test of your sensitivity and advisory skills. It calls for an attitude of communication, appreciation of other's viewpoints, accommodation, and at the same time a fully professional dedication to the mission, and decisiveness.

12. (U) You must devote considerable effort to motivation of your own advisory team. The advisory function is, at best, difficult to understand and appreciate. At this stage, when advisory teams are decreasing in size and shifting in emphasis, and when the environment is one of withdrawal, it is of paramount importance that each advisor understand his mission, and the broader context of our effort. Your task is to insure that each advisor, in fact, has meaningful work to perform. You must take pains to do this. You should concentrate especially on the advisors at the lowest level, such as the Mobile Combat Training Team, where frustrations are greatest and where the Vietnamese emphasis essential to success is often lacking.

13. (U) Your advisory team must in all things set the example to the Vietnamese. By our appearance, discipline, and adherence to established standards in everything we do, we must convey to our Vietnamese friends
SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (U)

This example of rectitude and professionalism that they will emulate. This includes the simple soldierly matters of appearance, military courtesy and the like, but it extends across all activities - maintenance of our equipment, concern for our men, avoidance of black market and other unauthorized practices, attention to duty, dedication to mission, and all the rest. More than we realize, the Vietnamese look on us as examples of how they should proceed. In our everyday conduct, we should go to great lengths to be sure that they have something worthy to copy.

(U) I want your relationship with me and with this headquarters to be informal and direct. Be sure that you keep us informed of your situation, and let us know about problems you are unable to resolve on your own. Be especially careful to let me or the Deputy CG know of significant developments or initiatives of your counterpart, or matters of a sensitive nature that may have effect beyond your own scope of responsibilities. Do not hesitate to be in direct touch with members of the DRAC command group on any problem. If you cannot resolve a matter, do not take the weight of the world on your shoulders. Bring it to me. We are all in this together.

/S/ John H. Cushman

/T/ J. H. CUSHMAN
Major General, USA
Senior Advisor, IV Corps/MR4
1. **Origin of REVAMP.**

   In May 1971, in the Delta Regional Assistance Command, a management program known as REVAMP was developed. The nickname stands for "Redoubled Vietnamization And Military Professionalism." The purpose of this management program was to bring together in a systematic way the many diverse elements of the total requirement for advisory mission accomplishment in MR 4. The REVAMP program had seven "Level 1 Objective" as follows:

   (1) Pacification was recognized as a major portion of the advisory mission which had already been adequately documented and was being managed in a manner acceptable to the CG. Level 2 and Level 3 objectives were therefore not made part of REVAMP.

   (2) Turn Over of programs and activities currently performed by US advisors to the Vietnamese.

   (3) Training of RVNAF in order to create a skilled base of trainers who would develop and conduct quality training programs after departure of advisory personnel.

   (4) Improve RVNAF Military Operations by focusing the advisory effort on those areas in which RVNAF self-sufficiency was required in a relatively short time frame.

   (5) Cambodia Cooperation: Included because of its decisive importance to mission accomplishment in the Delta.

   (6) Orderly Phasedown of the US Effort, directed toward insuring that the drawdown of US forces is adequately planned and executed. The emphasis here is in the word "orderly."

   (7) Professionalism in the Command, aimed at improving the "tone" of US forces in the Delta.

2. To provide a clearer understanding of how REVAMP has been managed, selected REVAMP documents are attached,

   a. REVAMP Information Bulletin No. 8-71, 28 August, which explains the program.

   b. A blank REVAMP worksheet and a worksheet sample, filled out.

   c. REVAMP Summary Sheet format.
d. Summary Sheet, filled out.
e. Level 2 and Level 3 objectives for each of the Level 1 objectives, less Pacification, as of January 1972.

3. The technique by which the CG, DRAC, monitored and motivated this program was to meet for a total of 4-5 hours each week, 30 minutes at a time, with selected action officers to review the status of their programs and to give guidance. The REVAMP Coordinator staff kept records of the actions taken at each meeting, and nominated to the CG candidates for the following week's meeting. Summary sheets were monitored by the REVAMP Coordinator staff, and updated as necessary to reflect a new situation or accomplishments. The objectives of "Cambodia Cooperation" and "Professionalism in the Command" had only Level 2, and no Level 3 objectives. The summary sheet and review procedures were even less formal for these two objectives.
HEADQUARTERS
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO 96215

28 August 1971

SUBJECT: REVAMP INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 8-71

D: See Distribution

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this information bulletin is to explain the REVAMP Program with emphasis on fostering an understanding of the program at the action officer level.

2. GENERAL: Throughout the past two months, all units in the Delta have undergone a period of considerable personnel turnover. Many new assignees were higher ranking field grade officers, who assumed positions as staff division chiefs and, as a part of their inprocessing briefings, received an orientation on the REVAMP Program. Other new staff officers, most assignees at the action officer level within this same timeframe, had their first exposure to REVAMP when faced with the responsibility of writing a summary sheet update by someone called a "REVAMP COORDINATOR". This information bulletin is designed to clarify the often asked question, "What is REVAMP?"

3. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT:

a. Origin: Upon assumption of command in May 1971, the Commanding General recognized a need to unify the advisory effort in terms of the direction it was to take during his tenure. There were a number of reasons for this. They included: the rapid pacification progress achieved during the 1969-1971 timeframe; the ever present problem of personnel turbulence caused by the 12 month tour; and the problem of interfacing the activities of all staffs and units in the Delta in order to insure that coordinated programs, covering all aspects of a problem, were developed. With these goals in mind, a management program was developed under the acronym of REVAMP (Reduced Vietnamization and Military Professionalism) which focused on those areas of CO DRAC's broad and diverse mission which he felt were most critical to the success of the advisory effort. These objectives were not all-pervasive, but discriminatingly chosen as the most critical aspects of the advisory function. They included the following:

   (1) Turn Over of programs and activities currently performed by US advisors to the Vietnamese.

