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4 December 1972


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1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) 2 July 1971.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Major General Harold A. Kissinger, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 525-14, as a result of subject report should be provided to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96312

12 March 1972

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report for Major General Harold A. Kissinger, RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHQO-00
APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ATTN: FOR OT UT
Department of the Army Washington, D.C. 20310

COUNTRY: Republic of Vietnam - MR2

DEBRIEFING REPORT BY: Major General Harold A. Kissinger

DUTY ASSIGNMENT: Commanding General, United States Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay

INCLUSIVE DATES: 7 September 1970 thru 15 March 1972

DATE OF REPORT: 15 February 1972

1. (U) REFERENCES:
   b. USARV Supplement 1 to Army Regulation 525-14 dated 11 October 1971.

2. (U) INTRODUCTION:
   a. The following report is submitted IAW the above references for the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh, for the period 7 September 1970 thru 15 March 1972.
   b. This report encompasses the logistical support operations of the Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, to include; analysis of significant problem areas, recommended solutions to major problems, and lessons learned in view of a rapidly changing mission as a result of the continuing drawdown and Keystone of US units coupled with an almost constant reorganization and realignment of the remaining US units, both tactical and logistical within Military Region 2 (MR2).
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report for Major General Harold A. Kissinger, RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

c. The information provided herein is based upon a combination of my personal observations and experiences at the command level and input from my major subordinate commanders and the USASUPCOM-CRB Staff Sections. I have purposely omitted geographic and demographic factors as well as the enemy Order of Battle as this information is readily available in previously published documents.

3. (U) MISSION:

a. The mission of the Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay (USASUPCOM-CRB) is to provide supply, maintenance, service and transportation support to US and other Free World Military Forces (FWMF) (primarily two RGK divisions) operating within MR2; and to provide the necessary logistical support required to accomplish the redeployment/inactivation of all US Forces in MR2. In addition, considerable logistical support is provided to ARVN Forces. This support to ARVN has been primarily the resupply of bulk POL and ammunition.

b. The MR2 area of operations (AO) covers approximately 89,000 square miles (over 47 percent of South Vietnam). At the present time, logistical support is provided to approximately 70,810 personnel but this stream has been in a constant state of flux due to realignment and troop reductions in MR2.

4. (U) ORGANIZATION:

a. HEADQUARTERS USASUPCOM-CRB: This element of SUPCOM-CRB was reorganized to its present structure in November 1970 with major changes being the redesignation of the ACoFS, SP60 to the ACoFS, P60, and the transfer of all security responsibilities to the Special Assistant for Combat Security (SACS). This established a single staff section solely responsible for combat security and intelligence gathering activities within SUPCOM-CRB and the Cam Ranh Special Sector. Later, this responsibility extended to the Qui Nhon Sub Area Command and other areas as required in my capacity as the Subzone IV Coordinator, which included security responsibilities for the coastal provinces of Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan. Two additional changes were the removal of the Signal Office from operational control of the ACoFS, P60, and the establishment of an Adjutant General Office separate from the ACoFS, Personnel. This provided these two sections with direct access to my office and completely organized the staff along functional lines as shown at Inclosure 1.

b. MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS:

(1) The Qui Nhon Support Command (QNSC) became a subordinate unit of SUPCOM-CRB on 17 May 1971. It was subsequently redesignated a Sub- Area Command of Cam Ranh Bay (QNSAC). This resulted in the consolidation of the entire MR2 support mission which commenced with the phase-
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
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<td>DEC</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>139.0</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Although these figures accurately depict a gradual reduction of mission requirements in terms of tonnage and POL transported, they fail to reveal that road miles traveled, over some of the most treacherous roads in Vietnam, actually increased during the past several months. The continuing high mileage reflects the increased retrograde mission which required vehicles to travel empty to many locations in the MR in order to backhaul retrograde materials, much of which was bulky in size, but light in weight. The large relocations from air bases in Tuy Hoa, CRB, Phu Cat and Phan Rang play a major role in our tonnages. Tonnages for MR2 North include that which was hauled to Tuy Hoa and Pleiku by the Han Jin Corporation, a Korean trucking and stevedoring contractor. The military POL line haul mission shows a significant decrease. This is attributed to an increase in contractor operations and the assumption of several of the POL missions by ARVN, in addition to the reduction of supported forces.

(3) During the past year, periodic enemy activity has harassed but did not interrupt for any long period of time, the flow of convoys in MR2, and the overall intensity and frequency of hostile acts against convoys has decreased significantly during 1971. However, during the first two months of 1972 several major convoy interdictions have occurred with significant WIA. While this overall reduction in enemy ambushes and mining incidents generally corresponds with the overall reduction of enemy initiated activities in MR2, I feel that actions we have taken in effecting closer coordination with ARVN and ROK forces, as well as requiring US gunship cover while traveling through critical areas such as the Duc My and Mang Gaing Pass areas, has significantly reduced convoy vulnerability. Another security measure which has proven most successful in reducing convoy vulnerability is the procedure whereby SUPCOM-CRB minimized and in some instances completely curtailed convoy operations during periods of anticipated high enemy activity or civilian demonstrations such as the Tet holiday season and GVN elections. This was accomplished by building up stocks of all classes of supply at our LSA's prior to these periods and making maximum use of water transport for resupply along the coastal areas. It is important to note, however, that the significant improvement in pacification have been instrumental in reducing incidents of highway interdictions.
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report for Major General Harold A. Kissinger, RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

Command on 5 January 1971 and 1 February 1971 respectively, because these two locations could be more economically resupplied by highway from Long Binh. On 5 April 1971, the Dalat LSA was relocated and established as a Liaison Activity (LA) at Duc Trong and subsequently moved to Don Duong until its closure on 7 January 1972. The 54th Group also operates the QM laundries, bakeries and supervises the contractor operated milk reconstitution plant at CRB. On 10 October 1971, the 54th Group received an air delivery capability with the reassignment of the 109th Quartermaster Company from the CRB Depot. However, this capability was shortlived as the 109th was inactivated in January, 1972. The organization of the 54th Group is shown at Inclosure 4.

