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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

DAAG-PAP-A (M)(9 Jun 72) DAFD-OTT-712694

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 54th General Support Group, (U)

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2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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OPERATIONAL REPORT/LESSONS LEARNED OF 54TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP
FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report/Lessons Learned of 54th General Support Group
for Period Ending (31 October 1971) RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, ATTN:
AVCA 6O-P, APO San Francisco 96512

Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHD-D0
APO San Francisco 96555

Commander-in-Chief, United States Army-Pacific, ATTN: CHP-DT,
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, DC

1. (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES.

a. MISSIONS:

(1) Provide command and control of all assigned combat service support
units to include two (2) Logistical Support Activities and two (2) Logis-
tical Activities as indicated at enclosure 1.

(2) Provide combat service support to non-divisional units in II
South and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF).

(3) Insure the security and defense of assigned units in accordance
with the Sector and/or Installation Defense Plan.

(4) Perform other support missions as directed by US Army Support
Command, Cam Ranh Bay.

b. THE 54TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP HAS CONTROL OF COMBAT SERVICE UNITS
AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES WHICH PERFORM THE FOLLOWING MISSIONS.

(1) 1ST SUPPLY & SERVICE BATTALION.

(a) Provides for the receipt, storage, and issue of FOL products
in Southern Military Region II.

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(b) Provides for local distribution of bulk POL in Cam Ranh Bay.

(c) Operation of the Class I activity to include wholesale and retail operations.

(d) Operation of the following facilities in the Cam Ranh Bay area.

   1. Class I Supply Point (ration breakdown facility).
   2. Perishable and non-perishable Class I depot and wholesale storage facilities.
   3. Commissary
   4. Field Laundry
   5. Central Issue Facility (CIF)
   6. Clothing and Equipment Exchange Facility (CEEP)
   7. Self Service Supply Center (SSSC)
   8. Graves Registration
   9. Bulk petroleum facilities

(2) 191st Ordnance Battalion

(a) Provides ammunition direct support for Military Region II South and, ammunition general support for all of Military Region II.

(b) Provides resupply of ammunition for the two (2) Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) divisions in Military Region II.

(c) Manages and controls all Class V stocks within US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay.

(d) Assists the US Navy in the receipt, storage and issue of ammunition as required.

(e) Provides personnel and equipment as required in support of Class V receipts, storage, and issue at Logistical Support Activities (LSA's) throughout Military Region II.

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(f) Operation of the following activities:

1. Ammunition renovation line
2. Brass and inert components yard.
3. Class V field return yard.
4. Civilian (Local National) management office.

5. Box and Pallet Facility responsible for the fabrication of boxes, crates and pallets required for shipment of ammunition, repair parts, and other materials from all Cam Ranh Bay Installation units.

(3) 69th Maintenance Battalion.

(a) Provides direct support maintenance and general support maintenance on communications equipment.

(b) Provides general support automotive maintenance.

(c) Provides direct support maintenance services for non-divisional units in Military Region II South.

(d) Operates a Collection and Classification Activity for the receipt, inspection segregation, disassembly, preservation, and disposition of serviceable and unserviceable Class VII, limited Class II and IV material, and similar foreign material (except items peculiar to cryptographic material, missile systems, aircraft, airdrop equipment, drones and medical material).

(e) Operation of a cannibalization point which allows customer units to obtain serviceable repair parts from end item assets on hand.

(f) Provides for the in-processing and furnishing turn-in credit for all Table of Organization and Equipment, Table of Allowances for post camp and station property, and excess supplies and equipment in the HR II South area. This same facility processes Keystone Units that are inactivating, redeploying or standing down.

(4) Logistical Support Activities provide logistical supply support maintenance and service support to US Army combat forces and other such US and Free World Military Assistance Forces within their zones of responsibility.

o. Activities of ISA's during the reporting period.
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(1) Don Doung (Duo Trong) Logistical Activity

(a) During May through August 1971, the Duo Trong Liaison activity continued to provide Class I and III, and limited II and IV support to 2,000 US Engineers, Signal Corps troops and a MACV Advisory Team. Laundry service and direct support maintenance by contact teams were also active missions. Weekly resupply convoys and daily ration flights to the Dalat-Lien Kang Airfield at Duo Trong provided adequate resupply in support of missions.

(b) Major activity during this period was continuous improvement of assigned areas. Buildings constructed by assigned personnel included a dayroom, lounge, snack bar, Class III office, and latrines. Extensive improvements were made in the defensive perimeter to include re-wiring floodlights, addition of gun positions with 360 degree sectors of fire, laying mines, and reinforcing berms.

