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AGO ltr 11 Jun 1980 ; AGO ltr 11 Jun 1980

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1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U), 2 July 1971.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Lieutenant Colonel James J. Turner, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 525-14, as a result of subject report should be provided to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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VERNE L. BOWERS
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The Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
ADVISORY TEAM 71 (BA XUYEN PROVINCE)
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO 96296

MACDR-71

24 June 1972

SUBJECT: Completion of Tour Report: MACV CORDS 174.01

THRU: DEPCORDS MR 4
APO 96215

TO: COMUSMACV
ATTN: MACCORDS-(AC of S CORDS)
APO 96222


2. Attached is end of tour report required by above references.

[Signature]

JAMES J. TURNER
LTC, IN
Deputy Province Senior Advisor

DAFD-OTT
72B024
Inclosure

CLASSIFIED BY: LTC James J. Turner
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1978
SECTION I

NAME: James Justice Turner
GRADE: Lieutenant Colonel
SSN: 463-34-3221
BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army (Infantry)
PROVINCE: Ba Xuyen, MR 4
INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: 4 January 1971 - 18 July 1972
EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 18 July 1972
PREVIOUS TOUR IN VIETNAM: 8 August 1966 - 12 July 1967
ASSIGNMENT ON PREVIOUS VIETNAM TOUR:

a. DSA Quang Dien District, Thua Thien Province, 8 August 1966 - 2 December 1966.

b. Regimental Senior Advisor 3rd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division, 3 December 1966 - 12 July 1967.
SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position?

I have had command through battalion and staff through corps level. I have had prior advisory experience with the German Training Assistance Group, 1 October 1956 - 10 July 1957, and as Senior Combat Arms Representative to the United States Army Chaplains School. The above experience is in addition to that indicated in Section I.

2. What training did you have for this position?

I attended the Vietnam Training Center (VTC), Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C. 31 March 1970 - 18 November 1970. Total instruction was approximately 33 weeks including about 28 in the Vietnamese language.

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position?

I would recommend a more intensive language course and less of the niceto-have subjects that VTC offered.

4. What should be the length of tour for your position?

I believe 18 months should be the optimum tour. Because of the demands placed on FSAs and DFSAs, they can put forth their best effort in an 18 month period. A one-year tour would not make maximum use of their knowledge in these positions.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory? If not, specify deficiencies.

a. Logistical support has been one of the major deficiencies. The Province Team was constantly plagued with problems pertaining to barrier material, boat motors, vehicles (scouts and jeeps), refrigerators, generators and repair parts for these items in outlying District and MAT Teams. As a result, a disproportionate amount of the PSA's, DFSA's and Province Team's time is spent in trying to correct these problem areas. Based on my observation, the lack of adequate and timely logistical support has done more to detract from the pacification and development effort than any other factor. I would strongly recommend that in a future conflict, such as Vietnam, the MAT teams be mobile and not semi-fixed.

b. Military management during the phase-down has done more to sow confusion and resentment than any singular factor. The personnel at province charged with the responsibility of making a team function have worked with little or no guidance during this period. It has been management by reaction and not by proper planning.
c. The Administrative Support has been less than adequate, considering the vast amounts of men and material available to MACV. At the region level, DRAC has just been recently reorganized into what proposes to be an economically and efficiently run operation; however, until that time comes, there is still doubt as to DRAC's capabilities. On three separate occasions within the past 90 days, end of tour awards have been lost and only through personal efforts of the team's personnel section have the errors been corrected. In only one case, though, has it been discovered in time for the award to be presented to the individual prior to his departure. To cite a problem at the MACV level, two Vietnamese recommended for meritorious service awards five months ago have yet to be returned. Only through a series of phone calls and one personal trip to Saigon was the Adjutant able to get approval on these awards.

Routine personnel actions have also been lost. For example, an application for degree completion program was submitted in early March. When the officer involved went on 30-day leave to CONUS, he stopped in Saigon to check on the status of his request. His paperwork had never been received at MACV, and a period of over 60 days had passed. The request had been forwarded through and logged out of DRAC, but somewhere between Can Tho and Saigon lies the unprocessed paperwork of an outstanding young officer.

The distribution system from MACV to Region and Province level is difficult to understand. DRAC informs us that paperwork can take up to 30 days to reach the addressee and again that long to return to DRAC. Since advisory teams are limited in assets from the beginning and personal visits to Saigon are a major endeavor from the Delta, a twelve-month tour is hardly enough time for important personnel actions to be initiated.