(4) The US Army Installation-Cam Ranh Bay (USAI-CR3) is a combination of special elements which provide some of the housekeeping activities needed at an installation the size of Cam Ranh Bay. The USAI maintains the transient billets, officer housing and various services to include postal, finance, transportation motor pool, library, officer and NCO club activities and Chapel support. The organization is shown at Inclosure 5.

(5) The United States Army Marine Maintenance Activity Vietnam (USAMMAV) was attached to SUPCOM-CRB until its relocation to Long Binh in April 1971. The relocation was necessitated by the closure of the Marine Repair Facility at CRB and the increased vessel density in MR3. When headquartered at CRB, MMAV was the principal Marine Maintenance Activity in Vietnam with detachments located at Saigon and Da Nang. This activity performed maintenance on floating plants such as barge tugs, floating cranes, reefer barges, and outboard and inboard motor boats. MMAV also provided marine support maintenance for all US Army watercraft and amphibians in Vietnam. Vietnamese military watercraft were also supported. The organization of MMAV when located at CRB is shown at Inclosure 6.

5. (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS:

a. In its capacity as supplier of logistical support in MR2, the USASUPCOM-CRB has had numerous command relationships with MACV Advisory units and other USAV commands as well as with US Air Force, Navy and other FWMF. Our relationships with the Saigon and Da Nang Support Commands is one whereby we provide and/or receive back up support as a result of unusual or extended military operations. An example of this was the vast support provided to Da Nang during the entire Lam Son 719 operation.

b. With the institution of the Subzone, Installation and Installation Defense Coordinator Functions, the SUPCOM-CRB assumed additional joint service responsibilities, initially as the Cam Ranh Bay Installation Coordinator and later as the Subzone IV Coordinator. Through the zone coordination channels, the next higher headquarters above SUPCOM-CRB is the Commanding General, US Army Military Forces, MR2 (CG, USARMMF, MR2). With this increased responsibility as a Subzone
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Coordinator there was a corresponding increase in authority and control over all military units in Subzone IV including US Air Force, US Navy and other subordinate and tenant units. However, the principal reason for outstanding success was the willing cooperation of support command units. While the Subzone concept has created a requirement for duplicative reporting in many areas (i.e. events/incidents occurring within my area of responsibility must be reported to CG, USARMYF, MM2 and USARV) and increased our involvement in civil affairs activities, the overall concept has been successful in effecting a closer coordination of security measures throughout VR2. The major deficiency of this arrangement was the fact that the responsible coordinating official does not have the resources available to him to accomplish the mission. As rear area security of US Forces became critical, the staff and supporting force needs increased dramatically. However, no provision was made for meeting the personnel requirements except through assuming the burden. Furthermore, the political sensitivities to the high loss risks of a large logistical complex from enemy action prompted assignment of a combat battalion to this command. With the continued withdrawal of US tactical and logistical forces it is logical to expect that the Subzone, Installation and Installation Defense Coordinator Functions will be gradually transferred to MACV Advisory Teams.

c. The relationship between Services on the Cam Ranh Peninsula has been excellent. All Services, Army, Navy and Air Force have fully appreciated the need for a coordinated defense of the peninsula and surrounding areas and have worked together toward that end. As the Installation Coordinator, I have designated my Joint Defense Operations Center (JDCC) as the central facility to coordinate this defense. Both the Air Force and Navy provide radio/telephone operators to assist in manning the JDCC. The Navy has also provided liaison officers and port security equipment. Daily exchanges of operational and intelligence information via secure voice radio and weekly meetings to discuss defensive requirements has fostered this good relationship and has also proven to be a good means of ensuring a cohesive effort. Relationships with the Combined Tactical Operations Center (CTOC) operated by the GVN at Ba Ngol have also been excellent. The MACV Advisory Team there is included in the weekly security meetings for the Cam Ranh Peninsula, and JDCC has assigned a full time Liaison Officer to work at the CTOC. These actions have served to improve the exchange of intelligence information.

d. Relationships with the Vietnamese government are as varied as all the many facets of daily contact with the Vietnamese which is necessary in performing the mission of this command. We have both direct and indirect dealings with the Vietnamese 2d and 5th Area Logistic Commands (ALC's) headquartered in Qui Nhon and Nha Trang respectively. All other relationships with the Vietnamese government other than mission oriented or liaison type activities are coordinated through the Civil/Military Operations Office. In the area of civil affairs we have concentrated efforts to provide assistance requested by the Cam...
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Government and MACV Team 46. Our goal is to aid the local populace by providing technical assistance and available material for projects that require community participation. Usually these projects are not funded by the Vietnamese Government and are charitable in nature. A great amount of credit for establishing and maintaining good relations with the Vietnamese can be bestowed upon the many interested Chaplains throughout my command who have demonstrated a willingness to devote much time and effort in support of these projects. In general, the mayor of Cam Ranh Special Sector has been outstanding in his cooperation, good will and friendly view to the American Community.

e. Relationships with the ROKFV in MR2 have been enhanced by a mutual dependency upon one another. While ROK forces depend upon SUPCOM-CRB for the preponderance of their resupply, by both unit distribution and supply point distribution, SUPCOM-CRB, is to a certain degree, dependent upon ROK forces for the external security of Cam Ranh and the Qui Nhon area, as well as route security in the coastal areas of MR2. With the continued withdrawal of US Combat Forces from MR2, a greater reliance is being placed on ROK forces for the security of US logistical bases and operations. ROK forces in MR2 presently consist of two divisional units and a logistical command consisting of approximately 37,000 personnel. This figure is expected to remain relatively constant until the end of calendar year 72. The support of ROK forces is a major task as they maintain minute account of all support they are due and exert pressure at the right time and places to assure timely receipt. They are generally cooperative in performing the majority of their logistic functions, however lack of reefer vans, fuel tankers and S&P trailers, as examples, force them to rely on US organizations.

6. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. Convoy Operations:

(1) Line haul operations in MR2 average approximately 30 convoys per week. Cargo included all classes of supply but in recent months backhaul of retrograde cargo to the Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon Ports has become increasingly prevalent as US forces continue to withdraw from Vietnam. The following figures reflect this command's line haul resupply mission accomplishments during the period 1 January 1971 to 31 December 1971:

LINE HAUL - 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MR2(S)</th>
<th>MR2(N)</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/T (THOUS) - GAL (MIL)</td>
<td>S/T (THOUS) - GAL (MIL)</td>
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<th>Month</th>
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b. Port Operations:

(1) At Cam Ranh Bay (CRB), the deep draft facilities consist of five piers, each capable of berthing two vessels. One pier is leased to Sealand and is used for handling containerized cargo, one is used for handling ammunition and the remaining three are for general cargo use. One of the general cargo, De Long type, piers was mobilized in August 1971 and is ready for rapid removal when required. The shallow draft facilities, which are located in the South Beach area, consist of four LST ramps, two LCU beaches and one pier. The deep draft stevedoring service is provided by contract with the Central Navigation and Trading Company and the shallow draft stevedoring contractor is the Alaska Barge and Transport Company for both Cam Ranh Bay and the Phan Rang outpost.

(2) The Qui Nhon Port has four deep draft and two shallow draft berths. During the period October thru December 1971, the Qui Nhon Port was ARVNized and all US military personnel except those required to account for and protect US military cargo interests were phased out. The transfer of responsibility for operation of the Qui Nhon Port was accomplished in an orderly manner by a time-phased agreement which provided OJT time for ARVN personnel working with US personnel.

(3) The following figures represent deep draft (less Sealand) and shallow draft operations for the calendar year 1971. Tonnage handled in deep draft operations clearly reflect an overall decrease in operations. The increase in deep draft operations in May was due to increases in general cargo discharged while the increase in August tonnage was a direct result of the phase out of the Army Depot at CRB and a high generation rate of retrograde cargo. Shallow draft operations, although on the downward trend, have shown some minor fluctuations near the end of the year. A significant decrease in our shallow draft capability was realized on 1 October 1971, when the Beach Discharge Lighter J.U.D. Page was transferred to the Da Nang SUPCOM due to a large backlog of intra-RVN Cargo at Da Nang. Anticipated requirements in support of the Phan Rang Air Base closure will result in an increase in shallow draft operations during the early part of 1972.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PORT OPERATIONS - 1971</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>(THOUS S/T)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MR2(S)</th>
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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report for Major General Harold A.
Kissinger, RCS CSPOR-74 (U)

Alex 35.2 36.9 32.0 13.7
May 60.6 37.1 23.7 17.4
Jun 39.2 38.0 19.7 11.8
Jul 24.3 30.7 21.7 8.4
Aug 41.5 38.7 15.2 14.0
Sep 20.2 23.2 18.9 12.2
Oct 31.9 17.2 15.9 13.5
Nov 16.2 21.1 17.9 20.6
Dec 16.2 21.1 17.9 20.6

TOTALS 400.6 390.4 165.0 111.6

C. Retrograde Operations:

1) During the past eighteen months SUPCOM-CRB consistently exceeded
the monthly goals established by USARV with the single exception during
the month of June 1971, when the Qui Nhon Sub-Area Command did not meet its goal
due to the nonavailability of shipping to handle retrograde items. The
ability of a command to meet assigned goals is almost totally dependent
on the amount of shipping scheduled into ports and scheduling of Keystune units. The setting of retrograde goals and the scheduling of
vessels are independent operations, the former done by USARV DCSLOG
and the latter by Transportation Movement Agency (TMA) and Military
Sealift Command (MSC). Because of this, I have recommended that the
assignment of specific retrograde tonnage goals be determined only after
a thorough evaluation of the shipping realities and potential gen-
erations of retrograde cargo.

2) The following is a 1971 breakdown by month of retrograde
tonnage versus the USARV goals:

RETROGRADE - 1971
(THOUS S/T)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>MR2(S)</th>
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<td>Jul</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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OCT  6.5  6.5  100  4.5  7.7  172
Nov  6.1  6.2  102  4.1  6.9  168
Dec  7.0  8.9  127  3.5  3.6  103

TOTALS  75.0  94.4  125  27.2  45.2  106

d. Keystone Operations:

(1) FY 71 marked the commencement of an incremental drawdown schedule which promulgated the inactivation/redeployment of units and reduction in forces from MR2. To facilitate these incremental drawdowns, Keystone processing locations were established at Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon to classify and dispose of equipment belonging to units involved in this special Keystone Program. The Keystone System as outlined in detail in Annex F (Logistics) to USARV OPLAN 183 has worked exceptionally well. Performance from January 1971 thru December 1971 was as follows:

KEYSTONE - 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units Keystoned</th>
<th>Major Items Processed</th>
<th>Secondary Items Processed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MR2(S)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>41,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR2(N)</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>32,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>47,990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) During the early Keystone increments we initially experienced considerable difficulty in that units were not cleaning their equipment, inspecting for explosives nor properly preparing the required documentation for turn-in of the equipment. To alleviate this problem a series of standard briefings were prepared by each of the SUPCOM-CRB agencies involved in Keystone operations and presented to units prior to their initial processing to ensure that all concerned were aware of the procedures for processing equipment through the Keystone facilities. This system of informal briefing eliminated most of the problem areas.