   (2) Training of RVNAF in order to create a skilled base of trainers who would develop and conduct quality training programs after departure of advisory personnel.
Promoting Effective RVNAF Military Operations by focusing the advisory effort on those areas in which RVNAF self sufficiency was required in a relatively short time frame.

Improving the "tone" of the command by insuring that all members of it had a meaningful function to perform, were aware of the importance of this function, and were willing to perform it in a professional manner. This objective also avoided negative aspects such as drug suppression and illegal activities. These broad areas were aimed primarily at US forces and were grouped under the category of professionalism in the Command.

Orderly Phasedown of the US Effort which is actually the culmination of the other 4 programs and is directed toward insuring that the drawdown of US forces is adequately planned and executed. The emphasis here is on the word "orderly".

Pacification was recognized as a major portion of the advisory mission which had already been adequately documented and was being managed in a manner acceptable to the CG.

Organization: During the latter part of May and early June, the Commanding General developed the REVAMP idea through a group he had created in order to terminate the program. Recognizing that he alone could not supervise the entire program, he developed an organization of program supervisors and program managers. To fit these more precisely into the program design, a series of levels were developed in order to categorize objectives. A level 1 goal equated to one of his 6 command objectives. Within each level 1 category, there were several level 2 goals which consisted of a major activity in the program category. Level 2 goals had specific operating objectives which contributed to their accomplishment and these were designated level 3 goals. To hypothesize, assume that a level 2 goal under the level 1 goal of TURN OVER was Turn Over of Pacification and Development Reporting. A logical level 3 goal would then be the Turn Over of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). In supervising the implementation of the program, CG, DRAC appointed key members of the command group as Program Supervisors for each level 1 goal. Their role was to ensure that the programs developed moved forward and that a continuous review was made of program data for accuracy and adequacy. A Program Manager was also assigned to perform the day to day monitorship of related activity; collect the summary sheets, updates etc, and provide whatever guidance was necessary to the agencies responsible for actually developing specific goals (level 3's). The Program Manager then was key to successful implementation of the REVAMP concept. Only through his discerning judgment and creativity could imaginative level 2 and level 3 objectives be developed. A coordinating committee was also created to provide technical advice and assistance in the mechanics of REVAMP.

c. Data Development: During successive Sundays in June, a major topic
at the Commanding General's Conference was REVAMP and its implementation. Through this medium, level 2 and 3 goals were developed. Concomitantly, staff agencies having functional responsibility for a given area were normally assigned as the action agency. To assist in developing usable data, a worksheet was constructed for use by the action officer. This worksheet was solely for his use and was not to leave his office. To manage activities, summary sheets were developed for level 3 objectives using the worksheet as a basis. The instructions for completing a summary sheet are attached. Summary sheets are made in 6 copies.

Distribution is made as follows:

1. Original - Action Officer
2. 1st Carbon - Program Manager
3. 2d Carbon - PPR Division, CORDS
4. 3d Carbon - DCO, DRAC
5. 4th Carbon - DEPCORDS
6. 5th Carbon - CO, DRAC

Five copies are submitted to the Program Manager, who retains one and forwards the remaining four to CORDS, PPR for posting to the appropriate binder. The binders are then used by the Command Group to monitor progress. As changes occur or target dates pass, action agencies are required to submit progress reports.

In this way the program continues to move forward and a chronology of progress is maintained.

4. CURRENT STATUS:

a. Summary sheet binders have been prepared, analyzed and presented to the Command Group in every area except Pacification. Updates of this data have occurred on 3 separate occasions and presently, one is pending. Due to rotation, considerable change has transpired in program managers, supervisors, and most importantly, in action officers. REVAMP has had a number of benefits accrue from it. More direct coordination and cooperation is evident within the DRAC Staff. A direct coordination relationship has been established with the Air Force Advisory Team and Navy Elements. Joint problems are aired in open discussion and joint solutions to them are developed. Within the DRAC Staff, REVAMP has caused programs to be definitized. This has resulted in a more effective transition between old and new staff members during a period of high personnel turbulence. Further, it has insured program continuity.

b. There are a number of problem areas which have surfaced, not the least of which is a tendency to adopt a short range approach to establishing programs for attaining objectives. Additionally, some agencies have indicated a reluctance to cite a specific program for fear of being held too closely to target dates so established. The utilization of command letters,
directives etc., without a corresponding program to insure they are implemented, has been noted as a common deficiency in summary sheets. Similarly, when a given level 3 objective is attained, there has been a reluctance to shift to another area and establish a new objective.

c. The key to continuing REVAMP as a viable program rests with two individuals; the action officer who develops the level 3 objective, and the Program Manager who analyzes those level 2 and 3 objectives for which he is responsible, and adds to or subtracts from them in order to keep the program moving. As programs progress, new areas arise which are suitable as level 3 objectives and they should be automatically included. The action officer must take the initiative in this regard and continuously analyze his area with a view toward developing new areas of concern and incorporating them into the program.

5. SUMMARY: To sum up, REVAMP is a management program specifically tailored by the Commanding General toward goals which he considers important. The concept is geared toward management by objective in order to focus on specifics and provide continuity within program categories. The program is working and tangible results have been achieved in every area. Continued viability is dependent upon you – the action officer – if the program is to be dynamic and adjust to changes in the direction of the advisory effort in the Delta.

