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IN REPLY REFER TO
DAAG-PAP-A (M) (26 Apr 72) DAFD-OTT


SEE DISTRIBUTION

Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

4. As Section 1 of subject reports are not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program, they have been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

2 Incl
1. DAFD-OTT 712044
2. DAFD-OTT 712101

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CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 720th Military Police Battalion

Period Ending 31 October 1971, NCS C3FCR-65 (B3) (U)

2. (C) Lessons Learned, Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel:

(1) Assignment of officers and key NCO's:

(a) Observation: No or little advance information concerning officer and NCO assignments to the battalion is received.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of projections concerning officer and key NCO replacements preclude effective personnel management and intelligent assignment within the battalion.

(c) Recommendation: That field grade officers, captains and senior NCO assignment forecasts be provided to battalion a minimum of 60 days prior to the individual's arrival.

(d) Command Action: Requests for advanced notification and projection of incoming personnel have been made to higher headquarters. This was reported as a problem area prior to the battalion Annual General Inspection, and mentioned in the previous CRLL.

(2) Lack of Mechanics:

(a) Observation: The battalion is not authorized sufficient track and wheeled vehicle mechanics for adequate maintenance due to the twelve (12) AFC's on DAFD-OTT 712044

Incl 1

CONFIDENTIAL
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AVGCR-HC

SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 720th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RSS CSFOR-65 (A) (U)

hand for contingency missions and convoy escorts and the eighty (80) non-organic wheeled vehicles supported on the battalion for maintenance.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of trained mechanics results in a reduced level of maintenance as well as the need to divert other MOS personnel, primarily military policemen, for duty as mechanics.

(c) Recommendations: That an adequate number of mechanics be provided.

(d) Command Action:

1. Additional 61B MOS personnel have been requested from higher headquarters.

2. A request for additional local national spaces which included mechanics was submitted.

3. Requirement for Dog Handlers:

(a) Observation: The 212th HP Co (Sentry Dog) is currently short thirty (30) dog handlers (MOS 95E20) and this situation is expected to get worse during the next ninety (90) days.

(b) Evaluation: Based on known losses and projected gains the shortage of dog handlers will become critical in the near future.

(c) Recommendation: Additional dog handlers be provided.

(d) Command Action:

1. Several military policemen are currently undergoing dog handler training.

2. Volunteers are being sought to undergo dog handler training.

3. Higher headquarters has been requested to determine the availability of scout dog handlers from units standing down who may be suitable for retraining as sentry dog handlers.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) Patrol Dogs:

(a) Observation: Patrol dogs are used to support military police operations at Phu Lea, Long Binh, and Vung Tau.
(b) Evaluation: The use of patrol dogs has been highly effective. The patrol dog can be used for all sentry dog functions and in addition can be used in situations where there are vehicular or personnel distractions. They are extremely useful in building searches, crowd and disorder control, and as a deterrent effect when their presence is known.

(c) Recommendation: That sentry dog training be discontinued and that all newly procured dogs be trained as patrol dogs. Additionally, a program to retrain sentry dogs as patrol dogs be initiated.

(d) Command Action: N/A

(2) V-100 Command Cars:

(c) Observation: The V-100's have been the workhorse in our convoy escort operations and proven their value.

(b) Evaluation: These vehicles are regularly used for convoy operations and for traffic accident assistance in hostile areas and at night. The crew's confidence in these vehicles and their ability to perform their missions effectively.

We recently received three 40 mm grenade launchers (M-162) which were mounted on V-100's. They have been successfully tested and fired, but we have not yet had the opportunity to use them against an enemy force. This weapon should allow effective suppressing large fires and enhance a convoy's extraction from the kill zone during an ambush.

(c) Recommendation: That the V-100 be adopted as a standard item of equipment.

(d) Command Action: N/A

d. Organization: None
e. Training: None
f. Logistics: None
g. Communications:

(1) Inadequate communications equipment maintenance support.

(a) Observation: Radios remain on deadliner an excessive period of time.

(b) Evaluation: Radios, particularly AN/VRC 46's and 47's, are not promptly repaired and returned to the using unit by support maintenance units. Many radios have been at a DS unit for periods over 60–90 days and few replacements have been available.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBC-nc

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 720th Military Police Battalion
Period Ending: 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

20 November 1971

(c) Recommendation: That maintenance and logistical procedures be
developed which will allow prompt repair and return of communications equipment
to the using unit. An adequate maintenance float would be helpful.