(3) Lateral transfer of Keystone equipment has probably been controlled too severely thereby not maximizing the full potential for units. Present policies establish USARV as the approving authority for all lateral transfers and excessive controls, in many cases, results in newer serviceable equipment being retrograded off shore, while the equipment remaining in RVN for use by US units ages and requires constant replacement of parts. In most cases selective lateral transfer in a timely manner would have reduced maintenance costs and increased the readiness rates. In essence, the retrograde of better items placed a greater logistics burden on both the CONUS and RVN supply system. As the support commands will be the last of the US units to Keystone and they
have the best appreciation of equipment status, consideration should be given to designating them as the approving authority for lateral transfer of newer equipment to facilitate the continuation of critical mission requirements.

c. Combat Support Operations:

(1) Since September 1970, a significant number of resupply missions in support of combat operations have been handled as Combat Essential (CE) or Emergency Resupply (ER) missions. In January 1971, a total of 31 CE requests were processed in support of Operation Lam Son 719. Equipment processed included air items, vehicles, howitzers, Class V and aluminum matting. In all cases, cargo arrived at the aerial or water ports prior to the stated availability time.

(2) Throughout the past year, projects Commando Image and Bonner, which are the two code names for munitions and material shipments under the Military Assistance Program Cambodia (Map Cambodia), have required a total of 123 CE's and have been transported entirely by air and water routes to out of country destinations. In addition to the CE requirements in support of projects Commando Image and Bonner, the Mechanical Equipment Delivery Teams, Cambodia (MEDTC) Class V requirements totaled over 14,000 S/T during the past year. During the months of October and November 1971, the 109th QM Company (Aerial Delivery) performed its final air drop mission when it was called upon to prepare for air drop 69 S/T of rations, ammunition and medical items in support of operations in Cambodia. Since that time, MEDTC Class V requirements have declined.

d. Contractor Operations: Contractors are used in stevedoring operations at both the Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay ports. Contract stevedoring has proven to be satisfactory but occasional work stoppages due to labor problems has been one of the major shortcomings in the operation. The Command is also responsible for supervising sizable contracts for dairy products and laundry services. The contractor operated maintenance facility provides backup for direct support and 100% of the command's capability for general support. Eighteen (18) contractors are presently engaged in support of this command with the total cost exceeding $23,924,864. Funds have recently been made available to finance contractor trucking and thus far, use of commercial highway transportation has been successful in augmenting military transportation units during our major retrograde operations.

e. Depot Operations:

(1) Prior to the closure of the US Army Depot Cam Ranh Bay (USAD-CRB), the theater-wide phase down that would normally have tended to reduce the overall depot workload, was more than offset by the assumption of the Qui Nhon Army Depot mission. The net result was a generally
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constant workload over this period as reflected by the number of Material Release Orders (MRO's) processed and total tonnages handled. The number of MRO's processed per month averaged approximately 35,000 to include 5,600 MRO's per month which were processed by the Depot Red Ball Facility in order to maintain continuity of supply of critical items during the assimilation of the Qui Nhon Red Ball Mission. While on hand tonnage decreased from 170,000 tons in December 1970 to 75,500 tons in March 1971, as a result of emphasis on the Retrograde Program, the average tonnage shipped remained at a constant level until the phasedown of depot operations began.

(2) Final phasedown of the Cuu Depot commenced on 1 July 1971 and was completed on 15 November 1971 when the Depot was brought down to zero stockage. During that period, a total of 61,650 short tons of equipment and supplies were either shipped off-shore or transferred to the USAD's at Long Binh and Da Nang. The residual Depot operations, such as the Class I wholesale mission, collection and classification, Red Ball, and Class II, IV, VII, and IX DS activities were assumed by 54th GS Group, the 124th Transportation Command and the Vinnell Corp. respectively.

(3) During the transition period there were several problem areas encountered, most internal in nature and easily worked out within the command. One external problem associated with the phasedown of the depot occurred with respect to items still being shipped to the depot, even though the Unit Identity Code (UIC) number was cancelled. This was due, in part, to a lack of timely action by supply and transportation agencies, and consequently shipments by the major CONUS depots continued to arrive at CRB for the USAD. Shipments arriving at the 14th Aerial Port, for example, that were not specifically earmarked for a customer in the CRB Area had to be transshipped to the Long Binh, Da Nang or Okinawa Depots. This required the initiation of new paperwork and utilization of transportation assets that were already committed to ship stock out of the depot to meet the prescribed closure data. It also resulted in unnecessary transportation costs and the generation of further excesses.

7. (C) LOGISTICS:

a. Logistical Support Activities:

(1) The continuing reduction of forces in MR2 has required a constant tailoring and stationing of LSA's according to the supported troop and equipment densities. Initially, the LSA's were providing Class I, II, III, IV, V, VII, and IX supplies as well as graves registration, laundry service and direct support maintenance for non-divisional units in MR2. With the reduction of US troop strength and
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the ARVNization of POL and ammunition supply points, the LSA operations have been reduced considerably.

(2) To accomplish their assigned missions, the LSA's were organized from elements of our organic maintenance, supply and service, and ammunition units. However, no personnel spaces were authorized to meet the requirements, and at one time in 1970, almost 1000 spaces had to be absorbed by units of the Support Command. As authorizations became the control in the strictest sense, we had increasing difficulty in staffing LSA's. Total strengths of the LSA's were equivalent to a company plus or platoon plus organization as the supported strength dictated. Because LSA's were organized primarily to accomplish a logistical function, we experienced problems in providing adequate security personnel at the LSA's and in many cases were dependent upon the Installation Coordinator and supported US Combat forces for external security. As the US Troop withdrawal continued, the LSA's became increasingly involved in security operations which detracted significantly from their primary mission of providing combat support. As LSA's lacked the necessary equipment and manpower to be responsive against enemy attacks, the use of sensors and the hiring of Nung guards was instituted to provide additional security.