(c) On 30 August 1971, the Duo Trong activity initiated a relocation to Don Doung which was completed on 2 September 1971 without interruption of support and service missions. This movement was made due to drawdown and relocation of engineer elements at Duo Trong and transfer of the support mission for engineer units at Bao Loo to the Saigon Support Command.

(d) During September and October 1971, the Don Doung Liaison activity provided Class I support and laundry service to an average of 600 Engineer and Signal Corps troops, and made improvements in living and working areas. The former Class III mission was assumed by the Shell Oil Company under contract. Class IV was provided by direct request from customers to Cam Ranh Bay. Class II (paper products) and bottled gas (propane) were issued by the Class I activity. The former maintenance mission was closed out and assumed by customer parent units.

(e) The period May through October 1971 saw the reduction in authorized strength of this activity from thirty-two (32) in May to fifteen (15) in September and to nine (9) in October. Supported units continue to reduce number of personnel which totalled 500 on 31 October 1971.

(2) Phan Rang Logistical Support Activity

(a) In May, the Class I activity supported six mess halls. With the reduction of forces in that area four mess halls closed leaving two operated by the ROKA. Support of Air Force was transferred to Cam Ranh Bay.
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(b) On 1 September 1971 the Class II and IV yards which provided industrial gases, construction material and retrograde were phased out and the remaining customers were referred to Cam Ranh Bay for support.

(c) The Class III supply point issued mogas, diesel, and package products. The pipeline from the outport to the Tank Farm was operated to supply Phan Rang Air Force Base with jet fuel. During May 4,507,000 gallons of jet fuel were issued. When the Air Force began standing down, the consumption of fuel dropped to such low level that in September the pipeline was changed to diesel fuel and in October was removed.

(d) The DSU maintenance which supported US Army forces in that area was eliminated 15 September 1971 leaving the LSA with only an organizational motor pool.

(3) Logistical Support Activity-Nha Trang

(a) In July 1971 Nha Trang LSA was assigned the mission of supplying POL products to ROKA forces in the Nha Trang and Minh Hoa areas. This eliminated their need to send convoys to Cam Ranh Bay for re-supply of POL.

1 Concept of support entails a daily convoy to the LSA with empty drums. The drums are filled while on the vehicle; thus eliminating exchange of empty for full drums.

2 This mission increased the LSA workload from 50 to 6700 drums per month.

(b) In June 1971, the LSA consolidated its organizational and third echelon maintenance activities. The consolidation itself did not reduce personnel requirements however it did improve the quality of work performance. With the withdrawal of forces Tech Supply Storage has dropped from 950 to 660 line items.

(c) Class I excesses are being identified and retrograded to Cam Ranh Bay. Current concept of operation envisions a reduced stocking level to seven days. During the months of September and October a total of $185,000 of excess Class I was retrograded to Cam Ranh Bay.

(d) In June 1971, Nha Trang LSA assumed the sole mission for baking all bread required for AR II South. This was brought about as a
result of the Cam Ranh Bay bakery closing for operational problems. Bread distribution is made for Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay using refrigeration vans generated as a result of daily Class I resupply convoys from Cam Ranh Bay to Nha Trang.

(e) During the reporting period Self Service Supply Center (SSSC) experienced a reduction of 9 customers decreasing the total to forty-one (41) supported at this time. Monthly sales have decreased from $15,000 to $11,000 during the reporting period.

1. A study was made to determine the feasibility of closing the store and thereby requiring customers to buy from the parent SSSC at CRB. As a result of the study, a decision was made to allow the SSSC Annex at Nha Trang to remain open for an indefinite period of time. The annex provides more responsive support to customer units, and to close the store would force each customer unit to dispatch a vehicle weekly to Cam Ranh Bay.

2. The Nha Trang store stocks only demand supported items. During this reporting period the stockage list has decreased from 610 to 154 line items.

(4) Logistical Support Activity - Ban Me Thout (LSA BMT)

(a) In mid August, LSA BMT started to phase down its activities. Graves Registration and Class II & IV were phased out in mid September. Maintenance Support ended towards the beginning of October. Class I and the laundry began to move from Camp Coryell to the MACV compound during the month of October. The Class III yard still remains at Camp Coryell and is planned to be turned over to ARVN in the near future. Rations will be delivered directly from Cam Ranh Bay to the MACV Compound where LSA personnel will supervise the operation.