ARTHUR W. FINEHOUT
LTC AD
Program Coordinator

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - Commanding General
2 - DEPCORDS
1 - Deputy Commanding General
4 - Chief of Staff, DRAC
4 - CO, 16thh CAG
4 - CO, 34th Engr Gp
1 - CO, JLSA
2 - Headquarters Commandant
4 - CO, 52d Signal Bn
1 - CO, Delta Naval Forces
4 - CO, 6255th Air Base Squadron
2 - CO, 3d Surg Hosp
1 - Military Senior Advisor, CORDS
1 - Director, Phung Hoang, CORDS
4 - ACofS, G-1
4 - ACofS, G-2
4 - ACofS, G-3
4 - ACofS, G-4
2 - ACofS, G-6
1 - Engineer, DRAC
1 - Deputy Zone Coordinator
1 - DRAC Community Relations Officer

2 - Director, TFD, CORDS
1 - Director, Public Safety Div., CORDS
1 - Director, Public Health Div., CORDS
1 - Director, Public Admin Div., CORDS
1 - Director, War Victims Div., CORDS
1 - Director, New Life Dev., CORDS
1 - Director, Land Reform Div., CORDS
1 - Director, PSYOPS Div., CORDS
1 - Director, Chieu Hoi Div., CORDS
2 - Artillery Advisor, DRAC
1 - Operations Advisor
1 - G-3 Plans Advisor
1 - G-2 Plans Advisor
1 - G-4 Plans Advisor
1 - Information Officer
1 - G-3 R&A Advisor
1 - Inspector General, DRAC
1 - Provost Marshall, DRAC
1 - NAVLE
4 - SA, AFAT 4
1 - Civilian Personnel Officer
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL 1</th>
<th>LEVEL 2</th>
<th>LEVEL 3</th>
<th>HOW?</th>
<th>WHEN?</th>
<th>PROGRESS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STATE THE</td>
<td>STATE THE</td>
<td>NUMBER AND</td>
<td>a. LIST HOS, STEP BY STEP, THE LEVEL 3 OBJECTIVE WILL BE ATTAINED</td>
<td>WHEN EACH STEP WILL BE COMPLETED</td>
<td>PENCILED COMMENTS FOR ACTION OFFICER'S INFORMATION</td>
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<td>LEVEL 1</td>
<td>LEVEL 2</td>
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<td>OBJECTIVE</td>
<td>OBJECTIVE</td>
<td>LEVEL 3 OBJECTIVES</td>
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b. LIST THE ACTUAL OPERATIONS, NOT THE GENERAL CONCEPTS

THE WORKSHEET NEVER LEAVES THE ACTION OFFICER'S OFFICE. IT IS FOR HIS USE ONLY.
REVAMP SUMMARY SHEET FORMAT

"REVAMP" is typed the top center of the page. Beneath it, centered, is the title of the summary sheet composed of the short titles of the level 1 and level 2 objectives involved and the number of the level 3 objective. Eg: Phasedown, Disposal of Real Property Facilities, Objective #4.

OBJECTIVE: A clear and concise statement of the level 3 objective not to exceed one sentence in length.

Situation (Day, Month, Year of initial or updated summary sheet):

This paragraph summarizes the status of the objective and the facts bearing upon it at that point in time when it was initially included in the REVAMP program. Whenever significant progress is achieved, a target date is met, or six weeks have elapsed since the last update, the summary sheet should be updated. This situation paragraph will then be expanded to include an evaluation of the progress made toward the attainment of the objective. Specific mention will be made of target dates and what was accomplished as of those dates. The progress since the last update will be clearly stated. As the objective approaches attainment the "Program for Attainment" and "Target Dates" paragraphs will become progressively shorter. When the objective is attained the final update consists of the objective statement and a situation paragraph summarizing the history and completion of the program.

PROGRAM FOR ATTAINMENT OF OBJECTIVE:

a. The "hows" from the worksheet are stated in outline form, in simple, direct language.

b. These statements set forth in logical sequence the steps necessary for attainment of the objective, using the situation as a start point.

c. When the summary sheet is updated the completed steps are omitted and any additional steps found necessary for the program are added.

d. The program should include mid and long range objectives and not restrict itself to a short range approach.

HOW PROGRESS IS MEASURED

a. The means for measuring progress towards each step and the program as a whole are listed in outline form.

b. These measurement tools may be absolute numbers, ratios, percentages, subjective qualitative judgments, or whatever is applicable.
c. If a measurement tool refers to a step which has been completed and omitted from the updated summary sheet, it will also be omitted on the updated summary sheet.

TARGET DATES:

a. The dates when the steps of the program are expected to be completed are stated in outline form. Essentially, these are the dates from the "when" column on the worksheet. Dates included may be keyed to the appropriate paragraph in the program for attaining the objective. When this is done an appropriate remark to that effect will be included.

b. If the steps are of a recurring nature, the date of the initial action and the basis of recurrence are stated. Eg: Reports will be submitted on 31 July and the end of the first month of each quarter thereafter.

c. If key dates are unknown at the time the program is planned, it is so indicated and a D-day is assumed for planning purposes. If key dates are highly classified then a reference is made to where the dates may be found and a D-day is assumed for planning purposes. The steps in the Program for Attainment of the Objective are then given target dates plus or minus X many days from the assumed D-day. Eg: D-day: the day construction is completed (unknown at this time). On D-5 all office furniture will have been moved into the new facility.

d. When a target date is reached an updated summary sheet is submitted to the Program Manager as soon as possible. Past target dates are omitted from the updated summary sheets and new dates are added if new steps have been added in the Program for Attaining the Objective.
OBJECTIVE: To turn over the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) to the Vietnamese.

SITUATION, 30 September 1971: CPDC has developed a tentative plan for gradual adoption of a HES reporting system and the training of necessary personnel to operate it. In Mid-May, the Vietnamese appointed province HES committee members country-wide; and on 21 May, each MR-4 Province HES Committee Chairman was directed to establish and implement an initial training program for his committee and the district HES officers. Province HES committee members include:

a. Deputy Province Chief for Aumin - Chairman
b. Deputy Commander for Sector
c. Chief of Coordination Center, PPDC
d. Chief of Provincial RD Cadre
e. US HES Officer, Province Advisory Team

The function of the District HES officer will be performed by the former district P&D officer. He will perform similar duties as are now performed by DSA's. Final determination of HES ratings will be made by the Province HES Committees. The month of June will be used by the VN for training and practice, and commencing on 1 July, gradual responsibility for reporting will be assumed by them. Initial districts selected for this program have no advisory team present or the MR DEPCORDS has requested that GVN assume the reporting responsibility.