(3) Due to the conglomerate composition of the LSA's and the wide geographical separation from the parent headquarters, administrative and logistic support for these activities was cumbersome. Basic action such as the allocation of self service account funds often required the coordination of three separate battalions, a headquarters company and the direction of a group S-4. In an attempt to revitalize the LSA organization and eliminate some of the inherent problems associated with the present LSA organization, this headquarters, recommended specific TDA's for the manning of the LSA's. This approach was not approved until recently. The TDA organization will fix responsibility and accountability for the mission and identify the authorized source of men and equipment.

b. Maintenance:

(1) Maintenance support within SUPCOM-CRB and MR2 is provided by DS and CS maintenance battalions with back up DS maintenance and additional CS maintenance support provided by the Vinnell Corporation (Fixed Field Maintenance Facility) at Cam Ranh Bay. DS support is provided on an area basis by the maintenance battalions located at the major troop concentration centers in MR2. DS support beyond these troop centers is provided by DS maintenance detachments attached to LSA's located in the more remote areas of the MR. Due to latest troop reductions, the majority of our DS maintenance detachments at the
LSA's have been withdrawn. Overall, this concept of area maintenance port along with contact specialist teams has proven satisfactory with some minor exceptions; notably, LSA maintenance detachments were unable to repair certain sophisticated or heavy major items of equipment in place which made it necessary to evacuate the equipment to parent maintenance units. Evacuation, except as part of large convoys, is complicated by the security conditions existing on most lines of communication. In short, evacuation of equipment to rear area major maintenance facilities in Vietnam was quite different than in the WW II and Korea type conflict where lines of communication were fairly secure and transportation from front to rear was relatively easy. Consideration should be given to providing large non-divisional units with an internal DS maintenance capability when involved in unconventional type warfare.

(2) The Vinnell Corporation operates a government owned Fixed Field Maintenance Facility (FFMF) and a GS overhaul shop at CRB. The purpose of the GS overhaul operation is to provide an in-country rebuild capability for various types of components and end items and then return them to Depot stocks once overhauled. With the continued emphasis on the ARVN repair and transfer program, a recent revision to the Vinnell Contract initiated operations on a two shift basis as a result of the increased workload. The Vinnell contract enables these maintenance missions to be performed without the necessity of providing additional TOE units within the country. The net result is a lower troop density which is a continuing goal of this headquarters. Additionally, the contractor is frequently able to procure skills for complicated and non-standard equipment and retain a fairly stable work force which is not subject to the personnel turbulence normally associated with a military unit in RVN. The Vinnell Corporation has been a most definite asset in improving the maintenance posture within SUPCOM-CRB. It has also played a major role in nation building through hiring and training large numbers of Vietnamese in automotive and related skills.

c. Supply Activities:

(1) Subsistence Support in MR2 which included the forecasting, receipt, storage and issue of Class I supplies averaged over 5,000 S/T per month during 1971. This included over 50 commissary accounts during the peak period totalling more than $300,000 in sales per month. One of the major problem areas in Class I activities was the severe shortage of personnel fully trained in subsistence operations. This problem centers around the lack of a qualified training base in CONUS where the majority of Class I positions are occupied by civilians. Qualified military personnel are required for accurate administration of Class I activities to ensure proper accountability and issue of Class I supplies to US, FWMF and non-appropriated fund activities. This shortage of fully trained personnel has resulted in considerable loss of subsistence to the US Government. The same deficiency of qualified people applies in general to the entire logistics field. More spaces in CONUS depots, National Inventory Control Points, etc., must be considered if
there is to be a major improvement. Existing subsistence training programs are in need of increased emphasis to include commissary operations, ration break down procedures and full coverage of the administrative operation. The DA Form 2969 (Subsistence Supply and Service Summary) should be stressed as this report is one of the best management tools available in the Class I Field, but at the same time, the least understood.

(2) During the period of this report, POL Support of US, RVNAF and FWMF was accomplished by a combination of US, ARVN and contractor operations. Sea-going POL tankers discharged more than 400 million gallons of POL products ashore for storage, delivery and consumption. The highlight of POL operation during the past year was the gradual transfer of the POL mission in MR2 to ARVN. At the present time all military POL points in MR2, with the exceptions of Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang are now operated by ARVN. Since the transfer of the Pleiku Tank Farm to ARVN on 27 April 1971, I have encountered a recurring problem in maintaining POL products above the safety level at that location. Although the number of US customers at Pleiku has been reduced as a result of troop withdrawals, the average daily issue has remained relatively constant. This is attributed to greater US air operations and increased VNAF use. There is also a potential problem in that once a POL distribution point is transferred to ARVN, we lose accountability control over the daily issues made from that point. Although the Pleiku tank farm mission has been transferred to ARVN, the US still has the task to line haul POL to Pleiku. Because of a shortage of ARVN tractors and tankers this requires a daily US POL convoy just to remain above the safety level for all POL products. At times, this problem has been so acute that I have been forced to transfer critical tanker assets from MR2 South to MR2 North to augment the Pleiku POL resupply convoys. This responsibility will be transferred to the 2d ALC (ARVN) in March when additional assets become available.

(3) Class V activities have amounted to over 398,870 short tons handled during the past year. Class V operations include the support of US, RVNAF and FWMF in MR1, MR2, MR3 and Cambodia. Over the past several months SUPCOM-G3 has continued a vigorous ammunition surveillance program which emphasizes inspection, classification, rewarehousing and disposition of Class V material. This program has proven its validity whereby the on-hand balance of unserviceable, suspended and excess ammunition has been substantially reduced. The lack of information on advance reship of ammunition coupled with ship diversions and large transships has been a continual challenge at Cam Ranh Bay. Because of the excellent deep draft port facilities, we have been the center of activity both in the receipt and transshipment of Class V tonnage for the entire theater. This has resulted in ship demurrage and time lost in processing ammunition to our customers when stow plans were not flexible.
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and ammunition not consigned to CRB had to be off-loaded and staged until the ammunition manifested for CRB could be off-loaded. When discharge is complete all staged ammunition must be back-loaded on the deep draft vessel. This problem can only be alleviated by the curtailment of ship diversions and major transshipments to CRB. However, weather conditions, port congestion and enemy action often leave no alternative. Overall, Class V activities within MR2 have diminished quite significantly over the past year. A comparative analysis of Class V operations during the month of January 1971 and the month of January 1972 bear testimony to the reduction of combat activity in RVN:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>RECEIPTS</th>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>ON HAND</th>
<th>TOTAL LIFTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JAN 71</td>
<td>5,459</td>
<td>19,090</td>
<td>38,184</td>
<td>26,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 72</td>
<td>6,858</td>
<td>9,320</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>18,387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. (G) Support of Republic of Korea Army Forces, Vietnam (ROKAFV)