(b) LSA personnel built a laundry shed at the MACV compound along with putting up a chain link fence to protect the Class I yard. All excess equipment was shipped back to CRB.

(c) LSA BMT went from a high of 68 troops in July to a current strength of 12 EM plus one officer.

(d) After phasdown is complete, only 8 personnel from the 54th Group will still be assigned to BMT. The Class III yard will have the majority of the personnel.
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(a) The RTT was sent back to CSB in mid November due to the lack of message traffic. All reports now are either telephoned, mailed or hand carried to Cam Ranh Bay.

d. Major activities of subordinate battalions during the reporting period.

(1) 191st Ordnance Battalion

(a) Ammunition Storage Area "Charlie" was closed during the month of August and its stocks of 13,397.4 short tons of ammunition were moved to Ammunition Storage Area "Alpha".

(b) On 30 June 1971, the unit designation of the 46th Ordnance Company was changed to "D" Company, 17th Infantry. This was accomplished by approval of Department of the Army of the Security Guard ITOE submitted to Headquarters, USARV during the last reporting period. "D" Company, 17th Infantry provides for the security of Ammunition Storage Area "A" and manned four guard positions along the South China Sea Beach in support of Ground Defense Plans for this installation.

(c) Since the closing of Ammunition Storage Area "Charlie" the physical security of Ammunition Storage Area "Alpha" has been greatly increased.

1. Security forces were increased from fifteen (15) to forty-nine (49) sentries of the guard, and two (2) vehicular mounted roving patrols were added.

2. Seven (7) new bunkers have been constructed, seven (7) walking posts activated along the perimeter wire, and one manned fighting position was installed to bolster guard forces in the area.

3. Fifteen (15) additional Ground Sensors, were retrieved from ASA "Charlie", were installed around the perimeter wire bringing the total number of sensors installed to thirty-five (35).

4. Five hundred trip flares were installed around the area, with installation continuing of four hundred more.

5. Twenty (20) new fighting positions were installed around the perimeter.
6 Eight (8) sentry dog walking patrols were added as an additional security measure.

7 A total of one hundred eighteen (118) mercury vapor glare projection lights were installed around the perimeter.

8 Fifty-nine hundred (5,900) meters of new concertina wire was installed around the perimeter.

(2) 1st Supply and Service Battalion (Provisional)

(a) Effective 15 May 1971 the Subsistence Division, US Army Depot - Cam Ranh Bay, was taken over by the 54th General Support Group and became the Subsistence Branch, 1st Supply & Service Battalion. The Subsistence Branch has continued to requisition, receive, store and issue Class I supplies in support of all US and third country forces in Military Region II South. Since assuming the Class I mission the Subsistence Branch has been engaged in the relocation of the Class I stock from four (4) larger warehouses into thirteen (13) smaller warehouses. As of 31 October 1971, approximately 60% of the move had been completed.

(b) On 23 May 1971 Tank Farm I of the POL Complex was the object of a well planned sapper attack. Reconnaissance patrol findings indicated a two pronged attack. One against Tank Farm I and the second against Tank Farm III. The successful attack against Tank Farm I netted a total loss of seven full tanks (1,834,000 gal) destroyed. Security measures have been greatly increased since the attack to include the following:

1 Lighting of the perimeter has been doubled.

2 Four sentry dog teams have been added to the security forces.

3 A triple strand, lighted concertina fence has been constructed between Tank Farm I and Tank Farm II.

4 One thousand trip flares have been installed around perimeters of all three (3) tank farms.

(c) On 1 October 1971 the 1st Supply & Service Battalion assumed the mission of operating the Cam Ranh Bay consolidated Material Handling Equipment (MHE) Pool following the expiration of the Wmell Corporation contract. The reconstituted pool consists of 41 items of MHE with an additional 12 items recently approved. In addition to filling commitments in support
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of the Subsistence Branch, Self Service Supply Center, Clothing and Equipment Exchange Facility, Central Issue Facility, and Packaged Petroleum Yard of the 1st Supply & Service Battalion, support was also provided to activities of 124th Transportation Command, elements of 54th General Support Group, Cam Ranh Bay Milk Plant, and the Army Post Office. Organizational maintenance support is provided for 23 items of MEU, organic to the 32d Medical Depot.

