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DAAG-PAP-A (M) (24 Nov 72) DAFD-OTT 6 December 1972
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Brigadier General Paul M. Timmerberg, Commander, 18th MP Brigade and Provost Marshal, Vietnam, 15 Jun 71 - 30 May 72

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Debriefing Report by: Brigadier General Paul M. Timmerberg

Duty Assignment: Commanding General, 18th Military Police Brigade and Provost Marshal, United States Army, Vietnam

Inclusive Dates: 15 June 1971 to 30 May 1972

Date of Report: 30 May 1972

1. Introduction. This report will seek to address only significant matters pertaining to the conduct of Military Police/Provost Marshal operations in a counterinsurgency environment with specific observations and recommendations which have not been contained in previous reports, unless such reiteration is deemed appropriate. Although the inclusive dates of the report apply to the tour of duty in the positions listed, comments will also be made concerning experiences from previous tours as Provost Marshal, 1st Infantry Division from August 1967 to August 1968 and as Commanding Officer, 89th Military Police Group from July 1970 to May 1971. From an overall perspective it is my opinion that military police/provost marshal doctrine for the support of counterinsurgency operations is sound. Further, the conclusion has been drawn that the service and support were provided with a generally high level of efficiency and responsiveness. This is not to say that improvements are unnecessary or that problems were minimal. The report will emphasize problem areas and recommendations for correction and/or further study; however, an attempt will be made to record favorable comment beyond the above general assessment.
2. Command Relationships. The designation of the 18th Military Police Brigade as a major command of USARV (a field army) was in keeping with Army doctrine. A centralized command over virtually all military police elements in-country except those assigned to tactical units (separate brigades, divisions, corps-field forces) was absolutely essential during the period that U.S. forces were conducting extensive operations on the ground. This permitted the Army Component Commander (DCG, USARV) to exercise the requisite direct influence over the employment of military police resources in a relatively fluid situation. It facilitated flexibility and unity of effort, and, precluded the uneconomical utilization which could have resulted if these resources had been assigned or attached directly to other commands. Moreover, the capability to adjust priorities in accordance with the changing conditions and to establish standards for uniformity was increased under this relationship. Under the Area Coordination concept, military police were placed in "direct support" of zone, sub-zone, and installation coordinators for combat service support functions and "in support" of Major Commands for combat support functions. This method of employment provided adequate response to the satisfaction of most commanders. However, some commanders held the position that they required "command" or "operational control" over military police units for accomplishment of their mission. Although this viewpoint is understandable and perennial, it was not considered advisable to do so at any time during the period of direct U.S. Army participation in the Vietnam conflict and during the preponderance of the drawdown. However, at some point in time when the U.S. Army activity in a counterinsurgency operation has been reduced to a minor role and when the location of Army units has been stabilized into a few, small areas, the Area Command doctrine should become applicable. In this event, most if not all military police units would be assigned or attached to area commanders for performing largely combat service support tasks. Whether that point has now been reached in Vietnam is uncertain but probable. Under the described conditions, if area commanders are given full responsibility for maintaining discipline, for safeguarding property, and for controlling the movement of personnel they should be given control over provost marshals and military police units. In addition to the doctrinal point, the axiom that a commander who is assigned a responsibility is provided the necessary resources to accomplish same would appear relevant in support of changing the relationship. Only the Army Commander, after applying his professional judgment and considering all factors, can make or should make this decision on the ground. The provost marshal - military police commander must endeavor
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to be objective and avoid any self-interest or parochialism in presenting recommendations on the subject.

The normal employment of military police forces in an active counter-insurgency situation involving substantial U.S. ground involvement should remain one of centralized control. This control should be carried out by an appropriate command and control headquarters immediately subordinate to the Army component headquarters. It is only through this relationship that best results can be achieved.