(d) Command Action: Continued coordination with the 91st CS BN.
Twenty (20) rebuilt radios were received on 28 October 1971, to replace radios
which had been turned in.

h. Material: None
i. Weather: None

ALBERT A. ACKERMAN

INF, INP

Commanding
AVBOE-C (20 Nov 71) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 720th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 89th Military Police Group, APO 96491 24 November 1971

TO: Commanding General, 18th Military Police Brigade, ATTN: AVBOE-C
APO 96491

1. In compliance with 18th MP Bde Suppl 1 to AR 525-15, subject report is forwarded.

2. Subject report has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

[Signature]
ROBERT W. CHILDS
LTC, MPC
Acting Commander
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 720th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade, APO 96491

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375
   Commanding Officer, 720th Military Police, APO 96491

1. Comments on Significant Activities: None.

2. Comments on Lessons Learned.

   a. Page 1, para 2a(1), Assignment of Officers and NCO's: Concur. Lack of advance notice concerning officer and NCO replacements does adversely affect the local personnel management program. However, under the present system, the final assignment for these personnel cannot be determined until the individuals arrival in RVN. Due to the present situation of rapid withdrawals and last minute diversions of replacement personnel, this problem is further magnified.

   b. Page 1, para 2a(2), Lack of Mechanics: Concur. An MTDA change, to include additional local rational spaces will be submitted by this headquarters.

   c. Page 2, para 2a(3), Requirement for Dog Handlers: Concur. An in country sentry dog training facility and program has been established which should alleviate the shortage.

   d. Page 2, para 2c(1), Patrol Dogs: Concur in part. The utilization of sentry dogs is a valuable program. There are many remote sites at which the aggressiveness of a sentry dog is desirable. It is recommended that the present military police working dog program be adjusted to allow a flexible mix of patrol dog(s) to be utilized in DE&O activities and in point and area security missions where sentry dogs are not effective.

   e. Page 3, para 2c(2), V-100 Commando Cars: Concur. This is in keeping with the numerous evaluations which have been completed and forwarded to higher headquarters since the arrival of the V-100 in this command. This vehicle has proven itself to be most effective in all aspects of police operations. This recommendation takes into consideration the mechanical problems of this vehicle which have been encountered and reported.

   f. Page 3, para 2g, Communications: Concur.

3. Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

1. (C) This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 720th Military Police Battalion and concurs with the exception of paragraph 2a(1), page 1. HQ USARV does not assign to Battalion sized units but rather to major subordinate commands. The policy of this command is to program field grade officers assignments 30 days prior to the officers arrival. However, during the periods of reduction that have taken place during the past months, this practice is not feasible. This office does not receive notification of officers available for reassignment prior to 20 days of the date the officer is eligible for reassignment. The 20 day advance notification is the maximum amount we receive; it is frequently less. The majority of officers available for assignment during the foreseeable future will continue to be officers from Keystone units and not newly arrived officers. At the present time, this office is not staffed, based on the number of officers in Vietnam, to program the assignment of company grade officers. It is envisioned that during the VAC time frame the recommendation will be programmed prior to their arrival. Key NCO's are not allocated in advance of arrival to a particular major command. During the period of large-scale ground combat in RVN, enlisted replacements were allocated to a major command at the time of arrival in order to provide the necessary flexibility to counter the impact of casualties, mission priority changes, and changing operational circumstances. During the current period of phased withdrawal, key NCO's must still be considered USARV-wide assets until actual arrival in order to insure replacements are provided where most urgently needed. The requested advance notification is recognized as highly desirable, but not possible under current operational environment in this combat zone.

2. (C) Additional comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Lack of Mechanics," paragraph 2a(2), page 1. Assignment of mechanics in excess of the number authorized is under the control of the CG, 18th MP Bde, who may allocate more mechanics to the 720th Bn than to his other elements if he desires. If he lacks sufficient authorization, action should be initiated thru the TAADS system to increase authorizations. Pending such changes, the CG, 18th MP Bde could request thru appropriate command channels for the assignment of additional mechanics as an exception to policy.
AVHDO-DO (20 Nov 71) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 720th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

b. Reference item concerning "Requirement for Dog Handlers," paragraph 2a(3), page 2. Close and continuous contact has been maintained with the 18th MP Bde over a period of time on this problem. Keystone dog handlers will be assigned whenever available. This problem is being solved to some extent by the in-country training program. HQ, USAFPV will continue to monitor dog handlers very closely and provide assistance to the 18th MP Brigade whenever possible.