(d) On 10 October 1971 the 109th Air Delivery Quartermaster Company, formally under the command of US Army Depot, Cam Rahn Bay, was assigned to the 1st Supply & Service Battalion. Since that date the 109th QM Co has continued with its aerial delivery mission in support of US Army and allied forces engaged in combat. The major portion of materials rigged for air drop consists of ammunition, ration and medical supplies.

(3) 69th Maintenance Battalion

(a) On 16 May 1971, the Unserviceable Property Division of Cam Rahn Bay Army Depot was assigned to the battalion and combined with the Keystone processing facility to form the Collection and Classification Activity, 69th Maintenance Battalion.

(b) Keystone Oriole Alpha (Increment 7) was completed on 30 June 1971. Twenty-two units were processed through the Keystone processing facilities.

(c) Keystone Oriole Bravo (Increment 8) was initiated on 1 July 1971 and completed on 12 September 1971. Twenty (20) units were processed during this time period.

(d) Keystone Oriole Charlie (Increment 9) was initiated on 1 September 1971 and is still in progress.

(e) During the month of June 1971 a realignment of Supply Support in MR II resulted in the closing of Cam Rahn Bay Army Depot. On 15 September 1971, 69th Maintenance Battalion assumed responsibility for the physical security and defense of the Depot Complex. In executing this responsibility the following measures were taken.

1. Establishment of a thirty (30) man security guard platoon.
2. Six (6) fighting bunkers and comex observation tower were constructed and plans made for additional posts.
3. Approximately 1,100 linear meters of concertine wire was implanted around the perimeter.
2. (c) Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Shortages of personnel.

(a) Observation: A critical shortage of personnel and MOS qualified personnel exists throughout the Group.

(b) Evaluation: Periodic shortages in personnel by MOS prevent efficient and timely completion of mission tasks, and cause units to work at reduced operational levels further hampering mission capabilities. All too often grade and MOS structure within the MOS was unbalanced. These irregularities when coupled with details, guard, leave/R&R, and high personnel turnover, drain units of manpower resources which occasionally results in operational effectiveness of less than 50% capacity. Insufficient MOS qualified personnel creates a situation which requires continuous retraining further hampering mission completion. Lack of qualified personnel places a greater workload on experienced soldiers who must already bear the responsibility for mission completion and high standards of output performance. Grade imbalances within an MOS are deleterious to success of the mission whenever they exist. Shortages in senior enlisted personnel deprives the commander of that essential experience, knowledge, and proficiency which he needs to train unqualified personnel and complete the mission. The imbalance where MOS are overstrength in the NCO grade forces a highly skilled professional to be excess to the mission or be assigned outside his career field. Imbalances hamper morale through their effect on the morale of the soldiers forced to work in promotion "frozen" units and those forced to work outside their MOS field.

(c) Recommendation: That greater consideration be given to assigning enlisted personnel in their MOS and that requisitioning for personnel be done 90 days in advance to reflect more accurately mission requirements instead of 180 days in advance. In-country reassigned from inactivated units should not be placed into units when they will cause serious grade or MOS imbalances. Manpower authorizations should be more flexible to allow for rapid changing mission requirements. Units who have requested TDA/TOE changes in personnel must have immediate approval of their authorizations so that they may legitimately draw against and assign personnel to these mission essential positions.
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(d) COMMAND ACTION: Accurate reporting of personnel overages and shortages by Group has enhanced the requisitioning cycle. Units planning to drawdown within the command have been screened for skilled replacements. Increased emphasis on the proper assignment and utilization of personnel has been directed. Reshuffling of excess personnel has been made to attempt to balance units if not by skill, then by grade and overall numerical authorizations.

(2) Drug Abuse:

(a) OBSERVATION: Relatively large numbers of personnel in 54th General Support Group have been detected or suspected of using drugs.