3. Experiences in Command.

a. Concept of operation. The provision of military police support on a geographic and area basis in accordance with doctrine has proved to be effective. Each group, battalion, company, and detachment has been assigned a defined area for the conduct of military police operations. Thus, each particular element has been responsible for direct support to all Army organizations within their area in addition to general coverage of geographic areas such as cities, roadnets, and recreational sites. This concept should be adhered to in any future counterinsurgency.

b. Command and control. A conventional chain of command has been used for command and control of military police units. One feature unique in Vietnam has been the assignment of a TOE 19-500 Provost Marshal Detachment to each battalion. These elements have operated local provost marshal offices and supervised the various military police stations while under the control of battalion commanders who have worn an additional hat as area provost marshals. This relationship has eased the reconciliation of priorities between command matters and operational commitments, which have traditionally posed conflicts. Normally, military police troops are placed under the operational control of a provost marshal for duty and there is constant competition in the determination for allocating available assets to various tasks. When the battalion commander is also an area provost marshal and the local provost marshals are responsible to him as well, a proper balance is more readily achieved. The two-hat designation was also maintained at group and brigade level with one group commander being Provost Marshal MR I & II, and the other being Provost Marshal MR III & IV, while the Brigade Commander served also as Provost Marshal, USARV. Therefore,
the interest and attention of all commanders involved the full spectrum of activities and included those day to day police operations which military police commanders in USAEUR, for example, are not personally concerned with. The end result was a strengthened chain of command and a greater unity of effort which enhanced effectiveness. The two-hat approach should be considered for adoption as Army doctrine, particularly in counterinsurgency operations. The importance of helicopter transportation being available to commanders for command and control, has been commented on previously. There were only two dedicated CH 58 aircraft for the 10th Military Police Brigade. Most group and battalion commanders had to rely upon informal arrangements with local aviation units to obtain support and, in many cases, the results were not totally acceptable. It is strongly proposed that the yardstick of one dedicated helicopter per military police battalion for normal use be incorporated into planning factors on the number of helicopters in a theater of operations. This support is indispensable to command and control in view of the habitual dispersion and location of military police units at widely separated locations. However, the aircraft should be assigned to and maintained by aviation units rather than organically within the military police structure, as has been suggested by several former commanders.

c. Techniques of employment. The most significant and pervasive aspect of military police employment in Vietnam has been the necessity of conducting combined operations. Normal unilateral patrols, posts, check points, and stations have been established and maintained along conventional lines. However, for best results (with few exceptions), the situation has demanded that there be an integration of this effort with the GVN National Police (NP), ARVMAF Military Police (CC), and the military police of the Free World Military Assistance Forces (FMMAF). Previous commanders and I have attempted to institute agreements with our counterparts to regularize combined operations. Moreover, we have encouraged cooperation and liaison at all local levels to maintain mutually agreeable combined activities. Yet, the result over the past several years has been somewhat less than optimum. In most cases the effectiveness of combined operations has relied too much on the goodwill and personal relationship maintained at each level between the U.S. Army provost marshal and his counterpart. By virtue of the personnel changes that occurred frequently within these parallel systems, there was continuous fluctuation in the level of cooperation.
Obviously, part of the problem was a shortage of personnel and equipment within the NP and QC, which precluded or reduced their participation in many instances. Legitimate differences in their judgment of priorities for employment also accounted for failure to support a given activity. Nevertheless, the principal limiting factor, in my opinion, was that no formal GVN-US agreement existed for police operations in South Vietnam. An agreement was written involving the Director General of the National Police, the Provost Marshal General of ARVNAP, and the Brigade Commander 18th Military Police Brigade. However, this document was never considered binding by the parties concerned and although it facilitated the planning and conduct of combined operations, the arrangement was lacking in impact due to its nature. Concerted efforts to operate within the framework of this agreement produced many favorable and highly effective results to the mutual benefit of both the GVN and US. Furthermore, continuous attempts were made to expand and increase combined activities which achieved positive gains, and perhaps the resultant improvements in the situation over the years is all that could reasonably be expected. However, it is recommended that, in the future, whenever US forces are to be involved in an overseas area, a formal agreement be adopted. The matter should be negotiated at a high level and specify police arrangements for combined operations. If a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is in existence with the country concerned, the police arrangement could become a part of it. On the other hand, where there is no SOFA, such as is the case in South Vietnam, a comprehensive police arrangement should be promulgated. The existing Pentalateral Agreement between the GVN and the USG provides adequately for resolving matters of civil and criminal jurisdiction, but does not sufficiently cover police guidelines. An agreement which is adhered to by the parties should minimize a myriad of operational conflicts that arise. Additionally, police action could be effected with greater efficiency in all areas where American and Vietnamese personnel have contact and incidents will likely occur.

d. Operations.