By 1 July 1971 province and district evaluation teams had been formed and the reporting responsibility in ten districts had been assumed by the Vietnamese. During mid-July CPDC requested that no reporting responsibilities be turned over on 1 August 1971, so that they would have the opportunity to evaluate and react to the reports submitted by the districts which assumed reporting responsibilities on 1 July. This request was granted, and 30, DRAC directed that the US also perform an evaluation on the 15th of each month following the turn over of reporting responsibilities. The reports of the ten districts which assumed the HES reporting responsibilities on 1 July were evaluated and found to be accurate. On 1 September 12 more districts assumed the reporting responsibility. Since the last update these were evaluated and found to be accurate.
II. ATTAINMENT OF OBJECTIVE:

- Gradually turn over HES reporting responsibility as districts meet the prescribed criteria.

- Evaluate the quality of the submissions to determine areas where more guidance is required for correct preparation of the report.

- Monitor and assist Vietnamese in order to insure timely arrival of reports in Saigon and to effect a smooth and orderly transfer of HES reporting responsibility.

PROGRESS IS MEASURED:

- Accuracy of HES reporting in districts where VN have assumed the responsibility.

- Timeliness of arrival of reports in Saigon.

- Number of districts which assume reporting responsibility.

- Number of districts in which DSA has to reassume reporting responsibility after program initiation.

TARGET DATES:

- Analyze and evaluate the quality of the reports being submitted by the districts by the 15th of each month.

- 10 districts assume reporting responsibility by 1 October 1971.

- 06 districts assume reporting responsibility by 1 November 1971.

- 05 districts assume reporting responsibility by 1 December 1971.

- Receipt of additional guidance from MACCORDS and development of plans for turn over of reporting responsibility to remaining 51 districts by 1 December 1971.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL 1</th>
<th>LEVEL 2</th>
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<th>HOW?</th>
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<th>PROGRESS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TURN OVER</td>
<td>PACIFICATION REPORTING</td>
<td>1. HES</td>
<td>a. Form and train District Evaluation Teams.</td>
<td>30 Jun 71</td>
<td>Completed</td>
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<td>b. Have the teams submit practice reports.</td>
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<td>1st Month</td>
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<td>c. If practice reports are acceptable turn over the reporting responsi-</td>
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<td>OK</td>
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<td>bility on the following schedule:</td>
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<td>10 Districts</td>
<td>1 Jul 71</td>
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<td>12 Districts</td>
<td>1 Sep 71</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 Districts</td>
<td>1 Oct 71</td>
<td>1st Month</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 Districts</td>
<td>1 Nov 71</td>
<td>Some minor problem corrected.</td>
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<td>5 Districts</td>
<td>1 Dec 71</td>
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<td>d. Evaluate quality of reports.</td>
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<td>e. Upon receipt of guidance from MACCORES, Plan turn over of remain-</td>
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<td>ing districts.</td>
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<td>2. TPES</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Notify RPDC of withdrawal dates for courier and Air America sup-</td>
<td>15 Jul 71</td>
<td>Completed</td>
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<td>b. Withdraw P&amp;P R Courier support.</td>
<td>1 Nov 71</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Withdraw Air America support.</td>
<td>1 Apr 72</td>
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LEVEL 2 AND LEVEL 3 OBJECTIVES

TURN OVER

1. Turn Over Pacification and Development Reporting
   Obj. 1 - HES Reporting
   Obj. 2 - TFES Reporting

2. Turn Over Medical Program
   Obj. 1 - Elimination of MILPHAP Teams (Deleted, Monitorship Function).
   Obj. 2 - Medical Facilities (Deleted, Monitorship Function).
   Obj. 3 - Surgery (Deleted, Monitorship Function).
   Obj. 4 - Dust Off
   Obj. 5 - 3d Surgical Hospital
   Turn Over Phung Hoang Activities (Completed and Withdrawn).

3. Turn Over G-2 Operational Responsibilities
   Obj. 1 - Intelligence Production
   Obj. 2 - Corps Interrogation Center (Completed and Withdrawn).

4. Turn Over Stagefield, Rearm/Refuel Points

5. Turn Over Combat Support Activities
   Obj. 1 - Helicopter Fire Support
   Obj. 2 - Naval Operations

6. Turn Over Communications
   Obj. 1 - Corps Area Communications System
   Obj. 2 - Phase Out DCAT/STZ Commcenters
   Obj. 3 - Phase Out DRAC/TOC Commcenters
   Obj. 4 - Replace Wide Band AUTOSEVOCOM
   Obj. 5 - Turn Over ICS to Federal Electric Corporation
   Obj. 6 - Turn Over ICS from Federal Electric Corporation to RVNAF

7. Turn Over Surveillance and Police of Rules of Engagement
   Obj. 1 - Obtain ARVN Command Emphasis
   Obj. 2 - Secure ARVN use of ROE
TRAINING

1. Improved Training Management
   Obj. 1 - Training Program Directive
   Obj. 2 - Training Center Evaluation
   Obj. 3 - Improve Individual and Unit Training

2. Conduct Special Training Programs
   Obj. 1 - Territorial Forces Refresher Training
   Obj. 2 - TM 7C-51
   Obj. 3 - Staff In-Place Training
   Obj. 4 - Command and Control School
   Obj. 5 - Rules of Engagement
   Obj. 6 - FANK Air/Ground Training