(b) EVALUATION: Soldiers have turned to the use of narcotics for a variety of reasons, of which, ease of accessibility and strongly entrenched "pushers" are paramount. Abuse of drugs results in morale problems, lowering of mission performance, and raises the incidence of crime. Drug related crimes deny the soldier security of his personal property and safety as drug users go to any extremes to support their costly habits. Barracks thievery has become common place and other crimes create hostilities between the non-user and the addict. Drug users become lethargic and incapable of performing even the most simple tasks, and therefore are not given any duties in which they would have to maintain high standards. Non-users are forced to pull more than their share of the mission requirements while the drug user does very little, if anything, to help the mission. The hands of the commander are tied from all angles as he cannot effectively deal with drug users unless he can get legally airtight charges against the user or pusher, or unless through urinalysis a positive, documented reading shows the soldier to be a user. Trials by courtmartial are severely back logged due to excessive drug related crimes and offenses to such an extent that 60 to 90 days pass from the commission of an offense to the trial with another 20 to 30 days before the completed trial record is available. Urinalysis testing is difficult to obtain for the initial test. However, once the user has been identified through urinalysis the procedures for detoxification and rehabilitation are now clear. Commanders cannot be expected to maintain discipline, security and morale when they do not have the immediate freedom to remove suspected users from their units, have them tested, and start them on a viable rehabilitation program.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That unit commanders be given more opportunities to have suspected users tested by urinalysis. All that should be required is the written requests of the commander. This will require an upgrading in the Medcom staffs and facilities so as to be responsive to the needs
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of the commanders. Greater clarification on admissibility of evidence regarding searches must be obtained to enable the Commander to give immediate strong punishment of personnel apprehended for possession of drugs.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Unannounced billet inspections are conducted frequently in an attempt to discover drugs, contraband and users/pushers. Personnel are subject to unannounced unit-wide urine tests and also must take urine tests prior to departing Vietnam on R&R, leave, PCS, FSS, or TDY. Commanders are constantly alert for evidence of drugs or users and of ways to prevent or detect drug use. Orientations of all incoming personnel are conducted and unit drug counselors assist soldiers with problems or drug rehabilitation.

(3) Shortage of school trained POL personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: There exists an acute shortage of school trained POL personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: During the last reporting period there has been a diminishing supply of qualified personnel (MDS 76W) to operate the POL storage and shipping facilities. This shortage of trained and experienced POL personnel contributed in some degree to instances of contaminated fuel and other pumping mishaps during critical ship to shore operations. Untrained personnel are continuously being retrained to:

1. Perform storage and handling of POL products, operate open storage facilities, and perform ship to shore pumping operations.


3. Receive and issue POL products.

4. Assist in the quality control for POL products

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That shortages of school trained personnel be filled promptly.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Requests are continuing to be submitted to fill vacancies.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Increased security requirements:

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(a) OBSERVATION: The drawdown of US Forces in RVN particularly in the vicinity of Cam Ranh Bay has brought about bolder actions by the enemy. This is indicated by the recent sapper attacks against the Denk Farm complex on 23 May 1971, and the Air Force Ammunition Storage Area on 25 August 1971. There continues to be numerous reports from reliable sources of Viet Cong elements in close proximity of Cam Ranh Bay.

(b) EVALUATION: The withdrawal of US Forces is seriously impairing the security of remaining forces in RVN. As more troops withdraw, security is certain to become an even greater consideration.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units be augmented with an additional security force to provide maximum security and safety of personnel, installation property and equipment.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Security of mission essential areas and cantonment areas are being vigorously upgraded to include:

1. Revetment of billets.
2. Construction of personnel bunkers.
3. Increases in guard personnel.
4. Inclosure of cantonment area by a perimeter barrier to include construction of fighting bunkers, towers, triple strand concertina wire and tanglefoot.
5. Increased use of ground sensors.
6. Increased use of night observation devices.
7. Vast land clearing projects around perimeters.
8. Daily visual reconnaissance made of likely or suspected areas of enemy activity on the mainland by Support Command.

(2) Continual review of security/defense plans.

(a) OBSERVATION: As units are continuing to stand down and security decreases, security/defense plans must be revised to keep pace with the changing situation and loss of security.
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(b) EVALUATION: The need for increased security requirements as units and personnel leave RVN presents ever increasing problems for commanders at all echelons. These problems must be evaluated and adequate procedures taken to provide protection for remaining forces. Procedures must be outlined in unit security/defense plans.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units continually review and update security plans.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The Group Defense Plan is being revised at this time. Unit plans are updated as the security requirements change.

1. Operations:

(1) Procedures for subsistence storage, LSA Nha Trang.

(a) OBSERVATION: Subsistence items were stored against refer walls and close to refrigeration ducts.

(b) EVALUATION: Procedures for subsistence storage were insufficient to preserve perishable items at proper temperatures for extended periods of time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Loading plans and storage procedures should be evaluated to insure that air flow, aisle space, stock rotation, etc., are satisfactory.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Requirements have been established to check temperature readings on all refrigeration units on a scheduled basis. New thermometers have been installed on each refrigerator where by a more accurate temperature can be noted without opening the boxes. Communications between support, Class I personnel and supervisors has been emphasized.