(1) Traffic control, a major military police function, involves the routine operation of patrols and checkpoints to enforce traffic regulations over US vehicle operators and pedestrians for proper
flow with safety. On U.S. installations and in U.S. controlled areas this control was exercised over all traffic. Another important element of this function was the provision of escorts to convoy movement for security and safety. These tasks have been traditionally performed with 1/4 ton tactical vehicles. It was learned quickly in Vietnam that the 1/4 ton truck did not satisfy the requirement. For many areas it lacked adequate protection for personnel and limited fire power capability beyond individual weapons of the passengers. Fortunately, an armored car of commercial design was available and could be obtained and issued to military police units. However, this vehicle, the XM 706 (V-100), was not available in sufficient quantities until 1969 because of time lag in procurement, production and shipment. Moreover, there was no maintenance and spare part system in being because of the fact that the XM 706 was not adopted as a standard item. The maintenance back-up has never been fully provided. Employment of the XM 706 in Vietnam and the lessons learned have been well documented in other reports. Suffice to say it meets most all requirements and should be declared a standard item and placed in appropriate TOE. On-going and continuous study must be devoted to the organic availability of an armored car for military police units to preclude a similar occurrence in any future counterinsurgency operation. Moreover, the vehicle has uses in other environments and for other functions, i.e. civil disturbance, physical security, installation defense, police raids, and tactical operations.

Another significant weakness in the control of vehicular movement in Vietnam was the late establishment and early disestablishment of a regulatory agency for convoy movements. An effective countrywide program was not operational until 1967. Further, this system, which performed a valuable service for several years, was largely terminated in late 1970. Army doctrine outlines the specific aspects which were generally followed during the period of time 1967-1970. As a minimum there is a requirement for a highway traffic regulating headquarters or staff section at the top Army headquarters with regional centers geographically located throughout the area of operations. All units or commands desiring to conduct a convoy movement must obtain clearance through the regional center where command established priorities are followed. After full processing, the schedules are distributed to and coordinated with interested organizations and agencies. Thus, conflicts are reduced and the roadnet is more fully utilized in accordance with the best interests of operational and administrative operations.
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Furthermore, necessary support in the form of traffic control, security and reaction, aerial surveillance, and external fire support can be better planned and accomplished. In summary, when this system is not operational there is a serious potential for accidents, congestions, delays, ambushes, and detours. The early establishment of a Highway Traffic Headquarters with regional centers is indispensable to efficient operations in a theater and the system should remain in existence until a low level of use clearly justifies its termination.

Traffic operations in Vietnam have been reported on comprehensively in other reports. The record reflects that massive quantities of personnel, supplies and equipment were enabled to move efficiently and expeditiously. Accident rates were low in those instances of movement by convoy, but were less favorable in those cases of vehicles moving individually. Except as noted above, the military police performance of their traffic control function was generally in conformance with doctrine and established techniques and methods.

(2) Physical security is another principal function of the military police. The term denotes those measures taken to protect supplies and equipment in transit and in storage from loss, damage, or destruction. In addition to command and supervisory actions, military police are charged with providing patrols, guards, sentry dogs and recommending security safeguards such as fences, walls, lights, locks and unit/activity guards. Although basic doctrine has been followed, the effectiveness of the program in Vietnam must be evaluated as lacking from a provost marshal standpoint. There are numerous reasons; however, the primary factor was the inability and/or unwillingness of commanders to allocate adequate resources for necessary safeguards in terms of manpower and materials. Of course, most commanders were faced with conflicting demands and limited assets which prevented them from taking desirable actions because of higher priority mission needs. Likewise, most provost marshals have relegated physical security to a lower priority than was dictated by the circumstances in my opinion. Appropriate recognition for this vital area should be expanded at all levels throughout the Army through the provision of expert advice and information to commanders by provost marshals using all available methods. This has not been done satisfactorily in Vietnam. Commanders must be made more fully aware of the costs, risks, and courses of action connected with the protection of property. It has been my experience that when they are properly informed their reaction is positive and the
results are favorable, although a degree of realism must be maintained. Provost Marshals should not expect a disproportionate or unrealistic expenditure of resources. Training literature and school curricula must give greater emphasis to the physical security role of military police. Members of the Military Police Corps are simply not as well-trained and qualified in this area as they should be. I consider this to be the only weak area in the training field.