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming? Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available? Which ones?

All programs are dependent upon the emphasis given them by the Province Chief. However, it should be realized that no program will move unless all levels of government are interested. The old cliche "The organization does well only what the boss checks" pertains to the Vietnamese. They do follow this cliche, and so at times much does not get done at all levels of government.

7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what changes would you recommend?

I think the reporting system, as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70, is adequate. The format for the province report is excellent.
8. Do the ACCORDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in pacification programs?

The current requirements for reporting progress in pacification programs, I believe, are quite valid in consideration of the rather nebulous areas we are trying to measure; however, with one notable exception. The exception is the TSF. The Vietnamese do not like this report and so, provide only limited accurate input. A report to be valid must have good input plus be considered of value by the user.

9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received?

For the most part, instructions were clear from higher headquarters. However, I would like to present for future consideration the thesis that the Region and Corps Headquarters should be advisors and not the generators of reports and "busy work." As the region elements have gotten smaller, less "busy work" has been developed and more advisory effort has been accomplished.

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:

a. Territorial Security
b. Local Administration
c. Land-to-the-Tiller.

11. The most effective para military forces are:

a. PRU
b. NPFF
c. APT.

12. The most successful pacification programs are:

a. Territorial Security
b. Land-to-the-Tiller
c. Local Administration.
13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:
   a. Territorial Security
   b. Land-to-the-Tiller
   c. Public Works.

14. The least successful pacification programs are:
   a. People's Information
   b. Labor
   c. Youth Affairs.

15. The programs that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:
   a. Youth Affairs
   b. Brighter Life for War Victims
   c. Greater National Unity.

16. The rural people (are) (are not) aware of the pacification effort the GVN and US are making. If not, how can they be informed?

   Based on surveys I have read and personal observations, I believe the rural people are aware to a limited degree of the pacification efforts being made by the GVN and US. The extent to which one is able to ascertain their true feelings depends upon the level of security in a particular locale and the degree of literacy. I do not believe the People's Information Program and PSYOPS are being exploited to its fullest to increase awareness by the people of government support being rendered to them. As could be expected, they know more about programs that affect them individually, Land-to-the-Tiller, than those that are beneficial to the community, Village Self-Development.

17. The people, as you know them, are (more) (less) committed to the GVN than when you assumed your job. Why?

   With the present NVA offensive, it is difficult to determine if the people are more or less committed to the GVN than when I assumed my job. My feelings on this is that whoever, NVA or GVN, is in control, this is whom the people will follow. The GVN has done a poor job selling themselves to the little man and may well pay dearly for their sin.
18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and growth of Vietnam? (Yes) (No) If no what change in the plan should be made.

The 1972 and 1972 - 1975 CDMLO Plans are both excellent and represent a considerable improvement over the past plans. I consider the national level pacification plan to be sufficiently detailed for that level of government. Whether or not it will result in the security and development of Vietnam will depend on whether the present NVA offensive is defeated and the plan is implemented with a sense of urgency at all levels of government.

19. Do you feel the pacification was adequately communicated and explained to you and your counterpart? (Yes) (No) If not, how can this be accomplished.

I would say yes on this question with no further elaboration.
SECTION III

(c) RF/PF:

a. OB elimination: The OB elimination program, designed to mobilize RF companies, get PSDF out of static locations and employ PF where static defense is necessary began 1 April 1972 with 363 OBs. Since then, 52 have been eliminated, leaving 311. The current province goal is to have only PF in OBs with not more than one OB for each PF platoon. Based on the current PF platoon forecast, this will mean 271 platoons and 271 OBs.

b. RF Company mobilization: The 1971 and 1972 CDL&D goal is to cast 100% of RF companies in mobile roles. As of 31 May 1972, only 18 of 36 companies were mobile. This is expected to improve as the OB elimination program progresses.

c. A 1971 CDL&D goal carried over to 1972 is to eliminate enemy local force and guerrilla units. The My-Hoa-Van Campaign, Rung Tram Forest operation and cross border operation into Bac Lieu are examples of the increasing offensive spirit of operations.

d. RF/PF Training: Training for RF and PF has been and will probably continue to be a major weakness. The Province Mobile Training Team (PMTT) goal for training in 1971 was 3 RF companies and 45 PF platoons of which 1 RF company and 4 PF platoons were actually trained. The 1972 goal is 4 RF companies and 64 PF platoons. These figures absorb the 1971 goals, but as yet no training has been conducted. Two PF platoons of the 15 formed in 1971 have not received their initial training. Stationed in Hoa Tu, these platoons are considered nondeployable. Since allocations for this training have been suspended, it appears that it will be quite some time before the training is conducted. Individual training has made a poor showing. Figures below are cumulative for the period 27 September 1971 through 8 May 1972:

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<th>TYPE OF COURSE</th>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>PF Leadership</td>
<td>274</td>
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e. RF Operations: RF units are to be targeted on VC province mobile and local level units with emphasis on reconnaissance and intelligence, swift attacks and devastating ambushes. During the past year, improvement in this area has been slow but steady. Lack of communications security was responsible
for the loss of surprise on many operations, but communications security has improved, and operations results have improved. Physical security still needs much improvement. Security at night and march route security are sadly lacking as evidenced by the enemy results against the 403rd and 422nd RF Battalions and ambushes of several separate RF companies.

f. Artillery: REARM 4 was initiated in June 1971 with an authorization of three 155mm howitzer platoons and six 105mm howitzer platoons. Currently there are one 155mm and seven 105mm howitzer platoons in province. Ammunition expenditures have been a problem since the artillery persisted in exceeding the authorized ASR. While the expenditure rate has dropped, the ASR is still being exceeded. Training has progressed well, and forward observer classes are being conducted.

(c) PSDF:

a. PSDF Strength: With a goal of 460 organized KITS, the province has achieved over 100% with 482 organized, and 17,820 weapons issued. Support PSDF are 2730 short of the goal of 83,973 and hardcore combat PSDF are 3080 short of the goal of 24,495. The increase of the draft eligibility age to 43 is expected to reduce the attained figures.

b. PSDF Operations: PSDF have the mission of supporting the National Police and local territorial forces and to gradually assume the responsibilities of PF for the internal security and defense of hamlets. One major PSDF problem area—that of employing the PSDF out of their own hamlets, villages and even districts—appears to have been corrected.

c. PSDF Security: A major problem of the PSDF is their lack of security. Many PSDF members have been abducted, ambushed or otherwise taken by surprise. The key to the solution of this problem is discipline, and until PSDF members conduct patrols and take other security measures instead of sleeping or playing cards on duty, the carnage will continue.

Field Branch Police:

The province has made significant inroads in the development and employment of these forces. The province has an FBP platoon in each of its eight districts. Although some difficulty has been encountered in the employment of these forces, in recent months they are being employed more within concept. The province is beginning to use FBP forces against specifically targeted individuals because of the improved Phung Hoang Program.

National Police Operations:

Ba Xuyen has made material advances in this area also, with police presence in all 52 villages — although not in the numbers desired, particularly at lower levels. In general, police presence is being felt throughout the province with efforts now being exerted not only to recruit, but to improve the quality of personnel and to emphasize police influence in hamlets at night. I believe that placing Phung Hoang under police control was a very wise idea.
Village Self Development:

All but one of the 251 approved category I and II projects for 1971 have been completed. The one outstanding project is a school classroom at Phuoc Minh Hamlet, My Phuoc Village, Thu Duc District, which ran into problems with the alleged death of the contractor. The security situation is interfering with completion of the project now.

1972 VSD projects have been hampered by the postponement of the spring village assemblies. These village assemblies will be held this month and should begin implementation soon. The RD Cadre are in charge of VSD this year and should aid in even better success of the program.

RD Cadre:

The 10-man teams have been dissolved. Now the village control groups vary in size according to village population, but they average five men per village. In the past year, the RD Cadre held Karate training courses, helped in tax collection and VSD accounting procedures in villages, and trained PSDF militarily. Fifty-six cadremen taught in remote and/or insecure hamlets. Further, RDG used tractors for land clearance in Dai Hai, and obtained a census of refugees and war victims. Seventy cadremen have been detached to work for the Land Reform Service in surveying future distribution areas. The RD Cadre attended several training courses and gave many training courses for cadremen and villagers. Nine cadremen received special VSD-GDA training in preparation for taking over the VSD program this year.

Ethnic Minorities:

The local Cambodian community supported President Thieu's re-election in return for consideration of their problems. One Cambodian, Son Thi, was elected to the Lower House and is active in meeting his constituents and representing them. Thach Piexh keeps the community together through his position as head monk. They have met with the Province Chief over the recent draft situation and seem reassured at this time. Problems of education and economic benefits should improve this coming year.