c. Reference item concerning "Patrol Dogs," paragraph 2c(1), page 2. Concur with the recommendation contained in 2nd Indorsement, paragraph 2d. Coordination has been effected with DCSOPS Operations and Training Division War Dog Officer and representatives of the 18th Military Police Brigade regarding the transfer of excess war dogs to the 18th Military Police Brigade. As war dogs become excess to DCSOPS needs, they will be screened by 18th Military Police Brigade sentry dog personnel for suitability for training as patrol dogs. Those suited for training would be laterally transferred and undergo training to become patrol dogs under the auspices of the 18th Military Police Brigade. ARVN has expressed a desire through MACV J42 to acquire excess Military Police sentry dogs. According to MACV J42, ARVN was short 108 sentry dogs as of 20 January 1972. The transfer to ARVN of Military Police sentry dogs, made excess through the acquisition of war dogs, would not only minimize the sentry dog overhead in-country, but would satisfy the ARVN requirement as well.

d. Reference item concerning "V-100 Commando Cars," paragraph 2c(2), page 3. The V-100 Commando Car has been a valuable asset as a convoy escort and security vehicle. The vehicle is also currently listed in SB 700-20 as an XM 706 and is Classified as Limited Production-Urgent.

FOR THE COMMANDE:

D. A. DURAN

Chief, AGC

AG
GPOP-FD (20 Nov 71) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 720th
Military Police Battalion, Period Ending
31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 MAR 1972
TO: HQDA (DAFD-2A) WASH DC 20310
This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.
FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
M. L. H.
ILT, AG
Asst AG
2. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation and Recommendation:

   a. Personnel:

      (1) Observation: That 8th MP Group (CI) had no organic audit capability to ensure timely audit support during investigation of non-appropriated activities. Investigators had to rely on assistance from Army Auditing Agency (AAA) and Vietnam Open mess Association (VOMA)
for the necessary support and in most cases was not timely as to enhance the investigative processes.

(a) Evaluation: Lack of organic auditors has proved highly undesirable during the initial stages of investigations. Agents in most cases do not have adequate knowledge in accounting techniques to determine discrepancies or fraudulent entries which have been recorded. In all cases support by AAA and/or VCMA was required causing considerable delay in the investigation. It has been determined that audits must be accomplished as soon as possible, in conjunction with the agents initial investigation. Too many cases have occurred in Vietnam where personnel departed Vietnam and later were identified as suspects. If a timely audit could have been conducted many cases would have been successfully completed many months earlier.

(b) Recommendations: Provision be made in the TO&E of CID units for qualified auditors.

(c) Command action: Coordination with the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration and the AG of USARV has been accomplished resulting in the assignment of 3 enlisted personnel who are qualified accountants.

b. Intelligence: None.

c. Operations:

(1) Observation: During the reporting period, six marihuana detector dogs and handlers were utilized in conjunction with customs operations.

(a) Evaluation: From May 1971 to present, evaluation of the Marihuana Detector Dog Team (MDDT) disclosed that performance is hampered by the hot climate in the Republic of Vietnam. MDDT's can only be employed effectively for short durations, normally 30 to 40 minutes, and then a 30 minute rest period is required. Further, the health of the dogs has been impaired by ticks, TOP, and other illnesses which have not as yet been diagnosed by US Army and US Air Force Veterinarians. In September 1971, one dog died as a result of a kidney infection. These dogs do present an effective psychological deterrent in preventing the flow of marihuana into the United States.
AVPGB-CO

19 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, (8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), Period Ending 31 October 1971, Reports Control Symbol CSPOR-65 (R2)

(b) Recommendation: That use of Marihuana Detector Dog Teams be continued, despite short comings due to tropical climate.

(c) Command Action: Periodic reports are being rendered to Fort Gordon Training Center.

(2) Observation: Presently, Joint Customs Group personnel inspect parcels at twelve US Army Postal facilities on a full time basis. The parcels are inspected after mailing and entering into the postal system. Joint Customs Group personnel do not inspect parcels mailed from US Navy Fleet Post Offices or Air Force Postal Facilities. There are approximately 81 postal facilities within Vietnam. However, there are only three Air Mail Terminals (AMT) through which all out-going mail from the Republic of Vietnam is channeled. These AMT's are operated by the US Air Force at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, RVN. Currently, the percentage of out-going parcels being inspected averages about 44%.

(a) Evaluation: Additional emphasis in preventing the introduction of narcotics, dangerous drugs, and marihuana into the postal system has necessitated the use of more Joint Customs Group personnel for inspection of mail; both at local postal facilities and at outlying post offices. By permitting Joint Customer Group personnel into the Air Force operated AMF's a higher percentage of out-going parcels would be inspected, and would also reduce manpower resources required to inspect parcels at all of the postal facilities in the Republic of Vietnam.

(b) Recommendations: That Joint Customs Group personnel be authorized access to the AMT's currently operational in the Republic of Vietnam for the purpose of inspecting parcels.