3. Improve Small Unit Effectiveness Through the Use of Mobile Combat Training Teams (MCTT's)
   Obj. 1 - 7th, 9th, 21st Division and Ranger MCTT's
   Obj. 2 - Artillery MCTT's
   Obj. 3 - Armor MCTT's
   Obj. 4 - Territorial Forces MCTT's

PROMOTE EFFECTIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Improve VNAF Rotary Wing Combat Support
   Obj. 1 - Improve Monitoring of VNAF Helicopter Operations
   Obj. 2 - Develop a VNAF Night Airmobile Assault Capability
   Obj. 3 - Improve ARVN/VNAF Airmobile Operational Techniques

2. Improve VNAF O-1A Combat Support

3. Improve VNAF Tactical Air Fire Support

4. Improve Effectiveness of ARVN Infantry and Ranger Battalions
   Obj. 1 - Increase Recruiting, Decrease Desertions, Increase Friendly Strength
   Obj. 2 - Increase Small Unit Capability to Conduct Operations thru Training
   Obj. 3 - Improve Battalion Level Leadership

5. Throttle Overland Infiltration
   Obj. 1 - Cross Border Spoiling Operations
   Obj. 2 - Border Surveillance and Denial Operations
6. Throttle Coastal Infiltration

Obj. 1 - Improve VNN Conduct of Surface Coastal Surveillance
Obj. 2 - Obtain and Improve VNAF Support of Coastal Surveillance Operations
Obj. 3 - Complete ACTOV RAD Sites
Obj. 4 - Develop a Command, Control, Coordination and Communication System
Obj. 5 - Establish Territorial Control over the 700 KM of MR-4 Coastline

7. Improve Management of Ammunition Resources

Obj. 1 - Reduce Over-Stockage at Depot (Completed and Withdrawn)
Obj. 2 - Increase Depot Storage Capability (Completed and Withdrawn)
Obj. 3 - Improve Ammunition Surveillance at Depot Level
Obj. 4 - Reduce Stock at SMADSL Centers
Obj. 5 - Lot Number Accountability at SMADSL Centers
Obj. 6 - Improve Ammunition Maintenance at SMADSL Centers
Obj. 7 - (Completed and Withdrawn)
Obj. 8 - Improve Storage, Care, and Handling at Artillery Positions

8. Improve the Capability of ARVN Divisions to Conduct Mobile Operations (Under Preparation)

9. Improve Artillery Fire Support

Obj. 1 - 6 Train RVNAF Artillery
Obj. 7 - Redistribute Artillery Assets, and Improve Command and Control
Obj. 8 - Improve Artillery First Round Accuracy

10. Improve Functioning of ARVN Staffs

Obj. 1 - Improve ARVN Information Processing
Obj. 2 - Improve ARVN Planning
Obj. 3 - Improve ARVN Decision Process
Obj. 4 - Improve ARVN Staff Supervision and Feedback


Obj. 1 - Identifiable Supplies
Obj. 2 - POL

12. Improve Sensor Operations

Obj. 1 - Operational Usage
Obj. 2 - Maintenance
RVNAF/FANK CAMBODIA COOPERATION

1. Operation of DRAC Support Operations Coordination Center (SOCC)
2. Exchange of Liaison Officers
3. Periodic Tripartite Meetings
4. Weekly Coordination Conference
5. Joint Operations FANK/RVNAF
6. Pacification Exchange
7. Air Ground School
8. Intelligence Seminars

PROFESSIONALISM IN THE COMMAND

1. Improve Job Satisfaction
2. Improve Living Conditions
3. Improve Recreational Opportunities
4. Improve Drug Rehabilitation
5. Improve Drug Law Enforcement
6. Motivate and Train Junior Officers
7. Strengthen NCO Performance
8. Expedite Administration of Courts-Martial and Administrative Discharges
9. Improve Inter-Person Communication
10. Improve Personal Standards
11. Good Order and Discipline
12. Improve Troop Information
13. Improve US/VN Relations
14. Wipe Out the Black Market
1. Reduction of Advisory Personnel
   Obj. 1 - Corps Troop Advisory Division
   Obj. 2 - Corps Headquarters Advisory Personnel
   Obj. 3 - CORDS Personnel
   Obj. 4 - Assumption of Support Function by Local Nationals

2. Return of US/RVN Titled Equipment to Wholesale Supply Channels
   Obj. 1 - Identify and Dispose of Excess Equipment
   Obj. 2 - Consolidate Property Records

3. Disposal of Real Property Facilities
   Obj. 1 - Terminate DRAC Leases
   Obj. 2 - Return LUC's to GVN Central
   Obj. 3 - Turn Over US Base Complexes to RVNAF
   Obj. 4 - Minimize New Construction
   Obj. 5 - Maximize Termination of USAID Leases

4. Maintain the Security of the Command
   Obj. 1 - Installation Security Planning
   Obj. 2 - Plan for Transfer of Installation Security to RVNAF
   Obj. 3 - Transfer Installation Security to RVNAF
   Obj. 4 - Assist USARV Installation Security

5. Phasedown of Non-Appropriated Fund Activities
CONFIDENTIAL

Senior Officer Debriefing Report of Major General
John H. Cushman, CG, DRAC. 14 January 1972 (RCS CSFOR-74),

Assessment of the Situation, MR4

The following are extracts from two "assessment" memoranda written to the Commanding General, IV Corps/Military Region 4 by the Senior Advisor. The first memorandum was dated 5 October 1971. The second was dated 12 January 1972, and was a "final assessment."