(2) Problems encountered in transferring equipment to ARVN.

(a) OBSERVATION: Condition of equipment continues to present problems in transfer to ARVN.

(b) EVALUATION: Before equipment is transferred to ARVN it must have a Technical Inspection (TI) performed and not fall below SCRAM I (serviceable with minor repair). ARVN is reluctant to accept equipment not in "like new" condition and is not required to accept equipment falling below the SCRAM I level.
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(o) RECOMMENDATION: That ARVN be required to adopt more realistic and practical acceptance standards.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Maintenance is continuing to repair equipment to bring it up to standards of acceptance by ARVN.

(3) Relocation of Logistical Support Activities.

(a) OBSERVATION: Numerous problems were encountered during the relocation of the LSA Duc Trong to Don Doung.

(b) EVALUATION: The relocation of the LSA brought about the following:

1 Communication between Group and the LSA Commander was not maintained at all times causing numerous difficulties in coordination to arise.

2 Once the move had been completed it was discovered that PA&ES had not connected power between the generators and refrigeration units. The unit was able to establish temporary wiring until qualified electricians could install permanent power lines.

3 The transportation unit stayed at Don Doung since it did not feel the security at Duc Trong was adequate. The LSA had to stay at Duc Trong until the move was completed. Since the transportation unit and LSA personnel were staying at different locations every night, only one transfer operation could be accomplished per day.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That sufficient coordination be initiated between the supporting units and the supported unit to be relocated before movement plans have begun. Communication must be maintained at all times until relocation is completed.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Closer coordination have been effected with LSA's.

(4) Assumption of responsibility for the Alternate Joint Defense Operations Center (Alt JDOC).

(a) OBSERVATION: When the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay closed, 54th Group assumed responsibility for the Alt JDOC.
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(b) EVALUATION: When the Alt JDOC was moved to 54th Group Headquarters a secure operations center had to be fabricated as there were no facilities for such an operation. It was decided to put the Alt JDOC above ground in an office located in Security, Plans and Operations was petitioned for this purpose. It was necessary to completely rebuild the office in order to meet stringent requirements for a secure operations center. This included; construction of map cases, radio mounts telephone switchboards, and provisions for air-conditioning. Appropriate antennas had to be erected and the operations center secured. Eight foot revetments were constructed around the operations center to provide protection against rocket and mortar attack. Operating procedures were established for the Alt JDOC and operators were trained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: NONE

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Emphasis is continuing to be placed on the mission and importance of the Alt JDOC Operations Center to insure security and operational efficiency.

(5) Assumption of Material Handling Equipment (MHE) Pool.

(a) OBSERVATION: The 1st Supply & Service Battalion was given the requirement of assumption of the MHE mission with only a five day notification. In this five day period the quantity of MHE items required had to be determined; the number of personnel needed by grade, specialty, etc; 91 Local National Civilians had to be hired, and equipment, supplies, and property, inventoried and signed for.

(b) EVALUATION: Upon assumption of a mission of such magnitude more time must be allowed for planning, organisation and execution. The assumption of such a mission from a private contractor is considerably more difficult than from other military activities. In this case, the majority of the equipment is commercial and normally is not supported by the existing DSU. The private contractors had supplied the bulk of repair parts to include DX items and upon termination of the contract the contractor withdrew this support. The military field maintenance activity was not prepared to provide the required DX support and the authorised Stockage Level (ASL) of the DSU was not compatible to the commercial items. No past demand history was available; thus, unrealistic deadline rates were imminent.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When assuming such a mission from a private contractor, emphasis must be placed on obtaining immediate repair parts support from the assuming unit's support activities. DX items as well as past demands provide immediate and positive support.
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(d) COMMAND ACTION: As above.

d. Organization: None

e. Training:

(1) OBSERVATION: Due to the high turnover, personnel are often assigned that do not have a MOS corresponding to their assigned duty.

(2) EVALUATION: Due to the rapid rate of turnover of personnel and replacements that are not MOS oriented, an intensified training program and increase in command supervision is necessary to accomplish the mission in a satisfactory manner. Personnel not adequately trained impair the capability of a unit to perform its assigned mission.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That military units (down to the lowest level) be made aware of the need for intensified training and cross training of all personnel.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: Greater emphasis is being placed on training and cross-training. Inspection of training classes are conducted on a frequent basis.

f. Logistics:

(1) OBSERVATION: Large amounts of ammunition continue to be found in equipment being processed by units for turn-in through the keystone activity.