(c) Command Action: Requests have been forwarded to COMUSMACV and higher command to obtain authorization for the Joint Customs Group personnel to conduct customs inspections of parcels at the above mentioned AMT's.

(3) Observation: During the reporting period, the Mark 15 Ordnance Detector Kit was introduced into the customs operations for utilization at Aerial Ports, Army Postal Facilities and Household Goods/Unaccompanied Baggage Facilities.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, (8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), Period Ending 31 October 1971, Reports
Control Symbol CSPOR-65 (R2)

(a) Evaluation: The Mark 15 proved to be generally ineffective when used at postal facilities and household goods/unaccompanied baggage processing points. Inspections in these activities required a degree of thoroughness, which is not possible with the use of the Mark 15 Detectors. The use of the Mark 15 at Aerial Ports evoked amusement rather than a psychological effect. Further, these building equipped with steel beams caused difficulties in the operation of the Mark 15.

(b) Recommendations: That the Mark 15 be restricted in use at Aerial Port Terminals to only those facilities where a frisk or pat search cannot be accomplished on a mass basis.

(c) Command Actions: Continuing efforts are being made to find a detection device more effective than the Mark 15.

d. Organization: None.

e. Training:

(1) Observation: A Crime Suppression Team (LOGISTICS) was organized to conduct investigations of Larcenies, Fraud, Diversion of Government Property from USA Depots, and irregularities of contract firms connected with the US Forces in the Republic of Vietnam.

(a) Evaluation: Assignment of investigation to Crime Suppression Team (LOGISTICS) was based on the investigators experience and training in the conduct of investigations in the logistical field. It was soon learned that the expertise desired was totally inadequate within existing assets in the Republic of Vietnam. It maybe logically assumed the same situation exists throughout the CID Command.

(b) Recommendations: That emphasis be placed on training investigators in the areas of contract fraud, procurement, and logistical depot operations to provide more expertise in these critical areas.

(c) Command Action: Officer-In-Charge of the Crime Suppression Team, in coordination with the Director of Logistics, USARV, provide the necessary training and orientation of investigators in this highly specialized area.

f. Logistics:
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, (8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation)), Period Ending 31 October 1971 Reports
Control Symbol CSPOR-65 (R2)

(1) Observation: During the reporting period, numerous homicides by gunshot were investigated. In these areas where a local national was the victim and the subject or suspect was a US Service member, difficulty in obtaining release of the projectile from the Vietnamese civilian police was experienced. To make a positive comparison of the projectile removed from the victim and the test projectile from the suspect weapon, the Firearms Examiner had to perform the examination at the civilian police headquarters or local hospital.

(a) Evaluation: Transporting the Firearms Examiner, with the comparison microscope, to the scene proved very beneficial. However, with only one microscope available to the Crime Laboratory, a calculated risk of damaging the microscope was assumed. If damage had occurred, the Firearms Section, Crime Laboratory would have been inoperable during the period required to effect repairs or obtain a replacement microscope.

(b) Recommendations: The Crime Laboratory be authorized two comparison microscopes. One should be a model that is portable, and easy to carry when examinations are required to be conducted outside the Crime Laboratory.

(c) Command Action: A requisition has been submitted for an additional comparison microscope.

  g. Communications: None.

  h. Material: None.

  i. Other: None.
ORGANIZATION: 3rd Military Police Group

19 NOV 71

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), Period Ending 31 October 1971, Reports Control Symbol CENCR-05 (R1)

To: Headquarters, 8th Military Police Brigade, APO 96491

From: Assistant Chief of Staff For Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96275

Commanding Officer, 3rd Military Police Group (CI), APO 96491

1. Comments on Significant Activities: None.

2. Comments on Lessons Learned:
   a. Page 1, para 2a: Concur.
   d. Page 4, para 2c(3): Concur. Further evaluation and testing directed toward the development of a low cost, light weight, portable detector kit for metallic devices would be a definite asset to all customs inspection efforts, worldwide.

3. Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

Paul A. Thierry
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
AVHD-DO (19 Nov 71) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, (8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), Period Ending 31 October 1971, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 8th Military Police Group and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[T. L. Childress]

CPT AGC
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL
GPOP-FD (19 Nov 71) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, HQ 8th Military Police Group (CI), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

3 MAR 1972

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

\[ \text{[Signature]} \]

\[ \text{M. MAH} \]

\[ \text{I.C., AGC} \]

\[ \text{Act AG} \]

8
Operational Report - Lessons Learned Hqs., 8th Military Police Gp, 720th Military Police Bn, Period Ending 31 October 1971 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

CO, 8th MP Gp, 720th MP Bn

19 April 1972

N/A

N/A

DAFD, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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