a. At the present time, SUPCOM-CRB provides supply and service support to approximately 37,000 ROKA Forces in MR2. These forces are located along the entire coastal area of MR2 from Qui Nhon in the north to Phan Rang in the south. Supported ROKA forces consist of two divisional size units and a logistical command.

b. While the bulk of the ROKA support requirement is in the area of Class I, III and V, we also provide them with maintenance, laundry and graves registration services. The following is a breakout of our average monthly Class I, III, and V support of ROKA:

AVERAGE MONTHLY ROKA SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>S/T/Gallons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>1,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>842,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. The most significant problem in the area of ROKA support is that their requirements have remained constant over the past year while our capabilities have been reduced due to strength drawdowns and equipment turn-in. Closure of our outlying LSA's at Tuy Hoa and Phan Rang will pose some problems in that our capability to support ROKA forces in those two areas by supply point distribution will cease once the LSA's are closed. As the ROKA capability to transport and store Class I (chill/freeze) is virtually non-existent we may be required to continue the line haul of Class I to Tuy Hoa (Phu Hiep) and Phan Rang. The transfer of selected items of equipment to ROKA forces may be the optimum solution to this problem as it would provide the ROKA forces with the capability to support themselves.
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9. (C) Security of Cam Ranh Bay:

a. The withdrawal of US Forces from RVN requires a continuing appraisal of the tactical situation with regard to the defense of the Cam Ranh Peninsula. As the strength of US Forces steadily declines, the threat of enemy attacks on the remaining US field installations increases and greater reliance must be placed on Vietnamese and Korean Forces for the security of the surrounding area. We have attempted to exploit all US, Vietnamese and RGKA resources to improve the security posture of the peninsula.

b. The assignment of a US infantry battalion under the operational control of SUPCOM-CRB has been most effective in providing a dynamic defense of the peninsula by conducting operations which have harassed the enemy and considerably reduced his capability to conduct attacks by fire. The large employment of unattended ground sensors has also proven to be a valuable resource. Since November, 1970, approximately 11,000 meters of line sensors have been implanted throughout the Cam Ranh Special Sector. In addition, radio frequency sensors have been employed on the mainland on known and suspected enemy rocket launch sites to give early warning of possible attacks by indirect fire. Although the unattended ground sensors, particularly the radio frequency sensors, are subject to malfunction or damage by artillery fire and require a 10-25 percent replacement factor with servicing required on a 30-45 day cycle, utilization of these sensors has unquestionably served to deter numerous enemy initiated attacks and has prevented him from being able to operate with the relative freedom he was once accustomed to. The inclusion of 16 mobile searchlights (23") and one static 30" searchlight, ground radar devices, anti-intrusion swimmer/sapper equipment and airborne night devices has resulted in one of the most effective base defenses in Vietnam.

c. In July 1971, a comprehensive program was initiated to rebuild and upgrade existing bunkers and fighting positions and construct additional new bunkers, revetments and fighting positions to provide protection for SUPCOM-CRB personnel. Experience indicates that protective revetments around living areas are extremely desirable because of the lack of reaction time during night rocket attacks. Approximately 103 bunkers, 420 fighting positions and 253 protective revetments have been constructed since the start of the program. Other defensive measures such as increased lighting, a siren alert notification system and practice alerts on a monthly basis have improved our defensive posture on the peninsula to a considerable degree.

10. (C) Significant Activities.

a. Drug Amnesty and Rehabilitation Programs:

(1) In October 1970, the first concentrated effort to combat drug abuse within SUPCOM-CRB was formalized with the initiation of a Drug Amnesty and Drug Rehabilitation Program. This program was designed and oriented to assist the drug user to discontinue his use of drugs and to provide him with every
reasonable assistance in his endeavor, excluding him from the administrative
and legal consequences of having participated in illicit drug use in the past.
The Chaplain, Surgeon, Judge Advocate, Mental Hygienist and commanders at all
levels of command actively participated in the program. After reviewing the
success and failure of this initial program, the need for a more comprehensive,
well coordinated program was immediately recognized. As a result, I assigned
an officer on a full time basis to develop a comprehensive amnesty and re-
habilitation program and to coordinate the activities of all staff and command
personnel involved in the program. Originally conceived as a "Halfway House",
this new program developed beyond that. Buildings, supplies and equipment were
acquired, volunteers for full time duty were interviewed and accepted, and
medical and religious personnel were made available on a part time basis. The
SUPCOM-CRB Drug Rehabilitation Center (Project Guts) opened for all Army
personnel on the Cam Ranh Peninsula on 23 May 1971.

(2) The center is capable of accommodating up to 78 patients simultaneously.
At present, a full time staff of three commissioned officers and 51 enlisted
men are on location to fulfill the mission of the center. All but five enlisted
men and one officer were volunteers who lacked formal school training, but
expressed a sincere desire to learn and assist in every way possible in the
restoration of the drug abuser. Because most of the cadre had not been trained
for this work, arrangements were made for medical personnel from the 6th Con-
valescent Center and the Air Force's 483rd Hospital to teach classes on
ounseling techniques, personality disorders and other related topics. Medical,
Chaplain, USO and Red Cross support were rendered on a scheduled basis. Since
its opening in May 1971, the center has accepted 1,037 patients.