Local Government:

Local government has improved somewhat over the past year but much remains to be done. Better qualified candidates must be found to run for office, and officials must be trained at all levels. If the province follows the 1972-1975 CDELD plan, there should be better local government to serve the interest of the people.

Aid in Kind:

Several hundred thousand plasters were provided to buy typewriters, school furniture and equipment, books, supplies, and other materials to help schools, youth, and other facilities.
The shortfalls left by the former Social Welfare Service (SWS) Chief are beginning to be met by the present incumbent through special authorizations. Payments are being made to people waiting since last June. Newly generated war victims are being paid promptly.

Social Welfare:

The Social Welfare Service suffered last year through the corruption of the former SWS Chief. The service chief has been moving cautiously to avoid compounding errors from the previous incumbent. He is extremely honest and willing to work long and hard.

Benefits are being paid as authorization comes from the Ministry of Social Welfare. The SWS operates a low-cost restaurant, day care center, and many other programs.

Chieu Hoi:

Significant gains have been made in several areas of the Chieu Hoi program. An effective program of Hoi Chanh follow-up has been implemented, particularly in the last six months. The Cultural/Drama Team has also improved both its performance and appeal. Current and continued inspections of the district Chieu Hoi centers has improved the facilities at all eight districts. Help in finding employment for released Hoi Chanh through both Vietnamese and advisor channels has also helped to enhance the program.

Perhaps the most significant shortcoming in the Chieu Hoi program is the effective use of the Armed Propaganda Team. This team is divided equally among the eight districts and falls directly under the control of the respective district chief. Ideally, orders are issued by the district chief giving specific target areas to be visited by the APTs. In actuality, these teams are being used for everything from drivers to home guard. Continued pressure from the Province Chieu Hoi Chief and his advisors has not eliminated the problem in all cases.

Report Requirements:

Report requirements are generally realistic and understandable. Concerted efforts should be continued to reduce requirements to a minimum and to avoid unnecessary duplication. Further, more effort should be taken by higher headquarters to obtain available information from within house resources rather than requiring another report.

Report Feedback:

Report feedback is adequate, but much was received too late to be of good use.
Phung Hoang:

The personnel in the Phung Hoang program are extremely well versed in the techniques of intelligence record keeping, card filing and dossier maintenance. These techniques are valuable tools for the intelligence officer to use in his work; unfortunately, the information contained in these files is not always utilized. The Phung Hoang cadre do not make pattern analyses, target folders, or utilize the files for other specific targeting techniques. Thus, any benefit gained by good record keeping is lost by not utilizing the files.

From May until December 1971, VCI neutralizations were very high. Because of the drawdown of American air assets, the disbandment of the Phung Hoang Platoon and stricter sentencing criteria, neutralizations in 1972 have been lower.

For the most part, the Phung Hoang sections at the districts are also good record keepers. With a few exceptions, they do not use specific targeting techniques for neutralization. Their VCI neutralizations are usually random captures on tactical operations and night ambushes. Most of the district level neutralizations are low level cadre from easily accessible areas. The districts usually lack the capabilities to get into areas, in sufficient force, to neutralize high level VCI on a random basis. If they used specific targeting techniques and planned operations for when a high level VCI is in an accessible area, they would have much better success.

The transition at Province to the National Police Headquarters was accomplished very smoothly and professionally. The transition at district level is also going smoothly. I think the incorporation of the Phung Hoang effort into the overall National Police mission will be extremely profitable in Ba Xuyen Province.

As an overall statement, I would say that the Phung Hoang Program has made a gradual improvement over the past months. It has had ups and downs in neutralization results, and has had high and low periods of operational activity. I think that the program is destined to become more and more effective as the caliber of personnel is improved and the current command interest at the national and regional levels is maintained.

Public Health:

The Public Health Service continues to have problems in the area of city sanitation through lack of enough trained personnel and contract problems. Sanitary hamlets have been built according to schedule. The maternity/dispensary construction program is progressing, but there continues to be a problem of trained personnel (midwives, technicians, etc.). The same is true of the province hospital and its staff shortages.

III-5

12
Education:

The education service continues to build more schools and recruit teachers. However, qualified teachers for remote insecure areas are hard to find. The new Normal School will be able to graduate more teachers to fill these gaps. In the meantime, the service uses RD cadresmen to help teach in remote areas.

Public Works:

The Public Service needs to be more dynamic and oversee construction projects more thoroughly. Again, red tape causes delays which make projects late and/or more costly. This past year, delays were most noticeable on ARVN engineering projects.