(2) EVALUATION: Equipment is inspected four times before turn-in: once by the arriving unit, once by the Keystone Inspection and Assistance Team, once before washing and once after washing.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That Keystone units perform complete and accurate inspections before turn-in of equipment.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: Emphasis is continually being placed on proper inspection techniques; by keystone activity before clearing the records of units being stood down.

g. Communications:

(1) Lack of communications during LSA relocation.

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OPERATIONAL REPORT/LESSONS LEARNED OF 54TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP
FOR PERIOD ENDING (31 OCTOBER 1971) GCS C5FOR-63 (R3)

(a) OBSERVATION: During the move from Duo Trong to Don Doung no provisions were made for communications with the RTT at Duo Trong which was being moved.

(b) EVALUATION: Communications is an essential asset in RVN and should never be lost between parent and subordinate units. In this instance no advance communication requirements were planned for and when the RTT was displaced to Don Doung it was found to be non-operational, thus limiting communication to only a telephone for a period of three days. An alternate RTT should have been emplaced at Don Doung until the relocation was completed and permanent communications established.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That alternate communications be established before the actual movement of a unit or LSA. If an alternate means is not available communications should be continued at either the original site or new location, depending where the personnel are located, until the movement is complete.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: As above.

(2) Establishment of company level radio nets.

(a) OBSERVATION: Companies should have a radio net for internal operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Several units, particularly "D" Company 17th Infantry, are involved in security operations in which a large amount of radio traffic is generated. Normal battalion radio traffic is interrupted and security operations are hampered by the use of only one net for all traffic.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That each company size unit have a command (tactical) and administrative (logistics) net.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Units are using battalion nets to maximum extent possible in order to meet their own requirements. Request for additional nets have been forwarded to higher headquarters.

h. Material

(1) Requirement for individual unit Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA).

(a) OBSERVATION: Need for table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) for LSA's.
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(b) EVALUATION: LSA's must hand receipt all of it property from units which provide support for it. Because of this system of property accounting LSA's have a conglomeration of hand receipts which are nearly impossible to reconcile. Shortages and overages occur frequently at LSA's, reasons stemming primarily from a lack of a TDA.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That TDA's be established for LSA's.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Units are continuing to monitor property issues: LSA's to provide for uniform allowances. Due to long range planning factors, TDA's will not be submitted at this time.

(2) Accountability of property.

(a) OBSERVATION: LSA's are collecting large amounts of excess property through normal day to day activities.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the large amounts of excess property, LSA Commander's are experiencing difficulties in disposing of excess as the phase down gains momentum.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commander's continually review property assets for excess non-mission essential material. All excess should be turned-in as it develops to eliminate unnecessary storage requirements and for ease of accountability.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Frequent staff visits are made to LSA's to assist commander's in property disposal and in expediting receipt of disposition instructions.

(3) Shortage of Material Handling Equipment (MHE)

(a) OBSERVATION: Serious difficulties in performing mission requirements have been experienced due to shortages of MHE.

(b) EVALUATION:

High deadline rates are the principle cause for lack of equipment. Units seldom have as much as 50% of it's MHE in operational condition at any one time. Once equipment is deadlined and sent to DSU for repairs it is usually in maintenance for long periods of time. This excessive downtime causes remaining equipment on hand to be subjected to long periods of use. MHE goes down for a variety of reasons, however a major contributing factor is operation by untrained drivers. The hot, sandy conditions which
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exists at Cam Ranh Bay is another important factor causing equipment to break down. All of the MHE in the group is old and cannot endure the long hours of use demanded of it.

2. It should be recognized that MHE becomes more critical in retrograde operations. When A3A "Charlie" was closed and when the Class I warehouses were relocated, MHE was used continuously in the re-warehousing operations. The retrograde workload resulting from keystone activities also places great demands on MHE.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That school-trained MHE operators be provided to operate the heavy equipment, and that adequate DSU support and stockage of repair parts be provided to decrease down time of equipment. Depot rebuilt MHE should be made available to using units through direct exchange facilities or normal supply channels.

(d) CORRELATION ACTION: A 40 hour program of instruction was instituted for MHE operators to train them in operation of heavy equipment and proper maintenance procedures. Intensive programs of first echelon maintenance were established, whereby equipment was taken out of operation to perform periodic inspections and maintenance. Continuous followup coordination was made with the contractor DSU. In spite of these actions, however, the problem persists.