Another element of the problem is that the force structure in Vietnam did not provide sufficient TOE Military Police Physical Security Companies for security of sensitive and critical facilities and installations as reflected in doctrine. An alternative was to organize modified infantry units for security duty which were assigned to military police battalions. However, these units were introduced late and removed early, which does not correspond to the situation. Experience has shown that the greatest difficulty in safeguarding property occurs during the build-up and drawdown phases. Moreover, while these infantry units performed creditably, it would have been preferable to use military police units which are organized, trained, and equipped to execute the required tasks. Finally, the configuration of military police support in a theater of operations needs to be studied carefully to determine the adequacy of military police physical security units. In my view the number specified would have been short even if doctrine had been followed.

The accountability procedures of our logistical system seriously compounded the task of conducting investigations and affecting recoveries of lost and stolen property. There is no centralized record to identify even vehicles, weapons and other serial-numbered items. The only means of tracing these items is through unit property books and the incomplete reports of losses submitted by units. It is absolutely imperative that the system be modified to establish a centralized record of the issuance and turn-in of vehicles, weapons, and most high value serial-numbered items in order to have any reasonable expectation of accomplishing preventive and corrective action. This is not only essential in determining loss, but in identifying ownership and in taking follow-up action during recovery and disposition.

An additional handicap in safeguarding property is the fact that tactical vehicles are not equipped with any method of securing them. The
routine technique of affixing a lock and chain to the steering mechanism has proved to be virtually useless. A thief or individual attempting misappropriation can cut the chain or lock quicker than a person with the key can unlock it. Security of tactical vehicles has been a problem for years and must be solved. A collar type device which is simple and inexpensive was provided in limited numbers to USARV during the past year for testing. The results have been most favorable. A priority action should be taken to obtain this device or a similar one for immediate issue to secure all vehicles currently on-hand. It is also recommended that material requirements be adopted which provide for the design and installation of an appropriate mechanism on all vehicles during manufacture. I am convinced these actions will be cost-effective and will have immediate impact.

The employment of sentry dogs in physical security functions was highly successful and represents one of the most outstanding achievements of the military police in Vietnam. They were programmed into country during the initial phases and have been retained to the present. They have been efficient, economical, and effective in protecting property against theft and providing security against attack. They have also produced substantial savings in manpower. As a corollary to the sentry dog, recent tests have revealed that the patrol dog may have great capability for use in areas where activity and noise would render the sentry dog ineffective. Although I am not prepared to recommend substitution of the sentry dog with the patrol dog, the feasibility should be given further study. Perhaps some mix is the best solution. Each type dog has certain strengths which are best suited for performing various tasks and which may be mutually exclusive.

(3) Circulation control of individuals is another basic function of military police operations. Control is exercised through patrols, posts, and checkpoints. Activities conducted normally include the enforcement of identification, registration, and pass and leave regulations. In Vietnam there were monumental obstacles to accomplishment of this mission; however, under the circumstances, the task was performed with reasonably effective results.

The problems associated with exercising control over the multitude of local nationals who were permitted entry onto US installations have been discussed at length in other reports. Imaginative and innovative techniques were employed to achieve good controls. There is one point, however, which continually posed a problem and that was the inability
of local national female security guards to remain free from temptation and intimidation. A number of actions were taken to minimize the adverse results. Attempts were made to carefully screen female security guards before employment. In many instances, they were permitted to live on the installations where they worked and were rotated frequently to reduce the opportunity for collusion. Military police supervisors attempted to maintain close observation over their activities, yet, the constraints resulting from the necessity for adherence to standards of dignity and privacy precluded proper supervision. Considerable effort was expended to obtain US female personnel for performance of the supervisory task, but neither WAC personnel nor Department of the Army civilians were ever authorized. The most desirable option for a solution would be to assign trained WAC personnel who would have the same authority as military police. Such a course would also permit their employment in other roles involving the handling of female personnel. An alternative would be the detail of WAC personnel to special duty with provost marshal offices based upon the needs. On-the-job training could assure they possessed reasonable proficiency. The least feasible solution would be to establish an appropriate job description and authorization for employing Department of the Army civilians. It is my judgment, however, that a question of necessary authority and jurisdiction would exist in the use of civilians. At least their utilization would be somewhat more restrictive than the WAC. It is strongly recommended that these proposals be considered by applicable agencies. The fact that civilian police departments have found it increasingly advantageous to have policewomen on their forces would tend further to prove the validity of adoption. Military police have been hampered for years in their ability to deal with women. This shortcoming should be rectified immediately and particularly for overseas areas and specifically for counterinsurgency environments.