(3) As a follow-on program, the Drug Suppression Council was founded in
June 1971. Foremost among the objectives of this council is to facilitate an
understanding of the current drug program so that commanders will be aware
of the possible approaches to the drug problem. In addition to keeping all
council members informed of the latest developments in the field of drug re-
habilitation and suppression, the council also discusses the nature of the drug
problem, how drugs are obtained, the role of commanders, approaches to counseling
and the current laws pertaining to drugs.

(4) As a commander, I also attempted to identify and reduce morale and
welfare factors such as idleness, loneliness and frustration which tend to lead
to drug abuse, and measures have been taken to provide more adequate living
conditions and recreational facilities for the individual soldier. I have
used the Command Information Office resources to the maximum in conducting a
continuing, vigorous program of education relative to drug abuse. All
individuals have been made aware of the drug exemption and drug rehabilitation
programs through formal classroom training and orientations. The true success of
any drug rehabilitative program is directly related to the time and effort that
commanders, NCO's and staffs are willing to devote to organizing, implementing,
and fully supporting the program. Our policy at Cam Ranh Bay has been to do
everything possible to rehabilitate drug users and not leave the responsibility
to someone else.
b. ARVNization:

(1) Project 272: Since 1970, ARVN personnel have been working at the Duffle Bag (Sensor Maintenance) facility at Cam Ranh and have received training in the issue, service, and maintenance of highly technical sensor equipment. ARVN personnel who received training when this program first started are now being used to train newly assigned US personnel. ARVNization of the Duffle Bag Facility is now approximately 80% completed, and it is estimated that complete turnover will be effected next month. The US role in the program has reverted to that of an advisory capacity and the number of Americans in the program has been reduced from 65 to 20. A total of 96 ARVN soldiers are now participating in this program including one Major and 12 company grade officers.

(2) Project 501: At the outset of FY72, the ARVN Transfer Program was initiated and SUPCOM-CRB maintenance facilities within MR2 were assigned the responsibility for the upgrading of wheeled vehicles, tracked vehicles, artillery, small arms, generators, engineer construction equipment, and refrigeration equipment, material handling equipment and communications and electronics equipment. From the program inception to the end of 1971, SUPCOM-CRB was directly responsible for the successful transfer of 372 wheeled vehicles, 4 tracked vehicles, 25 artillery pieces, 7,225 small arms, 10 generators, 10 pieces of engineer construction equipment, 142 pieces of electronic equipment and 3 pieces of MHE to ARVN forces in MR2, thereby equalling or exceeding all USARV assigned goals. These accomplishments in the ARVN Transfer Program have contributed significantly to the ARVNization progress in MR2. Although we have consistently met or exceeded our goals in the ARVN Transfer Program there have been some difficulties encountered in the transfer of equipment to ARVN because the acceptance standards for ARVN candidate equipment are much more stringent than for equipment used by US forces. In many cases, ARVN inspectors will reject equipment which is completely combat serviceable but is not like-new in appearance. This has made it necessary to offer the same equipment to ARVN two or more times before it is accepted. Equipment transfers to ARVN should be based on combat serviceability criteria, and ARVN standards should be relaxed so that equipment appearance is not a factor in acceptance or rejection.

(3) Transfer of Facilities: During this period major facility turnovers to ARVN have included the port at Qui Nhon and the outport at Nha Trang. Other turnovers have included the POL tank farms at Phan Thiet, Tuy Hoa, Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot, helicopter refueling points at Song Mao, Dalat, Gia Nghia and Bao Loc, and transfer of the ammunition supply points at Phan Thiet, Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot. Although we experienced some excessive delays in the turnover of several of these facilities, the overall transition from US to ARVN operations was accomplished without interruption of the logistical mission. Other major facilities scheduled for turnover early this year are the tank farms at Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay.

(4) In conjunction with the turnover of POL facilities, ARVN has recently assumed several of the POL line haul missions. In MR2 North, ARVN is transporting all POL products to Kontum, Dak To, Phu Mon, An Khe, Bong Son, LZ English and LZ Crystal. All of these locations were previously resupplied by US. ARVN also provides limited POL support to Pleiku, as stated earlier, as they receive additional tractor and tanker assets they will gradually assume this Pleiku and Tuy Hoa resupply missions. In MR2 South, ARVN is hauling POL products to Song Mao,
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Dalat, Gia Laiia and Phan Thiet. It is anticipated that they will soon assume the Ban No Thuan mission with augmentation by contractor operations.

c. Closure of Tuy Hoa Air Base: SUPCOM-CRB was tasked with the movement of approximately 14,000 short tons of material over highway distances in excess of 100 miles from Tuy Hoa to Cam Ranh Bay. Material backhauled have included modular dormitories, AM-2 matting, revetments and general retrograde cargo. To accomplish this mission, we have dedicated personnel and equipment to meet the rigid time frames established by MACV, USARV and 7th Air Force. Associated projects are the shipment of the dormitories from Cam Ranh Bay to Da Nang and the relocation of the 17th Combat Aviation Group from Tuy Hoa to Pleiku. All of these projects were being conducted simultaneously with our normal line haul missions and other critical transportation requirements. Closure of the Tuy Hoa Air Base represents a milestone in the phased down history of MR2 and will result in millions of dollars worth of recovered facilities and equipment which may be used elsewhere.

d. Incremental Troop Reductions and Future Force Planning: Among the most significant and challenging tasks which faced my command were those of planning the drawdown of USASUPCOM-CRB units throughout MR2 in connection with the incremental reduction of US Forces in RVN, and of planning the "residual" combat service support concepts and force structure required in MR2 once a stabilized, advisory force is realized.