1. **(C) Introductory paragraph:**

We are making progress in the Delta, but I think that you will agree with me that August and September did not show as much progress as we would like. Many actions have been postponed until "after the elections." Now that the elections are over, I would like to address what, in the opinion of your advisors, must be done in MR4 in the next six to nine months. These will be critical months of further phasedown for U.S. forces. I estimate that sometime in July to October of 1972, the U.S. support in Vietnam will level off at a stable, adequate, although much reduced level. I mean that it will be adequate, provided the Vietnamese do what is required by them. (5 October 1971)

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On 5 October 1971, I wrote you a memorandum outlining fourteen actions which in my opinion it was essential either to accomplish or to move ahead on substantially in the ensuing six to nine months, if Delta mission accomplishment were to advance satisfactorily during that period. In this, my final memorandum to you as your Senior Advisor, I would like to review your progress on these actions. I will also comment on some matters which affect even more fundamentally whether there is to be a satisfactory outcome to this war. (12 January 1972)

2. **(C) Specific points:**

a. **Close out the U-Minh.**

Forces are available to close out the U-Minh in the next dry season. However, from what I have seen of the planning, it does not appear that
anyone, at either province or division, is making provisions for outposting, restoring the population, and establishing territorial control in the entire strip of excellent farmland between the coast and the U-Minh forest. There is no doubt that some battalions of divisional forces will be required to man outposts if this is to be done. I am very much afraid that your commanders will not face up to this requirement, and that June of 1972 will arrive without MR4 having established territorial control over this vital ground. If you do not do so, the enemy will still be able to live in the U-Minh, and your campaign to close out the U-Minh will have failed. (5 October 1971)

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Some progress is being made. However, unless there is considerably better use of territorial forces, especially in the An Xuyen/21st Division plan, the dry season will end without territorial security being established on the periphery and along the waterways of the U-Minh, the U-Minh plan will have reached neither its goal nor its full potential, and the enemy will still be able to keep main force units in the U-Minh. This objective is still within reach. However, to attain it some stern RF and PF redeployment measures have to be taken, the 9th and 21st Divisions will have to use limited forces in outposts temporarily, and highly skillful pacification-oriented action will be especially required by the 21st Division and An Xuyen. (22 January 1972)

b. Deny the enemy coastal infiltration.

The measures I have just described will contribute to this objective. However, there is also the need to move against the Dam Doi and Nam Can secret zones, and to coordinate the VNN, VNAF, and your subordinate division and sector commanders in a comprehensive plan for effectively denying the enemy the ability to infiltrate supplies across the seacoasts. We have made some recommendations to you on this, and your advisors in the Delta are ready to assist. (5 October 1971)

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The most troublesome problem in this objective is the pacification of coastal territories. You and the Regional Pacification and Development Council will have to work hard to achieve this. The extension of territorial security to the water's edge seems to be fairly well planned in Vinh Binh and Kien Hoa. However, the slippage noted in paragraph a above, in pacifying the coastal territory west of the U-Minh, will be detrimental to
this objective. VNAF-VNN coastal surveillance cooperation is growing, and your staff is working well on an SOP for improved command-control-communications-coordination of all forces - ARVN-VNN-VNAF-Sector-Police - which have coastal surveillance, protection, and reaction responsibilities in the Delta. This is encouraging. (12 January 1972)

c. Deny the enemy overland infiltration.

Maintaining a strong block against infiltration from Cambodia is critical to success in the Delta. This depends entirely on establishing, with the Cambodians, working arrangements that deny the enemy any base areas in nearby Cambodia, and which severely limit his ability to move personnel and supplies across Cambodia and into Vietnam. That you have not yet achieved this goal is evident by the fact that the enemy has been able in the past months to reinforce his forces in the Delta. I believe that a much greater sense of urgency is required on the part of your responsible border commanders, and that you need even better working relationships with the Cambodian forces and authorities. (5 October 1971)

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The CG, 44th STZ, will present to you later this month his overall counterinfiltration plan. This will be a good opportunity for you and your staff to focus on this very important objective. Some improvement has been noted recently, especially since the 44th STZ has been assigned full border responsibility and its forces have been placed in an excellent structure along and across the border. My main concern in this objective is that the enemy is increasing his control over Cambodian territory opposite MR4, and there is insufficient Cambodian awareness of this threat. In addition, the tactics of border units require particular attention to increase offensive ambushes, small unit patrols, intelligence emphasis and the other well known techniques for defeating an infiltrating enemy. (12 January 1972)

d. Redeployment of RF.

The war in the Delta has now become a war for the control of new territory which is not thickly populated. If you are to succeed, you must be able to generate RF from the heavily populated, pacified areas and deploy them as needed in less populated, unpacified areas. MR4 has some good plans for this, already proposed to the JGS. More planning remains to be done. But everything depends on whether your province
chiefs in the pacified provinces like An Giang and Go Cong today and Sa Dec and Chau Doc later can generate the necessary companies. If they do not, mission accomplishment in the Delta is in serious trouble. It is clear that you will have to put pressure on your province chiefs. (5 October 1971)

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This action is going well. The gradual elimination of enemy mini-bases is taking place in the Delta countryside, as RF from the more pacified provinces move to help other less pacified provinces. If MR4 soon receives the requested authority to convert PF to RF, it will be possible for you to use this RF redeployment technique to put unbearable pressure on the enemy by July or August. And if minibase elimination can be followed by movement of the population into formerly cultivated but now fallow land, you are on the road to success in the Delta. (12 January 1972)

e. Redeployment within provinces and districts.

Village chiefs and local authorities in pacified areas do not want to lose their PF, or to eliminate the outposts that give them such comfort. Your district and province chiefs must be very tough-minded and overcome these objections. The forces available are sufficient. They must, however, be managed well, and moved from where they are not needed to where they are needed. Everything depends on it. (5 October 1971)

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Your district and province chiefs are still lagging in the tough-minded shifting of territorial forces, especially PF, many of which are stagnant and inactive in areas which can be secured by PSDs and police. Your RPDC and G3 staff must develop some analytical/evaluation techniques which will expose those district and province chiefs who fail to redeploy and will focus your command attention on this. This will do a great deal to generate the forces needed to keep up the momentum of pacification. (12 January 1972)

f. Establish realistic priorities and allocate forces wisely.