1. Other: None

FRED C. SHEFFER
Colonel, 54M
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL
AVCA GO-P (1 Dec 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 54th General Support Group, Cam Ranh Bay, for the Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCE CBFCR-65 (R3)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, CAM RANH BAY, APO 96312

31 DEC 1971

TO: Commanding General, UE Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report—Lessons Learned submitted by the 54th General Support Group, Cam Ranh Bay for the period 1 May – 31 October 1971 is forwarded.

2. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned from the 54th General Support Group, Cam Ranh Bay and concurs, with the following comments:

a. Reference 2a (1) Shortages of Personnel.

Assignment of newly arrived personnel and reassignment of personnel from standdown units is controlled, for the entire RVN, by Hq, USARV, SUPCOM-CRB further assigns personnel to major subordinate commands on the basis of critical MOS requirements. Continuing critical MOS shortages are reported to Hqgs, USARV requesting that Headquarters' immediate assistance in supplying the required MOSs.

In addition, the personnel and MOS status within the USASUPCOM-CRB is periodically evaluated by the 518th PSC to determine if personnel/MOS problems can be solved or relieved from command's assets.

b. Reference para 2a(3) Shortage of School Trained POL Personnel.

Personnel with the 76W MOS are and have been on personnel requisitions to USARV and will be furnished to the 54th GS Gp upon assignment of USASUPCOM-CRB.

c. Reference 2b(1) Increased Security Requirements.

The augmentation of units with additional Security Forces is not feasible due to the limited command assets.
AVCA GO–P (1 Dec 71) 1st Inf
SUBJECT: Operational Report–Lessons Learnt of the 84th
General Support Group, Cam Ranh Bay, for the Period
Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CAVCOM 22 (R3)

An Infantry Battalion under the operational control of the
Commanding General, SUPCOM–CBS, is being employed in a dynamic
defense role which simultaneously reduces the enemy threat and
allows flexibility to meet the changing conditions in the Cam
Ranh Bay area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
JOHN H. ANDERSON
ILT AGC
ASST AG

CF: Asst Chief of Staff for
Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, DC 20310
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report/Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 5th General Support Group and submits the following comments:

1. Reference item concerning "Shortages of Personnel", paragraph 2a(1), page 10. Optimum distribution of personnel by grade and MOS is a highly desirable goal. This headquarters makes every effort to allocate to all major commands their fair share of available assets. Imbalances are unavoidable during this period of reduction in force in RVN.

2. Reference item concerning "Drug Abuse", paragraph 2a(2), page 11. Nonconcur with recommendation. Periodic unit urinalysis is conducted on an unannounced basis. This program must be strictly controlled to preclude it becoming a form of harassment. Each month major subordinate commands submit, in priority sequence, the units they desire tested during the next month. Unit commanders desiring tests more frequently, may submit requests to their next higher commander. Major subordinate command requests are honored in sequence listed. MEDCOM has an extensive capability for support of the treatment aspects of the program. An upgrading of MEDCOM staffs and facilities is not considered necessary to be responsive to the foreseeable needs of the program. A Search and Seizure Handbook has been prepared by the Staff Judge Advocate to assist in clarification of the admissibility of evidence regarding search and seizure.

3. Reference item concerning "Shortage of school trained POL personnel", paragraph 2a(3), page 12. All support commands are now receiving a higher priority in support MOS's, such as 76W. A proportionate share of available assets will be allocated to SUPCOM CRB. The level of training and experience of these personnel is an Army-wide problem not subject to control by this headquarters. Commanders must initiate training programs to insure assigned EM can accomplish the mission.

4. Reference item concerning "Establishment of company level radio nets", paragraph 2g(2), page 18: Nonconcur. The recommended internal radio nets are not required by all TOAE companies. Therefore, a doctrinal change in the company communication concept is not recommended. In addition, higher
AVHDO-DO (19 Nov 71) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report/Lessons Learned of 54th General Support Group for Period Ending (31 October 1971) RCS CRFOR-65 (R3)

commands have contingency frequencies which may be allocated to subordinate units as operations dictate. The tactical FM frequency spectrum is saturated and the creation of additional FM nets would further compound an already chaotic problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

D. A. Kiliman
Captain, AGO
Asst AG

Cy thru:

USASUPCOM-CRB
54th GS Op
GPOP-FD (19 Nov 71) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 54th General Support Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 MAR 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. Man
1LT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned Hqs., 54th General Support Group, Period Ending 31 Oct 71 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operation.

DC, 54th General Support Group.

15 May 72

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