The tactical situation had considerable bearing on the extent of control exercised over U.S. military personnel movement and circulation. During the period when both combat actions and logistical support functions were conducted extensively it would not have been impractical to establish and enforce tight controls. Furthermore, such a policy could have been detrimental to the accomplishment of the mission. Notwithstanding this fact, it is my considered belief that more restrictive measures should have been applied. It was common practice for individuals to travel throughout the country as passengers in vehicles, aircraft, and vessels without any documentation of their authority to do so. Hitch-hiking became routine. Additionally, in many units a blanket,
long-term trip ticket was used for dispatch of vehicles. Some units authorized vehicles to be dispatched without any document. Consequently, it was extremely difficult and time-consuming to verify where any military member was authorized to be at a given time. As a result of this situation many soldiers took advantage of the laxness and travelled freely with serious consequences. Aside from the lack of good order and discipline as well as the resultant loss of duty performance, they frequently became involved in incidents and accidents which detracted from their mission and contributed to lower standards of conduct. A program was implemented throughout USARV in mid-1971 which proved instrumental in bringing about considerable improvement in the situation. Basically, all personnel were required to possess an installation identity card which specified their home base and permitted quick checks. In order to move from one installation to another a locally reproduced travel document was required unless the individual was a vehicle operator. For operators, a properly annotated trip ticket was necessary and they were not valid for more than 24 hours, except in unusual cases. These documents made it possible to determine readily if a soldier was in the proper location and had the approved authorization. Realistic enforcement of this program reduced the accident and incident rates and improved the conduct of troops. The lesson to be learned is that adequate controls must be established and maintained to preserve good order and discipline. Although exigencies of the situation in a combat zone should be considered, the measures to prevent abuses relative to the circulation and movement of individuals require, as a minimum, some system of documents that can be checked.

(4) Confinement of military prisoners involves the operation of a stockade or detention facility. Military police are tasked with the mission of administering the custody, control, and correctional treatment for individuals confined.

The single biggest problem in connection with the operation of the two stockades in country was that qualified and trained personnel were not available in sufficient quantity until early 1971. Until that time the bulk of personnel with MOS 95B were assigned to correctional duties because only a few men with MOS 95C qualifications were provided. The effect was a degree of inefficiency. With the establishment of an MOS 95C course at the Military Police School and the output from that training program, an immediately favorable result accrued. These correctional specialists were professionals who were motivated to perform their duty
and, with few exceptions, they demonstrated a high level of expertise. This training capability must be kept active for producing the required personnel who are trained properly in confinement work. The average military policeman does not perform well in a stockade environment.

Another problem in stockade operations was that the Department of the Army criteria for transfer of prisoners to USARPAC or CONUS facilities was too restrictive and required the confinement of personnel in USARV stockades for a longer period than was desirable. The prisoner population increased and problems were generated. Fortunately, requests in 1971 to USARPAC and DA for modifying the criteria were quickly approved and the relaxation of the criteria has enabled USARV to transfer sufficient numbers of prisoners to keep the population below an unacceptable level.

I strongly recommend that the doctrine of operating stockades in a theater of operations be reviewed and re-evaluated. It is my conviction that whenever and wherever possible the confinement of military personnel in active theaters should be avoided other than the temporary detention of personnel for 30 days or less. The practice is simply not productive and in fact has a debilitating impact. The costs in resources are also prohibitive without exception and the task can be accomplished far more efficiently in the CONUS or other areas removed from proximity to the war zone. This same recommendation has been made by my predecessors, but is repeated for emphasis. Consideration must be given to this matter.

(5) The investigation of crimes is another major function of military police. This task is essential to the maintenance of order and enforcement of laws and regulations and is performed by criminal investigators from cellular organizations prescribed in TOE 19-500.