You have many areas that need attention, such as the Ba Kuyen-Phong Dinh-border, central Ch#{244}ng Thien, southern Dinh T#{250}ng, and western Vinh Binh. But you can mobilize to solve these problem areas. If you generate the forces that it is possible to generate, you can p{h}ase these forces into these areas in a schedule over the next nine months. The provinces must prepare good, systematic plans to support the pacification effort in each of these areas, and to restore fallow land to production and empty hamlets to life. I am confident that most of these areas can

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be restored to a healthy condition by the end of June 1972. The essential element is sound, realistic, and comprehensive planning, carried out with skill and determination. (5 October 1971)

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No commander ever has all he needs to do everything at once. Successful commanders set priorities and then systematically put their resources to work on these tasks, economizing elsewhere. Adequate manpower and other resources are available in the Delta. The problem is one of management. At the province/TAOR meeting on 5 January the Prime Minister clearly outlined pacification priorities for the coming year. He stressed the elimination of enemy forces and the VCI, the need for training of village and hamlet officials, the need for upgrading of local government, the need for more and better training of RF and PF, and the need to carry approved and funded development projects quickly to completion. Your task is to line up these and other priority tasks and then to set up step-by-step programs which use the available forces and other resources toward their orderly accomplishment. This is of course simply a description of "good management." Your advisors are ready to assist. (12 January 1972)

g. Raise the strength of forces.

Determination and zeal on the part of your province, district, and village chiefs is also going to be required if you are to bring the ARVN and territorial forces to full strength. The enforcement of the conscription decree has had to wait until after the elections. The elections are over, and it is time to move strongly on this critical problem. This will be a severe test of the province chiefs, but they cannot afford to fail. (5 October 1971)

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I congratulate you on your recent courageous and decisive actions to strengthen manpower procurement and use in the Delta. Successful execution of your current plans will have a good effect not only in MR4 but in other MR's as well. I wish you continued success in getting province chiefs to make the tough decisions required by them. (12 January 1972)

h. Bring the VNAF to full effectiveness.

The VNAF in the Delta is capable of more than it is doing. One reason the VNAF does not perform as well as it should is that your commanders
We have presented to you a program by which the performance of the VNAF can be substantially improved. I urge you to get with Colonel Anh and to give this your personal emphasis. (5 October 1971)

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You programs in this area are going along fairly well. My main concern is that there is still insufficient command and staff attention on the effective use of VNAF tactical air in the Delta; as a result this powerful means is not being employed to its full potential. (12 January 1972)

i. Training of all forces.

Your commanders, like very many U.S. commanders, give inadequate attention to training. They concentrate on operations. However, further improvement in effectiveness of your forces cannot be made by increasing the number of units; it must now be made by improving performance, unit by unit, through good training. A number of good training programs have been put into effect by your headquarters - such as the Mobile Combat Training Teams for regular and territorial forces. What is required now is for your subordinate commanders to be motivated to give them their own personal attention - that is, to become "training minded". (5 October 1971)

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Although there has been some small increase in "training mindedness" by your subordinate commanders, I must say that this entire area remains one of the weakest in the Delta, and is personally very troubling to me. "Training" - and by this I mean the day-to-day review, critique, and systematic improvement of operations - and "command supervision" are one and the same. Your commanders - both divisional and sector - simply do not understand this well enough; they are "operations oriented." The results are unnecessary casualties and the failure to obtain the full potential of the excellent military material - especially the foot soldier - of the Delta. You must do better on this objective. Your advisors are ready to assist. (12 January 1972)
J. Modification of tactics.

You must adjust your tactics and methods of operation to make up for the loss of U.S. assets in the Delta, especially to the loss of helicopter gunship and slick support. In part, you can do this by insisting that the VNAF (and your artillery) do a better job. In addition, however, you have to change your tactics to rely much less on the helicopter. You must close out remaining enemy bases areas, populate the empty countryside, redeploy the RF, develop PF and PSDF to dominate the countryside on foot, train all these forces in night operations, use roads and canals to resupply 100% rather than use helicopters at all. Again, you have no choice. Your helicopter assets will be very limited, and the POL and repair parts to support the intensive flying such as done by U.S. units will simply not be available. (5 October 1971)

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While there has been some encouraging shift in tactics to make up for the impending loss of U.S. assets, this has been far short of what can be obtained. Some very hard decisions are going to be required by you and your commanders, in the direction of much more primitive, austere and (I believe) more appropriate and effective ways of doing the job. Time is short. (12 January 1972)

k. Extension of secondary roads. The economic development of the Delta has progressed admirably. However, as we move into the countryside the improvement of the LOC's, especially roads, must continue. Secondary roads are the foundation for economic growth. With the start of the dry season only two months away, your advisors see many problems in the secondary road program. There are problems of coordination between MPW and ARVN Engineers, and of timely contracting and placement of materials by MPW. These problems can only be solved by strong command interest and staff action. There are also some problems of equipment. We will do everything in our power to obtain the urgently needed construction equipment for the MPW. Your advisors believe that this year is critical for secondary road construction. (5 October 1971)

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The dry season is well along, but secondary road construction in the Delta is still lagging. One main problem has been the great difficulty of making the bureaucratic machinery function between the provinces and
the Ministry of Public Works. I believe that you will have to review the secondary road program in detail personally, and then use your personal influence and prestige to get action going on this program which is so critical to your mission in the Delta. (12 January 1972)

1. Economy.

A great deal has been done by your command in recent months to conserve the use of ammunition and other costly material. However, much more needs to be done, not only on supplies but to conserve vehicles, weapons, radios, and other items. I predict that the days of almost unlimited resupply of ammunition, fuel, and other material are at an end. Your advisors are prepared to assist you in applying stringent controls on supplies, in taking strong measures to make equipment last longer through good maintenance, and in preventing the diversion of supplies into unauthorized channels. Your country's future depends on it. (5 October 1971)

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Your Army is wasteful - I regret that in part they have learned this from the Americans. But your resources in the future will be severely reduced from those in the past. I strongly urge hard-headed command programs to improve maintenance, eliminate unnecessary consumption, cut the diversion of supplies, and practice economy. Your advisors are ready to assist. (12 January 1972)

m. Elimination of the VCI.