(1) Drawdowns in progress upon my arrival in RVN were those of Increment IV (designated Keystone Robin Alfa) of the phased redeployment of US Forces. Including that increment, the USASUPCOM-CRB has completed seven incremental drawdowns through 31 December 1971. At the time of this writing, the command is executing Increment XI (Keystone Owl) drawdowns of 3,236 spaces through the inactivation of 19 units and the reduction of 19 others.

(b) The planning of these increments prior to their execution has been a difficult task in part because of the diverse, complex organization of USASUPCOM-CRB and the wide geographical dispersal of its support elements throughout MR2, but principally because the drawdowns of USASUPCOM-CRB had to be planned concurrently with and frequently without detailed knowledge of the drawdowns of supported US Forces in MR2. Thus the Support Command force which remained at the end of each increment was not a logical, after-the-fact derivative organization tailored to the supported force remaining, but actually the fulfillment of the best judgment which my staff and commanders could make prior to the increment. Fortunately, this less-than-ideal planning situation resulted in no significant problems, largely because of the combat service support functions performed, and hence the support troops needed, have been more closely related to the total population of major US troop concentrations in MR2 rather than to the drawdown or stationing of specific combat/combat support units.
(2) Future Force Planning: During the summer of 1971, "Close-Hold" planners of USASUPCOM-CRB participated in a series of long-range planning conferences with the USARV staff (principally DCSLOG and DCSOPS). This assisted in determining the logistic force structure, concepts, and procedures required to support US forces, drawing down in a series of phased redeployments, toward an ultimate advisory force posture. The pace of this planning accelerated drastically in September, October and November 1971, when planners of my command spent about six man-weeks TDY to USARV headquarters to assist the USARV staff with detailed, on-the-ground knowledge and recommendations. From the USARV viewpoint, this effort culminated in November 1971 with the publication of USARV OPLANS 208 and 208A. My command followed through on this effort by publishing, on 1 January 1972, USASUPCOM-CRB OPLAN 208A, which is a blueprint of how Support Command will perform its various support missions while transitioning to a residual TDA organization designated the Regional Support Activity - Military Region 2.

H. A. KISSINGER
Major General, USA
Commanding
MISSION AND FUNCTION STATEMENT

a. To command an integrated logistical organization.

b. Provide logistical and services support, except aircraft, to all US and Free World Military Forces within Military Region II north.

c. Provide common user supply, maintenance, and services support to all US, FMF, and US Military Assistance Command in the assigned area.

d. Provide for the security of US shipping in ports of the assigned area.

e. Fulfill administrative responsibilities and provide related administrative support for US Military and Free World Military Assistance Forces in northern Military Region II.
MISSION AND FUNCTION STATEMENT

a. To provide command and supervision of units in all types of motor transport such as direct support of tactical units, depot aid terminal operations and line hauls.

b. Operates a truck terminal and/or trailer relay system.

c. Evaluates highway traffic plans for determination of best routing for U.S. and Free World Military Forces in Northern Military Region II.
MISSION AND FUNCTION STATEMENT

a. To provide command, administrative and
technical supervision for the Supply and
Service En Direct Support

b. Provides direct support supplies and
services to non-divisional troops, to in-
clude Free World Military Forces in Northern
Military Region II.
MISSION STATEMENT 62nd MAINT BN:

a. Provides command, administration and technical supervision of the Maintenance Direct Support Bn.

b. Provides direct support maintenance, limited evacuation and maintenance supply support to non-divisional units on an area basis. Also serves as a base of supply for the maintenance battalion. Exceptions to these mission responsibilities are cryptographic, ADPS/PAM, air craft, quartermaster air equipment and that equipment supported by army wide services.

c. Provides maintenance support for small arms and instruments on a direct exchange basis.

d. Operates the Logistical Support Area located at Pleiku.*

* This function will be assumed by the 88th S&S Bn effective 5 March 1972
MISSION AND FUNCTION STATEMENT
(124th Trans Cdo)

To command assigned and attached units engaged in the transfer of cargo and personnel in established terminal operations, logistical over the shore operations (LOTS), and in support of amphibious operations.

MISSION AND FUNCTION STATEMENT
(24th Trans Bn)

To provide command, administration and supervision of assigned and attached transportation terminal type units engaged in:

a. Operation of logistical over the shore sites.

b. Transfers of personnel and cargo from one mode of transportation to another at established water terminals.

c. Operation of inland terminal transfer points.

d. Support of the Army and joint tactical operations, of U.S. and Free World Military Forces, in Southern Military Region II.
MISSION AND FUNCTION STATUTORY

a. Provide command and control of assigned and attached combat service, support units forming a composite multifunctional organization. Provide combat service support to non-divisional units in II Corps Military Region south to include other U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Forces.

b. Operates Logistical Support Activities at Phan Rang and Nha Trang.
To provide command, tactical, administrative, training, and technical operational supervision of attached maintenance units in Military Region II.
d. Receive and disseminate technical intelligence information and required information to subordinate units in Southern Military Region II.
MISSION AND FUNCTION STATEMENT

a. Provides the personnel required for service support augmentation of these functions: Transportation Motor Mile, Chaplain, Special Services, Open Mess System, Central Post Fund, and Installation Staff.

b. Provides the Command and Control Element (HHC) for the supply and service type unit assigned to U.S.A. SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANCH BAY.

c. Provides Class I supply personnel.

d. Provide personnel for the data service center, an approved ADFE center, servicing attached and assigned units of USASUPCOM-CRB.

e. Provides Port and Beach operations support to the port to include: damage, CINEX Yard, box and pallet construction, Red Ball service, break bulk point services, and asphalt intransit storage facilities for U.S. and Free World Military Forces in Military Region II south.

f. Provides emergency recovery capabilities to the installation to be used to repair storm damage and damage caused by enemy action and civil disturbance.
MISSION AND FUNCTION STATEMENT

To provide organizational structure, personnel and equipment required for command, control, and supervision of assigned and attached units furnishing logistical support and terminal services to U.S. Army Forces and such other Free World Military Assistance Forces as directed within Military Region II.