Throughout the entire period of the US commitment in Vietnam there has been a contradictory policy which created severe difficulty. The policy is contained in Army doctrine and regulations; it stipulates that approved criminal investigators will conduct investigations of all offenses which call for a maximum punishment of over one year. However, staffing (force) levels and availability of qualified personnel have always been insufficient to satisfy the requirement. Consequently, additional personnel who are not thoroughly qualified, have been detailed to CID units on special duty from line military police units to aid in
accomplishing the workload. To the best of my knowledge this same situation has also existed everywhere in the Army for years without correction. The end result is that important, sensitive and even critical cases do not receive the attention they should and many routine cases are investigated by a higher level of expertise than required. In my view, a reasonable solution would be to raise the level of the type crimes that CID personnel investigate. The number of investigators available in the force structure could then be devoted solely to investigation of all really serious cases. Concurrently, a formal program of military police investigators, with lesser qualifications, although specially trained, should be established and supported in personnel strength ceilings to conduct investigations of less serious crimes, but encompassing more of the relatively minor offenses, i.e. larcenies up to $1,000, drug cases involving possession only, and auto theft. Thus, the investigative capability of CID agents would not be dissipated on minor cases and could be focused on major cases which demand their talents. The newly recognized military police investigators would be thoroughly competent to handle the type cases mentioned and the results should materially expedite the completion of the minor cases also. A bonus benefit of the above proposal would be a systematic and orderly progression in the MOS fields associated with criminal investigation, in that military police investigators could advance smoothly into CID and provide a better qualified and more experienced candidate. This would likewise enhance the incentive for military policeman as well as increase the number of personnel eligible for CID.

The US Army Criminal Investigation Command was recently organized as a major command of Department of the Army with command and control over all criminal investigation elements. Headquarters USARV requested and received approval to exercise operational control over all criminal investigation elements in Vietnam. This request was justified on the basis of the unusual turbulence and the exceptional climate of discipline in-country in addition to the fact that the area is an active theater of operations. It is strongly recommended that doctrine be established which would extend such operational control over criminal investigation units to the theater army commander in any theater involved in hostilities. Current doctrine provides for this relationship, but in view of the new configuration just mentioned it will be necessary to restate the position. Otherwise, the operational situation presented to the commander would be questionable and it is likely that the level of criminal investigative
support would be jeopardized by an unnecessarily complicated and cumbersome structure. The unusual demand in a combat zone, and particularly under conditions of stability operations dictate that the top army commander have authority to direct the efficient and responsive conduct of criminal investigations.

4. During 1966, in response to a need for the capability to provide close-in waterway security at U.S. controlled and operated ports, the 18th Military Police Brigade received the assignment of a Transportation Company. The unit was a TOE unit equipped with Patrol Boat River (PBR) craft and consisted of Transportation Corps personnel with appropriate MOS. The operational, administrative, and logistical activities of this unit have been thoroughly covered by previous reports. My purpose is not to criticize their performance or to refute the necessity of maintaining security at U.S. ports. The mission was essential. It was performed with reasonable effectiveness, however, the problems which developed were extreme. In my opinion, this unit should not have been assigned to the 18th Military Police Brigade. The military police commanders were not sufficiently knowledgeable to exercise command over the organization or to supervise any of the technical aspects involved in maintenance of the boats or in training of the crews. In the future, these units should be assigned to transportation commands and military police personnel should be detailed to augment the crews as required for execution of the security role for which they are specially trained. Transportation Corps commanders, in virtually all instances, had overall responsibility for port security and in fact operated certain craft in the same waters in connection with port operations. They would be in the best position to plan and control all security measures. Undoubtedly, these commanders and their staffs would be more familiar with the capabilities of the unit and the technical points stated. Although it is uncertain exactly why the military police assumed command of a transportation unit, it is probable that, as a result of exigencies at the time, a decision was made to get the job done with the shortest delay. The urgency of the situation prevailing cannot be questioned. However, in the future such a course should not be followed unless there is no recourse and appropriate action should be taken to assure the point is clearly covered in doctrine and at service schools. The mission was accomplished, but there were untold obstacles to overcome which need not have arisen.
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5. In conclusion, basic military police doctrine was proved to be sound with few exceptions. More emphasis must be given to making everyone aware of the details and in assuring that they are followed, particularly on the operating level. The basic and advanced courses produced well-trained officer personnel. However, there were numerous cases where the training literature was not published until after the build-up and, therefore, most officers were not fully acquainted with new doctrine which was adopted during 1964-1966. There was a time lag in getting the word out and in some instances senior officers had not been oriented. In other cases, senior officers were informed, but chose to disregard the doctrinal position in their plans. In my opinion, this is most ill-advised and the temptation should be consciously resisted. The lessons learned from the military police operations in Vietnam should be studied on a priority basis and where applicable new doctrine developed.

PAUL M. TIMMERBERG
Brigadier General, USA
Provost Marshal

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**Author:** BG Paul M. Timmerberg

**Date:** 20 November 1972

**Contract or Grant No.:** N/A

**Project No.:** N/A

**Distribution Statement:**

**Supplementary Notes:** N/A

**Sponsoring Military Activity:** DA, DAFD, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Abstract:**

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