The program to eliminate the VCI is bringing in too many low level enemy and not enough important enemy cadre. There are too few targeted operations. There is too much meeting of "quotas" with doubtful claims. Your police operations suffer from ineptness and I fear corruption. Accommodation exists. VCI are able to purchase protection. Too many province and district chiefs, and their police officials, do not have a sense of the tragic end that awaits them if the VC should come to power in your country. As a result, the enemy's control, propaganda, and logistic apparatus remains resilient and pervasive. It is imperative that your province, district, village, and police chiefs take this matter most seriously. If they do not, it could mean the eventual loss of all that they have struggled for so hard. (5 October 1971)
Although Phun3 Hoang techniques have improved in some provinces, the same conditions described on my 5 October memorandum still exist, except that I now add that the enemy use of legal cadre has evidently increased. This is a Vietnamese problem. We Americans can do little except to warn you of it. You must deal with it. Areas of particular concern are motivation, caliber of personal, and training. (12 January 1972)

n. Develop good administration and cadres at the village level.

The war is shifting to a low level but intensely personal war and the village and hamlet are now the primary battleground. It is at this level that your officials and cadres are directly observed by the people. It is here that a popular loyalty and a will by each person to commit himself individually against the VC must exist. This can be achieved provided that your subordinate province and district chiefs get themselves out and around the villages, among the population, in close touch with the people, intent on meeting their needs, and bringing honest, dedicated, good government to the countryside. (5 October 1971)

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Progress in this field is hard to measure in only three months. Progress comes only from continued emphasis, and from sustained and purposeful attention by your province chiefs. I suggest that you direct the RPDC to outline for you a specific program - along the lines of a REVAMP objective - to focus attention on this most critical problem. I would recommend, as part of the program, a Regional School at Can Tho for village and hamlet officials - where these all-important people could come for seminars, refresher training, and periodic guidance. (12 January 1972)

o. Corruption and favoritism.

There is one final and ultimately decisive point. I leave it to last because I want to emphasise its enormous importance to you and your country. This is the problem of corruption and favoritism that is so detrimental, not only to your country's performance but also to its reputation in the eyes of U.S. people, whose good opinion of you is essential for your continued support. You and others like you must take it as your primary objective to see that competent and honest men are placed in positions of responsibility. Dishonest and corrupt men must be removed. The Americans cannot do this for you. There are enough decent, honest, Vietnamese in your country to provide the leadership your country needs. (5 October 1971)
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Americans are not close enough to the situation to tell if there has been an improved trend in this area in the past three months. I will only say that, if your country is to survive, corruption and favoritism cannot be tolerated at any level. But this is a problem for the Vietnamese; your American friends can only point out (probably with not sufficient understanding) the problem. You, and others like you, have to solve it. (12 January 1972)

5. (C) Concluding remarks:

I recognize that the above is a long list. It may even be such as to cause some discouragement. I also recognize that I have called each of those items "decisive". By that I mean that your success is in doubt if each problem is not solved. If all the above problems are properly solved, your success is virtually assured. (5 October 1971)

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You will note throughout the above a repeated use of phrases emphasizing the need for "realistic appraisal" - "tough-mindedness" - "hard headed actions" and the like. This is not accidental. If there is any single aspect that is most troubling to me, as to the ability of the Republic of Vietnam to eventually bring about a satisfactory outcome of this war, it is the doubts I often have as to whether the responsible authorities and senior officials of your country possess the tough-mindedness to do what is required. If they delude themselves as to the real situation, and thus fail to take the actions necessary for survival, your country is simply not going to survive. In addition to matters discussed above, there are two areas in which I see serious problems if tough decisions are not faced up to and made.

a. Redeployment. Redeployment decisions are among the hardest to make. But the plain facts are that the enemy is maneuvering for an assault on your country, and that, despite this clear warning, the RVNAF may well not be maneuvering adequately to meet it. In MR4 you have recently moved regiments and RT battalions to pre-empt a threat to Base Area 470. But in your country, the JGS are not yet redeploying divisions to reinforce the northern military regions. The war outside the Delta is beyond my responsibilities as an adviser. I bring this up simply to suggest that you advise the JGS that they can and should make careful plans now to redeploy a division to the north from MR4, and that they can
probably take a second division later in 1972. (They must give you your additional RF, however, if they take divisions away.) The same basic point applies to redeployment at the province, district, and village level.

b. Local administration. Security in the countryside has made the farmer rich; yet he still goes without paying all but insignificant taxes. Manpower decrees are largely unenforced at the village level. I recognize that you have moved on the manpower problem. But until the governing bodies in your country take some tough-minded action in the areas of local administration of taxes and manpower management, there is serious doubt in my mind that what has been established in your country deserves to be called a "government". Your strong continued pressure on manpower, and your moral and practical support on taxation, will be necessary. Your country must establish a strong and secure administrative base adequate to defend itself against the attack being mounted from outside its borders.

4. (U) General Truong, I speak to you very frankly because I respect so highly your character and your ability, because I love your country and its people, and because my only concern is mission accomplishment in the Delta. It has been a great satisfaction for me to have served with you in the Delta. Good luck! (12 January 1972)
**Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Major General John H. Cushman) - Commander, Delta Regional Assistance Command, Vietnam, 14 May 1971 - 14 Jan 1972**

**Major General John H. Cushman**

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