Economic Development:

Economically the province has progressed in production of rice, vegetables and fruit. Last year the province exported 100,774 tons of rice; 2,120 tons of vegetables; 1,870 tons of fruit. It imported 14,635 tons of fertilizer and 1,130 tons of insecticide. Total rice production was 386,200 metric tons (average yield of 5 tons per hectare). At this time there are 58 large and 29 small rice-mills and 245 tractors. Canals, dams, and irrigation projects have been built to help improve production. The new Ngan Ho Dam alone will boost production in areas previously affected by salt water intrusion.

Land Reform:

Of the 90,000 hectares available for distribution under the Land-to-the-Tiller (LTTT) law, 52,309 hectares have been approved for 30,086 applicants. Province Land Affairs Service (PLAS) has received 1610 checks totaling 1,977,708,896 VN in compensation for 9,998 hectares, of which 951 checks totaling 1,410,341,870 VN for 6,607 hectares have been distributed. PLAS has also distributed 26,272 titles for 4,504 hectares of the 25,919 titles for 46,703 hectares received from Directorate General of Land Affairs (DLA) by 1 June 1972. Under the LTTT law, 47,133 hectares were distributed from 26 March 1970 to 28 February 1972 and 5,176 hectares in Phase I (1 March - 31 August 1972). The 1972 goal is to distribute the remaining LTTT land and the village controlled communal land. Land Reform has been one of the most successful programs in the province.

Domestic Production:

The province continues to be the leading rice producer in Vietnam. Improvement has been noted in mechanization, fertilizer application and increased areas of cultivation. The domestic production of cattle (250), hogs (2,573), buffalo (1,150), chickens (83,500), and ducks (83,500) has risen steadily in 1971-1972.
Labor:

The labor service has been one of the least active services in the province. Even in the four-year plan, it has only a modest program of training and monitoring the interests of labor unions and Vietnamese employees. It has no job placement program planned.

Youth Affairs:

Ba Xuyen has had a very active youth program primarily due to the service chief's enthusiasm and energetic approach to the program. Soc Trang has been the site of regional volleyball, tennis and basketball contests, all of which have been highly successful and have contributed materially to the furtherance of youth interprovincial aims. Future plans envision the formation of youth councils, youth groups, and sports and gymnastics associations, as well as construction and improvement of sports facilities at the province and district levels. However, the majority of the benefits of the youth program are reaped by those youths located in large urban areas.

Public Administration:

Last year some officials were to have been trained at Vung Tau, but only 209 were actually trained. In-province June 1971 - June 1972 training also fell short of projected goals: 813 actual out of a 2495-goal. The province plan to eliminate hamlet chief elections may not go through although the province sees it as a way to upgrade the quality of public administration at all levels.

PSYOPS:

The POLWAR company and VIS have progressed greatly in the field of Psychological Operations. The formation of Province Mobile Information Teams incorporated both agencies and enhanced the PSYOPS effort in rural areas. The POLWAR company has increased its activities in regards to OB visits and face-to-face communications with the soldier. The POLWAR Culture/Drama Team has also become an extremely effective device. VIS has continued to support Phung Hoang throughout the year, and in addition to this, they have handled all special projects; i.e., elections, narcotics, etc. More recently, both agencies have continued keeping the residents of Ba Xuyen informed on the present enemy offensive, to include the collecting of contributions for refugees and soldiers in the north.

The VIS Chief himself has been an undermining factor in the accomplishment of the PSYOPS mission. He is an extremely difficult man from whom to obtain cooperation. This has caused a lack of coordination between agencies, and the overall program has suffered. A general fault of the PSYOPS effort in Ba Xuyen is the failure of all agencies involved to be responsive. Numerous times, a potentially good theme has been missed due to the time lag involved in processing the necessary ingredients to begin an effective program.
Other Areas:

a. I would like to call this the "one-pot concept." Funding, supplies, material, housing, etc., should all come from one source with no differentiation between civilians and the military. The one major stumbling block to a one-team concept has been the "two-pot system" between the military and civilian sides of the house. If all things were equal, a great deal of duplication could be eliminated.

b. See Section II Question 9.
UNCLASSIFIED

Senior Officer Debriefing Report (LTC James J. Turner) - Deputy Province Senior Advisor, Ba Xuyem, MR 4 - Inclusive Dates 4 Jan 71 - 18 Jul 72

LTC James J. Turner

20 November 1972

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N/A

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DD, DAFD, Washington, D.C. 20310